Office of Inspector General

February 24, 2013

MEMORANDUM

TO: USAID/Egypt Mission Director, Mary Ott

FROM: Regional Inspector General, Catherine M. Trujillo /s/

SUBJECT: Audit of USAID/Egypt's Education Support Program (Report No. 6-263-13-008-P)

This memorandum transmits our final report on the subject audit. We have considered carefully your comments on the draft report and have included them, without attachments, in Appendix II.

The report includes three recommendations to assist the mission in improving its management and oversight of USAID/Egypt's Education Support Program. Based on management's comments on the draft report and other information provided, we acknowledge that the mission made management decisions on all three recommendations and completed final action on Recommendation 3.

Please provide the Office of Audit Performance and Compliance Division with the necessary documentation to achieve final action on Recommendations 1 and 2. Recommendation 3 is closed upon the issuance of this report.

Thank you for the cooperation and courtesy extended to the audit team during this audit.
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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations appear in this report:

ADS Automated Directives System
AIR American Institutes for Research
AOR agreement officer’s representative
CDIST Central Directorate for In-Service Training
FY fiscal year
PAT Professional Academy for Teachers
RIG Regional Inspector General
TraiNet Training Results and Information Network
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
SUMMARY OF RESULTS

USAID has supported educational programs in Egypt for more than 35 years, committing nearly $1.3 billion to support school access, gender equity, community participation in schools, and professional development for teachers and educational leaders. During that time, Egypt has made significant strides in education, with 98 percent of children enrolled in primary school in 2010, compared with just 69.5 percent in 1970.

According to USAID/Egypt officials, following the January 2011 revolution, the mission and the Egyptian Ministry of Education were concerned that these gains were in jeopardy. To address this concern, USAID/Egypt awarded a cooperative agreement worth about $18.6 million to American Institutes for Research (AIR) in September 2011 to implement the Education Support Program. Initially the program was to run for 30 months, ending in March 2013, but in October 2012, it was extended to September 2014.

The program was designed to strengthen local education systems to support professional development and community involvement in educational decision-making and quality improvement. It built on USAID/Egypt’s Education Reform Program, an $80 million, 6-year basic education program that ended in 2010. The support program relied primarily on a cascading process of hiring primary education specialists to train teachers.

The support program had three primary objectives:

- **Strengthening social work departments and boards of trustees**: This objective was designed to improve the capacity of district-level social work departments and school boards of trustees to enhance community participation.¹

- **Supporting the professional development of newly hired assistant teachers and social workers**: This objective was designed to support assistant teachers and social workers hired immediately after the revolution.

- **Strengthening district-level instructional leadership**: This objective was twofold. First, it was designed to support governorate- and district-level teacher professional development efforts. Second, it was designed to enhance the Ministry of Education’s capacity to plan for contingencies that could affect schools, including political and social disruptions and natural disasters.

As of the end of September 2012, USAID/Egypt had obligated $8.1 million and disbursed $3.5 million for program activities.

The Regional Inspector General/Cairo (RIG/Cairo) conducted this audit as part of its fiscal year (FY) 2013 audit plan to determine whether USAID/Egypt’s Education Support Program made progress toward achieving its objectives to strengthen local education systems to support professional development and community involvement in educational decision-making and quality improvement.

¹ Boards of trustees are elected school governance structures that include parents and community members. They are supported by social workers who are part of the district-level social work departments, as well as social workers assigned to the board’s schools.
As of September 2012—the end of the program’s first year—AIR had met or exceeded the majority of the first year’s indicator targets (included in Appendix III). For example, more than 33,000 newly hired assistant teachers and social workers were trained in core teaching skills. Similarly, employees in more than 250 district-level social work departments were trained, and people in these departments had, in turn, trained members of more than 11,000 school boards of trustees.

Information obtained during site visits suggests that the training was well received; in particular, assistant teachers said they were helpful. Because the program worked closely with the Ministry of Education’s Professional Academy for Teachers (PAT) to certify more than 40 training programs, the ministry can use them to train teachers in the future.

Despite these successes, the overall impact on school board capacity and teacher performance is unclear. The mission and AIR had no mechanisms in place to determine whether the training efforts had any impact (page 4). Therefore, it is difficult to measure the extent to which the program is contributing to its overarching goal of strengthening educational systems to support local capacity and professional development.

As the program starts its second year, the audit identified the following problems.

- The program’s designers did not include two important elements for sustainability (page 5). They did not address how to work with teachers and administrators at the local level who resisted the training’s offerings, and they did not include coordination with a relevant office within the Ministry of Education.

- Two program activities were behind schedule (page 7). Program activities related to both crisis management training and gender strategy were behind schedule.

- AIR did not comply with requirements to record participant training in the Agency’s Training Results and Information Network (TraiNet) (page 8).

The audit also determined that documents prepared as part of prior USAID/Egypt Education Reform Program, on which the support program was based, had not been submitted to an Agency clearinghouse, as required. This problem is discussed in “Other Matter” (page 9).

The audit recommends that USAID/Egypt improve the effectiveness of the program and mission operations by:

1. Implementing a corrective action plan that establishes (1) indicators to measure the impact of the Education Support Program and (2) a method for analyzing indicator results (page 5).

2. Obtaining written confirmation from the Ministry of Education assigning full responsibility for the implementation of teacher training, including budgetary resources, to the Professional Academy for Teachers (page 7).

3. Implementing procedures to confirm that (1) AIR is entering required data in the Training Results and Information Network, and (2) mission employees are monitoring this as required (page 9).
Detailed findings follow. The audit scope and methodology are described in Appendix I. Our evaluation of management comments is included on page 11, and the full text of management comments is in Appendix II.
AUDIT FINDINGS

USAID/Egypt Did Not Include Methods for Assessing Training Impact

USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS) 253, “Participant Training for Capacity Development,” requires missions implementing participant training financed by the Agency to “design, implement, and track the training . . . for . . . impact, with the ultimate aim of strengthening institutional or organizational capacity.” The ADS further defines “training impact” as improvements in job or organizational performance that are attributable to “new skills, knowledge, and attitudes acquired during training and applied at work settings.”

During its first year, the program trained more than 33,000 teachers, as well as employees in 250 social work departments. However, despite the ADS requirements, it did not have a system in place to determine how much these trainees applied their new skills or the impact the training had on teaching outcomes and on school board capacity. Instead, the program’s indicators and targets related to training focused exclusively on numbers of people trained.

By the end of the program’s first year, mission officials had not decided whether they would conduct a midterm or final evaluation of the program—either of which could have provided more information on impact. At the start of the second year, USAID/Egypt and AIR had another opportunity to incorporate outcome measures into program monitoring when they revised the performance management plan after modifying the agreement; however, by the end of audit fieldwork, the draft of the revised plan still did not include any.

Mission officials gave two reasons for not including mechanisms to measure impact.

First, the program was designed quickly to respond to the Ministry of Education’s immediate needs following the January 2011 revolution. At that time, the ministry had hired approximately 130,000 assistant teachers who worked under contract previously and had varying levels of training. The program was designed to focus primarily on training those teachers and building on activities of the Education Reform Program to strengthen the social work departments that support school boards.

However, even though the reform program lasted for more than 6 years and cost approximately $80 million, it was never formally evaluated (though some reviews were done of different components). Therefore, the level of impact was unknown. Had the reform program been formally evaluated, the support program would have had a more solid foundation on which to base its program activities.

Second, the mission’s agreement officer’s representative (AOR) said assessing a program that was nationwide in scope and involved large numbers of trainees was not possible, given the original duration of 30 months.

However, previous USAID/Egypt-funded programs developed multiple tools to measure management effectiveness and assess teaching practices. During the support program’s first quarter, AIR used some of the tools as part of a rapid assessment to identify priority areas.
These same tools could have been used to evaluate the program’s overall impact. Furthermore, given that the assessment was completed in a relatively short time (within the first two quarters of the program), USAID/Egypt and AIR could have incorporated a follow-up into the design to get information on the extent to which needs have changed because of activities.

As noted in USAID’s evaluation policy, the Agency is a steward of “public resources to promote sustainable development in countries around the world.” Training in and of itself may enhance beneficiaries’ skills and knowledge. However, by not measuring the extent to which trainees are applying their new skills, USAID/Egypt has no way of knowing whether program activities are actually strengthening the capacity of the teacher or school or improving teaching outcomes. To make sure public resources are used effectively, USAID/Egypt must be able to determine whether funded activities are having a significant, sustainable impact or whether resources should be redirected to other uses. Therefore, we make the following recommendation.

**Recommendation 1.** We recommend that USAID/Egypt implement a corrective action plan that establishes (1) indicators to measure the impact of the Education Support Program and (2) a method for analyzing indicator results.

Program Did Not Include Important Elements for Sustainability

According to ADS 202.3.5.3, “Supporting Coordination and Collaboration with Partners, Host Country Entities, Other Donors, and Customers,” USAID plays a critical role as a coordinator with respect to its partners and host-country governments. Furthermore, ADS 201, “Planning” emphasizes that missions should build the capacity of host governments to achieve sustainable results and should use the resources of host countries and others to maximize the impact of development assistance.

While the program has supported a large number of trainings for teachers, social work departments, and boards of trustees, the sustainability of these activities is questionable. The program’s designers did not address how to work with teachers and administrators at the local level who resisted the training, and they did not include coordination with a potentially key Ministry of Education office.

**Long-Term Impact of Training Activities.** RIG/Cairo met with 35 assistant teachers in four governorates. They said the training taught them a variety of skills, including planning, classroom management, and performance evaluation. One assistant teacher said that based on what he learned in the training, he collects anonymous feedback on his performance from his students on a regular basis and then uses the information to make improvements.

However, the assistant teachers consistently said they had difficulty applying the skills because of resistance on the part of other teachers and school officials. For example, one assistant teacher wanted his science students to conduct experiments themselves, in keeping with teaching methods he learned during the training. However, the head teacher did not approve, insisting that the students should watch while the assistant teacher conducted the experiments.

Assistant teachers said they would have been able to use their new skills better if the program had also trained senior teachers or school principals. However, because the Ministry of
Education’s primary interest was to train the newly hired assistant teachers, the mission chose not to include training for other school employees.

This resistance is not new; according to the AOR, getting senior staff members to accept new teaching skills has been a problem for past USAID/Egypt-funded programs. In the October 2012 modification, the mission acknowledged the difficulties assistant teachers could encounter by stating that training efforts can be “hindered or supported by... school leaders depending on their competence and adherence to their role as instructional leaders.” The mission modified the agreement to include training for more than 10,000 senior teachers and 3,000 school leaders.

Similarly, several social workers and school board members interviewed reported that the impact of the trainings on board capacity was limited. While members of more than 11,000 boards have received some level of training, boards are considered to have received training even if only one person participated. This person would be responsible for sharing information with fellow board members. However, the extent to which this occurred was unknown because the program did not collect information on changes in board behavior. Interviews with boards of trustees showed little change in the organizational capacity and needs of the boards over the duration of the program.

Social workers and board members said the training efforts also were restricted by lack of resources at the local level. Unlike the teachers’ training, the program did not provide any support for training school boards; social workers interviewed said they paid out of pocket to copy materials they used when training the boards. Social workers and board members also said that board members did not have enough time for training on the part of board members and that school officials resisted the training.

**Coordination With Relevant Ministries.** Throughout the program’s first year, AIR worked closely with the Ministry of Education’s PAT. Begun in 2007 with support from the Agency, PAT was responsible for designing, planning, coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating teacher and educational leader professional development activities. It was also responsible for licensing and certifying teachers, trainers, and accredited training programs.

Through the support program, AIR actively engaged PAT to accredit training curriculum and to certify trainers for its assistant teacher and social work department training programs in hopes that the materials and trainers would be available for the ministry after the program ended. However, while PAT played a vital role in teacher and educational leadership development, the ministry’s Central Directorate for In-Service Training (CDIST) was the office responsible for actually providing the training to teachers, using PAT-approved materials and trainers. CDIST approved all governorate, district, and school-level training plans. Furthermore, CDIST, unlike PAT, had funding to provide training at the school, district, or governorate levels. According to AIR officials, the relationship between PAT and CDIST was strained at times.

In its cooperative agreement with AIR, USAID/Egypt recognized CDIST’s role in teacher professional development, noting that every governorate had a small budget to implement their CDIST-approved professional development plan. However, beyond this recognition of authority, USAID/Egypt did not engage CDIST in designing or implementing the training component. A mission official said that when the mission was designing the program, CDIST’s future was unclear, and the mission had an ongoing relationship with PAT stemming from prior USAID/Egypt programs. Furthermore, because CDIST used PAT-certified curriculum and trainers, the mission felt that coordinating primarily with PAT was the best way to go.
AIR and mission officials said the ministry had discussed giving PAT responsibility for training budgets. Additionally, in October 2012—a full year into the program—the ministry issued a decree that assigned additional responsibilities to PAT. During a meeting a month later, ministry officials said CDIST would be subsumed into PAT. However, neither of those changes had taken place by the end of the audit’s fieldwork.

Support for the training comes through the program, as well as through the school, district, and governorate education systems. However, by not building the capacity of school officials or coordinating with all the relevant partners in the Ministry of Education, USAID/Egypt might have limited the extent of the activities. While the October 2012 modification took steps to build the capacity of senior school staff, there was no indication that either the mission or AIR intended to monitor the extent to which these activities actually addressed the concerns expressed by assistant teachers. As recommended in the prior finding, USAID/Egypt should establish indicators to measure the impact of program activities.

Furthermore, while the ministry issued the decree expanding PAT’s authority, the extent to which this decree has been implemented is unclear. If PAT does not take full responsibility for teacher professional development, the extent to which CDIST, responsible for in-service training, would choose to use these program-supported materials is unknown. Therefore, we make the following recommendation.

**Recommendation 2.** We recommend that USAID/Egypt obtain written confirmation from the Ministry of Education assigning full responsibility for the implementation of teacher training, including budgetary resources, to the Professional Academy for Teachers.

### One Program Activity Was Deleted, and Others Were Behind Schedule

As part of its effort to strengthen boards of trustees, the program planned to award competitive subgrants to boards to conduct activities that would address challenges they faced because of the January 2011 revolution. In addition, two of the program’s consistent themes were improving the Ministry of Education’s ability to plan for crises, including political upheavals and natural disasters, and increasing the participation of women in educational governance processes. To address these, the cooperative agreement’s first-year work plan included two activities related to contingency planning and one regarding gender.

However, the mission modified the program to delete the planned subgrants, and AIR was behind schedule on one of the activities related to contingency planning as well as the one related to gender.

**Board of Trustees Subgrants.** The initial program design included $4 million to be awarded as subgrants to local boards of trustees to help them implement activities at the school level. However, during the course of the program’s first year, USAID/Egypt, AIR, and the Ministry of Education determined that this proposed activity was not viable because of problems stemming from the Egyptian public’s perception of USAID.

So the program was modified in October 2012, and funds were reprogramed to allow AIR to implement many of the types of activities that the mission anticipated would be supported through subgrants. For example, the program plans to support school boards in selected
districts to organize science clubs, and to collaborate with the boards to address poor reading and writing skills. Some of the reprogrammed funds were also slated to be used to increase the number of assistant teachers and social work department staff members trained.

**Crisis Management Trainers.** Despite the program’s first year target to train 27 teams of crisis management trainers, AIR had not trained any. According to mission officials, implementing the assistant teacher and social work department training activities were substantially more complex than the contingency activities, and those trainings took precedence. Since the training activities were delayed, so were the contingency activities.

In addition, AIR officials said they delayed the contingency activities when they discovered that the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) had ongoing activities related to educational contingency planning. Mission officials said they did not coordinate with other donor organizations when designing the program primarily because they believed that donors were not working in the same areas of teacher or board capacity development. AIR identified UNESCO’s activities while conducting preliminary research on existing crisis management resources.

Because of these delays, AIR moved the crisis management training to the program’s second year and plans to work with UNESCO to coordinate efforts. The USAID/Egypt AOR said that when the program was designed initially, some schools were still closed following the 2011 revolution, and parents were afraid to send their children to those that were open—the types of crises USAID/Egypt hoped the program’s contingency management component could address in the future.

**Gender Strategy Development and Implementation.** The program’s first-year implementation plan called for AIR to design and implement a strategy to increase women’s participation in schools. However, as of the end of that year, the program had not completed this activity. AIR officials said they were behind schedule because they had difficulty identifying and hiring a gender consultant with the skills needed to develop the strategy. While a consultant was hired to start this work toward the end of the program’s first year, the bulk of this effort was moved to the second year.

Given the political environment in Egypt, the mission’s decision to reprogram funds from subgrants to other, more viable, activities was reasonable. Furthermore, since the program was extended to September 2014, it is reasonable to expect that AIR has sufficient time to complete the other delayed activities. Therefore, we have no recommendations at this time.

**Implementer Did Not Comply With Training Database Requirements**

ADS 253 requires that information about any participant training that exceeds 2 days or 16 hours, including in-country training, be entered into USAID’s Training Results and Information Network (TraiNet). That information includes the name of the program, subject of the training, start and end date, number of participants, and total training cost. This information must be entered within 30 days of the end of the quarter of each federal fiscal year. A reference to ADS 253 and these requirements was included in the program agreement.

However, AIR did not enter any information on trainings and trainees in TraiNet until October 2012, more than 1 year into the program and after more than 33,000 beneficiaries and
groups had participated. In early October 2012, the USAID/Egypt participant training assistant notified the staff that all mission-supported participant trainings needed to be entered into TraiNet no later than October 31, 2012. AIR then worked with the mission to secure a TraiNet log-in and reported having entered all required training information into the system by the deadline.

This delay was caused by two factors: AIR and USAID/Egypt staff members did not understand TraiNet requirements, and the mission had personnel problems.

AIR incorrectly believed it could wait until the program’s monitoring database was fully operational and tested before entering information into TraiNet. However, regardless of internal data systems, the cooperative agreement requires AIR to comply with the time frames for TraiNet reporting as explained in ADS 253. The TraiNet system is independent of the implementer’s program monitoring efforts, and, as such, data can be entered in keeping with the ADS requirements.

Additionally, the program AOR was not aware that information on trainings had to be entered into TraiNet on a quarterly basis. Mission officials acknowledged that AORs and contracting officer’s representatives (CORs) are not always fully aware of the TraiNet requirements and might not know to follow up on them with implementers.

Adding to the delays, the USAID/Egypt employee responsible for TraiNet left unexpectedly in August 2012. Mission officials said this employee generally was unwilling to provide information or assistance to AIR and mission employees on TraiNet and its requirements. TraiNet duties have since been reassigned, and the mission has begun providing information to its staff and AIR on the database.

While information on training activities forms the bulk of the program’s indicators, data from these indicators are reported to USAID/Washington annually as part of the mission’s performance plan and report. The data collected in TraiNet can provide more timely information and serves as USAID’s single repository of data for all training. Lack of complete information limits the Agency’s ability to provide accurate information to Congress and other interested parties in a timely manner. Therefore, we make the following recommendation.

**Recommendation 3.** We recommend that USAID/Egypt implement procedures to confirm that (1) American Institutes for Research is entering required data in the Training Results and Information Network, and (2) mission staff members are monitoring entry of this information as required.

**Other Matter**

According to ADS 540, “Development experience is the cumulative knowledge derived from the planning, design, implementation, evaluation, and results. . . of programs.” USAID’s Development Experience Clearinghouse, managed by the Agency’s Knowledge Management Branch, is the primary repository of institutional history and is designed to provide “accurate, comprehensive, and timely information on the Agency's development experience.” To accomplish this goal, implementers are required to submit reports or deliverables that they produce under USAID-funded programs to the clearinghouse. The ADS assigns responsibility for monitoring implementer compliance with this requirement to AORs or other individuals most familiar with the awards.
According to mission officials and documents, the support program is built on the work of USAID/Egypt's Education Reform Program, and some of the same staff from the Office of Education and Training were involved in both. During the course of this audit, the audit team sought multiple documents that implementers produced for the reform program; however, neither the audit team nor staff from the USAID’s Knowledge Services Center could locate these documents in the clearinghouse. The reform program’s AOR said the implementer was supposed to send documents to the clearinghouse, not the AOR. (Eventually mission employees provided copies of some documents.)

While the mission offered its staff training on the clearinghouse in September 2012, none of the 11 employees who participated were from the Office of Education and Training, which was responsible for the reform program.

The clearinghouse allows missions to incorporate lessons learned and contextual information into planning to improve program performance. Not submitting documents produced as part of USAID/Egypt-funded programs limits the ability of Agency personnel—including USAID/Egypt staff members—implementers, and others to learn from experience.

Following discussion of this matter with USAID/Egypt, information on the clearinghouse was provided to the Office of Education and Training and to implementers. The mission also began to develop a reminder of the clearinghouse requirement for all employees. Given these actions, we make no suggestions at this time.
EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

In its comments on the draft report, USAID/Egypt agreed with Recommendations 1 and 3 and did not agree with Recommendation 2. We have acknowledged management decisions on all recommendations, and final action was taken on Recommendation 3. A detailed evaluation of management comments follows.

USAID/Egypt also asked us to remove the reference to the deletion of a program activity from the second finding heading presented on page 7. However, because the heading accurately reflects what occurred and the finding clearly states that the mission’s decision to reprogram funds to other, more viable, activities was reasonable, we did not change the finding heading.

Recommendation 1. USAID/Egypt said the staff is working with the implementer in developing two indicators to measure the program’s impact and will use the data from these indicators to develop program recommendations and conclusions. Target completion date for these actions is February 14, 2014. As a result, we acknowledge that the mission made a management decision on Recommendation 1.

Recommendation 2. USAID/Egypt disagreed with the recommendation to obtain written confirmation from the Ministry of Education assigning full responsibility for teacher training, including budgetary resources, to PAT. However, the mission's alternative action of obtaining the ministry's revised organizational chart is sufficient and, as such, we acknowledge that the mission has made a management decision on Recommendation 2. Target completion date for this action is March 1, 2013. Final action will be taken when the mission obtains the revised organizational chart showing PAT’s role.

Recommendation 3. USAID/Egypt and implementer staff members attended TraiNet training in December 2012, and the mission has established a system to ensure that they are monitoring the entry of information into TraiNet. Based on the mission’s comments and supporting documentation provided, we acknowledge that the mission made a management decision and final action has been taken on Recommendation 3.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

Scope

RIG/Cairo conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe the evidence obtained provides that basis.

The purpose of this audit was to determine whether USAID/Egypt’s Education Support Program was making progress toward achieving its goal of supporting the provision of educational services in Egypt through strengthening local capacity, supporting professional development of newly hired assistant teachers, and strengthening instructional leadership. The mission awarded AIR a 30-month cooperative agreement worth about $18.8 million on September 13, 2011. In October 2012 the program was extended to September 20, 2014. As of September 30, 2012, $8.1 million had been obligated and $3.5 million disbursed under the program, of which approximately $2,900 was tested through trainings the team observed during site visits.

The audit covered the program’s first year, from September 13, 2011, to September 30, 2012. In planning and performing this audit, we assessed mission internal controls related to proper approval of documents, data verification, reporting, and establishment and review of performance measures and indicators. We also reviewed the internal controls in place to monitor program activities. Those controls included but were not limited to data quality assessments, AOR files, annual and quarterly reports, and portfolio reviews.

We conducted audit fieldwork at USAID/Egypt in Cairo and at AIR’s offices and field locations in Cairo, Gharbeya, Qena, and Suez. The work took place from November 4 to December 16, 2012.

Methodology

To answer the audit objective, we interviewed personnel from the mission and AIR, officials in the Ministry of Education, and program beneficiaries. In addition to interviewing key personnel and making on-site observations, we reviewed reports and files that the mission and AIR maintained as part of their program monitoring activities. We obtained an understanding of the program and how USAID/Egypt monitored and measured results by reviewing the cooperative agreement, subsequent modifications, the performance management plan, AIR’s annual implementation plan, and progress reports. We reviewed the mission’s FY 2011 Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act assessment, the oversight performed by the AOR (like site visit reports), and performance measures. Furthermore, we reviewed applicable laws and regulations and USAID policies and procedures, including ADS Chapters 201 (“Planning”), 202 (“Achieving”), 253 (“Participant Training for Capacity Development”), and Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 226, “Administration of Assistance Awards to U.S. Non-Governmental Organizations.”

To verify reported program results, we validated results for the seven indicators for which data were available. We tested the full universe of data for two and selected a statistical sample for
each of the other five. To test the indicators, we (1) traced results AIR reported to supporting documentation and records, (2) observed program training, and (3) interviewed mission and AIR staff members, national and local government officials, and beneficiaries. In addition, we reviewed program design elements, supervisory approvals, and the level of monitoring the AOR and USAID/Egypt conducted by reviewing program design documents and site visit reports. Results for each indicator can be generalized to the full population of reported results for that indicator. Based on this sample, we consider that data were sufficiently reliable to address the audit objective.

We conducted site visits to a judgmental sample of four of the program’s five regions, selecting one governorate within each one. To select the sites, we considered the number of trainings conducted and the number of people trained to date in the governorates, and any overlap in the governorate with prior USAID/Egypt education programs. In addition, we considered which districts in the governorate had been part of a preliminary assessment the program conducted to identify priority areas, and which districts had training ongoing during the audit period.

During site visits, we verified compliance with USAID branding requirements and determined the extent to which beneficiaries were aware of the source of program funding. In addition, we considered gender and human trafficking requirements to note any evidence of noncompliance. We interviewed beneficiaries to determine whether the program was meeting their needs and to learn about their experiences with AIR and USAID/Egypt. The results of these site visits cannot be generalized to all program activities and sites.
USAID/Egypt appreciates the time and effort that the Regional Inspector General Cairo (RIG/Cairo) staff devoted to its work on the audit report of “USAID/Egypt Education Support Program (ESP)”. We would like to commend the drafters for the clarity and conciseness of the Audit Report. We believe the ESP Project has been very successful in responding to a request from the Government of Egypt for assistance in training approximately 130,000 new teachers. The audit took place approximately halfway through the Life of Project which is ideal in terms of allowing for sufficient time to incorporate suggestions for improvements to the program. We would like to thank you for the opportunity to provide Mission comments on the draft audit report.

**Recommendation No.1.**

We recommend that USAID/Egypt implement a corrective action plan that establishes (1) indicators to measure the impact of the Education Support Program and (2) a method for analyzing indicator results.

**Management Response**

Recommendation Component 1 -

We concur with this recommendation and the importance of measuring the outputs (number of teachers trained) and their impact. We are currently working with the implementer to include indicators to better measure impact in the current Performance and Monitoring Plan.
The implementing partner will apply two measurement tools to achieve this:

− The Standardized Classroom Observation Protocol for Egypt (SCOPE) to assess the extent to which the teachers are utilizing desired practices; and
− The Board of Trustees Assessment Tool (BOTAT), which measures the extent to which a given Board of Trustees is utilizing best practices promoted in the training.

Recommendation Component No. 2
We concur with this recommendation. After collecting this data the implementing partner, the technical office and program will analyze the data to develop conclusions and recommendations.

In view of the above, the mission believes that management decision has been made for the two Recommendation No. 1 components 1 and 2. The target date for completing the corrective action is February 14, 2014

Recommendation No. 2.
We recommend that USAID/Egypt obtain confirmation, in writing, from the Ministry of Education assigning full responsibility for the implementation of teacher training, including budgetary resources, to the Professional Academy for Teachers.

Management Response

USAID does not concur with this recommendation. Given the issuance of the law and decrees described below, USAID is confident that program supported materials will continue to be utilized. It would be superfluous to require additional documentation from the MOE.

Education law 155 issued in 2007 (which can only be modified by Parliament), clearly states that the Professional Academy for Teachers (PAT) is the entity responsible for teacher training, including the certification of trainers, training courses and training providers. Accordingly, any teacher training authority can only use PAT's certified trainers and training courses to comply with Education Law, regardless of where the funding resides. Since its establishment in 2007, PAT has been working on developing its systems, organizational structure, certification procedures and processes, etc. With USAID support, PAT was able to finalize its certification system and certify several training courses, including the induction program, which was delivered to hundreds of trainers. Hence, the Mission is confident that PAT, as an authority established by the Education Law, is sustainable and reliable to certify and carry on training even after the project ends.

USAID managers and implementing partner should be commended for their foresight in recognizing that CIDST was unlikely to exist for much longer and developing the capacity of the MOE entity (PAT) that would ultimately be responsible for all aspects of MOE training.

The Ministry has been considering several options to redefine the role of CIDST so that it complements the role of PAT rather than duplicates it. The Ministry of Education, informed
USAID in late January 2013 that the new organizational chart for the ministry is expected to be published within the next month. The expected new arrangement will merge CDIST with PAT. CDIST will cease to exist. When USAID receives a copy of this organizational chart, it will be shared with the IG. However, it would not be appropriate for USAID to request the Ministry to prepare any special documentation to clarify other government decrees that it has issued. As the draft audit report points out (page 7) the Ministry of Education (MOE) has already issued a decree expanding PAT’s authority (Decree No. 394 dated Oct. 8, 2012). In article two (a) of this decree it is clearly stated that PAT is the only entity approving the annual training plan.

In addition, PAT issued a letter dated Dec. 12, 2012, declaring that the completion of the ESP teacher training course, "Teaching Applications in the Classroom” is considered the single prerequisite for teacher certification. Similarly, the ESP’s "Educational Applications in the School" for Assistant Social Workers replaces previous certification tests.

PAT’s letter requires the use of SCOPE tools by school principals and supervisors and requires that SCOPE be included in the portfolio an educator submits for certification. These requirements further support the institutionalization of training and monitoring programs developed under ESP and are the direct result of a considerable effort to the part of ERP and ESP to put in place sustainable teacher in-service professional development systems and practices.

USAID does not concur with Recommendation No. 2. In light of the Mission response, USAID requests that RIG/Cairo close this recommendation upon issuance of the final audit report.

**Recommendation No. 3**

*We recommend that USAID/Egypt implement procedures to confirm that (1) American Institute for Research is entering required data in the Training Results and information Network, and (2) mission staff is monitoring entry of this information as required.*

**Management Response**

The Mission concurs with this recommendation and has taken the following action:

(a) The ESP Monitoring & Evaluation Team sent TRAINET data entry (R1) staff and verifier (R2) staff to attend the TRAINET training conducted in the mission on Dec. 16 & 17th, 2012. This training clearly explained to the implementing partner as well as USAID staff how data should be entered in each quarter, (See attachment)

To ensure that the implementing partner is entering the data, the Mission’s Participant Training Assistant will, henceforth, print TRAINET reports that will be verified by the AOR on a quarterly basis.

*In view of the above, the mission believes that final action has been taken for the Recommendation No. 3 components 1 and 2, thus, requests closure of the recommendation upon final report issuance.*
Annex: Other Comments

ESP is a successful USAID project which has built strong relationships with Ministry of Education interlocutors, and, as the audit points out, has succeeded in meeting the target indicators. We believe the way in which the heading is phrased on page 7, (“One Program Activity Was Deleted, and Others Were Behind Schedule”) is overly negative and might lead a reader to conclude that USAID is at fault for one of the activities having been suspended. The Mission would suggest that the heading be revised to read: “Two Activities Were Delayed”. As with most development programs, once implementation is underway, there may be changes in the environment which necessitate changes in the program. Such was the case of the Board of Trustee Sub grants. The Ministry of Education advised USAID/Egypt in December 2011, that awarding sub grants would not be feasible given problems stemming from the public perception of USG funding. As a result, USAID reevaluated the activity and felt it was best for the project to reprogram these funds. The heading has a negative connotation when in fact USAID took the appropriate corrective action in that situation. Regarding the delay on two activities, due to the unrest in Egypt and the teacher’s continuous demonstrations, the Government’s higher priority at the time the Agreement was awarded was to provide training to untrained teachers. Thus, gearing up for this mammoth activity, took precedence over developing contingency planning capacity and increasing the participation of women on school boards. Both of these activities have been included in the current work plan and will be completed.
## Education Support Program Indicator Results as of Year 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Year 1 Target</th>
<th>Year 1 Actual</th>
<th>Target Met?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of social work units received program-developed, Ministry of</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education-endorsed training package.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of boards of trustees receiving Ministry of Education-endorsed</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>11,100</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training package.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid assessment tool developed and used.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher performance self-assessment tool developed and approved by Ministry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of district level master trainers certified to deliver PAT’s</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teacher professional development program to assistant teachers.*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of newly hired assistant teachers received PAT-certified training</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>33,938</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>package.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of newly hired teachers who successfully passed PAT-certified</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training course.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This indicator is dependent on both the program-supported training and final certification of the master trainers by PAT. At the time of audit fieldwork, AIR reported having trained more than 520 master trainers, but had received certification documentation from PAT for only 323 of those.

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2 Audit validated results.