Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations

OPERATION
INHERENT
RESOLVE

DoD
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INSPECTOR GENERAL

DoS
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INSPECTOR GENERAL

USAID
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INSPECTOR GENERAL

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress
April 1, 2015–June 30, 2015
LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL MISSION

The Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations will coordinate among the Inspectors General specified under the law to:

- develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation
- ensure independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations
- promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and prevent, detect, and deter fraud, waste, and abuse
- perform analyses to ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements
- report quarterly and biannually to the Congress on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead Inspector General

(Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended)
FOREWORD

We are pleased to submit our second Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). This operation is dedicated to countering the terrorist threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq, Syria, the region, and the broader international community. The U.S. counter-ISIL strategy includes support to military operations associated with OIR as well as diplomacy, governance, security programs and activities, and, separately, humanitarian assistance.

Our first report discussed the new Lead IG model for providing unified and comprehensive oversight. In this second quarterly report, we provide an update on U.S. programs and operations supporting OIR and the counter-ISIL strategy during April 1–June 30, 2015. This report also provides details of U.S. activities to address the complex humanitarian crisis within the region.

We continue to discharge our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities, pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, to deter waste, fraud, and abuse and promote effective stewardship of taxpayer dollars. We are deploying additional personnel to the region and identifying audits, assessments, inspections, and investigations to meet our FY 2016 strategic planning objectives and biannual reporting requirements in the fall. Our teams coordinate oversight operations and activities, reset priorities where it makes sense, and incorporate important lessons learned in our planning process.

We remain dedicated to a unified and comprehensive effort to ensure independent, effective oversight of U.S. government programs and activities related to this overseas contingency operation.

/s/
Jon T. Rymer
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

/s/
Steve A. Linick
Inspector General
U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

/s/
Catherine M. Trujillo
Acting Deputy Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International Development
MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD IG

I am pleased along with my colleagues to present the second Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report to Congress on the Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) known as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, the Lead IG agencies overseeing the Department of Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development continue their oversight responsibilities for the OCO in support of the U.S. strategy to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

This report provides a quarterly update on the programs and operations of several U.S. agencies working across multiple lines of effort within the counter-ISIL strategy. For example, the Department of State has reported on its diplomatic activities to foster more inclusive governance in Iraq—efforts considered key to the long-term success of the U.S. strategy. Its programs in other areas complement the work of the Departments of Treasury and Justice to disrupt ISIL’s finances and stem the flow of foreign fighters.

U.S.-led coalition military operations include the mission to provide air support for anti-ISIL forces and a train-and-equip program to build the capacity of security forces in Iraq and moderate Syrian opposition fighters in Syria. This quarter, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter addressed the complex challenges with the training and equipping programs for both countries, acknowledging that they have started slowly. Finding qualified individuals who meet the multiphase screening criteria in Syria has been problematic. For Iraq, the tribal interests of prospective recruits are often at odds with a government-backed coalition.

Across the backdrop of the fight against ISIL, millions of civilians live in need. Those affected are dependent on U.S. and international programs providing humanitarian relief that began long before OIR itself. Events this quarter, such as the Ramadi campaign in Iraq and fighting around the Syrian border town of Kobane, have served to deepen the plight of Syrians and Iraqis driven from their homes. The United States continues to provide need-based assistance programs to address the complex regional crisis. This report provides a separate section on these efforts.

Some U.S. agencies have reported that counter-ISIL efforts are part of programs that were already well underway in the Middle East region. Many funding obligations have multiple purposes, and agencies continue to reprogram funds to support the counter-ISIL strategy. Consequently, the Lead IG agencies are evaluating financial and programmatic information to best facilitate a more complete understanding of
the funding picture for the entire OCO. Additionally we are addressing the specific requirements for ascertaining the accuracy of U.S. government reporting of this information, pursuant to section 8L. We will mature these evaluations in subsequent quarterly reports.

Our whole-of-government approach to oversight is guided by the FY 2015 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for OIR, finalized by the Lead IG agencies in March. This report highlights the Lead IG activities that provide comprehensive oversight across agency boundaries. This quarter, we also agreed to a memorandum of understanding to create a new interagency Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group. The group will seek to synchronize and de-conflict fraud and corruption investigations related to OIR programs and operations. In October, in our next biannual report, we will provide further details of our oversight work as well as an update on our investigative and Hotline functions.

I thank the teams of the Lead IG agencies for their hard work here and overseas and their commitment to excellence on this and other OCOs now under Lead IG jurisdiction.

/s/

Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve

Jon T. Rymer
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPERATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INHERENT RESOLVE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMANITARIAN</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSISTANCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria Complex Crisis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHTS

Coalition Airstikes, as of 6/22/2015

DoD Counter-ISIL Operations
(airstrikes and training)

$5.05 B
FY 2015 Appropriations

$3.02 B
Cost of airstrikes, as of June 30, 2015

Targets damaged or destroyed:
7,655

Key Security Events, 4/1/2015–6/30/2015

1. Early April—Anti-ISIL forces retake Tikrit, on the highway to Mosul

2. 4/18—Iraqi forces retake Baiji oil refinery

3. 5/10—Kurdish forces cut off ISIL's Hasakah-Aleppo supply road

4. 5/17—ISIL seizes Ramadi, Iraq

For the sources of information presented in these quarterly highlights, see the last endnote in this report.
In Syria this quarter, anti-ISIL forces retook key cities, villages, and bases in the north with the support of coalition airstrikes, cutting off some ISIL supply lines and taking control of strategic highways. These predominately Kurdish forces have gained some support from non-Kurdish communities. In Iraq, GOI security forces made gains in April to retake Tikrit with the help of U.S.-led coalition airstrikes. In May, however, ISIL seized the capital city of Anbar province, Ramadi, causing more than 150,000 residents to flee. Regaining control of the Baiji refinery has been complicated. Although Iraqi forces retook the facility in April, ISIL set portions of the refinery on fire in May. Supported by U.S. airdrops and airstrikes, the government reportedly made gains this quarter, but the area remains contested.

Key Security Events, 4/1/2015–6/30/2015

1. Early April—Anti-ISIL forces retake Tikrit, on the highway to Mosul
2. 4/18—Iraqi forces retake Baiji oil refinery
3. 5/10—Kurdish forces cut off ISIL's Hasakah-Aleppo supply road
4. 5/17—ISIL seizes Ramadi, Iraq
5. 5/25—ISIL sets Baiji refinery on fire
6. Early June—Aleppo, Syria, under siege by ISIL
7. 6/16—Syrian opposition forces retake Tal Abyad, Syria, with coalition airstrike support
8. 6/23—Syrian opposition forces retake Ain Issa, Syria, with coalition airstrike support
9. 6/25—ISIL reportedly kills more than 140 Kobane civilians in a 24-hour rampage
10. 6/26—ISIL retakes parts of Hasakah, Syria
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This second Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report to Congress provides an update on the programs and operations that support the U.S. strategy to degrade and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), including military operations under Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). Lead IG agencies—the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD IG), Department of State Office of Inspector General (DoS OIG), and U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)—have responsibility for oversight reporting on this complex overseas contingency operation (OCO). DoD Inspector General Jon T. Rymer serves as the Lead Inspector General, and DoS Inspector General Steve A. Linick serves as the Associate Inspector General. This report provides information on the whole-of-government approach working across strategic lines of effort (LOEs).

The battlefronts in the offensive against ISIL extend throughout Syria and Iraq, involving more than a dozen major cities and hundreds of villages. The fighting campaigns have spanned months, with control switching between ISIL forces and anti-ISIL forces over many of the same key strongholds. The tactical gains and losses of the counter-ISIL forces are reported regularly by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in daily reports, news releases, press interviews, and on its website. The ongoing humanitarian crisis mounts, with regular civilian catastrophic events. As recently as July 18, 2015, ISIL claimed responsibility for a car bombing that reportedly killed or injured more than 280 people and destroyed several buildings in Khan Bani Sa’ad, a predominantly Shia area north of Baghdad.

DoS reported that it continues to strengthen its diplomatic engagement with the Government of Iraq (GOI) to support inclusive, multisectarian governance in Iraq. In recent testimony before Congress, the Secretary of Defense emphasized the role that all nine strategic LOEs play in the broader strategy to defeat ISIL, and especially emphasized the importance of DoS diplomatic efforts to develop more effective multisectarian governance in Iraq. According to Secretary Carter, success with Iraq governance will influence the success of all other LOEs. This quarter, the DoS Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) and Embassy Baghdad promoted Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s initiatives to defuse sectarian tensions, bring Sunnis into the fight, reign in Iranian-backed Shia militias, stabilize areas, and restore basic services affected by conflict.
The Tikrit campaign illustrates the complexities of the war situation. Typical of the campaigns in the region, the fight went back and forth, with control of the city in question for months. After the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), backed by coalition airstrikes, liberated the city in April, approximately 98,000 displaced civilians, predominantly Sunni, wanted to return to their district. The safe return of displaced families is an ongoing priority for the GOI and the focus of intense U.S. diplomatic outreach for its continued success. DoS leads the U.S. efforts to continue diplomatic outreach with members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL and with the United Nations. Meetings and discussions framed how to strengthen, accelerate, and integrate contributions to coalition efforts.

On the frontlines, several complexities frame the environment. The make-up of anti-ISIL forces, train and equip efforts, regional differences, protracted campaigns over key strongholds, and tactical aspects of the airpower and ground forces vary throughout the region. A “nimble” enemy has adapted to changing circumstances, adjusting its tactics. DoD leads two lines of effort (Denying ISIL Safe Haven and Building Partner Capacity) that are the main components of the ground campaign and fighting the enemy. U.S. and coalition airstrikes have been achieving tactical gains to support ground forces as they wage operations in both Iraq and Syria. At the same time, the U.S. continues to develop what the Secretary of Defense describes as the centerpiece of the military strategy—the train-and-equip mission.

- To counter ISIL’s presence in Syria, up to 1,000 U.S. military personnel have been authorized to support a program to vet and train moderate Syrian opposition fighters in FY 2015, and DoD reported that several coalition nations play “a critical role.”

Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, left, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Martin Dempsey testify at a hearing on U.S. policy and strategy in the Middle East in Washington, D.C., on June 17, 2015. (DoD photo)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

According to DoD, approximately 3,500 U.S. military service personnel and 1,800 coalition troops are working together in Iraq to train, advise, and assist the ISF and local tribal forces at four locations in Iraq. DoS reported it has helped to establish the new advise-and-assist site at Taqqadum Air Base in Anbar, Iraq. An additional 450 U.S. soldiers have been deployed to energize recruitment of Sunni fighters and provide command and control enabling support for local Iraqi forces. DoD reported that more than 1,000 Anbari tribal fighters enrolled in the GOI-led Sunni train-and-equip program this quarter. DoS hosted high-level visits to the United States by senior Anbari sheiks and the Sunni Speaker of the Council of Representatives, essential events in building Sunni support to join the fight. This is only one of several examples of interagency cooperation reported this quarter as U.S. programs and operations continue to build within the counter-ISIL strategy.

The complex humanitarian crises that have emerged as a result of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq are particularly highlighted in this report. These regional conflicts long predate OIR, with DoS and USAID leading U.S. government humanitarian response efforts in Iraq, Syria, and surrounding countries. Over time, the fighting on multiple fronts has propelled millions more into need. Highly visible battles regularly made the press this quarter, displacing thousands of people. In recent months, there have been notable escalations in fighting with increased civilian casualties around main population centers and continued displacement:

- The United Nations estimated that the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq grew by 410,000 during the period, raising the overall total to more than 3 million, and identified 3 million new people who require assistance in Iraq. The number of Iraqis in need has now been estimated at 8.2 million, or almost a quarter of the country’s population.

- The United Nations also estimated that 3.9 million have fled Syria, 7.6 million more have been internally displaced, and at least 12.2 million people—around 68% of the total population—are in humanitarian need. (Syria has been embroiled in conflict for more than 4 years, dating back to pro-democracy uprisings in March 2011, reflected in the high numbers.)

Although humanitarian support is identified as a strategic line of effort in both the U.S. and international coalition strategies to defeat ISIL, those activities are unrelated to military operations under OIR. To deliver relief, the U.S. government works through international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN agencies, and international organizations. The United Nations acts
as the primary international coordinating body for humanitarian response efforts in the region and conducts humanitarian missions across conflict lines and borders to reach those in need.\textsuperscript{17}

At home, several initiatives are underway to stop the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), disrupt ISIL financing, expose ISIL’s true nature, and protect the homeland:\textsuperscript{18}

- Federal prosecutors have charged more than 50 FTF-related cases and continue to arrest aspiring fighters before they are able to depart the country.
- Multiple agencies support the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), which sponsors the Counter-ISIL Information Coordination Cell (ICC). DoS reported that the ICC streamlines and consolidates counter-ISIL messaging initiatives to support a coalition-wide strategic communications effort.
- The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) provides a “full-time interagency forum and process to plan, integrate, measure” the effectiveness of U.S. strategic operational counterterrorism activities.
- NCTC produces a “counterterrorism calendar” that features the DoS Rewards for Justice program, profiling terrorist leaders and the rewards offered for information about them.
- The NCTC Pursuit Group works to identify FTFs to be included on the U.S. homeland watch list and the Counterterrorism Calendar.\textsuperscript{19}
- The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) published the National Money Laundering Risk Assessment and National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment reports, which identify the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks associated with money laundering and terrorist financing.

This quarterly report focuses on the OCO programs and operations only. Full reporting of Lead IG activities will be addressed in the October 2015 OIR combined quarterly and biannual report; however, details of selected ongoing activities have been incorporated throughout the report. The Lead IG agencies continue to work with their respective agencies to address reporting gaps, establish current and continuing reporting, and pursue reporting from other U.S. agencies that have lead or co-lead roles in the strategic LOEs. For FY 2016, OIR oversight will continue to have a regional approach and will supplement permanent assigned staffing through the full utilization of the special hiring authority and the re-employment of annuitants, where required.
# OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

- Countering ISIL: A Whole-of-Government Approach  
  - Page 7
- Global Coalition to Counter ISIL  
  - Page 8
- Funding  
  - Page 12
- Supporting Effective Governance in Iraq  
  - Page 13
- Denying ISIL Safe Haven  
  - Page 15
- Building Partner Capacity  
  - Page 21
- Enhancing Intelligence Collection on ISIL  
  - Page 42
- Exposing ISIL’s True Nature  
  - Page 45
- Disrupting ISIL’s Finances  
  - Page 46
- Disrupting the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters  
  - Page 49
- Protecting the Homeland  
  - Page 53
Strategic Lines of Effort to Counter ISIL

SUPPORTING EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE IN IRAQ

We are supporting the new Iraqi government on efforts to govern inclusively and effectively as well as to strengthen its cooperation with regional partners.

DENYING ISIL SAFE-HAVEN

We are conducting a systematic campaign of airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Working with the Iraqi government, we are striking ISIL targets and supporting Iraqi forces on the ground. We will degrade ISIL’s leadership, logistical and operational capability, and deny it sanctuary and resources to plan, prepare and execute attacks.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

We will build the capability and capacity of our partners in the region to sustain an effective long-term campaign against ISIL. Our advisors are working to advise Iraqi forces, including Kurdish forces, to improve their ability to plan, lead, and conduct operations against ISIL, and we will provide training to help the Iraqis reconstitute their security forces and establish a National Guard. Our train and equip program will strengthen the Syrian moderate opposition and help them defend territory from ISIL.

ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ON ISIL

Continuing to gain more fidelity on ISIL’s capabilities, plans, and intentions is central to our strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy the group, and we will continue to strengthen our ability to understand this threat, as well as to share vital information with our Iraqi and Coalition partners to enable them to effectively counter ISIL.

EXPOSING ISIL’S TRUE NATURE

Clerics around the world have spoken up in recent weeks to highlight ISIL’s hypocrisy, condemning the group’s savagery and criticizing its self-proclaimed “caliphate.” We are working with our partners throughout the Muslim world to highlight ISIL’s hypocrisy and counter its false claims of acting in the name of religion.

DISRUPTING ISIL’S FINANCES

ISIL’s expansion over the past year has given it access to significant and diverse sources of funding. So, we are working aggressively with our partners on a coordinated approach to reduce ISIL’s revenue from oil and assets it has plundered; limit ISIL’s ability to extort local populations; stem ISIL’s gains from kidnapping for ransom; and disrupt the flow of external donations to the group.

DISRUPTING THE FLOW OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

Foreign terrorist fighters are ISIL’s lifeblood, and a global security threat—with citizens of nearly 80 countries filling its ranks. On September 24, the President convened a historic Summit-level meeting of the UN Security Council, focused on this issue and we will continue to lead an international effort to stem the flow of fighters into Syria and Iraq.

PROTECTING THE HOMELAND

We will continue to use the criminal justice system as a critical counterterrorism tool, work with air carriers to implement responsible threat-based security and screening requirements, and counter violent extremism here at home.

HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT

We and our partners will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced and vulnerable in Iraq and Syria.

COUNTERING ISIL: A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH

On September 10, 2014, President Obama addressed the nation to explain the comprehensive strategy that the United States, in concert with coalition partners, would implement to defeat ISIL. He noted that the strategy incorporates all elements of national power, featuring core elements with military and non-military objectives complementary to the international coalition and its capabilities. For the United States, a whole-of-government approach brings together homeland security, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, military, capacity-building, and information-sharing efforts across multiple agencies, including DoD, DoS, USAID, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DoJ), Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and NCTC. Each agency has lead or co-lead responsibilities with one or more of the LOEs under the President’s strategy.

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on June 17, 2015, both the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized the role that all nine strategic LOEs play in the broader strategy to defeat ISIL and achieve “positive transformation of the region...over time, by, with, and through our regional partners.” According to Secretary Carter, success in all other LOEs hinges on the success of the Effective Governance LOE and the diplomatic efforts to support multisectarian governance in Iraq. He cited the political LOE’s influence in creating the support among local forces and local people “to make progress against extremism stick.” To support that end, Secretary Carter said that he and Secretary of State John Kerry have agreed to improve coordination and begin a process of continually assessing progress across their respective LOEs.

DoS leads the U.S. diplomatic efforts to support effective governance in Iraq and has co-lead responsibilities for Disrupting ISIL’s Finances (with Treasury), Exposing ISIL’s True Nature (with NCTC), and Disrupting the Flow of Foreign Fighters (with NCTC). NCTC shares leadership responsibilities for a third LOE, Enhancing Intelligence Collection on ISIL, with the Director of National Intelligence.

DoS and USAID lead U.S. strategic objectives for addressing the regional humanitarian crisis, which long pre-dates the counter-ISIL campaign. Although humanitarian support is identified as a strategic LOE in both the U.S. and international coalition strategies to indicate the importance of responding to the humanitarian effects of the crisis, those activities are not designed or implemented to support military operations under OIR or to counter ISIL. U.S. humanitarian programs provide assistance, based solely on need, to displaced and vulnerable populations in Iraq and Syria and work
with host governments to mitigate humanitarian and economic effects of the refugee crisis in neighboring countries. The complex humanitarian crisis had been building in the region for more than 3 years before the OIR OCO was designated, with reports of human atrocities and fleeing populations in the media regularly.\textsuperscript{25} By December 2014, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that Syria alone had a population in need that exceeded 12 million,\textsuperscript{26} a figure that helps frame the magnitude of the crisis in the region.

DoD leads two lines of effort, Deny ISIL Safe Haven and Building Partner Capacity. CENTCOM has responsibility for the OIR military campaign and for the coordination of operations with its coalition partners. U.S. and coalition airstrikes have been achieving tactical gains to support ground forces as they wage campaigns in both Iraq and Syria to deny ISIL safe haven. The U.S.-led training and equipping mission is working to improve the capabilities of security forces in Iraq and support moderate Syrian opposition fighters in Syria, preparing them to defend their homeland territories. Secretary Carter describes the train-and-equip mission as the centerpiece of the OIR military strategy.\textsuperscript{27} The military continues to support, as appropriate, lines of efforts that other agency partners and coalition members are pursuing.\textsuperscript{28} Secretary Carter views the two LOEs led by DoD as a “complex, nonlinear campaign that will require sustained level of effort over an extended period of time to promote durable regional stability over the long term.”\textsuperscript{29}

On July 6, 2015, speaking from the Pentagon, President Obama reiterated that the fight to defeat ISIL “will not be quick” and emphasized that “no amount of military force will end the terror that is ISIL unless it’s matched by a broader effort, political and economic, that addresses the underlying conditions that have allowed ISIL to gain traction.” The President said the United States will work with Iraq and the United Nations to help rebuild communities after they have been liberated from ISIL, and will support Prime Minister al-Abadi as he builds a government that unites all the people of Iraq. For the Syrian people to succeed against ISIL, the President called for the end to civil war and “an inclusive political transition to a new government without Bashar [Asad].”\textsuperscript{30}

GLOBAL COALITION TO COUNTER ISIL

Representatives of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL met in April and June 2015. In Jordan, on April 8, the group met to review coalition operations and progress along various international lines of effort.\textsuperscript{31} U.S. Special Presidential Envoy John Allen and Deputy Special Presidential Envoy Brett McGurk participated, along with representatives from nations leading the coalition’s five working groups.\textsuperscript{32}
• **Military efforts**—Iraq and the United States

• **Stopping the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters**—Turkey and the Netherlands

• **Counter Finance efforts**—Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the United States

• **Stabilization Support**—Germany and the United Arab Emirates

• **Counter Messaging**—United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States

One week later, on April 15, 2015, DoS hosted a plenary session of the full Global Coalition chiefs of mission in Washington. Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi as well as Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken addressed the session. General Allen briefed results of the Jordan meeting. According to DoS, members discussed how to further strengthen, accelerate, and integrate contributions to coalition efforts.

On June 2, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, and Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi co-chaired a coalition meeting in Paris, where delegations from several countries, the United Nations, and the European Union discussed the overall situation in Iraq and Syria. Coalition partners reaffirmed their shared purpose and commitment to work together “under a common, multifaceted, and long-term strategy” to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. The co-chairs announced that they would brief the full membership of the Global Coalition, including heads of state, on the progress of the five working groups, regional organizations, and other bodies established to fight terrorism at a meeting in September 2015.

According to DoS, General Allen works closely with U.S. agency leads “to help match specific campaign requirements and coalition needs,” which has culminated in action plans for each of the nine LOEs that form the U.S. strategy to defeat ISIL. The National Security Council (NSC) Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) has responsibility for ensuring that LOE action plans become a coherent campaign plan.

DoS reported that NEA continues to support the Special Presidential Envoy and other DoS bureaus by coordinating diplomatic engagements related to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL through its Coalition Working Group (CWG). CWG activities include the following:

• facilitating information sharing among the more than 60 members, including the coalition’s operational working groups

• maintaining a database to track member contributions, including military support

• advising DoD on managing political-military consultations among coalition partners involved in counter-ISIL military operations and training missions
UN Counterterrorism Activities

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United Nations Security Council established a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to work with member states in preventing acts of terrorism and denying and criminalizing the financing and provision of safe haven for terrorists. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) carries out CTC’s policy decisions, conducts expert assessments, shares best practices and information, and facilitates counterterrorism technical assistance to countries. The UN Security Council has called on members to support these international efforts through several resolutions:39

• United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 (2001) calls for criminalizing the financing of terrorism, freezing related funds, denying financial support, denying safe haven, and denying sustenance or support.40
• UNSCR 1624 (2005) condemns the incitement to commit acts of terrorism, calling for their prevention and the denial of safe haven for terrorists.41
• UNSCR 2129 (2013) directs CTED to work as a special political mission with international, regional, and sub-regional organizations, as well as private and academic organizations.42 CTED advises members on how to implement the mandates of UNSCR 1373 and 1624 by identifying trends and emerging issues along with practical measures to counter them.43
• UNSCR 2161 (2014) ensures that member states and those in their territories do not make assets or economic resources available to ISIL and related terrorist groups.44
• UNSCR 2170 (2014) calls on states to cooperate in preventing and stopping the illicit activities of ISIL, al-Nusrah Front, and other groups associated with al-Qaeda and “provides for a range of tools, including sanctions and other binding measures, to degrade these terrorist organizations’ ability to carry out brutal attacks.”446
• UNSCR 2178 (2014) calls on member states to prevent the recruiting, organizing, transporting, or equipping of individuals and to stem the flow of foreign fighters, “underscoring the need to prevent travel.”447
• UNSCR 2199 (2015) builds on UNSCR 2170’s measures to prevent terrorist groups from achieving success in Iraq and Syria and to condemn trade with ISIL, al-Nusrah Front, and al-Qaeda (or any entities associated with them).46 Member states are obligated to report to the UN Security Council, within 120 days, all activities related to oil smuggling, looting for antiquities, kidnapping for ransom, donations and finance, or arms.49 The Security Council Sanctions Committee must provide an assessment on the impact of the resolution measures within 6 months.51 According to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, UNSCR 2199 shows “the joint international commitment on countering terrorism and, in particular, defeating ISIL.”52 CTED is assessing the capacity gaps of 67 key States of origin, transit, and destination in order to facilitate technical assistance to further implement UNSCR 2178.53

In February 2015, CTED launched a global research network as an opportunity to engage think tanks and research institutes.54 The network aims to strengthen CTED’s capacity to identify new trends and developments related to terrorism and monitor member states’ counterterrorism efforts and challenges.55 The Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee will hold a special meeting, including technical sessions and a Ministerial meeting, in Madrid during July 27–29 to discuss specific strategies and techniques to stem the flow of foreign fighters.56
ISIL Destruction of Cultural Heritage Sites

ISIL has destroyed cultural heritage sites and looted ancient artifacts in Iraq and Syria. Notable losses include the Tomb of Jonah and an estimated 10,000 books and manuscripts burned at the Mosul Central Library. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) provides action plans for the safeguard of the cultural heritage in Syria and Iraq.

**6/23/2015**

**ISIL destruction of ancient tombs in Palmyra, Syria.**

This was the burial site of Mohammed bin Ali, a descendent of the Prophet Moahmmad’s cousin, and Nizar Abu Bahaeddine, a prominent religious figure of Palmyra.

**4/5/2015**

**Assyrian Virgin Mary Church in Tel Nasri, Syria, destroyed by ISIL on Easter Sunday.**

This Catholic church served the Christian minority population in the area for 80 years.

**3/8/2015**

**Members of ISIL in the act of destroying Hatra, Iraq.**

Hatra was the capital of the first Arab Kingdom and withstood invasions by the Romans in C.E. 116 and 198.

**3/5/2015**

**Members of ISIL in the act of destroying Nimrud, Iraq.**

Founded more than 3,300 years ago, Nimrud was one of the capitals of the Assyrian empire.

FUNDING

The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, provided funding for U.S. agencies conducting programs and operations to counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria and provide humanitarian assistance. DoD received $5.1 billion for OIR to fund airstrike operations and advise-and-assist programs for Iraq and Syria.57

DoS and USAID requested, but did not receive, specific, separate funding for OIR support and broader counter-ISIL efforts in FY 2015 appropriations. DoS is responsible for ongoing activities in five LOEs where DoS is lead or co-lead, as well as support operations to facilitate other U.S. agency personnel working overseas to counter ISIL. USAID received appropriations for humanitarian assistance activities, but Congress did not specify how much of this funding was intended for use in response to the complex crisis in Syria and Iraq.58

Lead IG data-collection efforts have yielded reports for some amounts allocated, obligated, and disbursed as of June 30, 2015. Those details have been incorporated where they are available throughout this report. The Lead IG agencies continue to work with their respective agencies to better understand and allow better reporting on all U.S. appropriated funds of any fiscal year directed toward the U.S. strategy to defeat ISIL and to address the wider humanitarian crisis that predates OIR. The Lead IG agencies are also planning to pursue reporting from other U.S. agencies that have lead or co-lead roles in the strategic LOEs.

Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, the Lead IG agencies have particular responsibility to accomplish the following as it relates to the counter-ISIL effort:

review and ascertain the accuracy of information provided by Federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements in support of the contingency operation.

DoD IG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG are identifying approaches to obtain and analyze information related to funds, costs, contracts, grants, and other agreements. DoD IG will perform attestation work to ascertain the accuracy of OIR obligations, disbursements, and accountability of fund amounts reported in the DoD Cost of War report and other relevant OIR reports, and add steps to test the accuracy of sampled transactions from the accounting system to the supporting documentation. DoS OIG expects to use sampling
methodologies to test the information and data obtained from the Department of State. USAID OIG plans to add steps to its annual financial audit work under the Government Management Results Act to test financial data from a sample of awards associated with USAID’S projects and activities.

SUPPORTING EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE IN IRAQ

DoS reported that diplomatic engagement with the GOI was the cornerstone of its efforts to support effective governance in Iraq. Since Iraq’s national elections in April 2014, and over the course of OIR, Embassy Baghdad and DoS supported Iraq’s efforts to form an inclusive and representative government. In September, Prime Minister al-Abadi formed a new government focused on a reconciliation agenda, and the Iraqi Council of Ministers passed a National Program embraced by the three major ethnosectarian groups. This National Program aimed to address core grievances, promote national unity, and devolve power and authority from the central government to Iraq’s regions and provinces.59

DoS reported that, over the last quarter, NEA and Embassy Baghdad engaged with political actors across Iraq to promote key elements of the National Program, particularly the proposed National Guard law and, more broadly, Prime Minister al-Abadi’s efforts to bring Sunnis into the fight against ISIL. According to DoS, its diplomatic engagement was instrumental in establishing the new advise-and-assist site at Taqqadum Air Base, in support of DoD and the Building Partner Capacity effort described later in this report. Bringing Sunnis into the fight against ISIL is a top priority for both the U.S. government and the GOI, and U.S. engagement—along with DoD training oversight—has already resulted in more than 1,000 Anbari tribal fighters being enrolled, trained, and equipped to join the fight. DoS also supported high-level visits to the United States by senior Anbari sheiks and the Sunni Speaker of the Council of Representatives.60

A key highlight of the last quarter was Prime Minister al-Abadi’s April visit to Washington, DC, during which he met with President Obama and Vice President Biden. According to DoD, the visit advanced U.S. stabilization objectives for Iraq and led to agreements for renewed economic and energy cooperation, key priority areas within the counter-ISIL strategy. The visit included a Higher Coordinating Committee meeting convened by Vice President Biden in support of the Strategic Framework Agreement, which signaled Iraq’s commitment to its long-term strategic partnership with the United States.61
DoS also supports the Coalition Working Group for Stabilization Support, which serves primarily as a coordination, advisory and support body for the GOI, while offering a forum for all coalition partners to contribute in accord with their individual political mandates and available resources. Through its Baghdad-based Task Force, it assists the GOI in planning, conducting, and monitoring recovery and stabilization measures immediately following liberation of areas previously under ISIL control, thereby creating an environment which will enable affected communities to resume their normal functions. The Working Group has one sub-group, led by Italy, which has taken on the specific task of assisting with the training and support of civilian police, and one focus group, led by Canada, on integrating gender issues into stabilization planning.  

In addition to extensive diplomatic engagement, DoS reported that several U.S. foreign assistance programs were working to support effective governance in Iraq as of June 30, 2015:

- DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) programs funded by allocations of Economic Support Fund (ESF) for Iraq include ongoing work that supports counter-ISIL strategies. Prior to ISIL’s incursions in northern Iraq in 2014, DRL solicited and received proposals to address democracy and human rights priorities in a post-national election environment in Iraq. With the outbreak of conflict, DRL chose to cancel those planned programs and release a new call for programs that would be more responsive to the current context, including programs that protect religious and ethnic minorities, strengthen civil society capacity to monitor and document human rights abuses, and promote tolerance and reconciliation to counter rising sectarianism. DRL also re-examined and re-focused approximately $11 million in FY 2013 expenditures in order to respond more directly to ISIL. Continuing programming has been designed to address both DRL’s priorities and the ongoing U.S. counter-ISIL strategy. At this stage, these programs are projected to continue through FY 2016.

- NEA adapted some ongoing programs it implements in Iraq to be more responsive to the needs on the ground, for instance shifting activities to increase work with IDP communities. There may be some ancillary benefits to the Effective Governance LOE from these programs, although they were not specifically designed to support it. Most of the programs are funded to continue into FY 2016.

- The DoS Counterterrorism Bureau has allocated $13 million in FY 2015 Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs funding for civilian counterterrorism capacity-building programs in both Syria and Iraq. However, DoS reports that it is not currently able
to implement some of its programs due to the security situation on the ground and a range of other factors. Some of the planned training sessions, such as a course for the Iraqi Ministry of Interior on crisis response, had to be cancelled because a number of units planning to attend training needed to remain in place to respond to security threats at the time. With respect to Syria, DoS has begun internal planning discussions on how to support civilian security actors in liberated areas. DoS reported serious challenges in conducting this type of training.

In addition to these efforts, USAID has six ongoing activities that are designed to support effective governance in Iraq. USAID reported, however, that five of the six activities predate ISIL’s incursions into Iraq and were not originally designed with a counter-ISIL focus. USAID’s longstanding projects in this area include the Administrative Reform (Tarabot) Project, Strengthening Service Delivery (Taqadum) Project, Access to Justice Project, Elections Support Project, and Broadening Participation Through Civil Society Project. USAID extended two of these projects—Tarabot and Taqadum—during the quarter, to provide targeted support for strengthening Iraqi capacity, including in geographic areas affected by ISIL. Tarabot works to promote administrative reform through technical assistance to the GOI on management of human and fiscal resources. Taqadum promotes GOI reform efforts to decentralize responsibilities, resources, and authorities from the central GOI to provincial and local governments. In May 2015, USAID initiated a new public financial management activity with a focus on building GOI Ministry of Finance capacity in budget planning, formulation, and execution under a regional award. As of June 30, 2015, USAID had obligated more than $362 million and disbursed approximately $316 million in connection with these projects over the full course of their project lifespans, which in most cases extended back to 2011. Funding for these projects has been provided through ESF.64

DENYING ISIL SAFE HAVEN

The battlefronts in the offensive against ISIL extend through much of Syria and Iraq, involving more than a dozen major cities and hundreds of villages.65 The fighting campaigns have spanned months, with control switching between anti-ISIL forces and ISIL forces over many of the same key strongholds. CENTCOM Commander General Lloyd J. Austin III reported in his spring posture statement to Congress that defeating ISIL would require time and “strategic patience.”66 The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff echoed this in their testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on June 17, 2015. Each emphasized that regional stability can only be reached through the coalition effort, with military force only one component of the larger international strategy.67
CENTCOM reported that many of the countries participating in the coalition military operations have planning elements embedded at its headquarters assisting with planning efforts daily and participating in formal conference events. A conference on April 27, 2015, for example, brought military planners from more than 40 coalition partner nations together to further develop their military campaign plans to counter ISIL and reassess their battlespace strategies. During a telephone press conference in June, the OIR Combined Air Component Commander emphasized that each nation brings its capabilities to a very complex terrain and operational environment, with combined expertise, “creating a coalition greater than the sum of its parts.” He reported that ISIL has come to fear the effects of air power, and estimated that the air campaign is removing more than 1,000 enemy fighters from the battlefield every month.

Coalition Air Support

DoD reported that coalition air operations against ISIL have resulted in nearly 7,700 targets damaged or destroyed in Iraq and Syria as of June 22, 2015, with estimates of 2,060 strikes in Syria and 3,267 in Iraq. Cost of the U.S. air campaign totaled $3.02 billion as of June 30, 2015.

The Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) identified progress in denying ISIL safe haven this quarter, attributing tactical gains to the combination of the operational maneuvers of ground forces and air power. According to DoD, airstrikes soften targets ahead of ground force action by taking out supplies and supply lines, communication lines, and equipment. CJTF-OIR cited the opportunity for open air strikes as a contributing factor for success. These types of missions, such as the ones being conducted in northern Syria where local populations have largely moved away, are not as complex and require less coordination to avoid possible collateral damage. The OIR Combined Air Component Commander emphasized in June 2015 the precision of the coalition’s disciplined airstrikes in more populated urban areas, where ISIL remains entrenched.

In June, DoD highlighted intended outcomes of the airstrikes to sustain the counter-ISIL offensive:

- Keep ISIL on the defensive, differentiate them from the population, go after them every time they are identified, providing 24/7 coalition airpower.
- Buy “space and time” for counter-ISIL ground forces to gain, regain, and hold ground and, ultimately, support the entire international counter-ISIL strategy.
- Protect civilian populations and avoid collateral damage by using precise and disciplined airstrikes.
In June, the OIR Combined Air Component Commander acknowledged the reality that short-term tactical setbacks will be part of the military campaign, but he did not credit ISIL with strategic victories. He reported that ISIL has had to shift its tactics, from large-scale, open offensive missions to maneuvering and hiding in populations, making its forces more difficult to identify for airstrikes. According to the OIR Air Commander, the coalition has adapted to the enemy’s changing tactics, using coalition joint terminal air controllers; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and communications capabilities to identify targets and increase the accuracy of airstrikes. He emphasized that, under the rules of engagement, coalition pilots have permission to respond immediately when in direct enemy fire during a planned mission.

Coalition nations conducting airstrikes in Iraq include the United States, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Coalition nations conducting airstrikes in Syria include the United States, Bahrain, Canada, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

For the monthly totals of weapons released during more than 16,000 coalition sorties flown since August 2014, see Figure 1.
IRAQ

In June 2015, CJTF-OIR reported that coalition forces have partnered with ISF operational-level headquarters and tribal leaders to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize coalition capabilities. Iraq-supported forces continue to observe the enemy in its preparations and are working on activities that DoD believes will shape the conditions for future engagements, such as securing logistical lines of communication; securing key road junctions, intersections, and key terrain; establishing logistics areas; finalizing planning, rehearsals, and preparing equipment; and collecting intelligence information. DoS reported that the GOI is working closely with the coalition to address training and equipping, strengthen border security, and improve law enforcement.

DoD reported in June on ISIL’s latest tactics and force capabilities, including its capture of equipment, such as tanks, artillery, and unmanned aerial drones; use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mobile suicide bombers; and broadcasts of hundreds of executions on social media. CTJF-OIR reported that same month, however, that ISIL operations were focused on small-scale, localized harassing attacks and the occasional complex or high-profile attack. It described some of the tactical gains against ISIL in operations this quarter.

• Anti-ISIL forces liberated Tikrit in early April, nearly a year after it was overrun by ISIL. The ISF has been working to prepare the city for the return of Tikrit’s refugees.

• ISF and popular mobilization forces (PMF) conducted clearing operations throughout the urban areas around Baiji, Hawejia, Sharkat, and Mosul and along the Tigris River. This interdiction disrupted ISIL resupply and communications support to Baiji. The coalition advise-and-assist planners worked closely with the ISF to control critical infrastructure and lines of communication in the vicinity. More than 176 coalition airstrikes in the vicinity of Baiji and the outlying oil refinery area destroyed enemy military capabilities by taking out fighters and fighting positions, mobility platforms, vehicle-borne IEDs, and weapon caches. By June 25, 2015, GOI-affiliated forces had reportedly reclaimed control of the Baiji oil refinery facilities, but the area remains contested.

By June 25, 2015, GOI-affiliated forces had reportedly reclaimed control of the Baiji oil refinery facilities, but the area remains contested.

Notwithstanding these tactical gains, on May 17, a relatively small ISIL force gained control of Ramadi. Prior to the action, more than 420 coalition airstrikes in the Falluja-Ramadi area destroyed many ISIL operational resources, facilities, fighting positions, and heavy equipment, including armored vehicles. According to CJTF-OIR, the ISF and local tribes had worked together for nearly a year to defend Ramadi and maintain a period of relative stability in the tactical situation. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee this quarter, Secretary Carter used the fall of Ramadi to illustrate the importance of strengthening the ground forces through enhanced training efforts to help make them more capable and motivated.

By the end of the quarter, CJTF-OIR reported that coalition and GOI-affiliated forces were focusing on deterring ISIL’s ability to produce IEDs—now one of ISIL’s main tactical weapons.

SYRIA

According to CJTF-OIR, anti-ISIL forces in northern Syria, with the help of U.S.-led airstrikes, took back many of the ISIL-controlled cities and villages this quarter. Coalition-supported anti-ISIL forces in northern Syria comprise predominantly ethnic Syrian Kurds and have attracted some support from non-Kurdish communities. DoD reported in June that anti-ISIL forces had taken control of multiple primary and secondary lines of communication in ISIL-dominated Syrian territory, as well as other communication lines that span east-west through northern Syria toward Iraq. This affects ISIL’s capabilities to mobilize, resupply, sustain, and communicate within Syria and Iraq.
On May 16, 2015, Secretary of Defense Carter announced that U.S. Special Operations Forces had killed ISIL leader Abu Sayyaf and captured his wife, Umm Sayyaf, also affiliated with ISIL. The operation took place in Syria, where Abu Sayyaf was known for his involvement with ISIL’s military and financial operations. According to the Secretary, the operation was a “significant blow to ISIL.”

Other reports provide details of tactical gains or losses in northern Syria, including the early June ISIL attacks in Suran and around Marea in northern Aleppo province. Media outlets reported that Kobane was attacked twice in June, and parts of Hasakah were seized on June 26, 2015. Although anti-ISIL forces were able to repel the attacks, ISIL fighters reportedly killed 200 or more civilians in areas where they attempted to probe lines of control. With the support of coalition airstrikes, anti-ISIL forces launched offensives in the area of Tell Tamer (to recapture territory they had previously lost to ISIL), cut off strategically important ISIL Hasakah-Aleppo supply lines, took control of strategic highways, and recaptured the Liwa Brigade 93 military base. ISIL retreated from Syria’s Tal Abyad area, for example, an area of about 4,100 square kilometers that includes a border crossing to Turkey.
BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

U.S.-led training programs to build capable ground forces in both Iraq and Syria continue to face complex challenges in preparing for and executing operations. Several coalition nations are providing personnel and financial contributions to join approximately 3,500 U.S. military personnel in the U.S.-led program in Iraq and another 1,000 working in the region to vet and train Syrian forces.

Funded predominantly by the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF), the U.S.-led training has been underway in Iraq since December 2014, yielding just under 11,000 trained personnel for the ISF and Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) as of June 30, 2015. This quarter, Secretary Carter acknowledged that the U.S. program got off to a slow start as it struggled to fund equipment purchases until release of the first tranche of the ITEF. He also cited the GOI’s inability to provide enough recruits to fully utilize program training capacity. U.S. military personnel had expected to conduct training for up to 24,000 recruits by fall 2015. To energize recruitment of Sunni fighters in highly contested Anbar province and provide additional advise-and-assist support for the ISF, President Obama announced on June 10, 2015, that he had authorized deployment of 450 additional U.S. military personnel to a new advise-and-assist site at the Taqaddum military base. As of early July, the Iraqis had mobilized, trained, and equipped 1,300 Sunni tribal fighters at Taqaddum, and an additional 500 were in Iraqi-run training programs supported by U.S. advisors.

U.S. and coalition trainers partnering under the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) to recruit, vet, and train a moderate Syrian opposition force began to occupy new and updated training and support facilities in multiple locations in May 2015. DoD has emphasized that the program will continue to adjust to best prepare trainees for the conditions they will face when they join the fight against ISIL in a few months. In July, however, Secretary Carter testified before Congress that the program had produced a first class of only about 60 trainees.

Iraq Train and Equip Program

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2015 authorized DoD to use the $1.62 billion ITEF to train, equip, advise, and assist the security forces associated with the GOI, including the ISF, Kurdish and tribal security forces, or other local security forces with a national security mission. DoD reported that, as of July 2, 2015, approximately 74% of ITEF was being programmed to support the ISF, 21% to support the Peshmerga, and 1.4% to support tribal security forces. According to DoD, the objective of the program...
is “to deny ISIL safe haven by creating Iraqi forces that complement the U.S. and coalition air campaign and have the capability to halt ISIL’s advance in Iraq, go on the offensive and roll back ISIL territorial gains, and restore the country’s territorial integrity.”

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) reported this quarter that the first FY 2015 ITEF funds, just more than $400 million, became available for use by DoD on February 23, 2015. DSCA has administered equipment cases for $328 million of that amount, and the U.S. Army Central Command received $76 million to be used for unknown urgent requirements. DoD reported that, as of June 30, 2015, no U.S. funds had been obligated or expended to modify or build training sites for the ITEF program. According to DoD, program activities are being conducted at existing Iraqi facilities. On May 19, DoS submitted a detailed report on the usage of the first 25% of ITEF to Congress, validating that the conditions had been met to release additional ITEF funds. DSCA received an additional $240 million of the ITEF on June 22, 2015.

According to DoD, approximately 3,500 U.S. military service personnel and 1,800 coalition troops are working together under CJTF-OIR to train, advise, and assist the ISF at four locations in Iraq. This total includes the 450 troops deployed to Anbar province to support the GOI-led Sunni train-and-equip program and provide additional adviser support in an advise and assist format for local Iraqi commanders. The increased capacity supports a tribal
outreach plan passed by the Iraqi Council of Ministers on May 19, 2015. CJTF-OIR reported that 500 Sunni tribal fighters became the latest of several groups inducted into the popular mobilization forces in a ceremony held on June 17, 2015, in Anbar.\textsuperscript{116}

DoS reported that it has been providing temporary life support for hundreds of DoD personnel living and working at the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center until DoD’s Building Partnership Capacity and Combatant Command sites are fully operational and adequate housing for personnel can be provided. According to DoS, this included providing support and maintenance contractors to establish, open, and sustain the site.\textsuperscript{117}

DoS reported that it has multiple offices working to engage coalition partners, for example, obtaining military clearance and permissions to support vetting of anti-ISIL forces, developing equipment requests, and laying the foundations for Sunni tribal engagement.\textsuperscript{118} Embassy officials have reportedly been engaging with Prime Minister al-Abadi and other senior Iraqi officials on the importance of recruiting and training Sunni tribal fighters, and the GOI has begun to mobilize these forces. DoS reported that it has assisted in visits of senior delegations of Sunni sheiks to the United States, and the Political-Military section at the Embassy continues to engage with the GOI to help define and develop Iraq’s new National Guard program. Embassy Baghdad’s Office of Security Cooperation works closely with the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior, as well as Iraq’s National Security Advisor, to develop a unified list of military requirements to meet equipping needs of all GOI-affiliated security forces.\textsuperscript{119}

The DoS Bureau of Political Military Affairs is responsible for Foreign Military Financing funds that are implemented by DoD. NEA also provides policy insights that informs decisions on the uses of Foreign Military Financing (FMF).\textsuperscript{120}

**CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

DoD reported that it is taking a multilayered approach to address urgent equipment shortfalls and training deficiencies in the ISF. The strategy’s four main elements work to ensure that the GOI remains in the lead in halting ISIL and building the capacity to be able to execute offensive operations:\textsuperscript{121}

- **Advise and Assist.** U.S.-led teams work to improve operational planning, communication, intelligence fusion, and targeting in support of Iraqi-led ground operations. DoD expects these efforts to continue throughout the campaign for the Iraqi forces already deployed and for forces to be generated.
• **Train.** Tailored training covers individual skills, collective battalion training, and some brigade training, emphasizing leader and individual confidence building needed for offensive operations and the tenets of the Law of Armed Conflict.

• ** Equip.** U.S. and coalition partners work with the GOI to define and assess critical requirements so that trained units can successfully engage in the fight. Equipping needs are being filled using coalition contributions, Iraqi stocks, or ITEF assistance, and traditional security assistance programs.

• **Reform.** Once the GOI is able to secure Iraqi territory, training will transition to the Security Sector Reform (SSR) phase, which will focus on developing more professional institutions and training centers of excellence.

**TRAINING**

In June, Secretary Carter testified to Congress that the U.S. training program faces complex challenges in rebuilding Iraq’s security forces. He cited as contributors to the ISF’s diminished capacity the loss of Mosul last year, when four divisions dissolved, and a combination of “disunity, deserters, and so-called ghost soldiers, who are paid on the books but don’t show up or don’t exist.” Secretary Carter announced the ITEF training program had produced 8,800 trained ISF and 2,000 CTS personnel as of June 30, 2015. An additional 4,000 soldiers, including 600 CTS personnel, were enrolled in training.

According to DoD, the goal of the U.S.-led training program is to prepare the ISF to take on ISIL—not to build U.S.-equivalent forces. Training curriculum for Iraqi Army soldiers covers a range of skillsets in 4-6 weeks, including:

- marksmanship
- squad movement
- urban combat
- combined operations
- mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) driver safety training
- convoy operations and preventative maintenance
- field medicine

Iraqi trainees participate in several types of practical training exercises during their courses. On June 2, 2015, for example, a combined operations exercise held at Camp Taji for Iraqi soldiers assigned to the 16th Iraqi Army Division challenged participants to use all the training skills they received during the U.S.-led course in simulated battlefield conditions.
DoD reported that it does not provide salary stipends to the ISF, but it does provide minimal direct sustainment support, and is using the ITEF to develop the ISF’s capability to sustain its own forces and equipment. Examples of U.S.-funded support include the transportation of mission-essential weapons, equipment, and other defense articles; development of procurement packages at DSCA; and contracted counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) training for the ISF to prepare them for counteroffensive operations.  

DoD IG has three assessments in progress or planned to determine whether DoD/CENTCOM and coalition goals, objectives, plans, guidance, operations, and resources to train, advise, and assist Iraq's security forces to defeat ISIL are operationally effective to initiate and sustain successful combat operations. The assessments will report separately on the Iraqi Army, Peshmerga Security Forces, and Sunni Security Forces. The results of the assessment on the Iraqi Army will be discussed in the October 2015 biannual report.  

DoD IG plans to visit or contact organizations and individuals in the United States and Iraq that are directly responsible for developing or advising each force; review the programs and processes used in the development and function of each force; and speak with appropriate U.S., coalition, and Iraqi leaders and managers. This will be a continuation of a series of congressionally mandated, command-requested, or self-generated reports published by DoD IG that focus on the train, advise, assist, and equip missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
EQUIPMENT

By the end of the quarter, more than $1.7 billion had been obligated or committed to meet the equipment needs of security forces affiliated with the GOI, including:

- **United States**—$316.8 million of the ITEF, $718.4 million in FMF, and $25 million through a special presidential drawdown authority in the Foreign Assistance Act128
- **Iraq**—$138.0 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and $362.7 million in direct commercial sales (DCS) contracts129
- **Coalition nations**—$183.4 million in direct contributions130

Initial equipment purchases addressed the needs of Peshmerga forces, the CTS, and the Iraqi Army.131 DoD reported in June 2015 that it is working with the GOI to determine the equipment needs of Sunni tribal forces.132 For details of Iraqi and coalition nation contributions, see Table 4.

DSCA, the U.S. agency responsible for administering GOI-funded FMS cases, FMF-funded cases, and ITEF-funded “pseudo-FMS” cases, reported that it did not receive the first tranche of ITEF funds until February 23, 2015, in the amount of $303 million. On May 15, 2015, DSCA received an additional $25 million transfer from U.S. Army Central Command.133 DoS reported that, to meet critical equipment requirements until the ITEF was released, it expedited approximately $160 million in GOI-funded FMS and U.S.-funded FMF cases during late 2014 and early 2015.134 DSCA reported that $50 million of those pre-ITEF FMS cases funded Humvees.135 The United States also delivered additional Humvees by December 22, 2014, through grants of excess defense articles.136

DoS reported that more than $718 million in FY 2013 and FY 2014 FMF funds for Iraq had been directed to counter-ISIL support as of June 30, 2015.137 For details, by fiscal year, see Tables 1 and 2.

Of the $328 million available to DSCA from the first tranche of the ITEF, nearly $317 million had been obligated for equipment as of July 2, 2015.138 For details of all pseudo-FMS cases implemented with that amount, see Table 3.
Table 1
Counter-ISIL Cases Funded by FY 2013 FMF for Iraq, as of 6/30/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Title</th>
<th>Cost ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logistics Capacity Building</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Information Systems &amp; Training</td>
<td>4,333,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professionalization and Training</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>IIA Equipment, Sustain &amp; Facility Support</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT (CTS) Leader Professionalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Training and Professionalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multi-Service Logistics Professionalization (CONUS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multi-Service Logistics Professionalization (OCONUS)</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Training and Professionalization</td>
<td>10,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF Training and Professionalization</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Platform-Specific Sustainment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy Simulator Sustainment</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Year Sustainment Multi-Platform Rolling Stock (FMF12/13 Split)</td>
<td>60,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4ISR CLS</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship CLS</td>
<td>43,110,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Border Security/Counter Terrorism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq Army Special Forces Training (OCONUS)</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hellfire Missiles</td>
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<td>CTS Battalion Set</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expanded Training Support for IQ-B-DAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC/RC-208 MPU Tech Refresh</td>
<td>5,200,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>KA-350 Datalink Modern Tech Refresh*</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pesh Resupply Transportation Case</td>
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<tr>
<td>M908 Tank Round</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA Small Arms LOR#1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change to IA Small Arms LOR#1 for 15K grenades</td>
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<td>2.75” Rockets</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>448,059,001</strong></td>
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*LOA in development

**Source:** DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/22/2015.
Table 2
Counter-ISIL Cases Funded by FY 2014 FMF for Iraq, as of 6/30/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Title</th>
<th>Cost ($)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Capacity Building and Professionalization &amp; Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1A1 Maintenance Instructor/Advanced Maintenance Training</td>
<td>$30,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1A1 Digital Diagnostics Translation</td>
<td>$8,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter Maintenance Training</td>
<td>$16,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-IED Equipment</td>
<td>$37,907,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair and Transport of Soft-Skinned HMMWs</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCADS Parachutes</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair, Transport, and Radios for ILAV Badgers</td>
<td>$399,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urgent Transportation (Pesh Airlift)</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair and Transport of Caiman, MaxxPro, and Recovery MRAPs</td>
<td>$9,832,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Months of MRAP Sustainment Support &amp; Parts</td>
<td>$29,999,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1A1 Maintenance Support and OJT</td>
<td>$51,630,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier Equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sets of Body Armor, Kevlar Helmets, IFAK</td>
<td>$44,130,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles, Sights, Magazines</td>
<td>$19,282,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds of .50cal Ammunition</td>
<td>$1,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging Requirements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbish Language Buildings</td>
<td>$14,200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total  $270,384,009

a Signed/implemented cases  
b Letter of Offer and Acceptance offered  
c Pending Letter of Request signature/in draft  

Source: DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/22/2015.
Soldiers from the Iraqi Army’s 73rd Infantry Brigade receive M16A2 rifles and infantry sets under the direction of CJTF-OIR forces at Camp Taji, Iraq, June 17, 2015. (CJTF-OIR photo)
### Table 3
**Pseudo-FMS Cases Implemented, as of 7/2/2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Description</th>
<th>Items Delivered</th>
<th>Items Not Yet Delivered</th>
<th>Obligated ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigade equipment sets</td>
<td>Kevlar helmets and body armor, M-16 magazines, first aid kits, assault packs and grenade pouches, magazine pouches, canteens w/pouches, military compasses, grenade launchers, .50 Cal machine guns, M249 Squad Assault Weapon (SAW), sniper rifles, mortar tubes: 120m and 60mm, 12-gauge shotguns, binoculars, M4/M16 rifles, M50 gas masks</td>
<td>7/2015—ambulances, medium tactical vehicles (MTV) (M1078s, M1083s, M1084s), M1089 MTV wrecker, maintenance HMMWs; 8/2015—Harris Radios, 3 kW generators, M1151 up- armored HMMWs, M1152 HMMWs; 10/2015—GPS devices, smalls arms repair tool kits; 11/2015—mechanic tool kits, medical equipment sets: combat medic, ground ambulance; TBD/Various—AK-47 magazines, MK-19 and .50 Cal tripods, M240B heavy machine guns, armored SUVs, M1070A1 tank transporters and 635 NL trailers, M978 fuel tankers, 400 gal water and fuel tank trailers</td>
<td>206,525,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Tribal Military Operational Requirement (MOR) and Amendment</td>
<td>M16 rifles, M4/M16 magazines</td>
<td>7/2015—Kevlar helmets, uniforms and boots; 12/2015—body armor; TBD—5.56mm ammunition</td>
<td>50,676,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEF Blanket Transportation Case</td>
<td>Transportation, consolidation, and packing, crating, and handling support (complete 4/2015)</td>
<td>TBD—5.56mm ball rounds, sniper rounds, high explosive (HE) rounds, HE anti-tank (HEAT) rounds, RPG-7</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>5.56mm ball rounds</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,310,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank Weapon Systems</td>
<td>M136 AT-4 84mm anti-tank weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,282,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-IED and EN Mobility Equipment</td>
<td>MK 155 Mine Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC) launchers and trailers, D7G bulldozer, “blow-in-place” kits (class V explosives and accessories), anti-personnel obstacle breaching systems (APOBS), HE MICLIC charges, MK 22 MICLIC rockets</td>
<td>TBD—D7R bulldozer, bridge erection boats, bridge bays: interior and ramp, boat cradles, bridge adaptor pallets, 10-ton M1977A4 bridge transporter trucks, bridge transporter tires, Iraqi light armored vehicles (ILAV): Badger-EOD and Badger-IA, ILAV run-flat tires, vehicle-mounted interrogation arms and thermal cameras, 360° situational awareness cameras, handheld detectors, RPG netting</td>
<td>7,433,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above Standard Level of Service (ASLS)</td>
<td>Completed 3/31/2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,255,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Cleaning Kits</td>
<td>M4/M16 kits, M249 SAW kits</td>
<td>TBD—M4/M16 kits, M2 kits, MK-19 kits, M240B kits, 12-gauge shotgun kits</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued on next page)
On June 22, 2015, DSCA received a second tranche of the ITEF, totaling $240 million. As of July 2, six cases funded with this amount had been approved, and three more were pending. Equipment already approved for purchase includes rifles, counter-IED equipment, vehicles, training ammunition, and anti-tank weapons.139

Pursuant to Section 1236(k) of the NDAA for FY 2015, DoD may not obligate more than 60% of the $1.68 billion ITEF until foreign governments, including the GOI and coalition partner nations, contribute funds or in-kind support of at least 40%, or $647 million. On June 4, 2015, DoD certified that the cost-sharing threshold had been met through FMS cases and DCS contracts signed and funded by the GOI, as well as equipment, munitions, and other support funded by coalition partners (predominantly to arm Kurdish Peshmerga forces).140 For details of the types of equipment purchased through these cost-sharing agreements, see Table 4. A few purchases include training, transportation, or other support services, as noted.

Table 3 (cont’d)
Pseudo-FMS Cases Implemented, as of 7/2/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Description</th>
<th>Items Delivered</th>
<th>Items Not Yet Delivered</th>
<th>Obligated ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training Ammunition*</td>
<td>40MM HE dual-purpose (HEDP) grenade, 5.56mm blanks: linked and unlinked, 7.62mm blanks, .50 Cal blanks, 40mm practice rounds, illuminating rounds: green star parachute and red star cluster rounds, white signal rounds, hand grenades, smoke grenades, MK142 signal kits, simulation ground burst projectile rounds, M16 blank-firing attachment (BFA)</td>
<td>TBD—5.56mm blank rounds: 5.56 mm linked and unlinked, 7.62 x 51mm (linked) blanks, .50 Cal (linked) blanks, M203 40mm target practice tracer (TPT) grenades, 7.62 x 39mm blanks, 7.62 x 54mm (linked) blanks, 12.5mm (linked) blanks, M4/M16 BFA, AK47 BFA, German G3/G36 BFA, pyrotechnics: simulation ground burst projectile rounds, simulation hand grenades, smoke grenades, tear gas, parachute flares, illuminating rounds, trip flares, MK142 signal flare kits</td>
<td>812,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>316,795,246</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *This MOR was for a monthly requirement of ammo for the next 12 months; first month was provided with initial implementation. Pseudo-FMS cases are funded by the ITEF. On February 23, 2015, DSCA received $303 million from the first tranche of the FY 2015 ITEF. On May 8, 2015, DSCA received a transfer from ARCENT of an additional $25 million.

Table 4
ITEF Cost Sharing: FMS, DCS, and Other Foreign Government Expenditures, as of 6/4/2015
($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FMS Cases</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio remote control units</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hellfire missiles</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement (CLSSA) for spare parts</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat vehicle spare parts</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1A1 spare parts</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120mm tank ammunition</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) Services</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>138.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DCS Contracts</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition (various) — (DEFEX, Spain)</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-mobility Tactical Vehicles (VAMTAC) — (DEFEX, Spain)</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military communications system — (Ericsson, Sweden)</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military bridging equipment — (Poly, China)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical masks — (Poly, China)</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition (various) — (Poly, China)</td>
<td>182.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>362.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Foreign Government Expenditures</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and munitions for the Peshmerga, including: mortar tubes, machine guns, RPG-7 launchers, sniper rifles, and AK-47 ammunition</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and munitions for the Peshmerga, including: mortar tubes, mortar rounds, machine guns, and assorted ammunition</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment for the Peshmerga, including: GPS units, metal detectors, vehicles, helmets, body armor, EOD equipment, communications equipment, and winter clothing</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation support for donations to the Peshmerga</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Peshmerga, including: AK-47 ammunition, mortar rounds, and RPG-7 rounds</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and munitions for the MOD and Peshmerga, including: machine guns, mortar tubes, ammunition, and hand grenades</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions for the Peshmerga, including RPG-7 rounds</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine gun ammunition for the Peshmerga</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 (cont’d)

ITEF Cost Sharing: FMS, DCS, and Other Foreign Government Expenditures, as of 6/4/2015
($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training support in northern Iraq, equipment, and munitions donations for the <em>Peshmerga</em>, including: small arms weapons, anti-tank systems, soldier equipment items, vehicles, small arms ammunition, anti-tank rounds, and hand grenades</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment for the <em>Peshmerga</em>, including: GPS units, metal detectors, vehicles, helmets, body armor, EOD equipment, communications equipment, and winter clothing</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment, munitions, and infrastructure to the <em>Peshmerga</em>, including: anti-tank systems, anti-tank rounds, machine gun ammunition, and construction of a logistics hub and helipad</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and munitions for the MOD, including: AK-47 rifles and ammunition</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and munitions for the <em>Peshmerga</em>, including: mortar tubes, RPG-7 launchers, and RPG-7 rounds</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions for the MOD, including: AK-47 ammunition and hand grenades</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training support for the MOD, including: training site infrastructure, vehicles, security items, transportation, training ammunition, and uniforms, along with other equipment and supplies for trainees</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handheld metal detectors for the MOD and <em>Peshmerga</em></td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>183.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>684.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CENTCOM, action memo for Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Iraq Train and Equip Fund Cost-Sharing Certification to Congress,” 6/11/2015.*
Syria Training and Equipping

In May 2015, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, characterized the U.S.-led train-and-equip mission in Syria as “very complex” and not easy. He emphasized its importance, however, as “one component of a much broader approach.”

Up to 1,000 U.S. military personnel have been authorized to support the program in FY 2015, and DoD reported that several coalition nations will play “a critical role.” These partners have offered training sites, logistical support for trainers and recruits, and personnel to assist U.S. forces with training under CJJATF. Additionally, these partners may provide weapons systems that the United States does not maintain in its stocks, transportation resources, life support for both trainees and U.S. personnel, and some forms of financial support for the trainees.

During May 2015, U.S. officials met with Syrian opposition and civil society leaders in Turkey. According to DoD, these meetings provided an opportunity to further discuss the U.S. train-and-equip program, improve coordination with Syrian civilian actors who have a role in the fight against ISIL, and discuss the current situation on the ground in Syria.
DoD reported that the program works to build the capability of “appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals” to accomplish the following objectives:

- Defend the Syrian people from attacks by ISIL.
- Secure territory controlled by the Syrian opposition.
- Protect the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria.
- Promote the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.

DoS and USAID have detailed liaisons to CJIAF’s Syria train and equip headquarters in Qatar to help coordinate between military and non-humanitarian civilian efforts. DoS reported that its programs provide support for local and provincial councils, including: capacity building on governance and operations, small grants to support provision of essential services, stipends for workers engaged in essential services projects, and equipment for essential services. DoS and USAID will continue to have the lead on assistance to Syrian civilian local governance entities in northern Syria and to Syrian civil society organizations to facilitate key services to the public, and to allow the basic elements of democratic local governance and citizen participation to develop. Coordinated interagency DoS/USAID teams from Turkey (START) and Jordan (SSAP) oversee and implement civilian programming efforts in Syria.

DoS reported that, as DoD trained elements under the Syria train and equip authority are able to remove ISIL from territory in Syria, civilian efforts will be directed to those opportunities to support local civilian leadership.

**COMMAND AND CONTROL**

The train-and-equip program comprises four interrelated efforts to “build, employ, stabilize, and expand” the moderate, vetted Syrian opposition forces (VSO). U.S. and coalition partner nations are collaborating to provide training and logistical support for the VSO, including transportation to training sites, ammunition, communications, equipment, food, water, tools, repair parts, fuel, force-protection materiel, medical supplies, vehicles, and military clothing.

According to DoD, this mission expands on non-military aid and civil-sector training for the Syrian opposition already in progress. DoD reported that it will continue leveraging relationships established by DoS and USAID (concerning
non-humanitarian efforts) and synchronize whole-of-government support for the program among other U.S. government departments and agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations.149

DoD reported that it works with coalition partners to mitigate the threat of internal and external attacks on training operations “through additional security measures, force-protection enhancements, and extensive screening and vetting of recruits.” As of June 2015, no such attacks had occurred.150

Once deployed, DoD expects the VSO to first strengthen the security of areas already held by opposition groups. Over time, DoD will train the VSO to organize themselves into a force that can operate from “relatively stable areas” and eventually evolve to conduct offensive operations to seize ISIL-controlled territory. DoD reported that it plans to call on coalition partners for assistance and regularly monitor the forces it trains to assess battlefield performance and to identify “unauthorized use of U.S.-provided assistance, human rights abuses, or the contravention of [Law of Armed Conflict] principles.”151

FUNDING

FY 2015 Syria training and equipping activities are funded through a $500 million allocation of the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF).152 The entire amount has been apportioned to U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Account</th>
<th>Apportioned</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army O&amp;M</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>28,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force O&amp;M</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM O&amp;M</td>
<td>368,000</td>
<td>136,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>500,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>164,708</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts. Nearly $165 million of this total had been obligated as of May 15, 2015.\textsuperscript{153} For additional details, see Table 5.

Nearly 74\% of all funds ($367.49 million) will purchase weapons, ammunition, and other operational equipment for the trained forces. More than $52 million will be required for construction of training and related facilities.\textsuperscript{154} For a breakout of training and equipment funds, by category, see Figure 2. For a listing of apportionments and obligations, by authorized category, see Table 6.

\textbf{Figure 2}

\textit{FY 2015 Syria Train and Equip Apportionments ($ Millions)}

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Category} & \textbf{Amount} \\
\hline
Construction & $52.16 \\
Sustainment & $34.85 \\
Supplies & $6.00 \\
Training & $39.50 \\
Equipment & $367.49 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Table 6
FY 2015 Syria Train and Equip Apportionments and Obligations, by Authorized Category, as of 5/15/2015
(§ Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Category</th>
<th>Apportioned</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training Total</td>
<td>39,500</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Lift/Inter-theater Air Transportation</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-theater Air Transportation</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-theater ground transportation</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>367,493</strong></td>
<td><strong>136,325</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>76,465</td>
<td>15,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>204,538</td>
<td>66,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous individual and operational equipment</td>
<td>86,490</td>
<td>53,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supplies Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,346</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumables</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracts and Bulk Purchase Agreement materials</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock fund materiel requisitions (Class I through VIII)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,160</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of training and associated facilities</td>
<td>47,960</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range modifications and improvements</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainment Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,847</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,037</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base life support</td>
<td>34,847</td>
<td>14,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-training support to VSO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stipends Total*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>500,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>164,708</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $77,000 has been committed but not appropriated or obligated.

DoD requested $600 million to meet mission requirements in FY 2016 under the new Syria Train and Equip Fund (STEF).\textsuperscript{155}

**RECRUITMENT AND VETTING**

To qualify for training, Syrian recruits must be approved through a multiphase DoD screening process to eliminate any threats to U.S. or coalition partner forces associated with the assistance program.\textsuperscript{156} DoD reported to Congress that it will employ “long-standing military procedures and practices for vetting international forces, as well as processes created by the U.S. intelligence community, and other U.S. departments and agencies.”\textsuperscript{157}

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in May 2015, Secretary Carter announced that training for the first cohort of 90 soldiers began on May 7.\textsuperscript{158} On July 7, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he announced that 60 trainees remained in the first class. Acknowledging that the number was very small, he reported that DoD was working to screen and vet almost 7,000 volunteers to ensure they pass the multistage screening process.\textsuperscript{159}

DoD IG has an assessment in progress to determine:

- whether guidance, standards, procedures, training, resources, and safeguards exist and are sufficient to enable CJIATF-Syria to develop and implement vetting processes to identify, recruit, and accept/reject New Syrian Forces (NSF) personnel, including pre-biometric, and counterintelligence vetting of recruit’s suitability
- whether these processes are designed to identify credible information vetted in accordance with applicable law, including but not limited to acts of violence against friendly forces, or political affiliation in conflict with the NSF mission
- the type and extent of current and planned U.S. Government interagency collaboration in the NSF vetting process

DoD IG will discuss this report in the classified annex to accompany the October 2015 biannual report.

**TRAINING**

Coalition-led combat training for the first company of new Syrian forces began on May 7, 2015. DoD reported it is providing “scalable, tailored training based on the assessed capabilities of [VSO] trainees, and adapted to fit the threats and geography that opposition forces are likely to face in Syria.” Subjects include small-arms training, communications, rudimentary medical care, and the chain of command.\textsuperscript{160}
DoD anticipates some attrition, particularly during advanced skills or leadership training. During typical training, some trainees will quit or fail advanced screening for counterintelligence, medical, or psychological reasons. In May, the Secretary of Defense estimated that the VSO would not become operational for a few months, but he expected the effort to be successful and to grow as the program determines “what the best training is.” That curriculum aims at developing effective fighting forces and fostering an “effective and reliable chain of command.”

DoD IG plans to review CJIAF-Syria training and equipping plans and policies to: (1) assess how they are working in support of the task force mission, (2) determine whether there are any gaps, and (3) determine if all mission preparation factors have been taken into consideration.

**SUSTAINMENT**

CJIAF anticipates providing several types of sustainment support for the VSO training cohorts, including logistics, communications, intelligence, and other enabling support. As of June 2015, however, it had yet to issue equipment or initial sustainment supplies and had not provided combat service or enabling support to maintain operations.

DoD reported that the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Syria will provide cash stipends to DoD-trained Syrian opposition leaders during and following training. However, it is not clear which funding source will be tapped to cover these costs. As of June 2015, the $500 million apportioned for the Syria Train and Equip program did not include funds for stipends, though $77,000 had been “committed” toward these costs.

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

DoD reported that coalition partners had undertaken and funded most construction of training and associated facilities. However, the U.S. government funded projects in four locations with $52 million of the CTPF, as of June 2015.

DoD IG will be conducting a series of audits and inspections related to contract support of base operations and adequacy of infrastructure. In the next quarter, we will be announcing an audit focusing on facilities maintenance, as well as a technical inspection examining the adequacy of electrical and fire protections systems at a training facility. This work will require DoD IG to conduct site visits.
Other Regional Stabilization Efforts

DoS reported that it is working to bolster regional security cooperation with its ongoing partnership with Jordan and the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF). Because Jordan is supporting OIR and participating in coalition operations, DoS expedited an early release of Jordan’s FY 2015 FMF allocation, approving the release of $300 million on February 19, 2015. An additional $85 million will be released before September 30. FMF funding supports Jordan’s ability to secure the borders, control national territory, and participate in coalition operations. It finances equipment, training, and services for these efforts, such as F-16 munitions for coalition operations and equipment sustainment support for aircraft and vehicles.¹⁶⁸

Enhancing Intelligence Collection on ISIL

The DNI serves as head of the intelligence community (IC), acting as the principal adviser to the President, to the NSC, and the Homeland Security Council “for intelligence matters related to the national security.”¹⁶⁹ The DNI has overall responsibility for the IC enterprise, including oversight of the NCTC, which was established along with the DNI position in 2004.¹⁷⁰

In 2005, the DNI designated NCTC as the Counterterrorism Mission Manager for the intelligence community.¹⁷¹ The NCTC Director reports to the DNI as the principal adviser on counterterrorism intelligence operations¹⁷² and also to the President and the NSC for “policy direction”¹⁷³ and matters about the planning and progress of counterterrorism operations, “except purely domestic terrorism.”¹⁷⁴

NCTC Counter-ISIL Activities and the Rewards for Justice Program

NCTC produces a “counterterrorism calendar,” designed as a ready reference guide for international focus on finding terrorists and also for awareness of various threats and important dates.¹⁸¹ NCTC reported it works to identify foreign fighters to be included on the U.S. homeland watch list and the counterterrorism calendar.¹⁸² The calendar provides a terrorist “most wanted list,” marking dates that terrorists may believe are important if planning attacks to commemorate particular events. For example, the 30 days of Ramadan are listed from June 18 through July 17, 2015, each with historical accounts of terrorist activities on those dates.¹⁸³
NCTC Background

NCTC assists the DNI in establishing requirements to meet the priorities of the President for the intelligence community across agency boundaries and performs several functions as the U.S. government’s lead for retention and dissemination of counterterrorism intelligence. The center also provides input to intelligence community leadership on agency counterterrorism plans and operations, and it conducts net assessments of terrorist threats. NCTC provides a “full-time interagency forum and process to plan, integrate, measure” the effectiveness of U.S. strategic operational counterterrorism activities. It does not, however, direct or execute operations. The center provides recommendations to the DNI to improve mission effectiveness with regard to the transfer of personnel and funds across the intelligence community, ensuring activities conform to priorities set by the President.

Six missions support the center’s primary responsibility of conducting net assessments of terrorist threats:

- assigning roles and responsibilities for counterterrorism activities to the appropriate lead agencies and monitoring the implementation of strategic operational plans
- providing analysis and integration for all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism (except intelligence exclusive to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism) and measuring the effectiveness and progress of strategic operational plans
- facilitating information sharing to ensure agencies have access to intelligence necessary for planning and assessing the progress of joint counterterrorism operations (other than intelligence operations)
- linking national counterterrorism policy to strategic operational objectives and tasks through an interagency forum to provide “all-source intelligence support”
- conducting “strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities within and among agencies”
- serving as the “central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts and support.”

NCTC’s Principal Deputy Director described the center’s intelligence strategic operational planning as filling “the gap between policy, strategy development and the execution of counterterrorism operations.”
NCTC’s calendar features the DoS Rewards for Justice program, administered by the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security, including a brief explanation of the program along with information about high-profile terrorists and the rewards offered for information about them. Although NCTC’s sources remain confidential, the calendar presents some of the program’s success stories. The Secretary of State has authorized rewards for information on key ISIL leaders, including the following:

- up to $7 million for information on Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli, a senior ISIL official who rejoined ISIL following release from prison in early 2012. (He operated under al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as a deputy to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the AQI amir (leader) of Mosul and was also a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.)
- up to $5 million for information on Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, born Taha Sobhi Falaha in Syria, the official spokesman and ISIL’s main conduit for disseminating its messages, including ISIL’s declaration of the creation of an Islamic caliphate. (He is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.)
- up to $5 million for information on Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili, senior ISIL commander and Shura Council member. (He is known to have overseen a prison facility in al-Taqba, where ISIL possibly held foreign hostages.)
- up to $3 million for information on Tariq Bin-al-Tahar Bin al-Falih al-‘Awni al-Harzi, an early ISIL official, named ISIL’s leader for the border region between Syria and Turkey. (Al-Harzi received new FTF recruits to the region and was leader of ISIL’s suicide bombers. He was reportedly killed in June 2015 in a drone strike in Syria.)

DoS reported that, since inception in 1984, the program has paid at least $125 million to more than 80 people “who provided actionable information that put terrorists behind bars or prevented acts of international terrorism worldwide.”

NCTC also maintains the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment database, which aggregates information to provide a consolidated repository of international terrorist information and identities. In February, the NCTC Director told Congress that NCTC and DHS are working together in developing “countering violent extremism” (CVE) Tools. CVE efforts are designed to “refine and expand the preventive side of counterterrorism” by raising community awareness about terrorist recruitment efforts. He cited as an example the “community resilience exercise” prepared by NCTC and DHS to practice case studies and various scenarios for awareness.
DoJ Counter-ISIL Activities

DoJ reported that it works with the FBI and other partners in the intelligence community to provide legal advice and ensure that U.S. agencies have the necessary legal authorities to conduct lawful collection of foreign intelligence and open-source information on terrorist threats. Regarding the CVE efforts, DoJ reported that it works with the FBI, DHS, and NCTC to empower public safety officials, educators, social service providers, and other civil-society organizations in local communities to design and implement strategies to strengthen resilience against all forms of violent extremist recruitment, including FTFs. The interagency team has implemented the “model regions” pilot. According to DoJ, U.S. Attorney’s Offices in these model regions coordinate a range of programs, including a multidisciplinary forum on intervention and educational programs to foster resilience.

DoJ reported that it also works with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) CVE subcommittee to encourage governments to enact good practices for supporting victims of terrorism. In addition, DoJ is developing strategies to counter violent extremism in prisons by developing and institutionalizing high-risk prisoner management procedures and programs to counter the radicalization of non-terrorist prisoners overseas.

According to DoS, certain DoJ activities are funded from their appropriations as part of their mandate for law enforcement, while others are funded by DoS foreign assistance funds under centrally managed or bilateral country programs and are designed to build capacity in the host nation’s security sector. Many of these programs have global and broad purposes and are not designed solely to counter ISIL.

EXPOSING ISIL’S TRUE NATURE

According to DoS, the CSCC sponsors the Counter-ISIL ICC, which is supported by multiple agencies (DHS, FBI, DoD, and members of the IC). The ICC streamlines and consolidates counter-ISIL messaging initiatives to support a coalition-wide strategic communications effort. The CSCC also sponsors a Digital Outreach Team, which conducts outreach that incorporates counter-ISIL messaging in English, Arabic, Somali, and Urdu. Funding allocated for the CSCC totals $4.73 million in FY 2014 and $5.43 million in FY 2015; there are 67 staff.

DoS reported that NEA implemented two small sub-grants inside Syria. According to DoS, the work will archive and disseminate information about human rights violations perpetrated by ISIL, with a focus on establishing
independent Syrian media programming. Broadcasts are in multiple languages, encouraging debates about inclusiveness and tolerance, reporting on human rights abuses, comparing ISIL’s extremist ideology with moderate tenets of peace and counter-ISIL narratives, and promoting the participation of women. The sub-grantees also conduct advocacy art campaigns through media such as graffiti and posters. The Department is planning to provide additional prior year ESF funds identified for Syria toward this broader program, which has other purposes than the counter-ISIL strategy and which predates it. As of June 30, 2015, DoS had allocated approximately $33 million for media assistance programs.  

DISRUPTING ISIL’S FINANCES

Treasury’s global terrorism authorities target the activities of extremist groups, including ISIL. In the past, Treasury has placed sanctions on numerous terrorist financiers who sent funds to extremists, including ISIL, and continues to do so as part of its portfolio. In addition, Treasury OIG continues to carry out audits of terrorist financing and anti-money laundering programs, including projects at the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program.

Treasury and DoS continue to coordinate U.S. activities with the Counter-ISIL Finance Group (CIFG), which includes 20 countries and several multilateral organizations. Thus far, CIFG has had two meetings (one in March 2015 and the most recent in May), and a third is scheduled for fall 2015.

DoJ reported that it is exploring with Treasury officials, DoS, and prosecutors how best to pursue individuals and designated terrorist entities who are acting illegally, on behalf of ISIL, as brokers and/or transshipment points for the procurement of goods (such as oil services equipment) with unwitting U.S. companies.

DoS reported that, as of June 30, 2015, its activities to disrupt ISIL finances included the following:

- The DoS Economic Bureau’s Office of Threat Finance Countermeasures within the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs provides policy support for the State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary co-lead of the counter-finance line of effort. The office develops and advances policy initiatives, coordinates with relevant agencies, and conducts outreach to foreign governments and the private sector on an ongoing basis in coordination with their Department of the Treasury counterparts. They also provide counter-finance expertise and support to the Special Presidential Envoy and the NSC, and policy input to
the Counter-ISIL Finance Cell (CIFC). During February–July 2015, the office performed a strategic analysis of ISIL’s financial and economic activities, including revenue streams from kidnapping for ransom, external donations, and other illicit activities and provided recommendations for a strategic counter-finance campaign, which it shared with the intelligence community, Treasury, and the Special Presidential Envoy.

- DoS reported that its Counterterrorism Bureau’s bilateral, regional and multilateral work, including through the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the UN, contributed to the adoption of UNSCR 2178 and the GCTF Good Practices, which served as the basis for the resolution. DoS reported that the bureau has also used its sanctions tools to target ISIL affiliates, entities, and individuals to constrain their financial activities. The CT Bureau’s Homeland Security Directorate’s Office of Terrorist Designations and Sanctions is charged with the task of using sanctions tools to target ISIL, its affiliates, and individuals and entities related to these organizations. CT uses its authorities under both the Immigration and Nationality Act and Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 in this effort. Under these authorities, State is able to impose legal penalties on those providing support to ISIL individuals or ISIL acts of terrorism. In September 2014, DoS designated 10 individuals and two groups as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under Executive Order 13224, all of whom were foreign terrorist fighters, and many of whom were fighting for or financing on behalf of ISIL. The officers working in designations have varied portfolios, which include not only ISIL and its affiliates, but a range of other terrorist organizations.

Some progress was made in 2014 in constraining ISIL’s ability to earn money from the sale of smuggled oil as a result of the anti-ISIL coalition airstrikes that were conducted on ISIL-operated oil refineries. But the oil trade was not fully eradicated. ISIL and AQ affiliates, including al-Nusrah Front, continue to use kidnapping for ransom operations, profits from the sales of looted antiquities, and other criminal activities to raise funds for operational purposes. Much of ISIL’s funding, unlike the resources utilized by al-Qaeda and similar groups, does not come from external donations, but was internally gathered in Iraq and Syria. ISIL earned up to several million dollars per month through its various extortion networks, in criminal activity in the territory where it operated, including through oil smuggling. 203
On June 12, 2015, Treasury published the National Money Laundering Risk Assessment and National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment reports, which identify the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks associated with money laundering and terrorist financing. The purpose of the reports is to help the public and private sectors understand the money laundering and terrorist financing methods used in the United States, the risks that these activities pose to the U.S. financial system and national security, and the status of current efforts to combat these criminal activities.

The 2015 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment report updates and expands the information identified in Treasury’s 2005 report, identifying money-laundering methods, risks, and related safeguards. Treasury consulted with DoJ, DHS, the Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Postal Service, and the financial community (including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). Treasury also used federal and state regulations and guidance established by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international standard-setting body for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing safeguards. The Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes leads the U.S. delegation to the FATF.

The first-ever National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment report identifies terrorist financing threats, vulnerabilities, risks, and assessments of the current efforts to combat these threats and vulnerabilities. Treasury consulted with the same partners used for preparing the National Money Laundering Risk Assessment report as well as DoS and NCTC. Treasury also used guidance from federal and state regulations and the FATF to prepare the report. The report details threats to the United States from an array of terrorist groups that have gained traction in areas of instability, limited opportunity, and broken governance. They include globally oriented groups, like al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and also regionally focused, globally connected groups. These groups rely on multiple revenue streams, including donations from individuals and charitable organizations; state sponsorship; and criminal activity, such as kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and drug trafficking. The report includes a discussion of the growing threat of terrorist acts committed by radicalized individuals inspired by al-Qaeda and ISIL.
DISRUPTING THE FLOW OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

The DoS 2014 country reports on terrorism provide insights into the terrorist groups exploiting porous borders and ungoverned areas to move fighters into and out of battleground regions. According to various academic and think tank studies, there have been more FTF traveling to the Syria/Iraq conflict than during previous jihad conflicts. The NCTC Director testified to Congress in February 2015 that more than 20,000 FTFs from approximately 90 different countries had travelled to Syria.205 DoS noted that Libya is a transit hub and source of FTFs, with possible tactical linkages to ISIL’s leadership in both Iraq and Syria. Turkey, however, remains the main transit hub for FTFs going to Syria to join ISIL. 206

U.S. Activities

The U.S. government has several programs dedicated to specialized efforts to stem the flow of FTFs, and legislation pending in the Senate would provide for increased reporting on these activities. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, introduced and passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in June 2015, would formalize FTF tracking requirements by the DNI, requiring a report to Congress every 90 days on details of FTF flow to and from both Syria and Iraq. This report would capture total numbers arrived, returned, gender, and visa status. When possible, it would include tracking information and the status of individuals on watch lists and those processed with biometrics data. The legislation would also require preparation of a graphic depicting worldwide concentrations of FTFs and flow and programmatic updates, such as FTF flow analysis, foreign-country cooperation, and actions taken to counter FTF flows. 207

DoS reported that its Counterterrorism Bureau funds programs to assist governments in better handling the threat posed by both departing and returning FTFs. Although these programs are not designed to be ISIL-specific, DoS expects them to have benefits in the broader context of stemming the flow of FTFs. 208

DoJ reported that it is supporting the investigation, disruption, and prosecution of those who provide financial and other support to foreign terrorist fighters and their associated organizations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. DoJ requests and receives international law-enforcement cooperation in criminal matters with foreign partners through mutual legal assistance exchanges and fugitive apprehension and return. DoJ also assists partner nations in developing institutions and best practices needed for effective mutual legal assistance and extradition cooperation. 209
DoJ reported that it also advises on both legislative reform and litigation best practices to address FTFs, and has commented on proposed legislation now being implemented by other countries to address the FTF threat. Additionally, at the request of partner nations, DoJ is dispatching teams of prosecutors, agents, and specialists to advise on how to apply best practices and lessons learned to active foreign FTF investigations. DoJ reported these additional activities conducted this quarter:

- During April 22–23, DoJ hosted the “Regional Police General Directors and Command Staff (Counter-terrorism) Workshop” in Pristina, Kosovo.
- During April 29–30, DoJ hosted a conference in Belgrade on FTFs called “Preventing Radicalization and Combating Terrorism in the Balkans Region.”
- During May 26–29, DoJ provided an assistance program on FTFs and UNSCR 2178 in India.
- In June, with DoS funding, DoJ deployed a regional Resident Legal Advisor to Tirana, Albania, to focus on rule of law, prosecutorial capacity building, and legislative reform to address FTF cases in certain Balkan countries.

Through INTERPOL Washington, the U.S. National Central Bureau, DoJ advances the law enforcement interests of the United States as the official representative to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). DoJ reported that INTERPOL Washington has contributed FTF profiles to INTERPOL’s Foreign Fighter Fusion Cell database, which included more than 4,000 FTF profiles contributed by over 40 member countries as of June 30, 2015.

In addition to these technical matters, DoJ reported that it meets on broader issues with its international counterparts, including the following activities conducted this quarter:

- On April 21–22, DoJ participated with its counterparts from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in a Quintet Foreign Fighter Working Group meeting in Ottawa that focused on legislative and prosecutorial best practices.
- During June 3–5, DoJ and INTERPOL Washington participated in the Counter-Terrorism Working Group meeting on FTFs in Barcelona, Spain.
- On June 8, DoJ participated in the Global Counter Terrorism Forum’s FTF Working Group Conference, at The Hague, to discuss trends and dynamics of the FTF phenomenon and outreach and engagement efforts.
On June 9, DoJ participated in the second meeting of the Counter-ISIL Coalition FTF Working Group, which met in The Hague, to update the progress of the coalition in countering ISIL and to discuss related rule-of-law, border-control, and security issues.

During June 15–16, DoJ hosted the U.S./Germany Counter Terrorism Working Group session focused on FTFs, covering topics such as prosecution of FTF cases, current laws and pending legislation to address FTF threats, capacity-building assistance, and the use of INTERPOL to counter the FTF phenomenon.

During June 24–25, DoJ participated in Eurojust’s annual Tactical Meeting on Terrorism at the Eurojust headquarters in The Hague.

**International Activities**

CTED is conducting analysis of the capacity gaps of 67 priority countries of origin, transit, and destination to assist with the implementation of UNSCR 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson represented the United States at the May 29 UN Security Council Session on Foreign Terrorist Fighters. The session adopted a second Presidential Statement to further highlight the need for greater implementation of UNSCR 2178 and called for the UN General Assembly’s Counter Terrorist Implementation Task Force to develop an action plan for capacity building. In February 2015, CTED launched a global research network as an opportunity to engage think tanks and research institutes. The network aims to strengthen CTED’s capacity to identify new trends and developments related to terrorism and monitor member states’ counterterrorism efforts and challenges. Spain has agreed to host a special meeting of the CTC and a Ministerial in Madrid on July 27–29, 2015, to discuss strategies and techniques to stem the flow of foreign fighters.

In June 2015, the GCTF’s FTF Working Group, co-chaired by the Netherlands and Morocco, met to discuss the implementation of The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon. Specifically, the meeting focused on figures, numbers, statistics, and common characteristics of FTF-related travel, as well as examples of de-radicalization, reintegration, and outreach programs designed to counter radicalization and address returning FTFs. As an outcome of that meeting, the working group is focusing on 1) the need to develop a standard mechanism to gather, analyze, and report FTF-related data and statistics; and 2) the need to intervene against recruitment and facilitation and to reintegrate returning FTFs through tailored de-radicalization programs. The Netherlands also co-chairs the anti-ISIL FTF Working Group with Turkey.
Other members of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL are involved in activities to stem the flow of FTFs. In June 2015, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott held a two-day regional security summit with senior representatives from 25 countries in the pacific theater, including Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Laos, Vietnam, and New Zealand. Major social media sites also participated, including representatives from Google, Facebook, and Twitter. Describing ISIL as “terrorism with global ambitions,” the Prime Minister said that the challenge of the summit was to determine how to stop young people from joining the terrorist groups. The Office of the Prime Minister reported that about 100 Australian citizens are thought to be part of ISIL in Syria or Iraq.\(^{218}\)

In its annual report on terrorism, DoS reported these highlights of measures taken by several countries to stem the flow of foreign fighters:

- Lebanon is working to secure its border with Syria and has increased security measures at airports and border crossings.\(^{219}\)

- Qatar has worked with U.S. interagency experts on countering terrorist and FTF funding sources.\(^{220}\)

- Saudi Arabia has worked on outreach and public awareness and expanded its programs to “address the rising threat to youth from recruitment from groups like ISIL and to dissuade its citizens from engaging as foreign fighters in Syria.”\(^{221}\)

- The Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) have worked for public awareness, providing “extensive coverage of the rise of violent extremism” through Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts throughout the region. VOA covers the particular ISIL threat of recruiting FTFs.\(^{222}\)

These countries, as well as other nations from Europe and Asia participated in the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe’s (OSCE) annual counterterrorism conference on June 30–July 1, which was focused on foreign terrorists fighters and countering violent extremism. OSCE serves as a platform that brings together government representatives from the 57 OSCE participating States with civil society to help curb the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon.\(^{223}\)
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND

The FBI reported that it is working with other departments and agencies, particularly DHS, to carry out at number of tasks and activities to counter the threat to the United States posed by ISIL and al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria and Iraq, including.  

- leveraging law enforcement and intelligence capabilities and authorities to identify, investigate, and prosecute terrorists
- enhancing aviation and border security efforts
- countering violent extremism
- continuing stakeholder outreach

DoJ reported that it works closely with DHS, the intelligence community, and federal and state law-enforcement agencies to share information and identify, investigate, and prosecute U.S. citizens and others who support foreign terrorist organizations by providing money or other resources, and who travel, intend to travel, and facilitate or recruit others to travel to foreign countries to fight or otherwise support terrorist groups.

Criminal Activity Reported This Quarter

As of June 30, 2015, federal prosecutors had charged more than 50 FTF-related cases, often arresting aspiring fighters before they are able to depart the country. According to DoJ, prosecutors have obtained a number of convictions, and many other cases are under investigation. Selected cases this quarter include:

- On May 13, in the Middle District of North Carolina, Donald Ray Morgan was sentenced to 243 months in federal prison, followed by 3 years of supervised release. Morgan pled guilty in October 2014 to attempting to provide material support to al-Qaeda in Iraq and one count of possession of firearm by a felon.
- On May 27, in the Southern District of Georgia, Leon Nathan Davis pled guilty to a criminal information charging him with attempting to provide material support to ISIL. For more than a year, an FBI-led team investigated Davis’s attempts to join an overseas designated foreign terrorist organization. He was arrested at the Atlanta Hartsfield Airport in October 2014 on a parole violation. He had purchased a ticket to fly to Turkey.
- On June 5, in the Western District of Texas, Michael Wolfe (also known as “Faruq”) was sentenced to 82 months in federal prison followed by 5 years of supervised release for attempting to provide material support
and resources to ISIL. In June 2014, Wolfe pled guilty to the charge, admitting that from August 2013 to June 17, 2014, he planned to travel to the Middle East to provide material support to ISIL.

- On June 11, in the Eastern District of Virginia, Ali Shukri Amin pled guilty to charges of conspiring to provide material support and resources to ISIL. Amin admitted to using Twitter to provide advice and encouragement to ISIL and its supporters. Amin, who used the Twitter handle @AmreekiWitness, provided instruction on how to use Bitcoin, a virtual currency, to mask the provision of funds to ISIL, and also facilitated ISIL supporters seeking to travel to Syria to fight with ISIL. Additionally, Amin admitted that he facilitated travel for Reza Niknejad, an 18-year-old Virginia resident who traveled to Syria to join ISIL in January 2015.

DoJ has also charged a number of individuals who have not traveled to the Syria-Iraq area of operations, but who have nonetheless been inspired or radicalized by ISIL to commit violent acts in the United States, including:

- In April 2015, an individual was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and attempting to provide material support to ISIL. He is alleged to have driven what he believed to be a fully functional vehicle-born improvised explosive device (VBIED) just outside a U.S. military installation in Kansas, with the intent to commit a suicide bombing by detonating the VBIED and murdering as many U.S. military personnel as possible to engage in violent jihad on behalf of ISIL.

- In May 2015, an individual in Ohio was charged with attempting to provide material support to ISIL. The individual allegedly plotted, planned, and attempted to attack the U.S. Capitol Building in an attempt to kill officers and employees of the United States during their official duties. The individual also allegedly possessed two semiautomatic rifles and approximately 600 rounds of ammunition.

- In June 2015, two individuals were charged in Massachusetts with conspiring to provide material support to ISIL. The individuals allegedly agreed to support ISIL, including by plotting to attack an intended victim who had organized a “draw the Prophet Muhammad” event that had occurred about a month earlier. Following that event, ISIL called for the intended victim’s “slaughter.”

For a sample of ISIL-related cases reported by DoJ this quarter, see Table 7.
DoD-funded Initiatives

DoD reported that a CENTCOM Interagency Action Group (IAG) provides embedded personnel (contractors and uniformed personnel) to support USAID, FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency, Treasury, and the Counter ISIL Finance Cell in efforts to disrupt ISIL access to funds, freedom of movement, and other facilitation activities. As of June 30, 2015, DoD had committed to funding the following activities related to Homeland Security Investigations (HSI):\(^{228}\)

- $900,000 to fund an HSI effort to establish and train a transnational criminal investigation unit in Jordan
- $314,000 to fund an initiative with Customs and Border Protection and HSI, operated out of the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, to work with host-nation ministries of interior and customs and border police to share intelligence and information on violent extremist organizations and adversary state networks

According to DoD, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats is statutorily authorized to provide counter-drug support to federal, state, local tribal, and foreign law enforcement agencies pursuant to section 1004 of the NDAA for 1991, as amended (P.L. 101-510). Moreover, a DoD joint task force that provides support to law-enforcement agencies conducting counterdrug activities may also provide, subject to all applicable laws and regulations, support to law-enforcement agencies conducting counterterrorism activities pursuant to section 1022 of the NDAA for FY 2004 (P.L. 108-136), as amended (10 USC 371 note). DoD reported that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has designated the IAG a joint task force within the meaning of section 1022 based on existing policy and prior practice.\(^{229}\)
### Table 7
ISIL-related Criminal Cases, 4/1/2015–6/30/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 29</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>New Jersey Man Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to ISIL and Witness Tampering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 22</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>North Carolina Man Charged with Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL and Weapon Offenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 19</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>U.S. Citizen Arrested for Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL and Other Federal Offenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 18</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>New Jersey Man Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Two Men Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Virginia Teen Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>Fifth Defendant Charged with Attempt and Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>Texas Man Sentenced to 82 Months in Prison for Attempting to Travel to Syria to Join ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27</td>
<td>GA</td>
<td>Georgia Man Pleads Guilty to Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 26</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>Texas Resident Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Two California Men Arrested on Charges of Conspiring to Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>Iraqi-Born U.S. Citizen Arrested for Making False Statement to the FBI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>North Carolina Man Sentenced to Serve 243 Months in Prison for Attempting to Provide Material Support to a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Virginia Woman Sentenced for Making False Statements in an International Terrorism Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>Cincinnati-Area Man Charged with Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 23</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>San Diego Man Arrested and Charged With Making False Statements in an International Terrorism Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20</td>
<td>MN</td>
<td>Six Minnesota Men Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10</td>
<td>KS</td>
<td>Topeka, Kansas, Man Charged in Plot to Explode Car Bomb at Military Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 9</td>
<td>WI</td>
<td>Madison, Wisconsin, Man Charged With Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 6</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>Fourth Brooklyn, New York, Resident Charged With Attempt and Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 3</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>U.S. Army National Guard Soldier and His Cousin Indicted for Conspiring to Support Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Philadelphia Woman Arrested for Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>Two Queens, New York, Residents Charged With Conspiracy to Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Syria Complex Crisis 61
Iraq Complex Crisis 65
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Conflict in Syria and Iraq has produced one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, causing the destruction of hundreds of communities and displacement of millions of people.

In Syria, the conflict continued to worsen during the reporting period, with the actions of the Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG)—including aerial bombardments, siege tactics, the targeting of civilian infrastructure, and denial of access to aid—serving as main drivers of the humanitarian crisis. Conflict among SARG and other armed groups—such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL, as well as moderate opposition groups—continues to complicate the humanitarian crisis. Shifting frontlines and high levels of violence hinder delivery of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected populations. In 2015, particularly in recent months, notable escalations in fighting around main population centers, such as the cities of Idlib and Palmyra, have resulted in further civilian deaths, destruction of infrastructure, large-scale displacement, and constrained access for relief efforts.

In Iraq, the consequences of the capture of territory by ISIL forces and the resulting counter-offensives by pro-government forces continue to be the main drivers of the humanitarian crisis, causing mass displacement and hindering humanitarian access to communities in need. Iraqis have been displaced throughout the country, including significant displacements in the provinces of Anbar, Ninewa, Baghdad, Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and Dahuk. According to the United Nations, recent advances by ISIL, such as the capture of Ramadi (the capital of Anbar province) on May 17, 2015, have resulted in the displacement of approximately an additional 300,000 people in the third quarter of FY 2015. The United Nations acts as the primary international coordinating body for humanitarian response efforts in the region and conducts humanitarian missions across conflict lines and borders to reach those in need.

Humanitarian assistance is provided solely on the basis of need, and delivered impartially, regardless of political, religious, or ethnic affiliation. These efforts may continue long after the fight against ISIL is over. The U.S. government’s humanitarian response activities are identified as a line of effort under the Administration’s counter-ISIL strategy to highlight the importance of the humanitarian response, but they long predate counter-ISIL efforts and have distinct aims.

Although the conflicts and difficulties presented in the two countries are distinct, the U.S. government’s humanitarian response in each is associated with the same strategic aims. The U.S. government’s humanitarian mission in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries seeks to accomplish the following:
• Provide assistance to the displaced, vulnerable, and conflict-affected in Iraq and Syria, as well as to Syrian and Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries.
• Continue to work with host governments in neighboring countries to mitigate the humanitarian and economic effects of the conflict.

To advance these aims and maximize the reach of humanitarian assistance, the U.S. government works through international NGOs, UN agencies, and international organizations.

USAID and DoS lead U.S. government humanitarian response efforts in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries. Within USAID, the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) is leading the agency’s response to the crises in Iraq and Syria. Two offices within DCHA are primarily responsible for responding to humanitarian crises: the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and Office of Food for Peace (FFP). OFDA and FFP coordinate activities and provide direct assistance to those in need in the Syria and Iraq complex crises. OFDA, which has a focus on providing non-food assistance for conflict-affected populations inside Syria and Iraq (including IDPs and host communities) is working through implementing partners, including UN agencies and international NGOs, to carry out humanitarian efforts in both Iraq and Syria. FFP, which has a specific
focus on the provision of food aid, also works through implementing partners to provide emergency food assistance to conflict-affected populations inside Syria, to conflict-affected populations inside Iraq displaced or otherwise affected by the Iraq crisis, and to Syrian refugees in five neighboring countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, and Iraq). As of June 30, 2015, OFDA was working with 29 organizations to provide humanitarian assistance in Iraq and Syria, while FFP was working with 7 implementing partners to provide assistance in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries. OFDA and FFP aim to provide assistance to vulnerable and needy populations across both Syria and Iraq and in neighboring countries regardless of affiliation or background.

OFDA and FFP manage, coordinate, and implement humanitarian assistance efforts through both field- and headquarters-based units. In the field, USAID Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) assess conditions on the ground, identify pressing needs, and coordinate U.S. government responses for Syria and Iraq. DARTs comprise humanitarian experts and technical advisors and include both OFDA and FFP personnel. A regional USAID DART supports efforts in and around Syria. The DART has two country teams, one based in Jordan and another in Turkey, that are managed by a regional DART team leader. In Iraq, USAID maintains a DART based in Erbil, which also has a staff presence in Baghdad.

In Washington, DC, a Middle East Humanitarian Crisis Response (MECHR) Management Team, staffed primarily by OFDA, but also including FFP staff, supports the DARTs and also performs overall operational and program management, strategic planning, interagency coordination, and outreach and communication. DARTs coordinate with the MECHR management team to ensure humanitarian assistance operations are well managed in the field and in Washington, DC.

Within DoS, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) leads the agency’s response to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq and Syria, assisting IDPs, refugees, and conflict victims. PRM works through implementing partners, including UN agencies and international NGOs, in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey. Worldwide, PRM also supports repatriation, local integration, and resettlement efforts. As of June 30, 2015, PRM announced funding for 10 organizations in FY 2015 to provide humanitarian assistance in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries. PRM aims to provide assistance to vulnerable and needy populations across both Syria and Iraq and in neighboring countries regardless of affiliation or background.

PRM manages, coordinates, and implements humanitarian assistance efforts through both field- and headquarters-based staff. In the field, refugee coordinators (Refcoord) based in Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, as well
as those deployed temporarily in Lebanon, work in close coordination with the relevant USAID DART teams. In Iraq, PRM has a Senior Refugee and IDP Coordinator based in Baghdad and a RefCoord based in Erbil who are responsible for meeting with partners and monitoring programs as security allows. PRM has also contracted with a third-party monitor in Iraq, whose local staff can access areas to directly monitor PRM-funded programs where PRM’s RefCoords are unable to travel. RefCoords also work closely with their DART counterparts in Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey. In Washington, D.C., PRM staff assigned to Syria and Iraq teams perform operational and program management, award administration, and interagency coordination functions.250

USAID and PRM receive appropriations for humanitarian assistance activities that are not designated for use in responding to a particular humanitarian crisis to enable the agencies to exercise flexibility in responding to ongoing and emerging crises. USAID uses International Disaster Assistance funds to support humanitarian assistance activities associated with the Syria-Iraq complex crisis, while PRM relies on Migration and Refugee Assistance funds for this purpose.251

SYRIA COMPLEX CRISIS

Syria has been embroiled in conflict for more than 4 years, dating back to pro-democracy uprisings in March 2011. Fighting has continued unabated in 2015, intensifying humanitarian needs across the country and displacement within and outside its borders. As of June 2015, the United Nations estimated that approximately 230,000 Syrians had lost their lives.252 According to the UN, nearly 4 million Syrians had fled the country, 7.6 million more had been internally displaced, and at least 12.2 million people—around 68% of the total population—were in humanitarian need.253 Additionally, 4.8 million were in UN-designated “hard to reach areas,” including 440,000 in besieged areas where humanitarian access is extremely limited and an estimated 2.7 million in ISIL-controlled territory.254 The United Nations estimated that only 2%–3% of the 7.6 million IDPs resided in camps or more organized settlements, with the majority living with relatives or others willing to provide shelter, squatting in schools or mosques, or surviving in informal, marginal settings, such as abandoned buildings.255

This quarter, the number of Syrian refugees continued to increase, with approximately 20,000 new refugees seeking shelter in neighboring countries such as Turkey, bringing the total number of new Syrian refugees in 2015 to approximately 700,000.256 This broader overall increase contrasted with trends in Lebanon. During the same period, the number of Syrian refugees (including registered refugees and those awaiting registration) in Lebanon—
the country with the second largest Syrian refugee population—decreased by 20,000, in part due to UNHCR’s temporary suspension of new registrations at the Government of Lebanon’s instruction.\textsuperscript{257} Syrian refugees in Lebanon have also faced pressure to move from informal settlements and other rudimentary facilities as a result of forced evictions, and security operations have also prompted the movement of refugees within the country. These developments, in turn, have prompted UNHCR to work with the Government of Lebanon to establish orderly procedures and alternative locations for refugees required to leave military and border zones.\textsuperscript{258}

Internal displacement continued to increase in Syria, as well. By May 2015, conflict had displaced more than half-a-million people as rebel infighting and resource scarcity left many without access to essential services.\textsuperscript{259}

On June 25, 2015, the U.S. government announced it would commit more than $360 million in additional funding for humanitarian relief efforts in Syria,\textsuperscript{260} raising to $4 billion the total amount committed since FY 2012.

For details of U.S. commitments, by country, see Table 8. Notwithstanding significant financial commitments on the part of the U.S. government, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported on June 30, 2015, that the United Nations had only received a quarter of the funding it needed to implement response plans for the humanitarian crisis inside Syria.\textsuperscript{261} The United Nations reported that this funding shortfall would dramatically affect the ability of major humanitarian actors to conduct operations.\textsuperscript{262} This quarter, World Food Program (WFP) officials reportedly expressed concern about the likelihood that it would have to reduce food aid benefits to Syrian refugees absent additional financial support from donors, noting that the reduction would affect hundreds of thousands of refugees.\textsuperscript{263}

In Syria, a UN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for all UN humanitarian assistance operations under a “Whole of Syria” approach that includes operations inside Syria as well as cross-border activities designed to help those affected by the conflict.\textsuperscript{264} Several major UN agencies such as the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), WFP, and UNHCR conduct humanitarian assistance operations in the region, providing support in areas like healthcare; water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); and the management and supply of camps for IDPs and refugees.\textsuperscript{265}

USAID’s OFDA and FFP and DoS’s PRM all contribute to the U.S. government’s humanitarian response efforts associated with the complex crisis in Syria.

As of June 30, 2015, USAID was providing support for 43 humanitarian assistance projects in connection with the complex crisis in Syria.\textsuperscript{266} Of this total, 32 awards associated with 24 different implementing partners were
funded by OFDA.\textsuperscript{267} OFDA-funded projects in Syria reportedly provided services in all of Syria’s governorates and districts.\textsuperscript{268} These projects are designed to promote humanitarian assistance coordination, provide logistics and relief commodities, and improve WASH, health, and food security among displaced populations. Most projects are geared toward the provision of general emergency assistance to conflict affected populations, while a smaller subset are intended to address more specialized needs such as reproductive health or the prevention of gender-based violence.\textsuperscript{269} During this reporting period, OFDA made four additional awards for projects with a focus on the provision of relief supplies, emergency food security, healthcare, and WASH support through international humanitarian aid organizations.\textsuperscript{270} Two OFDA programs with a focus on emergency humanitarian support and WASH assistance for conflict-affected people in Syria concluded during the reporting period.\textsuperscript{271} As of June 30, 2015, FFP was sponsoring 11 food aid projects through 7 implementing partners in support of responses to the Syria complex crisis.\textsuperscript{272}

Working through implementing partners such as WFP and others, FFP provides

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FY 2015 Q2</th>
<th>FY 2015 Q3</th>
<th>Since FY 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inside Syria</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>2,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>509</strong></td>
<td><strong>366</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,046</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Note:} Reflects the timing of funding announcement and not the fiscal-year source of funding that may ultimately be used.

\textbf{Source:} DoS, responses to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015 and 7/22/2015.
assistance through a variety of means inside Syria, including the provision of flour to bakeries, direct food rations to households, and food vouchers. While assisting those within Syria, FFP is also providing food aid to Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey, primarily through electronic food vouchers.

As of June 30, 2015, PRM had announced support for 10 humanitarian assistance partners in FY 2015 providing services in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt in response to the complex crisis in Syria. The programs for nine agencies are designed to meet emergency needs for protection (including prevention and response to gender-based violence and child protection); shelter; WASH; education, health, refugee reception, core relief items, and to a limited extent inside Syria food assistance. In addition, funding was announced for a tenth partner to support increased capacity of municipal actors, wastewater treatment, facilities to improve solid waste management. During this reporting period, PRM announced additional funding for six of these international humanitarian aid organizations funded earlier in the fiscal year for projects with a focus on the emergency needs outlined above.

The U.S. government and its implementing partners have encountered difficulties delivering aid to those affected by the conflict. Active fighting and tenuous security conditions often hinder USAID implementer operations. In addition, past audit work has identified problems with monitoring and verifying implementer and beneficiary actions. In some cases, the failure to institute proper monitoring practices has limited accountability for project activities. Monitoring limitations have been reported, for example, with respect to WFP, one of USAID’s more significant implementers in the region. Although WFP has reported that it significantly increased monitoring efforts, last year, WFP OIG found that WFP had been able conduct only 25% of planned verification activities in Syria. USAID OIG found that, while some implementing partners had identified means of monitoring activities in difficult security situations, others had not employed effective monitoring approaches and could not verify that food aid was reaching intended recipients. The Government Accountability Office has also highlighted concerns in this area, noting that FFP had only two field staff to assist in monitoring food aid to Syrian IDPs and refugees.

As of June 30, 2015, USAID programs and operations working to address the Syria Complex Crisis had obligated just more than $531 million and disbursed $592 million in FY 2015. PRM had obligated just more than $284 million in FY 2015. For a breakout, by office or bureau, see Table 9.
Table 9
U.S. Assistance for the Syria Complex Crisis, FY 2015 Obligations and Disbursements, as of 6/30/2015
($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office/Bureau</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>490.3</td>
<td>591.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>284.5</td>
<td>235.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>815.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>827.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: FY 2015 disbursements may exceed FY 2015 obligations because some are based on prior year obligations. Funding totals correspond to the year of obligation or disbursement and not the year in which they were appropriated. Data on disbursements can provide valuable information about how much money has been spent on activities as well as the amounts of funding that remain available for expenditure. However, this information is subject to a noteworthy limitation. Humanitarian assistance partners sometimes accrue expenses before drawing down on agency funds in the form of disbursements. As a result, disbursement data on these efforts does not always fully reflect the progress of humanitarian assistance efforts in financial terms. For example, provided a letter of credit from USAID, humanitarian assistance implementing partners may accrue significant expenses before drawing down on agency funds. For this reason, expenditures on humanitarian assistance activities sometimes exceed disbursements. Whereas OFDA only reported $1 million in disbursements on Syria programs during FY 2015, reported expenditures for these programs over the period exceed $10 million.

Sources: USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/14/2015; DoS, response to request for Lead IG information, 7/22/2015.

IRAQ COMPLEX CRISIS

In 2014, ISIL seized control of nearly one third of Iraqi territory. ISIL has continued to make territorial gains in 2015, including the capture of Ramadi, the Sunni majority capital of Anbar province. While Iraqi forces and militias made some gains against ISIL, like the retaking of Tikrit, sustained fighting on multiple fronts, such as along the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) and Baghdad province borders with ISIL territory, has put millions more in need.

This quarter, the number of people the United Nations identified as in need in Iraq increased by 3 million, bringing the total number of Iraqis in need to 8.2 million or almost a quarter of the country’s population. Parallel increases were registered among estimates for the number of Iraqi IDPs. The United Nations estimated that the number of IDPs in Iraq grew by 410,000 during the period, raising the overall total to more than 3 million. As of June 25, 2015, only 9% of IDPs resided in camps. While some had found refuge with family or friends, 66% reportedly survived in makeshift or informal shelters.
In Iraq, the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) is responsible for coordinating all UN and cluster-system humanitarian relief activities and for coordinating endeavors with the Government of Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the United States. The UN presence in Iraq is managed under the auspices of UNAMI, which is headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Humanitarian assistance in Iraq is coordinated by the Deputy SRSG and Humanitarian Coordinator. The Deputy SRSG facilitates coordination among the major humanitarian actors and host governments. Working-level coordination among humanitarian actors is achieved through the cluster system, in which sector-based working groups comprising the primary humanitarian actors in each area of focus (such as food; health; non-food items; shelter; and water, sanitation and hygiene) gather to share information on needs, challenges, and activities.

As of June 30, 2015, the U.S. government had announced commitments for humanitarian assistance in Iraq of $416 million since FY 2014. For details of U.S. commitments, by country, see Table 10. This quarter, the U.S. government announced approximately $196 million to address the expanding crisis in Iraq. However, according the UN, donor contributions to the assistance effort have not been sufficient to meet overall humanitarian requirements in the country. On June 30, 2015, UNOCHA reported that the UN had only received 31% of the funding necessary to address the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Iraq.

Table 10
U.S. Commitments Announced for Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq, FY 2015 and Cumulative Since 2014, as of 6/30/2015 ($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FY 2015 Q3</th>
<th>Since FY 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/Iraq Region</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Reflects the timing of funding announcement and not the fiscal-year source of funding that may ultimately be used.

Source: DoS, responses to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015 and 7/22/2015.
In early April 2015, ISIL began an assault on the city of Ramadi, the capital of Iraq’s largest province. Initially displacing approximately 90,000–114,000 people from Ramadi, ISIL’s eventual capture of the city in May 2015 and sustained fighting between pro-government forces and ISIL, has displaced those in other communities in Anbar province and increased the total number of IDPs from the area to nearly 300,000 people. Many of these IDPs have fled to other locations in Anbar province and Baghdad and face difficult conditions in both locations.

Efforts to aid the roughly 70% of Ramadi’s IDPs still located in Anbar province have been complicated by the fact that many are located in territory under ISIL control. In contrast to Syria, where humanitarian actors were operating before ISIL’s establishment and retained some access to communities following the group’s rise, ISIL’s rapid ascent in Iraq has prevented humanitarian groups from accessing communities under its control. The movement of these IDPs to other areas has been hampered because authorities from other provinces have prevented them from passing through checkpoints, despite orders from the GOI instructing them otherwise. By the end of June 2015, the needs of IDPs in Anbar province were particularly dire according to USAID, and include fundamental requirements for life such as shelter, protection, water, food, and sanitation. Although the GOI established camps for IDPs in Anbar province, the majority of IDPs from Ramadi continue to seek safety in unplanned settlements. For those within camps, humanitarian actors report significant problems, including a lack of access to essential services such as sanitation, healthcare, and safety from violence. UNICEF announced on June 29, 2015, that it had exhausted its supply of emergency kits, the main vehicle for assisting newly displaced IDPs from Anbar province, further exacerbating conditions.

Ramadi IDPs residing outside Anbar province reportedly remain in critical need as well. Approximately 25% of IDPs from Ramadi reside in Baghdad, where they sometimes face hostility from the local populace and lack access to core services. The GOI reportedly relocated thousands of Ramadi IDPs in Baghdad to Erbil, the capital of the IKR in northern Iraq, where they experience similar conditions.
As of June 30, 2015, USAID had obligated nearly $53 million and disbursed nearly $5 million in FY 2015 in support of efforts associated with the Iraq Complex Crisis. PRM had obligated just more than $150 million. For a breakout, by office or bureau, see Table 11.

**Table 11**

U.S. Assistance for the Iraq Complex Crisis, FY 2015 Obligations and Disbursements, as of 6/30/2015

(\$ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office/Bureau</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>150.4</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>203.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>68.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Funding totals correspond to the year of obligation or disbursement and not the year in which they were appropriated. Data on disbursements can provide valuable information about how much money has been spent on activities as well as the amounts of funding that remain available for expenditure. However this information is subject to a noteworthy limitation. Humanitarian assistance partners sometimes accrue expenses before drawing down on agency funds in the form of disbursements. As a result, disbursement data on these efforts does not always fully reflect the progress of humanitarian assistance efforts in financial terms. For example, provided a letter of credit from USAID, its humanitarian assistance implementing partners may accrue significant expenses before drawing down on agency funds. For this reason, expenditures on humanitarian assistance activities sometimes exceed disbursements. Whereas OFDA only reported $1 million in disbursements on Syria programs during FY 2015, reported expenditures for these programs over the period exceed $10 million.

**Sources:** USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/14/2015; DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/22/2015.

Although USAID’s bilateral assistance program in Iraq has been winding down, the current crisis arising from the military advances made by ISIL have resulted in significant U.S. humanitarian assistance to Iraq. USAID has undertaken a survey to determine whether OFDA and its implementers are taking reasonable steps to manage and mitigate risks for selected OFDA activities while responding to the needs of the internally displaced Iraqi population.

Due to the rapid advance of ISIL and deteriorating humanitarian situation in Iraq over the past quarter, USAID has substantially increased its humanitarian assistance activities in Iraq. As of June 30, 2015, OFDA was providing support for 19 projects through 16 implementing partners in areas like logistics support, relief commodities, WASH, protection, and shelter assistance.
Nine of these projects were initiated during the reporting period. A number of these focused on providing assistance to IDPs in northern and central Iraq. In addition, during the reporting period, OFDA and FFP, through support to UNICEF and WFP, respectively, funded the preparation and delivery of rapid response kits for conflict-affected populations in Iraq. The kits contain emergency food rations, potable water, and other relief items.301 Six OFDA projects with a focus on the provision of emergency humanitarian assistance, WASH, and shelter for conflict-affected people and IDPs in Iraq ended during the reporting period.302

FFP similarly expanded its engagement in Iraq during the reporting period, initiating a single project to address food security in the country. Specifically, on May 22, 2015, FFP began funding WFP emergency food security activities throughout the country to respond to the rapidly increasing number of IDPs. According to USAID, the WFP program is providing 220,000 camp-based IDPs and an additional 160,000 IDPs outside of camps with emergency food supplies. WFP is also reportedly providing 480,000 IDPs who are primarily concentrated in Kurdistan with food vouchers.303

Similarly, PRM has realigned its priorities for funding away from the longer-term programs focused on durable solutions and more toward emergency response programs. As of June 30, 2015, PRM had announced support for three international organizations providing humanitarian assistance inside Iraq and other countries in the region. Their programs are
designed to provide protection, shelter, non-food items, health care, and water and sanitation interventions to both IDPs and refugees in neighboring countries. One program also includes providing information on displacement trends to other humanitarian agencies, as well as camp mapping.  

As of June 30, 2015, humanitarian actors lacked access to areas of Iraq under ISIL control. ISIL’s territorial gains in 2015 have, therefore, had the effect of significantly reducing assistance options for many of Iraq’s displaced persons. This fact and the risk of fighting and incursion into other neighboring areas complicate U.S.-supported humanitarian assistance efforts in Iraq.
IG
ACTIVITIES

Logistics and Staffing  72
Oversight Projects  72
Investigations  73
Hotline  75
LOGISTICS AND STAFFING

Assigning permanent personnel to this contingency operation has been a priority for the Lead IG agencies. Some of the FY 2015 oversight projects require teams to travel to Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey, and other locations. For FY 2016, OIR oversight will continue to have a regional approach and will align to the U.S. strategy for the nine lines of effort. The Lead IG agencies will supplement staffing requirements by utilizing the special hiring authority provided with title 5 USC 3161 and the re-employment of annuitants, as provided within section 9902, in such number and with such skills to perform the functions required for effective Lead IG oversight. DoD IG plans to retain a field office in Kuwait in support of its regional activity.

OVERSIGHT PROJECTS

On March 31, 2015, the Lead IG agencies finalized their FY 2015 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for OIR, aligning oversight to the U.S. strategy to counter ISIL. The joint strategic plan is based on risk assessments that consider funding amounts, vulnerability to abuse, lessons learned, and potential impact on the operations of the contingency itself. The five major oversight areas are oversight of contracts, operations, governance, humanitarian and development assistance, and intelligence. A complete copy of the plan can be found at www.dodig.mil.

By the end of this quarter, the Lead IG agencies had issued 4 reports and had 12 ongoing projects in various stages of completion. DoS OIG issued 4 reports, with 1 of them related to contract oversight and 3 of them related to governance:


We will discuss these and other completed reports in the October 2015 biannual report to Congress. In particular, DoD IG will discuss the results of the Iraqi Army train, advise, and assist and MSO vetting assessments at that time.
As of June 30, 2015, DoD IG had 7 ongoing projects, DoS OIG had 8 ongoing, and USAID had 1 ongoing project. Of the 16 projects:

- 4 involve contract oversight
- 6 involve operations
- 3 involve governance
- 2 involve humanitarian and development assistance
- 1 involves intelligence

DoD IG also anticipates announcing 3 new projects early in the quarter with 1 involving contract oversight and 2 related to operations.

**INVESTIGATIONS**

On June 12, 2015, the Inspectors General for DoD, DoS, and USAID signed a memorandum of understanding and addendum establishing a Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group for Overseas Contingency Operations. The working group will identify, synchronize and de-conflict fraud and corruption investigations related to U.S. government contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and other federal assistance awards related to an OCO; protect the integrity of relevant U.S. government processes; and deter future crimes. The MOU requires the completion of an addendum for each contingency operation in order to establish the FCIWG for the particular operation. Addendum 1 to the agreement, “Operation Inherent Resolve,” established the FCIWG for OIR. The MOU and Addendum 1 were adopted and signed by the Inspectors General for DoD, DoS, and USAID on June 12, 2015. The MOU and addendum have been disseminated to the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the FBI for evaluation and consideration.

The investigative components of the Lead IG agencies are committed to actively and cooperatively pursuing allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse related to OIR programs and operations. Each of these components brings to bear a unique set of authorities and expertise.

**Defense Criminal Investigative Service**

The Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), DoD IG’s criminal investigations component, maintains regular liaison with contracting and support commands, such as the Defense Contract Management Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Joint Regional Contracting Commands. DCIS has agents currently deployed in
Africa, Qatar, and Kuwait in support of OIR, and is in the process of recruiting and hiring experienced agents under hiring authority 5 U.S.C. 3161 to support each mission for an extended period of time. These authorities give DCIS the flexibility to hire temporary agents core mission requirements.

DCIS investigators provide fraud awareness briefings and DCIS mission briefings to U.S. military leaders, civilian contracting officials, defense contractor personnel, and host-nation law-enforcement and civilian personnel. The purpose of these briefings is to educate these officials about recognizing, reporting, and countering fraud, waste, and abuse related to DoD contract dollars. From April 1, 2015, through June 30, 2015, DCIS conducted 18 fraud awareness briefings related to OIR for nearly 100 people.

DoS Office of Inspector General
DoS OIG agents have broad jurisdiction to conduct criminal, civil and administrative investigations into claims of fraud, waste, abuse, and any allegation affecting the programs and operations of DoS and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, including those relating to OIR. In conducting investigations, DoS OIG coordinates closely with its law enforcement partners, including DCIS, investigators from other military agencies, USAID OIG, and the FBI, to share intelligence and maximize limited resources. DoS has established an office in Frankfurt, Germany, to investigate offenses occurring in the OIR region and elsewhere. Investigations involving OIR will be prioritized as appropriate. DoS OIG is using hiring authority under 5 U.S.C. 3161 delegated from DoD to bring in experienced agents to complement the existing workforce. As of June 30, 2015, DoS had no open investigations relating to OIR.

USAID Office of Inspector General
USAID OIG provides fraud awareness briefings to U.S. and non-U.S. USAID implementers and intended beneficiaries, as well as accountability training to host countries. Assistance projects implemented in developing countries are at significant risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. Those risks are multiplied when projects unfold during a disaster or military contingency. To help address these risks, USAID OIG staff provides USAID officials, implementing partner staff, and local auditors with training in identifying fraud, complying with the requirements of USAID contracts and agreements, and reporting potential violations to their office. Training takes place in Iraq and neighboring countries. As of June 30, 2015, USAID OIG had 6 ongoing cases and did not open or close any cases during the quarter. USAID OIG also conducted a fraud awareness briefing with 42 attendees.
HOTLINE

Lead IG Hotline operations began in Kuwait, in May 2015. This is the first DoD IG-supported Hotline to deploy to a forward location. In June 2015, the Inspectors General for DoD, DoS, and USAID signed a memorandum of agreement codifying the reporting processes and procedures for the Lead IG Hotline.

During April 1, 2015–June 30, 2015, the Lead IG Hotline received the following contacts and complaints, by office of inspector general:

- DoS OIG—1 complaint
- DoD IG—4 complaints
- USAID OIG—31 complaints

The Lead IG Hotline conducted the following activities since arriving in Kuwait:

- performed outreach to brief contracting support personnel on the Lead IG Hotline at 15 commands, including commanders and staffs in Kuwait and Qatar
- placed 35 Lead IG Hotline posters advertising fraud, waste, and reporting procedures at various bases in Kuwait, Iraq, and Qatar
- briefed more than 200 DoD civilians, contractors, and servicemembers involved in pre- and post-contract award work on the Lead IG and risks for fraud, waste, and abuse, particularly in the use of U.S. Government purchase cards
- established briefings on reporting wrongdoing to the Lead IG for all incoming contractors, servicemembers, and DoD civilians arriving in Kuwait to support the OIR mission
- developed a Lead IG Hotline screen saver that displays randomly on all ARCENT NIPR and SIPR monitors in Southwest Asia
- began translating the DoD IG complaint form and the DoD IG informational tri-fold into Pashto, Hindi, and Tagalog to inform foreign workers who may be unable to speak, read, or write English about how to report wrongdoing
- provided Lead IG briefs at weekly tenant meetings in Kuwait

Complaint boxes are being constructed by Camp Arifjan personnel to be placed around the base to allow for confidential and anonymous reporting.
APPENDICES

Appendix A: Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as Amended 78
Appendix B: The Lead Inspector General Model 82
APPENDIX A:
SECTION 8L OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED

§8L. Special Provisions Concerning Overseas Contingency Operations

(a) Additional Responsibilities of Chair of Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.-Upon the commencement or designation of a military operation as an overseas contingency operation that exceeds 60 days, the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) shall, in consultation with the members of the Council, have the additional responsibilities specified in subsection (b) with respect to the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c).

(b) Specific Responsibilities.-The responsibilities specified in this subsection are the following:

(1) In consultation with the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), to designate a lead Inspector General in accordance with subsection (d) to discharge the authorities of the lead Inspector General for the overseas contingency operation concerned as set forth in subsection (d).

(2) To resolve conflicts of jurisdiction among the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) on investigations, inspections, and audits with respect to such contingency operation in accordance with subsection (d)(2)(B).

(3) To assist in identifying for the lead inspector general for such contingency operation, Inspectors General and inspector general office personnel available to assist the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) on matters relating to such contingency operation.

(c) Inspectors General.-The Inspectors General specified in this subsection are the Inspectors General as follows:


(2) The Inspector General of the Department of State.
(3) The Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development.

(d) Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operation.—(1) A lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall be designated by the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency under subsection (b)(1) not later than 30 days after the commencement or designation of the military operation concerned as an overseas contingency operation that exceeds 60 days. The lead Inspector General for a contingency operation shall be designated from among the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c).

(2) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall have the following responsibilities:

(A) To appoint, from among the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), an Inspector General to act as associate Inspector General for the contingency operation who shall act in a coordinating role to assist the lead Inspector General in the discharge of responsibilities under this subsection.

(B) To develop and carry out, in coordination with the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation and to ensure through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations, independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation.

(C) To review and ascertain the accuracy of information provided by Federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements in support of the contingency operation.

(D)(i) If none of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) has principal jurisdiction over a matter with respect to the contingency operation, to exercise responsibility for discharging oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to such matter.

(ii) If more than one of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) has jurisdiction over a matter with respect to the contingency operation, to determine principal jurisdiction for discharging oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to such matter.
(E) To employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), on a temporary basis using the authorities in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, such auditors, investigators, and other personnel as the lead Inspector General considers appropriate to assist the lead Inspector General and such other Inspectors General on matters relating to the contingency operation.

(F) To submit to Congress on a bi-annual basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the activities of the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) with respect to the contingency operation, including-

(i) the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits and of referrals to the Department of Justice; and

(ii) overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by inspectors general, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits.

(G) To submit to Congress on a quarterly basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the contingency operation.

(H) To carry out such other responsibilities relating to the coordination and efficient and effective discharge by the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) of duties relating to the contingency operation as the lead Inspector General shall specify.

(3)(A) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation may employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) of, annuitants covered by section 9902(g) of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of assisting the lead Inspector General in discharging responsibilities under this subsection with respect to the contingency operation.

(B) The employment of annuitants under this paragraph shall be subject to the provisions of section 9902(g) of title 5, United States Code, as if the lead Inspector General concerned was the Department of Defense.

(C) The period of employment of an annuitant under this paragraph may not exceed three years, except that the period may be extended for up to an additional two years in accordance with the regulations prescribed pursuant to section 3161(b)(2) of title 5, United States Code.
(4) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall discharge the responsibilities for the contingency operation under this subsection in a manner consistent with the authorities and requirements of this Act generally and the authorities and requirements applicable to the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) under this Act.

(e) Sunset for Particular Contingency Operations.—The requirements and authorities of this section with respect to an overseas contingency operation shall cease at the end of the first fiscal year after the commencement or designation of the contingency operation in which the total amount appropriated for the contingency operation is less than $100,000,000.

(f) Construction of Authority.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the ability of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) to enter into agreements to conduct joint audits, inspections, or investigations in the exercise of their oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to overseas contingency operations.


Prior Provisions

APPENDIX B: THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL MODEL

In January 2013, Congress passed the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which amended the Inspector General Act of 1978 to add a new section 8L. This amendment created the position of “Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operation” and specifically addressed jurisdictional conflicts. Section 8L also provided for special provisions concerning overseas contingency operations (OCOs) and directed additional responsibilities and authorities to the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and also to the Inspectors General (IGs) for the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).  

COORDINATION

Section 8L provides a new mandate for the three Lead IG agencies to work together from the outset of an OCO to develop and carry out joint, comprehensive, and strategic oversight. Each IG retains statutory independence, but together, they apply extensive regional experience and in-depth institutional knowledge in a coordinated interagency approach to accomplish oversight responsibilities for the whole-of-government mission. Essentially, when joint oversight projects are to be carried out among them, the Lead Inspector General, in consultation with the other two IG offices, will designate one of the three staffs to lead the project. The standard operating procedures of that IG office will take precedence.

In general, DoD IG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG conduct oversight projects within the boundaries of their individual office missions. However, OCO programs and operations often involve coordinated work among multiple agencies, including military operations. Pursuant to section 8L, the Lead Inspector General will determine which IG has principal jurisdiction among the Lead IG agencies. When jurisdiction is unclear, or where there is no jurisdiction, the Lead IG office will be responsible.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

The Lead IG approach leverages dedicated, rotational, and temporary staff from each of the Lead IG agencies to perform various operational activities, including joint strategic oversight planning. The Lead Inspector General must develop, update, and provide to Congress an annual joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each OCO. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed independent oversight, internal management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects.

Figure B–1

Establishing the Lead Inspector General for OIR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 17</td>
<td>Commission on Wartime Contracting final report makes recommendation for IG oversight of OCOs</td>
<td>April 17</td>
<td>Acting DoD, DoS, and USAID Inspectors General testify on Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform Act of 2012 before a Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
QUARTERLY REPORTING

As required by section 8L, the Lead Inspector General is responsible for producing quarterly and biannual reports to Congress and making these reports available to the public online. Biannual reports include the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits; the status of referrals to the Department of Justice; and overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by IGs, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits. Quarterly reports—published each April, July, October, and January—provide updates on U.S. programs and operations related to the OCO. The Lead Inspector General manages the timely production of congressionally mandated reports in a coordinated effort among the three Lead IG offices and other IG agencies, as appropriate.

THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OIR

In October 2014, the military mission for Iraq and Syria was named Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), and on October 17, the Secretary of Defense designated it an OCO. At the onset of the OCO, the Lead IG agencies had already developed a comprehensive framework for their joint oversight strategy. These agencies have always had plenary authority to conduct independent and objective oversight. For more than a decade, while they conducted independent oversight of their agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, they also worked jointly on several projects requiring cross-agency collaboration. Since 2008, they have met quarterly, along with the Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction, and the Service Auditors General to coordinate their oversight and avoid duplication of effort.

In consultation with the three IGs, CIGIE Chair Phyllis K. Fong designated Jon T. Rymer as Lead Inspector General for OIR on December 17, 2014. On December 18, 2014, Lead Inspector General Rymer appointed DoS Inspector General Steve A. Linick to serve as the Associate Inspector General for OIR, in keeping with the provisions of section 8L of the Inspector General Act, as amended. The Associate Lead Inspector General will draw on his experience as a career federal prosecutor, and as Director of DoJ’s National Procurement Fraud Task Force, to develop joint investigative capabilities across the IG community through an interagency working group.

For a timeline of the events leading to the designation of the Lead Inspector General for OIR, see Figure B-1.
# ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFCEN</td>
<td>U.S. Air Forces Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOBS</td>
<td>anti-personnel obstacle breaching systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQI</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-IED</td>
<td>counter-improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIFC</td>
<td>Counter-ISIL Finance Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIFG</td>
<td>Counter-ISIL Finance Group (Global Coalition to Counter ISIL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIGIE</td>
<td>Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJIAF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Interagency Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF-OIR</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLSSA</td>
<td>Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCC</td>
<td>Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (DoS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Committee (UN Security Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTED</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UN Security Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTPF</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTS</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Service (Iraqi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>countering violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWG</td>
<td>Coalition Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td>Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCIS</td>
<td>Defense Criminal Investigative Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCS</td>
<td>direct commercial sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of National Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD IG</td>
<td>Department of Defense Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoS OIG</td>
<td>Department of State Office of Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRL</td>
<td>DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCIG</td>
<td>Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group</td>
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<td>FFP</td>
<td>Office of Food for Peace (USAID)</td>
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<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTF</td>
<td>foreign terrorist fighter</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCTF</td>
<td>Global Counterterrorism Forum (United Nations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>global positioning system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>high explosive (ammunition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAT</td>
<td>high explosive anti-tank (ammunition)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEDP</td>
<td>high explosive dual-purpose (grenade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV</td>
<td>High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAG</td>
<td>Interagency Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Intelligence community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Information Coordination Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILAV</td>
<td>Iraqi light armored vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL</td>
<td>DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>Interagency Policy Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEF</td>
<td>Iraq Train and Equip Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAF</td>
<td>Jordan Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead IG</td>
<td>Lead Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead IG agencies</td>
<td>refers to DoD IG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOE</td>
<td>line of effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCLC</td>
<td>Mine Clearing Line Charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECHR</td>
<td>Middle East Humanitarian Crisis Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRAP</td>
<td>mine-resistant, ambush-protected (vehicle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center (DNI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>DoS Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSF</td>
<td>New Syrian Forces</td>
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<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance (DoD account)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>overseas contingency operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIR</td>
<td>Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Cooperation and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>DoS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refcoord</td>
<td>Refugee Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>rocket-propelled grenade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARG</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAW</td>
<td>squad attack weapon</td>
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<td>SITF</td>
<td>Syria-Iraq Task Force</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General (UN)</td>
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<td>STEF</td>
<td>Syria Train and Equip Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUV</td>
<td>sport utility vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Treasury</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>USACE</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<td>USAID OIG</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAMTAC</td>
<td>“High-mobility Tactical Vehicles”</td>
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<td>VBIED</td>
<td>vehicle-born improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSAT</td>
<td>Very Small Aperture Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSO</td>
<td>vetted Syrian opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>water, sanitation, and hygiene</td>
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ENDNOTES

1. Humanitarian support is identified as a LOE under the Administration’s counter-ISIL strategy to highlight the importance of the humanitarian response, but is distinct from other lines of effort in that it is based on need alone and is explicitly not intended to advance the objectives of OIR or to defeat ISIL. Therefore, it is treated in a separate section.


6. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.


12. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015; DoD, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/30/2015.


18. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015; DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015; and Treasury OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.

19. NCTC, Director Nicholas J. Rasmussen, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Current Terrorist Threat to the United States,” 2/12/2015, p. 11.


25. USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/14/2015.
26. UNHCR reported that 12.2 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria as of December 2014. USAID, Fact Sheet #5, “Syria—Complex Emergency,” 3/31/2015.
35. Secretary Kerry video-conferenced in briefly from the hospital. Deputy Secretary Blinken took his place as co-chair at the venue.
37. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/30/2015.
38. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/30/2015.
41. UNSCR 1624.
43. UNSCR 2129.
44. UNSCR 2161.
46. It called upon Member States to report within 120 days to the Al-Qa’ida Sanctions Committee on their compliance with the resolution, calling for the United Nations counterterrorism bodies to also track progress on implementation. DoS, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Fact Sheet: UN Security Council Resolution 2199 on ISIL,” 2/12/2015.
56. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.
58. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.
60. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.
63. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/30/2015.
64. USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.
68. CENTCOM, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/22/2015.
72. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 7/16/2015.
73. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 7/6/2015.
89. CENTCOM, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/15/2015.


95. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.


100. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.


104. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 7/1/2015.


106. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 7/1/2015.


110. Reporting on the remaining 4% was not available. DSCA, “Iraq Equipping: ITEF, FMS, EDA, PDA,” 7/2/2015, p. 3.


113. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.
117. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/30/2015.
118. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/30/2015.
119. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/30/2015.
120. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/23/2015.
127. DoD, Section 1236 Report: Department of Defense Plan for Authority to Provide Assistance to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, 6/2015, p. 3.
128. DoS reported that it coordinated the package. These funds were originally intended to fund airlift of third-country donations to Erbil, but coalition donations ultimately covered those costs. DoD reported that the funds were used instead for critical anti-IED equipment for forces in Erbil, including 50 MRAPS. DSCA, “Iraq Equipping: ITEF, FMS, EDA, PDA,” 7/2/2015, pp. 3, 20; DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/30/2015; CENTCOM, action memo for Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Iraq Train and Equip Fund Cost-Sharing Certification to Congress,” 6/11/2015.
129. CENTCOM, action memo for Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Iraq Train and Equip Fund Cost-Sharing Certification to Congress,” 6/11/2015.
130. CENTCOM, action memo for Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Iraq Train and Equip Fund Cost-Sharing Certification to Congress,” 6/11/2015.
133. DSCA, “Iraq Equipping: ITEF, FMS, EDA, PDA,” 7/2/2015, p. 3.
134. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/30/2015.
137. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/22/2015.
139. DSCA, “Iraq Equipping: ITEF, FMS, EDA, PDA,” 7/2/2015, p. 3.
140. CENTCOM, action memo for Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Iraq Train and Equip Fund Cost-Sharing Certification to Congress,” 6/11/2015.
145. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015; USAID response to Lead IG request for information, 7/24/2015.
146. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.


169. P.L. 108-458 implemented many of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations in December 2004. IRTPA is organized with eight Titles. Title I, also referred to as the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, amends the National Security Act of 1947 (118 STAT 3644).


171. The DNI designated NCTC as the Counterterrorism Mission Manager for the Intelligence Community via IC Policy Memorandum 2005-100-2, 11/15/2005.


174. P.L. 108-458 further clarifies, “planning and progress of joint counterterrorism operations (other than intelligence operations).”

175. Except, as defined in P.L. 108-458, that which is exclusive to domestic counterterrorism.


177. NCTC, Principal Deputy Director, briefing delivered at the 17th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium, “Role of the National Counterterrorism Center in the Global War on Terror,” 3/1/2006, p. 9.


182. NCTC, Director Nicholas J. Rasmussen, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Current Terrorist Threat to the United States,” 2/12/2015, p. 11.


186. Pursuant to Executive Order 13224.

187. Pursuant to Executive Order 13224.

188. Pursuant to Executive Order 13224.


191. Details also found on the NCTC website: www.nctc.gov. NCTC, Director Nicholas J. Rasmussen, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Current Terrorist Threat to the United States,” 2/12/2015, p. 11.

192. NCTC, Director Nicholas J. Rasmussen, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Current Terrorist Threat to the United States,” 2/12/2015, p. 12.

193. NCTC, Director Nicholas J. Rasmussen, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Current Terrorist Threat to the United States,” 2/12/2015, p. 12.

194. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
195. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
197. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.
199. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
200. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
201. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
205. NCTC, Director Nicholas J. Rasmussen, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Current Terrorist Threat to the United States,” 2/12/2015, p. 3.
208. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/30/2015.
209. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
210. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
212. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
213. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
224. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
225. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
226. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
227. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/10/2015.
228. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 7/14/2015.
229. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 7/14/2015.
230. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

231. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.


233. USAID/OFDA, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/11/2015.

234. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.


236. USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

237. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

238. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.

239. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.


241. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

242. Humanitarian assistance providers frequently distinguish between IDPs and refugees. IDPs are people who have fled their homes but not crossed international borders. Refugees are people who have fled to areas outside the country of their nationality.

243. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

244. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

245. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

246. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

247. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

248. DoS, response to request for Lead IG information, 7/22/2015.

249. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

250. DoS, responses to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015 and 7/22/2015.


252. USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.

253. USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/17/2015.

254. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

255. USAID/OFDA and FFP, responses to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015 and 7/14/2015.


261. USAID/OFDA and FFP, responses to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015 and 7/14/2015.
262. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.
264. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.
266. USAID/OFDA, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/24/2015.
267. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/15/2015.
268. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/15/2015.
269. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.
270. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.
271. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.
272. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.
273. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/14/2015.
274. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.
275. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/14/2015.
276. USAID OIG, Audit Report No. 8-276-14-003-P [REVISED], “Audit of USAID’s Office of Food for Peace Syria-Related Activities,” 6/30/2014.
278. USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/14/2015.
279. USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/22/2015.
283. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.
295. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.
297. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.
298. USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/14/2015.
299. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/22/2015.
300. USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/14/2015.
301. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.
303. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.
304. USAID/OFDA, response to Lead IG request for information, 6/11/2015.
305. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.
311. Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended: The Lead IG will “determine which IG has principal jurisdiction when more than one inspector general from the DoD, DoS, and USAID has jurisdiction.” Further, the Lead IG will “exercise responsibility for discharging oversight responsibilities” when Departments of Defense and State and USAID have no jurisdiction.
313. In internal DoD documents, OIR was named an overseas contingency operation as defined in 10 USC 101(11)(13).
314. CIGIE Chair Phyllis K. Fong, letter to DoD Inspector Jon Rymer, 12/17/2014.
LEAD IG FOR OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE RELATED TO OIR PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS, CONTACT:

Department of Defense Hotline
dodig.mil/hotline
1-800-424-9098

Department of State Hotline
oighotline@state.gov
1-800-409-9926 or 202-647-3320

U.S. Agency for International Development Hotline
ig.hotline@usaid.gov
1-800-230-6539 or 202-712-1023
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