ABOUT THIS REPORT

In January 2013, legislation was enacted creating the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. This legislation, which amended the Inspector General Act, requires the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to, among other things, provide quarterly reports to Congress.

The DoD Inspector General is designated as the Lead IG for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) and the DoS IG is the Associate Inspector General. USAID’s humanitarian assistance and development efforts in Afghanistan fall outside the OFS mission. However, the USAID Office of Inspector General conducts audits and investigations of its programs in Afghanistan and summaries of USAID oversight work is included in this report.

The Offices of Inspector General of the DoD, DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. Other partner agencies also contribute to oversight of OFS.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out four primary activities:

- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over the contingency operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations.
- Perform analyses to ascertain the accuracy of information provided by Federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements.
- Report quarterly and biannually to the Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead IG agencies.

METHODOLOGY

To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from their agencies and open sources, including congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports. DoD, DoS, and USAID officials also provide written responses to quarterly data call questions from Lead IG agencies.

The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, or evaluations mentioned or referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited all of the data and information provided by the agencies. For further details on the methodology for this report, see Appendix A.

CLASSIFIED APPENDIX

This report includes an appendix containing classified information on the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan, as well as information related to the Afghan security forces and the Afghan security ministries. This classified appendix is provided to relevant agencies and congressional committees.
FOREWORD

We are pleased to submit the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). This is our 13th quarterly report on this overseas contingency operation, in compliance with our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978.

OFS has two complementary missions: the U.S. counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan, and their affiliates in Afghanistan; and U.S. military participation in the NATO-led Resolute Support mission to develop the capacity of the Afghan security ministries and to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. The objective of Resolute Support is the establishment of self-sustaining Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and security ministries that together seek to maintain security in Afghanistan.

This quarterly report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OFS, as well as the work of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development to promote the U.S. Government’s policy goals in Afghanistan, during the period from April 1, 2018, through June 30, 2018. We have organized the information in this report according to the five strategic oversight areas set out in our FY 2018 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan:

- Security
- Governance and civil society
- Humanitarian assistance and development
- Stabilization and infrastructure, and
- Support to mission

This report also features oversight work completed by the Lead IG agencies and our partner oversight agencies during the same period, as well as ongoing and planned oversight work.

Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on OFS.

Glenn A. Fine  
Principal Deputy Inspector General  
Performing the Duties of the Inspector General  
U.S. Department of Defense

Steve A. Linick  
Inspector General  
U.S. Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Ann Calvaresi Barr  
Inspector General  
U.S. Agency for International Development
On the Cover
(Top row) A senior airman hangs U.S. flags onboard a C-17 Globemaster III during an airdrop mission over Afghanistan (U.S. Air Force photo); a B-1B Lancer is prepared for departure at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, to combat Taliban and other terrorist groups (U.S. Air Force photo); 619 Afghan National Army Special Operations warfighters complete their Commando Qualification Course at Camp Commando, near Kabul (DoD photo); a Cobra Strike sniper scans the horizon for threats during a live-fire exercise. (Bottom row) An Afghan commando keeps an eye on the horizon at the end of the day in Farah province (NATO photo).
MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL

I am pleased to present the 13th Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report on Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). This report summarizes key events in Afghanistan this quarter and also describes completed, ongoing, and planned Lead IG and partner agency oversight work relating to OFS.

Since the Administration announced its South Asia strategy in August 2017, the U.S. Government has increased the amount of troops and equipment in Afghanistan, increased offensive strikes against the Taliban, expanded training and assistance for Afghan forces, and sought to pressure Pakistan to eliminate terrorist safe havens. Overall, the strategy seeks to drive the Taliban to enter into negotiations for a political settlement.

While it is difficult to fully assess the overall progress under the strategy, this report explores key developments during this quarter. Commanders in Afghanistan stated that the strategy is working. Commanders also stated that Afghan forces showed improvement and that the Taliban was largely unsuccessful in seizing district centers. In June, the Afghan government and the Taliban implemented ceasefires. At the time, Afghans and members of the international community expressed hope that the ceasefires would be first steps toward reconciliation.

However, fighting resumed after the ceasefires ended. The Taliban maintained its hold on rural parts of the country and launched attacks on Afghan forces and population centers. During this quarter, civilian deaths reached historically high levels, and violence displaced tens of thousands of Afghans. In addition, despite operational successes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria-Khorasan, this terrorist organization continued to recruit and carry out high-profile attacks that killed hundreds of civilians.

This quarter, the Afghan government made progress toward holding parliamentary elections by completing the voter and candidate registration processes, despite deadly Taliban attacks on election facilities. Concerns remain regarding the security of polling places and staffing of the electoral committees. In addition, severe drought has critically affected 1.4 million Afghans, increasing the need for humanitarian assistance funding.

During this quarter, the Lead IG agencies and our oversight partners continued to provide oversight of OFS activities in Afghanistan. We issued eight reports relating to OFS that address topics such as contract performance and accountability, accurate reporting of OFS costs, and fuel management and oversight. As of June 30, 2018, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 34 ongoing audits, evaluations, and investigations related to OFS. Lead IG agency investigations this quarter resulted in 4 criminal convictions, and 33 criminal investigations were ongoing at the end of the quarter.

My Lead IG colleagues and I remain committed to oversight of overseas contingency operations, including OFS. We thank the OIG employees who are deployed abroad, who travel to the region, and who work from the United States to perform their important oversight work.

Glenn A. Fine
Principal Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“TALKING AND FIGHTING”

Since the Administration’s announced its South Asia strategy in August 2017, the Department of Defense (DoD) has increased the number of troops and amount of equipment in Afghanistan. Under the strategy, the United States increased the number of offensive strikes against the Taliban, expanded training, advising and assistance for Afghan forces, and put greater pressure on Pakistan to eliminate terrorist safe havens inside its borders.

The combined military, diplomatic, and social pressure under the strategy seeks to convince the Taliban it cannot win militarily and should enter into negotiations leading to a political settlement. During the quarter, U.S. commanders described the U.S. approach as “talking and fighting.”

However, the Taliban continued to launch attacks across the country, particularly against voter registration centers for the upcoming elections, and raided several district centers. While the number of enemy attacks declined compared to the same period last year, the number of civilian deaths increased compared to previous years. In addition, as has been the case since the announcement of the South Asia strategy, the share of the population in areas controlled/influenced by the Taliban or the Afghan government did not change this quarter.

Furthermore, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Alice Wells said that Pakistan has not taken “the sustained or decisive steps that we would have expected to see ten months after the announcement of the South Asia strategy.” She added that Pakistan did not make progress in expelling Taliban fighters who are not willing to enter into peace negotiations.

Fighting paused briefly in June, when President Ashraf Ghani announced a ceasefire in operations against the Taliban to coincide with the final week of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A U.S. airstrike killed the senior ISIS-K commander Qari Hekmatullah and his bodyguard in Faryab province, on April 5, 2018. (DoD photo)

The Afghan government ceasefire, which international forces also honored, lasted 19 days. The Taliban also implemented a three-day ceasefire during this period.

Images of Afghan forces and Taliban fighters celebrating the Eid al-Fitr holiday together raised hopes for additional ceasefires and progress toward reconciliation. However, the Taliban rejected President Ghani’s offer of negotiations and fighting resumed at the end of June.

U.S. and Afghan counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K) continued throughout the quarter, including during the ceasefire. U.S. and Afghan forces reported some operational successes in their fight against ISIS-K, including the death of ISIS-K leader Qari Hekmatullah and the clearing of

MAY 30
ANP special forces prevent an attack on MoI compound by Taliban fighters wearing U.S. Army uniforms.

JUNE 12
The Afghan government initiates a ceasefire with the Taliban that lasts until June 30.

JUNE 20
In the first attack since the ceasefire ended, the Taliban storms an ANA base in Badghis, killing 30 soldiers.

JUNE 15
The Taliban announces a 3-day ceasefire. A U.S. drone strike in Kunar province kills Pakistani Taliban leader Mullah Fazlullah.

JUNE 28
The U.S. Senate confirms Lt. Gen. Austin Miller as the next commander of Resolute Support and USFOR-A.
ISIS-K fighters from a key district in Nangarhar province. ISIS-K did not appear to gain significant territory during the quarter, but, according to United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), it was able to recruit new fighters and continue attacks in northeastern Afghanistan and in Kabul.

**Election Preparations Proceed Amidst Violence**

The Afghan government plans to hold parliamentary and district council elections on October 20, 2018. U.S. military commanders stated that the elections will be a form of “social pressure” on the Taliban to reconcile with the Afghan government. U.S. officials reported that more than 9 million Afghans registered to vote. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, it is likely that many Afghans did not participate because of frequent and widespread Taliban attacks on voter registration centers or because their assigned registration centers were closed due to insecurity.

**Recruiting Challenges Persist**

This was the first quarter that the U.S. military had the full contingent of troops and assets on the ground in Afghanistan as planned under the South Asia strategy. These troops included the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB), whose primary mission is to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Army (ANA) at the brigade and battalion level.

While the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have made slow improvement toward operational and institutional development goals, they are still struggling to maintain their force levels. As of June 2018, the ANDSF numbered 313,728 personnel, approximately 11 percent less than the 352,000 personnel slots authorized by the Afghan government. In addition, the ANDSF still suffers from high attrition rates, which the DoD attributes to poor leadership, low or delayed pay, poor living conditions, denial of leave, and insurgent intimidation.
KEY CHALLENGES

Previous Lead IG quarterly reports identified several challenges facing Afghanistan and the OFS mission, including preparing to hold safe, credible parliamentary elections; defeating ISIS-K; and pressuring Pakistan to eliminate terrorist safe havens. This quarter, the Lead IG agencies also identified the following emerging challenges* that complicate the OFS mission and efforts to end the conflict:

ASSESSING PROGRESS OF THE ANDSF

Under the South Asia strategy, the U.S. military deployed additional troops to Afghanistan to increase training and advising activities with Afghan forces, including the 1st SFAB, which provides training, advising, and combat enablement to Afghan National Army (ANA) brigades and battalions.

- Given that ANA units perform better when they are actively being advised and enabled, it may be difficult to assess whether improvements in performance are a result of the additional U.S. military support or due to ANA units actually growing more capable. Accordingly, that could make it difficult for U.S. forces to determine when to stop advising one ANA unit and begin working with another.

- The 1st SFAB provides support primarily to the ANA. The Afghan National Police (ANP), which has historically lagged behind the ANA in performance, will not receive a comparable infusion of advisors below the zone level, which may exacerbate the gap between ANA and ANP performance.

SUSTAINABILITY OF THE ANDSF

One of the pillars of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is to ensure that a future political outcome in Afghanistan falls “within fiscal constraints, and that the Afghan government can sustain in the future with minimal U.S. and international financial support.” The Afghan government currently pays approximately $507 million of the annual $6.5 billion cost of supporting the ANDSF.

- The ANDSF will have high costs in the near term as it seeks to pressure the Taliban to enter negotiations. In particular, the U.S. Government is providing the Afghan government hundreds of aircraft, vehicles, and technical systems that require skilled workers to maintain and operate. U.S. and international advisors note that there may not be enough skilled Afghans to fill these roles.

- While a future, peacetime ANDSF could be smaller and more affordable, the exact size and composition will depend upon a post-reconciliation security situation, which is yet to be determined and may still require international support for personnel and weapons platforms.

(continued on next page)
Key Challenges (continued from previous page)

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Afghanistan has been experiencing a severe drought that is compounding existing humanitarian challenges. U.S. and international relief agencies report that millions of Afghans are in need of humanitarian assistance, including food, shelter, and medical aid. In addition, the United Nations reported in December 2017 that approximately 1.3 million Afghans are internally displaced by conflict, in addition to the hundreds of thousands of returnees from Iran and Pakistan who may require aid.

- Aid agencies are often unable to assist Afghans in need due to insecurity. Similarly, many Afghans are unable to access medical services, education, and markets due to the conflict.

- Afghanistan’s growing youth population, combined with a weak economy, has led to high youth unemployment. Research suggests that this could have a destabilizing impact on Afghanistan’s security.

*This list is derived from Lead IG analysis of information from U.S. Government agencies, international organizations, and open sources.

Commandos training to become Afghanistan’s newest Special Operations unit prepare for their final test, a live fire exercise. (DoD photo)
In particular, the ANDSF struggles to recruit personnel for high-skills positions. This applies not only to the growing Afghan special forces and aviation units, but also to the logisticians, technicians, and maintenance mechanics who support them.\textsuperscript{12}

This report highlights the ANDSF’s efforts to recruit qualified Afghans to serve as aircraft mechanics, counter-IED technicians, and administrators of the Afghan Automated Biometric Information System (AABIS).\textsuperscript{13}

The 1st SFAB and Resolute Support advisors seek to help Afghans build operational and administrative capacity, but these efforts will not succeed unless the supporting systems and processes at the ministry level are also working effectively.\textsuperscript{14} For instance, ground vehicle and aircraft maintenance programs suffer when weak logistics systems fail to deliver spare parts on time, and power outages frequently render the AABIS non-operational.\textsuperscript{15}

The U.S. Congress appropriated $47.1 billion in DoD overseas contingency operations funding to support the OFS mission in FY 2018—about $15 billion of which is direct costs of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and security assistance for Afghan forces.\textsuperscript{16} During the quarter, Congress considered the President’s FY 2019 DoD budget request, which includes $46.3 billion for OFS, including $5.2 billion to support the development of the Afghan security forces. The budget request also includes $2.1 billion in overseas contingency operations funding for the Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to support activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{17}

**LEAD IG OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES**

During the quarter, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies completed eight audits and evaluations related to OFS, including reviews of DoD oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program invoice review and payment; costs invoiced under the Afghanistan
Life Support Services contracts; the Air Force *Cost of War* report for OFS; the Army’s OFS expenditure reporting, and management and oversight of fuel in Afghanistan.

Table 1 lists the completed reports by agency. As of June 30, 2018, the Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners had 34 ongoing and 24 planned oversight projects for OFS.

Although USAID has no OFS-related programs or activities, it conducts humanitarian and development activities in Afghanistan in many sectors, including agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth, education, gender promotion, health, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance. The USAID Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducts

Table 1.

**Oversight Reports Completed This Quarter**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Release Date</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of DoD Oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Invoice Review and Payment</em> DODIG-2018-119</td>
<td>May 11, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE AUDIT AGENCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Air Force Cost of War Report—Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</em> F2018-0002-L10000</td>
<td>April 4, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY AUDIT AGENCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Reporting Expenditures for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</em> A-2018-0043-1EX</td>
<td>April 5, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Management and Oversight of Fuel in Afghanistan: DOD Is Taking Steps to Improve Accountability, but Additional Actions Are Needed</em> SIGAR 18-41-IP</td>
<td>April 10, 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Investigative branches of the DoD, DoS, and their partner agencies closed 7 investigations, initiated 5 new investigations, and coordinated on 33 open investigations.

Investigations of the DoD, DoS, USAID OIG, and other organizations audited and investigated in Afghanistan related to these programs. USAID OIG’s activities are included in this report to provide a more comprehensive update on the oversight of U.S. Government programs in Afghanistan, including non-OFS programs. The USAID OIG has 22 ongoing financial audits and 2 performance audits.

Newly Announced Projects

The Lead IG agencies announced three new projects during the quarter:

- The DoD OIG announced an audit of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System. The audit objective is to determine whether DoD’s planning and implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System will accurately pay and track Afghan forces.
- The DoD OIG announced a summary audit of systemic weaknesses in the Cost of War reports. The audit’s objective is to summarize systemic weaknesses in DoD’s accounting for costs associated with ongoing contingencies identified in Cost of War audit reports issued between 2016 and 2018.
- The DoD OIG announced an audit of the National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract in Afghanistan. The audit’s objective is to determine whether the Army developed the contract requirements to meet user needs to maintain and sustain ANDSF vehicles.

Investigations Activity

Investigations conducted by Lead IG and partner agencies resulted in 1 arrest, 2 criminal charges, 4 criminal convictions, 1 suspension, fines or recoveries of $295,000, forfeitures of $104,000 this quarter. Lead IG and partner agencies also closed 7 investigations, initiated 5 new investigations, and coordinated on 33 open investigations. The investigations involve a variety of alleged crimes, including procurement fraud, corruption, grant fraud, theft, program irregularities, computer intrusions, and trafficking-in-persons.

At the end of the quarter, USAID OIG had 18 open investigations, including 3 joint investigations with SIGAR, involving Afghanistan-related programs and operations. This quarter, the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group conducted 27 fraud awareness briefings for 153 participants.

Hotline Activity

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority for independent review. The DoD OIG has an investigator who coordinates the hotline contacts among the Lead IG agencies and others as appropriate. During the quarter, the investigator referred 30 cases to Lead IG agencies or other investigative organizations.
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THE QUARTER IN REVIEW

“Chaos and progress can coexist and that is exactly what we feel is happening in Afghanistan.” –Department of Defense spokesperson¹

Since the Administration announced its South Asia strategy in August 2017, the Department of Defense (DoD) has sent more assets and troops to Afghanistan, and has given those troops greater authority to attack the Taliban. The third quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2018 was the first quarter that the U.S. military had the full contingent of additional troops and assets on the ground in Afghanistan as planned under the South Asia strategy. General John Nicholson, the Commander of Resolute Support and United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), said that under the strategy, the United States seeks to use military force, combined with diplomatic and social pressure, to convince the Taliban it cannot win militarily and must reconcile with the Afghan government.²

During the quarter, commanders in Afghanistan indicated that the strategy is working.³ They described the situation as “talking and fighting”: U.S. and Afghan forces battled the Taliban while the U.S. and Afghan governments explored avenues to initiate a reconciliation process with the Taliban.⁴

However, while there was significant activity on both fronts, neither side appeared to make any sizable gains on the battlefield, nor was there clear evidence of progress toward reconciliation during the quarter.
Assessing the progress of the South Asia strategy is a difficult task. The DoD informed the DoD OIG that the Secretary of Defense is currently reviewing assessments of the South Asia strategy. Because these assessments and the metrics that inform them are not public, Lead IG agencies continue to review progress using publicly released data, such as the percentage of the Afghan population living in areas under government control or influence, security incidents, and civilian casualties. In addition, Lead IG agencies examine progress toward reconciliation, which is more difficult to quantify.

During the quarter, the Afghan government did not increase the number of districts or the percentage of the population living in areas under government control or influence. While the Afghan government continued to urge the Taliban to enter into a reconciliation process, the Taliban rejected offers to participate in negotiations.

However, a major development during the quarter raised hope among Afghan and U.S. leaders that a peace process is possible. On June 12, 2018, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani implemented a unilateral ceasefire with the Taliban through the end of the Eid al-Fitr holiday on June 20; he later extended the ceasefire to June 30. In his announcement of the ceasefire, President Ghani repeated his offer to start peace negotiations with the Taliban “without conditions,” echoing a similar offer that he made in February.

U.S. and coalition forces honored the Afghan government ceasefire. However, the Afghan government ceasefire did not apply to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K), and U.S. and Afghan forces continued operations against the terrorist group.

ABOUT OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL

MISSION
U.S. forces carry out two complementary missions under the military operation known as OFS: counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, ISIS-K, and their affiliates in Afghanistan; and participation in the NATO Resolute Support Mission, which seeks to build the capacity of the MoD and MoI and to strengthen the ANDSF. OFS began on January 1, 2015, when the United States ended more than 13 years of combat operations in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom and transitioned to a NATO-led train, advise, and assist role, while continuing counterterrorism operations. Further details about the OFS mission are available in the classified appendix to this report.

HISTORY
On October 7, 2001, the United States launched combat operations to topple the Taliban regime and eliminate al Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001. The Taliban regime fell quickly and U.S. officials declared an end to major combat operations on May 1, 2003. Subsequently, the United States and international coalition partners sought to build a strong, democratic Afghan central government. However, as the new Afghan government developed, the Taliban regrouped and launched increasingly deadly attacks to recapture lost territory. To address the deteriorating security situation, the United States increased its troop strength from 37,000 in early 2009 to approximately 100,000 from 2010 to 2011.

The “surge” succeeded in reversing Taliban momentum. The United States reduced its force level to 16,100 by December 31, 2014, when the combat mission ended and OFS began. By the end of 2016, roughly 11,000 U.S. troops remained in Afghanistan. However, since the launch of OFS, Afghan forces have struggled against a resilient Taliban and have suffered extensive casualties. President Trump announced a new “conditions-based” South Asia strategy on August 21, 2017, which included an increase of approximately 3,500 U.S. troops in theater, bringing the total to approximately 14,000 troops.
Following the Afghan government’s ceasefire announcement, the Taliban announced a ceasefire for 3 days (June 15-17) during the Eid al-Fitr holiday. During this period when the two ceasefires overlapped, news reports showed pictures of Taliban and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) embracing as some Taliban openly entered cities to shop and celebrate.

The Department of State (DoS) also expressed the United States’ support for peace in a statement on June 16:

\[\text{All of Afghanistan’s people benefit from the end of bloodshed, and we have seen the overwhelmingly positive reaction from Afghans across society. We have seen pictures of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan soldiers and police with Taliban fighters offering prayers for Eid side by side. If Afghans can pray together, their leaders can talk together and resolve their differences.}\]

While the Afghan government continued its ceasefire after Eid, the Taliban resumed attacks across the country. As President Ghani ended his government’s ceasefire on June 30, he reiterated his offer to enter into a peace process with the Taliban. “I am ready to extend the ceasefire anytime when the Taliban are ready,” he said. The DoS reported that, as of the end of the quarter, the Taliban had not acknowledged the offer of negotiations.
On April 25, 2018, the Taliban officially launched its annual spring offensive, called Operation “al Khandaq.”

SECURITY

**U.S. Counterterrorism and Combat-Enabling Activities**

Under Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, U.S. military forces engage in offensive and combat-enabling operations as part of both their counterterrorism mission and the NATO Resolute Support mission.

The U.S. counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan seeks to defeat al Qaeda and ISIS-K and prevent Afghanistan from “becoming a safe-haven for terrorists to plan attacks against the U.S. homeland.”

The DoD said that the presence of terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan “requires an Afghan supported U.S. platform in the region to monitor, contain, and respond to these threats.”

Additional details about the organization and staffing of the U.S. and Afghan counterterrorism mission is available in the classified appendix to this report.

Through the Resolute Support train, advise, and assist mission, U.S. troops and civilian advisors work with Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI), and their military and police forces as they plan and execute operations against the Taliban. Under the expanded authorities granted to them by the President and Secretary of Defense pursuant to the South Asia strategy, U.S. military commanders in the field have authority to conduct offensive operations against irreconcilable factions of the Taliban, either unilaterally or in support of ANDSF operations.

**Taliban Launches Spring Offensive**

On April 25, 2018, the Taliban officially launched its annual spring offensive, called Operation “al Khandaq.” The operation is named for a 7th century battle in which Muslim fighters defended Medina from other tribes seeking to recapture the city. In a statement announcing the offensive, the Taliban reiterated its longstanding claim that the continued

**SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES**

- Despite U.S. military leaders’ cautious claims of progress, Taliban-related violence and civilian casualties remained high. ISIS-K remained a deadly threat in northeast Afghanistan and in Kabul, even after an intense U.S. and Afghan air and ground campaign against the terrorist group.

- Taliban attacks in the western provinces of Faryab, Badghis, and Farah increased. A Taliban attack on Farah city in May demonstrated how short-lived raids on district centers can inflict harm on civilians and undermine ANDSF operations.

- The U.S. military campaign to target Taliban sources of revenue, such as drug-processing facilities, expanded during the quarter, reportedly denying the Taliban an estimated $45 million in revenue.

- Maintenance remained a critical challenge for ANDSF ground and air operations. The DoD’s plans to transition maintenance tasks from contractors to Afghan mechanics face several challenges, including a lack of qualified Afghan candidates and immature ANDSF logistics and supply systems.
presence of U.S. and international troops in Afghanistan justifies the insurgency. The Taliban stated that it is primarily targeting “the American invaders and their intelligence agents,” and, secondarily, “internal supporters” of American forces.  

USFOR-A, in an analysis prepared for the DoD OIG, said the 2018 statement had a different tone than the Taliban’s statement announcing the 2017 fighting season, which was “more victorious in tone.” USFOR-A said that the 2018 announcement implicitly acknowledged that the Taliban is “under pressure from the United States and Coalition forces.”

USFOR-A attributed the change, in part, to increased offensive operations under the South Asia strategy, which it says has limited the Taliban’s ability to carry out large or complicated operations. For example, the Taliban’s 2018 statement did not mention high-profile suicide attacks or large-scale conventional operations, which were both announced as part of the 2017 campaign. “This may indicate a plan by the Taliban to limit their use of Kabul-based high profile attacks to only hardened targets with a low risk of civilian casualties,” USFOR-A said.

USFOR-A highlighted a portion of the statement in which the Taliban stated that, “protecting the lives and properties of civilian people and all precautionary measures should be taken while attacking a target.” Additionally, USFOR-A said that the absence of high-profile Taliban attacks using a car bomb at the outset of the spring offensive “corroborates our assessment that their opening statement signaled their possible shift in tactics.”

USFOR-A also said that this indicates a Taliban recognition that civilian casualties caused by high-profile attacks have negative consequences, such as weakening the Taliban’s ability to criticize the ANDSF and coalition forces for causing civilian casualties, and reducing popular support for its movement.

However, the Taliban has a long history of calling for the protection of civilians during combat, but continues to carry out operations that either target civilians directly, or result in substantial civilian casualties.

Further details about the South Asia strategy’s impact on Taliban tactics and attitudes toward reconciliation are available in the classified appendix to this report.

**Enemy Attacks Decrease Slightly**

While violence remained widespread during the quarter, available data indicates that the number of violent incidents decreased during this period. During a May 2018 press conference, USFOR-A and Resolute Support Commander General John Nicholson, citing ANDSF-generated data, said that enemy-initiated violence between February 2018 and April 2018 declined by 30 percent compared to the 5-year average (although he did not specify what the 5-year average level was). He added that in April and May, the initial months of the Taliban’s al Khandaq offensive, violence did increase, but remained at a level that was 10 to 12 percent below the 5-year average.
However, this reported drop in violence does not necessarily demonstrate lasting improvement in the security situation in Afghanistan. Violence in Afghanistan is cyclical in nature. Enemy attacks peak in the late spring through early fall and then can drop off significantly in the winter, as shown in Figure 1.

In addition, a decrease in attacks could also be a result of tactical changes by the Taliban since the launch of the South Asia strategy, which has been noted by commanders. Because of the increased offensive pressure on them, Taliban fighters appear to have shifted from large-scale operations to more targeted attacks, particularly against ANSF outposts.25

Furthermore, as discussed on page 25, civilian casualties remained high during the quarter, indicating that while there might have been fewer enemy attacks, they were proportionally more deadly.26

The United Nations reported that most of the security incidents it recorded – including those initiated by the Taliban, the ANSF, or international forces – were concentrated in six provinces: Nangarhar, Helmand, Kunar, Kandahar, Faryab, and Ghazni. Between February 15 and May 15, 2018, 60 percent of security incidents took place in these provinces.27

The United Nations further reported that the overall number of security incidents (5,675) declined 7 percent compared to the same period in 2017, but the proportion of incidents that were suicide attacks increased by 78 percent.28
New Commander Confirmed

On June 28, 2018, the U.S. Senate confirmed Lieutenant General Austin Miller as the next commander of Resolute Support and USFOR-A. Lieutenant General Miller will become the 3rd commander of Resolute Support, and the 17th commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Lieutenant General Miller most recently served as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, and last served in Afghanistan in 2014 as commander of Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command.

In his confirmation hearing and written testimony, Lieutenant General Miller stated that there is no military solution in Afghanistan, and that military force is only one form of pressure needed to drive the Taliban to the negotiating table. Lieutenant General Miller stated that he would assess conditions in Afghanistan once he assumes command and he provided no indication whether he would make any changes in strategy or tactics. Lieutenant General Miller also noted the importance of resource management and sustainability:

> I know and appreciate the tremendous cost committed to this mission. If confirmed, I will be a vigorous steward of the people, the resources I am entrusted with. Corruption and incompetence are corrosive to our mission, and fighting them will always be a constant focus of mine.  

> As we go forward on what must be a sustainable effort, my look on this is...you put money where you know you will have results. And that speaks to not only on the military side but any other activities that are taking place.  

> We must continue to increase the offensive capability and professionalism of the ANSF while ensuring that the Afghan Government can afford and sustain long-term security solutions.  

Lieutenant General Miller is expected to assume command of Resolute Support and USFOR-A in late summer 2018.

Little Progress on Securing Population

According to Resolute Support, the Afghan government made no significant progress in increasing the percentage of the population living in areas under government control or influence, a metric President Ghani and U.S. commanders have cited as an indicator of the security situation in Afghanistan. Resolute Support reported that, as of May 2018, 65 percent of Afghans lived in areas under government control or influence, 12 percent lived in areas under Taliban control or influence, and 23 percent lived in contested areas. Those numbers are identical to the previous quarter.

Although the Resolute Support assessment identified a small number of districts that moved from the Taliban control/influence category to “contested,” and some that moved from “contested” to Afghan control/influence since an assessment in January 2018, the
net changes did not amount to more than 1 percent of the population. As of May 2018, the Taliban controlled 11 districts, had influence over 45, and contested 122 of Afghanistan’s 407 districts. The Afghan government controlled 74 and influenced 155 districts.

Taliban fighters launched raids on several district centers during the quarter, including administrative centers in Badakhshan, Kunduz, Baghlan, Ghazni, and Faryab provinces. In June, after USFOR-A completed the assessment described above, the Kohistan district in Faryab province fell to Taliban control, and remained under Taliban control as of the end of the quarter.

While the ANDSF, often with significant NATO support, generally repelled attacks or quickly recaptured district centers, these Taliban assaults often result in ANDSF and civilian casualties, drive Afghans from their homes, and contribute to a culture of fear in the affected areas. In addition, they allow the Taliban to capture weapons and supplies for future operations and may force the ANDSF to undertake defensive, rather than offensive, operations.

**High Profile Attacks in Kabul Decrease**

In response to a growing number of high profile attacks in Kabul over the past 12 months, including 10 attacks last quarter, the ANDSF, with assistance from Resolute Support, took steps to improve security in the capital. The ANDSF increased patrols in the city, enhanced searches and inspections at Kabul city gates and checkpoints, and increased communication across Kabul’s local police districts. In addition, the U.S. 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) provided assistance to ANDSF personnel in Kabul this quarter.

The number of high profile attacks in Kabul this quarter decreased compared to last quarter. On April 30, a pair of bombings killed at least 25 people, including 9 journalists, in an attack claimed by ISIS-K. One month later, on May 30, Taliban fighters, wearing outdated U.S. army uniforms, attempted to attack an MoI compound. A police special forces unit prevented
the fighters from entering the compound and, although one police officer was killed in the attack, the actions of special forces prevented additional casualties. On June 4, a suicide bomber targeted a group of clerics who had gathered to condemn violence, killing 12 and wounding 17.

Given publicly available information, it is not clear whether the reduced number of high profile attacks is due to the enhanced security in and around Kabul, militant groups attempting fewer attacks, or other reasons. In response to a DoD OIG inquiry, USFOR-A reported that the Kabul Security Force has been “successful” in providing security in the capital but has not yet been able to quantify the impact of the enhanced security measures. Afghan security officials also reported that they foiled several planned attacks in recent months.

Meanwhile, the threat of attacks remains high, and it continues to affect mobility and commercial activity in the capital.
Checkpoints: An ANDSF Vulnerability

Large numbers of Afghan soldiers and police spend their days staffing static checkpoints across Afghanistan. While recognizing that there are strong political and societal forces that support maintaining checkpoints in Afghanistan, Resolute Support and USFOR-A officials have encouraged the ANDSF to reduce its number of static checkpoints and consolidate forces into larger bases.47

Static ANDSF checkpoints are an easy and frequent target for the Taliban. USFOR-A reported that beginning in 2017, the Taliban transitioned from large-scale attacks to guerilla-style assaults on checkpoints. The Taliban uses these raids to steal ANDSF supplies and equipment, and to “isolate cities, and to create panic in the populace.”48

The frequent insurgent attacks on fixed ANDSF positions contribute to the high ANDSF casualty rate. Resolute Support assessments have found that the number of checkpoints in a province “directly correlates” with ANDSF casualties in that area—the more checkpoints, the more casualties.49

USFOR-A reported that the high number of checkpoints is a “major concern” because it undermines the ANDSF’s offensive capability.50 In some cases, checkpoints in remote areas are manned only by a handful of ANDSF personnel and, according to USFOR-A, “are tactically unsound.”51 The broad distribution of checkpoints across the country spreads the ANDSF thin and makes supplying and reinforcing the checkpoints difficult.52

Afghan police work inside Kabul’s Enhanced Security Zone manning 26 checkpoints to keep the capital safe. (NATO photo)
Checkpoints: An ANDSF Vulnerability (continued from previous page)

Furthermore, the ANDSF continues to deploy Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) to checkpoints for extended periods, often to serve as a hold force after the completion of clearing operations. The ASSF commander drafted a directive for the proper use of ASSF. However, as of the end of the quarter, President Ghani had not executed the document. Further information about ASSF misuse is available in the classified appendix to this report.

While MoI and MoD leaders have made commitments to reduce unnecessary checkpoints, USFOR-A noted that there are many challenges to doing so:

- **Social pressure** from local leaders and citizens who are concerned about their security and nearby insurgent presence.
- **Political pressure** from local leaders who use checkpoints to bolster the appearance of security in their constituencies.
- **Illicit income** that checkpoints often generate for local commanders.
- **Senior leadership** in the MoD and MoI who are “are either unwilling or unable to enforce President Ghani’s continued directives,” to reduce the use of checkpoints.

USFOR-A reported that the number of checkpoints decreased over the last year, and that ANDSF offensive operations have increased, although progress remains uneven across the country. However, USFOR-A noted that this transition has exposed another shortcoming: ANDSF personnel “are often unprepared to conduct offensive, intelligence-driven operations” once moved off checkpoints.

Taliban Attack Farah City

On May 15, the Taliban launched a nighttime attack on Farah city, the capital of Farah province. The Taliban had built a strong presence in Farah province, where it was able to capitalize on cross-border and intra-regional trade and criminal routes. Taliban insurgents came close to attacking Farah city in January 2018, and, in the past year, raided district administration buildings in two of the province’s western districts, Anar Darah and Shayb Koh. The ANDSF, with significant support from U.S. and Italian forces, successfully responded to the May 15 Taliban attack, as shown in Figure 4.

General Nicholson stated that in the 2 weeks following the Farah city attack, U.S. Marines observed some fighters fleeing from Farah city and tracked them to a Taliban “command and control node” in the Musa Qal’ah district of Helmand province. The U.S. military then launched High Mobility Artillery Rocket System strikes against that node, killing as many as 50 Taliban fighters.

While the ANDSF succeeded in repelling the Taliban attack on Farah city, the attack forced many residents to flee the city, abandoning businesses and property. Moreover, the attack was a demonstration of force that can incite fear among residents as well as among ANDSF stationed in other cities and towns that are currently encircled by Taliban forces.
Following the Farah attack, the province’s police chief alleged that Iran was providing support to the Taliban in western Afghanistan.61 This quarter, U.S. Government officials noted that in the past, Iran has interfered in Afghanistan to support its interests, but Afghan and coalition officials offered no evidence to indicate Iranian involvement in the May 15 attack.62

Further information about the role of Iran and other neighboring countries in the Afghan conflict is available in the classified appendix to this report.

**Operation Iron Tempest Targets Taliban Revenue Sources**

In November 2017, the U.S. military began a campaign called “Operation Iron Tempest” to target the Taliban’s sources of revenue, including narcotics production facilities and related investments, such as weapons and explosive caches, headquarters, and staging areas. This quarter, as part of the campaign, U.S. and Afghan aircraft targeted 65 Taliban facilities and raided 5 markets.63

The 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (9th AETF-A) released data that show that the airstrikes have expanded beyond their initial targets in Helmand province. Air strikes this quarter also targeted facilities in Farah, Faryab, Badakhshan, Uruzgan, Kandahar, and Zabul provinces.64
USFOR-A reported that the strikes had a “swift and effective” impact and that intelligence indicated that they caused insurgent confusion, concern about finances, changes to tactics, and disruptions in insurgent command and control. USFOR-A also reported seeing no evidence that the Taliban rebuilt facilities destroyed by air strikes during the quarter, but USFOR-A acknowledged that some rebuilding might have occurred last quarter. USFOR-A also said that there have been no confirmed allegations of civilian casualties as a result of the strikes.

Brigadier General Lance Bunch, Assistant Deputy Commander for Air and Vice Commander of 9th AETF-A, said in a June 12 press conference that the airstrikes and raids have targeted the Taliban’s largest revenue source: narcotics production. He added that the airstrikes are not counternarcotics operations, but counter-threat operations aimed at the Taliban’s use of narcotics production to generate revenues to finance the insurgency. He reported that since Operation Iron Tempest began, U.S. air strikes had denied the Taliban $45 million in revenue. Afghan-led raids denied the Taliban $11 million in revenue. USFOR-A also reported in that Afghan- and U.S.-led strikes had denied the Taliban an estimated $14 million during the preceding quarter.

ISIS-K Resilient Despite Continued ANDSF, U.S. Assault

The U.S. military continued to support ANDSF operations against ISIS-K in northeastern Afghanistan through airstrikes and expeditionary advising. These operations targeted ISIS-K in its stronghold in Nangarhar province, as well as ISIS-K positions in Jowzjan and Kunar provinces. In particular, an April 5 airstrike in Faryab province killed Qari Hekmatullah, the leader of ISIS-K. In June 2018, U.S. Special Forces completed a two-month operation to clear ISIS-K from its Deh Bala district in Nangarhar province, which U.S. forces described as the terrorist group’s local capital in Afghanistan. It is not yet clear what impact the Deh Bala operation has had on ISIS-K’s capabilities to launch attacks in Afghanistan.

USFOR-A reported that there were fewer than 2,000 ISIS-K fighters in Afghanistan during the quarter, similar to force estimates reported in previous quarters. USFOR-A added that it was unable to determine the total number of ISIS-K cells operating in Kabul. However, USFOR-A noted that, “the elimination of several high-level ISIS-K members [during the quarter] has negatively affected the group’s operations.” Further information about U.S. counterterrorism operations during the quarter can be found in the classified appendix to this report.

Air War Continues

During the quarter, U.S. air sorties continued at a historically high level. The number of weapons released increased compared to last quarter. (See Figure 5) U.S. Air Forces Central Command reported that U.S. forces suspended offensive strikes against the Taliban during the ceasefire, but continued strikes against ISIS-K and other terrorist groups during that time.
On June 15, a U.S. airstrike in Kunar province killed Maulana Fazlullah, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban. The DoS had designated Fazlullah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in January 2015 for his affiliation with the Pakistani Taliban.

Civilian Casualties Remain High

UNAMA DATA

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which investigates allegations of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, reported that casualties (both deaths and injuries) decreased slightly during the quarter, but civilian deaths increased slightly, and reached the highest level UNAMA has recorded for the first 6 months in a year of the conflict. (See Table 2) Improvised explosive devices, including both suicide- and non-suicide bombs, continued to be the leading cause of civilian casualties, followed by ground engagements, targeted and deliberate killings, aerial operations, and explosive remnants of war.

UNAMA attributed more than half of civilian casualties caused by suicide and complex attacks to ISIS-K, which carried out a number of large-scale bombings that deliberately targeted civilians during the quarter. In Nangarhar province, where ISIS-K is active, civilian casualties doubled during the first 6 months of 2018. In addition, UNAMA documented 341 civilian casualties (117 deaths and 224 injured) related to Taliban and ISIS-K attacks on facilities related to the upcoming parliamentary elections.
Table 2.
**UNAMA Documented Civilian Casualties in 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January-March</th>
<th>April-June</th>
<th>First 6 Months (January-June)</th>
<th>% Change Compared to January-June 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Killed</strong></td>
<td>763</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>1,692</td>
<td>+1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Injured</strong></td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>1,935</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL CASUALTIES</strong></td>
<td>2,248</td>
<td>2,864</td>
<td>5,112</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNAMA

According to UNAMA, pro-government forces (primarily the ANSF) caused 20 percent of civilian casualties in the first half of 2018. UNAMA documented a 21 percent reduction in ground engagement civilian casualties caused by pro-government forces, but UNAMA said that was offset by a 52 percent increase in civilian casualties caused by aerial attacks compared to the same period in 2017. UNAMA attributed most of the increase to an April Afghan Air Force (AAF) airstrike on a madrassa in Kunduz province that resulted in more than 100 casualties. This incident remains in dispute, as Afghan officials at the time claimed that the attack targeted only members of the Taliban.80

**RESOLUTE SUPPORT DATA**

Resolute Support also investigates reports of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. As noted in previous Lead IG quarterly reports, Resolute Support and UNAMA use different methodologies to investigate and record civilian casualties.81 Resolute Support reviews information from a variety of sources, including operational data that its forces produce, such as video feeds of operations, reports from units, and operational planning data. UNAMA relies heavily on witness accounts and statements from Afghan officials. In addition, UNAMA sometimes classifies individuals as civilians when Resolute Support would consider them combatants. Resolute Support also stated that UNAMA has a lower threshold for the level of injury that counts as a “casualty.”82

Because of their differing methodologies, Resolute Support and UNAMA report different civilian casualty counts each year. Compared to Resolute Support, UNAMA consistently reports higher numbers of casualties, with a higher percentage attributed to Afghan and international forces. During the quarter (April-June), Resolute Support reported 2,313 casualties, compared to UNAMA’s report of 2,864 casualties during the same period.83

In a factsheet released this quarter, Resolute Support indicated that its casualty numbers might increase in the future. The fact sheet noted that while UNAMA recorded a 9 percent decrease in civilian casualties in 2017 compared to 2016, Resolute Support data showed an unspecified increase, which Resolute Support attributed to “more accurate reporting by Afghan forces.”84 However, the data for that period showed that compared to UNAMA, Resolute Support reported a higher percentage of casualties caused by anti-government forces, and a lower number of casualties caused by pro-government airstrikes.85
ANSDF Casualties Increase

U.S. CASUALTIES
On April 30, 2018, insurgents attacked U.S. military personnel conducting operations in Kapisa province, killing one American soldier. This was the only American fatality in Afghanistan during the quarter. With the increase in the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and with more advisors working with ANSF units at the tactical level, there is the potential for an increase in U.S. casualties.

AFGHAN CASUALTIES
Since September 2017, USFOR-A has classified ANSF casualty figures at the request of President Ghani. The Lead IG and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) had regularly reported ANSF casualty data prior to that time. The most recent unclassified data showed that between January 1 and May 8, 2017, there were 2,531 ANSF service members killed in action and 4,238 wounded. Approximately 7,000 Afghan forces died in combat in 2016.

While overall ANSF casualty figures remain classified, USFOR-A reported that in the past 6 months, ANSF casualties during offensive operations decreased, while casualties during defensive operations and incidents increased. In particular, casualties suffered during local patrols and checkpoint operations from December 2017 through April 2018 were 14 percent higher than the same period the year before. According to USFOR-A, the majority of ANSF casualties are the result of direct fire attacks, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and land mine explosions.

INSIDER ATTACKS
Insider attacks pose a particular threat to U.S. and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. This quarter, there were no “green on blue” (Afghan on coalition) insider attacks against U.S. forces. Between December 2017 and May 2018, there were 47 “green on green” (Afghan on Afghan) attacks against the ANSF. According to the DoD, ANSF casualties from insider attacks increased 50 percent compared to the same period the year before.

In the past when there was a much larger foreign troop presence in Afghanistan, “green on blue” attacks against U.S. forces were a regular occurrence. Since 2007, insider attacks by Afghan forces have killed more than 150 U.S. and NATO forces. The DoD stated that while it is impossible to prevent all green on blue attacks, “coalition advisors assess that current force protection measures have been successful in limiting insider attacks.”

Resolute Support Train, Advise, and Assist Mission
Through the NATO-led Resolute Support mission, U.S. and coalition forces train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces as they “develop the capacity to defend Afghanistan.” In addition to building the fighting capabilities of the ANSF, the United States and coalition partners advise MoD and MoI staff on planning, logistics, communications, and other administrative capabilities, as part of a broader effort to “institutionalize” ANSF
gains.\textsuperscript{94} Table 3 shows the eight branches of the Resolute Support advisory mission. These branches, formerly called “essential functions,” were renamed as part of the Resolute Support reorganization that began in early 2018. In addition, the Resolute Support Gender Office works with the eight advisory branches to integrate gender perspectives into all facets of policy and strategic planning.\textsuperscript{95}

In the past, Resolute Support advisors focused this advising and assistance at the ministry and corps level only. In November 2017, Resolute Support and the Afghan government agreed to expand these activities to the tactical level. The 1st SFAB arrived in theater and began implementing this expanded mission.\textsuperscript{96} (See page 29)

Lead IG agencies continue to monitor U.S.-funded initiatives associated with the Resolute Support mission and the ANDSF Road Map, including the expansion of the ASSF, growth and modernization of the AAF, the Afghan National Army Territorial Force pilot program, and modernization of ANDSF personnel management systems. The classified appendix to this report contains information about ASSF growth, use, and readiness.

Resolute Support tracks ANDSF progress using a variety of metrics and tools, including the Resolute Support tracker, which was published in detail in the previous Lead IG quarterly report on OFS.\textsuperscript{97} Resolute Support and USFOR-A, often at the request of the Afghan government, occasionally prohibit public release of previously published information about ANDSF capacity. This quarter, unlike last quarter, the report does not contain the current Resolute Support tracker.

\textbf{The ANDSF Road Map}

President Ghani’s ANDSF Road Map, launched in late 2016, provides a framework for reforming, restructuring, and developing key parts of Afghanistan’s security forces. The Road Map is a multi-year strategy with four main lines of effort:

- **Increase Fighting Capabilities**: Increase the size and strength of the ANDSF’s most effective fighting units, specifically the special operations and air forces.

- **Leadership Development**: Emphasize the development of honest, competent, and committed ANDSF professionals through improved instruction, education, and training, as well as merit-based selection.

- **Unity of Command/Effort**: Review command and control structures to improve the unity of command and effort between Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units by realigning MoI combat units and border forces to the MoD.

- **Counter Corruption**: Implement reforms to address illicit activity and patronage networks within security organizations in order to reduce the corruption that has weakened the ANDSF.\textsuperscript{98}
Table 4.

Troop Contributing Nations to Resolute Support Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>247</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>170</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>679</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,997</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As of June 2018

Source: NATO

**NATO Members Pledge Troops for Resolute Support Mission**

Since the announcement of the South Asia strategy in August 2017, Resolute Support coalition members increased their troop contributions to the operation.\(^9^9\) NATO reported that as of June 2018, there were 15,997 coalition troops supporting the Resolute Support mission, as shown in Table 4.\(^1^0^0\) Of the 39 Resolute Support countries, 28—notably Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the United Kingdom—increased their troop contributions during the quarter.\(^1^0^1\) USFOR-A reported that Resolute Support has now filled approximately 95 percent of its personnel requirements, compared to 90 percent in December 2017.\(^1^0^2\)

At a NATO force generation conference in May 2018, 28 of the 39 NATO member and partner countries that participate in Resolute Support submitted force contribution offers for 2019. Of those countries that submitted offers, 15 offered to increase their troop contributions in 2019.\(^1^0^3\) USFOR-A said in June that since individual countries are still formalizing their pledges, it is not possible to project future force composition.\(^1^0^4\) Further information about troop contributions to the Resolute Support mission is available in the classified appendix to this report.

**1st SFAB Begins Advisory Mission**

The mission of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB), which arrived in Afghanistan last quarter, is to train, advise, and assist ANDSF brigades and battalions.\(^1^0^5\) Prior to November 2017 and the 1st SFAB’s arrival last quarter, Resolute Support advisors primarily advised conventional Afghan forces at the corps and zone level and interacted with brigades on limited expeditionary advising missions and with brigades on corps level bases. This quarter, USFOR-A provided the DoD OIG with additional information about how the SFAB is organized and deployed in Afghanistan.

The 1st SFAB is composed of six subordinate battalions/squadrons and one brigade headquarters and headquarters company. The 1st SFAB units are deployed to train, advise, and assist commands (TAACs) across the country, as shown in Table 5. While the 1st SFAB battalions have functional specializations, such as infantry or artillery, subordinate Combat Advisor Teams are deployed throughout the country based on mission requirements, often independent of their parent headquarters.\(^1^0^6\)

The 1st SFAB advisor teams include subject matter experts who assess the capabilities and capacities of the ANDSF units to which they are
assigned. Each SFAB team has artillery, logistics/sustainment, administration, medical, communications, and maneuver expertise and capabilities. The 1st SFAB units are assigned to bases to provide persistent train, advise, and assist coverage of ANDSF units either co-located or in close proximity to them. They also can work with ANDSF units away from their fixed sites. During the quarter, all SFAB advisory elements worked outside of their fixed location at some point.
reported that this model has provided the 1st SFAB units with “an enhanced level of awareness” of ANDSF processes and a “better understanding” of their strengths and weaknesses.\textsuperscript{109}

U.S. Army planners will use the 1st SFAB’s experience in Afghanistan to inform the creation of subsequent SFABs. Leaders of the 1st SFAB meet weekly with U.S.-based commanders and force designers to identify possible adjustments to the SFAB model, and every three weeks with the Center for Army Lessons Learned to review current and future deployments.\textsuperscript{110}

One challenge going forward is to determine whether any improvements in the performance of ANDSF units are due to the SFAB training and enabling support, or to reasons independent of the work of the SFABs. This raises the question of how SFAB units will determine whether they have institutionalized progress in an Afghan unit and can “lift off” to work with another unit, without concern that the unit they are leaving will backslide. Further details about the 1st SFAB’s advisory mission are available in the classified appendix to this report.

**ANDSF Force Strength Remains below Authorized Level**

The ANDSF continue to meet recruiting targets, but the target is below maximum authorized strength. As of June 2018, the ANDSF numbered 313,728 personnel. This total is approximately 11 percent less than the 352,000 personnel slots authorized by the Afghan government.\textsuperscript{111}

ANDSF personnel shortages vary by location, mission, and unit, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) reported. In the ANA, unfilled positions are typically concentrated within the lower ranks, particularly in the 205th Corps (Helmand), the 205th Corps (Kandahar), and the 203rd Corps (Paktika). Unfilled positions in the ANP are comparatively less concentrated in particular job categories or locations.\textsuperscript{112}

The DoD also noted that ANDSF force levels fluctuate from month to month due to a variety of reasons, including varying end-dates of enlistment contracts.\textsuperscript{113} As shown in Table 6, total force strength has remained relatively stable for the last four years, though well below 352,000.\textsuperscript{114}

**Table 6.**

**ANDSF Force Strength in June (2014-2018)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>June 2014</th>
<th>June 2015</th>
<th>June 2016</th>
<th>June 2017</th>
<th>June 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>166,911</td>
<td>169,465</td>
<td>169,229</td>
<td>171,346</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>151,966</td>
<td>155,182</td>
<td>149,213</td>
<td>148,042</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>318,877</td>
<td>324,647</td>
<td>318,442</td>
<td>319,388</td>
<td>313,728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: DoD*
CSTC-A does not provide disaggregated data about ANDSF attrition rates in an unclassified format. However, the DoD has acknowledged that personnel dropped from the rolls—ANDSF personnel who leave before the end of their contract through desertion, going absent without leave, or other unauthorized actions—“significantly impacts ANA and ANP attrition rates.”\textsuperscript{115} The DoD reported that among personnel categorized as dropped from the rolls, the leading cause is poor leadership, followed by low or delayed pay, poor living conditions, denial of leave, and insurgent intimidation.\textsuperscript{116}

CSTC-A said that it “does not have a direct role in mitigating personnel losses” in the ANDSF, but is helping the Afghan government better identify and monitor personnel through its human resources management advisory efforts.\textsuperscript{117} In addition, the Inherent Law initiative, through which the ANDSF is retiring excess and ineffective general officers and colonels, also seeks to address the morale of ANDSF personnel. At the same time, the DoD has reported that the ANA and ANP often fail to enforce their own policies against going absent without leave.\textsuperscript{118}

USFOR-A reported that there were 29,032 ALP on hand and present for duty as of May 31.\textsuperscript{119} The ALP authorized strength is 30,000.\textsuperscript{120}

MoD Lowers Targets for Female Recruitment

The ANDSF continue to struggle to recruit women to serve in the ANA and ANP in female-only and mixed-gender assignments. Challenges to the recruitment of women into the ANDSF include negative cultural perceptions about female employment in the security services. While female personnel in the ANDSF has increased by 10 percent over the past 2 years, the ANDSF has repeatedly lowered their female recruiting targets.\textsuperscript{121}

During the quarter, the MoD lowered its target for recruiting women into female-only positions from 400 per quarter to 200 per quarter, with a goal of recruiting 6,425 women into these positions over 8 years. The MoI seeks to recruit 600 women per year, with a long-term goal of recruiting 10,000 women.\textsuperscript{122} As of May 2018, 4,543 women served in the ANDSF, an increase of 208 since February 2018, as shown in Table 7. However, most of this growth was in the ANP, indicating that the MoD is not yet on track to meet its goal.\textsuperscript{123}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Officer & NCO & Soldier/Patrol & Cadet & \textbf{TOTAL} \\
\hline
\textbf{ANA} & 625 & 414 & 140 & 133 & \textbf{1,312} \\
\hline
\textbf{ANP} & 806 & 1,209 & 1,216 & — & \textbf{3,231} \\
\hline
\textbf{AAF} & 63 & 27 & 9 & 4 & \textbf{103} \\
\hline
\textbf{ASSF} & 8 & 8 & 3 & — & \textbf{19} \\
\hline
\textbf{TOTAL*} & \textbf{1,431} & \textbf{1,623} & \textbf{1,356} & \textbf{133} & \textbf{4,543} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Women in the ANDSF, as of May 2018}
\end{table}

* Total of all ANA and ANP. The AAF is part of the ANA and the ASSF represents personnel from both the ANA and ANP.

Source: USFOR-A
Female operators assigned to the Afghan General Command of Police Special Units conduct pistol marksmanship training during the first Female Foundation Course in Kabul. (U.S. Army photo)

Resolute Support noted that it seeks to ensure that positions and career paths are available to female ANDSF personnel. Resolute Support gender affairs advisors caution the ANDSF against a “recruitment first, placement second” approach if appropriate placements are not available for female recruits. Resolute Support noted that this deliberate constraint on recruitment is one reason why their quarterly recruitment goals have not been met.124

Resolute Support said that its advisors promote ANDSF gender integration efforts through training initiatives, development of career paths, and the construction of facilities for women.125 This quarter, USFOR-A reported the start of construction of a “Women’s Police Town,” a facility to house 90 ANP families.126 The ANDSF also plans to build women’s barracks, wellness clinics, gyms, and day care facilities.127 Women also continued to progress through ANDSF leadership courses.128 However, the DoD reported that current efforts to recruit and train women into the MoD are “ad hoc,” resulting in underutilization of female ANA and ANP personnel.129 In addition, while the ANDSF hold shuras (consultations) and other gatherings to address allegations of sexual harassment in the ANA and ANP, neither security ministry has signed and implemented an anti-sexual harassment plan.130

**Afghan Government Retiring Senior Army Officers**

Under Afghanistan’s “Inherent Law,” the Afghan government seeks to retire senior military officers in order to eliminate excess capacity and elevate “the next generation” of ANDSF leaders based on merit, rather than patronage.131 As of September 2017, the ANA had approximately double the number of general officers as was authorized. The MoD intends to retire more than 5,000 colonels and generals over the next 2 years.132

During the first phase of Inherent Law retirements, which began in January and ended in June, 494 colonels and 162 general officers retired from the ANA.133 CSTC-A reported that most of the officers included in the first wave of retirements were serving in reserve
or excess positions, so their departure did not create vacancies that would allow for the promotion of younger officers.\(^{134}\)

The second phase of retirements began during the quarter. As of June 20, 2018, 55 general officers retired under the second phase. So far, the MoD has granted no retirement waivers. The MoD will convene promotion and assignment boards to fill the vacated positions.\(^{135}\)

**Transfer of Forces Puts Focus on Role of the Police**

The Afghan government, through the ANDSF Road Map and MoI Strategic Plan, has prioritized a de-emphasis of the ANP’s combat role so that it can assume traditional law enforcement function.\(^{136}\) Resolute Support has 40 advisors focused on police reform, professionalization, counter-corruption, logistics, and strategic communications. The ANP, with advisor support, will begin the transition to a law enforcement role in Kabul and then expand the transition process to other police districts throughout the country.\(^{137}\)

A key part of the law enforcement transition is the transfer of police units with largely military functions from the MoI to the MoD. In December 2017, the ANDSF completed the transfer of 19,500 Afghan Border Police (ABP) from the MoI to the MoD, forming a new force called the Afghan Border Force (ABF). The ABF brigades, now under the ANA Corps, patrol Afghanistan’s borders, interdict smugglers and block insurgent movements across the border. In March 2018, the ANDSF completed the transfer of 13,100 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) from the MoI to the MoD, creating a new Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF). The eight ANCOF brigades will also be under the ANA corps, and will focus on population center security, highway security and armed support of the Afghan Uniformed Police. The ANCOF will have a key role in providing security during upcoming elections in 2018 and 2019.\(^{138}\)

With the ANCOP and ABP transfers complete, Resolute Support is turning its attention to a more difficult task: changing the practices of the police units that remain at the MoI (collectively called the ANP). Table 8 shows the desired roles and responsibilities of ANP units following the ANCOP and ABP transfers.

CSTC-A identified several challenges to completing the transition to a law enforcement role. Given their current paramilitary role—Afghans often refer to police officers as “soldiers”—limiting their focus to a traditional law enforcement role will require a paradigm shift among ANP leaders, officers and patrol personnel, and the public. In addition, Afghan law restricts police to discovering crime, delegating most investigative functions to the Attorney General’s Office.\(^{139}\)

Several factors contribute to public mistrust of police officers, which may cause friction as they move to a civil order role. The MoI has always been a lower priority for investment, and police officers receive lower pay than soldiers do, which makes it difficult to recruit talented personnel.\(^{140}\) In addition, the MoI workforce is plagued by corruption, which not only undermines MoI practices, but also contributes to a public perception that the powerful and wealthy can escape justice.\(^{141}\)
### Table 8.

**ANP Units and Responsibilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Unit</th>
<th>Force Size</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Uniformed Police</strong></td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>The largest segment of the ANP and the primary force that Afghan citizens encounter daily. Responsibilities include community policing, ensuring road/highway safety, detecting crime and maintaining evidence, arresting suspects, and facilitating public order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Safety Police (formerly ANCOP)</strong></td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>Residual ANCOP personnel that serve as a medium threat level response force and are responsible for ensuring public safety during peaceful demonstrations and large events and providing policing support after natural disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Border Police</strong></td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Residual ABP personnel who are responsible for law enforcement and security at established border points and ports of entry, such as airports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Anti-Crime Police</strong></td>
<td>400</td>
<td>A specialized criminal investigative unit responsible for traditional police investigations, corruption, and organized and white-collar crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Local Police</strong></td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Originally part of the U.S.-funded Village Stability Operations program, these police deter insurgent activity in small, local communities by creating a visible government presence. These personnel have no policing or arrest authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Public Protection Force</strong></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Responsible for protecting key public infrastructure, construction projects, and personnel for both Afghan government and, through formal contracts, international agencies and private sector organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Command of Police Special Units</strong></td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>The MoI’s special forces, which conduct high-intensity, quick-reaction counterterrorism and other functions. The MoI is doubling the size of this force from three units to six.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>The lead agency for counternarcotics in Afghanistan, responsible for combatting the manufacture, production, and distribution of illegal drugs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prison and Detention Centre Police</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Responsible for implementing court decisions and securing the rights of convicted persons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not included in the ANDSF personnel billet (tashkil)

**Sources:** USFOR-A, CSTC-A

### Fewer Afghan Air Force Planes and Helicopters are Operational

This quarter, the Afghan Air Force continued its modernization program, which calls for a 40 percent increase in AAF personnel and a nearly 300 percent increase in aircraft by 2023. A key component of the modernization plan is the replacement of the AAF’s existing fleet of Russian-made Mi-17 utility helicopters with U.S.-made UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. The plan also calls for the introduction of the AC-208 attack/surveillance light fixed-wing aircraft, a variant of the AAF’s existing light cargo plane. As of this quarter, UH-60 delivery and training was underway, and AC-208 delivery was planned for FY 2019.142
The AAF had fewer aircraft available for operations this quarter than during the same quarter in 2017, primarily due to maintenance needs. As shown in Figure 6, and Table 9, a smaller number of aircraft have been available to perform an increased number of missions, which reinforces concerns about the AAF’s practice of exceeding recommended flight hours for aircraft such as the Mi-17.

The AAF fleet includes 4 C-130s, medium-lift cargo planes, two of which were grounded this quarter for maintenance. The DoD reported that there are no plans to change the C-130 fleet size. While the AAF modernization plan has resulted in some C-130 pilots and crews being retrained and transferred to more highly prioritized aircraft, the DoD noted that the FY 2019 budget request for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) includes $35 million for C-130 contractor logistics support to maintain the current fleet.

U.S. aviation advisors have emphasized the role of the A-29 turboprop airplane in offensive AAF operations. The AAF used the aircraft for airstrikes on targets of strategic significance and to provide close air support to ground forces. The manufacturer delivered an additional 8 A-29s to the AAF during the last year, bringing the total to 20. However, these eight new aircraft are all located in the United States for training purposes. Of the 12 A-29s stationed in Afghanistan, 1 was out of service in need of repair this quarter.
NATO Air Command-Afghanistan (NAC-A) reported no significant change in capacity of trained Afghan pilots and crews this quarter. Training continued to focus on C-208 airdrops and aviation advisors reported a 60 percent success rate of packages reaching Afghan troops in the field. (By comparison, U.S. airdrops in Afghanistan were more than 98 percent successful). On June 1, 2018, Resolute Support reported that an AAF C-208 aircrew conducted its first combat airdrop under emergency conditions, supplying ammunition to ANP forces engaged with the Taliban in Badakhshan province. Within 6 hours of receiving notification of the need for support, the C-208 crew dropped 1,000 pounds of ammunition, all of which was received by friendly forces. Advisors also worked with their Afghan counterparts on integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance with airstrikes.

**UH-60 Black Hawks Perform First Missions**

The AAF graduated a class of 15 pilots and 16 special mission operators for UH-60s this quarter. NAC-A reported that with UH-60 training ongoing, aviation advisors predicted that their goals for this aircraft would be met by the 2019 fighting season. The initial class of Afghan UH-60 pilots and crews began using the aircraft to ferry equipment between Kandahar Airfield and a base in Helmand province this quarter, initially with coalition observers flying behind. Later, the AAF completed these missions independently.

According to DoD officials, a shortage of candidates with the requisite education, technical skills, and English-language proficiency was the primary factor limiting pilot and crew training. Of the 311 students reportedly enrolled in the Afghan Air Force Academy commissioning program, 40 were in the United States for pilot and crew training on the A-29 and UH-60, as well as for English language education.

Table 9.

**AAF Fleet Strength and Activity, April 1, 2018-June 30, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Usable Aircraft</th>
<th>Pilots</th>
<th>Flight Hours</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Air Strikes</th>
<th>Casualty Evacuations</th>
<th>Human Remains Recovered</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
<th>Tons of Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2,673.3</td>
<td>5,233</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>27,238</td>
<td>901.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2,254.6</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>310.7</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>9,954</td>
<td>354.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,978.6</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>8,185</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>697.2</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60*</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,090.5</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All UH-60 pilots and sorties were in training and not yet operational.

Source: NAC-A
Maintenance: The Challenge to Building a Sustainable ANDSF

The ANDSF relies heavily on DoD contractors to perform maintenance on its U.S.-funded fleet of vehicles and aircraft just as the U.S. military does. Resolute Support seeks to develop the capacity of the ANDSF to take on an increasing share of maintenance tasks.155

GROUND VEHICLES

The DoD funds training for ground vehicle maintenance through the National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract, which seeks to gradually transfer maintenance duties to Afghan mechanics over 5 years, as shown in Table 10. The contract includes several training courses that cover basic maintenance of light- and medium-wheeled vehicles, as well as a continuum of specialized courses for heavy wheeled vehicles, such as trucks and armored vehicles. Some courses also include follow-on apprenticeships to achieve journeyman-level skills.156 In 2017, the DoD awarded a $142 million contract to implement the base year of the contract. The DoD estimates that the costs of implementing the contract for the full 5-year performance period may exceed $1 billion.157

If Afghan mechanics are to meet their maintenance responsibility goals by the end of the fifth year, they will need to successfully complete training and demonstrate the ability to perform increasingly complex maintenance tasks. On-time maintenance task completion also depends on the ANDSF’s ability to evacuate vehicles in need of high-level maintenance and access to spare parts. If Afghan mechanics and their contractor trainers are unable to stay on this 5-year schedule, the costs to implement the contract may change.

U.S. oversight agencies have raised concerns about previous contracts to maintain ANDSF vehicles and train highly skilled Afghan mechanics.158 A 2016 SIGAR audit found that the Afghanistan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program, which preceded the current ground vehicle maintenance contract, “made inaccurate assumptions about the capacity of the Afghans to manage the supply chain and conduct maintenance.”159 It also found that the DoD did not provide sufficient oversight of the contractor’s invoices for parts, in part due to security concerns.160

Table 10.
National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support Contract Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base Year</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DoD
This quarter, the DoD OIG announced that it will audit the National Maintenance Contract requirements to determine if it meets user needs to maintain and sustain ANSF ground vehicles.\endnote{161}

**AIRCRAFT**

The AAF has shown improved ability to maintain aircraft, but faces challenges as it expands its fleet to include UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. As shown in Table 10, contractors perform 100 percent of maintenance on the UH-60 and the C-130 transport plane, and large portions of maintenance on other aircraft in the AAF fleet. Some of the most complex maintenance tasks for the Mi-17 helicopter are performed outside of Afghanistan.\endnote{162} Overall, contractors perform approximately 80 percent of maintenance on Afghan aircraft.\endnote{163}

Resolute Support aviation advisors seek to increase Afghan maintenance capacity so that Afghan mechanics perform approximately 80 percent of maintenance tasks, with contractors continuing to perform the most complex tasks.\endnote{164} The DoD noted that Afghans perform a greater share of maintenance on the aircraft that have been in the AAF fleet for the longest period of time, which suggests that they will become “increasingly capable of maintaining newer aircraft” over time.\endnote{165}

The aviation maintenance program shares many challenges with the ground vehicle maintenance contract, including aggressive training and transition schedules and reliance on immature logistics systems. In addition, the need to keep aircraft ready for operations puts pressure on contractors to emphasize maintenance over the training of Afghans.

Development of Afghan capacity to maintain aircraft will be particularly challenging given the complexity of the maintenance tasks and the time required to train mechanics. USFOR-A said it takes between 5 and 7 years for the U.S. Air Force to develop a fully competent U.S. aviation mechanic and the time required to develop Afghan trainers to train Afghan mechanics will likely exceed that timeline.\endnote{166} The DoD said that development of institutional training, as well as maintenance personnel management capacity, will be important to ensure that the AAF can maintain their aircraft in the absence of contractor-led training.

(continued on next page)
As shown in Figure 8, the training program includes graduated English-language training alongside training on increasingly complex maintenance tasks. Afghan mechanics typically enter with only a high school education, and must develop sufficient English fluency to read semi-technical texts. Once the training is complete, the AAF may struggle to retain its technicians, who may choose to seek job opportunities in other countries.

**Figure 8.**

**Aircraft Maintenance Mechanic Training**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12-18 months</th>
<th>2-3 years</th>
<th>2-3 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Routine level maintenance</td>
<td>Intermediate-level maintenance</td>
<td>Fully-trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy in technical English</td>
<td>General English (technical and rate memorization)</td>
<td>Continued English (technical and rate memorization)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To become fully-trained depends on aircraft type and student speciality (e.g. engine body, flightline mechanic, avionics, etc.)

**Source:** 9th AEFT-A

### Russian Helicopters Still in Use

The AAF modernization plan calls for the UH-60s to replace Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters. The AAF had 26 Mi-17s available for operations this quarter, one fewer than during the same quarter last year. The AAF will continue to use and train on the Mi-17 until they achieve sufficient UH-60 operational capacity. For example, this quarter, the Special Mission Wing (SMW), which continues to use the Mi-17 as its primary aircraft, trained its pilots on “fast roping” techniques to insert special operations forces into areas where the helicopter cannot land. The SMW also worked this quarter toward implementing radio technology to enable encrypted communication from the Mi-17s to ground forces.

The DoD’s budget request for FY 2019 includes $247 million for contracted logistic support to sustain the Mi-17s. These costs cover the full range of maintenance and repairs, including acquisition of parts and on and off-site contractor logistics support. The DoD estimated that these costs will eventually decline as use of the Mi-17 declines and contracting strategies change. Additionally, the AAF has another Russian-made platform in its fleet, the Mi-35 attack helicopter, but does not receive any support from the United States to support or maintain them. NAC-A reported that all 4 of the AAF’s Mi-35s were down for maintenance this quarter.
The Afghan government originally created AABIS to collect and maintain biometric data of ANDSF personnel, as part of a broader effort to reduce opportunities for fraud and waste in the ANDSF, including payments of salaries to “ghost soldiers.” AABIS also includes biometric information on Afghan citizens in several other categories, including ALP personnel, government employees, persons suspected or convicted for committing crime, and applicants for driver’s licenses, passports, and weapons permits. AABIS stores individuals’ finger and palm prints, as well as iris and face photographs.

USFOR-A reported that since its launch in 2011, AABIS has improved operability and responsiveness to increasing queries from intelligence personnel, but challenges remain. CSTC-A reported that the MoI, which operates AABIS, is unable to recruit and maintain qualified personnel to operate the system. CSTC-A reported that the Afghan government has no strategy for maintaining a biometrics program and that the MoI, which operates AABIS, is unable to recruit and maintain qualified personnel to operate the system. In addition, sporadic power interruptions and equipment breakdowns have “routinely degraded AABIS performance.” Lack of reliable electronic connections between the MoI and field collection locations, other Afghan government agencies, and provincial police headquarters has undermined effective sharing of AABIS data.

Unreliable AABIS performance threatens ongoing ANDSF accountability efforts and terrorism response capability. AABIS feeds biometric information into the Afghan Personnel and Pay System, which links ANDSF human resources and biometrics information with an individual’s financial information, to facilitate direct payment of salaries. When AABIS is not operating, the ANDSF is unable to process enrollments and check them against known criminal and insurgent records. Even when AABIS is operational, it is often unable to respond to a surge in data queries, particularly those required to investigate high profile attacks, such as the January 2018 Taliban attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul.

The new 5-year AABIS contract, called AABIS 2.0, includes several requirements to expand the system and increase its processing speed. The AABIS 2.0 system storage capacity should triple in size, from 10 million to 30 million records, and processing transaction speed should accelerate from 20,000 to 36,000 transactions per 24-hour period. In addition, the software will include upgraded algorithms that increase processing speeds and reliability. The President’s FY 2019 budget request includes $15.9 million to fund AABIS 2.0, up from $1.2 million in FY 2018.

While AABIS 2.0 seeks to make several technical improvements to the system, the contract does not appear to address other cited factors that degrade system reliability and operations, including frequent power outages at the MoI facility in Kabul where AABIS servers reside and lack of trained personnel to operate and maintain the system. In addition, the Afghan
government has no target or strategy for expanding the number of people enrolled in the system. Currently, approximately 3.6 million Afghans (about 10 percent of the population) are registered in AABIS.\textsuperscript{182}

**Leadership, Attrition Undermine Counter-IED Training**

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and landmines remain a significant threat to security forces and civilians in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{183} CSTC-A offers several counter-IED training courses to ANDSF personnel in both the MoI and MoD. The courses, which are listed below in Table 11, take place at MoI and MoD training centers throughout the country. CSTC-A reported that over a recent 90-day period, 4,185 ANDSF personnel participated in these courses.\textsuperscript{184}

CSTC-A wants to transition counter-IED training responsibility to the ANDSF. This quarter, CSTC-A reported that its Afghan counterparts have made progress toward this goal. However, CSTC-A said that the ANDSF needs to update its personnel authorization to ensure that there are sufficient personnel, particularly leaders, to staff an Afghan-led counter-IED training program. Currently, the only counter-IED training leader above the platoon level is a single ANA lieutenant colonel, and there is no corresponding leader for the ANP.\textsuperscript{185} Furthermore, while the 1st SFAB will be able to train, advise, and assist ANA units below the Corps level, Resolute Support counter-IED advisors will continue to provide support to the ANP at the zone level only.\textsuperscript{186}

In addition, the ANA suffers high rates of attrition among soldiers who perform counter-IED tasks. Many of these soldiers go absent without leave, in part, CSTC-A reported, due to the “disproportionately high level of risk” that counter-IED soldiers face when completing their mission.\textsuperscript{187}

Table 11.

**ANDSF Counter-IED Training**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal Course</td>
<td>Instruction in the skills necessary to identify, render safe, and dispose of unexploded ordinance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Course</td>
<td>Instruction in the skills necessary to identify, render safe, and dispose of IEDs and unexploded ordinance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route Clearance Course</td>
<td>Instruction in the skills necessary to maintain freedom of maneuver throughout Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CSTC-A*
GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Election Preparations Proceed Despite Violence

The Department of State (DoS) reported that the Afghan government is on track to hold parliamentary and district council elections in October 2018. However, the Afghan government has repeatedly postponed the elections, which were originally to take place in 2015, and the government still has a number of problems to solve before election day. The Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan remains leaderless after President Ghani fired its chairman in October 2017 for poor performance.

Additionally, the Afghan government is still trying to secure funding for the election from the international community; cost estimates range from $90 million according to USFOR-A to $120 million according to the Independent Election Commission. According to the DoS, international donors, including the United States, have contributed funds for election costs.

VOTER REGISTRATION

In preparation for the election, the Independent Election Commission conducted voter registration in three phases between April and June 2018. Media reports indicated that turnout for voter registration was low; however the DoS stated that turnout exceeded expectations. The Independent Election Commission registered more than 9 million voters out of an estimated 14 million eligible.

As registration began, the Taliban called for a boycott of the vote. Then, the Taliban launched dozens of attacks on voter registration centers. These attacks, though mostly small-scale with limited casualties, were frequent and widespread. UNAMA reported that it is likely that the Taliban succeeded in deterring some Afghans from registering to vote, and the attacks demonstrated the Taliban’s capacity to launch a similar campaign of violence on election day. Moreover, the insecurity forced the Afghan government to close many registration centers, possibly denying thousands of Afghans the opportunity to

GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES

- The Afghan government completed voter registration during the quarter and is on track to hold district council and parliamentary elections on October 20.
- However, Afghanistan faces many challenges to a successful election, including violence against voting facilities and Afghan citizens’ hesitation to use their identification cards as part of the registration process.
- Afghanistan and Pakistan announced a bilateral cooperation framework, but relations between the two nations remain tense. A DoS official stated that Pakistan has not taken “sustained and decisive steps” against Taliban fighters within its borders.
- Afghanistan’s growing youth population and weak economy have led to high levels of youth unemployment. Research suggests this combination could have a destabilizing impact on Afghanistan’s security.
vote. USFOR-A reported that it expects that attacks on election facilities “will continue and increase as the election date gets closer.”

ISIS-K also targeted a voter registration center in a predominantly Shia neighborhood of Kabul, killing 57 and wounding more than 100, and also attacked a voting center in Jalalabad. It is not clear that ISIS-K was specifically targeting the voting process. The attacks may have been a reflection of ISIS-K’s strategy to launch high-casualty attacks against minority groups in Kabul than political intent to undermine the election. Nevertheless, the attacks demonstrate that ISIS-K may see large events related to the vote as an easy target for future attacks.

CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

In addition to voter registration, the Independent Election Commission registered several thousand candidates for the parliamentary and district council elections and published the lists of Wolesi Jirga (lower house) candidates by province and district on its website. Candidate registration took place between May 26 and June 12; prospective candidates were required to collect the signatures of at least 1,000 supporters to become eligible for registration as a candidate.

USAID is supporting the upcoming parliamentary and district council elections through a grant to the UN Development Programme for the UN Electoral Support Project. The project provides support to the Independent Election Commission to conduct the elections. As of the end of the quarter, USAID had obligated nearly $20 million to the UN Development Programme for electoral support.

Bilateral Action Plan Yields Limited Improvement in Afghan-Pakistan Relations

During this quarter, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed on a bilateral cooperation framework, the “Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity” (APAPPS). In an April meeting, President Ghani and Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi finalized the plan, agreeing to seven principles, including that their governments would support a reconciliation process with the Taliban, deny sanctuary to terrorist groups, enhance military cooperation, and avoid public recriminations of each other.

However, in testimony to Congress on June 20, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia Alice Wells, the lead DoS official for Afghanistan and Pakistan, stated that the Pakistani government had not taken “the sustained or decisive steps that we would have expected to see 10 months after the announcement of the South Asia strategy, including arresting or expelling Taliban elements who will not come to the negotiating table.”

USFOR-A reported that the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship “remains tense,” but that APAPPS has resulted in an increased level of military-to-military discussions. In June, the Afghan and Pakistani militaries committed to deploy border liaison officers to each other’s country to help prevent and defuse cross-border incidents.
The Afghan population as a whole increased from an estimated 21 million in 2001 to 35 million in 2016, according to the World Bank.

**LIMITED PROGRESS IN ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS**

Earlier this year, U.S. officials told Lead IG agency inspectors general that corruption remains a pervasive and deep-rooted problem in Afghanistan, despite years of U.S. Government and international support for anti-corruption programs and institutions.  

The DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs reported that the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC), Afghanistan’s primary corruption prosecutor, continued to try cases and hand down sentences, but some high profile defendants flouted its authority.  

On June 10, 2018, the ACJC primary court convicted two defendants of laundering money, after the Supreme Court approved the transfer of the case from the Counter Narcotics Justice Center. The DoS noted that this was a successful instance of interagency cooperation, and the first full money laundering trial.

USAID stated that several of its programs supported rule of law and anti-corruption efforts during the quarter. The Afghanistan Development Assistance for Legal Access and Transparency program delivered preparatory courses this quarter for 525 female law faculty graduates, a step towards becoming judges. According to USAID, only 13 percent of the 2,096 judges in Afghanistan are women.

Another USAID program, Afghanistan's Measure for Accountability and Transparency, reportedly conducted an analysis to examine anti-corruption programs in Afghanistan and opportunities to work with government and non-governmental institutions on reform.

USAID also reported that its Afghan Civic Engagement program organized a public hearing during the quarter to increase civil society’s oversight role of the National Budget Law.

**WEAK ECONOMY AND DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH: A DESTABILIZING COMBINATION**

During the quarter, the Afghanistan Central Statistics Office released its biennial *Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey* report, which described potentially destabilizing demographic trends. Afghanistan’s youth population has grown rapidly in recent decades. The survey reported that as of 2017, 48 percent of the population was under the age of 15. Additionally, the Afghan population as a whole increased from an estimated 21 million in 2001 to 35 million in 2016, according to the World Bank.

The rapid population growth has produced the world’s third largest “youth bulge” with roughly half of the Afghan population born after the fall of the Taliban. World Bank experts estimate that 400,000-660,000 new workers will enter the Afghan work force every year between 2018 and 2023.

The weak Afghan economy is unable to absorb this growing and young population. Economists predict that the Afghan economy will grow only modestly in the coming years, particularly as foreign assistance declines. The Afghan economy grew rapidly...
between 2001 and 2012 with the infusion of large amounts of foreign development assistance, but foreign assistance has declined since. The International Monetary Fund estimates that Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic product (GDP) will grow by 2.5 percent in 2018 and 3.0 percent in 2019. Unemployment has tripled over the last decade. Today, one in four Afghans is unemployed and more than half the population lives in poverty.

In Afghanistan, a young population, a weak economy, and a rapidly expanding labor force could combine to worsen an already unstable security situation. According to a 2004 study published by the World Bank, countries with demographic “youth bulges” and limited economic opportunities are more prone to internal conflict. The study found that when 15-24 year-olds make up more than 35 percent of the adult population the risk of conflict is 150 percent higher than in a country with an older population. High and rising levels of unemployment among large youth cohorts also lead more young people to participate in anti-government groups or criminal enterprises out of a sense of grievance or simply as a means to generate income.

According to the World Bank, in Afghanistan “[c]ontinued reform to improve governance, to increase revenue mobilization and to improve its administration, and to establish a conducive environment for private sector growth is critical to the achievement of sustainable growth.” According to the DoS, DoS and USAID economic assistance programs are intended to develop the professional skills and employability of Afghan youth and to promote private sector investment and an export-oriented strategy to spur job creation and economic growth. Despite the reform and development efforts, sustainable economic growth has proven difficult to achieve in Afghanistan.
Since the beginning of the year, approximately 80 natural disaster events, including droughts, earthquakes, flash flooding, and landslides, have affected thousands of Afghans, according to USAID. From January through June 2018, more than 8,700 houses were damaged or destroyed in 26 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Flooding and landslides alone affected more than 1,400 households in 14 provinces during the quarter. In many areas already suffering from drought, heavy rains destroyed farms and irrigation waterways. In May 2018, more than 46,000 Afghans were hit by flash floods and flooding in the north and east areas of Afghanistan.

The impact of the drought has been far reaching, with long term effects. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), families have exhausted the humanitarian assistance that has been provided, the harvests of entire communities have failed, and traditional migration patterns to and from Iran that would have mitigated the crisis in past years were no longer available.

OCHA reported that 1.4 million Afghans have been critically affected by the drought, a number that could rise to 2.2 million in the coming months. In response to the drought, the United Nations revised the Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan to request an additional $117 million for 2018 to support humanitarian assistance to Afghans affected by drought, bringing the total request to $547 million to reach 4.2 million people in need across Afghanistan.

Displacement, Returnees Increase Demand for Humanitarian Assistance

Conflict has displaced 131,931 people since the beginning of the year, OCHA reported. This represents an increase from more than 80,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).
reported in the previous quarter.\textsuperscript{234} (See the infographic on pages 50-51.) The largest IDP populations were located in Kunduz and Faryab provinces, hosting approximately 20,000 and 22,000 IDPs, respectively.\textsuperscript{235} Many IDPs were forced to relocate several times, due to an increase in combat once the Taliban spring offensive began.\textsuperscript{236} Shelter, food assistance, sanitation and health facilities, and protection services were the greatest needs for IDPs this quarter, according to USAID.\textsuperscript{237}

The World Health Organization reported that the large number of returnees to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan during the quarter increased the demand on health services.\textsuperscript{238} The significant increase in returnees, as described by OCHA, was due to the economic downturn in Iran and the further devaluation of the Iranian Rial versus the U.S. dollar.\textsuperscript{239} More than 364,000 undocumented Afghans have returned from Iran and Pakistan since January 1, 2018, according to the International Organization for Migration.\textsuperscript{240} OCHA reported that the number of Afghan returnees from January 1 through May 30, 2018, was 50 percent higher than the same period in 2017, with 58 percent deported by authorities and 42 percent returning of their own volition.\textsuperscript{241}

**Violence Undermines Humanitarian Relief Efforts**

USAID reported providing humanitarian assistance this quarter through cash transfers, relief commodities, protection, economic recovery, water supply and sanitation, and shelter for vulnerable populations. USAID also supported food assistance, nutrition programming, and cash transfers to purchase food.\textsuperscript{242} In April 2018, USAID announced $25 million in additional support for the World Food Programme to provide cash-based and food assistance to nearly 1.7 million Afghans.\textsuperscript{243} The United States is the largest donor to the World Food Programme in Afghanistan and has funded $89 million in support since October 2017, according to USAID.\textsuperscript{244}

USAID officials noted that access to those in need continued to be the primary challenge to providing humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan during the quarter. USAID reported that the Afghan government and humanitarian assistance organizations were unable to respond to humanitarian needs in hard-to-reach and insecure areas.\textsuperscript{245} Attacks on humanitarian organizations and staff during the quarter continued to limit access to vulnerable populations, according to USAID.

While overall incidents against aid workers remained stable in 2018, OCHA reported that violence against health workers rose in 2018.\textsuperscript{246} Nearly half of the aid workers killed in the first half of 2018 (7 out of 16 killed) and more than half of the aid workers that were kidnapped (13 out of 23) were health workers.\textsuperscript{247} OCHA also reported that a record high 37 health workers were detained during the first 6 months of 2018.\textsuperscript{248} In addition, increased fighting resulted in the delay or partial suspension of several program activities that were supported by USAID-funded implementers.\textsuperscript{249}
Challenges to Health and Education Access Persist Despite Foreign Assistance

The World Health Organization reported that health challenges in Afghanistan included reduced availability and access to basic services because of attacks, acute and severe malnutrition, an increase in deaths from Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, and increased measles outbreak.250 OCHA reported that armed groups shut down more than 140 health facilities, cutting off access to health care for 2 million people.251

Approximately 1.6 million people suffer from acute malnutrition and an estimated 571,000 have severe acute malnutrition, according to the World Health Organization. Deaths and cases of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever significantly increased in June compared to previous months in 2018 as well as June of 2017. Meanwhile, measles cases increased from 14,000 for the first 6 months of 2017 to approximately 25,000 cases from January 2018 through June 2018.252 Three new polio cases were confirmed this quarter, for a total of 8 cases in 2018, according to USAID.253 OCHA reported that a campaign to vaccinate approximately 6.5 million children against polio will begin in July 2018.254 USAID continued to provide on- and off-budget funding to the Afghan government this quarter to support the health system, in addition to technical assistance.255

According to the United Nations, nearly half of all school-aged children in Afghanistan did not have access to education during the quarter due to cultural, economic, and governance-related obstacles. While education-related infrastructure and enrollment has improved since 2001, 3.7 million school-aged children in Afghanistan (43.7 percent of the primary-aged population) were not attending school and an additional 300,000 schoolchildren were at risk of dropping out of school.256

A June 2018 UNICEF report stated that barriers to education in Afghanistan included cultural beliefs and practices; economic factors such as poverty and child labor; a lack of opportunities for education; and governance issues such as lack of capacity, financial constraints, and allegations of financial mismanagement.257 USAID continued to support the Ministry of Education in the printing and distributing of 135 million textbooks as well as improvements in teacher recruitment, payroll, finance, and budgeting.258
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) refers to Afghans who flee their homes due to conflict, humanitarian crises, or natural disaster but do not leave the country. According to data compiled by the UN, approximately 1.3 million Afghans are internally displaced. With the current IDP system largely inaccessible for Afghans living in Taliban-held areas, the number is likely to be considerably higher. Most IDPs move from rural areas to urban centers within their province. This, in part, reflects the prevalence of Taliban-related violence in Afghanistan’s countryside and the relative security of cities and towns. Other IDPs choose to move to larger cities outside their province, such as Kabul and Herat.

Internal displacement is both a symptom of conflict and a phenomenon that creates new humanitarian challenges. IDPs frequently move to informal settlements near urban centers with limited access to water and food, poor hygiene, and few opportunities to earn income. In addition, many IDPs shelter in hard-to-reach areas that humanitarian organizations are unable to access.

**Notes:** Available data on internal displacement capture only a portion of the IDP population in Afghanistan. The UN’s Displacement Tracking System (reported here) is the most comprehensive IDP data set available, but includes only IDPs who receive UN assistance. IDPs who remain in insecure areas, those who are unaware of or unable to apply for assistance, and those who move and do not require assistance (such as those who move to live with family or earn an income) are less likely to be tracked and monitored. All data presented here are current as of June 30, 2018.
Plagued by Taliban violence, and the site of frequent ANDSF security operations, Kunduz province is a leading source of IDPs in Afghanistan.

The IDP population is five times larger today than in 2013.

Returnees

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is responding to a “substantial increase” in undocumented Afghans returning from Iran and Pakistan. While some Afghans return to their homeland voluntarily, many are forcibly repatriated. Pakistan told the 1.4 million Afghan refugees living in its country to return home by the end of June, but in July extended their permits for an additional 3 months. Iran, home to 2.5 million Afghans, has been deporting hundreds of thousands of undocumented Afghans each quarter since 2016. This quarter, Turkey stepped up a campaign to forcibly repatriate Afghan migrants who had settled within its borders.

Though not officially classified as IDPs, many returnees face similar forms of hardship because they are unable to return to their home district in Afghanistan due to insecurity. Like the IDPs who are displaced from homes in Afghanistan, this group of returnees struggles to secure housing, food, water, education, and employment.

Returnees to Afghanistan in 2018 (January-June)

- **362,499 returnees from Iran**, many of whom were deported as part of an Iranian government crackdown.
- **17,007 returnees from Pakistan**, which threatened to discontinue visas for Afghan refugees at the end of the quarter, but later extended them.

New Displacements by Year (in thousands, rounded)

57% of new IDPs since January were under age 18.

18% of all Afghans were displaced in 2012-2017, either as an IDP or returnee, according to an IOM survey.

Sources: See Endnotes on page 104.
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Funding in Afghanistan

USAID’s Offices of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food for Peace (FFP), and the DoS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration are the primary U.S. government offices responsible for humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. Tables 12 and 13 detail U.S. funding through these agencies for humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan.

Table 12.
Status of Cumulative FY 2018 U.S. Government - Humanitarian Assistance Funds for Afghanistan, by Office, as of 6/30/2018 - (in millions/rounded) -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID/OFDA</td>
<td>$2.1</td>
<td>$22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID/FFP</td>
<td>$26.0</td>
<td>$40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS/PRM</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$33.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>$68.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: USAID/OFDA*

Table 13.
Status of Cumulative FY 2018 USAID Funds for Afghanistan, as of 6/30/2018 (in millions/rounded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development Assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td>$1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Support Fund - Overseas Contingency Operations</td>
<td>$4.4</td>
<td>$359.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts and Donation *</td>
<td>$1.4</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Health</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>$423.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For example, another donor contributing funds to a USAID activity through a memorandum of understanding.*

*Source: USAID/OAPA*

STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

The Afghan government launched the National Export Strategy this quarter. The National Export Strategy identified six priority sectors for export growth: dried fruits and nuts, fresh fruits and vegetables, saffron, marble and granite, carpets, and precious stones and jewelry. USAID reported that several activities under its Office of Economic Growth and Office of Agriculture continued their support to these priority sectors.

USAID reported that its Economic Growth program supported several Afghan economic sectors including mining, business registration, customs reform, and access to finance. During the quarter, USAID reported supporting efforts to make it easier to obtain business licenses, the development of an “anti-corruption action plan” for the Afghan Customs Department, amendments to the Minerals Law, and facilitation of loans to IDPs in the Herat region through the Credit Guarantee Program.

In the mining sector, the Afghan Geological Survey building, which was previously renovated by USAID is now being used by non-technical departments of Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. The Ministry of Mines and Petroleum evicted the USAID-supported Afghan Geological Survey from its building, denying staff access to their data centers, computers, and communication equipment.

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) conducts extensive oversight of stabilization and infrastructure programs in Afghanistan. SIGAR’s latest unclassified quarterly, inspection, and audit reports are available on its website: https://www.sigar.mil/
THE QUARTER IN REVIEW

STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES

- USAID supported economic development activities across multiple sectors in Afghanistan, including energy, infrastructure, and priority sectors under the Afghan National Export Strategy.
- USAID also supported business registration, anti-corruption, and credit programs for Afghan businesses, but noted that in some cases technical problems impeded implementation of economic development programs.

In the energy sector, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat continued construction activities on the North East Power Station-South East Power Station Connector Transmission Line. For both power substations and South East Power Station completion, USAID issued a request for proposals for a construction contractor and developed a Participating Agency Program Agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to provide technical services to USAID for this contract. Boundary security walls were completed for the Kandahar Solar Project and leveling, grading, and construction of its control room began. USAID also reported that it was in the design stage to scale up and replicate the Kandahar Solar Project and has released a Broad Agency Announcement to engage the private sector in developing the new design.

SUPPORT TO MISSION

DoD Spending on Afghan Conflict Since 9/11 Tops $718 Billion

On July 18, 2018, the DoD Comptroller released the DoD’s congressionally mandated quarterly Cost of War report, which details the DoD’s spending on overseas contingency operations (OCOs) through March 31, 2018. According to this report, the DoD has spent $1.5 trillion in support of OCOs in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere since September 11, 2001. As shown in Figure 8, the total cost of operations in Afghanistan over that period was $718.6 billion, of which $134.3 billion has been obligated in support of OFS since that operation began on January 1, 2015.

The Comptroller reported that the DoD obligated $17.6 billion for OFS during the first half of FY 2018, which was $1.4 billion less than the amount spent on OFS in the first half of FY 2017. The Cost of War report said that average monthly spending on all OCOs in the first half of FY 2018 was $3.4 billion, of which $2.9 billion was in support of OFS.

The President’s budget for FY 2019 requests a total of $69 billion in OCO funding, of which $46.3 billion is for OFS, a reduction of $800 million compared to the FY 2018 request. By comparison, in FY 2017, before the President’s announcement of the South Asia strategy, the DoD obligated $42.5 billion in support of OFS. Within the FY 2019
President’s Budget request for OFS, $5.2 billion is for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the principal funding stream used by the DoD to support the ANDSF. The FY 2019 ASFF request includes $1.9 billion for the ANA, $766 million for the ANP, $1.8 billion for the AAF, and $702 million for the ASFF. The FY 2019 request is an increase of more than 10 percent (approximately $500 million) from the $4.7 billion appropriated for the ASFF in FY 2018.

The ASFF is executed primarily through DoD contracts for goods and services to be used by the ANDSF (otherwise known as “pseudo-Foreign Military Sales”) for defense articles and services. A smaller portion is provided directly to the Afghan government and generally covers ANDSF salaries and some Afghan government contracts for operational support. This quarter, the DoD reported only one disbursement from the ASFF directly to the Afghan government, which totaled $192 million ($179.5 million to the MoD; $12.5 million to the MoI).

The U.S. Government process of providing direct funding to the Afghan government has faced many challenges, including lack of realistic requirements for the oversight of funds, according to a March 2018 DoD OIG report. As a result, CSTC-A did not have assurance that $3.1 billion in U.S. Government direct funding was used entirely for the intended...
purposes. Diversion of funds and commodities, such as fuel and ammunition, due to corruption remains a significant challenge for the DoD, which has reduced the amount of funding it provides directly to the Afghan government.277

**Afghan Government Remains Dependent on Security Assistance**

According to the DoD, the Afghan government relies on international funding for approximately 90 percent of its security costs.278 As shown in Figure 10, U.S. funding through the ASFF will provide most of the $6.5 billion ANDSF funding requirement in FY 2019. The DoD expects the Afghan government to provide approximately $500 million per year for its own security forces, with most of this funding used to provide food and subsistence for personnel.279 In FY 2019, the DoD also expects the ANDSF to receive $370 million through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, which supports the MoI, and $397 million through the ANA Trust Fund.280

The DoD estimates that implementation of the ANDSF Road Map initiatives will maintain the annual requirement for the ASFF above $5 billion through at least 2023. Annual sustainment costs for the expanded ASSF will require approximately $1 billion, and the total cost of expanding and sustaining the AAF will be $11.4 billion through FY 2023.281 The latter figure includes the $6.9 billion required to acquire new aircraft, including a planned 159 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.282 (See page 37) It also includes the cost of maintaining these aircraft, training and paying personnel to operate them, and providing the necessary fuel, ammunition, and infrastructure through FY 2023.283

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**Figure 10.**

*Sources of Funding for the ANDSF*

**TOTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ANDSF IN FY 2019: $6.5 BILLION**

- Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (UN) $370 million
- ANA Trust Fund (NATO) $397 million
- Afghan Government $507 million
- Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (U.S.) $5.2 billion

Source: DoD
Cost of War Audits Show Improvement

In the congressionally mandated Cost of War report, the DoD Comptroller details current year and cumulative costs of overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Previously issued on a monthly basis, the report is now issued quarterly, per the FY 2018 National Defense Authorization Act. The DoD Comptroller is required to deliver the report to Congress 45 days after the end of the quarter.\(^{284}\) The DoD Comptroller issued the most recent Cost of War report, for the quarter ending on March 31, 2018, on July 18, 2018.\(^{285}\) While this did not comply with the statutory 45-day deadline, it did reflect an improvement in the timeliness of the report. The next Cost of War report, covering the period April-June 2018, should be completed in mid-August.

The DoD OIG published two audits on the Cost of War in 2016 and 2017, which found shortcomings in the accuracy and timeliness of this report. Specifically, the DoD OIG found that the Navy was unable to provide transaction-level detail to support $866.3 million out of $948.8 million in total reportable obligations and disbursements for the first quarter of FY 2016. The DoD OIG also noted that reports for FY 2015 were issued on average of 125 days after the reporting period ended.\(^{286}\)

This quarter, the Army Audit Agency and the Air Force Audit Agency completed two audits of their respective Services’ reporting of OFS-related expenditures for the Cost of War report, both of which found only relatively minor errors. The Army Audit Agency found that out of $21.6 billion in cumulative obligations across 13 different appropriation

Figure 11.
Quarterly Change in DoD Personnel in Afghanistan

![Graph showing quarterly change in DoD Personnel in Afghanistan](image-url)
categories for FY 2016, the Army over-reported approximately $25 million in military personnel costs. The Air Force Audit Agency found “overall...adequate accountability of funds supporting overseas contingency operations” and identified errors totaling $24.4 million (out of $243.8 million) in procurement obligations. The Air Force concurred with the findings and took corrective actions, which the Air Force Audit Agency evaluated as sufficient to correct the problem.

The DoD OIG announced this quarter that it will prepare a summary report of the six Cost of War audits issued this quarter and in previous quarters by the DoD OIG and Service audit agencies. The report will identify any systemic weaknesses in the DoD’s accounting for costs associated with OFS and other overseas contingency operations. Further information about these audits is available on pages 66 and 67.

**Coalition Military and DoD Civilians Increase Presence**

According to the DoD, there was no change in the U.S. military personnel presence in Afghanistan during the quarter, as shown in Figure 11. The DoD said there are about 14,000 US military personnel in Afghanistan, including the official force level of 11,958 troops deployed in support of OFS, but not including certain military personnel deployed for sensitive missions, as detailed in the classified appendix.
This quarter, the DoD reported that the number of coalition troops in Afghanistan increased from 6,600 to 7,522, and the number of DoD civilian personnel in country increased from 560 to 818.290 Contractors continued to be the largest single category of personnel supporting the OFS mission in Afghanistan, with 26,922 U.S., Afghan, and third country national contractors reported this quarter, an increase of 275 from the previous quarter.291 As shown in Figure 12, these contractors performed a wide range of functions, with nearly a third serving in logistics/maintenance roles. The DoD reported that security was the second largest mission category, and that nearly half of these personnel were reportedly armed.292

U.S. Embassy Kabul Supports Reconciliation, Reduces its Taxes

To support Afghan peace and reconciliation efforts, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul created a “Peace and Reconciliation Section.” This section seeks to enhance U.S. Government support for these efforts, to build capacity of Afghan institutions working for peace, to assist the Afghan government with reintegration of reconciled fighters, and to improve information sharing within the interagency and military commands.293

During the quarter, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul’s Economic Section, in coordination with the appropriate DoS bureaus and offices as well as other stakeholders, finalized negotiations to provide a tax exemption for the portion of U.S. foreign assistance to Afghanistan not already covered by tax exemption agreements. Approximately 90 percent of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan was already tax exempt before the agreement. The new tax exemption agreement applies most importantly to funding through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs authorization account, which in FY 2017 had been subject to Afghan taxes of more than $363,000.294
A U.S. marine reads against a mud wall at Camp Nolay, Afghanistan. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Completed Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Reports ............................................ 62
Investigations ............................................................................................................. 68
Hotline Activity ......................................................................................................... 71
This section of the report provides information on completed Lead IG agencies and partner agencies’ oversight work related to audits, inspections, and evaluations; Lead IG agency investigations; and hotline activities from April 1 through June 30, 2018.

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) OIG conducts audits and investigations of USAID’s activities in Afghanistan, which do not involve OFS-related programs or activities. USAID OIG coordinates these efforts, as appropriate, with other audit and law enforcement organizations. USAID OIG’s oversight activity related to USAID’s non-OFS-related programs in Afghanistan is included in this report to provide a more comprehensive update on the oversight of U.S. Government programs in Afghanistan.

**COMPLETED AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION REPORTS**

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations.
Some oversight staff from the Lead IG agencies are stationed in offices in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, and Germany. Oversight teams from these offices and from offices in the United States travel to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other locations in the region to conduct fieldwork for their projects.

This quarter, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies completed eight reports related to OFS.

**Final Reports**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**DoD Oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program in Afghanistan Invoice Review and Payment**

DODIG-2018-119; May 11, 2018

The DoD OIG conducted an audit to determine whether the DoD adequately monitored contractor performance and conducted sufficient invoice reviews for services provided under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV contract in Afghanistan.

The DoD OIG found that the Army paid $2.4 billion in vouchers submitted from 2015-2017 with little or no examination of the supporting documentation. The DoD OIG also determined that command officials did not have reasonable assurance that the contractor performed all service in accordance with contract requirements.

To improve voucher oversight, the DoD OIG made five recommendations to issue clarifying guidance, delegate additional voucher responsibilities, develop standard operating procedures to monitor contractor billings, review contractor billing practices and communicate results, review the contractor’s billing practices, and create detailed checklists for contract officer representatives to use when conducting contract oversight.

The first four recommendations were resolved and will be closed when the DoD OIG verifies the planned actions are fully implemented. The final recommendation was considered closed.

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**Audit of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations Process for Reviewing Invoices for the Construction of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan**

AUD-MERO-18-46; June 20, 2018

The DoS OIG conducted an audit to determine the extent to which the DoS Bureau of Administration and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations implemented invoice review and approval procedures that verified the accuracy and completeness of invoiced construction costs for the Embassy Islamabad and Housing Project in Pakistan.

The DoS OIG identified areas that could be improved, including the certification of contractor payments to subcontractors. The DoS OIG also found that the contracting
officer’s representative did not always document the inspection of the contractor’s work to attest to the amount due to the contractor for work performed. Additionally, the DoS OIG found that the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations had not adopted a standard operating procedure for reviewing construction invoices associated with the Islamabad project. Implementing such a procedure for reviewing invoices would provide continuity among the contracting officer’s representatives and Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations engineers who periodically rotate throughout the life of the project.

The DoS OIG made three recommendations to prompt compliance with applicable regulations and to protect the DoS’s interests. The Bureau of Administration concurred with the recommendation to certify contractor payments to subcontractors. However, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations did not concur with recommendations to include documentation in the invoice file that supports the amount requested by the contractor, and to implement a standard operating procedure similar to those promulgated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for reviewing invoices for multi-year, multi-million-dollar construction projects. During its audit compliance process, the DoS OIG tracks and reports on the implementation of each recommendation on the DoS OIG website.

**Audit of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s Invoice Review Process for Worldwide Protective Services Contracts**

**AUD-MERO-18-47; June 15, 2018**

The DoS OIG conducted an audit to determine whether the Bureau of Diplomatic Security is following applicable regulations when reviewing invoices under the protective services contracts for guard services in Iraq and Afghanistan, whether there is a sufficient number of qualified staff members to oversee the protective services contracts, and the extent to which the Bureau of Diplomatic Security provided oversight of contractor performance.

The DoS OIG found that desk officers sampled supporting documentation for cost reimbursable invoices rather than review all supporting documentation associated with the corresponding invoices in order to save time and meet payment timeline requirements. The use of such informal sampling increases the risk that unallowable or unsupported costs for high-dollar, high-risk invoices could go undetected.

The DoS OIG also found that staffing shortfalls have affected the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s ability to perform effective invoice review and contract oversight. The two offices charged with protective services contract oversight responsibilities had 26 percent fewer staff members than required as of November 2017.

The DoS OIG made four recommendations that are intended to improve the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s invoice review process and associated contract oversight activity. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security agreed with all four recommendations. The DoS OIG will track implementation of each recommendation during the audit compliance process and will report progress on the DoS OIG website.
Management Assistance Report: Improper Installation of Key Components of
U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan’s Fire Alarm System Needs Prompt Attention
AUD-MERO-18-32; April 11, 2018

During an audit of Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations construction projects at the
U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, the DoS OIG found that the embassy’s fire alarm
system was improperly installed and presented potential risks to personnel and property.
The DoS OIG issued this Management Assistance Report to prompt immediate action to
address the identified deficiencies.

During its onsite fieldwork, the DoS OIG learned that the underground fiber optic cables
at the embassy compound were accidentally cut by a construction worker rendering fire
alarm panels in eight buildings unable to transmit data to Post One for 6 months. The DoS
OIG shared its findings with Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations officials, and the
embassy facility managers took steps to repair the damaged fiber optic cables and restored
connectivity between the affected buildings and the communications center.

The DoS OIG found that the existing fiber optic cable network did not have a separate
redundant path as required. Additionally, the DoS OIG found that seven fire alarm
control panels on the east side of the embassy compound are not connected to the main
communications center as required.

The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations did not concur with the DoS OIG
recommendation to take immediate actions to establish a separate redundant path for the
fire alarm system to bring the complex into compliance with the National Fire Protection
Association code requirements. The DoS OIG considers this recommendation unresolved
and will track and report on the implementation of the recommendation on the DoS OIG
website.

Audit of Costs Invoiced Under the Afghanistan Life Support Services Contracts
AUD-MERO-18-35; April 2, 2018

The DoS OIG conducted an audit to determine whether the Bureau of South and Central
Asian Affairs properly reviewed and approved invoices submitted under the life support
contracts between May 11, 2015, and July 20, 2017. In September 2014, the DoS Bureau
of Administration awarded two Afghanistan Life Support Services contracts on behalf of
the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and is responsible for administration of the
contracts.

The DoS OIG found that Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Contracting Officer’s
Representatives for the Afghanistan Life Support Services contracts generally reviewed
and approved invoices in accordance with applicable regulations. However, the DoS OIG
found a small percentage of invoiced costs that either did not meet contract requirements
or lacked supporting documentation. The DoS OIG identified some areas for improvement
in the invoice review process and noted that the Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs’ management did not routinely monitor the results of its invoice reviews.
The DoS OIG made one recommendation to the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs to develop and implement a quality assurance process to track invoice review results and periodically test invoice reviews for accuracy to ensure the effectiveness of its invoice review process. The DoS OIG made two recommendations to the Bureau of Administration to address the questioned costs identified in the report. Both bureaus concurred with the recommendations. The DoS OIG will track implementation of each recommendation during the audit compliance process and will report progress on its website.

**AIR FORCE AUDIT AGENCY**

**Air Force Cost of War Report–Operation Freedom’s Sentinel**

F2018-0002-L10000; April 4, 2018

The Air Force Audit Agency conducted an audit to determine whether the Air Force had adequate accountability of funds supporting overseas contingency operations.

The Air Force Audit Agency determined that, overall, the Air Force had adequate accountability of funds supporting overseas contingency operations. Specifically, the personnel complied with legal requirements for reporting obligations and disbursements for military personnel and operations and maintenance appropriations in the September 2016 DoD Cost of War report for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). However, personnel did not accurately report OFS obligations and disbursements for Investment appropriations, which are the costs that result in the acquisition of, or an addition to, end items, such as aircraft.

The Air Force Audit Agency identified errors totaling $24.4 million (out of $243.8 million) regarding reported obligations and disbursements for Investment appropriations. As a
result, the Air Force provided inaccurate OFS costs in the *Cost of War* report presented to Congress.

The Air Force Audit Agency made two recommendations to improve the accuracy of the DoD *Cost of War* report. One recommendation was to have investment appropriation analysts correct the identified discrepancies, and the second recommendation was to update the standard operating procedures and tracker tool used to capture OFS costs.

Air Force officials agreed with the audit results and recommendations, and took responsive corrective actions during the audit. The Air Force corrected the identified errors and updated the standard operating procedures and management tool used to capture OFS costs. All recommendations are considered closed.

**ARMY AUDIT AGENCY**

*Reporting Expenditures for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel*

A-2018-0043-IEX; April 5, 2018

The Army Audit Agency conducted an audit of the Army’s financial data for the FY 2016 DoD *Cost of War* report for OFS to verify that the data was accurate and was submitted by required milestone dates.

The Army Audit Agency found that the Army reported most of its financial data for OFS supported the FY 2016 DoD *Cost of War* report. Specifically, for FY16, the Army reported about $21.9 billion in cumulative obligations across 13 individual Army appropriations. The Army Audit Agency found that the Army over reported about $25 million in obligations for the “Military Personnel, Army” appropriation. The error occurred because key Army personnel involved in the process did not develop standard operating procedures to document all processes used to capture the OFS expenses. Additionally, Army personnel used an inaccurate methodology to allocate expenditures for the “Military Personnel, Army” appropriation, over-reporting this appropriation for OFS by an estimated $25 million instead of allocating these costs to Operation Inherent Resolve. Finally, the Army did not submit the financial data for the *Cost of War* report by the established milestone dates. However, the late submissions did not appear to affect materially the timeliness of the monthly *Cost of War* report.

The Army Audit Agency did not make any recommendations in this report because the issues identified in this report were similar to those the Army Audit Agency addressed in their report *A-2018-0039-IEX, Reporting Expenditures for Operation Inherent Resolve, March 26, 2018*. In that report, the Army Audit Agency recommended that the Army review and revise existing standard operating procedures detailing the Army’s processes to obtain and compile its monthly financial data.

The Army agreed with the findings and conclusions in this report and the corrective actions that the Army plans to take as reported in the Army Audit Agency’s March 2018 report would also address the Army’s submission for the OFS *Cost of War* report.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Management and Oversight of Fuel in Afghanistan: DoD Is Taking Steps to Improve Accountability, but Additional Actions Are Needed
SIGAR 18-41-IP; April 10, 2018

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) conducted an evaluation of the DoD’s management and oversight of fuel in Afghanistan to 1) review and summarize weaknesses identified in audits and evaluations conducted prior to 2017; 2) assess current challenges associated with overseeing and accounting for fuel acquired for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF); and 3) evaluate DoD’s planned initiatives to improve oversight and accountability of fuel acquired for the ANDSF.

SIGAR found weaknesses in supplying and accounting for fuel in Afghanistan that involved a lack of contractor oversight, poor record keeping, and a lack of accurate fuel-measurement procedures. Additionally, SIGAR identified weaknesses associated with supplying fuel for the ANDSF, including falsified consumption data, lack of independently verified fuel deliveries, and corruption.

SIGAR made six recommendations to the DoD to enhance accountability of U.S. Government-funded fuel procured for the ANDSF. The recommendations included that the DoD 1) use technology to monitor fuel transport and storage; 2) add detailed anti-corruption and oversight requirements in future contracts; 3) enforce commitment letter agreements that require the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI) to regularly submit fuel consumption data to Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A); 4) expand training on fuel quality testing and handling methods; 5) coordinate with the MoD and MoI to develop a plan to upgrade and repair infrastructure and equipment at ANDSF fuel sites; and 6) coordinate with MoD and MoI to develop and implement a plan to enhance accountability and oversight of fuel after it is delivered to ANDSF fuel sites.

CSTC-A neither agreed nor disagreed with SIGAR’s recommendations. Nonetheless, CSTC-A described several actions it is taking and plans to take in response to each recommendation.

INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE ACTIVITY

Investigations

During the quarter, the investigative components of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies continued to conduct criminal investigations related to OFS. The Lead IG agencies use criminal investigators forward deployed to the region, as well as criminal investigators in the United States, to investigate OFS-related fraud and corruption. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the criminal investigative component of the DoD OIG, has an office in Bagram Airfield and in Kabul, within the NATO Resolute Support Compound. The DoS OIG maintains an office in Frankfurt, Germany, from which investigators travel to Afghanistan.
ACTIVITY BY FRAUD AND CORRUPTION
INVESTIGATIVE WORKING GROUP -
OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL
As of June 30, 2018

OPEN INVESTIGATIONS
33 –

Q3 FY 2018 RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criminal Charges</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Fines/Recoveries</td>
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<td>Suspensions/Debarments</td>
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Q3 FY 2018 ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Cases Closed</td>
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Q3 FY 2018 BRIEFINGS

<table>
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<tr>
<td>No. of Briefings</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Attendees</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some investigations are being worked jointly by more than one agency. Therefore, the total number of open cases by FCIWG agency may not equal the total number of open investigations. Note: Cumulative since Jan. 1, 2015
OFS INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

Lead IG investigations this quarter resulted in 1 arrest, 2 criminal charges, 4 criminal convictions, 1 suspension, fines or recoveries of $295,000, and forfeitures of $104,000. Investigative branches of the DoS OIG and the DoD OIG and their partner agencies closed 7 investigations, initiated 5 new investigations, and coordinated on 33 open investigations. The investigations involve a variety of alleged crimes including procurement fraud, corruption, grant fraud, theft, program irregularities, computer intrusions, and trafficking-in-persons. This quarter, the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group conducted 27 fraud awareness briefings for 153 participants.

A consolidated depiction of the OFS-related activities of these investigative components during this quarter is shown in the dashboard on the previous page, and examples of investigative activities are listed below the dashboard.

U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR IN AFGHANISTAN SENTENCED

On June 14, 2018, Christopher McCray, a former employee of a U.S. Government contractor in Afghanistan, was sentenced in Federal court to 5 months in prison, 5 months home detention, 3 years supervised release, and 200 hours community service after pleading guilty in March 2018 to one count of accepting illegal kickbacks from a subcontractor. DCIS, along with SIGAR, the Army Criminal Investigation Command, the Air Force Office Special Investigations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted the investigation. McCray was originally charged with 1 count of conspiracy to accept kickbacks and 14 counts of accepting illegal kickbacks in an indictment filed on April 25, 2017.

USAID OIG INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY IN AFGHANISTAN

USAID OIG’s Afghanistan office consists of one Foreign Service special agent and two Foreign Service national investigators located in Kabul, Afghanistan, along with one investigative analyst based in Washington, D.C.

During the quarter, USAID OIG received 24 new allegations. As of June 30, 2018, USAID OIG continues to maintain 18 open investigations, including 3 joint investigations with SIGAR, involving Afghanistan-related programs and operations. USAID OIG submitted two investigative referrals to USAID/Afghanistan and one to the U.S. Department of State. During the quarter, the office had a total of $5,718 in recoveries of overpayment.

In addition, USAID OIG conducted 5 fraud awareness briefings in Afghanistan for 88 participants.
Hotline Activity

Hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means to report allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse without fear of reprisal. Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency.

The OIG hotline representatives process the complaints they receive and refer these complaints to the appropriate entity in accordance with their respective protocols. Any hotline complaint that merits referral is sent to the responsible organization for investigation or informational purposes.

The DoD OIG employs an investigator to coordinate the hotline contacts received among the Lead IG agencies and others, as appropriate. During the reporting period, the DoD OIG’s hotline received and coordinated numerous complaints, which subsequently resulted in the opening of 30 cases. The cases were referred within the DoD OIG and to the service IG entities. Not all complaints result in the opening of investigative cases and some include numerous allegations that result in multiple cases.

As noted in Figure 13, the majority of the complaints received during this quarter are related to personnel matters, procurement or contract administration, and safety or security concerns.

Figure 13.
Hotline Activity
ONGOING AND PLANNED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Strategic Planning ..................................................... 74
Ongoing Oversight Activities .................................... 77
Planned Oversight Activities .................................... 86
ONGOING AND PLANNED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

This section of the report discusses the Lead IG strategic planning activities, as well as ongoing and planned audits, inspections, and evaluations. The ongoing and planned oversight projects related to OFS activities, as of June 30, 2018, are listed in separate tables, beginning on page 79.

USAID OIG has ongoing oversight projects related to USAID’s activities in Afghanistan, which do not involve OFS-related programs or activities. These ongoing oversight projects examine USAID efforts in Afghanistan related to agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth, education, gender promotion, health and nutrition, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance. When these current projects are nearing completion, USAID OIG may add additional projects based on a risk analysis done in coordination with USAID and oversight organizations. These projects are listed in separate tables on page 84.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Pursuant to Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, the Lead IG is required to develop and carry out a joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for OFS. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed oversight, management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects. To maximize effectiveness, the Lead IG agencies update the joint strategic oversight plan for each operation annually.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group Holds Quarterly Meeting

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S. Government-funded activities supporting overseas contingency operations, including those relating to Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. The Joint Planning Group provides a forum for information sharing and coordination among the broader Federal oversight community, including the military service IGs and audit agencies, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the OIGs from the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security. The meeting in April 2018 featured a presentation by Lieutenant General (ret.) Terry A. Wolff, Deputy Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS at the DoS.
FY 2018 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan Covers OFS

In April 2015, when the DoD IG was designated as the Lead IG for OFS, the three Lead IG agencies developed and implemented a joint strategic oversight planning process for comprehensive oversight of OFS and subsequent overseas contingency operations. The initial oversight plan created through the planning process has been updated each year since. The FY 2018 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, effective October 1, 2017, was included in the FY 2018 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations.

The FY 2018 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel organized OFS-related oversight projects into the following strategic oversight areas:

SECURITY

Security focuses on determining the degree to which OFS is accomplishing its missions of counterterrorism, and training, advising, and assisting the Afghan security forces in activities that may include:

- Establishing transitional public order,
- Countering illegal combatants and criminal elements,
- Protecting key personnel and facilities,
- Establishing and strengthening relationships with host-nation military and police,
- Enforcing cessation of hostilities and promoting peace processes,
- Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating combatants, and
- Building or enhancing the capacity and capabilities of the Afghan security institutions and sustainability of such institutions.

GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Governance and Civil Society focuses on the ability of the Afghan government, at all levels, to represent and serve its citizens in activities that may include:

- Building or enhancing Afghan governance capacity, including the capacity to sustainably resource its activities and services,
- Promoting inclusive and effective democracy, and civil participation and empowerment,
- Promoting reconciliation, peaceful resolution of conflict, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces, and other rule of law efforts,
- Fostering sustainable and appropriate reconstruction activities,
- Fostering fair distribution of resources and provision of essential services, and
- Countering and reducing corruption, inequality, and extremism.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

*Humanitarian Assistance and Development* focuses on ensuring that the population’s basic needs are met, transitioning to peaceful coexistence in communities, and providing long-term development supporting health, education, and the empowerment of women in activities that may include:

- Providing food, water, medical care, emergency relief, and shelter to people affected by crisis,
- Building resilience by supporting community-based mechanisms that incorporate disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness, and supporting coherent and coordinated national disaster preparedness and humanitarian response systems,
- Supporting healthcare, education, and the empowerment of women,
- Assisting and protecting returning Afghan refugees,
- Strengthening Afghanistan’s capacity to absorb returning refugees, and
- Helping refugee-assisting communities in Pakistan and Iran to preserve asylum space for Afghan refugees.

STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

*Stabilization and Infrastructure* focuses on efforts to provide the people of Afghanistan the opportunity to pursue sustainable livelihoods in peaceful communities with effective economic systems and essential public services in activities that may include:

- Repairing or building infrastructure and buildings such as schools, hospitals, and government facilities,
- Establishing or reestablishing public utilities that provide services such as water and electricity,
- Removing explosive remnants of war, and
- Promoting an economic system that fosters basic commerce, free markets, and employment generation through sound legal frameworks, outside investment, and the reduction of corruption.

SUPPORT TO MISSION

*Support to Mission* focuses on administrative, logistical, and management efforts that enable the United States to conduct military operations, empower host-nation governance, and provide humanitarian assistance to the local population in activities that may include:

- Protecting U.S. personnel and property on U.S. installations,
- Providing for the occupational health and safety of personnel on U.S. installations,
- Supporting logistical needs at U.S. installations,
- Managing grants and contracts, and
- Administering programs.
ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Ongoing OFS Oversight Projects

As of June 30, 2018, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 34 ongoing projects related to OFS. Tables 14 and 15 list the project title and objective for each of these projects. Figure 14 groups the ongoing projects by strategic oversight area. USAID OIG’s ongoing oversight projects for USAID activity in Afghanistan, which are unrelated to OFS, are listed in Table 16.

The discussion that follows highlights some of these ongoing projects by primary oversight area.

SECURITY

The DoD OIG is auditing the implementation of cybersecurity controls for unmanned aerial vehicle systems to protect these systems from unauthorized access and use.

The GAO is auditing the ANDSF’s equipment and capability and is evaluating the DoD’s strategy for retrograde, reconstruction, and replacement of operating forces used to support overseas contingency operations.

SIGAR is auditing the Afghan Air Force’s ability to operate and maintain U.S.-provided aircraft, and reviewing DoD’s procurement of Humvees for the ANDSF.

GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The DoS OIG is inspecting the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Foreign Assistance program management.

SIGAR is auditing DoD’s efforts to advise the Afghan MoI and MoD to determine whether the DoD has clearly articulated the advisory effort’s goals, objectives, and strategy, and DoD’s strategy and programs to develop the MoD’s and MoI’s anticorruption initiatives. SIGAR is also conducting an audit to determine the amount of on-budget assistance provided to develop the capacity of the Afghan MoD and MoI and evaluate potential negative issues that affected on-budget assistance.

STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

SIGAR is inspecting the Afghan National Army (ANA) Garrison at South Kabul International Airport to determine whether the construction and utility upgrades were completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and whether the facilities are being used and maintained. SIGAR is also inspecting the ANA Camp Commando Phase III project and the ANA’s Ground Forces Command, Garrison Support Unit, and Army Support Command.
SUPPORT TO MISSION

The DoD OIG is conducting an audit to determine whether the U.S. Air Force C-5 squadrons have adequate mission-ready aircraft and training to support U.S. Transportation Command readiness and mission requirements. In addition, the DoD OIG is auditing the DoD’s management of the Enhanced Army Global Logistics Enterprise maintenance contract in Afghanistan to determine whether the U.S. Army monitored contractor performance and costs related to the contract; and the National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract in Afghanistan to determine if the DoD effectively developed the requirements for the contract. The DoD OIG is also auditing the DoD’s planning and implementation of the Afghan personnel and pay system to determine whether the system will accurately pay and track Afghan forces.

The DoS OIG is auditing the compliance of the construction contract for Embassy Kabul’s physical security features as it relates to contract requirements and industry standards, and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs aviation program to determine whether the DoS is administering the program in accordance with Federal requirements and DoS policy. The DoS OIG is evaluating the Camp Eggers Guard Housing contract’s termination to determine the reason for the failure to complete the contract terms and the extent to which the expenditures that exceeded the budgeted amount.

The GAO is auditing the DoD’s procedures for managing the disposal of excess equipment in Afghanistan.

SIGAR is auditing the Alaska Tents program, and conducting a follow-up review on the Afghanistan Integrated Support Services Afghan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program contract.
### Table 14.

**Ongoing Oversight Projects by Lead IG Agencies, as of June 30, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Military Facilities Evaluation Follow-Up Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan</em></td>
<td>To determine whether U.S. military-occupied facilities supporting OFS comply with DoD health and safety policies and standards regarding electrical and fire protection systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Evaluation of Theater Linguist Support for OFS</em></td>
<td>To review policies and procedures impacting the recruitment, hiring, and employment of military and contract linguists on the conduct of the OIR and OFS campaigns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of DoD’s Management of Cybersecurity Risks for Purchasing Commercial Items</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the DoD is assessing and mitigating cyber security risks when purchasing and using select commercial items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of the National Maintenance Strategy Contract in Afghanistan</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the DoD effectively developed the requirements for the National Maintenance Strategy contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy Readiness</em></td>
<td>To determine if the U.S. Air Force C-5 squadrons have adequate mission-capable aircraft and training to support U.S. Transportation Command readiness and mission requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of the DoD Management of the Enhanced Army Global Logistics Enterprise (EAGLE 2) Maintenance Contract in Afghanistan</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the Army monitored contractor performance and costs of the Enhanced Army Global Logistics Enterprise 2 maintenance contract to ensure the contractor is properly maintaining tactical vehicles and weapons while keeping costs to a minimum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System</em></td>
<td>To determine whether DoD implemented the Afghan Personnel and Pay System to accurately pay and track Afghan forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Summary Audit of Systemic Weaknesses in the Cost of War Reports</em></td>
<td>To summarize systemic weaknesses in DoD’s accounting for costs associated with ongoing contingencies identified in <em>Cost of War</em> audit reports issued between 2016 and 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Aviation Program</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is administering its aviation program, including key internal controls such as inventory management, aviation asset usage, aircraft maintenance, and asset disposal, in accordance with Federal requirements and DoS guidelines.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
# Ongoing Oversight Projects by Lead IG Partner Agencies, as of June 30, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of Embassy Kabul Physical Security Features</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations and other DoS stakeholders managed the construction of physical security features at U.S. Embassy Kabul’s newly constructed facilities to ensure that they met industry standards and contract requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of Contracting Officer Representative Responsibility for Overseeing Invoices for Overseas Contingency Operations Contracts</strong></td>
<td>To determine if contracting officer’s representatives were adequately overseeing invoices for overseas contingency operations contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation of Camp Eggers Guard Housing Contract Termination</strong></td>
<td>To determine the reason for the contractor’s failure to fulfill the contract terms and for the expenditures significantly increasing over the initial budgeted amount.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15.

**Audit of Downrange Civilian Overtime Pay and Entitlements**

To audit the Army’s downrange civilian overtime pay and entitlements program to determine whether overtime was effectively managed and downrange entitlements, including danger pay and post differential were accurately paid to civilians deployed in support of OFS and OIR.

**Munitions Management**

To determine whether personnel accounted for, stored, and safeguarded munitions in accordance DoD and Air Force guidance.

**Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Management**

To determine whether personnel 1) managed reported cases and incidents in accordance with DoD and Air Force guidance, and 2) complied with personnel assignment, background investigations, training, awareness, and operations support requirements.

**Afghan National Defense & Security Forces’ Equipment and Capability**

To audit the performance of the ANDSF’s equipment and capability and summarize how such weapon systems and equipment support ANDSF capability given the evolving security situation and overall strategy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalizing Advise-and-Assist Lessons Learned</td>
<td>To determine to what extent the DoD has 1) modified its approach for planning for, training, and utilizing U.S. military personnel to advise and assist partner forces based on lessons learned from advise-and-assist efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria; 2) incorporated lessons learned from challenges the DoD has faced in providing and utilizing U.S. military personnel to carry out their assigned advise-and-assist missions in support of geographic combatant commands; 3) incorporated lessons learned from past challenges it has experienced in providing key enablers for the advise-and-assist missions, including air support; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; logistics; or other enabling capabilities; and 4) assessed and institutionalized specific lessons from OIR, OFS, and other past and present advise-and-assist missions in various geographic combatant commands to identify and implement necessary changes to doctrine, training, and force structure to support ongoing and future advise-and-assist missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposal of Excess Equipment in Afghanistan</td>
<td>To audit the performance of the disposal of excess equipment in Afghanistan activities to determine 1) the volume and value of new or otherwise useable equipment being disposed of in Afghanistan; 2) the procedures the DoD has to ensure that items designated for disposal are not in demand elsewhere in Afghanistan; and 3) the extent to which potential future orders and requirements in Afghanistan are considered in decisions to dispose of new or useable items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense’s Strategy for Retrograde, Reconstruction, and Replacement of Operating Forces Used to Support Overseas Contingency Operations</td>
<td>To determine the extent to which 1) the DoD developed a policy consistent with leading practices on sound strategic management planning for the retrograde, reconstitution, and replacement of operating forces that support overseas contingency operations; 2) the DoD developed and required the use of consistent information and descriptions of key terms regarding retrograde, reconstitution, and replacement in relevant policy and other guidance; 3) have each of the services developed and implemented service-specific plans consistent with leading practices on sound strategic management planning for the retrograde, reconstitution, and replacement of operating forces that support overseas contingency operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase III</td>
<td>To inspect the ANA Camp Commando Phase III project to determine whether the 1) work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) project is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Title</strong></td>
<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Afghan National Army’s Ground Forces Command, Garrison Support Unit, and Army Support Command</td>
<td>To inspect the ANA’s Ground Forces Command, Garrison Support Unit, and Army Support Command to determine whether the 1) work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards and 2) project is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Efforts to Advise the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior</td>
<td>To audit the DoD’s efforts to advise the Afghan MoD and MoI to determine the 1) extent to which DoD has clearly articulated the goals, objectives, and strategy of its advisory efforts; 2) DoD’s advisory efforts, including funding, the number of advisors and contractors, their assigned locations, and criteria for selecting the advisors, among other things; and 3) the methods DoD uses to measure success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation and Effectiveness of On-Budget Assistance</td>
<td>To 1) determine the amount of on-budget assistance provided to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014, and the mechanisms used to provide the assistance; 2) assess the impact of on-budget assistance provided to develop the capacity of Afghan MoD and MoI; and 3) evaluate potentially negative issues that affected on-budget assistance, e.g., corruption, and how these issues were mitigated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Air Force’s Ability to Operate and Maintain U.S.-Provided Aircraft</td>
<td>To determine the extent to which the 1) aircraft the United States plans to provide the AAF address validated capability gaps identified by both the DoD and the MoD; 2) DoD synchronized the recruitment and training of aircrews and other critical personnel with estimated aircraft delivery schedules; and 3) DoD and the MoD have developed and implemented a plan to support the operation and maintenance of AAF aircraft provided by the United States that includes steps to address capability gaps within the AAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Procurement of Humvees for the ANDSF</td>
<td>To review the processes the DoD used to develop the requirement for providing the ANDSF with Humvees in 2017, and compare and evaluate the selected course(s) of action to available alternatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program Bridges in Baghlan</td>
<td>To 1) determine if the locations on record reflects the actual locations of the bridges and 2) assess the overall condition of the bridges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Women’s Participation Program Ministry of Interior Headquarters Gender Compound Barracks, Gym, and Daycare in Kabul</td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and 2) the buildings are being used and maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Defense's Anti-Corruption Initiatives and Programs in the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior</strong></td>
<td>To review DoD's strategy and programs to develop the MoD's and the MoI's anti-corruption initiatives, DoD's oversight of these efforts, and their efficacy. Specifically, we plan to determine: 1) the extent of DoD's efforts related to combatting corruption within the MoD and the MoI; 2) assess the effectiveness of DoD efforts to address corruption at the MoD and the MoI; and 3) identify specific challenges, if any, to DoD's efforts to promote anti-corruption initiatives at the MoD and the MoI, and how DoD is working to overcome those challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIISS–ATEMP Contract Follow-Up–Vehicle Spare Part Cost</strong></td>
<td>To review the Afghan Integrated Support Services Afghan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program contract to 1) determine Afghanistan Integrated Support Services' requirements for the purchase of spare parts for vehicle maintenance under the National Army's Technical Equipment Maintenance Program contract; 2) describe weaknesses in ANHAM FZCO’s purchasing practices, and identify the steps taken to minimize the impact of spare part cost increases; 3) determine the costs of spare parts purchased by Afghanistan Integrated Support Services over the course of the contract and compare costs of those spare parts to spare parts purchased through the Foreign Military Sales system; and 4) assess additional costs paid by CSTC-A for Afghanistan Integrated Support Services’ maintenance practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alaska Tents</strong></td>
<td>To review the Alaska Tents program to determine 1) the requirements generation and procurement processes related to the purchase of Alaska Tent structures for the ANDSF, and 2) the cost of purchasing these structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of Construction and Utility Upgrades for the Afghan National Army Garrison at South Kabul International Airport</strong></td>
<td>To inspect the construction and utility upgrades at the ANA garrison at South Kabul International Airport and to determine whether 1) the construction and upgrades were completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and 2) the facilities and utilities are being used and maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status of ANA National Defense University (Phase II) Construction</strong></td>
<td>To obtain information from the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers related to the construction of Phase II of the ANA National Defense University (Task Delivery Order 33).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Ongoing USAID OIG Projects in Afghanistan

As of June 30, 2018, USAID OIG had 24 ongoing oversight projects pertaining to USAID’s non-OFS-related activities in Afghanistan. Table 16 provides the project title and objective for each of these ongoing projects.

Table 16. Ongoing USAID OIG Oversight Projects in Afghanistan, as of June 30, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Financial Audit of Purdue University</em></td>
<td>To audit the Strengthening Afghanistan Agricultural Faculties grant 306-A-00-11-00516 for the period from July 1, 2015, to December 31, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Financial Audit of ICF Macro, Inc. Demographic and Health Surveys</em></td>
<td>To audit contract AID-OAA-C-13-00095 for the period from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Financial Audit of Roots of Peace</em></td>
<td>To audit the Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program cooperative agreement 306-A-00-10-00512 for the period from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Audit of Tetra Tech ARD</strong></td>
<td>To audit the Initiative to Strengthen Local Administration contract AID-306-C-15-00005 for the period from October 1, 2015, to September 30, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Audit of Ministry of Education</strong></td>
<td>To audit the Basic Education, Learning and Training program for the period from December 21, 2014, to June 30, 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Audit of KNCV Tuberculosis Foundation</strong></td>
<td>To audit Challenge Tuberculosis cooperative agreement AID-OAA-A-14-00029 for the period from January 1, 2015, to September 28, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Audit of Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.</strong></td>
<td>To audit Services under Program Project Offices for Results Tracking, contract AID-306-C-12-00012, for the period from July 5, 2016, to April 4, 2018; and Assistance for development of Afghan Legal Access, contract AID-306-TO-16-00007, for the period from April 15, 2016, to September 30, 2017.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL**

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### Project Title Objective

**Financial Audit of Di-Democracy International**
To audit Afghanistan Electoral Reform and Civic Advocacy, cooperative agreement 306-A-00-09-00522, for the period from January 1, 2016, to June 30, 2017.

**Financial Audit of FHI 360**

**Financial Audit of IDS-International Government Services LLC**
To audit Monitoring Support Project-South West Provinces TO 2, contract AID-306-TO-15-00070, for the period from August 9, 2015, to August 10, 2017.

**Financial Audit of IRD-International Relief and Development**
To audit Engineering, Quality Assurance, Contract number is 306-C-00-11-00512, for the period from January 1, 2016, to April 17, 2016; and Kandahar Food Zone KFZ, cooperative agreement 306-AID-306-A-13-00008, for the period from October 1, 2016, to December 31, 2017.

**Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s New Development Partnership (NDP)**
To audit whether USAID has adopted internal policies and procedures to adequately verify indicator achievements, and assess if the reported achievements were adequately verified.

**Follow-Up Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Multi-tiered Monitoring Strategy**
To audit the extent to which USAID used its multi-tiered monitoring strategy in Afghanistan to manage projects and serve as the basis for informed decision making.

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### PLANNED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

**Planned Oversight Projects**

As of June 30, 2018, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 24 planned oversight projects related to OFS. Tables 17 and 18 provide the project title and objective for each of the planned projects. Note that USAID OIG’s ongoing projects, which pertain to USAID activities in Afghanistan and are unrelated to OFS, are listed in Table 16.

The discussion that follows highlights some of these planned projects by oversight area.

**SECURITY**

The DoD OIG intends to evaluate biometric-enabled intelligence operations to determine whether they effectively support the OFS Commander’s requirements and will evaluate the Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance operations to determine whether USFOR-A’s allocation of the assets support U.S. Government counterterrorism operations.

SIGAR is planning to audit counternarcotics police specialized units to determine the extent to which the units are achieving their goals. SIGAR is also planning to audit the Afghan Air Force’s use and maintenance of MD-30, A-29, and PC-12 aircraft, and examine the Security Force Assistance Brigade’s efforts in Afghanistan and their effects on ANDSF capabilities.
GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

SIGAR plans to review the DoD, DoS, and USAID assistance programs, which are intended to improve governance in Afghanistan, and will assess how those efforts contributed to improvements in Afghan government institutions. SIGAR is also planning to review DoD’s Gender Advising programs for the MoD and MoI, and to audit CSTC-A’s efforts to implement conditionality through its commitment letters with the MoD and MoI.

STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

SIGAR will audit DoD’s Women Participation projects. SIGAR will inspect ANA South Kabul International Airport Utilities power distribution, grid connection, and water and sewer upgrades to ensure the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and the facilities are being used and maintained. SIGAR will also inspect the Women’s Compound at the ANP Regional Training Center—Jalalabad.

SUPPORT TO MISSION

The DoD OIG intends to audit whether the DoD military services and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service accurately calculated hostile fire pay and imminent danger pay, family separation allowance, and combat zone tax exclusion for combat zone deployments.

The DoS OIG is planning to audit the Aviation Working Capital Fund cost center to determine whether the fees collected were sufficient to cover all costs required to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; DoS’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons to determine whether the administration and oversight of their grants complied with Federal regulations and DoS guidance; and the DoS armored vehicle procurement process to determine whether DoS contractors providing armoring services to the DoS comply with contract terms and conditions.

SIGAR plans to audit the DoD’s procurement, oversight, and disposal of the G222s.
### Table 17.

**Planned Oversight Projects by Lead IG Agencies, as of June 30, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Evaluation of Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</em></td>
<td>To evaluate the airborne, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance supporting counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan to determine if USFOR-A’s airborne, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance allocation process is supporting U.S. counterterrorism operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Counterterrorism Operations in Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Summary Report of Recommendations from OCO Intelligence Evaluations</em></td>
<td>To determine if recommendations from DoD Overseas Contingency Operations intelligence evaluations affecting OIR and OFS have been implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Evaluation of DoD Biometric - Enabled Intelligence Operations for OFS</em></td>
<td>To determine whether biometric-enabled intelligence effectively supports the OFS Commander’s requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of the Department of Defense Military Payroll for Combat Zone Entitlements</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the DoD military components and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service accurately calculated hostile fire pay, imminent danger pay, family separation allowance, and combat zone tax exclusion for combat zone deployments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>U.S. Host-Tenant Agreements for Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the U.S. Navy has effectively developed host-tenant agreements and cost allocation methodologies for reimbursement of support services provided at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of the Aviation Working Capital Fund</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the fees collected by the Aviation Working Capital Fund cost center were sufficient to cover all costs required to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of DoS Armored Vehicle Procurement Process</em></td>
<td>To determine whether DoS contractors providing armorng services to the DoS comply with contract terms and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of the Administration and Oversight of Grants within the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the DoS Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons administration and oversight of grants was in accordance with applicable Federal regulations and DoS guidance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 18.
Planned Oversight Projects by Lead IG Partner Agencies, as of June 30, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units</td>
<td>To audit Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units to 1) determine the extent to which counternarcotic police specialized units are achieving their goals; 2) assess the oversight of salary payments made to personnel in the specialized units; and 3) assess the long-term sustainability of the specialized units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of its PC-12s</td>
<td>To review lessons learned for the Afghan Special Mission Wing’s use and maintenance of its fleet of PC-12s and assess 1) the extent to which the Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s, and 2) the DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s, including any contracts the DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to Improve Governance in Afghanistan</td>
<td>To 1) identify the DoD, DoS, and USAID programs focused on improving governance in Afghanistan; 2) assess how these efforts contributed to improvements in Afghan government institutions; and 3) determine lessons learned for future governance efforts in conflict-affected countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of its A-29 Fleet</td>
<td>To 1) describe the DoD’s process for selecting the A-29 as a platform for the Afghan Air Force; 2) assess the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the A-29, including the DoD’s measures for determining success; 3) assess the DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the A-29s, including any contracts the DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services; and 4) determine the extent to which the Afghan Air Force will be able to sustain this fleet in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of its MD-530 Fleet</td>
<td>To 1) describe the DoD’s process for selecting the MD-530 as a platform for the Afghan Air Force; 2) assess the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the MD-530, including the DoD’s measures for success; 3) assess the DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the MD-530s, including any contracts the DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services; and 4) determine the extent to which the Afghan Air Force will be able to sustain this fleet in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan’s Efforts to Implement Conditionality through its Commitment Letters with the Ministries of Defense and Interior</td>
<td>To 1) identify the conditions CSTC-A has included in its commitment letters with the MoD and the MoI, and how these conditions have changed over time; 2) assess the extent to which the MoD and MoI met those conditions; and 3) assess the extent to which CSTC-A implemented the penalties described in the commitment letters when the MoD and MoI did not meet those conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Afghan National Army South KAIA Utilities Power Distribution, Grid Connection, and Water and Sewer Upgrades</td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the construction of the ANA South KAIA utilities power distribution, grid connection, and water and sewer upgrade were completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and 2) the building is being used and maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Women’s Compound at the Afghan National Police Regional Training Center–Jalalabad</td>
<td>To determine whether 1) the construction of the women’s compound at the ANP Regional Training Center-Jalalabad was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and 2) the facilities are being used and maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD’s Gender Advising Programs for the Ministries of Defense and Interior</td>
<td>To 1) identify the DoD’s gender-related goals for the MoD and MoI, and determine how the DoD has incorporated these goals in its strategies, plans, and other directives related to its ministry advising efforts; 2) identify how the DoD measures the results of its gender-advising efforts and the extent to which these efforts have been met and are effective; and 3) identify what impediments, if any, may be prohibiting greater success in gender-related areas of improvement at the MoD and MoI, and how the DoD is addressing those issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement, Use, and Maintenance of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
<td>To 1) describe the process(es) by which the DoD develops intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance for the ANDSF; 2) assess the extent to which the DoD oversees these procurement processes; 3) assess the extent to which the DoD evaluates the performance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance once fielded and makes adjustments, if needed; and 4) review DoD’s plans for sustaining this equipment once fielded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of DoD’s Follow-on Contract to Operate and Maintain Critical ANDSF Infrastructure</td>
<td>To assess the extent to which 1) the follow-on national maintenance contract for critical ANDSF infrastructure is achieving its contractual requirements and the DoD’s broader goal of developing the ANDSF’s capacity to independently operate and maintain this infrastructure, and 2) the U.S. Corps of Army Engineers developed measurable performance standards for the follow-on national maintenance contract to enable evaluation of work performed against those standards, and assess the contractor’s performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>DoD’s Procurement, Oversight, and Disposal of the G222s</em></td>
<td>To 1) describe the DoD’s process for selecting the G222 aircraft for the AAF and the need they were expected to fulfill; 2) determine why the aircraft did not ultimately meet this need and what, if any, conditions changed between their selection and arrival in country; and 3) determine why they were scrapped and what alternative disposal methods were considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of DoD’s Women Participation Projects</em></td>
<td>To review the planning and use ANA and ANP facilities built for female members of the ANDSF and their families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Review of the Security Force Assistance Brigades in Afghanistan</em></td>
<td>To examine the efforts of Security Force Assistance Brigade in Afghanistan and their effect on ANDSF capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Review of CSTC-A’s Vaccines for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police</em></td>
<td>To review CSTC-A’s procurement and management of vaccines for the ANA and ANP including vaccination schedules and distribution plans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Female Tactical Platoon members prepare to search a compound during a capability exercise near Kabul. (NATO photo)
A U.S. sailor with Task Force Southwest guards a stairwell during a combined security patrol with Afghan forces in Lashkar Gah. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)
APPENDIX A
Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Quarterly Report

This report complies with sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which requires that the designated Lead IG provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on an overseas contingency operation. The DoD IG is the designated Lead IG for OFS. The DoS IG is the Associate IG for the operation.

The USAID IG is designated by the Inspector General Act as the third IG responsible for overseas contingency operations, but USAID has no OFS-related programs or activities. However, the USAID OIG does conduct audits, investigations, and other activities in Afghanistan. USAID OIG coordinates those activities as appropriate, with other oversight entities.

This report contains information from the Lead IG agencies as well as from partner oversight agencies. This unclassified report covers the period from April 1, 2018, through June 30, 2018.

To fulfill its congressional mandate to produce a quarterly report on OFS, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, or evaluations mentioned or referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited all of the data and information provided by the agencies.

This report includes an appendix containing classified information on the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan, as well as information related to the Afghan security forces and the Afghan security ministries. This classified appendix is provided to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

Data Call
Each quarter, the Lead IG directs a series of questions, or data calls, to federal agencies about their programs and operations related to OFS. Lead IG coordinates with SIGAR, which also issues a data call to support its quarterly report, in developing the OFS data call to avoid duplication and minimize the burden on reporting agencies while maximizing the collective yield of the data calls. The Lead IG agencies use responses to these data calls to develop sections of the OFS quarterly report, as well as to inform decisions concerning future audits and evaluations.

Various DoD commands and offices and DoS offices participated in the data call for OFS this quarter.

Open-Source Research
This report also draws on the most current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report include the following:

- Information publicly released by U.S. agencies included in the data call
- Congressional testimony
- Press conferences, especially DoD and DoS briefings
- United Nations (and relevant branches)
- Reports issued by non-governmental organizations
- Media reports
Materials collected through open source research provide information to describe the status of the operation and help the Lead IG agencies assess information provided in their agency data calls. However, the Lead IG agencies have not tested, verified, or independently assessed the assertions made by these agencies.

**Report Production**

The Lead IG is responsible for assembling and producing this report. It coordinates with the DoS OIG and the USAID OIG, which drafted sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies. Every Lead IG agency participates in reviewing and editing the entire quarterly report.

The Lead IG agencies provide the offices who have responded to the data call with opportunities to verify and comment on the content of the report. During the first review, the Lead IG asks agencies to correct inaccuracies and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG incorporates agency comments, where appropriate, and sends the report back to the agencies for a final review for accuracy. Each OIG coordinates the review process with its own agency.

**APPENDIX B**

**Classified Appendix to this Report**

This appendix provides additional information related to counterterrorism and other activities in Afghanistan. The appendix will be delivered to appropriate government agencies and congressional committees.
## ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AABIS</td>
<td>Afghan Automated Biometric Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
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<td>ACJC</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Justice Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>AETF-A</td>
<td>Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANCOF</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Force</td>
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<td>ANCOP</td>
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<td>APAPPS</td>
<td>Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity</td>
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<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Defense Criminal Investigative Service</td>
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<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>FFP</td>
<td>Food for Peace</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIMARS</td>
<td>High Mobility Artillery Rocket System</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan</td>
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<td>Lead IG</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior Affairs</td>
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<td>NAC-A</td>
<td>NATO Air Command-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NSOCC-A</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>Overseas Contingency Operation</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<td>OIS</td>
<td>Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
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<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>Security Force Assistance Brigade</td>
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<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMW</td>
<td>Special Mission Wing</td>
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<td>TAAC</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>United States Forces-Afghanistan</td>
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</table>
ENDNOTES

Executive Summary

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263. USAID/OAPA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 7/5/2018.
265. USAID/OAPA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 7/5/2018.
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1-800-424-9098 -

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stateoig.gov/hotline
1-800-409-9926 OR 202-647-3320

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DEVELOPMENT HOTLINE -
ighotline@usaid.gov
1-800-230-6539 OR 202-712-1023