LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL MISSION

The Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations will coordinate among the Inspectors General specified under the law to:

- develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation
- ensure independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations
- promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and prevent, detect, and deter fraud, waste, and abuse
- perform analyses to ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements
- report quarterly and biannually to the Congress on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead Inspector General

(Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended)
FOREWORD

We are pleased to submit our combined Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) biannual and quarterly report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). This is our third quarterly report on the overseas contingency operation (OCO), discharging our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The OCO is dedicated to countering the terrorist threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq, Syria, the region, and the broader international community. The U.S. counter-ISIL strategy includes support to military operations associated with OIR as well as diplomacy, governance, security programs and activities, and, separately, humanitarian assistance.

In a whole-of-government approach, we have published our first comprehensive guide for all oversight work related to OCOs in the Fiscal Year 2016 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations (COP-OCO), including the Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for OIR. Our teams collaborated to produce an effective oversight strategy to deter waste, fraud, and abuse and promote effective stewardship of taxpayer dollars. These teams are empowered to coordinate oversight operations and activities, incorporate important lessons learned, and reset priorities as complex events continue to evolve.

During the quarter, and particularly over the last several weeks, we have witnessed the dynamic and changing nature of this U.S. and coalition effort and its complexities, as well as the grave situation for those fleeing the region. As military, diplomatic, and leadership changes occur, we will adapt to provide timely, effective, and independent oversight of this OCO and the wider humanitarian crisis.

/s/
Jon T. Rymer
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

/s/
Steve A. Linick
Inspector General
U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

/s/
Catherine M. Trujillo
Acting Deputy Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International Development
MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD IG

On behalf of the oversight community, I am pleased to present to the U.S. Congress our third quarterly and second biannual report for the Overseas Contingency Operation known as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) and the associated humanitarian crisis.

Through complex challenges this quarter, the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL continued its work to further a global response to defeating a brutal enemy. Three more countries joined 60 others as members of the coalition, and Turkey agreed to coalition use of Incirlik Air Base for drone and airstrike activities. During the same period, Russia entered into theater with a separate strategy—one that conflicts with U.S. aims regarding the future of the Syrian regime. Russian involvement further increases the complexity of U.S. military and coalition operations and complicates responses to an already dire humanitarian crisis. Events also demonstrated the hazardous environment in which our U.S. and coalition members serve. On October 22, 2015, the United States suffered its first casualty of this conflict when Master Sergeant Joshua Wheeler, U.S. Army, died from injuries sustained while supporting Peshmerga fighters in a raid in northern Iraq that rescued 70 hostages facing imminent execution by ISIL.

The highly fluid operational environment has challenged momentum and required constant reassessment of policy and strategy. My Lead IG colleagues and I recently met with General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition. He shared with us his perspective as he prepared to pass leadership responsibility to his Deputy, Brett McGurk. His views on the first year of the counter-ISIL strategy were informative and impactful to our joint strategic oversight planning. General Allen observed that, if implementation of the strategy—targeting, integration, and synchronization of U.S. government efforts, as well as continuous intelligence feedback—continues to improve, the second year should result in significant progress. My colleagues and I concur with General Allen that the development of meaningful measures of effectiveness and performance is critical to a realistic assessment of progress.

Oversight efforts by the Lead IG agencies produced 12 reports during this biannual reporting period. DoD IG’s assessment of the vetting processes used in recruiting anti-ISIL forces in Syria provided insights into the many obstacles in training sufficient numbers of fighters through a U.S. train and equip program. On October 9, President Obama paused the program and announced a shift from a training focus to one of providing equipment to vetted commanders of existing Syrian opposition forces. DoD IG released a separate report that addresses weaknesses in the program to
train, advise, and assist the Iraqi Army. DoS OIG issued inspection reports on three embassies in the region, examining high-risk and counterterrorism national security interest areas as well as fiduciary and administrative responsibilities of the embassy staffs. DoS OIG also inspected its Bureau of Political Military Affairs, taking a hard look at foreign assistance and military-related activities having foreign policy implications.

My colleagues and I continue to meet regularly to discuss our joint oversight responsibilities, to stay current on the activities of our teams, and to respond to changes in strategy, operations, and programs in a timely way. With the many changes we have witnessed over the last several weeks, this coordination has been and remains critical. I am pleased to report that several Offices of Inspector General not formally under the Lead IG umbrella are collaborating with our efforts to further whole-of-government oversight.

This biennial report includes an overview of the Lead IG FY 2016 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for OIR, effective October 2015, and provides an update concerning the IG teams deployed in the field, who are our eyes on the ground. Oversight reports completed this quarter have led to many recommendations to improve efficiency and effectiveness. The 31 ongoing and 10 planned projects conducted by the Lead IG and partner oversight agencies give a sense of the larger context of the contingency.

While the pace of our oversight work increases, we maintain the flexibility to target our resources where they can be most useful.

/s/

Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve

Jon T. Rymer
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense
# Lead Inspector General Statutory Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section 8L, Inspector General Act of 1978, as Amended</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appoint, from among the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), an Inspector General to act as associate Inspector General for the contingency operation who shall act in a coordinating role to assist the lead Inspector General in the discharge of responsibilities under this subsection.</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and carry out, in coordination with the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation and to ensure through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations, independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation.</td>
<td>103–106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements in support of the contingency operation.</td>
<td>12–13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), on a temporary basis using the authorities in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, such auditors, investigators, and other personnel as the lead Inspector General considers appropriate to assist the lead Inspector General and such other Inspectors General on matters relating to the contingency operation.</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit to Congress on a biannual basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the activities of the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) with respect to the contingency operation, including: status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits and of referrals to the Department of Justice; and overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by inspectors general, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits.</td>
<td>107–123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the contingency operation.</td>
<td>7–100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) are the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Inspector General of the Department of State, and the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead IG Activities</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Coalition to Counter ISIL</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Funding</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Effective Governance in Iraq</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denying ISIL Safe Haven</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Partner Capacity</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing Intelligence Collection on ISIL</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposing ISIL's True Nature</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrupting ISIL's Finances</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrupting the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting the Homeland</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government Strategy and Response</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria Complex Crisis</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Complex Crisis</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIANNUAL REPORT ON U.S. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Update on the Lead IG Model</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead IG Agency Projects</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotline</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIXES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A: U.S. Equipment Purchases for Iraq's Security Forces</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B: The Lead Inspector General Model</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C: Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
270,000+ Syrian applications for asylum in Europe in 2015 (as of 9/30) © UNHCR

$4.5 BILLION in U.S. humanitarian assistance since 2012

People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance, Syria and Iraq

12.2 million
7.6 million displaced
4.6 million displaced to neighboring countries

8.6 million, including
3.2 million displaced internally
207,000 displaced to neighboring countries


538,165 total

UNHCR Europe

Syria

Iraq
Syria Training Paused To Emphasize Equipping

On October 9, the White House announced that the United States would pause its efforts to recruit, vet, and train Syrian forces to oppose ISIL. DoD will now provide equipment packages and weapons to a select group of vetted Syrian leaders already engaged in the fight against ISIL. U.S. airstrikes will continue to support ant-ISIL forces operating in Syria, including the soldiers trained through the U.S. program.

**U.S. Funding for Syria Train and Equip Program ($ Million)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transferred from the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, 6/2015</td>
<td>383.5</td>
<td>Requested 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obligated as of 9/14/2015</td>
<td>(297.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unobligated</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DoD reported it will revise the request for establishment of the Syria Train and Equip Fund based on the President’s decision to pause training.

**Syria Train and Equip Program Throughput, as of 9/30/2015**

- First cohort of 90 recruits begins training May 7
- 60 trainees remain in first cohort July 7
- 9 of 54 graduates of the first cohort still serving Sept 29
- Some recruits who passed initial screening exfiltrated for training outside of Syria.
- DoD had been working to screen and vet up to 7,000 recruits.
- At least 129 completed training and returned to positions along the Ma’ra Line in NW Syria.
- First class of 54 graduates faced several challenges, including an Al-Nusrah Front attack on their base. 9 members remain on active duty with different units.
- 75 graduates from the second class returned to Syria with two parent groups. This group has had some tactical success in NW Syria.
- $1 million apportioned to pay stipends; $101 million obligated as of 9/14/2015

**Apportionments**

- Army O&M $19.15
- Air Force O&M $19.8
- Defense-wide O&M (Special Operations Command) $344.6

**Note:** For the sources of information presented in these quarterly highlights, see the last endnote in this report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) at one year was met with the announcement of the resignation of the Special Presidential Envoy, General John Allen. On October 23, 2015, President Obama thanked General Allen for his “tremendous ability and courage” and also welcomed his successor, Brett McGurk, who has been serving as General Allen’s deputy for the last 13 months.1 On October 16, 2015, the three Lead IGs met with General Allen, prior to relinquishing his leadership role, to discuss anti-ISIL strategy and progress. Highlights from this interview are included in the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL section of this report. General Allen noted that anti-ISIL efforts need accepted measures of performance and effectiveness that address both quantitative and qualitative efforts.2 This is an area of focus for the Lead IG agencies.

ISIL continues its barbaric tactics, inflicting heinous and vicious attacks against vulnerable civilians. This quarter, ISIL reportedly murdered 70 Anbari tribesmen because of their familial ties to those who serve in the armed forces,3 bombed local markets, attacked Muslims at prayer in mosques, bombed the ancient relics in Palmyra and beheaded an 82-year old archaeologist tending the ruins there,4 and executed innocent civilians by the hundreds in Mosul.5 On October 22, 2015, U.S. forces joined the Peshmerga and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in rescuing 70 hostages held by ISIL and facing imminent execution. The raid also resulted in the seizure of intelligence information, and the killing or capture of several ISIL fighters. During the operation, however, the United States suffered its first casualty in the line of duty in Iraq since 2011.6

In September 2015, Russia initiated airstrikes in Syria, inflicting a reported 140 hits around Hama, Homs, and Latakia,7 displacing an estimated 35,000 people.8 On October 20, 2015, Russia’s Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) agreed to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on air safety in Syria9 and committed to forming a working group to discuss implementing the agreement.10 DoD stated that “Russia’s strategy in Syria is counterproductive” and that the MOU discussions “do not constitute U.S. cooperation or support for Russia’s policy or actions in Syria”11 noting that “uncoordinated actors add risk.”12

During this quarter, the Administration ended the Syria train and equip effort, considering it a failure.13 Going forward, certain vetted anti-ISIL ground forces will receive equipment and air support to “increase their combat power.”14
Secretary Carter stated that he stands by the concept “that a lasting defeat of ISIL in Syria will depend in part on the success of local, motivated and capable ground forces.” Now one year into the campaign, the coalition has approximately 5,500 trainers and advisors from 18 countries supporting the Iraq train and equip efforts, and has trained almost 15,000 Iraqi personnel. An estimated 900 trainers and advisors support the opposition forces in Syria.

DoS reported that ISIL has lost some of the territory it had previously seized in Iraq, and its movements are limited in 30% of the populated territory it still occupies. According to DoD, ISIL now controls about 1/10th of the Turkey-Syria border, or approximately 68 miles. The United States has engaged in discussions with Turkey to determine a coordinated way to deter foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and smugglers from crossing the border.

In August 2015, Turkey agreed to allow the U.S. to launch anti-ISIL airstrikes from Incirlik Air Base, which shortens the distance to many ISIL targets. That same month, F-16 fighter aircraft and approximately 300 personnel arrived on Incirlik to support coalition airstrikes, as well as unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) operations for conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.

DoS reported it continues to work closely with the Government of Iraq (GOI) to improve governance and increase the inclusion of Sunnis into the national government. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has taken steps to streamline his government and empower local governors in responding to security and stabilization requirements. The GOI’s popular mobilization forces (PMF) personnel are being trained to liberate and protect their local communities and fight alongside the ISF against ISIL. According to DoD, Sunni tribes and volunteers have shown that they can unite with the GOI in the fight against ISIL, and at least 4,000 tribal fighters have U.S.-provided arms and equipment. Positive indicators of government and regional stability include Qatar’s naming of an Ambassador to Iraq for the first time in more than 25 years and Saudi Arabia’s announcement of its intention to re-open its embassy in Baghdad.

This quarter, the coalition and its Stabilization Task Force have focused on plans to stabilize areas in turmoil or that have recently been liberated from ISIL. Once ISIL is driven from an area, prompt and sequenced efforts must be deployed to provide for local security and police forces, re-establish local governance structures, restore basic services (water, food, sanitation, and healthcare), and provide humanitarian aid. These stabilization efforts are necessary to successfully return internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to their communities.
The UN Development Program (UNDP) has established a stabilization fund for Iraq, the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS), to provide immediate assistance to those liberated from ISIL. The FFIS has received $10 million, including $8.3 million from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and a total of more than $27 million had been pledged as of September 2015. Iraq and coalition members are also providing funds directly for stabilization efforts. Examples of FFIS projects include rebuilding water stations, repairing the electric grid, and rehabilitating health centers.29

DoS looks to stabilization efforts in Tikrit, Iraq, as a model for assistance. More than 100,000 IDPs have returned to that area since its liberation in May 2015. The lessons of Tikrit have helped the governor of Anbar prepare a plan for his province for the liberation of Ramadi and surrounding areas from ISIL.30 Significant issues remain, however, such as how to create reconciliation while imposing justice for crimes committed by returning IDPs and those who stayed (some of whom cooperated with ISIL or used ISIL’s presence to commit crimes).31

Despite the efforts to degrade and defeat ISIL, the growth in its ability to recruit FTFs has been “explosive,” drawing men and women of “an array of ethnicities from all corners of the globe.”32 The House Homeland Security Committee (HSC) formed a task force this year to take an in-depth look at the methodologies of ISIL radicalization and what needs to be done to counter the movement.33 The HSC task force report described where most of the FTFs originate and some of the marketing techniques that are effective in encouraging them to join ISIL.34 Social media networks provide creative and elusive playgrounds for ISIL recruiters to easily and regularly communicate with FTF candidates. Though the segment of the population considered recruitable is very small, recruitment numbers remain high and are increasing worldwide.35

Porous borders allow FTFs to move easily to reach the fight. Counterfeit passports and visas regularly go undetected.36 Effective information sharing on a national or international scale has several barriers, mainly because of multiple stovepipe legacy information systems, inconsistent and untimely data, and ineffective partner agreements for sharing important data. According to the HSC task force, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has established a global database for FTFs, supports law enforcement, and continues to develop its systems to meet the trends in terrorism.37 However, not all of the 190 countries who are members of INTERPOL have input their data into INTERPOL’s systems, and most countries do not use INTERPOL tools consistently and in real time to detect FTFs.38 The same problem holds for other important information-sharing systems. The task force concluded that there is no comprehensive strategy for information sharing or effective tactics to best stem the tide of FTFs traveling to support ISIL.39
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

According to USAID, the humanitarian and refugee crisis in the region is dire, and the numbers of IDPs and refugees continue to climb. DoS, USAID, and the United Nations, along with partner nations, are providing life-emergency assistance to millions of people in need. U.S. programs provide medical care, shelter, food and water, and other basic needs to people in the region.40 According to the United Nations, international donations to its humanitarian response effort did not meet the funding requirements identified in the Syria and Iraq UN Humanitarian Response Plans and fell short by 65% in Syria and 60% in Iraq. Consequently, assistance providers had to cut back support for IDPs and refugees. Millions of people in need reportedly went without basic services, including food assistance; water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); and healthcare. In July 2015, the United Nations reported that World Food Program (WFP) regional operations for Syrian refugees had received only 19% of needed funding and 32% of required funds for operations inside Syria.41 A U.S. contribution of $65 million enabled WFP to provide support for the most vulnerable Syrian IDP and refugee populations during August and September, but WFP was forced to make cuts.42 In Iraq, WFP reported on September 2015 that it also still required an additional $61.6 million to fund operations in Iraq through the end of the year.43

As of September 2015, the United Nations estimated that 7.6 million people had been displaced in Syria, including about 3.8 million children. Of the 12.2 million people estimated to be in need of assistance in Syria, the U.S. government has been able to reach an estimated 5 million per month.44 As of September 30, 2015, the number of IDPs in Iraq exceeded 3.2 million,45 and many IDPs reportedly lacked access to essential services, such as clean water and electricity, and were in need of relief assistance, including shelter and food aid.46 Also, humanitarian providers have little to no access to ISIL-controlled territory in Iraq, leaving thousands without access to humanitarian assistance.47 On September 21, 2015, the U.S. government committed $419 million in additional humanitarian support for the Syrian crisis. On September 30, 2015, it provided $56 million in additional assistance for Iraq.48
LEAD IG ACTIVITIES

The Lead Inspector General must submit to Congress and the public a report every quarter on the contingency operation. This quarterly report on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) cites information announced by federal agency officials in open-forum settings and supplied by federal agencies in response to questions from the Lead IG agencies. Where available, as noted in this report, the Lead IG agencies have consulted reputable impartial sources in an effort to verify and assess such information. However, in light of the operational realities and dynamic nature of OIR, the Lead IG agencies have limited time to test, verify, and independently assess all of the assertions made by these agencies. This is particularly true where the Lead IG agencies have not yet provided oversight of these assertions through audits, inspections, or evaluations. The Lead IG agencies are assessing the information provided from their respective agencies and will use it to determine where to conduct future audits and evaluations.

Table 1.

Lead IG Agency Reports Released During 4/1/2015–9/30/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of DoD/USCENTCOM and Coalition Plans/Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Iraqi Army to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (DoDIG-2015-177)</td>
<td>9/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Army Did Not Effectively Account for Wholesale Property in Kuwait (DODIG-2015-178)</td>
<td>9/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Generally Designed Adequate Controls to Monitor Contractor Performance at the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center, but Additional Controls Are Needed (DOD IG-2015-160)</td>
<td>8/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Embassy Tunis, Tunisia (ISP-I-15-31A)</td>
<td>7/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Department of State Management and Oversight of Non-Lethal Assistance Provided for the Syrian Crisis (AUD-MERO-15-39)</td>
<td>9/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Embassy Amman, Jordan (ISP-I-15-29A)</td>
<td>6/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Embassy Muscat, Oman (ISP-I-15-30A)</td>
<td>6/2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During the biannual reporting period, April 1, 2015-September 30, 2015, the Lead IG agencies released 12 reports. As of September 30, 2015, they had 30 projects ongoing and 11 more planned. The planned and ongoing projects are part of the updated Joint Strategic Oversight Plan (JSOP) for OIR, effective October 1, 2015. The plan focuses on five strategic categories: contracts, operations, governance, humanitarian and development assistance, and intelligence. The oversight strategy is flexible so that auditors and investigators can respond to the demands of OIR, and also the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

The Lead IG agencies share the responsibility to ascertain the accuracy of the information related to the overseas contingency operation (OCO), and have begun a series of projects to meet this requirement. USAID OIG is implementing discrete steps to its future Government Management Reform Act work to test financial data from a sample of awards related to humanitarian assistance in the region, and DoS OIG is identifying approaches to obtaining and analyzing financial information obtained from DoS. An ongoing DoD IG audit is reviewing financial systems tracking costs related to OIR and determining whether reporting of war-related obligations in the Cost of War report meets reporting and legislative requirements.
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

Global Coalition to Counter ISIL 10
U.S. Funding 11
Supporting Effective Governance in Iraq 16
Denying ISIL Safe Haven 22
Building Partner Capacity 32
Enhancing Intelligence Collection on ISIL 47
Exposing ISIL’s True Nature 52
Disrupting ISIL’s Finances 57
Disrupting the Flow of FTFs 65
Protecting the Homeland 72
On October 16, 2015, a week before the announcement of his departure as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, General John R. Allen discussed the latest state of affairs with Inspectors General Jon T. Rymer (DoD) and Steve A. Linick (DoS), and Acting Deputy Inspector General Catherine M. Trujillo (USAID). General Allen spoke of the progress made in the first year of the fight to counter ISIL and the challenges that remain.

Building the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL

The mission was to build the international coalition against ISIL and, at the end of the first year, 63 nations had joined the coalition, including three just in September—Malaysia, Nigeria, and Tunisia. The Arab League and European Union are also members. The coalition’s objectives are to degrade and defeat ISIL in 3 years (to October 2017), attack its root causes, and initiate a political transition in Syria leading to the departure of President Bashar al-Asad. Although the military effort is important to degrade and defeat ISIL, the goal ultimately is to defeat the idea of ISIL. The strategy is sound, although the implementation of the strategy needs continued work.

Measuring Effectiveness of Efforts

The anti-ISIL efforts need better ways of measuring themselves against the Lines of Effort (LOEs). The measurements of effectiveness and performance need to be quantitative and qualitative. These assessments must occur relentlessly, with progress on each LOE assessed on a near-daily basis. A broader assessment is needed at 6-month intervals. When asked about areas where IG assessments might assist the anti-ISIL efforts of the coalition, General Allen pointed to the development of these measures of effectiveness and performance in implementing the LOEs.

Monitoring Russian Intervention

The recent Russian military intervention in Syria has added a new dimension to the anti-ISIL efforts. Russia is stabilizing the Asad regime and western Syria in case the country cannot survive with its current borders. For the Russian and Syrian government, all groups in opposition to Asad are terrorists to attack. This, in turn, may cause moderate Syrian opposition forces to divert their efforts from countering ISIL to instead fighting to hold onto territory they now control against a Russian-Asad incursion. Russia has agreed to meet with the United States to discuss deconfliction in the combat zones.

Stabilizing Areas After ISIL Is Expelled

In Iraq, the coalition is focused on pushing back ISIL in three largely Sunni provinces: Ninewa, Salah al-Din, and Anbar. Once ISIL is driven out, the key is to stabilize the areas by immediately restoring order with local Sunni police and tribal forces, re-establishing governance structures, and restoring basic services (such as electricity and fresh water). UNDP has established a stabilization fund with a $60 million goal. For example, in Tikrit about $10 million was needed to stabilize the city. Since Tikrit was liberated, approximately 60% of those who had left have returned to the city. That is the coalition goal—to return displaced persons to their communities.
Vetting the Refugees and Tracking Terrorists

The security and intelligence problems are enormously complex. Refugees are an immediate and strategic challenge to our allies in Europe. Here in the United States, there is exceptional and unprecedented coordination between DoD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DoJ), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and it is working well to prevent large attacks. ISIL and other terrorist groups use social media to prompt direct attacks as well as inspired attacks (where the individual is not connected with ISIL or another terrorist groups but is inspired by the group’s propaganda). The U.S. law enforcement community wants to be able to protect U.S. social networks, but some communication systems used by ISIL are immune to U.S. interception or penetration.

Assessing the First Year and Looking Ahead into the Next Year

The first year was focused on building the coalition and stopping the momentum of ISIL. Several factors are encouraging for the second year: the coalition has been in place for a year and is poised to exert a global pressure strategy on ISIL in Iraq and Syria; Brett McGurk, my replacement as Special Presidential Envoy, has in-depth experience with Iraq and various stakeholders; and the integration of targeting efforts is improving. If the implementation of the strategy—targeting, integration, and synchronization of U.S. government efforts, as well as continuous intelligence feedback—continues to improve for the LOEs, the second year should result in significant progress.

The strategy is sound, although the implementation of the strategy needs continued work.

*Special Presidential Envoy John Allen*
GLOBAL COALITION TO COUNTER ISIL

According to Special Presidential Envoy John Allen, the coalition has made progress in denying ISIL safe haven and in building partner capacity through a combination of strikes, advising and assisting the GOI to plan and execute ground operations against ISIL, and training and equipping the Iraq’s security forces. By September 20, 2015, or one year into what he described as a 3-year effort, the campaign had accomplished several important elements, although much more remains to be done:

• Under U.S. leadership, a global coalition has been assembled that includes Iraq and 64 other members
• The coalition has stalled the momentum of ISIL operations across territories in Iraq and Syria.
• Iraq, with coalition support, is re-taking territory from ISIL, and much of the Turkey-Syria border has been liberated.
• The transition to a more offensive military strategy to push ISIL back is underway.
• There is a strengthened emphasis on stabilization in areas liberated from ISIL.

The military campaign continues to face previous and emerging challenges in a complex and dynamic environment, including the following:

• the recent and increasing presence of Iran and Russia in the conflict zone, including Russian airstrikes that appear to be targeting Syrian opposition forces, rather than ISIL, with the aim of securing the Asad regime
• continued difficulties in stemming the flow of FTFs, including those from U.S. soil
• the slow pace of government reform and power-sharing within Iraq
• the humanitarian crisis that is overwhelming the region and spreading to into Europe

On October 23, 2015, Secretary Carter announced the appointment of Lieutenant General Sean McFarland, USA, as commander of the counter-ISIL campaign. Rather than several generals, there will now be one single commander in charge of all counterterrorism operations in Syria and Iraq. Secretary Carter reiterated that the commitment to strengthening partnerships with moderate Syrian forces was not a change in strategy, but rather, a change in approach to achieving the strategy.
U.S. FUNDING

DoD Funding

As of October 2015, the United States had provided at least $5.1 billion for DoD programs and operations related to OIR and counter-ISIL activities, including $1.62 billion for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and $383.5 million for training and equipping of Syrian opposition forces. For details on final apportionment for the Syria training and equipping, see the Building Partner Capacity section of this report.

As of July 31, 2015, more than $3.62 billion had been obligated, including $2.94 billion in Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds and $485.38 million of the ITEF.


DoS Funding

DoS reports that, generally, it does not separate, identify, or track the costs of DoS programs and activities that support OIR or the U.S. counter-ISIL strategy. Where specific funding of particular efforts can be reported and tracked separately, these are noted in the various sections of this report that discuss the nine LOEs in the U.S. counter-ISIL strategy.

DoS reported that it requested but did not receive specific, separate, additional funding for OIR support and broader counter-ISIL efforts in FY 2015 appropriations. For FY 2016, DoS requested $7.0 billion for “Overseas Contingency Operations,” which DoS defines more broadly than the OIR or Operation Freedom’s Sentinel OCOs. The $7.0 billion request was to fund DoS and USAID for the “extraordinary costs of operations and assistance in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Ukraine.” Although that request includes the counter-ISIL efforts, it is more extensive both in geographical area (covering several additional countries) and in scope (a “robust diplomatic presence and critical assistance programs” in Pakistan, for example). As of September 30, 2015, Congress had not approved the FY 2016 budget.

In the absence of dedicated funding, DoS reported that it supports OIR’s strategic LOEs primarily through a full range of already existing platforms, programs, and personnel, adapting as needed, and funded by operations and diplomatic engagement funds. Although a portion of the funding for
diplomatic activities supports OIR or the broader counter-ISIL strategy, according to DoS it is not possible to segregate OIR-directed funds (for example, to assign the salary of diplomats). Nor were new funds allocated to cover the costs and expenses of the office of the Special Presidential Envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. However, as of September 14, 2015, the office of the Special Presidential Envoy had obligated just more than $1.7 million for its operating expenses.62

Foreign assistance programs may support OIR or the broader counter-ISIL strategy, but also other goals in countries or globally. Grants or contracts can also support multiple activities, including those outside the scope of the OCO. Thus, DoS reports it cannot identify which portion of those programs support the counter-ISIL LOEs and cannot disaggregate financial reporting data.63

**Funding for Humanitarian Assistance**

The United States has provided more than $4.5 billion in additional funding since FY 2012 to address humanitarian assistance for the wider Syrian crisis.64 This includes approximately $125 million in DoD FY 2014/FY 2015 Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding to support DoS’s FY 2015 request for non-food items for Iraqi IDPs and Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.65 Authorized funding is split evenly for assistance to Iraq and Syria.66 This quarter, the U.S. government also announced approximately $56 million in additional commitments to address the humanitarian crisis in Iraq.67 For details of USAID and DoS funding for these activities, see the Humanitarian Assistance section of this report.

**Ascertaining the Accuracy of Data**

Under section 8L of the Inspector General Act, as amended, the Lead IG carries the responsibility to ascertain the accuracy of information provided to federal agencies on OIR-related programs and operations.68 Specifically, the Lead IG is responsible for reviewing the accuracy of obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements.

**DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL**

The Cost of War report captures the incremental cost of OCOs up to and above planned deployment activity, including the status of the ITEF, a subset of funding for OIR.69

DoD IG has begun the first of a series of projects to ascertain the accuracy of information provided through DoD financial tracking systems on costs related to OIR. In October 2015, DoD IG began a project to determine whether the U.S. Air Force has adequate accountability of DoD funds supporting
OIR. DoD IG is determining the accuracy of U.S. Air Force obligations and disbursements reported in the Cost of War report. Additionally, DoD IG will determine the relevancy of the Cost of War report, released by DoD Comptroller, as it is used to satisfy legal requirements to report financial information for contingency operations. The Cost of War report provides the status of obligations for the following OCO requirements:

- war-related operational tempo, training, overseas facilities and base support, equipment maintenance, communications, and replacement of combat losses
- support for deployed troops, including food, clothing, health/medical services, and benefits for troops in the field
- transportation of personnel and equipment, including airlift and sealift into and out of the theater of operations, and support payments for coalition partners

**DOS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

DoS OIG will conduct an audit in 2016 focused on contract and grant monitoring weaknesses in Iraq. DoS reports that, generally, it does not separate, identify, or track the costs of DoS programs and activities that support OIR or the U.S. counter-ISIL strategy. However, DoS OIG has identified tens of millions of dollars in questioned costs associated with contracts and grants in Iraq, and OIG has reported repeatedly that contract and grant monitoring weaknesses in Iraq are due, in part, to the insufficient number of qualified oversight staff assigned to monitor contracts and grants. In 2016 DoS OIG will conduct an audit of contract and grant oversight staffing and determine whether the number of contract and grant oversight staff in Iraq is commensurate with the amount and complexity of funds being expended.

**USAID OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

USAID OIG announced it will add discrete steps to its future Government Management Reform Act (GMRA) work to test financial data from a sample of awards related to humanitarian assistance in the region. The results of this work will be folded into overall GMRA report results and will also be reported in a separate product with a specific focus on the testing of awards related humanitarian assistance efforts in the region.
Strategic Lines of Effort to Counter ISIL

SUPPORTING EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE IN IRAQ

We are supporting the new Iraqi government on efforts to govern inclusively and effectively as well as to strengthen its cooperation with regional partners.

DENYING ISIL SAFE-HAVEN

We are conducting a systematic campaign of airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Working with the Iraqi government, we are striking ISIL targets and supporting Iraqi forces on the ground. We will degrade ISIL’s leadership, logistical and operational capability, and deny it sanctuary and resources to plan, prepare and execute attacks.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

We will build the capability and capacity of our partners in the region to sustain an effective long-term campaign against ISIL. Our advisors are working to advise Iraqi forces, including Kurdish forces, to improve their ability to plan, lead, and conduct operations against ISIL, and we will provide training to help the Iraqis reconstitute their security forces and establish a National Guard. Our train and equip program will strengthen the Syrian moderate opposition and help them defend territory from ISIL.

ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ON ISIL

Continuing to gain more fidelity on ISIL’s capabilities, plans, and intentions is central to our strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy the group, and we will continue to strengthen our ability to understand this threat, as well as to share vital information with our Iraqi and Coalition partners to enable them to effectively counter ISIL.

EXPOSING ISIL’S TRUE NATURE

Clerics around the world have spoken up in recent weeks to highlight ISIL’s hypocrisy, condemning the group’s savagery and criticizing its self-proclaimed “caliphate.” We are working with our partners throughout the Muslim world to highlight ISIL’s hypocrisy and counter its false claims of acting in the name of religion.

DISRUPTING ISIL’S FINANCES

ISIL’s expansion over the past year has given it access to significant and diverse sources of funding. So, we are working aggressively with our partners on a coordinated approach to reduce ISIL’s revenue from oil and assets it has plundered; limit ISIL’s ability to extort local populations; stem ISIL’s gains from kidnapping for ransom; and disrupt the flow of external donations to the group.

DISRUPTING THE FLOW OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

Foreign terrorist fighters are ISIL’s lifeblood, and a global security threat—with citizens of nearly 80 countries filling its ranks. On September 24, the President convened a historic Summit-level meeting of the UN Security Council, focused on this issue and we will continue to lead an international effort to stem the flow of fighters into Syria and Iraq.

PROTECTING THE HOMELAND

We will continue to use the criminal justice system as a critical counterterrorism tool, work with air carriers to implement responsible threat-based security and screening requirements, and counter violent extremism here at home.

HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT

We and our partners will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced and vulnerable in Iraq and Syria.

DoS Engagement

DoS reported that it supports the President’s counter-ISIL strategy and the LOEs through existing bureaus, offices, and posts, in addition to the office of the Special Presidential Envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. When DoD designated OIR as an “overseas contingency operation” on October 17, 2014, DoS already had in place significant diplomatic and political strategies to promote inclusive democracy in Iraq, encourage development and security in the region, discourage terrorism and violence, and respond to the complex crisis in Syria and the humanitarian issues affecting the region generally. DoS has continued and adapted its diplomatic and foreign assistance efforts to support the LOEs and to advance broader U.S. diplomatic and political goals.71

Various bureaus and offices at DoS in Washington, D.C., and the Embassy in Baghdad are responsible for implementing the diplomatic efforts to counter ISIL. These efforts focus on U.S. relations with Iraq as well as with other countries in the region and the world. Diplomatic engagement includes working with the United Nations, coalition countries, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).72

This quarter, for example, DoS stated that its Mission in Turkey has engaged regularly with Turkish officials and others on a host of topics, including the U.S. military use of Incirlik Air Base; border security, smuggling, and foreign terrorist fighters; ISIL financing; refugee issues; countering violent extremism and messaging; and training events.73 The Mission has worked with congressional delegations, U.S. and foreign law enforcement, financial institutions, and NGOs on these and other topics.74 According to DoS, these efforts promote not just the anti-ISIL LOEs, but also DoS’s broader goals of supporting democratic institutions, encouraging development and security in the region, discouraging terrorism and violence, and responding to the complex regional and humanitarian crises in the region.75

DoS participates in a broad range of working groups and interagency programs aimed at bringing together all relevant parties to address aspects of the counter-ISIL strategy. These include LOE-specific efforts, such as the interagency and international Counter-ISIL Finance Group (CIFG); interagency coordination meetings, such as those led more than once a week by the White House’s National Security Council (NSC) among all Iraq policy stakeholders; regular sub-agency policy committee meetings led by the NSC; internal DoS meetings on particular topics, such as stabilization planning (bi-weekly); informal and working group meetings with coalition partners; and regular contacts with foreign governments and embassies.76

DoS reported that it is difficult at times to dissect the various LOEs within a diplomatic engagement or foreign assistance program, in part because the LOEs are all facets of a counter-ISIL strategy. For example, topics discussed at the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council Counterterrorism and Border Security Working Group meeting in Riyadh during August 17-18, 2015, included matters relating to several LOEs, such as security, counterterrorism, countering foreign terrorist fighters, strengthening border and aviation security, countering terrorist messaging, and disrupting terrorist financing.77
SUPPORTING EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE IN IRAQ

Although the Iraqi military, with U.S. and coalition military support, seeks to rid that country of ISIL, ultimately success will rest as well on non-military factors. As President Obama recently reiterated, “Our military and intelligence efforts are not going to succeed alone; they have to be matched by political and economic progress to address the conditions that ISIL has exploited in order to take root.” General Allen has stated that, once attained, security and military gains can only be sustained by accompanying political reforms.

The operating premise of the global coalition in Iraq is to assist the Iraqi authorities to drive ISIL from their country. On the non-military front, the United States is committed to supporting democratic processes in Iraq that promote the rule of law and can address deep, long-standing sectarian issues. DoS reported that it has continued to conduct two main categories of activities under this LOE: diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance programs. Diplomatic engagement includes encouraging Iraq’s efforts to form a stable, inclusive, and representative government, implementing a national program to address Sunni core grievances (reconciliation), bringing Sunnis into the fight against ISIL, and promoting post-conflict stabilization. Foreign assistance programs promote democracy, governance, peace and security, and stabilization objectives.

Engaging the Sunnis

According to DoS, the most urgent work under this LOE concerns the Sunnis—bringing them into the fight against ISIL, reconciling them with the Baghdad central government, and empowering them. Prime Minister al-Abadi has taken steps to empower local governors to play key roles in the security and stability of Sunni provinces. For example, on September 3, 2015, the ISF hosted a ceremony in Anbar province to mark the handover of U.S.-provided arms and equipment to 100 Sunni fighters enrolled in the Iraqi government’s PMF (a largely, but not exclusively, Shia force). PMF soldiers are being trained to liberate and protect their local communities, fighting against ISIL under the command of the ISF.

On occasion, Sunni tribes and the PMF have shown that they can unite with the ISF to push ISIL out of their areas, for example, in liberating Tikrit from ISIL’s occupation. However, important pieces of legislation proposed last fall by Prime Minister al-Abadi to gain Sunni support have not been passed. These proposals include decentralizing a National Guard to place it under provincial authority, implementing measures to reverse de-Ba’athification and provide amnesty to Sunnis, and formalizing oil revenue sharing.
In August 2015, the GOI devolved the responsibilities of the Ministries of Health, Education and Municipalities, and Public Works to the provincial governments. Also in August, in response to protests by Iraqis against corruption and government mismanagement, Prime Minister al-Abadi streamlined his cabinet and associated ministries, reducing their number from 33 to 22. The U.S. government supports these reforms.\(^{86}\) Notwithstanding these and other measures taken over the course of the last year, analysts have observed that “continued Sunni mistrust of Baghdad appears to be slowing any broad Sunni shift to cooperate with the government against the Islamic State.”\(^{87}\)

**Governance Capacity Building**

USAID reported that it manages seven activities to support governance efforts in Iraq, including five that predate ISIL’s ascent. USAID projects that predate ISIL in Iraq include the Administrative Reform (Tarabot) project, Strengthening Service Delivery (Taqadum) project, Access to Justice project, Elections Support project, and Broadening Participation Through Civil Society project. This quarter, USAID obligated an additional $2.0 million for the Taqadum project, which is designed to improve service delivery at the provincial level by facilitating the decentralization of services from the central government. The Tarabot project provides the GOI with technical assistance to strengthen public management institutions and improve service delivery processes through better governance and improved management of human and fiscal resources. The Access to Justice project and the Elections Support project both ended on September 30, 2015.\(^{88}\)

USAID’s most recently initiated activities in this area focus on efforts to strengthen governance through improved resource management and promote stabilization in areas liberated from ISIL control. The Asia and Middle East Economic Growth Best Practices (AMEG) project, which began Iraq-based activities during the previous quarter, provides public financial management assistance through senior technical advisors embedded at the Ministry of Finance. One advisor focuses on sovereign debt, and the other focuses on budget execution. Assistance aligned with the FFIS project, which was initiated during the reporting period, provides support to local authorities in meeting immediate basic service and livelihoods restoration needs in territory recently liberated from ISIL to encourage IDPs to return to their homes. This $8.3 million project is intended to serve as a bridge for these efforts until Iraqi resources can be used to address the needs of IDPs in these areas.\(^{89}\)
As of September 30, 2015, USAID had obligated more than $372.7 million of the Economic Support Fund (ESF) for the seven governance-related activities since their inception and disbursed $331.3 million of this amount. Of the total amount obligated, $10.3 million was obligated during the reporting period.\textsuperscript{90}

Prime Minister Abadi has stated that decentralization is the exit from the sectarian divide at the root of years of civil strife. USAID, through its decentralization programming under the Taqadum project, is engaged in a collaborative effort with Iraqi government officials at the central and provincial levels in essentially a complete overhaul of the structure and financing of Iraqi government systems for public service delivery. Initially, work focuses on helping central ministry and provincial officials to develop a decentralization roadmap for each targeted ministry, which addresses which functions should be transferred, when and how. Then, provincial officials engage with the project to design, develop and implement accountable and effective planning, budgeting, management, and oversight processes at the local level. Moving responsibility and authority for service delivery to the local level serves, in part, to ensure that disaffected Sunni populations hold local leaders accountable, rather than ascribe poor services to disparate treatment by the central government motivated by sectarianism.\textsuperscript{91}

In September 2015, Prime Minister Abadi requested that the USAID project be expanded to all eight ministries, and all provinces. In addition, while the imperative from the Prime Minister’s office to accelerate and broaden the decentralization reforms is a positive sign, moves by some of the most powerful, and therefore most affected, ministries (such as the Ministry of Finance) to embrace these changes are also encouraging.\textsuperscript{92}

In addition to embedding senior advisors at the Ministry of Finance through the AMEG project this quarter, USAID’s Tarabot project reported the launch of a procurement help desk at the Ministry of Planning (part of efforts to improve the efficacy and limit corruption in GOI procurements), advances made at the Ministry of Oil to limit revenue losses and improve production with the technical assistance of advisors placed there, and the launch of a new, more accountable social safety net system in the Kurdistan Regional Government. These collaborative efforts to increase and better manage revenue are intended in part to help reinforce the legitimacy of the GOI in the eyes of the general public.\textsuperscript{93}

This quarter, DoS reported it has renewed and launched foreign assistance programs focusing on some of the difficult issues surrounding the building of a stable, inclusive government. Several programs seek to promote reconciliation, accountability, and cohesion among Shia, Sunni, and Kurds through airing of grievances, documentation of abuses, protection of victims, promotion of community-based conflict mitigation structures, and expanding...
access to justice. Other programs provide strategies to empower women and vulnerable groups, support human rights, advance the rule of law, provide vocational and entrepreneurial skills, and make Iraq’s governance and security structures more representative of the entire population.94

DoS’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) manages assistance agreements throughout Iraq, except in ISIL-controlled areas. For areas liberated from ISIL, DRL’s programs focus generally on rebuilding the capacity of exiled local authorities, strengthening legislative and political party processes, improving service delivery and coordination among governmental and non-governmental actors responding to the crisis, and reconciliation processes involving documentation of abuses, accountability, rights of victims, and encouraging community dialogue and conflict resolution.95 DRL administers $17.5 million in FY 2013 and FY 2014 Economic Support Funds for programs in Iraq (not exclusively in support of OIR).96

The GOI receives about 90% of its revenues from oil sales, and the fall in oil prices from 2014 to the present has resulted in a fiscal gap of at least $25 billion in Iraq’s budget.97 According to DoS, this shortfall has significantly hindered Iraq’s ability to fund government services and salaries, for example.98 The security environment has constricted the movements of DoS and other non-military U.S. personnel, who are largely limited to the International Zone in Baghdad and the consulates in Erbil and Basrah. DoS reported that it has been difficult to conduct diplomatic outreach and to assess the progress of decentralization and stabilization in Sunni areas and in territories newly liberated from ISIL. Additionally, DoS has been unable to monitor directly its grant programs. Security issues also prevent ready contacts with Iraqi ministries, UN agencies, coalition partners, and NGOs.99

Regional Support

With the assistance of U.S. diplomatic efforts, regional coalition members have increased their cooperation with Iraq in important ways. Neighboring Gulf States have pledged and contributed more than $850 million in funds for humanitarian assistance and education and have hosted donor conferences for humanitarian assistance for Syria. Qatar has named an Ambassador to Iraq for the first time in over 25 years, and Saudi Arabia has announced its intention to re-open its embassy in Baghdad.100
Stabilization

Special Presidential Envoy John Allen stated that the future of Iraq depends on the ability of all displaced persons to return home in safety and dignity to rebuild their communities. In its occupied areas, ISIL controls the provision of basic services and security, paid for in part through extortion of the local population (see the Disrupting ISIL’s Finances section of this report). Once the coalition military operation succeeds in driving ISIL out of an area, immediate stabilization measures are critical to filling the security and services vacuum. Otherwise, displaced persons may not want to return, and the chaotic environment could allow local militias or criminal elements to assert dominance, thereby fracturing Iraq further, or even permitting the return of ISIL.

The coalition members, along with relevant DoS components, have developed programs to assist Iraq in the critical stabilization endeavor, and coalition governments are surging support for this work. As reported last quarter, the Coalition Working Group for Stabilization Support, with diplomatic efforts supported by DoS, has been deeply involved in this critical effort. The working group convenes regularly, last meeting in Brussels on September 15, 2015. The coalition also has a Stabilization Task Force, which met in Baghdad on August 13, 2015. DoS reported that GOI, local government, and tribal officials have improved their abilities to work together on stabilization efforts. The GOI has prioritized the allocation of considerable resources toward this goal, and has set up a National Operations Center in the prime minister’s office which works with Joint Coordination Committees at the provincial level to implement stabilization measures. According to DoS, these joint efforts should increase trust between the GOI and non-Shia populations, promote reconciliation, and encourage decentralization—goals emphasized by Prime Minister al-Abadi.

According to General Allen, immediate stabilization should include the following steps:

- A local police force must be ready to move in quickly behind the military operation to protect the populace from a resurgence of criminal elements, ISIL forces, or militias.
- Local governance structures must be re-established.
- Basic services must be restored, including electricity, potable water, and basic health care.

In addition to these stabilization items, humanitarian assistance must immediately be provided, as needed for the population in the cleared areas.
The security and policing element is a sensitive issue. The clearing force normally includes Iraqi troops and PMFs, as well as other security elements, such as local militias. According to Special Presidential Envoy Allen, effective local policing should be provided by an integrated package of reconstituted local police (Sunni police in Sunni areas, for example), tribal forces, and some components of the PMFs under the governance of officials whose power is devolved from the GOI. The coalition conducts a program to train local police forces, including Sunni and Kurdish personnel, to assist them in providing local security in ISIL-liberated communities. More than 3,000 Iraqi police have returned to Tikrit, and hundreds more are in training. Italy leads the police-training sub-group of the Stabilization Working Group and started an 8-week training course in June. It expected to deploy 100 *Carabinieri* military police trainers to Iraq by the end of October.\footnote{112}

Local authorities must also determine 1) how to support reconciliation, accountability, and justice among returning IDPs and people who stayed (some who may have cooperated with ISIL or used ISIL’s presence to commit crimes) and 2) how to extend GOI state authority to newly liberated populations. ISIL’s use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) creates additional security burdens, and mine-clearing is a stabilization priority. Japan has started specialized training in Jordan for Iraqi police on IEDs, cybersecurity, organized crime, investigation, and tracking of financial assets of terrorists.\footnote{113}

The UNDP has established the FFIS to provide immediate assistance for stabilization priorities. The FFIS has received $10 million, including $8.3 million from USAID, and more than $27 million in additional funds have been pledged as of September 28, 2015. USAID’s contribution is intended to serve as a bridge for these efforts until Iraqi resources can be used to address the needs of IDPs in these areas.\footnote{114} Because of its budget shortfall due to the decline in oil revenues, Iraq has not been able to fund these stabilization projects or repair critical public infrastructure. Members of the coalition are also providing funds directly for stabilization efforts in both Iraq and Syria. Examples of FFIS projects include cash grants for small businesses, rebuilding of water stations, repair of the electrical grid, and the reopening of health centers. After stabilization, reconstruction accomplishes the larger public works projects and repairs to structures.\footnote{115}

The stabilization of Tikrit, liberated from ISIL as of April 2015, has been instructive to GOI and coalition planners. In mid-June, national and local Iraqi officials organized the return of IDPs to that area, and, as of September 30, 2015, approximately 100,000 people (about half of those who fled) had returned. FFIS is funding efforts in Salah al-Din province, in particular Tikrit, to provide grants for small repairs to damaged
infrastructure. Reports of problems facing liberated Tikrit include the poor local economy; the need to reopen schools; the need to continue to achieve balance among local police, PMFs, and national forces; and the need to balance reconciliation with accountability and transparency.\textsuperscript{116}

While the fight to drive ISIL from Ramadi and Anbar province continues, plans for post-ISIL work have progressed. Anbar Governor Sohaib al-Rawi shared his plan for Anbar, developed with the UNDP, at the Coalition Stabilization Task Force meeting in Baghdad on August 13, 2015. The plan, which has the full support of the Office of the Prime Minister, emphasizes reconciliation and restoration of services and covers local stabilization structures and coordination mechanisms, security transition to local police, and communications outreach (social and traditional media). According to Governor al-Rawi, the plan incorporates lessons learned from the return of IDPs to Tikrit. Al-Rawi also visited Washington and briefed the plan in September 2015.\textsuperscript{117}

DoS continues to support stabilization work as part of its long-standing efforts to promote effective governance. DRL manages assistance agreements throughout Iraq, except in ISIL-controlled areas. For areas liberated from ISIL, DRL’s programs focus generally on rebuilding capacity of exiled local authorities and reconciliation processes involving documentation of abuses, accountability, rights of victims, and encouraging community dialogue and conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{118}

**DENYING ISIL SAFE HAVEN**

In coordination with coalition partners, the U.S. military continues to conduct operations under OIR to degrade and defeat ISIL. The battlefields in this offensive extend through much of Syria and Iraq. Russian presence and operations in Syria have been increasing, with Russia launching its first airstrikes in late September 2015.

Among coalition advances this quarter, the government of Turkey granted U.S. military access to Incirlik Air Base for anti-ISIL efforts. The location puts U.S. air forces in closer range to strike. Incirlik is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) installation with an existing population of about 1,800 personnel. On August 9, 2015, 6 U.S. F-16 fighter aircraft and approximately 300 personnel arrived on station at the base.\textsuperscript{119} The week prior, Incirlik began supporting unmanned UAVs for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).\textsuperscript{120} The United States has also engaged in discussions with Turkey to determine a coordinated way to close the last miles of its border that remain porous to ISIL. FTFs and smugglers can still traverse about 68 miles of that border relatively undeterred.\textsuperscript{121}
In August 2015, the U.S. Air Force deployed six F-16 Fighting Falcons, support equipment, and about 300 personnel to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. (U.S. Air Force photo)

In September 2015, Russian aircraft launched their first strikes in Syria, dramatically changing the coalition’s theater of operations. Russia claimed to be targeting ISIL, but it apparently bombed anti-Assad opposition forces in northern Syria. DoD reported that the coalition assessed approximately 140 Russian airstrikes (including the possibility of cruise missiles launched from platforms on the Caspian Sea) around Hama, Homs, and Latakia, with indications that about 7,000 households or 35,000 people were affected.

On October 20, 2015, Russia’s Ministry of Defense and DoD agreed to an MOU on air safety in Syria that provides “measures to minimize the risk of in-flight incidents among coalition and Russian aircraft operating in Syrian airspace.” It specifies safety protocols, in-flight communications frequencies, and on-the-ground communications and reinforces professional airmanship. The MOU does not call for sharing of intelligence or target information and does not establish “zones of cooperation.” Russia and the United States have also agreed to form a working group to continue discussions on implementation of the MOU. DoD stated that “Russia’s strategy in Syria is counterproductive” and that the MOU discussions “do not constitute U.S. cooperation or support for Russia’s policy or actions in Syria.”
Key Operational Engagements

This quarter, 15 countries conducted airstrikes over Syria and Iraq and supported the train, advise, and assist mission in Iraq, providing equipment, ammunition and airlift.\textsuperscript{129}

ISIL’s advance through Syria has included the taking of oil fields. In early September 2015, ISIL reportedly captured Syria’s last regime-controlled oil field, in Homs province near Palmyra.\textsuperscript{130} Secretary Carter announced on October 23 that the coalition would be ramping up its assault on this “critical pillar of ISIL’s infrastructure.” He described the coalition’s destruction of a node in ISIL’s oil enterprise this quarter, including a pump station and a site for crude oil production and cash collection.\textsuperscript{131} However, as described in the Disrupting ISIL’s Finances section of this report, ISIL retains a sophisticated oil production enterprise.

In Iraq, the ISF is reportedly making a drive to take back Ramadi, in Anbar province, advancing from various directions about 9 miles out from the city in early October.\textsuperscript{132} ISIL force strengths inside Ramadi are estimated to be about 600 to 1,000. Although small, the ISIL force has had time to dig in, making trenches and berms and creating minefields by laying IEDs. Iraqi F-16s and increased ISR are now providing direct support to the troops on the ground for their maneuvers. DoD reported that the coalition had conducted 292 airstrikes in and around Ramadi as of October 13, 2015.\textsuperscript{133}

In Mosul, there have been reports that ISIL is executing suspected spies or those within their ranks who practice poor operational security. In early September 2015, iraqbodycount.org reported that more than 100 ISIL fighters, including several leaders, were executed in Mosul for planning a coup against ISIL’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This quarter, the exiled governor of the province estimated 2,000 executions had taken place at the hands of ISIL in Mosul over the summer months.\textsuperscript{134} For the daily execution totals and selected details from among more than 1,100 executions, predominantly of civilians, reportedly carried out by ISIL in Mosul during July, August, and September 2015, see the sidebar in this section.

ISIL has been increasingly using IEDs as its main weapon to disrupt or penetrate ISF or Peshmerga lines, often strapped to trucks, making them “precision-guided” munitions.\textsuperscript{135} DoD reported that it has been expediting orders of anti-tank munitions to combat the threat of vehicle-borne IEDs but announced there was a shortage of such weapons this quarter.\textsuperscript{136}
### ISIL Executions in Mosul, July–September 2015

#### July 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul 10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Jul 10**—12 civilians accused of “opposing (ISIL) ideology, collaborating with Iraqi government forces and providing them with information about terrorist hideouts” executed by being crushed with a bulldozer. 9 women also found in mass grave.

**Jul 18**—1 journalist executed for being a spy, bringing the total number of journalists executed in Mosul by ISIL to 15.

#### August 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 7</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 23</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Aug 2**—4 clerics executed for refusing to comply with ISIL regulations.

**Aug 7**—300 workers for the Iraqi Electoral Commission, at least 50 of them women, executed by firing squad for being “apostates and infidels.”

**Aug 23**—67 executed, including 39 associates of Iraqi army and security forces shot in the head, and 9 people thrown from the roof of a tall building.

#### September 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep 7–8</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sep 7–8**—112 extremists, 18 of them among the top commanders of ISIL, executed over two days by firing squad and electrocution for planning a coup against Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

**Sep 9**—10 women executed for refusing to join ISIL and have sex with ISIL members.

**Sep 27**—2 female lawyers executed for violating the regulations of the Islamic Sharia.

**Note:** The text to the right briefly describes notable examples of executions and other violence in Mosul on select days and does not purport to comprehensively detail all security incidents that occurred on the specified day.

**Sources:** Lead IG analysis of open-source media reports and "Recent Events," [iraqbodycount.org](http://iraqbodycount.org), 7/2015–9/2015.
Iraq and Syria: ISIL's Areas of Influence, August 2014 to August 2015

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in northern and central Iraq and northern Syria have been pushed back since August 2014. ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 20 to 25 percent of populated areas in Iraq and Syria where it once could. The map depicts ISIL’s territorial losses, which translate into approximately 15,000 to 20,000 square kilometers, or about 30 to 37 percent, in Iraq, and 2,000 to 4,000 square kilometers, or about 5 to 10 percent, in Syria. ISIL probably has a presence and freedom of movement in much of the unpopulated areas depicted on the map, but it is not possible to determine whether it is a dominant actor. In Iraq, ISIL’s largest territorial losses have been in Diyala, Erbil, Ninawa and Salah ad Din Governorates. In Syria, the group’s frontlines have been pushed back in areas in the north. Despite its net losses in both countries, ISIL has captured territory of strategic value since August 2014, such as Ar Ramadi in Iraq’s Al Anbar Governorate and Tadmur (Palmyra) in Syria’s Homs Province. Estimates fluctuate regularly because of the dynamic nature of the conflict.

Source: OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2015.
Just beyond the end of this reporting period, U.S. military forces suffered their first casualty in the fight to defeat ISIL. On October 22, 2015, at the request of the Kurdistan Regional Government, U.S. forces provided helicopter support and accompanied the Kurdish Peshmerga on a raid that rescued 70 ISIL hostages facing imminent execution near al-Hawija, Iraq. All 70 hostages were reportedly freed, including 20 ISF personnel. A cache of intelligence information was captured, along with 5 ISIL fighters. Several ISIL fighters were also killed.

The rescue spurred additional dialogue from Congress and the news media questioning the scope of the train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission and the U.S. policy to keep troops out of combat missions in Iraq. Secretary Carter said that “nobody should be at any illusions that U.S. personnel aren’t in harm’s way,” and he further explained, “We do not have combat formations there, but we do have people who are in harm’s way and who are willing to do that to … have mission success.” As of the publishing of this report, those discussions continue.

### Coalition Air Support

DoD reported that, as of October 6, 2015, the coalition had conducted more than 7,300 airstrikes, including approximately 4,700 in Iraq and more than 2,600 in Syria. U.S. costs associated with OIR operations have averaged approximately $10 million per day since August 2014. For a breakdown of nearly 14,000 targets damaged or destroyed by coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria as of September 24, 2015, see Table 2.

### COMMAND AND CONTROL

As of September 30, 2015, eight coalition partner air forces were conducting strikes in Iraq with the United States: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Jordan, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In Syria, eight countries were working with the United States: Australia, Bahrain, Canada, France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. The U.S Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) reported that, to ensure each nation has the

---

**Table 2.**

**Targets Damaged/Destroyed in Iraq and Syria, as of 9/24/2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>3,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting positions</td>
<td>3,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles (includes construction)</td>
<td>1,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical vehicles</td>
<td>771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging areas (including units)</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWVs</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checkpoints/offensive positions</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons caches</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil infrastructure</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored personnel carriers</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-aircraft artillery/air defense</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training camps</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,781</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** CENTCOM, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/8/2015.
opportunity to maximize its contribution, coalition planners at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) identify which assets from contributing nations are best suited to carry out individual strikes. This selection process takes many factors into consideration, including individual partner’s national policy caveats and technical capabilities. As of October 6, 2015, coalition teams had flown more than 57,800 sorties in Iraq and Syria.144

According to AFCENT, the CAOC closely monitors resource availability, maintenance rates, weather trends, and other planning factors to maintain continuous strike coverage across the theater. The CAOC can react to changes in the plan and compensate for delays or cancellations. Assets can be shifted or extended to minimize unplanned gaps in coverage. AFCENT reported that coalition aircraft are purposely placed across Iraq and Syria to provide continuous close air support within minutes, based on the priority of the operations.145

IRAQI F-16s JOIN THE FIGHT

The first four of several F-16 aircraft purchased from the United States arrived in Iraq in July 2015, along with three Iraqi pilots who had recently completed training in the United States. By September 2, these pilots were flying combat sorties over Iraq.146

Two of the aircraft received this summer are the F-16C single-seat variant, and two are F-16D two-seat variants. AFCENT reported that eight additional aircraft are being used for pilot training and maintenance technician training
The Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) at al-Udeid Air Base, Qatar, provides command and control of air power throughout Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and 17 other nations. (U.S. Air Force photo)

at various locations in the United States. The delivery of four more F-16s to Iraq is expected in January 2016. Lockheed Martin continues to produce against the GOI order at a pace of about one aircraft per month.147

Several dozen Iraqi pilots and trainees are training at various stages in courses held in the United States. They receive English language training at the Defense Language Institute, the F-16 Basic course, and advanced training.148

THREATS TO COALITION AIR OPERATIONS

Amid a complex operating environment, U.S. and coalition pilots face a range of threats in flying daily combat missions over Syria and Iraq. There were reports of Russian aircraft coming within visual range of coalition air forces in October,149 and an OIR spokesperson stated that “uncoordinated actors add risk” to the environment.150 Reports of ISIL’s limited use of MANPADS anti-aircraft weapons surfaced a year ago in Iraq and Syria.151 A video posted to YouTube in July 2015 purports to show ISIL’s downing of an Iraqi helicopter this summer.152
DoD reported this quarter that new basing in Turkey is allowing greater flexibility for staging of dedicated personnel recovery assets nearer to Syria. This allows shorter response times and increases the ability to rescue isolated pilots, should that be necessary. DoD reported that pilots receive Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) training as well.153

Targeting ISIL Leadership
Coalition forces continue to target ISIL leadership. Among the 20,000–32,000 ISIL fighters estimated to remain on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria,154 the coalition air campaign works to eliminate high-value individuals and deplete ISIL’s “bench.”155 In September 2015, the HSC task force reported, however, that “there has been ‘no meaningful degradation in their numbers,’ according to one defense official, as estimates place ISIS’s total fighting force...[at the same level as] last fall.”156 Since May 2015, coalition strikes have killed at least 70 mid- and high-level targets, including Haji Mutazz, ISIL’s second in command, and Junaid Hussain, ISIL’s top recruiter, both killed in August.157
On October 15, 2015, a coalition airstrike in northwest Syria killed a senior ranking member of al-Qaeda’s Khorasan Group, Abdul Mohsen Adballah Ibrahim al-Charekh, also known as Sanafi al-Nasr.\textsuperscript{158} Al-Nasr facilitated FTF movements by maintaining and organizing travel routes from Pakistan to Syria, through Turkey.\textsuperscript{159} In 2014, al-Nasr was designated by Treasury as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order (EO) 13224.\textsuperscript{160}

In September 2015, DoS designated 5 groups and 10 individuals as SDGTs. DoS cited examples of SDGT atrocities with these designations, such as the deaths and injuries of numerous civilians, beheadings, use of explosives, shootings, and the seizure of Mosul.\textsuperscript{161} Groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL include:\textsuperscript{162}

- The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Caucasus Province (ISIL-CP)—includes fighters from Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria
- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-K)—includes former Pakistani and Afghan Taliban faction commanders who announced ISIL’s expansion into Khorasan
- Jund al-Khilafah in Algeria (JAK-A)—includes senior military commanders who broke from al-Qaeda-linked Islamic Maghreb
- Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT)—operates in Indonesia
LEAD IG FOR OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

• Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN)—first announced insurgency operations against coalition forces in Iraq in December 2006; took part in the seizure of Mosul
• ISIL-Sinai Province (ISIL-SP)—previously designated SDGT under its old name, ABM

ISIL-K includes former Pakistani and Afghan Taliban faction commanders who announced ISIL's expansion into Khorasan. According to DoD, al-Nasr is the fifth senior Khorasan Group leader killed in the last four months. It is unclear whether he was directly linked to the ISIL faction of Khorasan; however, this example demonstrates the complications of countering violent extremism throughout the region and distinguishing the multiple fractured terrorist parties participating in atrocities in Syria and Iraq.

For updates on Treasury designations of terrorist financiers this quarter, see the Countering ISIL's Finance section of this report.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

U.S. efforts to build credible ground partners in the fight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria continue to face complex challenges in meeting expected program outputs. On October 9, 2015, the Administration ended the failed Syria training effort. DoD announced it would pause training of vetted Syrians after preparing fewer than 150 fighters. Secretary Carter directed the U.S. program to pivot toward providing equipment packages and weapons to a select group of vetted leaders, some of whose units have already been tested in battle against ISIL. He said that he remains “convinced that a lasting defeat of ISIL in Syria will depend in part on the success of local, motivated, and capable ground forces.” He expressed thanks to the coalition partners supporting the counter-ISIL efforts, acknowledging that the fight to retake territory held by ISIL “will continue to be a long and arduous process.”

According to DoD, U.S. and coalition military forces continue to assist the GOI to supply ISF, Kurdish Peshmerga, and Sunni tribal forces with urgently needed equipment and training. More than $3.07 billion in ITEF, GOI, and coalition commitments have purchased equipment to build the capacity of Iraq’s security forces.
Iraq Train and Equip Program

As of October 5, 2015, 3,550 U.S. personnel were authorized to serve under the U.S. TAA mission in Iraq.\textsuperscript{170} U.S. capacity-building efforts supported by the $1.62 billion ITEF reportedly yielded more than 2,000 additional trained and equipped Iraqi security personnel this quarter, including soldiers for the Iraqi Army (IA), Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service personnel, and Kurdish Peshmerga forces.\textsuperscript{171} This brings the total number of personnel trained and equipped through the program to more than 13,000 as of September 15—only 46% of the personnel expected by fall 2015.\textsuperscript{172} According to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Christine Wormuth, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in September 2015, some of the newly trained units have participated in operational maneuvers in areas such as Ramadi. She noted that they were performing well in their initial combat missions and emphasized that “strong leadership” would be essential to their success.\textsuperscript{173}

U.S. capacity-building efforts continue to center on four main elements:\textsuperscript{174}

- **Advise and Assist**—Coalition teams work to improve operational planning, communication, intelligence fusion, and targeting in support of Iraqi-led ground operations to halt ISIL’s advance and continue to liberate territory.
- **Train**—U.S., coalition, and Iraqi trainers employ tailored training cycles that cover individual skills, collective battalion training, and some brigade training. Courses focus on providing personnel the confidence to conduct successful offensive operations that adhere to the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict.
- **Equip**—The GOI works with the United States and coalition partners to define and assess critical requirements and prioritize equipment distribution to address shortfalls.
- **Reform**—Once the GOI is capable of securing Iraqi territory, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) phase will focus on developing more professional security institutions and training centers to sustain the forces’ proficiency.

No insider attacks against coalition or ISF personnel were reported this quarter, and there were no reported incidents of lost or misused ITEF-funded equipment.\textsuperscript{175}
Measuring Progress

Two new assessment products, expected to begin in November 2015, are designed to help determine the effects of the U.S. TAA program in Iraq: the Coalition Campaign Assessment (CCA) and the Iraq Security Forces Report on Operational Capability (IROC). These feed the Monthly Coalition Assessment Report (MCAR) presented to an Assessment and Analysis Board (AAB) that reviews the progress in the U.S. program.¹⁷⁶

The CCA Process

The CAAG reported this quarter that it is developing a draft framework for the CCA.¹⁷⁷ Assessment planning has primarily relied on the Commander’s Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution released in 2011.¹⁷⁸ The handbook provides a notional assessment structure at every level—tactical, operational, and strategic—linked to answer at the campaign level: “Are we accomplishing the mission?”¹⁷⁹ Based on joint environment lessons learned and best practices, the handbook recognizes three assessment process tasks:¹⁸⁰

- continual monitoring of the situation and operations progress
- evaluation of operations against measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that can either be quantitative (observation-based) or qualitative (opinion-based)
- developing recommendations and guidance for improvement

MOPs are linked to performance indicators of task-based capabilities and answer the question: “Are we doing things right?” A quantitative MOP might be “objectives seized.” Qualitative MOPs might be “integration with supporting commanders” or “understanding of assigned tasks.”¹⁸¹

MOEs are used more at operational and strategic staff levels. They help determine progress of operations toward achieving military objectives and ultimately achieving an end state. MOEs answer the questions: “Are we doing the right things? Are our actions producing the desired effects?”¹⁸² MOE analysis is linked to indicators associated with enemy courses of action and enemy centers of gravity.¹⁸³ A quantitative MOE might be “forces or civilians injured.” Qualitative MOEs might be “sentiments of host nation leaders on the security situation” or “host-nation commanders’ assessment on ability to provide security.”

Two other terms used in joint and coalition assessment frameworks are objectives and effects. An objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal for directing military operations. An effect is a consequence or outcome of an action, and can either support the achievement of an objective (a desired effect) or inhibit progress toward an objective (undesired effect).¹⁸⁴
The IROC Process

The IROC provides periodic operational assessment of ISF partner units of the IA, Peshmerga, and tribal forces. It reports on the readiness and capability of Iraq's security forces in five areas: 185

- **Leadership**—subjective assessment of unit leadership, staff officers, and senior NCOs
- **C3I**—subjective and objective assessment of unit command and control, communications, and intelligence
- **Combined Arms**—subjective assessment of unit operations (execution in fires, movement and maneuver, and protection)
- **Sustainment**—objective and subjective assessment of unit Manning, maintaining, medical, equipping, and resupply
- **Training**—assessment of unit integral training programs and unit formal coalition or Iraqi training program participation

Units will receive a rating against the following scale (against factors that vary based on unit type and definition): 186

- **Fully Capable (green)**—The unit can conduct operations without coalition assistance.
- **Capable (yellow)**—The unit can conduct operations with some coalition assistance.
- **Partially Capable (orange)**—The unit cannot conduct operations without significant coalition assistance.
- **Not Capable (red)**—The unit cannot conduct operations with or without significant coalition assistance.
- **Not Assessed (white)**—Direct or indirect assessment is not possible.
FUNDING

U.S., coalition, and GOI funding committed to building the capacity of the ISF as of September 30, 2015, totals more than $3.07 billion, including:

- **United States**—$1.62 billion for the ITEF; $747 million\(^{187}\) in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and $25 million through a special presidential drawdown authority in the Foreign Assistance Act.\(^{188}\)

- **Iraq**—$138.0 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and $362.7 million in direct commercial sales contracts.\(^{189}\)

- **Coalition nations**—$183.4 million in direct contributions\(^{190}\)

An undetermined amount of O&M funding supports the costs associated with 3,550 personnel authorized by the President serving the TAA mission in Iraq.\(^{191}\) The only reporting available on these costs aggregates O&M in broader categories, which prevents reporting on the status of funds specifically supporting the TAA program in Iraq. Reporting on the status of the ITEF is less problematic. The ITEF has been programmed to address critical equipment shortfalls for security forces operating under the direction of the GOI:\(^{192}\)

- $1.24 billion to equip nine IA brigades, including personnel protective gear for 45,000 soldiers
- $353.9 million to equip three Peshmerga brigades, including personnel protective gear for 15,000 soldiers
- $24.1 million to support Sunni tribal forces training in Anbar, including personnel protective gear for 5,000 soldiers
DoD reported that security units have not shown up in units of 5,000 personnel as expected; thus, fewer soldiers have been trained and equipped through the coalition program.\textsuperscript{193} As of September 18, 2015, $679.0 million of the ITEF had been obligated, including $88 million by the U.S. Army Central Command and $591.0 million by the Defense Security Cooperation Activity (DSCA) for pseudo-FMS\textsuperscript{194} equipment and services cases. An additional $565 million in pseudo-FMS cases is pending with DSCA.\textsuperscript{195}

Reporting on disbursements of the ITEF is not as timely. DoD reported that $261.0 million had been disbursed as of August 31, 2015.\textsuperscript{196}

**MINISTERIAL ADVISOR SUPPORT**

DoD’s Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) leads a small SSR working group to encourage fundamental reform of all components of Iraq’s National Security Forces “to defend against threats to public order and enable stable relationships with the country’s neighbors.”\textsuperscript{197} OSC-I serves as the primary partner in advising and assisting under the SSR approach, which anticipates five functional groups working on the following issues:\textsuperscript{198}

- the national defense and security sector and supporting institutions
- democratic oversight and accountability
- intelligence
- law enforcement and criminal justice
- national command and control

OSC-I reported it is currently advising and assisting efforts to restructure the IA, which includes reviewing and providing inputs to the Iraqi National Defense Strategy. It is also assessing the potential for assisting Iraq’s Ministry of Interior (MOI) with its internal security structure to identify deficiencies in the federal and border police forces.\textsuperscript{199}

At least $22 million in FY 2015 funds have been programmed to support ISF supply chain management, pending approval by Congress. The funds would provide supply chain enablers and advisors, support distribution capabilities from the Taji supply center, and address sustainment at an aerial port of debarkation.\textsuperscript{200}
In an assessment of DoD, CENTCOM, and coalition plans and efforts to train, advise, and assist the IA to defeat ISIL, DoD IG found that the training and equipment provided to the IA counterattack brigades and divisions could develop their capability to perform combat operations against ISIL. However, it noted significant internal deficiencies that will require adequate leadership and support by the GOI and its Ministry of Defense (MOD). These forces will also require U.S. and coalition air support.

U.S. personnel assigned to CJFLCC-I are providing standardized programs of instruction (POIs) for nine IA brigades, including a 6-week course to provide staff and unit instruction in leadership, marksmanship and weapons training, movement formation and techniques, and squad and platoon tactics. Specialty training includes preventive medicine, heavy weapons, and counter-improvised explosive device tactics. A follow-on 3-week POI provides advanced training in rifle marksmanship, military operations in urban terrain, and combined arms. Both POIs conclude with a training event, designed to demonstrate the trainees’ knowledge of the skills learned during each course. DoD IG found that U.S. and coalition trainers at some sites took the initiative to develop additional leadership instruction for Iraqi officers and sergeants.
DoD IG noted several areas of progress in communication and collaboration between U.S. and coalition advisors and their Iraqi counterparts and made six overarching observations in areas that require improvement. Two of the observations and related recommendations, involving leadership issues and managing capability expectations of the BPC-trained IA brigades, were reported in a classified annex. DoD IG released four observations and recommendations in the unclassified report:

**OBSERVATION 1**—U.S. and coalition commands conducting training at the BPC sites and providing advise and assist functions with Iraqi division headquarters reported uncertainty about the follow-on mission once the counterattack brigades were trained. **DoD IG recommended:** the Combined Joint Task Force-OIR (CJTF-OIR) commander, in coordination with the CJFLCC-I commander, complete the update/publication of the campaign plan and ensure adequate dissemination/communication throughout the command, and within the constraints of classification, with the GOI and its MOD.

**OBSERVATION 2**—Equipment provided by U.S. and coalition partners to the IA brigades training at BPC sites would, at times, arrive incomplete, rendering the equipment not fully mission capable. **DoD IG recommended:** the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in coordination with the geographic combatant commands and the implementing agencies, establish, via a written external standard operating procedure, a formal quality assurance review process that identifies process errors and omissions during each phase of the pseudo-foreign military sales equipment supply/procurement process.

**OBSERVATION 3**—U.S. advise and assist personnel at the Taji National Depot did not have accurate knowledge of the contents of individual supply warehouses under Iraqi control at that location or at other supply locations throughout Iraq. In some cases, even the IA personnel did not know what supplies were present. **DoD IG recommended:** the CJTF-OIR commander, in coordination with the CJFLCC-I commander and MOD, develop a plan that allows U.S. and coalition access to the warehouses at Taji National Depot and other supply depot sites within an expedited time period.

**OBSERVATION 4**—The facilities housing IA trainees at some of the BPC sites visited were inadequate and distracted from training activities. **DoD IG recommended:** the CJFLCC-I commander advise/mentor MOD to use GOI funds to repair and improve IA billeting facilities for trainees at the BPC sites and work with MOD to devise and implement a plan that clarifies GOI and U.S. monetary contributions to improve billeting facilities at the BPC site.
Iraqi soldiers enter a room during an urban operations training at the Iraqi Army Noncommissioned Officer Academy at Camp Taji, Iraq, on September 29, 2015. (U.S. Army photo)

TRAINING

As of September 23, 2015, more than 1,400 support personnel and 785 trainers from 14 coalition partner nations were working alongside more than 1,700 U.S. support personnel and 488 trainers at five Build Partner Capacity (BPC) sites in Iraq. Reporting on the total number of soldiers trained this quarter was not available as of October 21, 2015. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 16, 2015, Under Secretary Wormuth put the number of total trained through that point at 13,000, including 4,000 Sunni tribal fighters. This number is well below the goal of 24,000 soldiers set for fall 2015.

Pursuant to section 1236 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015, before providing assistance to elements of any force, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) assesses whether trainees have been associated with either a terrorist organization or governments hostile toward the United States. Trainees must also commit to promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law.

DoD reported that coalition training spans a range from basic combat maneuvers and weapons instruction to advanced courses, such as the train-the-trainer course on urban operations held at the
IA’s Noncommissioned Officer Academy at Camp Taji, in September 2015. Iraqi soldiers attending the course reportedly learned how to properly clear buildings for the urban combat that will be required to take back towns occupied by ISIL.208

Sunnis trained to fight as part of tribal force units would eventually be transitioned to a formal National Guard organization. However, as of October 2015, the GOI had not passed enabling legislation to put the plan into action. OSC-I reported that it continues to press initiatives to support a future force, and the SSR working group has developed a draft Mission Table of Organization and Equipment and concepts to support National Guard formation.209

In September 2015, DoD IG released the results of its assessment of TAA efforts for the IA. For details of those findings, see the sidebar earlier in this section. DoD IG has begun similar projects to assess TAA efforts for the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and for the Sunni tribal forces.

EQUIPMENT

As of September 2015, the U.S., Iraqi, and coalition governments had committed at least $3 billion in equipment purchases to address shortfalls for the ISF, Peshmerga, and tribal forces. Although DoD IG was told during recent fieldwork about perceptions that popular mobilization forces are
better equipped, its assessment of the program this summer determined that U.S. and coalition partners were providing “appropriate and sufficient” supplies and equipment to the IA at BPC sites, noting that some equipment will not arrive until later in the calendar year.\textsuperscript{210}

Obligations of the ITEF for pseudo-foreign military sales equipment cases totaled just more than $591.5 million as of October 5, 2015, up 87% from the total last quarter. The largest case, totaling $250.4 million, provides equipment sets for eight ISF brigades, including weapons, body armor, medical kits, and vehicles. A case totaling $122.8 million purchased weapons, body armor, and ammunition for the tribal security forces. Purchases for anti-tank weapons more than tripled to $26.5 million, and purchases of counter-IED equipment rose from $7.4 million last quarter to nearly $88.5 million.\textsuperscript{211} For details of case deliveries implemented by DSCA last quarter and this quarter, as well as quarterly obligation increases by category, see Appendix A.

According to DoD IG, the so-called “pseudo-FMS” process used to manage ITEF-procured equipment and supplies is proving to be an effective accountability tool. In coordination with the MOD, the process allows CJTF-OIR to target delivery of equipment and supplies directly to IA brigades training at the BPC sites, for example, while maintaining accountability in both the U.S. and Iraqi systems.\textsuperscript{212}

DoD reported that many vetted Sunni tribal personnel report to training sites with their own weapons. For those who do not, the U.S. government works under an agreement with the GOI to ensure they receive AK-47-type weapons. As of mid-June 2015, at least 1,900 vetted Sunni tribal personnel had been armed with such weapons by the GOI. DoD, in turn, provides the GOI an equivalent number of U.S. M-16 rifles. According to DoD, tribal units that have completed training and equipping at BPC sites have been integrated effectively into GOI security forces conducting counter-ISIS operations.\textsuperscript{213}

**Syria Training and Equipping**

In October 2015, DoD announced it would pause training of Syrian fighters after fewer than 150 people had completed the program.\textsuperscript{214} Details about the number of trainees admitted to the program, those who failed out, and the final number trained were not available in an unclassified setting. Discussing the program in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 27, Secretary Carter said he “was disappointed that it failed.”\textsuperscript{215} DoD IG addressed some of the challenges to obtaining qualified candidates and the rigorous vetting standards in its classified evaluation of the U.S. screening processes completed in September 2015. In October 2015, President Obama spoke to the problem of asking these
forces to focus solely on fighting ISIL, describing the Syrian response: “How can we focus on ISIL when every single day we’re having barrel bombs and attacks from the regime?”(For more on the use of barrel bombs, see the Humanitarian Assistance section later in this report.)

DoD confirmed that the coalition would continue to support graduates of the program still serving in Syria as well as those completing training that was already in progress when the shift in program focus was announced. This includes payment of stipends for those who completed the training program. Now the U.S. program will focus on assisting groups actively engaged in fighting ISIL and work with a select group of vetted leaders. According to DoD, these groups will receive limited equipment packages ahead of a concerted push toward Raqqah, ISIL’s self-proclaimed capital city in Syria, to disrupt ISIL lines of communication.

DoD IG reviewed Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Syria (CJIATF-S) screening processes for Syrian training candidates to determine whether CJIATF-S effectively identified derogatory information that would keep an individual from participating in the coalition training program. The team assessed whether the guidance, standards, procedures, training, resources, and safeguards existed and were sufficient to enable CJIATF-S to develop and implement vetting processes to identify, recruit, and accept/reject New Syrian Forces (NSF) personnel, including pre-biometric, and counterintelligence vetting of recruits’ suitability. The team also assessed whether the processes were designed to identify credible vetting information in accordance with applicable law, including acts of violence against friendly forces or political affiliations in conflict with the NSF mission. Finally, the team assessed whether the type and extent of current and planned interagency collaboration in the NSF vetting processes used local sources and reach-back capabilities available to DoD, DoS, other government agencies, and non-governmental organizations. In a classified report released in September 2015, DoD IG found that the vetting procedures met all legislative requirements, but made specific recommendations to help strengthen the overall T&E vetting effort. CJIATF-S concurred with all of the team’s recommendations and initiated process improvements.

On October 13, 2015, DoD announced that it would use the same process evaluated by DoD IG to vet leaders who receive U.S.-funded equipment under the reorganized Syria train and equip program.
FUNDING
According to DoD, host-nation partners have undertaken and funded much of the training and associated facility construction for the Syria train and equip program. The United States had allocated $500 million of the FY 2015 Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) for Syria training and equipping efforts. As of September 15, 2015, $367.5 million of that amount, or 74% had been programmed for equipment.\(^{222}\)

For a breakout of the $383.547 million in program apportionments finalized by the Office of Management and Budget as of September 30, 2015, by service Operations and Maintenance (O&M) account, see Figure 1.

DoD had requested $600 million of the CPTF for establishment of a new Syria Train and Equip Fund in FY 2016.\(^{223}\) Following the President’s decision to pause the training program, however, DoD reported it is revising the request.\(^{224}\)

TRAINING
Up to 1,000 U.S. military personnel were authorized to support the Syria train and equip program in FY 2015.\(^{225}\) Coalition partner nations have supported with intelligence, logistics, operations, planning, and social media exploitation support as CJIATF-S headquarters staff and as trainers at training sites in Turkey and Jordan.\(^{226}\)

DoD officials expected to form classes of 300 Syrian volunteers when the program began. Training for the first cohort of 90 soldiers began on May 7 2015.\(^{227}\) Two months later, on July 7, Secretary Carter announced that 60 trainees remained in the first class. Acknowledging that the number was very small, he reported to Congress that DoD was working to screen and vet almost 7,000 potential recruits to ensure they passed the multistage screening process.\(^{228}\)
This quarter, DoD IG issued a Notice of Concern on critical health and safety deficiencies requiring immediate corrective action after its inspection of U.S. Military-Occupied facilities at the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) in Amman, Jordan in August. DoD IG’s final inspection report will be available no later than January 2016.

The first group of coalition-trained fighters inserted back into Syria met with the challenges of re-forming after the Eid-al-Fitr holiday and an attack by an al-Qaeda affiliate on their base in Syria. Out of 54 graduates of the first training class, 9 were still serving with active groups as of September 29. The second training class yielded 75 fighters who returned to two major opposition groups where they had previously served.229

DoD reported that the Syria Engagement Team, a small group of U.S. Special Operations Forces personnel, liaises directly with Syrian opposition groups in Turkey and Jordan. As of September 14, 2015, the U.S. government had obligated $101 million in stipends for the graduates of the Syria train and equip program.230 CJIAF-Syria reported in September 2015 that it was seeking to bring key vetted Syrian opposition leaders to Amman, Jordan, “to synchronize aims and strengthen a working relationship that will deliver advisory support.”231

THE WAY FORWARD

On October 12, 2015, media reported a new alliance between a Kurdish militia in northern Syria and Arab rebels. This suggests new types of operational relationships are emerging possibly as a result of the U.S. recasting its TAA program. For example, Kurdish YPG militia and Arab groups operating under “The Syrian Arab Coalition” have reprised a cooperative working arrangement. The groups reportedly shared a similar arrangement while liberating areas of northern Syria earlier in the year, now calling themselves “the Democratic Forces of Syria.” Spokesman for the 3,200 Raqqah Revolutionaries, Abu Muazz, reported that the United States had committed new weapons ahead of a joint offensive on Raqqah. He told the media, “We met the Americans and this has been approved and we have been told these new arms … are on their way.” The coalition reportedly includes Arab groups Jaysh al-Thuwwar (Army of Rebels) and Jaysh al-Sanadeed as well as an Assyrian Christian group. According to Nasir Haj Mansour, an official in the defense ministry of the Kurdish administration in YPG-held territory, “The current goal in practical terms is to confront Daesh [another name for ISIL], given that it is the first enemy, but the goal is also to build a democratic Syria in the future.”232

Unconnected to reports of the newly formed coalition, a spokesman for OIR confirmed that the United States air-dropped 50 tons of ammunition specifically for a Syrian-Arab coalition on October 10, 2015. He estimated force strength of this collective to be approximately 5,000 fighters. According to DoD, the coalition program vetted and trained the group’s leader to use the specialized equipment provided to the leader’s units. This 100-bundle airdrop was five times the size of a U.S. airdrop of 23 bundles over Kobane a year
ago. Items included ammunition for 5.56 and 7.62 caliber machine guns and assault rifles, hand grenades, and mortar rounds. DoD emphasized that much of the funding for the Syria capacity-building mission has been obligated for equipment that remains available to commanders who have been vetted, are long known to U.S. and coalition partners, and have already proven themselves in the fight against ISIL.\textsuperscript{233}

DoD IG will continue its oversight of the programs that support the Syrian forces, including the effectiveness of the TAA teams, equipment delivery and distribution, and coordination of these activities with other OIR efforts.

Other Regional Stabilization Efforts

The costs associated with counter-ISIL operations and the longstanding Syrian humanitarian crisis continue to mount for regional neighbors to Iraq and Syria. In FY 2015, Congress approved $136 million for border security and quick reaction forces in Jordan and Lebanon through the CTPF to address counterterrorism priorities in the region. Congress also approved the use of $500 million through CTPF for the Syria train and equip mission. DoD reported that it continues to assess partner requirements to enhance their counterterrorism capabilities in the CENTCOM area of operation, in the following categories:\textsuperscript{234}

- border security and quick reaction forces
- partner nation support to counter ISIL
- enhancing partner counterterrorism training

More than $59 million of this amount was enacted for Lebanon’s border security, and $60 million for Jordan, pursuant to section 2282 of Title 10, U.S.C. The Jordanian border security program provides vehicles, equipment, weapons, munitions, and training to enhance the ability of Border Guard companies to respond to border incursions from terrorist elements. Additional funds support quick response forces and provide weapons, ammunition, night-vision devices, other equipment, and training to enhance the ability of Jordan’s military to disrupt terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{235}

Last quarter, DoS reported that it provided $300 million in FMF funding in FY 2015 to support Jordan’s ability to secure the borders, control national territory, and participate in coalition operations. FMF covers, for example, the costs of F-16 munitions for coalition operations and equipment sustainment support for aircraft and vehicles. An additional $85 million was released in September 2015.\textsuperscript{236} DoS reported that FMF deliveries since February 2015 include more than 26,000 rifles and machine guns and more than 2 million rounds of small arms ammunition, as well as 1,000 night
vision devices to support Jordan’s immediate operational requirements. The United States has also delivered several hundred munitions to the Royal Jordanian Air Force for use by its F-16 fighter aircraft in coalition operations against ISIL. In September, DoS released an additional $85 million in FY 2015 FMF support for Jordan. This assistance will support Jordan’s border security capacity as well as its ability to participate in coalition operations against ISIL. 237

The United States has also provided substantial humanitarian support for Jordan. 238 According to information provided to the Congressional Research Service by DoS in August 2015, the United States has allocated more than $624 million in multilateral humanitarian assistance to Jordan since FY 2012. 239

ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ON ISIL

Details of U.S. intelligence collection programs and operations are not available in an unclassified setting, but this report presents in the other LOE discussions some of the cross-cutting issues being addressed by U.S. and international intelligence, law enforcement, and military organizations as they work to improve information sharing on ISIL actors and activities around the world. Success in identifying threats and sharing information affects the ability to defeat ISIL on the battlefield, intercept FTFs, thwart attacks on the homeland, counter ISIL’s finances, and conduct counter-narrative campaigns to expose ISIL’s true nature.

Intelligence Sharing for FTF Interdiction

In September 2015, the HSC Task Force on Combatting Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel released its review of the FTF and terrorist travel. The report presented 32 findings across four main categories—(1) U.S. strategy, (2) identification of terrorists and prevention of travel, (3) detection and disruption of FTFs during travel, and (4) overseas security gaps. 240 Among many key findings, the task force emphasized that “the U.S. government lacks a comprehensive strategy for combating terrorist and foreign fighter travel and has failed to maintain a system for identifying and plugging related gaps in America’s defenses.” 241 A broader discussion of the report has been included in the Disrupting the Flow of FTFs section of this report, but some of the underlying insights about intelligence collection are relevant to this LOE.
Countering Violent Extremism

In September 2014, at the United Nations, President Obama called on member nations to do more to address violent extremism within their regions. He asked them to return in a year with concrete steps to address “the underlying grievances and conflicts that feed extremism.”242 Five months later, the White House supported that call for action when it convened the February 2015 3-day summit of local, federal, and international leaders to focus on approaches to countering violent extremism (CVE).243

The definition of CVE activities to emerge from that summit “encompasses the preventative aspects of counterterrorism,”244 as well as “interventions to undermine the attraction of extremist movements and ideologies that seek to promote violence.”245 The CVE designation thus includes activities that cut across several of the lines of effort set out in the President’s strategy to defeat ISIL.246 These include enhancing intelligence collection in ISIL, exposing ISIL’s true nature, disrupting ISIL financing, and disrupting the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.247

In late September 2015, as the President had requested, leaders from more than 100 countries, 20 multilateral bodies and 120 civil society and private sector organizations convened in New York for a “Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism” on the eve of the 70th Annual meeting of the UN General Assembly.248

Leaders convened in New York for a “Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism”
Prosecutive Information Sharing

On September 14, 2015, the first Counter Terrorism Prosecutors Network (CTPN) was launched in Zurich, Switzerland, as a part of the International Association of Prosecutors (IAP) 20th Annual Conference and General Meeting. The IAP is in partnership with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and the Institute for Security Studies.249 The new CTPN provides a virtual network of prosecutors worldwide, where the criminal justice agencies of United Nation Member states can address issues and challenges, as well as best practices in the prosecution of terrorism cases. The CTPN offers its IAP membership resources, databases, and the opportunity to share information, exchange ideas, and make queries through a secure online platform. The CTED has committed to sharing its assessments through the network, offering the CTPN as a “conduit for delivering technical assistance and capacity building for investigators, prosecutors, and judicial authorities at the national level.”251

DoJ Activities

DoJ reported it is working with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Global Counterterrorism Forum's CVE working group to encourage governments to enact good practices to counter the spread of terrorism. This includes developing and institutionalizing high-risk prison management procedures and programs to counter the radicalization of non-terrorist prisoners overseas. Together with FBI, DHS, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), it works with public safety officials, educators, social service providers, and civil society to empower communities and support the design and implementation of strategies to strengthen their resilience against all forms of violent extremist recruitment, including FTFs. The interagency team has implemented the “model regions” pilot, in which select jurisdictions coordinate with the interagency working group, and receive federal support for strategy design and implementation. The U.S. Attorneys offices in these model regions coordinate a range of programs, including a multidisciplinary forum on intervention, workshops on CVE messaging, and educational programs to foster resilience.252

DoJ and other agencies participated in international, national, and state-level conferences, meetings and groups throughout the quarter ending September 30, 2015, including assistance and training of foreign governments, and conferences designed to address radicalization. On September 29, 2015, the Strong Cities Network was unveiled at the UN General Assembly. This global network links local and other subnational governments to build community resilience and social cohesion to counter violent extremism.253
According to the HSC task force report, about 40 countries participate in activities associated with the 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6)—Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism. HSPD-6 directs that the U.S. government “develop, integrate, and maintain thorough, accurate, and current information” about terrorists and use that information to support the many appropriate screening processes for protecting the “people, property, and territory of the United States against acts of terrorism, as permitted by law.” These agreements with other countries allow the United States to consistently share and exchange current data about terrorists.

In early 2015, DoS’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) and Embassy Baghdad determined that the U.S. Mission should focus its messaging role on helping change the narrative where the ground fight was taking place, providing raw content that could be used for counter-ISIL outreach and amplifying other counter-ISIL messaging. NEA’s support for the LOE of Exposing ISIL’s True Nature has continued in parallel and in partnership with Embassy Baghdad. After its initial push into Iraq in June and July 2014, ISIL’s own graphic messaging campaigns brutally exposed its nature. ISIL’s social media network widely broadcast videos and images of its heinous acts of violence to convey an image of religious fervor, toughness, and invincibility.

To change that narrative in Iraq, U.S. messaging focused on offering hope to the Iraqi people, the GOI, and Iraq’s security forces that ISIL could be defeated and that they had the support of the U.S.-led coalition with the strength and resolve to do that. The Mission focused its messaging on stories within Iraq, where it was uniquely positioned, and captured military developments on U.S. cooperation with Iraqi partners, U.S. assistance to refugees, and support for national unity and reconciliation. The embassy and consulates individually amplified content that would resonate with their respective audiences.

Mission Iraq and U.S. government visitors also conducted person-to-person engagements with influential religious leaders and scholars, marginalized populations, civil society, and foreign government officials to reassure them of U.S. and coalition support for Iraq and dispel false narratives about U.S. support for ISIL, encouraging these contacts to publicly message to counter ISIL. The Mission’s Public Affairs Section also worked with U.S. military public affairs colleagues at post to advise and assist the ISF media directorates and spokespersons to help improve their messaging capacity.
capability gaps in executing the agreements, including inadequate, limited, dated, or infrequent sharing of information, as well as countries that do not use their agreements.  

According to the HSC task force, human intelligence, such as private citizens (friends, relatives, community members) provide information in more than 75% of the U.S. FTF cases that lead to arrests. HSC’s report noted that multiple U.S. agencies share information about these FTFs through the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and state and local law enforcement. DoJ reported that it works with the FBI and other partners in the intelligence community to provide legal advice and ensure that they have the necessary legal authorities to conduct lawful collection of foreign intelligence and open source information with respect to terrorist threats. Additionally, NCTC’s Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment database feeds the TSDB. The United States National Central Bureau at DoJ (INTERPOL Washington) has provided additional FTF profiles to INTERPOL’s Foreign Fighter Fusion Cell database, which now includes more than 5,000 FTF profiles contributed by more than 50 member countries.

Notwithstanding these mechanisms’ central collection, the HSC task force identified gaps and weaknesses in gathering valuable “financial intelligence” for counterterrorism vetting and screening processes and in intelligence reach-back to identify FTFs at the borders or other points of entry into the homeland. HSC task force recommendations to enhance information sharing recognize the need for a central FTF identity database, with information scrubbed and declassified on a regular basis and made available on an international scale through INTERPOL. According to DoJ, INTERPOL Washington is exploiting existing mechanisms and building new ones to address the FTF threat.

U.S. Oversight

In response to a congressional request, DoJ OIG, DHS OIG, and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community initiated a coordinated, joint review focusing on domestic sharing of counterterrorism information. The objectives of this review are to: (1) identify and examine the federally supported field-based intelligence entities engaged in counterterrorism information sharing to determine their overall missions, specific functions, capabilities, funding, and personnel and facility costs; (2) determine whether counterterrorism information is being adequately and appropriately shared with all participating agencies; and (3) identify any gaps and/or duplication of effort among the entities.
This quarter, a DoD IG hotline complaint referred for investigation involved allegations concerning the processing of intelligence information by the CENTCOM Intelligence Directorate. DoD IG initiated an investigation to address whether there was any falsification, distortion, delay, suppression, or improper modification of intelligence information; any deviations from appropriate process, procedures, or internal controls regarding the intelligence analysis; and personal accountability for any misconduct or failure to follow established processes. The investigation remains ongoing.

EXPOSING ISIL’S TRUE NATURE

When President Obama addressed the Leader’s Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism at the United Nations Headquarters on September 29, 2015, he spoke of ISIL’s ability to take root in areas around the world that are suffering from “failed governance,” or in some cases “civil war or sectarian strife.”276 He said ISIL has been “very effective through social media” and has been able to “attract adherents not just from the areas in which they operate, but in many of our own countries.”277 This is not a “conventional battle,” he said. “This is a long-term campaign, not only against this particular network, but against its ideology.”278

Much of DoS’s public diplomacy work focuses on countering violent extremism.279 Collectively DoS regional bureaus, such as the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and several functional bureaus (including International Information Programs, Educational and Cultural Affairs, and the Bureau of Counterterrorism) support OIR by countering ISIL’s false narrative directly and coordinating regional counter-ISIL messaging.280

On the domestic front, the National Security Council has directed an interagency review to assess how the U.S. government can most effectively engage in CVE messaging directed to the U.S. audience. The DoS component that leads and coordinates the U.S. counter violent extremism messaging effort operates exclusively in the international, and not the domestic, sphere.281

The HSC Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel recommended that there be a ramp-up of counter-messaging and social media campaigns and testimonials to help expose ISIL’s true nature.282
Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications

The CSCC leads the DoS counter-ISIL messaging strategy.\textsuperscript{283} It had a funding base of $5.4 million in FY 2015, augmented by $3.5 million to address priority needs not funded in the base. CSCC operates within the Under Secretariat of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. DoS reported that much of CSCC’s staff of 66 is engaged in directly countering ISIL messaging.\textsuperscript{284}

CSCC recently added an interagency Information Coordination Cell (ICC) that draws its staff from seven different government agencies.\textsuperscript{285} The ICC team works to develop and coordinate counter-ISIL messaging, and it collaborates with regional DoS bureaus, which in turn provide communications guidance to foreign governments and NGOs.\textsuperscript{286} In support of this function, the ICC circulated 52 “Thematic Guidance” papers to more than 3,000 U.S. government offices and coalition partners.\textsuperscript{287} DoS reported that the ICC also distributes regular reports on ISIL’s messaging trends.\textsuperscript{288}

COORDINATING OTHER VOICES WORLDWIDE

In July 2015, the U.S. worked with its counter-ISIL coalition partner, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to help launch the Sawab Center, a UAE-based joint operations center for online engagement.\textsuperscript{289} The Sawab Center counters ISIL’s social media messages in Arabic and English has created a cloud-based information sharing platform for coalition partners to amplify credible Arab and Muslim voices and share Arabic counter-ISIL content.\textsuperscript{290} In less than 3 months the Sawab Center had more than 10,100 followers.\textsuperscript{291} Sawab is the Arabic word for “the right path.”\textsuperscript{292} Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Richard Stengel emphasized that the connotations of the name Sawab Center reinforce the idea that people should not view this effort as a competition between American and ISIL messaging, “That isn’t the ball game. It’s the whole rest of the Islamic world-versus-ISIL.”\textsuperscript{293}

Three additional regional digital messaging centers, envisioned to be similar to the Sawab Center, are being established by the Government of Malaysia,\textsuperscript{294} by the Organization for Islamic Cooperation,\textsuperscript{295} and by the government of Nigeria.\textsuperscript{296}

CONFRONTING EXTREMIST MESSAGES DIRECTLY

Within CSCC, the Digital Outreach Team specifically confronts extremist ideology online.\textsuperscript{297} DoS reported that, during April–September 2015, CSCC produced more than 25,500 discrete social media posts on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram in Arabic, Urdu, English, and Somali, garnering more than 165 million impressions.\textsuperscript{298} Another example is the CSCC’s recent defectors campaign launched ahead of the UN General Assembly, which
released 13 videos and 36 social media banners that feature former fighters testifying to ISIL’s depravity. The campaign generated 13,000 social media mentions; 897 articles; and more than 90 million impressions. CSCC also issues daily and thematic guidance on counter-ISIL messaging to nearly 3,000 officials within the U.S. government and to coalition partners. To further support the dissemination of effective messaging, CSCC is developing a content-sharing platform so that U.S. government offices around the world and coalition partners can work together to upload, download, curate, and produce counter-ISIL content.

ISIL’S FALSE NARRATIVE AND THE GLOBAL RESPONSE

Terrorists in general, and ISIL in particular, commonly use ideology to attract and radicalize adherents, according to Rashad Hussain, Special Envoy and Coordinator for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. Speaking at the UN Foreign Press Center in September 2015, Special Envoy Hussain spoke of ideology, in particular a “warped interpretation of Islam,” as one of the factors that often plays a role in the radicalization of a terrorist recruit. He described three contributing factors commonly seen in the process:

- **Grievance:** Terrorists prey on political grievances, particularly their narrative of Western responsibility for Muslims suffering discrimination, repression, restrictions on their political expression and lack of economic opportunity.
- **Ideology:** Terrorists often use a warped interpretation of Islam to advocate violence in defense of Muslim communities. ISIL urges sectarian violence to defend Sunnis from Shia aggression and to establish a caliphate for Muslims.
- **An influencer:** Recruits rarely become radicalized on their own. Almost always an influencer in their community, or online, uses both grievance and ideology to reel them in.

According to Special Envoy Hussain, a clear response must come from credible voices within and outside of government to counter this process and its false narrative. If terrorists call young people to a path they call “righteous,” claim to be defending Muslims and lure them to join a winning team; we have to show that to be false, that they are destroying Muslim communities, and will be on the losing side. He elaborated a set of six specific narrative themes that effectively embody these needed responses:

- stories of defectors and former ISIL fighters
- accounts of poor living conditions under ISIL
- descriptions of the resistance ISIL is facing on the battlefield and the losses they have taken
Part of the messaging challenge that we are facing is that extremists are producing and disseminating materials that are often much more emotionally appealing than government statements and religious leader edicts and direct-to-camera condemnations of terrorism.

Rashad Hussain, Special Envoy and Coordinator for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, June 2015

- stories of ISIL atrocities against Muslims, who make up the majority of ISIL’s victims
- statements of credible Muslim voices, scholars, and those who have lived under ISIL rule
- positive examples of young people who are addressing challenges through productive means

To amplify these narratives, CSCC’s ICC continues to expand its messaging efforts, including introducing “original content on social media platforms in Arabic, Somali, Urdu, Hausa, and English.”

The Broadcasting Board of Governors

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is both the name of the independent federal agency that oversees all U.S. civilian international media and the board that governs those broadcasts. BBG’s formally stated mission is to “inform, engage, and connect” people around the world in “support of freedom and democracy.”

BBG reports that it can and does reach closed information areas within Iraq and Syria using advanced Internet anti-censorship tools to support its distribution capabilities. According to BBG, content carried on its media networks, Voice of America (VOA) and The Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN), counter the false information and media messaging by extremist groups.

BBG CONTENT

In FY 2015, BBG received $6.3 million to expand its work in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. BBG allocated this funding in equal measure to VOA (federal) and MBN (a non-federal grantee), each receiving $3.15 million. BBG reported that, across Iraq, it has a 43.9% weekly audience, nearly double that of the BBC, and in Kurdish Iraq, its weekly audience is 23.9%. BBG’s presence in Turkey and the region is growing. In programming directed toward those audiences, BBG looks to amplify the voices of moderate political and religious leaders. According to BBG, countering the ideology and messaging of violent extremism requires accurate and objective information, and there are indications that these audiences find BBG programming credible. BBG reports that public surveys confirm MBN’s Iraq-specific programming has earned a reputation as a trusted news source, with 85% of the Iraqi audience saying that Alhurra-Iraq and Radio Sawa Iraq’s content is credible.
In the Gulf countries of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and Kuwait, MBN reaches 18%–48% of Arab populations weekly through TV, radio, and digital media. Of those audiences, 88% of Alhurra viewers and 82% of Radio Sawa listeners find MBN credible.314

MBN’s Iraq-specific television and radio networks (Alhurra-Iraq and Radio Sawa Iraq) now feature call-in shows, a monthly town hall in Iraq, and new public affairs programming. MBN’s new “Raise Your Voice” campaign targets audiences in Iraq and Syria and provides an arena for discussing extremism and its underlying causes.315

Alhurra’s Facebook page has 6.2 million followers, and Alhurra and Radio Sawa’s website visits have increased by 65% over the last 3 months, with many of the followers and visitors originating in Iraq. But ISIL is not just an Iraq or Syria problem. According to BBG, Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf States have regional interests at stake, and BBG reaches policy leaders and mass audiences in these surrounding states.316

VOA reported that it is expanding its original coverage of news and information and adding unique content in the form of short, interactive segments and longer-format TV programs and material for online and mobile use. VOA is also increasing its social media engagement related to countering extremism and ISIL. VOA’s Kurdish and Turkish Services have established relationships with major radio and television networks in the region and are entering into partnerships to increase BBG’s reach. In FY 2015, VOA committed approximately $3.15 million in OCO funds to expand support for this effort.317

VOICE OF AMERICA EXTREMISM WATCH DESK
The VOA Extremism Watch Desk became operational in October 2015 with five contractors and a senior newsroom supervisor detailed from the VOA English web desk to oversee the operation. Another three contractors are expected to join the team in the near future. They have been providing translations and versioning of stories from VOA’s Afghan, Urdu, Kurdish, Turkish, Persian, and several other services for VOA-wide distribution.318 Stories include a morning roundup of Islamic State and terrorism activities in the region collected daily from news outlets and social media in vernacular languages and English.319

ASSESSMENTS OF EFFECTIVENESS
According to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD), “The primary challenge continues to be in understanding the impact of this [public diplomacy and broadcasting] work and creating data to inform and drive strategies.”320 BBG reported it is in the early stages of expanding its assessment effort utilizing quantitative and qualitative research data.
within its Impact Model that assesses the extent and effectiveness of U.S. international media’s journalism to “inform,” “engage,” “connect,” and “be influential” with target audiences.\footnote{321}

As such assessment tools are being developed, BBG offers what general guidance on performance can be gleaned from audience survey and online traffic information, such as MBN’s surge in digital traffic following an increase in coverage of ISIL, and a 65% increase in web page views and 97% traffic increase on mobile networks in the last quarter. MBN’s focus on social engagement was followed by over 590,000 votes cast in its Facebook polls since April 13. After a recent substantial increase, MBN reported it had 6.2 million Facebook followers. In video, MBN had 216,121 views in July, a 30% increase and a 60% increase in minutes watched year over year.\footnote{322}

This general guidance on performance, however, offers less than a full understanding of the impact of these efforts, and more needs to be done according to ACPD.\footnote{323} At DoS, less than 1% of public diplomacy and broadcasting budgets are allocated toward audience research, analytics, and process and impact evaluations; and there continues to be a deficit of research experts and methodologists on staff. ACPD reported it continues to prioritize advancing the measurement and evaluation of capacity at DoS and BBG.\footnote{324}

**COORDINATION WITH CSCC**

BBG also collaborates with other U.S. government agencies to share its on-the-ground reports.\footnote{325} BBG produces a “Daesh Daily Report,” highlighting ISIL-related content. BBG reported it coordinates with CSCC to distribute this report to more than 300 policy analysts and decision makers.\footnote{326}

**DISRUPTING ISIL’S FINANCES**

ISIL has a sophisticated financial operation to fund and administer its military campaigns in the areas it occupies. In raids on ISIL operations, the coalition has seized internal ISIL financial records that provide details about ISIL’s financing.\footnote{327} According to the Congressional Research Service, in 2014, ISIL was able to generate income of at least $1 million per day.\footnote{328} Another informed estimate put the total raised by ISIL at $1 billion in 2014 alone.\footnote{329} Overall, “ISIL financing is a constantly changing picture and a very different and complicated area to address” in the current security environment.\footnote{330}

However, ISIL’s expenses are also very significant. The salaries of its fighters alone constitute a considerable expense. Some fighters, including FTFs, can receive up to $1,000 per month. For an estimated 30,000 fighters, ISIL could spend as much as $360 million annually just for salaries.\footnote{331} It faces other
costs of war, such as providing and maintaining weapons, ammunition, and transport vehicles. ISIL has also emphasized its social welfare programs for its occupied lands, where it supports the poor and the families of those killed, and it runs schools and government systems, such as the courts. Further, ISIL has infrastructure expenses in occupied territories, where intensive bombing and fighting have often largely damaged the delivery of basic services, such as water and electricity. Terrorist organizations also need funds for propaganda, recruitment, and training.

Targeting ISIL’s finances to limit its access to resources, and its ability to move and use those resources, is a critical component of the coalition’s counter-ISIL strategy. Treasury and DoS, through its Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, are co-leads on this LOE. This topic (among others) was addressed this quarter in the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Counterterrorism and Border Security Working Group meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during August 17–18, 2015; through the interagency and international Counter-ISIL Finance Group (CIFG); in regular contacts among coalition partners; in regular diplomatic engagement by DoS and embassies; in regular discussions with UN agencies and NGOs; and in meetings among U.S. agencies, including the intelligence community.

A CIFG conference, planned this quarter, was held on October 6–7, 2015. Jointly led by Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the United States (DoS and Treasury), and attended by 28 member countries and 3 multilateral organizations, the CIFG coordinated international measures to disrupt ISIL financing. The discussion focused on foreign affiliate financing, cross-border illicit financial flows, oil and natural resource revenues, and trafficking in cultural property. A project group was established for each of these areas.

Because much of ISIL’s income derives from territories that it occupies, as the coalition succeeds in liberating lands now held by ISIL, its income will naturally decrease. In addition, because some of its revenue sources are finite (such as money held in banks), ISIL’s opportunities to exploit those resources should also prove finite.

ISIL has amassed wealth at an unprecedented pace for a terrorist organization. It may have raised over $1 billion in 2014 alone. Second, unlike many other terrorist groups, it does not rely on donors to raise funds. Rather, it derives most of its revenue from its control of territory: oil sales, extortion/taxation, and plundering of natural resources under its control.

Daniel Glaser, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing, Remarks at “Conflict Antiquities: Forging a Public/Private Response to Save the Endangered Patrimony of Iraq and Syria” symposium, September 2015.
Interrupting ISIL’s Access to International Financing

According to DoS and Treasury, the U.S. government is pursuing a four-part strategy to disrupt ISIL’s ability to finance operations:

1. **Disrupt ISIL’s sources of revenue.** Cut off ISIL’s ability to generate revenue from the sale of oil, extortion in ISIL-controlled territories, ransom payments for kidnapped victims, and external donations.

2. **Cut off ISIL’s access to the regional and international financial systems.** Restrict ISIL’s ability to move and use its funds by accessing financial systems. Treasury has worked closely with the GOI and foreign partners in the region, such as UAE, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, to ensure that bank branches in ISI-controlled territory are cut off from the international financial system and to limit ISIL’s ability to use exchange houses to move funds.

3. **Target ISIL’s financial leadership and facilitators.** Identify and target key financiers within the ISIL structure.

4. **Disrupt ISIL’s external networks.** Deny ISIL access to the international financial network that could support it in resupplying its war effort.

In July 2015 during a panel discussion with Special Presidential Envoy Allen at the Aspen Institute, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing Daniel Glaser discussed ISIL’s financial capabilities and the strategy to disrupt its finances. He said that ISIL holds much of its funds in bank vaults in ISIL-controlled territories throughout Iraq and the U.S. continues to work with Iraqi officials to stop ISIL’s access to those local banks and through them to international financing systems. By isolating ISIL-controlled territory from the international financial system, he remarked “we could make that money much less valuable to them if they can’t use it, if they can’t spend it.”

Working with Treasury, DoS sponsored several activities this quarter to obstruct ISIL’s financing networks:

- During September 14–18, 2015, DoS funded a Cross Border Financial Investigators Training event with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection in Ankara, Turkey, to educate Turkish National Police investigators about investigating terrorist financing.

- DoS Embassy representatives met with local bank officers to discuss efforts to limit ISIL’s access to the financial system.
• Embassy Ankara supported visits by congressional delegations and DoS officials to engage the Turkish government on counter-ISIL operations, including disrupting terrorist financing.

• DoS’s Bureau of Counter-Terrorism increased its efforts in cooperation with the DoS Bureaus of Economic and Business Affairs and Diplomatic Security, Treasury, and the Counter-ISIL Finance Group.

DOS AND TREASURY SANCTIONS

On September 29, 2015, Treasury designated as terrorists 15 key ISIL terrorism facilitators, and DoS announced 15 other ISIL designations (10 individuals and 5 groups), amending its earlier designation of 2 groups. The activities of these designated persons included starting a new ISIL branch, serving as an ISIL provincial “governor,” serving as an ISIL recruiter, managing a processing facility for new recruits, and facilitating travel for FTFs. As a result of the designations, all property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which these individuals or groups have any interest is blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with them or to their benefit. On October 5, 2015, Treasury designated three more persons affiliated with ISIL (2 FTFs and 1 recruiter).343

Several of these individuals were also designated by the United Nations and added to its al-Qaeda Sanctions List.344 These designations require member states to deny terrorist access to the international financial system and to prohibit their travel—restrictions beyond those enforced strictly under U.S. sanctions.345, 346

Treasury reported holding a meeting on September 11, 2015, to review the process for designating individuals and entities for sanctions with the components of its Office of Terrorist Financing and Intelligence, the entity responsible for activities related to foreign sanctions and designations. Attendees included the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and Office of Intelligence and Analysis.347
DoJ Participation

DoJ reported that it is exploring with Treasury officials how best to pursue foreign individuals and designated terrorist entities who act illegally, on behalf of ISIL, as brokers or transshipment points for the procurement of goods (such as oil services equipment) with unwitting U.S. companies. DoJ reported that it continues to support the investigation, disruption, and prosecution of those who provide financial and other support to foreign terrorist fighters and their associated organizations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. DoJ requests and receives international law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters with foreign partners through mutual legal assistance exchanges and fugitive apprehension and return. DoJ also reported it assists partner nations in developing institutions and best practices needed for effective mutual legal assistance and extradition cooperation.

Disrupting ISIL’s Sources of Revenue

ISIL’s funds come from several key sources: oil revenues; trafficking in antiquities and cultural objects; ransom payments; plundering banks in areas that it controls; taxes and extortion from the occupied territories; and foreign donors, including FTFs. Most of these constitute a “sophisticated extortion racket,” which pulls resources from areas ISIL occupies. These internal sources of revenue are estimated to be more important to ISIL than foreign sources. U.S. and coalition partners have developed strategies to diminish these revenue streams.

Oil Revenue

ISIL’s oil revenues have been difficult to estimate. Targeted coalition airstrikes have reportedly destroyed nearly 200 oil and gas facilities used by ISIL, as well as its supply and transportation networks. Despite these strikes, however, as of July 2015, Treasury estimated that oil revenues represented ISIL’s third most important source of revenue, producing an estimated $500 million this year.

ISIL’s oil revenues have been affected by the decline in the price of oil and by increased attention to border security. The military efforts have cleared ISIL from much of the Turkey-Syria border, thereby narrowing ISIL’s window for smuggling. DoS reported that it engaged in diplomatic efforts with Turkey during this quarter aimed, in part, at resolving border issues, such as smuggling by ISIL. Coalition members also regularly exchange information.
and work together to disrupt smuggling routes and close border crossings. DoS announced that its Rewards for Justice program is offering to reward up to $5 million for information leading to the significant disruption of ISIL's oil trade.

Despite these efforts, ISIL continues to run a sophisticated, large-scale oil business, reportedly earning an average of $1.5 million per day. Because of its ongoing revenue from oil, DoS Energy Bureau has accelerated outreach to regional partners and industry, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2199, to stop cross-border access to oil production and refining equipment. Working with interagency and international partners and industry counterparts, the Energy Bureau is developing an illustrated list of the main types of equipment and spare parts likely needed by ISIL to maintain its lucrative energy business. That list can be used in training programs for border officials from countries bordering ISIL-dominated territories to help them identify and interdict those items that ISIL is attempting to import.

TRAFFICKING IN ANTIQUITIES

ISIL garners additional millions in profit from the illegal sale of antiquities from as many as 5,000 archeological sites across the territories it controls in Syria and Iraq. ISIL's systematic looting and profiteering, along with its wanton destruction of these countries' irreplaceable cultural heritage, is a matter of international concern. UNSCR 2199 expressed the international condemnation of ISIL's destruction of and illegal trafficking in cultural and religious items from Iraq and Syria.

On September 29, 2015, DoS and The Metropolitan Museum of Art sponsored an experts' symposium, “Conflict Antiquities: Forging a Public/Private Response to Save the Endangered Patrimony of Iraq and Syria,” in New York City. Coinciding with the UN General Assembly meetings, this symposium brought together senior officials from DoS and the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, UN officials, national and international law enforcement, museums, auction houses, dealers and cultural artifacts recovered from ISIL's possession. (DoS photos)
collectors. The participants discussed how ISIL loots heritage sites and traffics in antiquities to help fund its terrorist operations; the importance of effective international law enforcement; practical ways to share information on the looting and destruction; and forging public-private education and advocacy campaigns about best practices for museums, collectors, and auction houses around the world.  

Figure 2.

ISIL Diwan of Natural Resources, Antiquities Division, Organization

At the symposium, DoS Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions, Andrew Keller, spoke about evidence amassed from a U.S. special operations raid in Syria that killed Abu Sayyaf, leader of ISIL’s oil and gas division and its antiquities division. Items recovered in the raid include laptops, cell phones, documents, and hundreds of archeological objects from Sayyaf’s compound. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary Keller, the information demonstrated “that ISIL is well-organized to traffic in looted antiquities that it devotes considerable administrative and logistical resources to this activity, and, most importantly, that it profits from this activity.”  One document revealed an organizational chart, with lines of responsibility delineated by name and hierarchy (See Figure 2). Materials from the raid included receipts that confirm ISIL is collecting a 20% “khums tax” on the proceeds of stolen treasures and that the tax collections are being enforced across the territory it controls.
DoS announced at the symposium that its Rewards for Justice Program will pay up to $5 million for information leading to the significant disruption of any trade in antiquities or oil that benefits ISIL.\textsuperscript{366} In partnership with the International Council of Museums, DoS has also funded the publication of notices to educate customs officials and art dealers to stop international trafficking in antiquities by or on behalf of ISIL—the Emergency Red List of Iraqi Cultural Objects at Risk, and the Emergency Red List of Syrian Cultural Objects at Risk.\textsuperscript{367}

DoS funded a workshop held in October 2015 by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This workshop addressed issues relevant to the counter-ISIL strategy, including trafficking in cultural property. DoS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has obligated and disbursed $49,600 to fund this workshop and has obligated an additional $176,150 to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to produce and disseminate a public service announcement on trafficking in cultural property and possible links to transnational organized crime and terrorism.\textsuperscript{368}

BANK RAIDS, TAXES, AND EXTORTION OF LOCAL POPULATIONS

ISIL has seized control of the banks in its occupied territories, and in 2014 it likely gained access to at least $500 million from these sources.\textsuperscript{369} ISIL loots GOI accounts and the accounts of citizens who are not Muslim or not Sunni, and extracts a percentage payment from customer withdrawals.\textsuperscript{370} ISIL also requires local populations in those territories to pay it a percentage of any salary (largely paid in cash). ISIL further imposes “taxes” on all types of business activities. According to Treasury Assistant Secretary Glaser, ISIL “stands to profit from taxing all of the sources of revenue to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars per year.”\textsuperscript{371} According to the Congressional Research Service, Treasury “has acknowledged that its counterterrorism finance tools are ‘not particularly well-suited to the task’ of disrupting...
revenue that the Islamic State generates from extortion and other local criminal activities” in the territory ISIL controls. Nonetheless, a natural consequence of liberating territories from ISIL control will be the reduction in ISIL’s revenue from its extortion of any payments from the local population.

RANSOM PAYMENTS

ISIL has shown its willingness to take hostages and execute them in the most public and brutal manner possible when its demands are not met. The official U.S. policy remains that the government will make no concessions to individuals or groups holding U.S. nationals hostage. The international Financial Action Task Force estimated in February 2015 that, over the prior year, ISIL had taken in $20 million–$45 million in ransom payments. DoS and the coalition continue to work with other governments to reject the payment or facilitation of ransoms to ISIL. On May 13, 2015, the coalition issued a Counter-ISIL Finance Group Kidnapping for Ransom Communique calling for cooperative efforts to prevent kidnapping and bring kidnappers to justice.

Emerging Threat

An October 2015 recent report from the international Financial Action Task Force notes that charities and NGOs operating in conflict zones are more at risk of being infiltrated and exploited by terrorist groups. In particular, Australia has advised that funds for humanitarian aid in Iraq and Syria may be “at increased risk of being used for financing terrorism if they are sent through less-established or start-up charities” and NGOs, which may lack proper controls.

DISRUPTING THE FLOW OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

The global community and several U.S. government agencies have stepped up efforts to stem the flow of FTFs to ISIL’s forces in Syria and Iraq, as required by UNSCR 2178 (passed in September 2014). Some countries have enhanced their criminal legal structures to sanction FTFs. More arrests and prosecutions are occurring in more countries. Countries and agencies continue to examine recruitment, radicalization, and demonstrations of violent extremism to improve counter initiatives; border security enhancements have been implemented; and best practices are being shared. Despite these efforts, however, FTFs continue to replenish ISIL’s troop strength.

On September 29, 2015, the HSC Task Force on Combatting Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel issued its final report on FTF travel. The bipartisan task force spent 6 months evaluating the FTF threat to the United States and the international community, receiving briefings from many federal agencies.
and international organizations, and conducting national and international site visits. The task force studied areas such as terrorist watch-listing, watch-list enhancements, information sharing, domestic radicalization, counter-radicalization, counter-messaging, FTF travel and methodologies, “dark space,” immigration screening, counterfeit passports, visa waivers, diplomatic efforts, arrests and prosecutions.\(^{381}\)

Despite U.S. and international efforts, and the focus provided by the coalition’s Working Group on Foreign Terrorist Fighters, U.S. and foreign governments, as well as international organizations, the HSC task force included the following as its first two “key findings:”

- The [United States] lacks a comprehensive strategy for combating terrorist and foreign fighter travel.
- Despite concerted efforts to stem the flow, [the United States has] largely failed to stop Americans from traveling overseas to join jihadists.\(^{382}\)

The increased dangers posed by FTFs may be felt in the military confrontations in the Middle East, internationally, and domestically. According to FBI Director James Comey, Americans must brace for a “terrorist diaspora” coming out of Syria and Iraq, referring to violent ISIL jihadists leaving the conflict zone and traveling to their homes or other countries with jihadist intentions. The main concern about returning fighters is that they will recruit others or plan domestic attacks.\(^{383}\)

**Status of the FTF Phenomenon**

The task force report describes the level of FTF travel today as “without precedent” and its growth as “explosive.” FTFs from more than 100 countries have traveled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIL, up from 60 countries in 2013. In 2011, FTFs numbered about 1,000. As of September 2015, an estimated 25,000 FTFs, including an estimated 4,500 from western countries (over 250 from the U.S.), have made the journey to join the battlefront. By comparison, an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 FTFs joined the Afghan War over the course of an entire decade in the 1980s.\(^{384}\)

### Figure 3.
**Top 10 Countries of Origin for FTFs, as of 9/2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although coalition airstrikes have reportedly killed approximately 10,000 ISIL soldiers, these losses are readily replaced by FTFs and domestic fighters. Thus, the total ISIL fighting force remains roughly the same as in fall 2014, at about 20,000–30,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{385}

According to the HSC task force, recruits have traveled from 19 U.S. states, but large concentrations originated from three areas: Minnesota (65 recruits, or 26%); California (30 recruits, or 12%); and New York and New Jersey (30 recruits, or 12%). Thirty young U.S. women are known to have joined ISIL. The HSC report estimates that approximately 20% of the U.S. FTFs have been killed in theater, in fighting, or by suicide bomb. Another 40 have reportedly returned to the United States, and some travel back and forth. Only five returnees have been apprehended. Most interdiction cases and arrests are based on human intelligence (friends, relatives, and confidential sources). The task force was able to identify only 28 cases of interdiction during FTF travel.\textsuperscript{386}

**Recruiting FTFs**

According to the HSC report, ISIL’s recruiting techniques are sophisticated and effective, capable of producing speedy radicalization. Recruiters export a distinct branding and culture that centers on building “the caliphate.” They use methodologies that capitalize on the Internet and other social media, where they engage directly with prospects, stay current with them, follow up and build relationships, validate the prospects’ feelings, generate leads, and keep selling. FTFs “reach back” to home after they make it to the battlefront to persuade friends to join the fight.\textsuperscript{387}

ISIL employs several techniques that make interception difficult:\textsuperscript{388}

- sophisticated, secure websites and applications in areas of the Internet that are end-to-end encrypted and impossible to survey (these areas are called “dark space” or “dark net”\textsuperscript{389})
- social media, such as Facebook, ask.fm, You Tube, and Twitter\textsuperscript{390}
- evasive travel techniques that exploit porous borders and visa waiver programs
- effective sales program with repeat business (relationship and brand building)

The report identifies the profile most highly sought after by recruiters—typically young men, averaging 24 years old, although there is a rise in recruiting people under the age of 18,\textsuperscript{391} targeting those who have faced adversity “often reinforced by a life event” and prospects who “feel excluded from society.”\textsuperscript{392} Recruiters emphasize the features of camaraderie, belongingness, greater cause, adventure, and appeals through peer-to-peer inspirational ideology and historical relevance (the caliphate).\textsuperscript{393} “Peer-to-peer” relationship building starts on public social media forums,
such as Facebook or YouTube. Then the communications become more intimate through personal social media accounts, such as email, text messaging, Facebook. From there, the recruiters take their efforts off-line and ultimately communicate on the dark web to “plot attacks or plan travel to overseas terrorist hotspots.” There is concern that increased use of telegrams will prevent detection and interception by law enforcement, as one example of the effort to stay out of sight. The report indicates that recruiting methods are consistent with al-Qaeda’s, “A Course in the Art of Recruiting.”

FTF Travel
When recruits commit to ISIL, travel to the battlefront is relatively easy, according to several testimonials offered to the HSC task force. Shifting travel itineraries to different places, sometimes safe havens, makes it difficult to track individuals. FTFs hop through different points, break up their travel, exploit porous borders, use counterfeit passports, and travel to and from countries that have a visa-waiver program with the United States.

TRACKING FTF TRAVEL MOVEMENTS
The HSC task force reported that there is no comprehensive worldwide FTF database. Countries rely on sharing information through bilateral and regional agreements. For example, INTERPOL has created a database to track FTFs internationally. The database is available by membership only, restricting updates to membership as well. Not all countries share information, and FTF travel details are based on ad hoc and incomplete data and processes, making tracking difficult or unreliable. According to the task force, “a foreign fighter leaving Syria might be kept out of country X but can travel freely through country Y, which has not been made aware he is a suspect.”

DOMESTIC TRAVEL WATCHLISTING
The FBI’s TSDB helps track the movements of FTFs in the United States, and the HSC task force considers it an effective screening system. The database is a compilation of suspected terrorist information derived from NCTC’s integration of details from multiple intelligence sources on its Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment database. In effect, the TSDB is a current watchlist shared across U.S. agencies. In recent testimony, TSA provided some of its TSDB usage statistics to demonstrate the watchlist’s utility:

- TSA screens about 6 million passengers daily through the TSDB.
- TSA screens all employment applicants against the TSDB.
- TSA re-vets 14.8 million TSA workers against the TSDB daily.

The House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel reported in September 2015 on many areas of weakness in identifying, preventing the recruitment of, and intercepting foreign terrorist fighters:

- The national strategy for combating terrorist travel is not up-to-date.
- IT tools to identify FTFs are inadequate (no comprehensive global database; stovepipe legacy systems country-to-country).
- Information sharing is inadequate and inconsistent within the U.S. government and with foreign partners (ad hoc, intermittent, incomplete).
- We lack sufficient local community awareness.
- We lack early intervention off-ramps to radicalization.
- There are weaknesses in monitoring and apprehension.
- Overseas security is weak, allowing easy travel back and forth from the battlefield.
- Iraq/Syria FTF source/recruitment capabilities are high, and U.S. interdiction is low.
PASSPORTS AND VISAS
Passports are easy to counterfeit. More and more countries are now using e-passports, which are considered fraud resistant because they contain smart cards with discrete passenger biometric information such as fingerprints, iris scans, or face scans. The HSC task force reported that officials confirm e-passport biometric information through a shared database with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). However, less than 25% of countries participate in the ICAO system. Most countries do not have the technology or processes to issue or screen e-passports, so consistent usage of the electronic capability is problematic.403

DoS sends all visa applications for screening through NCTC’s databases. As a result, thousands of visas have been denied due to counterterrorism concerns. 404

VISA SECURITY PROGRAM
For 19 higher threat countries, DHS hosts the Visa Security Program (VSP) through a database system called the Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT). All visa applications from the 19 countries are vetted more thoroughly; each applicant flagged through PATRIOT is assigned a U.S. overseas post case worker to resolve any concerns.405

FTFs: A Worldwide Problem
According to the HSC task force, the overall report card for the United States is “failure.”406 It found “there is no clear, whole-of-government system for cataloging the proliferation of terror-travel programs, nor a strategy to ‘stitch the seams’ between them.”407 A variety of independent identification and preventative programs operate on a national and international scale to prevent and intercept FTFs. With each capability, there are notable weaknesses, and each relies on other capabilities to be effective.408 For example, the National Network of Fusion Centers has 78 centers that bring together important information for first responders collected from local, state, and federal levels. According to the HSC task force, the network provides “invaluable on-the-ground assistance to mitigate terror threats.”409 Although fusion centers can provide timely interdiction, HSC found that coordination and information sharing is not automatic, making data very inconsistent from center to center.410
Countering FTF Travel: Recommended Improvements

The HSC task force reported 32 key findings and made more than 50 specific recommendations in four main areas, summarized as follows: 411

**U.S. Government Strategy and Planning to Combat the Threat.** 412 HSC recommended that the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel be updated, along with an annual assessment that catalogs existing programs, identifies duplication of effort, identifies gaps and prioritizes resources against risk assessments, and accounts for suspected and known terrorists (domestic and foreign). 413 HSC recommended that DHS develop a full data framework, improve information sharing with foreign governments (streamline, standardize, enhance and enforce compliance), 414 create a central repository for FTF identities (through INTERPOL), declassify available information through regular reviews of data, review no-fly lists, conduct national-level exercises to test all points of travel, and improve vetting and screening processes for financial intelligence. 415

**Identifying Terrorists and Foreign Fighters and Preventing Them From Traveling.** 416 HSC recommended enhanced use of National Network of Fusion Centers through coordinated information sharing, notification of FTFs returning to communities, and stronger relationships with FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. 417 The report highlights the need to leverage state and local law enforcement to help handle the FBI caseloads; 418 to standardize the legal framework with baseline policies for intervention as well as process improvements, such as for passport revocations; 419 and to ramp-up counter messaging and social media campaigns, including testimonials. 420

**Detecting and Disrupting Terrorists and Foreign Fighters When They Travel.** 421 HSC recommended expansion of the VSP, using the PATRIOT database, to all 225 countries that issue U.S. visas; 422 re-evaluation of the VWP for additional security improvements, including country eligibility, relevance of the program itself, and reasons to suspend the VWP with countries (such as withholding CT information); and evaluation of the Electronic System for Travel Authorization application process. 423 The report highlighted the vulnerability of refugee routes and recommended they be evaluated as well as possible avenues for terrorists to join, thereby perhaps evading restrictions. 424 Domestic initiatives could include integrating DHS and Customs Border Protection intelligence data and “empowering INTERPOL.” 425

For the countries participating in the VWP, see Figure 4.
Overseas Security Gaps. 426 HSC recommended creation of an annual “Foreign Partner Engagement Plan” as part of the National Strategy; 427 improvement of international information sharing; 428 creation of better methodologies for EU screenings of possible FTFs; improvement of international processes for the validation of visas, the VWP, and fraud resistant e-passports; 429 improved utilization of INTERPOL; 430 and sharing of ready-made hardware with foreign partner governments (such as DoS Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System and CB Automated Targeting System Global). 431 The report also highlighted the need to have a regular UNSCR 2178 “report card.” 432
U.S. Engagements With International Partners

Federal agencies continue to report significant activities to address the FTF issue. DoS diplomatic efforts have prioritized the FTF threat issues and efforts to ensure implementation of UNSCR 2178. In the time leading up to the September 29, 2015, “Leaders’ Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism,” DoS led efforts to encourage other countries to implement fully this landmark resolution, which provides a legal and policy framework to confront the FTF threat. These efforts then were echoed at Counter-Terrorism meetings and forums at the UN in late September 2015, including a plenary session of the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee to review the results of its working group meetings to promote implementation of UNSCR 2178.433

Other international gatherings during this quarter have devoted considerable attention to stemming the flow of FTFs, including the Leaders’ Summit and UN meetings in September, the U.S.-GCC Counterterrorism and Border Security Working Group meeting in Riyadh in August, and a conference hosted by the United Nations and Spain in July that convened more than 400 technical experts and high-level officials. DoS reported it engages at these events in bilateral discussions with senior representatives of various attending nations.434

DoJ and DoS reported that they continue to work together with their international counterparts through the Central Authorities Initiative to help partner countries build effective authorities. These institutions support effective international cooperation, focus on FTFs, and enable the legal processes necessary to bring terrorists to justice under the rule of law.435 DoJ has advised on both legislative reform and litigation best practices to address FTFs, commenting on numerous countries’ drafts of new laws to address the FTF threat. At the request of partner nations conducting FTF investigations and preparing prosecutions, DoJ sends teams of prosecutors, agents, and specialists to advise on best practices and lessons learned.436

PROTECTING THE HOMELAND

The HSC task force report on FTF travel identified several issues relevant to homeland security.437 The recommended the need to coordinate information sharing, enhance the use of the National Network of Fusion Centers, enhance notification among agencies of FTFs returning to communities, and build stronger relationships with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force.438 The task force also noted that, with increased access to appropriate security clearances, state and local law enforcement officials could assist on more DHS cases.439
Perspectives From the DHS Secretary

In testimony before a Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on “Threats to the Homeland,” DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson described current security and addressed enhancements for aviation and cybersecurity. His testimony identified some specific measures for detecting and preventing travel by FTFs and improvements for the VWP, as well as outreach initiatives, both here at home and internationally. The following provide a recap of the major aspects that apply to the Protecting the Homeland LOE:

DHS Aviation Security Enhancements. A DHS OIG review of TSA’s screening released in a classified report to Congress in August 2015 revealed several deficiencies. DHS responded by producing a 10-point plan to address the concerns raised by the OIG’s testing. According to Secretary Johnson, TSA has increased manual screening, increased the use of random explosive trace detectors, re-tested its screening equipment, re-evaluated its screening equipment, and revised its standard operating procedures. He also testified that every TSA officer has attended “back to basics” training.

Pre-clearance Overseas Screening. Secretary Johnson described 15 U.S. pre-clearance sites in 6 different countries and reported that DHS is negotiating to expand to 10 new foreign airports. In overseas locations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers screen passengers bound for the United States. As an example he cited preclearance activities in Abu Dhabi, where more than 580,000 passengers and crew bound for the United States have been inspected since early 2014. More than 1,000 individuals were found “inadmissible,” some due to national security reasons.

Visa Waiver Program Enhancements. In August 2015, DHS added fields to the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) to ensure that information about known and suspected terrorists and serious criminals can be shared through the system. Travelers from VWP countries are required to use ESTA, and the new fields will allow wider collection, sharing, and analysis of travel data. Secretary Johnson testified that this would aid in cooperation and reporting of FTFs among multilateral organizations such as INTERPOL or EUROPOL. Secretary Johnson also testified that DHS is working with VWP countries to expand use of U.S federal air marshals on international flights from the point of origin overseas and to enhance screening at select overseas airports with direct flights to the United States.

Refugees. Addressing the Syrian refugee crisis, Secretary Johnson said that DHS is working with DoS, DoD, NCTC, and the FBI to vet refugees. He added that “all refugees admitted to the United States, including those from Syria, will be subject to this stringent security screening.”
**Outreach.** Secretary Johnson described several activities to build trusted partnerships with diverse communities, including the following highlights:\(^{446}\)

- DHS and the FBI share intelligence and terrorist threat information with Joint Terrorism Task Forces, state fusion centers, local police chiefs, and sheriffs.
- DHS estimated that it held over 200 meetings or other events with local and regional communities during FY 2015.
- In September 2015, DHS established a new Office for Community Partnerships to serve as the central hub for DHS efforts to counter the evolving global terrorist threat to the homeland. The new office is tasked with building relationships inside and outside of government and identifying resources to support CVE efforts through government funded grants, public-private partnerships, technology, and philanthropy.
- DHS announced the partnering of the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties with the Office of Community Partnerships to “lead, improve, and expand its important community engagement work including Community Engagement Roundtables, Town Hall Meetings, and Youth Forums in cities all across the country.”

**Prosecution Activity Reported This Quarter**

DoJ works closely with the FBI, DHS, the intelligence community, and federal and state law enforcement agencies to share information and identify, investigate, and prosecute U.S. citizens and others who support foreign terrorist organizations by providing money or other resources or who travel, intend to travel, or facilitate or recruit others to travel to foreign countries to support terrorist groups. Since 2013, federal prosecutors have charged more than 60 FTF-related cases, many of which involved arresting aspiring fighters before they leave the country. In a September 2015 briefing at the Foreign Press Center, Assistant Attorney General John Carlin noted that DoJ has an additional 10 criminal cases against people inspired by ISIL to commit terrorist acts in the United States.\(^{447}\) Prosecutors have obtained a number of convictions, and many other cases are under investigation. Selected cases this quarter include:\(^{448}\)

- On July 28, 2015, in the Southern District of Georgia, Leon Nathan Davis was sentenced to 15 years in prison, a lifetime of supervised release, and a $1,500 fine after pleading guilty to attempting to provide material support to ISIL. An FBI-led team investigated for over a year Davis’ attempts to join a foreign terrorist organization. He was arrested at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport in October 2014 on a parole violation. He had purchased a ticket to fly to Turkey.
• On August 10, 2015, in the Central District of California, Adam Dandach pled guilty to attempting to provide material support to ISIL and making a false statement in a passport application. Sentencing is scheduled for January 11, 2016, where Dandach faces up to a 25-year prison sentence. Dandach expressed a desire to fight violent jihad in Syria. He was arrested at the airport seeking to travel to Syria. At the time of his arrest, Dandach possessed a cell phone and laptop containing instructions on how to enter Syria from Turkey as well as contacts in Turkey to facilitate his travel.

• On August 14, 2015, in the Eastern District of New York, Abdurasul Hasanovich Juraboev pled guilty to conspiring to provide material support to ISIL. Juraboev planned to travel with others to Syria to join ISIL with the assistance and financial support of several co-conspirators. He explained that if he were unable to travel, he would engage in an act of martyrdom on U.S. soil if ordered to do so by ISIL.

• On August 28, 2015, in the Eastern District of Virginia, Ali Shukri Amin was sentenced to 136 months in prison followed by a lifetime of supervised release and monitoring of his Internet activities, based on his plea to charges of conspiring to provide material support and resources to ISIL. Amin admitted to using Twitter to provide advice and encouragement to ISIL and its supporters. Amin provided instruction on how to use Bitcoin, a virtual currency, to mask the provision of funds to ISIL, and he advised ISIL supporters seeking to travel to Syria to fight with ISIL, including an 18-year-old Virginia resident who traveled to Syria to join ISIL in January 2015.

• On September 9, 2015, in the District of New Jersey, Samuel Rahamin Topaz pled guilty to conspiring to provide material support to ISIL. Sentencing is set for November 18, 2015. An FBI investigation revealed that, from October 2014 through 2015, Topaz and others made plans and agreed to travel overseas to become ISIL fighters.

• In September 2015, in Minnesota, Zacharia Yusuf Abdurahman and Hanad Musse pled guilty to conspiring to provide material support to ISIL. Abdurahman, Musse, and other defendants conspired for more than a year to travel to Syria to fight for ISIL.
In other cases, ISIL-related charges are pending, involving international travel, and domestic violence inspired by ISIL, including the following:

- In August 2015, a man and a woman in Mississippi were charged with conspiring and attempting to provide material support to ISIL. The individuals made arrangements to fly to Istanbul via Amsterdam. They were arrested after traveling to the airport in Columbus, Mississippi, for the first leg of their international travel.

- In August 2015, an individual was charged in New York with conspiring and attempting to provide material support to ISIL. The individual is alleged to have facilitated an individual’s travel to Syria to receive military-type training from ISIL.

- In July 2015, an individual in Ohio was charged with attempting to provide material support to ISIL, possessing a firearm as a felon and marijuana charges. The individual allegedly had crafted propaganda for ISIL, including calling for Muslims inside the United States to engage in jihad. The individual has allegedly made numerous statements about conducting an attack inside the United States.

- In July 2015, an individual in Massachusetts was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and assault with a deadly weapon or causing bodily injury. Public filings in the case allege that the individual was seeking to acquire components for improvised explosive devices, which he intended to detonate on a university campus as an expression of his support for ISIL. The individual is also alleged to have acquired the firearms in preparation for such an attack.

- In July 2015, a man in Florida was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and attempting to provide material support to ISIL. Investigation revealed that he was attempting to recruit another individual to join ISIL. He also allegedly intended to detonate a bomb on a populated beach to aid and promote ISIL.

For a listing of prosecution activities reported by DoJ this quarter, see Table 3.
Table 3.
ISIL-related Prosecution Activity in the United States, 7/1/2015–9/30/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 17, 2015</td>
<td>MN</td>
<td>Minnesota Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy To Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 17, 2015</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>New York Man Arrested for Attempting To Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 9, 2015</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>New Jersey Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiring To Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 9, 2015</td>
<td>MN</td>
<td>Minneapolis Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy To Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 28, 2015</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Virginia Man Sentenced to More Than 11 Years for Providing Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 27, 2015</td>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>Arizona Man Charged With Providing Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 14, 2015</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>Brooklyn, New York, Resident Pleads Guilty to Conspiring To Provide Material Support to Terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 11, 2015</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Mississippi Couple Charged With Conspiracy and Attempt To Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 11, 2015</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>Two New York City Residents Charged With Conspiracy To Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 10, 2015</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>California Resident Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to ISIL and Making False Statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 10, 2015</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>Former New Jersey Resident Charged With Conspiracy and Attempt To Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 29, 2015</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>New York Man Arrested and Charged With Attempting To Provide Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28, 2015</td>
<td>GA</td>
<td>Georgia Man Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Attempting To Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28, 2015</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>Florida Resident Charged With Attempting To Use Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 28, 2015</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>Miami Resident and ISIL Sympathizer Sentenced to 10 Years in Prison for Illegally Possessing a Firearm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 23, 2015</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Massachusetts Man Charged in Connection with Plot To Engage in Terrorism Plot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20, 2015</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>DC facilitator and Fundraiser for Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Extradited to United States To Face Terrorism Charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, 2015</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>Ohio Individual Charged With Attempting To Provide Material Support to ISIL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OVERVIEW

As conflicts in Syria and Iraq continue, the associated humanitarian crises have worsened, spreading beyond the borders of these two countries and extending outside the region.

In Syria, the main drivers of the humanitarian crisis are conflict between the Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG) and rebel groups, and attacks against civilians. SARG use of highly destructive indiscriminate weaponry, such as barrel bombs (drums packed with metal shrapnel and explosives) continued to cause mass civilian casualties. Conflict among armed groups has aggravated conditions as numerous rebel factions and alliances compete for power and territory throughout the country, further displacing civilians. During the reporting period, combat in urban areas continued as rebel groups and SARG forces launched offensives against one another in major cities, such as Aleppo and Idlib. These offensives caused high levels of civilian casualties and displacement, hindered relief efforts, and decimated infrastructure.
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are people who have fled their homes but not crossed international borders. Refugees are people who have fled to areas outside the country of their nationality.

In Iraq, conflict between ISIL and the GOI and allied forces continued to displace thousands of people and hinder humanitarian access in some areas. During the quarter, GOI and allied militia incursions against ISIL territory in Anbar province reportedly displaced an additional 75,000 civilians. Meanwhile, travel restrictions imposed by local authorities, including ISIL, limited the ability of IDPs to access humanitarian assistance and complicated relief efforts in some areas. During the reporting period, the number of IDPs in Iraq surpassed 3.2 million, and many IDPs reportedly lacked access to essential services, such as clean water and electricity, and required relief assistance, including shelter and food aid. Additionally, safety concerns and limited access have prevented humanitarian organizations from providing aid in ISIL-controlled territory, leaving hundreds of thousands without humanitarian assistance.

Shortfalls in funding to support UN appeals during the reporting period prompted humanitarian providers to cut back support for IDPs and refugees. According to the United Nations, international donors did not meet funding requirements identified in the Syria and Iraq UN Humanitarian Response Plans, falling short by approximately 65% and 60%, respectively. Resulting cuts were focused on support for specific services, such as food assistance, WASH, and healthcare, and people across the region reportedly went without these services or received reduced support. Funding for food assistance fell well short of needs. In July 2015, the United Nations reported that WFP regional operations for Syrian refugees had received only 19% of needed funding and 32% of required funds for operations inside Syria. This prompted WFP to reduce IDP support through its planned food basket, and by August, food parcels provided only 74% of planned caloric support. Funding shortfalls reportedly contributed to a 50% reduction in WFP voucher sizes for refugees in Jordan and Lebanon and a reduction in the number of refugees served. According to WFP, 229,000 refugees in Jordan were removed from the program in September. A U.S. contribution of $65 million enabled WFP to provide support for the most vulnerable Syrian IDP and refugee populations in August and September. On September 15, 2015, WFP reported that it still required an additional $61.6 million to fund its operations in Iraq through the end of the year.
U.S. GOVERNMENT STRATEGY AND RESPONSE

The U.S. government’s humanitarian assistance activities are identified as a line of effort under the Administration’s counter-ISIL strategy to highlight the importance of the humanitarian response, but they predate counter-ISIL efforts and have distinct aims. Humanitarian assistance is provided solely on the basis of need and delivered impartially, regardless of political, religious, or ethnic affiliation. Moreover, humanitarian assistance efforts may continue long after the fight against ISIL is over.

The U.S. government’s humanitarian mission in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries seeks to accomplish the following:

- Provide assistance to the displaced, vulnerable, and conflict-affected populations in Iraq and Syria, as well as Syrian refugees in neighboring countries.

In Syria, a UN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for all UN humanitarian assistance operations under a “Whole of Syria” approach that includes operations inside Syria as well as cross-border activities designed to help those affected by the conflict. Several major UN agencies such as the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), WFP, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) conduct humanitarian assistance operations in the region. These activities provide support in areas like healthcare; WASH; food assistance; and camp management and supply for IDPs and refugees.

The UN presence in Iraq is managed by the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), which is headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Humanitarian assistance in Iraq is coordinated by the Deputy SRSG and Humanitarian Coordinator. The Deputy SRSG facilitates coordination among the major humanitarian organizations and host governments. Working-level coordination among humanitarian organizations is achieved through the cluster system, in which sector-based working groups comprising the primary humanitarian organizations in each area of focus (such as food, health, non-food items, shelter, and WASH) gather to share information on needs, challenges, and activities.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Several major UN agencies such as the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), WFP, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) conduct humanitarian assistance operations in the region.
• Continue to work with host governments in neighboring countries to mitigate the humanitarian and economic effects of the conflict.

To advance these aims and maximize the reach of humanitarian assistance, the U.S. government works through both NGOs, UN agencies, and other international organizations.

USAID and DoS lead U.S. government humanitarian response efforts in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries. Within USAID, the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) leads the agency’s response to the crises in Iraq and Syria. Two offices within DCHA are primarily responsible for responding to humanitarian crises: the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Office of Food for Peace (FFP).475

OFDA and FFP coordinate activities and provide assistance to those in need in the Syria and Iraq crises. OFDA, which focuses on providing support for IDPs, is working through implementing partners, including UN agencies and NGOs, to carry out humanitarian efforts in Iraq and Syria. FFP, which has a specific focus on food assistance, also works through implementing partners to provide emergency food assistance to conflict-affected populations inside Syria, to populations inside Iraq that have been displaced or otherwise affected by the Iraq crisis, and to Syrian refugees in five neighboring countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, and Iraq). As of September 30, 2015, OFDA was working with 35 organizations to provide humanitarian assistance in Iraq and Syria, while FFP was working with 7 implementing partners to provide assistance in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries. OFDA and FFP provide assistance to vulnerable and needy populations regardless of affiliation or background.476

OFDA and FFP manage, coordinate, and implement humanitarian assistance efforts through field- and headquarters-based units. In the field, USAID Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) assess conditions on the ground, identify pressing needs, and coordinate the U.S. government response.477 DARTs are staffed with humanitarian experts and technical advisors and include both OFDA and FFP personnel. A regional USAID DART supports efforts in and around Syria. The DART has two country teams—one based in Jordan and another in Turkey—that are managed by a regional DART team leader. In Iraq, USAID maintains a DART based in Erbil and also maintains a presence in Baghdad.478

In Washington, D.C., a Middle East Humanitarian Crisis Response Team, staffed primarily by OFDA but also including FFP staff, supports the DARTs and performs operational and program management, award administration, and interagency coordination functions.479 Additionally, OFDA and FFP personnel
participate in formal and informal coordination groups, such as the Syria and Iraq Task Forces (interagency committees that gather to coordinate information about U.S. responses to the crises).  

OFDA and FFP rely on several types of personnel to conduct their missions, including U.S. government direct hires, U.S. personal service contractors (PSCs), and personnel on long-term temporary duty assignments. As of September 30, 2015, OFDA, which relies primarily on U.S. PSCs, had 29 personnel focused on the Iraq-Syria crises, and FFP had 8 (see Table 4).

Table 4.  
OFDA and FFP Personnel Assigned to the Iraq-Syria Crises, by Location, as of 9/30/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operating Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes three U.S. and two local-national staff. An additional temporary-duty position, filled on short-term rotations, is located in Beirut, Lebanon.

Source: USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015; PRM, response to Lead IG request for information 11/12/2015.

USAID has proposal and program review processes designed to promote accountability in its efforts to provide humanitarian assistance in Iraq, Syria, and the region. To submit a proposal for work and subsequently receive USAID funding and support, prospective implementers must provide detailed information on program goals, intended beneficiaries, and past performance in the field. According to USAID policy, technical advisors review proposals and prospective partner’s credentials, evaluate proposed work for viability, confirm that implementers have a track record of operating in line with international humanitarian principles, and assess adherence to gender and protection standards. Once a program is awarded and active, USAID is responsible for reviewing implementer activities on the ground to assess whether program objectives and targets are being achieved.

Within DoS, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) works to assist IDPs, refugees, and conflict victims of the Iraq-Syria complex crisis. As of September 30, 2015, PRM had announced funding for 32 organizations.
in FY 2015 to provide humanitarian assistance in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries. PRM works through implementing partners in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey to provide assistance to vulnerable and needy populations regardless of affiliation or background.484

PRM manages humanitarian assistance efforts through both field- and headquarters-based staff. In the field, refugee coordinators based in Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as those deployed temporarily in Lebanon, work in close coordination with the relevant OFDA DART teams. In Iraq, PRM has a senior refugee/IDP coordinator and an admissions coordinator based in Baghdad and a coordinator based in Erbil who meet with partners and monitor programs as security allows. A third-party monitor in Iraq, under contract to PRM, also monitors PRM-funded programs. Refugee coordinators work closely with their DART counterparts in Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey. In Washington, D.C., PRM staff assigned to the Syria and Iraq teams perform operational and program management, award administration, and interagency coordination functions.485

USAID and PRM receive appropriations for humanitarian assistance activities that are not designated for use in responding to a particular humanitarian crisis to enable the agencies to exercise flexibility in responding to ongoing and emerging crises. USAID uses International Disaster Assistance funds to support humanitarian assistance activities associated with the Syria-Iraq complex crisis, while PRM relies on Migration and Refugee Assistance funds for this purpose.486

SYRIA COMPLEX CRISIS

Fighting continued throughout Syria during the reporting period, especially in the west, where rebel forces and other groups, such as ISIL, made gains against SARG forces. Fluid frontlines, intense bombardments, and high levels of generalized violence aggravate conditions for remaining civilians and render humanitarian operations extremely difficult. According to the United Nations in September 2015, 68% of the total Syrian population needed assistance, which equates to 12.2 million persons in need. Among those in need, some of the most vulnerable included 4 million women of reproductive age and 5.7 million children.487 Humanitarian responders identify this population’s greatest needs as medical care and supplies, food assistance (6.8 million people suffered from food insecurity during the reporting period), emergency relief items, potable water, hygienic sanitation, shelter, and psychological support.488

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and the United Nations reported 240,000 total deaths in Syria as of August 2015 and approximately 7.6 million IDPs as of September 2015.489 The majority of IDPs (53.2%) were concentrated
in the governorates of Aleppo, Rural Damascus, and Idlib, which served as the frontlines in the conflict between SARG and rebel forces.\textsuperscript{490} The United Nations estimated that only 2.7\% of Syrian IDPs were residing in formal camps or other establishments refitted to house IDPs, such as public buildings, by the end of the reporting period.\textsuperscript{491} The majority of IDPs lived in family-member households or in informal settlements, such as abandoned buildings, where they often lack access to humanitarian assistance or basic goods and services.\textsuperscript{492}

Conflict in several areas, including Homs, Idlib, and Deyr al-Zur governorates, reportedly displaced tens of thousands civilians during the quarter.\textsuperscript{493} In Idlib governorate, conflict displaced nearly 80,000 in July 2015. According to the United Nations, many of the newly displaced were living with members of host communities or in rented accommodations, while approximately 15,000 took shelter in school buildings or open fields.\textsuperscript{494} In eastern Homs, ISIL attacks against the city of Qaryatayn and the subsequent SARG response displaced approximately 27,000 in early August 2015.\textsuperscript{495} Counter offensives by SARG forces, which included barrel bombs and heavy artillery, reportedly killed or injured many civilians and substantially damaged civilian infrastructure in the town.\textsuperscript{496}
Restrictions imposed by local authorities aggravated conditions for residents in other conflict areas. In the Damascus suburb of Qudsaya, local authority restrictions on movement reportedly affected up to 250,000 people who were trapped in the area and in need of humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian aid last reached Qudsaya in April 2015 through WFP. Since that time, local authorities have prevented further access, and the city remained inaccessible to humanitarian organizations by the end of the reporting period.

Of the total 12.2 million persons in need of humanitarian assistance, approximately 4.6 million were in 127 UN-designated “hard to reach areas”—areas where sustained humanitarian access and aid delivery are not possible. In September 2015, UN agencies and partners reportedly reached only 31 of these locations (24%). Additionally, of the 4.6 million civilians in these hard-to-reach areas, roughly 422,000 were in besieged areas—locations where humanitarian access is extremely limited or blocked by intense conflict. During the reporting period, aid organizations reached only 9% of the besieged population with health assistance between July 1 and August 31, 2015, and 1.8% with WASH assistance in September 2015. No food or other type of humanitarian relief item reached any besieged area through official routes during the reporting period.

SARG’s extensive use of barrel bombs—oil drums or other containers filled with explosives and metal shrapnel that are often dropped from helicopters—remain one the deadliest forms of violence against civilians and one of the greatest drivers of the humanitarian crisis in Syria. According to UNHCR, SARG has repeatedly targeted not only rebel forces, but also civilians and civilian infrastructure with barrel bombs. SARG aerial campaigns frequently target opposition-held areas in major cities throughout Syria, including Aleppo, Dar’a, and Idlib, killing and displacing thousands of civilians and razing schools, homes, hospitals, and other civilian infrastructure. In February 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2139, which demanded “all parties” cease their use of barrel bombs and condemned SARG for its use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, in July 2015, SARG forces launched almost 6,700 airstrikes involving more than 3,600 barrel bombs, killing approximately 800 civilians and injuring about 3,000 more.
The UN reported in April 2015 that most people in hard-to-reach areas (2.7 million), resided in ISIL-controlled territory. The majority of those living in ISIL-controlled territory were located in the Syrian governorates of Aleppo and Deir ez-Zor, and attempts to provide assistance to these communities have proven difficult.

Civilians in ISIL-controlled areas are reportedly subject to harsh social and political controls, forced indoctrination and recruitment, and violence. This is especially so for women and those from minority populations. UN reports indicate that children as young as 8 years of age have been trained for military roles. Additionally, the majority of civilians living under ISIL control are based in urban areas, placing them in danger of attacks by forces opposing ISIL and leaving them vulnerable to exploitation by ISIL on the battlefield.

By the end of the reporting period, the U.S. government had committed more than $4.5 billion in humanitarian assistance to respond to the Syria complex crisis, with USAID funding accounting for more than half the total. OFDA commitments total $866.2 million, and FFP commitments total more than $1.5 billion. During the quarter, FFP increased its commitments by $65 million to fund ongoing WFP efforts that were at risk of concluding due to a lack of alternative financial support. Of this amount, $47.0 million was allocated for regional operations in Jordan and Lebanon, while the remaining $18.0 million was designated for efforts inside Syria.

On September 21, 2015, USAID and PRM announced an additional $419.0 million in assistance funding for Syrians, Syrian refugees, and governments hosting significant refugee populations in the area. For details of U.S. commitments by country, as of September 30, 2015, see Table 5.
Table 5.
U.S. Commitments Announced for Humanitarian Relief Efforts in Syria, FY 2015 and Cumulative Since 2012, as of 9/30/2015 ($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FY 2015 Q2</th>
<th>FY 2015 Q3</th>
<th>FY 2015 Q4</th>
<th>Since FY 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inside Syria</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>2,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>4,530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers affected by rounding. Announced commitments of funding do not necessarily reflect what will ultimately be obligated, disbursed, or expended.
Source: DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 11/10/2015.

Despite substantial commitments by the U.S. government during the quarter, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported in September 2015 that unmet requirements associated with the Syria Strategic Response Plan totaled more than $1.9 billion, with critical sectors such as food security, non-food items and shelter, and health receiving less than 50% of required funding. UN Emergency Relief Coordinators warned that the consequences for Syrian IDPs and refugees could be dire as they risk going without relief supplies and as public service support in neighboring countries ceases.

USAID’s Syria response strategy is to address critical humanitarian needs within vulnerable communities across the country in addition to providing food assistance to Syrian refugees in countries in the region. USAID efforts inside Syria focus on providing several types of lifesaving assistance, including medical, shelter, relief items, and food assistance.
RENEE CRISIS

More than 138,960 Syrian refugees applied for asylum in Europe this quarter—4,000 more than the total number of applications in all of 2014.

In addition to resulting in the deaths of thousands and displacement of millions, the conflict in Syria has produced a large-scale refugee crisis that has become increasingly complicated. According to DoS, approximately 4 million Syrians, more than half of whom are children, have fled their country seeking refuge in nearby countries such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, and more distant destinations in Europe and Africa. The United Nations and other international organizations have worked with host governments to accommodate these refugees, but the scope and scale of the requirement has exceeded international and local capacity, leaving significant numbers of refugees to live in informal settings without sufficient access to basic services, such as food assistance.

By the end of the reporting period, UNHCR appeared to have received less than half of the funding necessary to adequately address the Syrian refugee crisis.

In Syria’s neighboring countries, which host the majority of Syrian refugees, the needs of refugees have exceeded the international community’s level of support. During the reporting period, the number of refugees continued to increase, especially in Turkey which registered an additional 160,000 refugees. More than 138,960 Syrian refugees applied for asylum in Europe this quarter—4,000 more than the total number of applications in all of 2014. Approximately half sought asylum in Germany and Serbia, and the balance split among the countries of Sweden, Hungary, Austria, and the Netherlands. This upsurge has caused significant concern as hundreds of refugees have died in recent months while seeking refuge in Europe and European governments have struggled to respond to the crisis. In September 2015, the recent influx of migrants, many of whom are Syrian refugees, prompted some European governments, such as Hungary, to close their borders.
Estimated Syrian IDPs and Refugee Asylum Seekers

**Europe**—538,165 as of 09/30/2015

**Turkey**—2,072,290 as of 10/2/2015

**Iraq**—247,352 as of 09/28/2015

**Lebanon**—1,078,338 as of 09/30/2015

**Jordan**—628,887 as of 09/30/2015

**Egypt**—128,019 as of 09/30/2015

**Syria**—Internally Displaced Syrians—7.6 Million as of 09/30/2015

**Turkey**—2,072,290 as of 10/2/2015

**Iraq**—247,352 as of 09/28/2015

**Lebanon**—1,078,338 as of 09/30/2015

**Jordan**—628,887 as of 09/30/2015

**Egypt**—128,019 as of 09/30/2015

By the end of the reporting period, USAID was supporting 49 humanitarian assistance awards in association with the Syria complex crisis. Of this total, OFDA reported that it funded projects through 28 implementers that reached communities in all 14 governorates and 63 districts of Syria.527 OFDA supported programs across several different sectors, including relief commodity logistics, WASH, health, and shelter and settlements.528 Although most OFDA programs are designed to provide a range of services for target communities, some are intended to assist specific communities with special needs, such as the protection of men, women, and girls through the promotion of personal hygiene and dignity.529 While the bulk of OFDA activities are concentrated on addressing pressing emergency needs, some programs are designed to strengthen the effectiveness of relief efforts through better humanitarian coordination and information management; other programs are designed to build the resilience of conflict-affected populations.530

As of September 30, 2015, OFDA was providing humanitarian assistance to Syrian IDPs through 38 different awards to implementing partners. Fourteen of these awards were initiated during the reporting period for activities with a primarily focus on the general provision of emergency humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected populations in Syria. Other new awards provided support in more specific areas, for example, efforts in northern Syria that supported agriculture and food assistance, as well as shelter and settlement support.531 In addition to these active awards, USAID made nine others with performance periods that began shortly after the reporting period ended. Meanwhile, 19 OFDA awards concluded during the reporting period. These awards supported projects focused on delivering emergency humanitarian support, WASH, and shelter assistance.532

As of September 30, 2015, FFP was sponsoring 11 food aid projects through seven implementing partners associated with the Syria complex crisis.533 Through support from FFP, WFP administered food assistance to conflict-affected communities in Syria through the distribution of food vouchers and direct food rations.534 During the reporting period, WFP redirected resources to assist recently displaced peoples in northern and central governorates, where conflict continues to worsen, and to those in UN-designated hard-to-reach areas.535 Overall, in August 2015, with the support of FFP, WFP delivered emergency food aid to approximately 4.2 million people in 12 of 14 Syrian governorates, including more than 800,000 in high-conflict areas.536 According to USAID, FFP also supported NGOs working in Syria to provide food assistance and flour to bakeries.537
FFP also supported implementers providing food assistance to Syrian refugees residing in neighboring countries, such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, through electronic food vouchers. In September 2015, WFP reported that it had introduced nearly $1.2 billion into the economies of Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon through this program.

PRM reported that, as of September 30, 2015, it was providing humanitarian assistance to Syrian IDPs and refugees through 47 different awards to implementing partners. Among these, 38 awards were initiated during the reporting period for activities focused primarily on the provision of protection and humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected populations in Syria and refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt. Meanwhile, eight PRM awards concluded during the reporting period. These projects also focused on delivering humanitarian assistance and protection.

The U.S. government and its implementing partners have encountered difficulties delivering aid to those affected by the conflict. Past audit work has identified problems with monitoring and verifying implementer and beneficiary actions in the region. WFP OIG has highlighted limitations in the past regarding WFP’s ability to execute planned verification activities in Syria. In a June 2014 audit, USAID OIG found that, while some implementing partners had identified means of monitoring activities in difficult security situations, one other had not employed effective monitoring approaches and could not verify that food aid was reaching intended recipients. In July 2015, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that FFP awards for activities had been modified to increase their value and that USAID did not have formal guidance on when it was appropriate to modify awards in this way rather than pursue new awards through a competitive process. GAO also noted limitations in USAID field financial oversight, observing that “USAID had two staff members in the field to oversee its Syria regional cash-based projects spread over five countries that had received approximately $450 million in EFSP [Emergency Food Security Program] funding from July 2012 through December 2014.”

According to USAID, OFDA and FFP have worked to manage the risks of supporting activities in Syria by putting additional internal controls in place. These measures include regular in-person communication between field staff and implementers to track progress against objectives, and implementers’ submission of safety and security plans that specify the location of planned activities and describe risk-mitigation measures.
As of September 30, 2015, USAID programs and operations designed to respond to the Syria complex crisis were associated with more than $887.7 million in obligations and $674.8 million in disbursements in FY 2015. Of these totals, $356.7 million was obligated during the reporting period and $83 million disbursed.

As of September 30, 2015, USAID and PRM programs and operations designed to respond to the Syria complex crisis were associated with nearly $1.64 billion in obligations and nearly $1.13 billion disbursements in FY 2015. Of the total obligations, $824.3 million had been made during the reporting period. Of total disbursements, $299 million was made during the reporting period.

For a breakout of these obligations and disbursements by office, see Table 6.

Table 6.

FY 2015 U.S. Government Humanitarian Assistance for the Syria Complex Crisis, Obligations and Disbursements, as of 9/30/2015 ($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Obligated ($M)</th>
<th>Disbursed ($M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>304.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>583.0</td>
<td>653.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>752.2</td>
<td>452.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,639.9</td>
<td>1,126.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Reported disbursements may exceed obligations for a given fiscal year because disbursements may be made against obligations from a prior fiscal year. Data on disbursements can provide valuable information about how much money has been spent on activities as well as the amounts of funding that remain available for expenditure. Provided a letter of credit from the U.S. government, however, humanitarian assistance implementing partners may accrue expenses before drawing down on agency funds. For this reason, expenditures on humanitarian assistance activities sometimes exceed disbursements.

Sources: USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015; DoS response to Lead IG request for information, 10/15/2015.
IRAQ COMPLEX CRISIS

In July 2015, the United Nations reported that, during January 2014–April 2015, the conflict in Iraq had caused more than 44,000 casualties, including approximately 15,000 civilian deaths. In Iraq, sustained conflict between ISIL and the GOI and its allies this quarter exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. Out of a total Iraqi population of 36 million, the United Nations estimated in September 2015 that 24% (8.6 million) were in need of humanitarian assistance and, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), more than 3.2 million were internally displaced. These figures reflect an increase of approximately 400,000 more people in need and about 94,000 additional IDPs during the reporting period. Humanitarian assistance responders reported that the most pressing needs among Iraqis remained emergency non-food items or services such as emergency healthcare, sanitation, and water, especially among communities in central Iraq, where ongoing conflict continued to displace people throughout the reporting period.

During the reporting period, sustained conflict between ISIL and GOI continued to displace civilians and restrict humanitarian access throughout the country, especially in the provinces of Anbar and Kirkuk. Restrictions on movement in areas like Anbar province also complicated humanitarian efforts and prevented IDPs from safely accessing humanitarian aid. In July 2015, approximately 78,300 residents fled the area between Ramadi and Falluja due to escalating violence associated with the GOI and allied militia offensive on ISIL positions in Anbar province. In the following weeks, routes out of Anbar province were limited or blocked by conflict. Checkpoint closures, especially around Ramadi and Falluja, prevented people from fleeing the area. While humanitarian organizations sought to increase access in Anbar, especially to besieged cities such as Haditha, residents and IDPs in the area had limited access to commodities and basic services such as medical care, food, electricity, and water.

In Kirkuk province, advances by Kurdish Pershmerga forces against ISIL-controlled villages reportedly displaced nearly 10,000 residents in late August. Approximately 63% of these new IDPs fled to Kirkuk city, where IDPs reportedly faced increasing pressure from local authorities to return to their places of origin. The United Nations reported that Kirkuk province hosted the third-largest number of IDPs in Iraq and that displacement continued into mid-September.

While the numbers of people in need and IDPs increased this quarter, the rates of growth of these groups slowed significantly. Although the number of people identified as “in need” increased by 400,000 during the reporting period, this increase was substantially smaller than the increase seen during the previous quarter, when 3 million Iraqis were first identified as in need by the United Nations. Approximately 94,000 people were reportedly displaced this quarter, down from 410,000 displaced last quarter.

In certain areas, improved security conditions may have encouraged some IDPs to return to their homes. By the end of the reporting period, more than 400,000 were estimated to have returned to their homes in areas that had returned to GOI control. In Salah al-Din province, approximately 142,200 people had returned since mid-June 2015, with about 75% of returnees settling in Tikrit, which had been retaken from ISIL by the GOI in April 2015. In the last week of September 2015 alone, 20,000 individuals reportedly returned to Salah al-Din province. However, concerns have been raised about conditions in the areas being resettled. The UN reported that many returning IDPs found significant damage in communities affected by the prolonged conflict, and that long-term or permanent resettlement may not be viable.
PRM reported that all of its FY 2015 programs inside Iraq respond, at least in part, to the current humanitarian crisis in Iraq. The protracted caseload of IDPs (those who fled due to the violence in 2006–2008) and host communities also receive PRM support. PRM cannot distinguish which beneficiaries have needs based specifically as a result of the actions of ISIL. Syrian refugees inside Iraq, most of whom (86%) sought refuge in Iraq prior to January 2014, fled Syria due to violence from the Asad regime.566

By the end of the reporting period, the U.S. government had committed nearly $534 million in humanitarian assistance to respond to the Iraq complex crisis since FY 2014. This quarter, the U.S. government announced approximately $118 million in additional commitments to address the humanitarian crisis in Iraq.567

Table 7.

U.S. Commitments Announced for Humanitarian Relief Efforts in Iraq, FY 2015 and Cumulative Since FY 2014, as of 9/30/2015 ($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FY 2015 Q3</th>
<th>FY 2015 Q4</th>
<th>Since FY 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/Iraq Region</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>197</strong></td>
<td><strong>118</strong></td>
<td><strong>534</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Numbers affected by rounding. Announced commitments of funding do not necessarily reflect what will ultimately be obligated, disbursed, or expended.

*Source:* DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 11/10/2015.

OFDA and FFP work to address acute humanitarian needs among conflict-affected communities throughout Iraq.568 Working through a network of implementers, including major international organizations, OFDA supports emergency relief programs that provide services like healthcare and shelter, while FFP funds food assistance programs in Iraq.569 Access to ISIL-controlled areas in Iraq remains limited as does information on the humanitarian needs of people in these areas.570 OFDA and FFP implementers work to access these populations without jeopardizing their security or increasing the risk of aid diversion.571 Barring security or transportation issues, OFDA and FFP members of the DART monitor programs and review partner reports to identify potential problems with implementers in the field.572
quarter, OFDA and FFP sent teams to assess conditions on the ground, with OFDA focusing on protection programming and FFP focused on assessing the availability of food in markets, the government Public Distribution system, and WFP plans.  

In response to growing humanitarian needs in the country, OFDA increased its humanitarian assistance funding in Iraq over the last quarter. As of September 30, 2015, OFDA had 24 active awards to 18 implementing partners to support activities in sectors like health, WASH, shelter, logistical support, and relief commodities. Last quarter, OFDA supported 19 projects through 16 implementers. Most OFDA-supported activities were designed to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to IDPs and conflict-affected communities in northern and central Iraq.  

In northern Iraq, projects in the provinces of Dahuk, Erbil, and Ninewa sought to address issues such as emergency assistance, WASH, shelter assistance, and rapid-response cash assistance. For example, in Ninewa province, OFDA supported WASH activities in IDP camps, including latrine and shower upgrades, piping maintenance, and water chlorination system installation that benefitted the nearly 15,350 Yezidis who reside in the camp. Although OFDA is providing support to numerous IDP camps and communities, in July 2015, USAID OIG raised questions about sanitation and environmental conditions in an IDP camp in northern Iraq. According to a USAID implementing partner, hasty construction of the camp’s water and sewage systems had resulted in waste overflow, creating conditions that violated minimum standards for humanitarian response.  

In central Iraq, OFDA supported programs in provinces where conflict between ISIL and GOI forces restrict humanitarian access and activity. In July 2015, a Rapid Response Mechanism consortium, with U.S. government support, distributed 35,000 kits to approximately 243,000 IDPs and other vulnerable people in 60 different locations in Iraq. About 9,400 of these kits were distributed in Anbar and Salah al-Din provinces, where conflict between ISIL and GOI had limited humanitarian access.  

In six different provinces, OFDA supported a program that attempted to reduce the threat from explosive remnants left over from conflict by delivering emergency risk education to IDPs and returnees. Additionally, OFDA-funded programs provided health and psychosocial support to IDPs in camps in Erbil, Dohuk, and Ninewa provinces.  

USAID awarded 8 of its 24 ongoing projects during the reporting period. These projects focused on emergency relief, such as shelter and WASH assistance, and seasonal needs, such as the provision of winter supplies like blankets and coats. OFDA also ended four awards during the reporting period. These
projects focused specifically on the provision of WASH, rapid assistance to IDPs, winterization efforts, and information management support for the response to the IDP crisis in Iraq.586

As of September 30, 2015, PRM was providing humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in Iraq and Iraqi IDPs through 12 different awards to implementing partners. All of these awards were initiated during the reporting period, and they address needs such as education, shelter, protection, capacity building, restoration of livelihoods, mental health care, and the combatting of gender-based violence. In addition, PRM provides funding to international organizations like UNHCR, IOM, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.587

Throughout most of Iraq, markets continue to function and provide accessible food sources.588 Nevertheless, pockets of food insecurity existed within conflict zones and IDP communities, as displaced people without

WINTERIZATION

The Iraq IDP Winterization Plan focuses on vulnerable IDPs likely to experience extreme winter conditions such as those in the Kurdistan Region, and vulnerable populations like women-led households or the disabled.

During the reporting period, USAID supported programs in the region designed to help communities prepare for the impending winter season.589 Aimed at mitigating the potential impacts of cold weather on conflict-affected IDP and refugee populations, USAID supported the procurement and distribution of seasonal relief commodities like thermal blankets, warm clothing (including winter coats, scarves, hats, socks, and boots), and additional plastic sheeting for shelters.590 As the winter season draws closer, USAID intends to ramp up winterization efforts, including further shelter and infrastructure preparation in both camp and non-camp areas.591

In August, the UN Shelter and Non-Food Cluster released its 2015–2016 Iraq IDP Winterization Plan, outlining expected needs for the coming winter.592 The plan focuses on vulnerable IDPs likely to experience extreme winter conditions, such as those in the Kurdistan Region, and vulnerable populations like women-led households or the disabled.593 According to the plan, an estimated 373,000 IDP households will need assistance. Identified assistance requirements for these IDPs include emergency relief kits for 257,000 households, shelter sealing kits for 103,000 households, and tent insulation kits for 13,000 households.594

Despite the efforts of USAID and other donors, the United Nations reported that half of shelter and settlement program’s activities will be scaled back by October 2015 due to funding shortfalls, leaving approximately 300,000 IDPs at risk of not receiving emergency shelter support for the coming winter.595
employment to generate income depleted their savings. To address these issues, FFP continued to fund the WFP emergency operation to provide immediate response rations to the newly displaced and food vouchers and food commodities to vulnerable Iraqis across the country. In FY 2015, this operation had reportedly provided food assistance to 1.3 million IDPs and 500,000 other conflict-affected Iraqis.

As of September 30, 2015, USAID and PRM programs and operations working to address the Iraq complex crisis had obligated $325.7 million and disbursed $195.5 million in FY 2015. Of these totals, $122.4 million had been obligated and $127.2 million disbursed this quarter. For a breakout of this funding by office, see Table 8.

Table 8.

FY 2015 U.S. Government Assistance for the Iraq Complex Crisis, Obligations and Disbursements, as of 9/30/2015 ($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>227.8</td>
<td>183.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>325.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>195.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Reported disbursements may exceed obligations for a given fiscal year because disbursements may be made against obligations from a prior fiscal year. Data on disbursements can provide valuable information about how much money has been spent on activities as well as the amounts of funding that remain available for expenditure. Provided a letter of credit from the U.S. government, however, humanitarian assistance implementing partners may accrue expenses before drawing down on agency funds. For this reason, expenditures on humanitarian assistance activities sometimes exceed disbursements.

Sources: USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015; DoS response to Lead IG request for information 10/15/2015.
UPDATE ON THE LEAD IG MODEL

In January 2013, Section 8L of the amended Inspector General Act introduced the Lead IG model, creating the structure for teams of IGs to coordinate independent oversight of complex overseas contingency operations (OCOs). The challenges inherent in these OCOs require problem solving that crosses agency boundaries—problems that cannot be handled by an individual agency. During the reporting period, the Lead IG agencies expanded their oversight capabilities and collaborated with other oversight partners to finalize the FY 2016 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan (JSOP) for OIR.

For background on the designation of OIR as an OCO and appointment of the Lead Inspector General, see Appendix B. For the text of section 8L, see Appendix C.

Staffing and Outreach

During the biannual reporting period, the Lead IG agencies took significant steps toward staffing their respective oversight of this contingency operation. This strategy includes a combination of assigning permanent staff and hiring new staff, through the special hiring authority provided within Title 5 USC 3161 and the re-employment of annuitants provided within section 9902. Further, the Lead IG agencies have adopted an expeditionary workforce model to support efforts throughout the region. Staff deployed overseas will serve 6 months or more, and teams will travel to Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey, and other locations in the region to conduct oversight.

Each Lead IG agency has assigned current permanent staff as well as newly hired 3161 staff to the oversight projects identified in this report and in support of the strategic oversight plan and reporting responsibilities. In particular, the DoD IG has on board 36 employees to support the Lead IG responsibilities, with ongoing efforts to conduct additional hiring. DoD IG has field offices in Kuwait and Qatar in support of its regional activity. Senior officials of the Lead IG agencies continued to visit commands and offices in OIR-related locations. During this reporting period, DoD’s Principal Deputy IG and other officials traveled overseas for in-country meetings with military leaders in Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan. DoS OIG and other OIG officials traveled to Jordan and Turkey to meet with embassy and military officials and visit a refugee facility.

DoD IG and DoS OIG staff met with various congressional committees to discuss Lead IG plans, results, and challenges. DoD IG continues to conduct briefings within the IG community to describe the Lead IG model and the whole-of-government approach to oversight.
Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for FY 2016

The Joint Strategic Oversight Plan (JSOP) for OIR took shape a year ago with the commencement of the OCO, and the plan was initially published on March 31, 2015. The updated JSOP for OIR, in the Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations (COP-OCO), effective October 1, 2015, reflects a strategy for flexible oversight activity as the coalition’s counter-ISIL military and diplomatic strategy adjusts to realities on the ground.

In an effort to better report on the progress and details of OIR, Lead IG oversight is conducted around five strategic and broad categories: contracts; operations; governance; humanitarian and development assistance; and intelligence. The slate of IG activities builds from several sets of input to capture results across several areas. IGs consider management requests for reviews. The Lead IGs also conduct reviews to address requests from Congress and statutory mandates, for example, to ascertain the accuracy of information provided on OIR programs and operations.599 Other reviews are initiated by the IGs based on their priorities that are developed through risk-based evaluations in the planning process.

The findings of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan underscore the need to factor operational, political, and financial risks into a “context-sensitive, risk-sensitive, and mission-sensitive approach.”600 IG teams consider quantifiable factors, such as dollars allocated, obligated, and disbursed, as well as other factors that are qualitative in nature, in determining what reviews to conduct.

The three Lead IGs have entered into cooperative standing interagency memoranda of agreement (MOAs) or understanding (MOUs) to incorporate into oversight work the best practices and lessons learned across agency boundaries. Specific examples include the particularly sensitive work related to hotlines and investigations.
STRATEGIC OVERSIGHT AREAS

The Lead IG agencies have ongoing and planned projects that center on five strategic areas:

**Oversight of Contracts**
In its August 2011 final report, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan found more than $60 billion of waste, fraud, abuse in contracts for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report highlighted the prevalence of poorly defined contract requirements, inappropriate contract types, and inadequate contract surveillance. It also identified a need for improved contract oversight in a contingency environment.

**Operations**
U.S. contingency operations include military, diplomatic, and development actions. Under OIR this means the coordination of homeland security, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic and military actions, capacity-building, and information-sharing efforts across multiple agencies. The tempo of these operations is often high. Accordingly, inter-agency and coalition coordination is frequently complex, ad hoc, and fluid. These factors increase the level of risk for fraud, waste and abuse.

**Governance**
U.S. governance support empowers recipient-nation governments to be representative, accountable, responsive, and constitutionally legitimate. The United States provides governance assistance to Iraqi governing institutions for building capacity to perform critical government services through contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements, and through on-budget assistance. Under OIR, this effort includes DOS programs to protect religious and ethnic minorities, strengthen civil society, improve capacity to monitor and document human rights abuses, and promote tolerance and reconciliation to counter rising sectarianism.

Success of the U.S. mission to achieve its objectives, and must include monitoring and assessing the U.S. Government’s engagement, performance, and progress in three key areas: multinational planning and coordination with Coalition leadership; interorganizational planning and coordination with Iraqi government leadership and moderate Syrian opposition groups; U.S. interagency planning and coordination of the OIR mission.
Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Humanitarian and development assistance programs in a contingency operation are more at risk for waste, fraud, and abuse than those conducted in a stable environment. Prior oversight work in this arena has identified a greater need for tradeoffs between risk and rewards to determine which programs to execute, better-defined program objectives and metrics, increased coordination among programs, and integration of host-country sustainability into program design and implementation. Prior oversight work has emphasized the importance of closely monitoring programs with a greater chance of failing due to the challenges associated with implementing humanitarian and development assistance programs in crisis environments.

Intelligence

Intelligence gathering and sharing are integral to U.S. conventional and counterinsurgency operations. Under OIR, intelligence operations are executed by the entire U.S. intelligence community in coordination with partner nations. To assess whether these efforts are effective in achieving the mission to degrade and destroy ISIL, the oversight community must monitor the intelligence enterprise to ensure collaboration, coordination, and deconfliction. The Lead IG will focus on intelligence community OIR actions in five key areas: intelligence sharing with coalition partner nations; intelligence fusion and analysis to support counter ISIL efforts; intelligence collection operations; intelligence support to ISF advise and assist activities; intelligence activities enabling New Syrian Forces employment in Syria.
Immediate Reporting Mechanisms

When there is an urgent need for corrective action, Lead IG agencies report promptly to management before final reports have been completed. During the biannual reporting period, DoD IG released three such alerts, including one related to a June 2015 audit to determine whether the Army had effective controls for maintaining property accountability for equipment staged in Kuwait. During fieldwork, the DoD IG audit team determined that not all wholesale property at Camp Arifjan was inventoried in accordance with Army regulations and the contract performance work statement. For example, the team’s preliminary analysis identified at least $3.6 million in equipment, including sensitive items, had not been inventoried in more than one year. Prior to departing, the team provided a briefing and follow-on notification correspondence to alert the commander with the team’s preliminary analysis. DoD IG suggested corrective actions necessary to resolve the causes identified. The commander agreed with the team’s observations and immediately initiated steps to implement corrective actions. For a more details, see DODIG 2015-178.

DoS OIG issued a management alert letter in July to address embassy evacuation—an area of concern raised during an audit of Emergency Action Plans for U.S. Missions in North Africa. In a management assistance report released earlier in the year, DoS OIG recommended that DoS entities take action to develop a list of bureaus’ requirements related to tracking and reporting foreign assistance funds by program, project, country, region, and purpose and develop and implement a comprehensive plan with target completions dates to address foreign assistance tracking and reporting requirements. DoS has reported that providing information on the costs associated with its programs and operations to counter ISIL have been difficult to isolate.
LEAD IG AGENCY PROJECTS

During the biannual reporting period, the Lead IG agencies completed 12 oversight projects related to OIR and humanitarian assistance for Iraq and Syria, and 30 additional projects were ongoing as of September 30, 2015. The completed and ongoing projects are listed in this section, along with summaries of each activity and recommendations made by oversight agencies.

Final Reports

During the biannual reporting period, the Lead IG agencies released 12 reports:

- 3 addressed major contracts.
- 4 addressed operations.
- 4 addressed governance.
- 1 addressed humanitarian and development assistance.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Assessment of DoD/USCENTCOM and Coalition Plans/Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Iraqi Army to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

DODIG-2015-177, September 30, 2015

DoD IG evaluated the effectiveness of DoD and U.S. Central Command and coalition plans, operations, and resources to train, advise, and assist the Iraqi Army to initiate and sustain combat operations to defeat ISIL. DoD IG observed that the IA brigades have significant internal deficiencies and require adequate leadership and support by the Government of Iraq and its Ministry of Defense, as well as continued coalition air support. The report also identifies several areas for improvement in the U.S. and coalition mission to train, advise, and assist the IA. In a separate classified appendix to the report, DoD IG made observations about managing capability expectations of the BPC-trained IA Brigades and leadership issues. This report is discussed in more detail in the Building Partner Capacity section of this report.
The Army Did Not Effectively Account for Wholesale Property in Kuwait

DODIG-2015-178, September 22, 2015

DoD IG found that the Army Field Support Battalion (AFSBn)-Kuwait did not have effective internal controls for conducting inventories of wholesale equipment as required by both Army policy and the contract’s Performance Work Statement. DoD IG audit found that, out of 471,201 wholesale equipment items located at Camp Arifjan, 147,831 (31%), including 99 sensitive items, worth $10.5 million, had not been inventoried within the last year. Inventory processes did not always consider the type of identifying information available for wholesale equipment. For example, AFSBn-Kuwait personnel directed contract staff to inventory by Line Item Number (LIN), though not all wholesale equipment had an accompanying LIN. As a result, Army Sustainment Command did not have accurate accountability and visibility of equipment available at Camp Arifjan. In addition, there is an increased risk that non-inventoried equipment may be vulnerable to loss or theft. DoD IG informed the Commander, 402nd AFSB, that the brigade needed to clarify the methods for conducting wholesale inventories and revise its directions to the contractor to ensure all wholesale equipment is inventoried in accordance with Army regulations. The Commander immediately initiated steps to implement suggested the corrective actions.

Evaluation of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Syria Vetting Process for New Syrian Forces

DODIG-2015-175, September 15, 2015

DoD IG evaluated Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Syria (CJIATF-S) vetting procedures to determine whether they effectively identified derogatory information that would keep an individual from participating in the Syrian Training and Equipment (T&E) program. Specifically, DoD IG determined whether the guidance, standards, procedures, training, resources, and safeguards existed and were sufficient to enable CJIATF-S to develop and implement vetting processes to identify, recruit, and accept/reject New Syrian Force personnel, including pre-biometric and counterintelligence vetting of recruit suitability. DoD IG examined whether processes were designed to identify credible information vetting in accordance with applicable law, including acts of violence against friendly forces or political affiliations in conflict with the NSF mission. DoD IG also reviewed whether the type and extent of interagency collaboration in the NSF vetting processes used local sources and reach-back capabilities available to DoD, DoS, other government agencies, and non-governmental organizations. DoD IG determined that the vetting procedures met all legislative requirements. However, it made several recommendations to strengthen the overall train and equip effort. This report is classified.
U.S. Army Generally Designed Adequate Controls to Monitor Contractor Performance at the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center, but Additional Controls Are Needed
DOD IG-2015-160, August 7, 2015

This audit sought to determine whether DoD officials appropriately designed controls to adequately monitor contractor performance for the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) basic life support services contract. Without controls, personnel at KASOTC are at an increased risk of exposure to hazards. Additionally, contractor failure to effectively deliver base operations support functions could adversely impact the morale and safety of personnel at KASOTC and degrade the ability of forces to accomplish their missions. The audit found that DoD officials generally designed adequate controls to monitor contractor performance on the basic life support services contract at KASOTC, but identified areas for improvement. DoD IG made three recommendations in those areas.

Drawdown of Equipment in Afghanistan: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued from August 19, 2011, through May 18, 2015
DODIG-2015-156, August 6, 2015

The report summarized systemic challenges associated with the drawdown of equipment and forces in Afghanistan identified in audit reports issued by the DoD Office of the Inspector General. On August 5, 2015, the DoD OIG issued a report summarizing weaknesses found in 10 of its previously issued reports. The report is intended to advise incoming commanders of potential pitfalls in retrograde operations and avoid the five recurring weaknesses found in past oversight projects: (1) lack of physical security controls; (2) ineffective equipment accountability controls; (3) insufficient contractor oversight; (4) inaccurate property accountability systems; and (5) inadequate development of and compliance with policies/procedures. The reported weaknesses indicate there is an opportunity to improve drawdown procedures by applying lessons learned to future retrograde operations as the in Afghanistan and for future contingency operations.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of Department of State Management and Oversight of Non-Lethal Assistance Provided for the Syrian Crisis

NOTE: This is report 2 of 2 associated with AUD-MERO-15-22 (Ref. No: OIR 0007) issued on March 31, 2015.

DoS OIG identified varying levels of compliance with Department policy for the three cooperative agreements and one grant included in our audit sample. Specifically, DoS OIG found weaknesses in the monitoring of non-lethal assistance provided to address the Syrian crisis, as well as incomplete risk assessments and missing or poor quality monitoring plans. These weaknesses impacted the responsible bureaus’ ability to ensure that award recipients performed required program activities and that the awards achieved their intended outcomes. DoS OIG found that the responsible bureaus did not provide sufficient monitoring for any of the four award recipients in the audit sample. This report included 10 recommendations.

Inspection of Embassy Tunis, Tunisia

Tunis is a high-threat/high-risk post. Tunisia is a key U.S. partner in regional counterterrorism efforts. Over the past year disproportionate numbers of Tunisians have traveled to fight with militant groups in Iraq and Syria and disrupting the flow of foreign fighters into ISIL operations is a high U.S. policy priority at Embassy Tunis. Local media estimates of Tunisians joining ISIL and fighting in Syria and Iraq range as high as 3,000-3,500. More than $100 million in security assistance allocated since 2011 goes toward building the capacity of Tunisia’s Ministry of Defense and to counter terrorism. U.S. support helped the Tunisian government establish an inter-ministerial Counterterrorism Fusion Center. Inspectors evaluated the full range of embassy operations, including anti-violent extremism programs, and made recommendations for improvements and for strengthening management controls.
Audit of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Aviation Support Services Contract in Iraq

DoS OIG questioned $932,644 in costs associated with 9 of the 14 invoices examined. DoS OIG reviewed 14 invoices totaling approximately $49.7 million of the $541.5 million in invoices submitted as of October 31, 2013. The questioned costs were not detected because DynCorp International is not required to provide documentation supporting its invoices’ charges unless Law Enforcement Affairs, Office of Aviation (INL/A) INL/A requests it; and INL/A’s invoice review processes, methodologies, and staffing were insufficient. DoS OIG also found that although DynCorp was generally able to complete most of its missions, given the instability in Iraq, deficiencies associated with obtaining and providing spare parts could reduce the likelihood that a sufficient number of aircraft are available when needed. This report included 11 recommendations.

Inspection of Embassy Amman, Jordan

Growth in Embassy Amman’s support staff has not kept pace with the embassy’s transformation over the past 5 years from a midsized embassy to a large, front-line operation. The permanent American staff grew more than 60% in the past 5 years, but the management staff grew less than 10% during the same period and is straining to fulfill requirements. The Ambassador and the deputy chief of mission have provided strong and focused strategic direction to an embassy that functions well, despite an intense work pace that stems from coalition efforts against ISIL and from frequent senior U.S. visitors. This inspection included 37 recommendations.
Inspection of Embassy Muscat, Oman

Embassy priorities include promoting regional security and stability, improving defense cooperation and increasing Oman’s counterterrorism capacity. An important regional counterterrorism partner and member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Omani officials participated in the October 2014 Communications Conference in Kuwait to develop a counter-narrative to ISIL messaging, and December 2014’s Counter-ISIL meeting in Brussels. Omani security officials also received training on maritime border security, cyber investigations, and critical incident management through DoS’s Antiterrorism Assistance program. Oman is challenged on border security and crisis response by its long, remote borders with Yemen and Saudi Arabia and limited counterterrorism capabilities. OIG inspectors noted delay in formalizing local police security cooperation agreements, but inspectors reported that military and security relations between embassy personnel and Omani defense and security counterparts were productive.

Inspection of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

DoS OIG found that leaders were positioning the complex organization to strengthen its role in policy making and strategic planning, both within the U.S. Department of State and with its primary partner, the U.S. Department of Defense. With foreign assistance levels relatively static, the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security and bureau leaders were focused on setting global, rather than country-specific, priorities for security assistance allocations. The bureau’s Office of Security Assistance was developing its own monitoring and evaluation framework to assess the success of security assistance in meeting Integrated Country Strategy objectives. The bureau’s primary contribution to countering ISIL was expediting security assistance, Foreign Military Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales to entities engaged in the fight. Program managers monitored grantee performance but did not document all their reviews and travel in the grants files, and some sole source justifications were inaccurate. OIG made 24 recommendations to enhance the bureau’s Foreign Policy Advisor Program, strengthen grants and records management, broaden Equal Employment Opportunity and diversity awareness, and bolster security practices and procedures.
Audit of the U.S. Mission Iraq Medical Services  

DoS OIG found that CHS Middle East LLC (CHS) generally performed in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract and task orders. In addition, DoS OIG found that insufficient staffing in Baghdad limited contract monitoring activities early in the contract and during the summer and autumn of 2014. DoS OIG also found discrepancies between recorded and actual inventories of pharmaceuticals, clinical supplies, and other contract-related property. Finally, DoS OIG questioned $6,788,027 in costs, including $15,146 in potentially unallowable costs and $6,772,881 in unsupported costs, from its review of the 12 largest invoices from September 2011 and December 2013. DoS OIG made 4 recommendations to the Department, including that it require CHS to fully implement an electronic inventory system, complete an incurred cost audit and recover any costs deemed unallowable and unsupported, and determine whether overtime charges for which CHS did not pay its employees constitute incurred costs, as defined by the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

Ongoing Activities
Among the 31 ongoing projects reported by U.S. oversight agencies as of September 30, 2015:

- 5 involve contract oversight
- 15 involve operations
- 3 involve governance
- 3 involve humanitarian and development assistance
- 5 involve intelligence
### Table 9.
Ongoing Oversight Projects, as of 9/30/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army Audit Agency</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability and Reporting of Equipment Transferred to Vetted Syrian Opposition Forces</td>
<td>To verify that processes and procedures related to the accountability and reporting of equipment transferred to vetted Syrian opposition forces were sufficient to ensure compliance with provisions set forth in Section 1209 of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act and applicable regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds Supporting Vetted Syrian Opposition Forces</td>
<td>To verify that funds supporting the training and equipping of vetted Syrian opposition forces were properly obligated and executed in accordance with the provisions set forth in Section 1209 of the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act and other applicable regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force Audit Agency</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCENT AOR Installation Infrastructure Planning</td>
<td>Determine whether implementation plans for installation development and sustainment adequately address mission requirements. Specifically, determine whether personnel accurately identify and plan civil engineering infrastructure and sustainment support to meet combatant commander's requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCENT AOR Integrated Defense</td>
<td>Determine whether Air Force Personnel effectively planned and executed integrated defense (ID) at United States Air Forces Central locations. Specifically, determine if personnel properly identified critical assets, assessed risks, implemented security plans, and tested mitigation strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumable Item Demilitarization</td>
<td>Determine whether Air Force personnel properly disposed of consumable parts requiring demilitarization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Defense Inspector General</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of DoD/CENTCOM and Coalition Plans/Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Tribal Resistance Forces</td>
<td>To determine the extent to which U.S. and Coalition Force efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip Tribal Resistance Forces have enabled their combat effectiveness and successful integration into the Iraqi National Security Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence and Information Sharing with Coalition Partners in Support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE</td>
<td>Evaluate DoD’s procedures and guidelines for sharing information, including Intelligence and Surveillance and Reconnaissance, with coalition partners in support of OIR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Facility Maintenance for the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center</td>
<td>To determine whether DoD effectively maintained facilities at the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center in Jordan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Reliability of Financial and Operational Data Reported for Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
<td>Our objective is to determine whether the Air Force has adequate accountability of DoD funds supporting Operation Inherent Resolve by determining the accuracy of obligations and disbursements, as reported in the Cost of War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of U.S. Occupied Military Facilities at King Abdullah II</td>
<td>To determine whether U.S. military occupied facilities at KASOTC comply with DoD health and safety policies and standards regarding electrical, and fire protection and suppression systems. A radiation survey will also be conducted to determine whether current ambient (background) radiation levels pose unacceptable health risk concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) Jordan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on United States Military Housing Inspections – Middle East</td>
<td>To collect information and data to determine if U.S. controlled and occupied military housing facilities in the Middle East comply with Federal and DoD policy regarding environmental health policy and safety standards. No reports will be issued from this research effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Acquisition Cross-Service Agreements in Southwest Asia</td>
<td>Determine whether DoD Components are properly using Acquisition Cross-Service Agreement Global Automated Tracking and Reporting System in support of OIR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Army Property Accountability in Kuwait</td>
<td>To determine whether the Army had effective controls for maintaining property accountability for equipment in Kuwait. The DoD IG continues its series of audits on property accountability in Kuwait. This current project will determine whether the Army had effective controls for processing equipment in Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Controls Over Shared Costs of Administrative Support Functions in Iraq</td>
<td>Determine whether DoD developed controls to effectively manage the shared cost of administrative support functions in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of State Office of Inspector General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Department of State Management of the Worldwide Protective Services</td>
<td>To determine whether the Department of State is administering WPS Task Order No. 3 in accordance with acquisition regulations and the contractor is complying with contract terms and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Order No. 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Task Orders for Transition Services and Overtime Under the Baghdad</td>
<td>To determine whether the Department of State is administering the BLISS contract in accordance with acquisition regulations and the contractor is complying with contract terms and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Support Services (BLiSS) Contract</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Department of State Management of the Operations and Maintenance</td>
<td>To determine whether the Department of State is administering the contract for operations and maintenance in accordance with acquisition regulations and the contractor is complying with contract terms and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OMSS) Contract for U.S. Mission Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thematic Review of Mission Iraq’s Implementation of the Supporting Effective</td>
<td>This thematic review will assess whether Mission Iraq has set clear, outcome-based performance goals for State diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance related to the Supporting Effective Governance in Iraq line of effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Line of Effort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Department of State Vetting of Syrian Non-Lethal Aid Recipients</td>
<td>To determine whether DoS has complied with the process for vetting non-lethal aid recipients in Syria and whether the assistance provided has been used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Bureau of International Organizations</td>
<td>As part of the inspection of the IO Bureau’s overall programs and operations, assess the adequacy of the bureau’s role and oversight of its missions (including the U.S. Mission to the United Nations) related to ISIL initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thematic Review of Mission Iraq’s Implementation of the Exposing ISIL’s True Nature Line of Effort</td>
<td>This thematic review will assess whether Mission Iraq has set clear, outcome-based performance goals for public diplomacy and counter-ISIL messaging related to the Exposing ISIL’s True Nature line of effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Embassy Cairo and Constituent Post</td>
<td>As part of the inspection of Embassy Cairo, to determine whether the Chief of Mission is effectively coordinating and supporting counter-ISIL programs and operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Embassy Ankara and Constituent Posts</td>
<td>As part of the inspection of Embassy Ankara, to determine whether the Chief of Mission is effectively coordinating and supporting counter-ISIL programs and operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration</td>
<td>As part of the inspection of the overall programs and operations of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), to assess the effectiveness of PRM’s humanitarian support activities in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc.</td>
<td>As part of the inspection of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN), to review obligations, expenditures, and program goals for overseas contingency operations (OCO) funds appropriated to BBG and allotted to MBN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Accountability Office</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip the Syrian Opposition</td>
<td>To evaluate: 1) What are the U.S. government’s plans to vet, train, and equip the Syrian Opposition; 2) What is the status of implementing these plans; 3) What level of support have international coalition partners provided to the U.S. train and equip program; and 4) How much funding have U.S. agencies allocated, obligated, and disbursed for the Syrian opposition train and equip program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD’s Support for the Syria Train and Equip Program</td>
<td>To evaluate the extent to which DoD 1) Identified roles and missions for the advisor teams, including personnel, equipment, and training requirements; 2) Met these requirements, including any potential impact on the readiness of units providing advisors; 3) Incorporated lessons learned from its prior advisory experience in structure, preparing, and executing this advisor mission; and 4) Provided enablers, such as force protection and base security, to the train and equip mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Project Title

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Vetting Iraqi Security Forces for Human Rights and Terrorism</strong></th>
<th><strong>Objective</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assess 1) The processes and procedures in place to ensure that Iraqi Security Forces personnel receiving training and equipment who are required to be vetted are vetted for violations of human rights or for associations with terrorist organizations, 2) The extent to which the U.S. government complied with policies and procedures to vet Iraqi security forces for human rights violations and associations with terrorist organizations, and 3) The extent to which the vetting process resulted in identifying Iraqi Security Forces with evidence of human rights violations or associations with terrorist organizations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>DoD’s Support for the Iraq Train and Equip Program</strong></th>
<th><strong>Objective</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Determine to what extent DoD: 1) Identified roles and missions for the advisor teams, including personnel, equipment, and training requirements, 2) Met these requirements, including any potential impact on the readiness of units providing advisors, 3) Incorporated lessons learned from its prior advisory experience in structuring, preparing, and executing this advisor mission, and 4) Provided adequate enablers, such as force protection and base security, to support its operations in Iraq.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Combating Looting of Antiquities From Iraq and Syria</strong></th>
<th><strong>Objective</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key questions: (1) What activities have U.S. agencies taken to combat the destruction and trafficking of Syrian and Iraqi antiquities since 2011, and what resources have been dedicated to those activities, (2) To what extent do U.S. agencies work with art market participants, including auction houses, dealers, and collectors, to prevent the sale and purchase of stolen Syrian and Iraqi antiquities, (3) To what extent do U.S. agencies work with key foreign partner countries and international organizations to combat the destruction and trafficking of Syrian and Iraqi antiquities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General</strong></th>
<th><strong>Objective</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Survey of Selected USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Activities (OFDA) in Iraq</strong></td>
<td>Although USAID’s bilateral assistance program in Iraq has been winding down, the current crisis arising from the military advances made by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have resulted in significant U.S. humanitarian assistance to Iraq. This survey will determine if USAID/OFDA and its implementers are taking reasonable steps to manage and mitigate risks for selected OFDA activities while responding to the needs of the internally displaced Iraqi population.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Planned Projects

The Lead IG agencies continue to cooperate among themselves and with law enforcement partners, and continually modify their activities to support the overall objectives of the combined oversight plans. Among the 10 planned projects reported by U.S. oversight agencies as of September 30, 2015:

- 5 involve contract oversight
- 4 involve operations
- 2 involve intelligence

For a listing of planned projects, see Table 10.

Table 10.
Planned Oversight Projects, as of 9/30/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Audit Agency</td>
<td>Evaluate whether Air Force civil engineers effectively coordinated construction projects. Specifically, determine if personnel properly 1) programmed, authorized, and documented O&amp;M funded construction; 2) used existing, temporary, or movable facilities when possible; and 3) planned construction projects to meet desired mission capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Central Command (USAFCENT) Area of Responsibility (AOR) Construction Planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense Inspector General</td>
<td>Determine the extent to which U.S. and Coalition Force efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip the Kurdish Security Forces have enabled their combat effectiveness and successful integration into the Iraqi National Security Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of DoD/CENTCOM and Coalition Plans/Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Kurdish Security Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Oversight of the ACC Heavy Lift Seven Contract for OIR</td>
<td>To determine whether DoD provided effective contract oversight of the Heavy Lift Seven contract. In addition, to determine whether the contractors are providing adequate quality control to ensure services are executed in accordance with the contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Inter Agency Agreement (IAA) for Iraq between Army Central Command (ARCENT) and the Department of State (DoS)</td>
<td>Determine whether the IAA is effectively meeting the needs of ARCENT to support DoD personnel in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Oversight of Base Operations Support Services Contracts in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (Location is Sensitive)</td>
<td>This is the third in a planned series of audits on a critical Base Operations Support Services (BOSS) contracts in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, such as Jordan. Specifically, to determine whether the U.S. Army Contracting Command officials’ controls for monitoring contractor performance are adequate for the (location is sensitive) BOSS contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Oversight of Information Operations Contracts for OIR</td>
<td>Determine whether DoD effectively provided contract oversight for IO contracts for OIR in accordance with Federal and DoD guidelines.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Project Title** | **Objective**
--- | ---
Audit of Oversight of the Theater Express II Contracts (TRANSCOM) for OIR | Determine whether DoD is providing effective contract oversight for the Theater Express II contract in support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR).

Assessment of ISR Resource Allocation Process for OIR | Determine 1) What processes and tools DoD employed to support OIR ISR resource requirements, and 2) if decision on ISR resource allocation was properly supported.

**Department of State Inspector General**

Audit of Contract and Grant Oversight Staffing in Iraq | To determine whether the number of contract and grant oversight staff in Iraq is commensurate with the amount of funds being expended and complexity of projects.

**U.S. Agency for International Development Inspector General**

Audit of Selected Middle East Missions’ Use of Full and Open Competition | This regional review will determine to what extent the Middle East Bureau is using other than full and open competition to award contracts and whether the Middle East Bureau is complying with Federal Acquisition Regulations when doing so.

**INVESTIGATIONS**

Embracing the whole-of-government philosophy, the criminal investigative components of the three Lead IG agencies are employing a collaborative, multiagency strategy to combat fraud and corruption that affects OIR. The Lead IG investigative components completed an MOU establishing the structure and procedures for the Lead IG’s Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group (FCIWG). The mission of the FCIWG is to identify, synchronize, and de-conflict fraud and corruption investigations related to U.S. government OCO contracts, grants, cooperative agreement, and other federal assistance awards; protect the integrity of relevant U.S. government processes; and deter future crimes.

Specifically, these components are the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), which is the law enforcement arm of the DoD OIG; the Offices of Investigations for the DoS OIG and the USAID OIG; the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command, Major Procurement Fraud Unit; and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations is in the final stages of review and is expected to concur by next reporting period. The MOU is currently under consideration by the Federal Bureau of Investigations.

The Associate Lead Inspector General is guiding and assisting in focusing the joint investigative capabilities of the Lead IG investigative components. Emphasizing the critical importance of prosecutorial support for
investigations, the Associate Inspector General has taken steps to strengthen existing relationships with federal prosecution components at DoJ and among the offices of several United States Attorneys.

Information related to the source of complaints, case allegations and fraud briefings is compiled from DoS OIG, USAID OIG, and DCIS in Figure 5.

**Figure 5.**
Lead IG Investigative Activity
Defense Criminal Investigative Service

During this reporting period, DCIS deployed agents and a Regional Director of Investigations to Kuwait to establish an office and initiate investigations in support of OIR. DCIS recently hired several experienced agents under the hiring authority in 5 U.S.C. 3161 to support the mission for an extended period of time.

DCIS maintains regular liaison with contracting and support commands, such as the Defense Contract Management Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Joint Regional Contracting Commands. DCIS investigators provide fraud awareness briefings and DCIS mission briefings to U.S. military leaders, civilian contracting officials, defense contractor personnel, and host-nation law-enforcement and civilian personnel. The purpose of these briefings is to educate these officials about recognizing, reporting, and countering fraud, waste, and abuse related to DoD contract dollars. During April 1–September 30, 2015, DCIS conducted 12 fraud awareness briefings related to OIR for more than 256 people.

DCIS currently has four ongoing OIR investigations, two investigative projects, and, during this reporting period, completed one information report relevant to OIR. Investigative projects are initiated when there is reason to believe a suspicious activity exists or the suspicious activity involves a similar modus operandi (identified in prior substantive investigations) that may affect DoD entities, programs, or personnel. Information reports are generated if an allegation is received where, following a preliminary review/inquiry, it is determined not to warrant the initiation of an investigation by DCIS. Investigations opened prior the implementation of OIR are not included in this total. DCIS includes only investigations directly related or attributable to OIR since its inception.

DCIS continues to investigate over 132 legacy OCO related criminal investigations not reflected here. The results of these investigations are reported in the DoD IG Semiannual Report to Congress.

DoS Office of Inspector General

DoS OIG special agents have broad jurisdiction to conduct criminal, civil, and administrative investigations into claims of fraud, waste, abuse, and any allegation affecting the programs and operations of DoS and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, including those relating to OIR. In conducting investigations, DoS OIG coordinates closely with its law enforcement partners, including DCIS, investigators from other military agencies, USAID OIG, and the FBI, to share intelligence and maximize limited resources. DoS OIG uses its office in Frankfurt, Germany, to investigate
offenses occurring in the OIR region and elsewhere. DoS OIG is using hiring authority delegated from DoD under 5 U.S.C. 3161 to bring in experienced agents to complement the existing workforce. As of September 30, 2015, DoS OIG had two investigations related to OIR.

DoS OIG special agents provide fraud awareness briefings to DoS and BBG personnel working on many issues, some of which relate to overseas contingency operations. These personnel include contracting and grant officers; contracting and grant officers representatives; and regional security personnel. This quarter, DoS OIG delivered 17 fraud awareness briefings for approximately 670 personnel.

**USAID Office of Inspector General**

An ongoing OIG investigation substantiated allegations of fraud and mismanagement against an Office of a Disaster Foreign Assistance (OFDA) sub-awardee this quarter. OIG found that the sub-awardee did not conduct a non-food items (NFI) distribution in southern Syria, but had another organization do the distribution. The sub-awardee nevertheless billed OFDA for the full cost of the project. The sub-awardee is reliant on one individual in Syria to facilitate the transfer of materials and salaries. This individual was chiefly responsible for the alteration and falsification of records related to the NFI distribution. Senior leadership at the sub-awardee was aware of these facts. As result of OIG’s investigative findings, OFDA decided to terminate the sub-award and reduce its planned funding to the prime implementer by $10,500,000.

In spring 2015, USAID OIG completed an investigation of the food assistance program in Syria that resulted in systematic changes. USAID OIG received numerous allegations that community representatives in southern Syria were selling flour, provided by a USAID-funded program, which had been intended for beneficiary consumption. In response to the allegations, the USAID implementer temporarily suspended flour shipments and implemented additional monitoring requirements.

Subsequently, the OIG met with USAID, the implementer, and subcontracted staff to discuss a plan forward. As a result, the implementer, subcontractor, and USAID all agreed to suspend flour distributions until the program was restructured by limiting flour distributions to bakeries.

In July 2015, USAID OIG and the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) co-sponsored a fraud awareness roundtable for implementers in Turkey. Representatives of 14 organizations attended the event, which included information on specific fraud-related threats related to the Syria program, fraud detection and prevention, and best practices related to
internal controls. In addition, representatives of OIG conducted site visits to four USAID implementers in Turkey and provided additional training on fraud awareness, prevention, and reporting.

Pursuant to the Lead IG MOU, USAID OIG continues to closely coordinate with the DoS OIG. USAID OIG and DoS OIG recently began a joint analysis to identify implementers operating in (and around) Iraq and Syria that may be receiving funds from both USAID and DoS. As of September 30, 2015, USAID OIG and State OIG had initiated one joint investigation.

HOTLINE

Since beginning deployed operations in May 2015, the Lead IG Hotline has implemented an education campaign on preventing, detecting, and reporting fraud, waste, and abuse across the OIR military bases and camps throughout Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar. During the biannual reporting period, the Lead IG Hotline investigator conducted 48 briefings and participated in 12 training events to share hotline information with more than 430 commanders, servicemembers, DoD and Army civilians, contractors, and facility directors. This campaign also involved placing Lead IG Hotline posters in high-traffic areas, including gyms; morale, wellness, and recreation locations; and USO facilities and dining facilities at the bases and camps.

These initial efforts appear to have paid some dividends, especially as it relates to the complaints received by DoD IG. In the 3-month period ending June 30, 2015, DoD IG had 8 OIR-related complaints, and 28 complaints in the 3-month period ending September 30, 2015. Of these 28 DoD IG complaints, 10 were referred for investigation, 12 were referred for information only and the remaining 6 were non-referrals.

One of the complaints referred for investigation involved allegations concerning the processing of intelligence information by the CENTCOM Intelligence Directorate. DoD IG initiated an investigation to address whether there was any falsification, distortion, delay, suppression, or improper modification of intelligence information; any deviations from appropriate process, procedures, or internal controls regarding the intelligence analysis; and personal accountability for any misconduct or failure to follow established processes.

During the reporting period, DoS IG received three complaints, and USAID OIG received 47 complaints. In the 3-month period ending June 30, 2015, USAID OIG received 31 complaints compared with 16 complaints in the period ending September 30, 2015. USAID OIG believes that the initial spike in cases was most likely due to a number of issues that occurred prior to setting up Lead IG
reporting. The USAID OIG believes that USAID implementers are now more familiar with the reporting requirements and making disclosures more timely, thereby reducing the number reported during the last 3 months.

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline, processes complaints received, and refers complaints according to its respective protocols, according to the MOU codifying the reporting processes and procedures for the Lead IG Hotline. Representatives from each of the Lead IG agency continue to participate in a working group to discuss and coordinate hotline issues.

The Lead IG Hotline will continue educate individuals deployed within the OIR, many of whom turn over frequently. Most Air Force personnel, for example, rotate out every 120–180 days, and Army personnel serve 270- to 365-day rotations. Such turnover calls for recurring training, especially in the contracting area, to maintain the focus on preventing and detecting fraud, waste, and abuse.
APPENDIX A:
U.S. Equipment Purchases for Iraq’s Security Forces 126

APPENDIX B:
The Lead Inspector General Model 132

APPENDIX C:
Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended 134
**APPENDIX A:**

**U.S. Equipment Purchases for Iraq’s Security Forces**

**Pseudo-FMS Cases Implemented, as of 10/5/2015**

($ obligated and % change from last reporting period)

*Items in colored text were implemented this reporting period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Description</th>
<th>Items Delivered</th>
<th>Items Not Yet Delivered</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>8 Brigade Equipment Sets</strong></td>
<td><strong>As of 7/2/2015</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kevlar helmets and body armor (4,000 each); M-16 magazines (24,000); first aid kits (4,000); assault packs and grenade pouches (12,000 each); magazine pouches (96,000); canteens w/pouches (16,000); military compasses (592); Mk-19 grenade launchers and (88); .50 Cal machine guns (88); M249 Squad Assault Weapon (SAW) (520); M14 EBR sniper rifles (72); mortar tubes: 120m (40) and 60mm (136); 12-guage shotguns (120); binoculars (1,600); M4/M16 rifles (6,000); M50 gas masks(16,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | 7/2/2015–10/5/2015 | Harris Radios (416); GPS devices (70); 3KW Hwwgenerator sets (48); ground ambulance medical equipment sets (48); tripods for Mk-19 grenade launchers and .50 Cal machine guns (88 each); M240B heavy machine guns (608); small arms repair tool kits (64); Ambulances (48); medium tactical vehicles (MTV): M1089 MTV wrecker (13), cargo trucks (109–M1078s, 16–M1083s, 16–M1084s); maintenance HMMWVs (16); mechanic tool kits (8); M1151 up-armored HMMWVs (27); M1152 HMMWVs (150) | **EDD 10/2015**— GPS devices (502); M1151 up-armored HMMWVs (88); **EDD 11/2015**—M978 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) fuel tankers (32); **EDD 12/2015**—medical equipment sets: combat medic (208); mechanic tool kits (366); **EDD TBD/Various**—AK-47 magazines (72,000); M1089 Medium tactical vehicles (MTV) wrecker (19); armored SUVs (100); 400 gal water trailers (96); ¾ ton trailers (56); M1070A1 tank transporters and trailers (25 each); MTV M1078 cargo trucks (11) | **$250,408,774**

|  |  |  | **↑21%** |
### Initial Tribal Military Operational Requirement (MOR) and Amendment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Description</th>
<th>Items Delivered</th>
<th>Items Not Yet Delivered</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>As of 7/2/2015</strong></td>
<td>M16 rifles (11,000); M4/M16 magazines (66,000)</td>
<td>EDD 10/2015—body armor (717); EDD 11/2015—uniforms, field hats, and boots (11,000); EDD 12/2015—AK-47 rounds (11,000); EDD TBD—PKM machine gun (500); RPG-7 launcher (290); uniforms, field hats, and boots (11,000); weapons slings (11,000); individual first aid kits (IFAK) (11,000); AK-47 chest harnesses (11,000); 7.62mm rounds: x 39mm ball (9.3M), x 54mm R ball (4.8M), x 54mm linked (48,000); hand grenades (17,800); RPG-7 ammo: HEAT (17,400), HE frag (17,400)</td>
<td>$122,803,961 ↑242%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7/2/2015–10/5/2015</strong></td>
<td>Kevlar helmets (11,000); body armor (10,283); 5.56mm ball rounds (9M); Kevlar helmets (11,000); body armor: outer tactical vest (OTV) (3,563), small arms protective insert (SAPI) (22,574)</td>
<td>Pending ($12,000,000 additional) Harris HF long-range radio systems (290); Harris 6-bay radio chargers (49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Counter-IED and EN Mobility Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Description</th>
<th>Items Delivered</th>
<th>Items Not Yet Delivered</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>As of 7/2/2015</strong></td>
<td>MK 155 Mine Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC) launchers and trailers (20 each); D7G bulldozer (4); “blow-in-place” kits (class V explosives and accessories) (3,000); anti-personnel obstacle breaching systems (APOBS) (200); HE M58 MICLIC charges (36); MK 22 MICLIC rockets (72)</td>
<td>EDD 05/2016—Iraqi light armored vehicles (ILAV): Badger-EOD (10) and Badger-IA (6) EDD 06/2016—Iraqi light armored vehicles (ILAV): Badger-EOD (4) and Badger-IA (9) TBD—vehicle-mounted interrogation arms (90) and thermal cameras (10); 360° situational awareness cameras (10); ILAV run-flat tires (400), RPG netting (10); additional fixed bridging assets (TBD)</td>
<td>$88,487,531 ↑1,090%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7/2/2015–10/5/2015</strong></td>
<td>10-ton M1977A4 bridge transporter trucks (28); D7R bulldozer (17); bridge erection boats (8); bridge bays: interior (12) and ramp (8), boat cradles (8); bridge adaptor pallets (20); bridge transporter tires (120); handheld detectors (392)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Description</td>
<td>Items Delivered</td>
<td>Items Not Yet Delivered</td>
<td>Obligated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterterrorism Service (CTS) Battalion Set (1)</strong></td>
<td>As of 7/2/2015</td>
<td>EDD TBD—M1151A1B1 armored HMMWV (50); M1152 ambulance HMMWV (2); M2 heavy barrel (HB) machine gun (50); M240B 7.62mm machine gun (100); MK-19 grenade launcher (50); M249 SAW (50); M14 sniper rifles (18); M4 rifles (900); M9 9mm handguns (200); M500 12-gauge shotguns (20); M203A2 grenade launchers (45); M224 60mm mortar (6); M252 81mm mortar (2); small-arms laser illuminator (450); VHF radios (50); Kevlar helmets (900); IBA and small arms protective inserts (SAPI) (900); individual first aid kits (1,800); medical equipment sets: combat medic (2), tactical combat (2), and ground ambulance (2)</td>
<td>$30,501,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remaining 2 x CTS battalions are FMF Funded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Line cost TBD, but “remaining Value” listed as $40M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ITEF Blanket Transportation Case</strong></td>
<td>7/2/2015–10/5/2015</td>
<td>Pending ($36,225,000 additional)</td>
<td>$25,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation, consolidation, and packing, crating, and handling support</td>
<td>Additional packing, crating, handling, and transportation (PCH&amp;T) support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ammunition</strong></td>
<td>As of 7/2/2015</td>
<td>EDD 12/2015—sniper rounds (9,750)</td>
<td>$12,310,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.56mm ball rounds (7.8M)</td>
<td>EDD 2017—OG-9V high explosive (HE) rounds (9,996), PG-9V HE anti-tank (HEAT) rounds (9,996), RPG-7 (10,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7/2/2015–10/5/2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.56mm ball rounds (7.2M)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Above Standard Level of Service (ASLS)</strong></td>
<td>Completed 3/31/2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3,255,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weapon Cleaning Kits</strong></td>
<td>As of 7/2/2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>$2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M249 SAW kits (550); M4/M16 kits (40,000); M2 kits (100); MK-19 kits (100); M240B kits (650); 12-gauge shotgun kits (150)</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blanket Weapons Inspection, Refurb/Repair</strong></td>
<td>7/2/2015–10/5/2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>$258,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons inspection, refurbishment and repair services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interceptor body armor (IBA), helmets, and individual first aid kits (IFAK) for ISF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CANCELLED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Description</td>
<td>Items Delivered</td>
<td>Items Not Yet Delivered</td>
<td>Obligated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Ammunition</td>
<td>As of 7/2/2015 40MM HE dual-purpose (HEDP) grenade (7,520), 5.56mm M200 blanks: linked (125,000) and unlinked (75,000), 7.62mm M82 blanks (125,000), .50 Cal M1 blanks (62,500), 40mm M781 practice rounds (12,500), illuminating rounds: green star parachute (125) and red star cluster (125), M159 white signal rounds (125), M116 hand grenades (250), M18 smoke grenades (1,950), MK142 signal guns (125), M115A2 simulation ground burst projectile (300), M16 blank-firing attachment (BFA) (2,000)</td>
<td>EDD TBD—M430A1 40mm HEDP grenade (172,480); 5.56mm M200 blanks (825,360), linked (1,376,000); 7.62mm M82 blanks (1,375,200); .50cal blank M1 rounds (687,600); M781 40mm practice rounds (137,500); M918/M385A1 40mm mixed belt target practice rounds (10,016); hand grenades: green smoke (3,584), yellow smoke (3,584), red smoke (3,584); violet smoke (3,584); practice smoke (3,904); illuminating signal flares: green star parachute (1,512), red star cluster (1,392); hand-held white signal flares (1,392); simulator hand grenades (2,850); MK142 illumination signal kit (1,375); M115A2 projectile ground burst simulator (2,800); 7.62mm rounds: x 39mm blank (600,000), x 54mm blank (800,000), x 54mm belt (8,000); 12.7mm rounds: x 108mm blanks (400,000), x 108mm belts (8,000); linking machines: 7.62x54mm (4), 12.7x108mm (4)</td>
<td>$18,974,921 ↑2,236%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank Weapon Systems</td>
<td>As of 7/2/2015 M136 AT-4 84mm anti-tank weapons (2,000) 7/2/2015–10/5/2015 M72A7 light anti-armor weapon (LAW) (2,000)</td>
<td>EDD TBD—RPG-7 40mm high-explosive fragment ammunition (9,990); M136 AT-4 84mm launchers and cartridges (2,000); Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM)</td>
<td>$26,542,465 ↑220%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**New this quarter**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Description</th>
<th>Items Delivered</th>
<th>Items Not Yet Delivered</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communications Equipment</td>
<td>Pending ($51,000,000 additional) Harris communications equipment: 5W VHF dismount systems (2,310), 10W VHF dismount systems (600), 50W VHF/UHF multiband vehicle systems (34), 10W VHF/UHF multiband dismount systems (88), 50W VHF vehicular retransmit systems (32), 50W VHF vehicular systems (251)</td>
<td>Pending ($51,000,000 additional)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess ANTS Equipment</td>
<td>Pending ($10,000,000 additional)</td>
<td>Pending ($10,000,000 additional)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSAT Hub Move</td>
<td>Pending ($7,000,000 additional) Very-Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) Hub: indoor equipment (1 pkg), outdoor equipment antenna (1 pkg), Earth station support equipment (1 pkg), special tools and test equipment (1 pkg), generator (1); in-country VSAT Hub training</td>
<td>Pending ($7,000,000 additional)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Bridging Request</td>
<td>Pending ($6,000,000 additional)</td>
<td>Pending ($6,000,000 additional)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Description</td>
<td>Items Delivered</td>
<td>Items Not Yet Delivered</td>
<td>Obligated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTS Equipment and Ammunition</td>
<td>EDD TBD—M1151A1 fully armored HMMWV w with run-flat tires (120); .50cal M2 HB machine gun (50); 7.62mm M240B machine gun, (125); MK-19 grenade launcher (50); 5.56mm M4 (800); 40mm M203A2 grenade launchers (120); 7.62 x 51mm M110 sniper rifle (10); 60mm M224 lightweight mortar (12); 81mm M252 mortar (24); 73mm SPG-9 recoiless guns (95); M400T HVY Type II Skidsteer loader kit (9); PEQ-15 advanced target pointer/illuminator (800); M197 machine gun vehicle ring mount (M240B) (120); general mechanic tool kit (60); MK93 machine gun mount (120); 5.56mm M4 magazines (8,000); Kevlar helmets (1,400); body armor (1,400); set of 2 SAPI plates (1,400); mine probe kit (480); EOTECH holographic sight (925); laser range finder (126); M4 two-magazine pouch (9,600); assault pack (2,400); explosive detector (500); Lensatic compass (200); M-9 assault medical aid backpack (144); medical assault pack with detachable top pocket (96); IFAKs (800); non-pneumatic combat application tourniquet (800); STOMP II medical coverage bag (52); HMMWV C-IED mine roller kit attachment for SPARK II or equivalent (36); MRAP C-IED mine roller kit attachment for SPARK II or equivalent (18); Ventura ECM (MERCURY) man-portable jamming system (90); PVS-7D lightweight night vision goggle (800); ammunition: 73mm OG-9V SPG HE rounds (3,996); 5.56mm blanks (5,150,000), RPG-7 (3,500), 81mm mortar (17,400), 60mm mortar (25,000), 7.62mm linked (1,000,000), .50cal (2,000,000), 40mm MK-19 linked (50,000), 40mm M-203 (1,000), SPG-9 Ammo (15,000)</td>
<td>Pending ($60,000,000 additional)</td>
<td>$1,963,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRAP Request</td>
<td>MaxxPro Plus MRAP (120)</td>
<td>Pending ($TBD additional)</td>
<td>$8,557,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRAP Bll</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Description</td>
<td>Items Delivered</td>
<td>Items Not Yet Delivered</td>
<td>Obligated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Load and Sustainment Ammunition</td>
<td>Pending ($231,596,341 additional)</td>
<td>Grenades: M430A1 40mm HEDP (3,130,816), M433 40mm HEDP (11,160), M933A1 120mm HE (13,920); 5.56mm rounds: M855 ball 10-round clip (12,258,960), M856 tracer (2,089,360), 4 ball/1 tracer linked (1,866,600), 7.62mm rounds: 4 M80 ball/1 M62 tracer linked (2,116,000), M118 long range (32,200); .50cal M8 4 API/1 API tracer linked (4,110,600); 40mm grenade cartridges: M661 green star parachute (1,364), M662 red star parachute (1,364); M713 red ground smoke (704); M715 green ground smoke (704), M716 yellow smoke (704), M583 white star parachute (2,068), M585 white star (1,408); 60mm M721 illuminating round for M224 Mortar (5,376); M19 12-gauge riot control cartridges (1,600); 12-gauge breeching round (9,600); hand grenades: M67 fragmentary (139,200), M83 practice smoke (34,800), M18 green smoke (13,920), M18 yellow smoke (13,920); M18 red smoke (13,920); M18 violet smoke (13,920); 9mm M882 ball rounds (144,000); 81mm mortar ammunition: M19 red phosphorous smoke (4,500); M853A1 illuminating, (1,068); M889A2 HE (15,636); 120mm M930 illuminating mortar rounds (3,480); M5 Hexa-chlorethane (HC) ground smoke pot, (348); Illuminating, Green Star, Parachute M195 (6,984); M158 illuminating red star cluster (6,960); hand-held signal flares: M159 white (6,960), M126 red (6,960), M127 white (6,960)</td>
<td>pending ($231,596,341 additional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 BDE Sets</td>
<td>Pending ($135,000,000 additional)</td>
<td>Kevlar helmets (TBD); IBA (24,000); SAPI plate sets (3,822); IFAK (24,000); assault packs (24,000); M5- protective masks (24,000); M16 rifles (24,000); 12-gauge shotguns (180); M14 sniper rifles (108); MK-19 grenade launchers (132); M2 heavy barrel (HB) .50cal machine guns (132); M249 machine guns (912); 120mm mortar (60); 60mm mortar (204); M197 machine gun mounts (132); M192 machine gun mounts (912); MK 93 40mm mounts (132); M3 tripod (264); M122A1 tripod (912)</td>
<td>pending ($135,000,000 additional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW/MICLIC Trainers</td>
<td>Pending ($57,000 additional)</td>
<td>Trainers</td>
<td>pending ($57,000 additional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$591,564,628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values of pending cases are estimates only—not final pricing. Pseudo-FMS cases are funded by the ITEF. On February 23, 2015, DSCA received $303 million from the first tranche of the FY 2015 ITEF. On May 8, 2015, DSCA received a transfer from ARCENT of an additional $25 million.

APPENDIX B:
The Lead Inspector General Model

In January 2013, Congress passed the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which amended the Inspector General Act of 1978 to add a new section 8L. It directs responsibilities and authorities to the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and to the Inspectors General (IGs) for the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DOS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the oversight of overseas contingency operations (OCO). Specifically, it details the duties of the designated Lead Inspector General for an OCO and addresses jurisdictional conflicts.  

COORDINATION

Section 8L provides a new mandate for the three Lead IG agencies to work together from the outset of an OCO to develop and carry out joint, comprehensive, and strategic oversight. Each IG retains statutory independence, but together, they apply extensive regional experience and in-depth institutional knowledge in a coordinated interagency approach to accomplish oversight responsibilities for the whole-of-government mission. Essentially, when joint oversight projects are to be carried out among them, the Lead Inspector General, in consultation with the other two IG offices, will designate one of the three staffs to lead the project. The standard operating procedures of that IG office will take precedence. 

In general, DoD IG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG conduct oversight projects within the boundaries of their individual office missions. However, OCO programs and operations often involve coordinated work among multiple agencies, including military operations. Pursuant to section 8L, the Lead Inspector General will determine which IG has principal jurisdiction among the Lead IG agencies. When none of the three Lead IGs has jurisdiction, the Lead IG is to coordinate with the appropriate agency to ensure that comprehensive oversight takes place.  

STRATEGIC PLANNING

The Lead IG approach leverages dedicated, rotational, and temporary staff from each of the Lead IG agencies to perform various operational activities, including joint strategic oversight planning. The Lead Inspector General must develop, update, and provide to Congress an annual joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each OCO. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed independent oversight, internal management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects. 

QUARTERLY REPORTING

As required by section 8L, the Lead Inspector General is responsible for producing quarterly and biannual reports to Congress and making these reports available to the public online. Biannual reports include the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits; the status of referrals to the Department of Justice; and overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by IGs, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits. Quarterly
reports—published each April, July, October, and January—provide updates on U.S. programs and operations related to the OCO. The Lead Inspector General manages the timely production of congressionally mandated reports in a coordinated effort among the three Lead IG offices and other IG agencies, as appropriate.

THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OIR

In October 2014, the military mission for Iraq and Syria was named Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), and on October 17, the Secretary of Defense designated it an OCO. At the onset of the OCO, the Lead IG agencies had already developed a comprehensive framework for their joint oversight strategy. These agencies have always had plenary authority to conduct independent and objective oversight. For more than a decade, while they conducted independent oversight of their agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, they also worked jointly on several projects requiring cross-agency collaboration. Since 2008, they have met quarterly, along with the Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction, and the Service Auditors General to coordinate their oversight and avoid duplication of effort.

In consultation with the three IGs, CIGIE Chair Phyllis K. Fong designated Jon T. Rymer as Lead Inspector General for OIR on December 17, 2014. On December 18, 2014, Lead Inspector General Rymer appointed DoS Inspector General Steve A. Linick to serve as the Associate Inspector General for OIR, in keeping with the provisions of section 8L of the Inspector General Act, as amended. The Associate Lead Inspector General will draw on his experience as a career federal prosecutor, and as Director of DoJ’s National Procurement Fraud Task Force, to develop joint investigative capabilities across the IG community through an interagency working group.
§8L. Special Provisions Concerning Overseas Contingency Operations

(a) Additional Responsibilities of Chair of Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.-Upon the commencement or designation of a military operation as an overseas contingency operation that exceeds 60 days, the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) shall, in consultation with the members of the Council, have the additional responsibilities specified in subsection (b) with respect to the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c).

(b) Specific Responsibilities.-The responsibilities specified in this subsection are the following:

(1) In consultation with the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), to designate a lead Inspector General in accordance with subsection (d) to discharge the authorities of the lead Inspector General for the overseas contingency operation concerned as set forth in subsection (d).

(2) To resolve conflicts of jurisdiction among the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) on investigations, inspections, and audits with respect to such contingency operation in accordance with subsection (d)(2)(B).

(3) To assist in identifying for the lead inspector general for such contingency operation, Inspectors General and inspector general office personnel available to assist the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) on matters relating to such contingency operation.

(c) Inspectors General.-The Inspectors General specified in this subsection are the Inspectors General as follows:


(2) The Inspector General of the Department of State.

(3) The Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development.
(d) Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operation.—(1) A lead
Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall be designated
by the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
under subsection (b)(1) not later than 30 days after the commencement or
designation of the military operation concerned as an overseas contingency
operation that exceeds 60 days. The lead Inspector General for a contingency
operation shall be designated from among the Inspectors General specified
in subsection (c).

(2) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall
have the following responsibilities:

(A) To appoint, from among the offices of the other Inspectors General
specified in subsection (c), an Inspector General to act as associate Inspector
General for the contingency operation who shall act in a coordinating role to
assist the lead Inspector General in the discharge of responsibilities under
this subsection.

(B) To develop and carry out, in coordination with the offices of the other
Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), a joint strategic plan to
conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency
operation and to ensure through either joint or individual audits,
inspections, and investigations, independent and effective oversight of
all programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the
contingency operation.

(C) To review and ascertain the accuracy of information provided by Federal
agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and
projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major
contracts, grants, and agreements in support of the contingency operation.

(D)(i) If none of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) has principal
jurisdiction over a matter with respect to the contingency operation,
to exercise responsibility for discharging oversight responsibilities in
accordance with this Act with respect to such matter.

(ii) If more than one of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c)
has jurisdiction over a matter with respect to the contingency operation, to
determine principal jurisdiction for discharging oversight responsibilities in
accordance with this Act with respect to such matter.
(E) To employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), on a temporary basis using the authorities in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, such auditors, investigators, and other personnel as the lead Inspector General considers appropriate to assist the lead Inspector General and such other Inspectors General on matters relating to the contingency operation.

(F) To submit to Congress on a bi‑annual basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the activities of the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) with respect to the contingency operation, including—

(i) the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits and of referrals to the Department of Justice; and

(ii) overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by inspectors general, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits.

(G) To submit to Congress on a quarterly basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the contingency operation.

(H) To carry out such other responsibilities relating to the coordination and efficient and effective discharge by the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) of duties relating to the contingency operation as the lead Inspector General shall specify.

(3)(A) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation may employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) of, annuitants covered by section 9902(g) of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of assisting the lead Inspector General in discharging responsibilities under this subsection with respect to the contingency operation.

(B) The employment of annuitants under this paragraph shall be subject to the provisions of section 9902(g) of title 5, United States Code, as if the lead Inspector General concerned was the Department of Defense.

(C) The period of employment of an annuitant under this paragraph may not exceed three years, except that the period may be extended for up to an additional two years in accordance with the regulations prescribed pursuant to section 3161(b)(2) of title 5, United States Code.

(4) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall discharge the responsibilities for the contingency operation under this
subsection in a manner consistent with the authorities and requirements of this Act generally and the authorities and requirements applicable to the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) under this Act.

(e) Sunset for Particular Contingency Operations.—The requirements and authorities of this section with respect to an overseas contingency operation shall cease at the end of the first fiscal year after the commencement or designation of the contingency operation in which the total amount appropriated for the contingency operation is less than $100,000,000.

(f) Construction of Authority.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the ability of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) to enter into agreements to conduct joint audits, inspections, or investigations in the exercise of their oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to overseas contingency operations.


Prior Provisions

## Acronyms and Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACPD</td>
<td>U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCENT</td>
<td>U.S. Air Forces Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOBS</td>
<td>anti-personnel obstacle breaching systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Build Partner Capacity (training sites)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-IED</td>
<td>counter-improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAG</td>
<td>Coalition Assessment and Analysis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOC</td>
<td>Combined Air Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Coalition Campaign Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIFG</td>
<td>Counter-ISIL Finance Group (Global Coalition to Counter ISIL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJFLCC-I</td>
<td>Combined Joint Force Land Component Command-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJIATF-S</td>
<td>Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF-OIR</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP-OCO</td>
<td>Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCC</td>
<td>Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (DoS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTED</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UN Security Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTPF</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTPN</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Prosecutors Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTS</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Service (Iraqi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>countering violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td>Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCIS</td>
<td>Defense Criminal Investigative Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD IG</td>
<td>Department of Defense Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS OIG</td>
<td>Department of State Office of Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRL</td>
<td>DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO</td>
<td>executive order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTA</td>
<td>Electronic System for Travel Authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFIS</td>
<td>Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>Office of Food for Peace (USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTF</td>
<td>foreign terrorist fighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>global positioning system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>high explosive (ammunition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAT</td>
<td>high explosive anti-tank (ammunition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEDP</td>
<td>high explosive dual-purpose (ammunition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV</td>
<td>high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSC</td>
<td>Homeland Security Committee (U.S. House of Representatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSPD</td>
<td>Homeland Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Iraqi Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Intelligence community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>information coordination cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILAV</td>
<td>Iraqi light armored vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IROC</td>
<td>Iraq Security Forces Report on Operational Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL-CP</td>
<td>ISIL-Caucasus Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL-K</td>
<td>ISIL-Khorasan Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL-SP</td>
<td>ISIL-Sinai Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEF</td>
<td>Iraq Train and Equip Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRTN</td>
<td>Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Oversight Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead IG</td>
<td>Lead Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead IG agencies</td>
<td>refers to DoD IG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOE</td>
<td>line of effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBN</td>
<td>The Middle East Broadcasting Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCAR</td>
<td>Monthly Coalition Assessment Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCLC</td>
<td>mine clearing line charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>Mujahidin Indonesian Timur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>memorandum of agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRAP</td>
<td>mine resistant ambush protected (vehicle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center (DNI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>DoS Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>New Syrian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance (DoD funding account)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>overseas contingency operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIR</td>
<td>Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHDACA</td>
<td>Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td>Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATRIOT</td>
<td>Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMF</td>
<td>popular mobilization forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>programs of instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>DoS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>personal service contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>rocket-propelled grenade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARG</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAW</td>
<td>squad attack weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDGT</td>
<td>Specially Designated Global Terrorist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERE</td>
<td>Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOJTF-I</td>
<td>Special Operations Joint Task Force-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform (working group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEF</td>
<td>Syria Train and Equip Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUV</td>
<td>sport utility vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>train, advise, and assist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSA</td>
<td>Transportation Security Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSDB</td>
<td>Terrorist Screening Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID OIG</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAMTAC</td>
<td>vehículo de alta movilidad táctico (high-mobility tactical vehicle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBIED</td>
<td>vehicle-borne improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSAT</td>
<td>very small aperture terminal (satellite communications system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>water, sanitation, and hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Endnotes

25. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.
27. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.


29. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.

30. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.

31. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.


44. IDPs are people who have fled their homes but not crossed international borders. Refugees are people who have fled to areas outside the country of their nationality. USAID, “Syria Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #8,” 9/21/2015, www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria, accessed 10/16/2015.


49. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/8/2015.


55. OUSD(C), Cost of War, 7/2015.


58. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.


61. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.

62. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.

63. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.


65. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 11/5/2015.

66. DoD, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.


69. OUSD(C), response to Lead IG request for information, 11/5/2015.

70. OUSD(C), Cost of War, 5/2015.

71. DoS, responses to Lead IG request for information, 6/30/2015 and 10/20/2015.

72. DoS, response to IG request for information, 10/20/2015.

73. DoS, response to IG request for information, 10/20/2015.

74. DoS, response to IG request for information, 10/20/2015.

75. DoS, response to IG request for information, 10/20/2015.

76. DoS, response to IG request for information, 10/20/2015.

77. DoS, response to IG request for information, 10/20/2015.
80. DoS, response to Lead IG request for Information, 10/20/2015.
83. DoS, response to Lead IG request for Information, 10/20/2015.
84. DoS, response to Lead IG request for Information, 10/20/2015; Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, General John Allen, meeting with Inspector General Jon Rymer, Inspector General Steve Linick, and Acting Deputy Inspector General General Catherine Trujillo, 10/16/2015; OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 11/5/2015.
86. DoS, response to Lead IG request for Information, 10/20/2015.
88. DoS, response to Lead IG request for Information, 10/20/2015.
89. DoS, response to Lead IG request for Information, 10/20/2015.
90. USAID, Middle East Bureau, response to Lead IG request for Information, 10/13/2015.
91. USAID, Middle East Bureau, response to Lead IG request for Information, 10/13/2015.
96. DoS, response to Lead IG request for Information, 10/20/2015.
100. DoS, response to Lead IG request for Information, 10/20/2015.
114. USAID Middle East Bureau response to Lead IG request for information, 10/13/2015.
129. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/8/2015.
130. Lead IG analysis of open-source media reports, 10/2015.
136. CENTCOM, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.
142. OUSD(C), response to Lead IG request for information, 10/16/2015.
143. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 11/5/2015.
144. AFCENT, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.
145. AFCENT, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.
147. AFCENT, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.
148. AFCENT, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.
153. CJTF-OIR, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.
154. James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, testimony before Committee on Armed Services, 2/26/2015.


170. OUSD(P), responses to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015 and 11/5/2015.

171. DoD, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Christine E. Wormuth, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on “U.S. Military Operations to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,” 9/16/2015.


175. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 11/5/2015.

176. CJTF-OIR, information provided to Lead IG, 10/3/2015.

177. CJTF-OIR, information provided to Lead IG, 10/3/2015.

178. CJTF-OIR, information provided to Lead IG, 10/3/2015.


185. CJTF-OIR, information provided to Lead IG, 10/3/2015.
186. CJTF-OIR, information provided to Lead IG, 10/3/2015.
187. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.
188. DoS, reported that it coordinated the FMF package. These funds were originally intended to fund airlift of third-country donations to Erbil, but coalition donations ultimately covered those costs. DoD reported that the funds were used instead for critical anti-IED equipment for forces in Erbil, including 50 MRAPS. DSCA, “Iraq Equipping: ITEF, FMS, EDA, PDA,” 7/2/2015, pp. 3, 20; DoS, responses to Lead IG request for information, 6/30/2015 and 10/20/2015; CENTCOM, action memo for Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Iraq Train and Equip Fund Cost-Sharing Certification to Congress,” 6/11/2015.
189. CENTCOM, action memo for Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Iraq Train and Equip Fund Cost-Sharing Certification to Congress,” 6/11/2015.
190. CENTCOM, action memo for Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Iraq Train and Equip Fund Cost-Sharing Certification to Congress,” 6/11/2015.
191. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 11/5/2015.
193. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 11/5/2015.
194. Psuedo-FMS cases refer to purchases of equipment or services funded by the United States through the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (the entity that facilitates GOI-funded FMS procurements).
196. OUSD(C), response to Lead IG request for information, 10/16/2015.
197. OSC-I, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.
198. OSC-I, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.
199. OSC-I, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.
200. OSC-I, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.
202. Psuedo-FMS cases refer to purchases of equipment or services funded by the United States through the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (the entity that facilitates GOI-funded FMS procurements).
203. CENTCOM, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.
204. DoD’s congressionally required Section 1236 Report: Department of Defense Plan for Authority to Provide Assistance to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant for the period 7/2015–9/2015 had not been released as of October 21, 2015. The report details most aspects of TAA program output required to demonstrate the uses of U.S. funding.
205. DoD, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Christine E. Wormuth, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on “U.S. Military Operations to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,” 9/16/2015.
207. CENTCOM, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015; OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 11/5/2015.
209. OSC-I, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/2/2015.
216. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Conference by the President,” 10/2/2015.
217. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 10/21/2015.
218. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 10/27/2015.
219. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 10/21/2015.
224. OUSD(C), response to Lead IG request for information, 10/16/2015.
235. OUSD(C), response to Lead IG request for information, 10/16/2015.
236. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.
237. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.
238. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/17/2015.


252. DoJ, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.

253. DoJ, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.


268. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.

269. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015; Lead IG for OIR, Quarterly Report to Congress, 8/24/2015, p. 43.

270. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.


272. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.


274. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.

275. DoJ OIG, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.


279. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/8/2015.


298. An impression is a measurement of responses from a Web server to a page request from the user browser, which is filtered from robotic activity and error codes, and is recorded at a point as close as possible to the user’s opportunity to see the page. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/8/2015.


300. DoS, Special Envoy and Coordinator for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, Foreign Press Center briefing, United Nations Plaza, 9/30/2015.

301. DoS, Special Envoy and Coordinator for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, Foreign Press Center briefing, United Nations Plaza, 9/30/2015.


304. DoS, Special Envoy and Coordinator for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, Foreign Press Center briefing, United Nations Plaza, 9/30/2015.

305. DoS, Special Envoy and Coordinator for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications Rashad Hussain, “Counterterrorism Communications,” remarks at the Foreign Press Center, United Nations Plaza, 9/30/2015.


308. DoS, Special Envoy and Coordinator for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications Rashad Hussain, “Counterterrorism Communications,” remarks at the Foreign Press Center, United Nations Plaza, 9/30/2015.


311. BBG, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/23/2015.

312. BBG, response to Lead IG Request for Information, 11/5/2015.

313. BBG, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/23/2015.

314. BBG, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/23/2015.

315. BBG, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/23/2015.

316. BBG, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/23/2015.

317. BBG, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/23/2015.

318. BBG, response to Lead IG Request for Information, 10/30/2015.

319. BBG, response to Lead IG Request for Information, 10/30/2015.

320. BBG, response to Lead IG Request for Information, 10/30/2015.

321. BBG, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/23/2015.

322. BBG, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/23/2015.


325. BBG, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/23/2015.

326. BBG, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/23/2015.


346. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.

347. Treasury, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.
348. DoJ, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.
349. DoJ, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.
352. The RAND Corporation, testimony by Linda Robinson to the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on “Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” 8/24/2015.
353. Treasury, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.
356. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.
357. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.
360. DoS response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.
361. Treasury, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.
362. UNSCR 2199, 2/12/2015.
386. Dark Space, or Dark Web, or Dark Net is the part of the Internet that cannot be accessed through conventional means.


431. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.

432. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/20/2015.
435. DoJ, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.
436. DoJ, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.
440. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, written testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on “Threats to the Homeland,” 10/8/2015.
441. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, written testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on “Threats to the Homeland,” 10/8/2015.
442. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, written testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on “Threats to the Homeland,” 10/8/2015.
443. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, written testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on “Threats to the Homeland,” 10/8/2015.
444. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, written testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on “Threats to the Homeland,” 10/8/2015.
446. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, written testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on “Threats to the Homeland,” 10/8/2015.
448. DoJ, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.
449. DoJ, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/6/2015.


455. USAID/OFDA and FFP, responses to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015 and 9/15/2015; USAID, responses to Lead IG request for information, 8/13/2015 and 8/27/2015.


472. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.


474. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/14/2015.

475. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

476. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

477. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.

478. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/24/2015.

479. USAID OIG attends Syria and Iraq Task Force meetings regularly where both OFDA and FFP representatives are in attendance.


481. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.

482. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.


484. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.

485. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015.


488. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.


492. USAID/OFDA and FFP, responses to Lead IG request for information, 7/7/2015, 7/14/2015, and 9/24/2015.


509. USAID/OFDA and FFP, responses to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015 and 9/24/2015.


518. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.
519. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.
527. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
528. USAID/OFDA and FFP, responses to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015 and 10/9/2015.
529. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
530. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
531. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
532. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
533. In addition to these projects, FFP funded two activities that provided food security information management support during the reporting period.
534. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.


537. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 11/10/2015.

538. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.


540. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 11/10/2015.


544. USAID/FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/23/2015.

545. USAID/FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.


550. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.


566. DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 11/10/2015.


568. USAID/OFDA and FFP , response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.

569. USAID/OFDA and FFP , response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.

570. USAID/OFDA and FFP response to USAID OIG request for information, 9/15/2015.

571. USAID/OFDA and FFP response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.

572. USAID/OFDA and FFP response to USAID OIG request for information, 9/15/2015.

573. USAID/OFDA and FFP response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.
575. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
576. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
577. USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 7/23/2015.
581. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
582. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
583. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
584. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
585. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
586. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/9/2015.
588. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.
589. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.
590. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.
591. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015.
593. USAID/OFDA and FFP, responses to Lead IG request for information, 9/15/2015 and 10/19/2015.
594. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/19/2015.
595. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/19/2015.
596. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/19/2015.
597. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/19/2015.
598. USAID/OFDA and FFP, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/24/2015.


604. Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended: The Lead IG will “determine which IG has principal jurisdiction when more than one inspector general from the DoD, DoS, and USAID has jurisdiction.” Further, the Lead IG will “exercise responsibility for discharging oversight responsibilities” when Departments of Defense and State and USAID have no jurisdiction.


606. In internal DoD documents, OIR was named an overseas contingency operation as defined in 10 USC 101(1)(13).

607. CIGIE Chair Phyllis K. Fong, letter to DoD Inspector Jon Rymer, 12/17/2014.


TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE RELATED TO OIR PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS, CONTACT:

Department of Defense Hotline
dodig.mil/hotline
1-800-424-9098

Department of State Hotline
oighotline@state.gov
1-800-409-9926 or 202-647-3320

U.S. Agency for International Development Hotline
ig.hotline@usaid.gov
1-800-230-6539 or 202-712-1023
TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE RELATED TO OIR PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS, CONTACT:

**Department of Defense Hotline**
dodig.mil/hotline
1-800-424-9098

**Department of State Hotline**
oighotline@state.gov
1-800-409-9926 or 202-647-3320

**U.S. Agency for International Development Hotline**
ig.hotline@usaid.gov
1-800-230-6539 or 202-712-1023