OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

OCTOBER 1, 2018—DECEMBER 31, 2018
ABOUT THIS REPORT

In January 2013, legislation was enacted creating the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. This legislation, which amended the Inspector General Act, requires the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to, among other things, provide quarterly reports to Congress on the contingency operations.

The DoD Inspector General (IG) is designated as the Lead IG for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) and the DoS IG is the Associate Inspector General. USAID’s humanitarian assistance and development efforts in Afghanistan fall outside the OFS mission. However, the USAID Office of Inspector General conducts audits and investigations of its programs in Afghanistan and summaries of USAID oversight work are included in this report.

The Offices of Inspector General of the DoD, DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. Other partner agencies also contribute to oversight of OFS.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out their statutory missions to:

- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over the contingency operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations.
- Report quarterly and biannually to the Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead IG agencies.

METHODOLOGY

To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies submit requests for information to the DoD, DoS, and USAID about OFS and related programs. The Lead IG agencies also gather data and information open sources, including congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports. This quarter, due to the partial government shutdown, the DoS and USAID OIGs did not participate in the production of this report.

The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, or evaluations mentioned or referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited all of the data and information provided by the agencies. For further details on the methodology for this report, see p. 68.

CLASSIFIED APPENDIX

This report includes an appendix containing classified information on the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan, as well as information related to the Afghan security forces and the Afghan security ministries. This classified appendix is provided to relevant agencies and congressional committees.
FOREWORD

This Lead Inspector General quarterly report to the U.S. Congress is our 15th report on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). This report discharges our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978.

OFS has two complementary missions: the U.S. counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan, and their affiliates in Afghanistan; and U.S. military participation in the NATO-led Resolute Support mission to develop the capacity of the Afghan security ministries and to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. The objective of Resolute Support is the establishment of self-sustaining Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and security ministries that together seek to maintain security in Afghanistan.

This report discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG Offices of Inspector General and our partner oversight agencies during the period from October 1, 2018, through December 31, 2018.

This report provides information on the status of OFS in line with strategic oversight areas adopted by the Lead IG agencies:

- Security
- Support to Mission

This report also features oversight work completed by the Lead IG agencies and our partner oversight agencies during the same period, as well as ongoing and planned oversight work.

Due to the partial government shutdown and the furlough of staff at the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development, this report does not contain sections on Governance and Civil Society, Humanitarian Assistance and Development, and Stabilization and Infrastructure, which are provided by the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development Offices of Inspector General. The Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development also did not review this report or provide input. However, the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development Inspectors General reviewed and concurred with the content of this report. Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on OFS.

Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on OFS.

/s/
Glenn A. Fine
Principal Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

/s/
Steve A. Linick
Inspector General
U.S. Department of State

/s/
Ann Calvaresi Barr
Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International Development
(Top row): Infantry soldiers on patrol with Afghan Special Security Forces return fire during a Taliban attack on their position in Logar province (NSOCC-A photo); An election poster for a Hazara parliamentary candidate in Kabul (Stars and Stripes photo); Afghan soldiers listen during a map reading class (DoD photo). (Bottom): A view of the mountains near Bagram Airfield (DoD photo).
I am pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). This report describes key events in Afghanistan and completed, ongoing, and planned Lead IG oversight work relating to OFS from October 1 through December 31, 2018.

During this quarter, the security situation in Afghanistan remained volatile. The Taliban and other terrorist groups continued to attack Afghan security forces and civilians, and U.S. and Afghan forces also continued to combat the Taliban and other terrorist groups with airstrikes and ground operations.

Afghanistan held parliamentary elections this quarter, although the elections were impacted by violence and controversy surrounded the outcome. Despite this violence, a substantial number of Afghans went to the polls to cast their votes. In addition, Afghanistan continues to prepare for its presidential elections, which are currently scheduled for July 2019. As discussed in this quarterly report, this election will be challenging to execute.

As discussed in this report, according to media reports in December 2018, the Administration is considering a potential troop reduction in Afghanistan. According to U.S. officials, however, there has been no order to draw down U.S. troops.

In February 2019, after the quarter ended, the Inspectors General from the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development and I visited Afghanistan and Iraq. This was our third annual joint Lead IG trip to the region. We met with senior U.S. military, diplomatic, and civilian officials to obtain briefings on military operations, security, governance, economic development, and humanitarian assistance issues.

These briefings made it apparent that there are critical developments now occurring simultaneously, creating uncertainty. The most significant development is the ongoing negotiations, led by U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, to encourage the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan to reach a peace and reconciliation agreement.

According to U.S. officials in Afghanistan, the Department of Defense and the U.S. Embassy are planning for different scenarios to ensure that they can support U.S. strategic interests in Afghanistan.

Separately, U.S. officials reported to us that, regardless of the outcome of these developments, they are seeking efficiencies and savings in operations, programs, and contracts. For example, among other initiatives, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the command responsible for the training mission in Afghanistan, reported that it was reviewing major contracts to identify cost savings. In a related initiative, CSTC-A said it is also evaluating logistics systems to enhance Afghan capabilities and to optimize efficiencies and cost savings in how equipment and supplies are transported in Afghanistan.

We intend to report on, and assess, these and other developments and initiatives in upcoming OFS quarterly reports.

During this quarter, the Lead IG agencies and our oversight partners also continued to provide oversight of OFS activities, issuing 9 audit and evaluation reports, and conducting 31 ongoing projects, which we describe in this report. In addition, 35 criminal investigations were ongoing at the end of the quarter.

My Lead IG colleagues and I remain committed to fulfilling our responsibility to provide quarterly status reports and oversight of this overseas contingency operation. We also thank the dedicated OIG employees who perform this work, both in Afghanistan and in the United States.

/s/
Glenn A. Fine
Principal Deputy Inspector General Performing the Duties of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and their Offices of Inspector General, experienced a lapse in appropriations beginning in December 2018. Due to the suspension of affected agency functions, the DoS and USAID OIGs were unable to report on OCO-related developments this quarter in the areas of governance and civil society, humanitarian assistance and development, and stabilization and infrastructure. Their agencies did not review or provide input to this report.

THE QUARTER IN REVIEW

The security situation in Afghanistan remained volatile during the quarter. The Taliban continued to attack Afghan security forces and election facilities while U.S. and coalition forces intensified Afghan-led operations to counter the Taliban and terrorist organizations in Afghanistan.1 As the military conflict continued, Afghanistan held a nationwide parliamentary election and Taliban representatives met with U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad to discuss a peace process. These events led Afghan and international observers to express new hopes for the peace and reconciliation process. However, these diplomatic discussions are in an initial stage and there are many hurdles to an eventual settlement.

Parliamentary Elections, Diplomatic Talks Spark Cautious Hope

On October 20, more than 4 million Afghans participated in parliamentary elections, a civic activity that the Department of Defense (DoD) described as a major social pressure on the Taliban because it legitimized the Afghan government.2 While the elections took place as scheduled, violence and controversy marred the process. The vote was delayed in two provinces, Kandahar and Ghazni, following significant Taliban attacks.3 The United Nations reported that Taliban attacks on election day killed 52 people.4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) reported to the DoD OIG that the Independent Election Commission (IEC) planned and executed the elections poorly, which undermined Afghan-led efforts to secure the nationwide event. The IEC’s logistical challenges included polling centers opening late or not at all, long lines at polling centers, error-ridden voter lists, and confusion regarding use of biometric voter devices. As of February 2019, the IEC had not yet released final results of the election.

During the quarter, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad led three rounds of talks with Afghan and regional leaders, including representatives of the Taliban. Ambassador Khalilzad told interviewers that the talks focused on security issues, such as a potential ceasefire

*ISIS claims responsibility for a bombing at an ANA base in Khost that killed 27.*

*President Ghani appoints Assadullah Khalid to be Minister of Defense and Amrullah Saleh to be Minister of Interior.*

*A suicide bomber attacks the Ministry of Disabled Persons in Kabul, killing 43. The Taliban denies responsibility.*

*Secretary of Defense James Mattis announces his resignation.*

*Media report that President Trump plans to withdraw thousands of troops from Afghanistan.*

*The Independent Election Commission announces that it will delay the presidential elections, originally scheduled for April 2019, to July 20, 2019.*
and the future of foreign forces in Afghanistan. On January 29, 2019, after the quarter ended, Ambassador Khalilzad announced that he and Taliban representatives had agreed, in principle, to a framework for a deal, under which the United States would withdraw troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban would guarantee that Afghanistan does not harbor terrorists.

U.S. officials described the election and Ambassador Khalilzad’s diplomacy as “encouraging.” However, U.S. and Afghan negotiators have many difficult steps ahead before they can reach a peace deal with the Taliban. Most notably, the framework, as reported, does not yet address Taliban relations with the Afghan government, which did not participate in any of the direct talks with the Taliban during the quarter. Ambassador Khalilzad’s ongoing diplomacy will be discussed in more detail in our next quarterly report.

In December 2018, media reports indicated that President Trump planned to withdraw thousands of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. In February, Acting Secretary of Defense said he had not received orders to withdraw troops.

**Continued Taliban and Terrorist Threat**

Publicly available measures of security—such as incidents of violence, population control, and civilian casualties—showed little change compared to the previous quarter and the same time last year. USFOR-A reported that there were 2,517 enemy-initiated attacks in Afghanistan that resulted in casualties during the quarter, a slight decrease compared to last quarter but a nearly 10 percent increase compared to the same period in 2017. Resolute Support, the NATO mission in Afghanistan, reported that as of October 2018, 63 percent of the Afghan population lived in areas under Afghan government control or influence, a decline from 65 percent reported throughout FY 2018. During the quarter, Resolute Support verified 2,347 civilian casualties (785 killed and 1,562 wounded) as a result of combat, a slight decrease compared to last quarter, but an increase compared to the first two quarters of 2018.

On October 18, the Taliban launched a deadly insider attack against U.S. and Afghan security leaders. The attack killed the powerful police chief of Kandahar province, Lieutenant General Abdul Raziq Achekzai, and the provincial intelligence chief, Abdul...
While Afghan security forces repelled recent attacks on provincial capitals, with assistance from international forces, the Taliban remained active on the periphery of urban centers throughout the country.

Mohmin. Provincial governor Zalmay Wesa and a U.S. general officer were also injured; General Scott Miller, commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the NATO Resolute Support mission, was also present but escaped unharmed. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that, contrary to concerns expressed by some observers, Raziq’s death did not create a security vacuum in Kandahar.

USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that the Taliban continued to threaten provincial capitals, including Ghazni city and Farah city, two cities that came under Taliban siege in 2018. While Afghan security forces repelled recent attacks on provincial capitals, with assistance from international forces, the Taliban remained active on the periphery of urban centers throughout the country. For example, USFOR-A said that since the Ghazni city attack, the Taliban had reconstituted its forces in the province. In November, Taliban fighters from neighboring provinces joined local fighters to attack two districts near the provincial capital, Jaghor and Malistan, leading to several days of heavy fighting and a humanitarian crisis in Ghazni province.

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K) continued to launch attacks and recruit fighters, despite consistent pressure from Afghan and U.S. airstrikes and Special Forces operations. USFOR-A said that ISIS-K often inflates the success of its attacks against Afghan and coalition forces in order to create a perception of Afghan government instability and attract new recruits.

The U.S. military provided combat enabling support to Afghan forces as they battled the Taliban and terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. U.S. forces also conducted unilateral operations against terrorist targets, as discussed in the classified appendix to this report. U.S. forces conducted 2 airstrikes against Taliban narcotics facilities during the quarter, a decline from 72 and 70 strikes in the previous two quarters.

**U.S. Support to Afghan Security Forces**

U.S. and coalition efforts to support the development of sustainable Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) produced progress and setbacks. This includes supporting the ANDSF as they grow the size of the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Afghan Special Security Forces. USFOR-A reported that the AAF continued to expand its fleet in accordance with its modernization plan, but struggled to train a sufficient number of pilots to fly its new aircraft. The AAF continued to rely heavily on contractors to perform maintenance on its aircraft. USFOR-A reported that the AAF performed a lower percentage of maintenance on its aircraft this quarter compared to last quarter. Details about the growth of the Afghan Special Security Forces are available in the classified appendix to this report.

The Afghan government continued to establish companies of the Afghan National Army-Territorial Force (ANA-TF), which are designed to serve as “hold forces” in locations under Afghan government control. After experiencing challenges last quarter in recruiting soldiers for some companies, the Afghan government enlisted local leaders to help identify districts for the new force.
DoD appropriation bills, signed into law in September 2018, provided the DoD with a total of $685.6 billion in FY 2019, which includes $616.8 billion in base funding and $68.8 billion in funding for overseas contingency operations (OCO). This represents an increase of approximately 2.2 percent from FY 2018's total DoD appropriation of $671.1 billion and a 4.4 percent increase in the OCO budget from the FY 2018 appropriation of $65.9 billion. Funding for the DoS and USAID expired on December 22, resulting in a partial government shutdown during this quarter.

**LEAD IG OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES**

The Lead IG and partner agencies conducted audits, inspections, and evaluations; Lead IG investigations; and Lead IG hotline activities from October 1 through December 31, 2018. Due to the lapse in appropriations, the DoS OIG provided only limited information about its oversight activities during the quarter.

Although USAID has no programs or activities related to OFS, it conducts humanitarian assistance and development activities in Afghanistan in many sectors, including agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth, education, gender equality, health, and infrastructure. USAID OIG conducts audits and investigations in Afghanistan related to these programs. USAID OIG’s activities are included in this report to provide a more comprehensive update on the oversight of U.S. Government programs in Afghanistan, including those not involving OFS-related programs.

**Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations**

The Lead IG and partner agencies completed nine audit, evaluation, and inspection reports related to OFS from October 1 through December 31, 2018. Table 1 lists the released reports by agency. During this quarter, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 31 ongoing and 37 planned oversight projects for OFS.

Table 1.

**Oversight Reports Issued this Quarter**

<table>
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<th>Report</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISP-I-19-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Foreign Assistance Program Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISP-I-19-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE AUDIT AGENCY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Munitions Management</td>
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<td>F2019-001-RA0000</td>
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Investigations

Lead IG investigations this quarter resulted in one arrest, one criminal charge and two criminal convictions. Investigative branches of the DoD OIG, the DoS OIG, and their partner agencies also closed 9 investigations, initiated 11 new investigations, and coordinated on 35 open investigations. The investigations involve a variety of alleged crimes, including procurement fraud, corruption, grant fraud, theft, program irregularities, computer intrusions, and trafficking-in-persons.

This quarter, the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group conducted 37 fraud awareness briefings for 333 participants.

Hotline Activity

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority for independent review. The DoD OIG has an investigator to coordinate the hotline contacts among the Lead IG agencies and others as appropriate. During the quarter, the investigator referred 53 cases to Lead IG agencies or other investigative organizations.
An Afghan Air Force special mission operator watches for threats in his sector. (U.S. Air Force photo)

THE QUARTER IN REVIEW

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Elections Proceed Despite Security and Logistics Challenges

Elections to Afghanistan’s parliament took place on October 20, after being delayed multiple times since they were originally scheduled in 2015. Voting in Kandahar province took place one week later due to security concerns. The Afghan government delayed the vote in Ghazni province to July 20, 2019, the newly rescheduled date for the presidential election.1

According to the Independent Election Commission (IEC), an estimated 4.2 million Afghans participated in the election, out of 8.5 million registered voters.2 The IEC planned to open 7,355 polling centers across Afghanistan, but ultimately 4,812 opened on election day.3 The IEC extended voting to a second day in some areas where the polling centers failed to open on time.4

Afghans participated in the election despite the Taliban’s months-long campaign to target election facilities and candidates.5 During the 3-week campaign period leading up to the vote, the Taliban and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K) killed 10 candidates and wounded or abducted 6 others.6 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which tracks incidents of violence in the country, reported that there were 388 casualties (52 deaths and 336 injuries) on October 20, the highest single-day total of civilian casualties in 2018.7
The IEC demonstrated limited capacity to plan and execute the election, and tally the results, the United Nations reported. The IEC’s logistical challenges included polling centers that opened late or not at all, long lines at polling centers, error-ridden voter lists, and confusion regarding use of biometric voter devices. By the end of the quarter, the IEC had not yet released final results of the election. The IEC and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission disagreed about whether to count votes cast without biometric verification, as many of the verification devices malfunctioned or were not available on election day.

Poor IEC planning hindered the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ (ANDSF) ability to provide security for the election, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) said. Specifically, USFOR-A told the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) that the IEC made last-minute decisions on which polling centers would be open, which undermined ANDSF ability to make security plans. The IEC was also late in printing ballots, which forced the Afghan Air Force (AAF) to alter delivery routes. On the day of the election, some district- and provincial-level IEC personnel failed to provide real-time information to the ANDSF about security threats and needs in individual towns and neighborhoods. The IEC’s weak administration of the election, USFOR-A concluded, led to “additional exposure of the ANDSF to threats before, during, and after the elections.”

However, USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that despite IEC planning challenges and threats of violence from the Taliban and ISIS-K, the ANDSF “performed well” in planning and providing security for the election. USFOR-A said that U.S. and coalition forces played a “limited” role in election security, because “it was important to show the election and associated security was an Afghan event and not a U.S./coalition effort.” U.S. forces have advised Afghan security institutions on planning for and executing large security events for several years. For the October elections, U.S. forces only provided “point of need” assistance and facilitated communications between the ANDSF and the international community. Additional information about the parliamentary elections is available in the classified appendix to this report.
Special Representative Meets with Regional Leaders and the Taliban

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation, met with regional leaders several times during the quarter in pursuit of reconciliation with the Taliban, as detailed in Table 2. Representatives of the Taliban participated in some of the meetings, but they did not meet with Afghan government representatives. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that U.S. military activities in Afghanistan “are designed to complement diplomatic efforts” to reach a negotiated end to the conflict.

Following Ambassador Khalilzad’s second round of talks in November, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani announced the formation of a 12-person Afghan negotiation team for peace talks with the Taliban. In a statement, described as a “road map for peace,” President Ghani said that he seeks to identify key issues for both the Afghan government and the Taliban, and assign them to committees for further discussion. He said that negotiations should proceed in phases, first resolving issues among Afghans before engaging with international partners. To date, the Taliban has refused to meet with representatives of the Afghan government for any peace and reconciliation talks.

In December, Ambassador Khalilzad reported that there has been some progress in the negotiations but did not provide details. He told an interviewer the three rounds of discussions during the quarter focused on security issues, such as a potential ceasefire and the future of foreign forces in Afghanistan. Ambassador Khalilzad said that the United States’ primary interest is that Afghanistan cannot be used by terrorists to stage attacks. Some subjects, such as an interim government and human rights issues, were not discussed because, Ambassador Khalilzad said, they are “internal issues” that should be decided among Afghans.

On January 29, 2019, after the quarter ended, Ambassador Khalilzad told an interviewer that he and Taliban representatives had agreed, in principle, to a framework for a deal, under which the United States would withdraw troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban would guarantee that Afghanistan does not harbor terrorists. The framework, as reported, did not address Taliban relations with the Afghan government.

Table 2.

**Ambassador Khalilzad’s Travel Itinerary, October-December 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>October 4-14</th>
<th>November 8-20</th>
<th>December 2-20</th>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>Qatar</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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Source: DoS
No Order to Withdraw Troops

On December 20, 2018, U.S. media reported that the President was considering withdrawing half of U.S. forces from Afghanistan—approximately 7,000 troops. The reports, which coincided with the President’s decision to withdraw forces from Syria, surprised and concerned the Afghan government and coalition partners in Afghanistan, according to media reports. When asked at the end of the quarter about possible withdrawal plans, the DoD referred the DoD OIG to a National Security Council statement, which said that “there is no announcement related to U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan at this time.” As of the time this report was published, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan and USFOR-A had also said that they had not received orders to withdraw troops.

Progress Toward South Asia Strategy Goals Unclear

Under the Administration’s South Asia strategy, the U.S. government and coalition partners apply military, diplomatic, and social pressure on the Taliban with the goal of reaching a negotiated settlement to the conflict. The U.S. military and coalition partners also continued to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces as they work to secure the Afghan population. U.S. officials described the election and Ambassador Khalilzad’s diplomacy as “encouraging.”

However, U.S. and Afghan negotiators have many difficult steps ahead before they can reach a peace deal with the Taliban. Previous Afghan elections and U.S.-led attempts to negotiate with the Taliban, while positive activities, did not result in an immediate end to the conflict. General Scott Miller, the commander of USFOR-A and the Resolute Support mission, said that the Taliban “realizes they cannot win militarily” and that he has a “pragmatic” view of the possibility for reconciliation. Publicly available indicators of security, such as population control and civilian casualties, showed little change this quarter or, in some cases, declined. (See pages 19-20)

SECURITY

Insider Attack Targets Meeting of Afghan and U.S. Leaders

On October 18, U.S. and Afghan leaders were the victims of a deadly insider attack in Kandahar province. According to media reports, a gunman opened fire during a meeting between General Miller, Kandahar Governor Zalmay Wesa, provincial intelligence chief Abdul Mohmin, and the provincial police chief, Lieutenant General Abdul Raziq Achekzai. Mohmin and Raziq died in the attack; Wesa and a U.S. general officer were injured. General Miller was unhurt. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that the Army is investigating the attack, which prevented it from providing public information about the incident. Further information about the attack is available in the classified appendix to this report.

In the days following the attack, some commentators predicted that Raziq’s death would create a dangerous security vacuum in Kandahar. However, USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that this was not this case. It reported to the DoD OIG that the Taliban “probably viewed Raziq as a major obstacle and made several plans to assassinate him,” but the Taliban “did not attempt to exploit opportunities” in Kandahar city following his death.
In response to the attack, the Afghan government delayed the parliamentary elections in Kandahar province. The vote was held one week later, “without any major election-related insurgent violence” in the provincial capital, USFOR-A said. The Afghan government named Raziq’s brother, Major General Tadin Khan, as the new police chief in Kandahar province.

**Ongoing Risk of Insider Threats**

Following the Kandahar attack, General Miller ordered an immediate suspension of all Resolute Support physical advisory engagements with Afghan partners. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that General Miller also ordered all installation commanders to review screening procedures for Afghans that interact with NATO personnel. For example, U.S. military leaders in Train Advise and Assist Command-South, where the attack occurred, reviewed their Screening Standard Operational Procedures and re-screened all ANSF personnel who interact with advisors. By October 27, advising resumed at some locations, provided the ANSF advisees were unarmed. The remaining advising activities resumed by November 4, provided that regional U.S. commanders verified Afghan security measures to prevent insider attack and conducted security rehearsals.

In the month following the Kandahar attack, two coalition personnel—a U.S. soldier and a Czech soldier—were killed in insider attacks. USFOR-A reported that there were 18 insider attacks against ANDSF personnel during the period August 26 to October 31, bringing the total number for the first 10 months of 2018 to 74. This represents an increase of 22 insider attacks against ANDSF personnel compared to a similar 10-month period last year.
The Taliban Intent to Confront Provincial Centers

Unlike the previous two quarters, the Taliban did not attempt to take control of any provincial capital during the quarter. In May 2018, the Taliban attacked Farah city and in August 2018, attacked Ghazni city, although the ANDSF regained control of both cities within a few days. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that these attacks were a military failure for the Taliban but a “strategic victory in the information space.” USFOR-A assessed this quarter that the Taliban intend to conduct more attacks against provincial centers. USFOR-A noted that the Taliban benefit from the media attention the attacks generate.

Throughout the country, the Taliban remained active in areas on the periphery of urban centers during the quarter. For example, in Farah province, USFOR-A reported that the Taliban maintained a “strong, but not overwhelming” presence in districts surrounding the provincial capital. During the quarter, the Taliban launched attacks against ANDSF outposts, major traffic routes, and an airfield. USFOR-A said some of the attacks may have been reactions to USFOR-A operations and the expanded ANDSF security presence in the province.

According to USFOR-A, Ghazni city appears to be particularly vulnerable to another Taliban attack. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that since the Ghazni city attack in August, the Taliban reconstituted its forces in the province. The Taliban maintain a presence on the outskirts of the city and control major transportation routes in the province. In November, the Taliban attacked two districts near the provincial capital, Jaghori and Malistan, which are home to thousands of Hazaras, a minority ethnic group. USFOR-A reported to the DoD OIG that Taliban fighters from neighboring provinces joined the attacks, leading to several days of heavy fighting and a humanitarian crisis.

USFOR-A said that the capital of Kunduz province and Tarin Kot, the capital of Uruzgan province, are among the population
centers also vulnerable to Taliban attack. Similarly, in northwest Afghanistan, local media reported that the Taliban continued to attack and capture ANDSF checkpoints in Faryab province, including positions on roads leading to the capital, Maimanah.

U.S. and Afghan leaders have made several security enhancements in and around Farah and Ghazni cities to prevent another Taliban attack. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that in Farah, the U.S. military established a new forward operating base that contributed to a reduction in significant enemy activity. USFOR-A also said that new security leadership in the province has enabled more effective advising in the province. In Ghazni, coalition advisors conducted more engagements with their Afghan counterparts to improve ANDSF capability in the province. Further information about the Taliban threat to provincial capitals is available in the classified appendix to this report.

**ISIS-K Resilient Despite Pressure**

ISIS-K continued to launch attacks in Afghanistan during the quarter, despite ongoing ground and air operations by U.S. and Afghan forces, and clashes with rival Taliban forces. ISIS-K did not claim any high profile attacks in Kabul during the quarter, but it may have been responsible for a November 20 attack on a gathering of religious clerics in the capital that left more than 55 dead. ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a November 23 attack on an ANA base in Khost province that killed at least 27 Afghan soldiers.

USFOR-A estimated that there are fewer than 2,000 ISIS-K fighters in Afghanistan. The estimate remained unchanged in recent quarters, despite reported deaths of ISIS-K fighters as a result of Afghan and U.S. operations. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that ISIS-K is able to replenish its fighting force by recruiting from socially conservative and Salafi-oriented populations in eastern Afghanistan and by offering fighters an income. USFOR-A said that ISIS-K often inflates the success of its attacks against Afghan and coalition forces to create a perception of Afghan government instability and to attract new recruits.

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**President Ghani Replaces Security Chiefs Ahead of 2019 Presidential Election**

In December, President Ghani named Asadullah Khalid Minister of Defense and Amrullah Saleh Minister of Interior. Both are former leaders of the National Directorate of Security (Afghanistan’s intelligence service), and have worked closely with U.S. and NATO leaders. Khalid and Saleh will serve as acting ministers until confirmed by the Parliament.

President Ghani’s decision to replace his security chiefs came as Afghan political leaders, including current and former members of Ghani’s cabinet, began positioning themselves for the upcoming presidential election. In January, former national security advisor Hanif Atmar announced his candidacy. Ghani announced that he will seek a second term as president and named Saleh to be his candidate for first vice president.
U.S. Casualty Demonstrates Ongoing al Qaeda Presence

In November, the DoD reported that a U.S. soldier was killed during a firefight with al Qaeda militants in Nimroz province. While the death appears to have resulted from friendly fire by Afghan partner forces, the incident underscores al Qaeda’s continued presence in Afghanistan. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that al Qaeda is operating in Kabul, Badakshan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Helmand, and Nimroz provinces. USFOR-A also said that al Qaeda cells likely operate in Taliban-controlled areas and eastern provinces due to the proximity of likely al Qaeda bases in western Pakistan. USFOR-A estimated that there are approximately 200 al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan including members of al Qaeda in the Islamic Subcontinent, an affiliate of the terrorist group.

Measures of Security Show Little Change

INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE

Both Resolute Support and the United Nations collect data on incidents of violence in Afghanistan. Resolute Support collects data on “enemy-initiated attacks” in Afghanistan, which it defines as attacks by the Taliban, ISIS-K, or other groups. Resolute Support labels an enemy-initiated attack as “effective” if it causes a casualty. USFOR-A reported that there were 2,517 effective enemy-initiated attacks in Afghanistan between October and December. This represents a decline in enemy initiated attacks compared to the July to September period (3,093), but a nearly 10 percent increase compared to the same period in 2017 (2,298). During 2018, approximately 49 percent of reported enemy-initiated attacks (10,955 out of 22,495 attacks) were effective. However, the ANDSF often does not report attacks that do not result in casualties, so the actual percentage of enemy-initiated attacks that were effective may be lower.

Figure 2.
Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks, 2017-2018
UNAMA collects and reports data on “security incidents” in Afghanistan. In contrast to the Resolute Support data, the UNAMA reports of “security incidents” include violence initiated by Afghan and international forces (such as airstrikes), in addition to attacks by the Taliban, ISIS-K, and other violent organizations.

UNAMA recorded 5,853 security incidents during the period August 16-November 15, a 2 percent decrease compared to the same period in 2017. In particular, UNAMA noted that the level of violence during the week of the Eid al-Adha holiday in August was the lowest recorded for a one-week period since early 2013. UNAMA reported that the number of security incidents on October 20, the day of the parliamentary election, was comparable to the level of violence during the presidential run-off election in 2014.

UNAMA reported that the majority (63 percent) of security incidents during the August 16-November 16 period were armed clashes, reflecting trends of previous quarters. Airstrikes by Afghan and international forces increased by 25 percent compared to the same period in 2017, while suicide attacks decreased by 37 percent. UNAMA suggested that the decrease in suicide attacks may reflect interdiction efforts in Kabul and Jalalabad.

### POPULATION AND DISTRICT CONTROL

The most recent Resolute Support District Stability Assessment, conducted in October 2018, found that the percentage of Afghan citizens who live in areas under government control or influence decreased slightly compared to the previous quarter. As shown in Table 3, 63 percent of Afghan citizens were assessed to be living in areas under government control or influence in October, compared to 65 percent in July. The net total of districts assessed as contested increased by six districts, and the net total of districts assessed as under Taliban control or influence increased by one district. The provinces with the greatest number of Afghans living under insurgent influence or control were Faryab, Kunduz, and Helmand.

#### Table 3.
The most recent Resolute Support District Stability Assessment, July and October 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Districts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 2018</td>
<td>October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Government Influence</strong></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Government Control</strong></td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Afghan Government Control or Influence</strong></td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Contested</strong></td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taliban Influence</strong></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taliban Control</strong></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Taliban Control or Influence</strong></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.*

*Source: USFOR-A*
In late 2017, USFOR-A and the Afghan government stated that a major objective of the South Asia strategy and Afghan Road Map was to increase security to the point that 80 percent of the Afghan population lived in areas under government control or influence by the end of 2019. A previous Lead IG quarterly report questioned the analytical foundation for that goal. The DoD stated this quarter that district and population control “are not indicative of the effectiveness of the South Asia strategy.” The DoD also attributed the lack of large changes in district and population control to the “uncertainty in the models that produce them.” Further discussion of the Resolute Support District Stability Assessment and other measures of Taliban influence and control in Afghanistan can be found on pages 22-23.

**AFGHAN CIVILIAN CASUALTIES**

Resolute Support assesses reports of civilian casualties using ANDSF and coalition operational reports, aircraft video footage, records of U.S. and Afghan weapons releases, and other coalition and Afghan government-generated information. During the quarter, Resolute Support verified 2,347 civilian casualties (785 killed and 1,562 wounded) as a result of combat. This represents

---

*Figure 3. Resolute Support-verified Civilian Casualties by Province, August 15-November 16, 2018*
a slight decrease compared to last quarter, as shown in Figure 4. During 2018, the greatest share of civilian casualties resulted from direct fire and improvised explosive devices (IED). The provinces where the greatest number of civilian casualties occurred were Kabul, the site of several high-profile attacks, and Nangarhar, the site of frequent Taliban- and ISIS-K-related attacks and operations. Figure 3 shows the distribution of Resolute Support-verified civilian casualties during a recent 3-month period.

UNAMA also receives and verifies reports of civilian casualties in conflict. UNAMA’s 2018 annual report on civilian casualties, which includes data for the quarter, was not available by the time this quarterly report was published.

**AFGHAN MILITARY PERSONNEL CASUALTIES**

The Afghan government classifies ANDSF casualty data. However, the DoD told the DoD OIG that ANDSF casualties were higher than the same quarter last year, and that the ANDSF suffered a higher percentage of casualties on defensive positions than on offensive operations. Additional information about Afghan military personnel casualties is available in the classified appendix to this report.

**U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY PERSONNEL CASUALTIES**

The DoD reported seven U.S. military combat deaths during the quarter. The fatalities included a soldier who died of wounds sustained during an IED explosion in Helmand province, a soldier who died as a result of an apparent insider attack in Kabul province, a soldier who died during combat in Nimroz province, and three soldiers and one airman who died from injuries sustained during an IED explosion in Ghazni province. An eighth U.S. soldier died in Afghanistan during the quarter in a non-combat related incident. In addition, a Czech soldier died during the quarter as a result of an apparent insider attack in Herat province.
**U.S. Air Force Activity Continued at High Levels**

The U.S. military intensified strikes on Taliban and terrorist targets during the quarter, releasing historically high numbers of weapons over Afghanistan. U.S. Air Forces Central Command reported that U.S. aircraft released 2,149 weapons during the quarter. As shown in Figure 5, the number of weapons released in the July to December period was more than 50 percent higher than the number of weapons releases in the first half of the year. However, as explained in a previous Lead IG report, the methodology that U.S. Air Forces Central Command uses to tally weapons released does not count all munitions, which range from .50 caliber bullets to bombs and missiles, on a one-to-one basis, so reported totals from month to month are not directly comparable.

In September 2018, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command announced the first combat mission of the Marine Corps F-35B strike fighter jet, which targeted a Taliban weapons cache in Kandahar province. This quarter, the 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan (9th AETF-A) reported that the F-35Bs flew 28 sorties that resulted in two strikes and provided intelligence, show of force, and show of presence in southern Afghanistan. 9th AETF-A said that the F-35B flights met ground commanders’ desired effects for their use. However, according to 9th AETF-A, the introduction of the F-35Bs “brought little impact to operations” in Afghanistan because “the antiquated surface to air threat environment and the lack of sophisticated infrastructure in Afghanistan limits the full potential of what the F-35B was designed to do.” In other words, the Afghan combat environment does not require the use of the F-35Bs unique technological capabilities, which are designed to strike more complex targets and counter enemies with more sophisticated air defense systems.

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**Figure 5.**

**U.S. Forces Weapons Released in 2018 by Month**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Weapons Released</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Number of Weapons Released includes both manned and unmanned aircraft. Source: AFCENT*
INFLUENCE AND CONTROL: THE DYNAMICS OF TALIBAN POWER

District control and population control are among the most commonly-cited measures of progress—or lack of progress—under the South Asia strategy. But what does it really mean to be under Taliban or Afghan government control? The Taliban presence can still be felt in areas considered to be under Afghan government control or influence, often resulting in casualties and a disruption of daily life. Recent research explores how the Taliban exert their control and influence over physical space, public services, and public opinion in Afghanistan.

CONTROL OF KEY BUILDINGS AND ROADS

Resolute Support considers several factors when assessing district and population control for its quarterly District Stability Assessment (see map). To illustrate this, the DoD OIG asked USFOR-A to explain why districts in three provinces showed changes in control between the October 2017 and October 2018 assessments. As shown below, the assessments focus on control of key infrastructure and transportation networks.

A FARYAB: Dowlatabad and Gurziwan districts
Decreased government control due to:
- Increased Taliban operations; ANDSF withdrawal from some areas
- Taliban control of majority of terrain, can prevent freedom of movement
- Afghan government control of limited infrastructure that is at high risk for capture

B HELMAND: Nahr-e Saraj and Washer districts
Decreased government control due to:
- Decreased Afghan government control of district centers
- Little Afghan government control outside city limits
- Limited Afghan government control of Highway 1 outside of checkpoints

C LOGAR: Azrah, Baraki Barak, Charkh, Kharwar districts
Increased government control due to:
- ANDSF ability to maintain security gains
- Improved governance, localized ceasefires, and demands for peace
- Re-opening of 39 schools that were closed by the Taliban

SENSE OF SECURITY

A district center may be under government control, but incidents of violence and harassment, such as a car bomb or a Taliban threat letter, can lead to a deteriorating sense of security. Feelings of insecurity may prevent Afghans from going to the market, sending a child to school, or engaging in other routine activities. In December 2018, The Asia Foundation released its annual Survey of the Afghan People, which has documented a 31 percentage point increase in fear for personal safety since 2006. In 2018, 71 percent of Afghans reported some or a lot of fear for their personal safety. Fear varied according to where Afghans live, their gender, ethnicity, and with whom they interact, as shown below.
More than 80 percent of Afghans live within 50 km of the Highway 1. Influence or control of Afghanistan’s highly-populated districts along this corridor is more likely to impact commerce, economic growth, citizen support for the government, and the ability of the Afghan government to provide services. According to the October 2018 Resolute Support District Stability Assessment, the Afghan government controls 54 percent of districts, which are home to 63 percent of the population (see map and p. 18).

**PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES**

In many districts, the Taliban influences or controls the provision of public services, such as justice, education, and health. In a June 2018 report, the Overseas Development Institute investigated the Taliban’s system of “shadow governance” at the provincial and district levels. The report described how, through a complex hierarchy of governors, representatives, and commissions, the Taliban works with local leaders—both formally and informally—to influence, co-opt, and control how Afghans receive basic services.

**How the Taliban Influences Public Services**

- **Education**
  - Vets teachers and school staff
  - Monitors teacher attendance and teaching style
  - Vets curricula
  - Monitors student behavior

- **Health Care**
  - Vets staff and monitor staff attendance
  - Monitors clinic facilities, medical supplies, and gender segregation

- **Justice**
  - Appoints its own judges
  - Resolves disputes
  - Brings cases and delivers judgements

---

“The Taliban “[does] not have to formally occupy territory to control what happens in it.””

—Overseas Development Institute

Sources: See Endnotes, page 76
Table 4.
Table Contributing Nations to Resolute Support Mission, December 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>364</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>315</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,910</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Resolute Support

Campaign to Target Narcotics Facilities Ends

The U.S. military’s counter-threat finance operations in Afghanistan seek to disrupt and degrade Taliban resources through air strikes and raids that target narcotics production, processing, trading, and transportation. In 2017, U.S. and Afghan forces launched an air and ground campaign, called Operation Iron Tempest, to target Taliban narcotics sites. At that time, USFOR-A estimated that there were 400-500 drug labs in Afghanistan that produced $200 million per year in revenue for the Taliban.

During the quarter, however, the U.S. military ended this campaign. The 9th AETF-A told the DoD OIG that U.S. forces struck two narcotics targets during the quarter, both in Helmand province. This is a much smaller number of strikes compared to April-June 2018, when U.S. forces conducted 72 strikes under Operation Iron Tempest, and July-September 2018, when U.S. forces conducted 70 strikes. The 9th AETF-A said that the counter-threat finance campaign has led to “insurgent confusion, concern, and changes to their tactics, techniques, and procedures” and “disruptions in their command and control.” Further information about the campaign is available in the classified appendix to this report.

Narcotics production in Afghanistan remained at elevated levels. During the quarter, the United Nations reported 263,000 hectares of net opium poppy cultivation in 2018. The United Nations said this represented a 20 percent decrease from its 2017 opium survey but described it as a “very high level” of production. The United Nations attributed the production decline to heavy drought in northern Afghanistan, and decreasing prices in other parts of the country.

NATO Members and Partners Commit Troops for 2019

Through the NATO-led Resolute Support mission, U.S. and coalition forces train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces as they “develop the capacity to defend Afghanistan.” In addition to building the fighting capabilities of the ANDSF, the United States and coalition partners advise Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI) staff on planning, logistics, communications, and other administrative functions, as part of a broader effort to “institutionalize” ANDSF gains.

Over the course of the year, NATO member states and partners announced their commitments for the Resolute Support mission. At the end of 2018, 26 of the 29 NATO member states had made...
formal and informal pledges, and 13 non-NATO partner nations announced that they would
send troops to Afghanistan. Resolute Support reported that it has filled 94 percent of its
requested personnel slots for 2019. Table 4 shows NATO member and partner nation troop
contributions to the Resolute Support mission as of December 2018. These nations did not
make any official statements about their current and future troop levels following reports
that President Trump may withdraw troops from Afghanistan.

**ANDSF Force Strength Declines Slightly**

The size of the ANDSF declined slightly during the quarter. USFOR-A reported that as of
October 31, the ANA had 190,753 personnel and the ANP numbered 117,940 personnel.
This brings the total number of ANDSF personnel to 308,693, compared to 312,328
reported in July 2018 and more than 12 percent below the ANDSF authorized force strength of 352,000. In addition, National Special
Operations Component Command-Afghanistan reported that the ALP had approximately 28,000 personnel on hand and present for
duty. The ALP was created as a bilateral initiative of the U.S. and Afghan governments. Therefore, it is not included as part of the
352,000 authorized ANDSF force strength that international donors have agreed to fund.

In his December Senate confirmation hearing to be the next Commander of U.S. Central
Command, Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie said that current ANDSF force numbers
“are appropriate given the existing conditions on the ground.” In addition, the DoD noted
to the DoD OIG that ANDSF force levels fluctuate from month to month due to a variety
of reasons, including varying end-dates of enlistment contracts. The DoD reported that
personnel dropped from the rolls—ANDSF personnel who desert, go absent without leave,
or otherwise leave through unauthorized actions before the end of their contract—represent
the greatest portion of attrition. According to the DoD, the leading cause for personnel being
dropped from the rolls was poor leadership, followed by low or delayed pay, poor living
conditions, denial of leave, and insurgent intimidation.

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the U.S. military
component that oversees U.S. security assistance to the ANDSF, told the DoD OIG that
it is working with the ANDSF to improve its recruitment forecasting and force modeling
capability, particularly the alignment of recruiting with basic training courses.

**Inconsistencies in ANA Training**

Many new ANA recruits fail to complete basic warrior training, a 13-week course delivered
in Kabul. CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that of the 2,949 recruits enrolled in courses that
ended during the quarter, 87 percent graduated. However, graduation rates for the courses
since 2017 have varied between 46 percent and 100 percent, as shown in Figure 6.
The MoD is considering a decentralization of basic training to the regional military training centers. The result of this change, CSTC-A said, would be “further reducing training efficiency, essential branch-specific schooling, resulting in soldiers being ill-equipped for duty with the ANA field force.”

According to an MoD directive, all ANA graduates of basic warrior training should proceed immediately to advanced training for a specialized military role at one of the ANA’s 12 branch schools. However, this does not occur. CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that in November 2017, the MoD Chief of General Staff issued guidance that all basic training graduates be immediately assigned to their units, which then decide whether or not the soldier should attend advanced training. During the quarter, training utilization rates at most ANA branch schools were below 25 percent, as shown in Table 5. The number of available slots and instructors, in addition to number of students, may affect these training rates. As noted in previous Lead IG quarterly report, no Resolute Support participating nation has offered to sponsor the Combat Service Support branch schools, which train soldiers for military careers in logistics, human resources, and finance.

**Territorial Force Expands, Alters Recruiting Strategy**

USFOR-A reported to the DoD OIG that as of the end of December, there were 16 operational ANA Territorial Force (ANA-TF) companies, an increase from 9 operational companies reported in September. The MoD established the ANA-TF earlier in 2018 to serve as a “hold force” in security-permissive locations, allowing other ANA personnel to focus on tactical offensive operations. ANA-TF soldiers are locally recruited and under the command of the regionally organized ANA Corps.
Table 5.
Training Utilization Rates of ANA Branch Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>October</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Arms Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Branch School</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Branch School</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Branch School</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Support Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Branch School</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Branch School</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police Branch School</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Service Support Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Branch School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources Branch School</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Branch School</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Training utilization rates for the General Services branch schools (legal, religious/cultural affairs, and public affairs) were not available.

Source: Resolute Support

Last quarter, USFOR-A reported that the ANDSF failed to recruit any soldiers for two ANA-TF companies in Ghazni and Paktika provinces. USFOR-A explained to the DoD OIG that the ANA Recruiting Element was unable to build personal relationships with local leaders in those areas and, as a result, those leaders expressed no interest in having ANA-TF companies in their communities. In November, President Ghani directed the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, a body that liaises with local leaders, to assume the lead role in identifying districts that may be interested. While this change to ANA-TF recruiting practices may prompt more district leaders to participate in the program, USFOR-A acknowledged that some communities may still choose not to participate.

According to USFOR-A, the Afghan government will continue to expand the ANA-TF with the intention of training 21,000 ANA-TF soldiers by 2020. The ANA-TF will be part of the 227,374 authorized force strength for the ANA. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that there are 22 companies currently in training, and 6 planned companies that will be established next quarter. The 6 planned companies, which will comprise up to 121 soldiers each, will undergo training and then return to their home communities in Farah, Paktika, and Ghazni provinces.

As AAF Fleet Grows, Pilot Training Does Not Keep Pace

The DoD reported that it continued to provide equipment and training to the Afghan Air Force (AAF), in accordance with the Afghan Aviation Modernization Plan. Under the plan, the size of the AAF fleet will roughly triple by 2023 compared to the size of the fleet in 2016. USFOR-A reported that the AAF had 125 useable aircraft in December 2018, compared to 107 in September. (See Figure 7) Most of this growth is attributable to the phased introduction of UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and MD-530 helicopters to the fleet.
In December, 25 AAF aircraft, mostly Mi-17 helicopters, were not usable. The AAF had 9 A-29 light attack aircraft based in the United States for pilot training, in addition to 12 usable A-29s in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{125}

However, the AAF has not been able to train enough pilots to keep pace with its rapidly growing fleet. The UH-60 program, for example, has not filled all of its pilot classes due to attrition and lack of candidates, USFOR-A said.\textsuperscript{126} The DoD said that because the initial fielding of the UH-60s occurred nearly two years earlier than initially planned, the throughput of pilot candidates initially lagged the pace of aircraft fielding. In addition, some UH-60 pilots who were in the United States for training went AWOL. The DoD has ended U.S.-based training for rotary wing pilots and is conducting it in other locations.\textsuperscript{127}

Training of MD-530 pilots is also unable to keep pace with projected expansion due to low numbers of pilot candidates. The A-29 pilot training program, conducted at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, is training a sufficient number of pilots, USFOR-A said. Continued pilot production will depend on full program resourcing as it transfers to Afghanistan by 2021.\textsuperscript{128}

Ultimately, USFOR-A seeks to build a cadre of Afghan pilots who can eventually assume responsibility for training future air crews. The 9th AETF-A reported to the DoD OIG that in December, the AAF had 53 instructor pilots who can train on the MD-530, A-29, C-208, and C-130 platforms. Of those instructor pilots, 18 are also evaluator pilots who have the skill and authority to determine whether a student pilot is qualified to fly missions.\textsuperscript{129} The 9th AETF-A said that it does not set a target number of instructor pilots. Instead, instructor pilots are chosen based upon their performance and professionalism as aviators.\textsuperscript{130}
Table 6.

Class A Accidents in 2018 Involving AAF Mi-17s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Circumstances</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 2018</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>Crash during taxi</td>
<td>Cause unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 26, 2018</td>
<td>Mazar-e Sharif</td>
<td>Rotor strike due to tail boom contact</td>
<td>Wind out of limits for engine start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12, 2018</td>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>Crash</td>
<td>Cause unknown, crash site could not be accessed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 31, 2018</td>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>Crash</td>
<td>Cause unknown, crash site could not be accessed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 9, 2018</td>
<td>Jowzjan</td>
<td>Rotor strike due to tail boom contact</td>
<td>Personnel approached aircraft prior to being cleared by crew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12, 2018</td>
<td>Faryab</td>
<td>Crash</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 9th AETF-A

Mi-17 Safety and Overuse Concerns

The Russian-made Mi-17 helicopter remains the workhorse of the AAF, performing more mission sorties than any other platform in the fleet during the quarter. Under the AAF modernization plan, the DoD is providing U.S.-made helicopters to the AAF and Special Mission Wing in order to gradually phase out the M-17 by 2023. In the meantime, a string of accidents in 2018 prompted concerns that the AAF is devoting insufficient time and resources to Mi-17 safety and maintenance.

The AAF Safety Office reported six accidents in 2018 involving Mi-17s, listed in Table 6, that resulted in fatalities and/or major damage (known as a “Class A” accident). The list includes an October accident in Shindand district of Herat province that killed 21 people, including senior Afghan government officials. The 9th AETF-A told the DoD OIG that it cannot verify the causes of these accidents, and in some cases the AAF investigation is ongoing. However, it appears that at least some accidents were the result of pilot error, such as a pilot not checking or ignoring wind limitations.
In addition, the 9th AETF-A told the DoD OIG that the AAF routinely exceeds recommended flight hours for the Mi-17. In October 2018, the AAF averaged 40.6 flight hours per month on its Mi-17s, far more than the recommended 25 hours per month. In November and December 2018, Mi-17 utilization rates decreased to 28.7 hours per month, still exceeding recommendations for the airframe. The 9th AETF-A reported that the AAF routinely exceeds recommended flight hours on the MD-530 as well. As noted above, a large portion of the Mi-17 fleet is unusable because the aircraft are due for or undergoing maintenance and repair, which may put pressure on the AAF to overuse the available Mi-17 aircraft. Use of an aircraft beyond recommended flight hours can increase the risk of mechanical failures and shortens the interval between required overhauls, which can take an Mi-17 off-line for close to a year, leaving fewer Mi-17s available for operations.

**Challenges in Building Air, Ground Maintenance Capacity**

The DoD reported that building the capacity of the ANDSF to maintain its vehicles and aircraft is a critical component to the long-term sustainability of the force. In the AAF, Afghan maintenance staff performed a smaller percentage of maintenance tasks compared to the previous quarter, as shown in Table 7. The DoD noted that the share of Afghan maintenance tasks may vary from month to month based on operational tempo, phased maintenance, and the complexity of maintenance tasks. In addition, limited English language skills among Afghan maintenance staff and fleet usage above AAF policy continue to pose challenges as the AAF develops its maintenance capacity.

As discussed in detail in the Lead IG quarterly report for the third quarter of FY 2018, the DoD seeks to transfer responsibility for 100 percent of ANA ground vehicle maintenance tasks to the MoD and 90 percent of ANP ground vehicle maintenance tasks to the MoI over a period of 5 years. The DoD supports the development of ANDSF maintenance capacity through a hybrid service and training program under the National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Systems contract. The DoD OIG is currently conducting an audit of this contract.

### Table 7.

**Percent of AAF Maintenance Performed by Afghans**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airframe</th>
<th>April 2018</th>
<th>September 2018</th>
<th>December 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60A</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: USFOR-A*
Powerbrokers, Politics, and Security

Afghanistan has a long history of powerbrokers who control government and security in various parts of the country. Even with a central government in Kabul, powerbrokers remain a key feature of Afghanistan’s political life and security structure. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported to the DoD OIG that powerbroker activities “primarily revolve around cooperation and support for the political process as a means of leverage to benefit their individual illicit activities and political goals.” These individuals, who include current members of parliament, national government leaders, and regional leaders, may shape the outcome of the upcoming presidential elections, scheduled to take place in July 2019. The DIA assessed that powerbrokers are weaker than they were 4 years ago, “but remain powerful enough to challenge Kabul’s authority.”

Powerbrokers can also affect security because of their connection to regional militias. These militias include local protection forces for ethno-tribal or criminal interests, forces that cooperate with the Afghan government to provide local security, and units that are fully integrated into the ALP. In September 2018, Resolute Support assessed that 70 ALP personnel nationwide were working for powerbrokers, down from 219 the previous quarter.

The assassination of Kandahar police chief Abdul Raziq on October 18 highlighted the role that powerbrokers can play in regional stability and instability. The Afghan government postponed elections in the province amid fear that Raziq’s death would create a power vacuum. Similarly, in July, President Ghani arrested the leader of a pro-government militia commander in Faryab province, sparking violence and protests. The commander was aligned with 1st Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum, who recently formed a political alliance to oppose President Ghani in the upcoming election. The crisis, USFOR-A said, “degraded ANDSF operations in the area and likely contributed in part to successful Taliban attacks in the Northwest.”

Further discussion of powerbrokers and militias can be found in the classified appendix to this report.

(continued on next page)
### Powerbrokers, Politics, and Security
(continued from previous page)

Table 8.
Prominent Afghan Powerbrokers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOHAMMAD ATTA NOOR</td>
<td>Former Governor, Balkh Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABDUL RASHID DOSTUM</td>
<td>First Vice President</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before stepping down in March 2018, Atta maintained security in Balkh province, seizing land for his retainers and providing them government positions. He engaged in assassinations of political opponents and committed other abuses. Security in Balkh has declined since March, and there have been reports of clashes between competing criminal patronage networks in Balkh, the type of dispute which Atta would routinely arbitrate.

Dostum remains restricted to Kabul following his July return from exile in Turkey, and has been unable to negotiate for the full release of his lieutenant, Nizamuddin Qaisari, whose July arrest precipitated Dostum’s return. The continued deterioration of security in Faryab province suggests Dostum’s militias are less effective than in the past.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOHAMMAD MOHAQQEQ</td>
<td>Second Deputy CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISMAIL KHAN</td>
<td>Former Governor, Herat Province</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mohaqeq leads one of two main factions of Hizb-I Wahdat-e Islami, centered in Balkh province, but with supporters throughout the Hazara powerbase. Mohaqeq maintains strong ties with Iran, and even praised Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps General Qassem Soleimani and Afghan volunteers who supported activities in Syria in late 2017. He has been intensely critical of Ghani’s administration. In January 2019, Mohaqeq announced that he will run for vice president on a ticket led by former National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar.

Khan remains an influential figure in Jamait-I Islami- Afghanistan and opposition politics. He is strongly critical of Ghani’s administration and the continuing U.S. presence, but he lacks the large militias and popular loyalty that he held a decade and a half ago. He is the Grand National Coalition of Afghanistan (GNCA) opposition alliance’s lead on peace talks with the Taliban, seeking direct talks with minimal or no government involvement, and was recently named as a representative on President Ghani’s peace consultative council.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR</td>
<td>Leader, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABDUL RAZIQ</td>
<td>Former Kandahar Police Chief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hekmatyar retains significant pockets of support scattered among Pashtun communities, despite not having a geographic base of operations or support. Hekmatyar wants U.S. forces to leave Afghanistan, but he is also extremely critical of Iran. He is also critical of the GNCA—most of whose members have ties to Iran—and will likely not support any presidential ticket supported by the GNCA.

After Raziq’s assassination in October, control of his network went to his younger brother, Tadin. Tadin’s appointment prevented an immediate collapse of Kandahar security forces, but it remains to be seen how effectively Tadin will be able to control Raziq’s overall network.

Source: DIA
SUPPORT TO MISSION

DoD Begins FY 2019 with Full Year Appropriations, DoS and USAID End Quarter with a Shutdown

On September 21 and 28, two appropriation bills were enacted that provided full-year FY 2019 funding for some federal departments and agencies, including the DoD. This legislation provided the DoD with a total of $685.6 billion in FY 2019, which includes $616.8 billion in base funding and $68.8 billion in overseas contingency operation (OCO) funding.\textsuperscript{150} This total represents an increase of approximately 2.2 percent from FY 2018’s total DoD appropriation of $671.1 billion and a 4.4 percent increase in the OCO budget from the FY 2018 appropriation of $65.9 billion.\textsuperscript{151} For the first time since FY 2009, the DoD’s annual appropriation was enacted before the fiscal year began, and the DoD was able to begin executing its budget immediately without the need for a continuing resolution.\textsuperscript{152}

Within the DoD’s OCO appropriation for FY 2019, the bills provide $4.9 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the principal funding stream for U.S. support to sustain the ANDSF.\textsuperscript{153} This is an increase of approximately 5.4 percent from the FY 2018

Figure 8.
Total DoD War-Related Appropriations and Obligations from September 11, 2011 through September 30, 2018

\textbf{$1.566$ Trillion Appropriated, $1.538$ Trillion Obligated}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Noble Eagle: $28B
  \item Afghanistan (OEF/OIF): $742B
  \item Iraq (OIF/OND/Post-OND Activities/OIR): $758B
  \item Total OCO Appropriation
\end{itemize}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Total DoD War-Related Appropriations and Obligations from September 11, 2011 through September 30, 2018}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Note:} Obligation data shown by year of appropriation. Excludes classified programs and non-war OCO appropriations.

\textbf{Sources:} DoD Comptroller
enacted level of $4.7 billion but more than 5.4 percent less than the President’s request of $5.2 billion. Most ASFF funding is executed by the DoD through contracts for goods and services that support the ANDSF, but a smaller percentage of this funding is provided directly to the MoD and MoI for immediate requirements, such as military and police salaries. According to the DoD Comptroller, $151.1 million was disbursed from the ASFF to the MoD and $10.4 million to the MoI during this quarter.155

A series of continuing resolutions provided short-term funding for the DoS and USAID for most of this quarter. However, appropriations for these and other Federal departments and agencies expired on December 22, resulting in a partial government shutdown, during which essential DoS and USAID personnel reported for duty without pay and all other employees were furloughed.156 The partial government shutdown ended on January 25, 2019.

Cost of War: $3 Billion per Month Spent in Afghanistan

In December, the DoD Comptroller released the DoD’s congressionally-mandated quarterly Cost of War report, which details the DoD’s spending on overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria through September 30. According to this report, the DoD has spent $1.5 trillion in support of contingency operations since September 11, 2001. The total cost of operations in Afghanistan over that time was $737.6 billion, of which $157.9 billion has been obligated in support of OFS since that operation began in 2015.157

The Comptroller reported that the DoD obligated $41.2 billion for OFS during FY 2018, which was $1.3 billion less than the amount spent on OFS in FY 2017. Average monthly spending on all OCO in FY 2018 was reported at $3.7 billion, of which $3 billion was in
support of operations in Afghanistan. According to the DoD Comptroller, these obligations cover all expenses related to the conflicts, including war-related operational costs, support for deployed troops, and transportation of personnel and equipment.\textsuperscript{158}

USFOR-A’s implementation of the South Asia strategy called for an increase in personnel in Afghanistan in FY 2019 above the estimate included in the President’s FY 2018 Budget. The DoD Comptroller submitted an amendment to this budget, which included an additional $1.2 billion to support an increase in U.S. forces. Of this funding, $836.8 million was designated for Army operating forces. Other major costs included Navy weapons maintenance, Navy weapons support, Army logistics, and pay and benefits for U.S. military personnel.\textsuperscript{159}

**Number of DoD Contractors in Afghanistan at 3-Year High**

The DoD reported to the DoD OIG that there were approximately 14,000 military personnel in Afghanistan supporting OFS during the quarter, as shown in Figure 9.\textsuperscript{160} However, U.S. troop numbers at the end of the quarter may have been lower following the departure of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) in November. The 2nd SFAB is scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan in the spring.

While the number of U.S. military and civilian personnel remained constant, the number of contractors increased by nearly 14 percent during the quarter, reaching the highest level since the 1st quarter of FY 2016. The greatest growth during the quarter was among contractors who perform logistics/maintenance, management/administrative, and training tasks.\textsuperscript{161} Figure 10 displays the tasks performed by contractors during the quarter.

![Figure 10. Contractors in Afghanistan by Function, 1st Quarter FY 2019](image)
OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

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OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

This section of the report provides information on Lead IG strategic planning efforts; completed, ongoing, and planned Lead IG and partner agencies’ oversight work related to audits, inspections, and evaluations; Lead IG investigations; and Lead IG hotline activities from October 1 through December 31, 2018.

However, due to the lapse in appropriations, the DoS OIG provided only limited information about its oversight activities during the quarter.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Pursuant to Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, the Lead IG develops and implements a joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each overseas contingency operation. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed oversight, management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects. The Lead IG agencies issue an annual joint strategic plan for each operation.

FY 2019 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan Activities

In April 2015, upon designation of the DoD IG as the Lead IG for OFS, the three Lead IG agencies developed and implemented a joint strategic oversight plan for comprehensive oversight of OFS. That oversight plan has been updated each year. The FY 2019 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan, effective October 1, 2018, included the strategic oversight plan for OFS and organized OFS-related oversight projects into five strategic oversight areas: 1) Security, 2) Governance and Civil Society, 3) Humanitarian Assistance and Development, 4) Stabilization and Infrastructure, and 5) Support to Mission. The strategic plan was included in the FY 2019 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S.-funded activities supporting overseas contingency operations, including those relating to Africa, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. The Joint Planning Group meets quarterly to provide a forum for information sharing and coordination of the broader Federal oversight community, including the military service IGs and audit agencies, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and the OIGs from the Departments of Justice, the Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security.

The most recent meeting in November 2018 featured Mark Swayne, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs. He provided an overview of the 2018 joint DoD-DoS-USAID Stabilization Assistance Review and the proposed framework for maximizing the effectiveness of U.S. Government efforts to stabilize conflict-affected areas.
Lead IG Strategic Oversight Areas

SECURITY

Security focuses on determining the degree to which the OCO is accomplishing its mission to defeat violent extremists by providing security assistance to partner security forces. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Conducting counterterrorism operations against violent extremist organizations
- Training and equipping partner security forces
- Advising and assisting partner security forces
- Advising and assisting ministry-level security officials

GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Governance and Civil Society focuses on the ability of the host nation, at all government levels, to represent and serve its citizens. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Building or enhancing host-nation governance capacity, including the ability to sustainably resource its activities and services
- Countering and reducing corruption, social inequality, and extremism
- Promoting inclusive and effective democracy, civil participation, and empowerment of women
- Promoting reconciliation, peaceful conflict resolution, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces, and other rule of law efforts
- Fostering sustainable economic development activities
- Encouraging fair distribution of resources and provision of essential services
- Supporting sustainable and appropriate reconstruction activities

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Humanitarian Assistance and Development focuses on aid intended to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity during and after conflict, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for such crises. Distinct and separate from military operations, activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Providing food, water, medical care, emergency relief, and shelter to people affected by crisis
- Building resilience by supporting community-based mechanisms that incorporate national disaster risk reduction, emergency preparedness, and humanitarian response systems
- Assisting and protecting internally displaced persons and returning refugees
- Setting the conditions which enable recovery and promote strong, positive social cohesion

(continued on next page)
Lead IG Strategic Areas  (continued from previous page)

STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Stabilization and Infrastructure focuses on U.S. Government efforts to enable persons affected by the contingency operation to return to or remain in their homes with the expectation of basic security, and government and public services. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Removing explosive remnants of war
- Planning for security forces acceptable to local populations
- Repairing infrastructure and buildings
- Reestablishing utilities and public services
- Supporting local governance structures and reconciliation
- Setting conditions for resumption of basic commerce
- Planning for the provision of humanitarian assistance

SUPPORT TO MISSION

Support to Mission focuses on the United States’ administrative, logistical, and management efforts that enable military operations, empower host-nation governance, and provide humanitarian assistance to the local population. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Ensuring the security of U.S. personnel and property
- Providing for the occupational health and safety of personnel
- Supporting the logistical needs of U.S. installations
- Managing government grants and contracts
- Administering government programs

AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION ACTIVITY

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations. Some oversight staff from the Lead IG agencies are stationed in offices in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, and Germany. Oversight teams from these offices and from offices in the United States travel to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other locations in the region to conduct fieldwork for their projects.

This quarter, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies completed nine reports related to OFS. These reports examined various activities that support OFS, including foreign assistance programs, munitions management, construction, and oversight of U.S. purchased equipment. As of December 31, 2018, 31 projects were ongoing, and 37 projects were planned.
OFS-Related Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspection of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
ISP-I-19-11; October 31, 2018

The DoS OIG conducted this inspection of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to assess the Bureau’s executive direction, program and policy implementation, resource management, and management controls.

The DoS OIG determined that the Bureau had increased internal control risks for Leahy vetting, visa ineligibility determinations, and foreign assistance management due to staffing shortfalls and the lack of an effective strategic planning process. For example, the Department’s system of record for implementing Leahy laws did not include all Leahy cases originating in Afghanistan.

Also, the Bureau had increased risk of waste, fraud, mismanagement, and delays in modernizing information technology systems used to conduct Leahy vetting due to insufficient staffing and oversight. Finally, the Bureau did not dedicate sufficient staff, training resources, or strategic direction to prepare human rights assessments related to visa processing and sanction functions.

The DoS OIG made 10 recommendations. These recommendations related to instituting a formal, periodic process to develop policy goals, monitor results, and align resources with priorities; developing internal control procedures for the Leahy program; and developing and implementing a project plan to modernize information technology systems. Other recommendations addressed training on international religious freedom and human rights assessments. Management agreed with the recommendations.

Inspection of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Foreign Assistance Program Management
ISP-I-19-12; October 31, 2018

The DoS OIG conducted this inspection to determine whether the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s foreign assistance program management was consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980. The inspection covered the foreign assistance program management’s policy implementation, resource management, and management controls.

The DoS OIG determined that the Bureau’s foreign assistance program took steps to strengthen internal controls, but 11 of 26 direct-hire positions in the Office of Global Programming were vacant. The Bureau did not systematically conduct and document site visits in accordance with monitoring plans, and the Bureau did not update risk assessments and monitoring plans annually for seven of the 13 grant files reviewed. The Bureau returned $6.6 million in canceled funds to the U.S. Treasury, despite having the statutory recategorization authority to extend most foreign assistance appropriations.
Finally, the Bureau did not accurately record expenditures of foreign assistance grants into the DoS’s financial system, creating the potential for violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act. For example, the Bureau incorrectly billed expenditures for a cooperative agreement to prevent gender-based violence in September 2017 that benefitted multiple countries including Afghanistan.

The DoS OIG made six recommendations. These recommendations involved implementing quality control procedures to regularly update risk assessments and monitoring plans and update document site visits in accordance with these plans. The other recommendations related to identifying and classifying foreign assistance funds and modifying grant processes to accurately record expenditures and monitor grant irregularities. Management agreed with the recommendations.

**OFS-Related Final Reports by Partner Agencies**

**AIR FORCE AUDIT AGENCY**

**Munitions Management**  
F2019-001-RA0000; November 7, 2018

The Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) conducted this audit to determine whether U.S. Air Forces Central Command personnel accounted for, safeguarded, and stored munitions in accordance with DoD and Air Force guidance. This audit was conducted in four locations, including at Bagram and Kandahar Airfields in Afghanistan.

The AFAA determined that U.S. Air Forces Central Command personnel properly accounted for and safeguarded munitions. However, the AFAA also found that personnel at two locations stored incompatible munitions together, and stored munitions outdoors without proper coverage or protection as required by Air Force guidance and technical orders.

The AFAA recommended the U.S. Air Forces Central Command, Directorate of Logistics, Munitions Branch Commander, establish periodic oversight verifying compliance with Air Force and technical order outdoor munitions storage requirements. Management agreed with the recommendation.

**GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE**

**SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: U.S. Advising of Afghan National Army Has Expanded since 2015, and the U.S. Army Has Deployed a New Advising Unit**  
GAO-19-251R; December 19, 2018

The GAO conducted this audit to examine the evolution of the DoD’s approach for advising the Afghan National Army and the actions the Military Services have taken to meet additional advisor requirements. This report is a publicly releasable version of a classified report that GAO issued in September 2018.

The GAO found the DoD’s approach has evolved from primarily advising at the corps and ministry level in 2015 to also advising at the tactical level by 2017. The GAO also found that the DoD increased the number of military advisors over an expanded geographic area.
These changes corresponded to the U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia, which was updated in August 2017.

The GAO further found that the Army provided the majority of the troop increase, including the deployment of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade. The GAO found the Army had challenges with this deployment including issues related to manning and training, but the Army is collecting “lessons learned” from this deployment to inform the continued development of the Security Force Assistance Brigade.

**AFGHANISTAN SECURITY: Some Improvements Reported in Afghan Forces’ Capabilities, but Actions Needed to Enhance DoD Oversight of U.S.-Purchased Equipment**

GAO-19-116; October 15, 2018

The GAO conducted this audit to determine whether the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) has the capability and capacity to operate and sustain U.S.-purchased weapon systems and equipment, and to what extent does the DoD have information about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment.

The GAO determined that the ANDSF has continued to improve its capabilities, but relies on coalition forces to fill several critical capability gaps. The ANDSF relies on contractors and coalition forces for assistance in weapons and equipment sustainment, which solve immediate capability gaps, but potentially prolongs reliance on such support. Furthermore, the GAO determined that the DoD has first-hand information on the abilities of the Afghan Air Force and Special Security Forces to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, but has little reliable information on the proficiency of conventional ANDSF units to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. The GAO found that the DoD has reliable information on the Afghan Air Force and Special Security Forces because U.S. and coalition advisors are embedded at the tactical level and can directly assess those forces’ abilities. However, the advisors have little direct contact with conventional ANDSF units on the front lines. Therefore, the DoD relies on unit self-assessments of tactical abilities that can be unreliable.

The GAO analyzed three critical U.S.-purchased equipment types to identify the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment: tactical radios, Mobile Strike Force Vehicles, and MD-530 helicopters. For tactical radios, the GAO found that DoD officials could not say how well ANDSF personnel operate radios in the field, and had only limited information on the ANDSF’s ability to maintain radios. For the Mobile Strike Force Vehicles, the GAO found that DoD officials were able to provide information on the Special Security Forces’ ability to operate and maintain the vehicles, but had limited information on how well the conventional forces operate and maintain them. For MD-530 helicopters, the GAO found that the Afghan Air Force could conduct operations for short intervals without contractor support, but relied on contractors to perform the majority of maintenance and sustainment activities.

The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense should develop and implement options for collecting reliable information on the ANDSF conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. Management agreed with the recommendation.
Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase III: Facility Construction and Renovation Generally Met Contract Requirements, but Three Construction Deficiencies Increased Safety Risks
SIGAR 19-09-IP; December 28, 2018

SIGAR conducted this inspection to determine whether the construction and renovation work of the ANA Camp Commando Phase III was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and if the facilities were being used and properly maintained. In December 2012, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded a $14.9 million contract to ECC CENTCOM Constructors LLC to design, construct, and renovate the phase III facilities at Camp Commando in Kabul, Afghanistan. The contract required the construction of seven new facilities and renovation of four existing buildings. After 11 modifications, the contract’s value increased by $2.5 million to $17.4 million. The contractor completed the construction and renovation work in June 2014. In July 2014, the facilities were transferred to the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD).

SIGAR found that the construction and renovation work generally met contract requirements. However, SIGAR also identified three construction deficiencies that raised safety concerns for building occupants should a fire occur. SIGAR determined that certified fire-rated interior doors were not installed in the renovated buildings, noncertified doors were installed as part of the fire barrier that separates the kitchen from the serving and dining areas, and 19 of the 33 fire extinguishers installed by the contractor were counterfeit, and six more were missing.

SIGAR also determined that the Camp Commando phase III facilities are being used and maintained, but there are some issues with the facilities. Broken panic hardware on the dining facility’s exit doors has resulted in three of the six exit doors being locked from the outside. In that same building, only one of the three exits in the dining area is available during an emergency evacuation. ANA personnel also converted two of the renovated classroom buildings into barracks and obstructed the exit by installing lockers. In another building a permanent wall was installed blocking the exit corridor of the building.

SIGAR recommended that the ANA be notified of the following potential safety hazards: noncertified doors in the renovated buildings; noncertified rolling counter doors in the dining facility; counterfeit fire extinguishers installed throughout the facilities; blocked exits in the dining facility and one of the new barracks; and obstructed exit corridors in one of the training classroom buildings that were converted into barracks. Management agreed with the recommendation.

Bridges in Kabul Province, Afghanistan: Six Bridges Are in Generally Good Condition, But Afghan Government Lacks Budget for Sustained Maintenance
SIGAR 19-08-SP; December 4, 2018

SIGAR conducted this project to examine bridges throughout Afghanistan that were constructed or rehabilitated using Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds. This report includes SIGAR’s observations from six such bridges in Kabul province. The total cost for the six projects was approximately $610,000.
SIGAR determined that the location information maintained in DoD systems was accurate, and less than one kilometer from the geospatial coordinates contained in DoD files. They also determined that the six bridges appeared to be in generally good condition. The only concern that SIGAR identified was the lack of a sustainment plan or fund for eventual maintenance.

The report contained no recommendations, but SIGAR was concerned that without sustained maintenance by the Afghan government, there is reasonable risk that the bridges will fall into disrepair.

**Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and Interior**

SIGAR 19-03-AR; October 26, 2018

SIGAR conducted this audit to evaluate the extent to which the DoD assesses its advising efforts to the Afghan MoD and MoI; tracks advisors assigned to the MoD and MoI; and trains its advisors for their assignments. Since 2010, the DoD has awarded four contracts totaling $1.62 billion to DynCorp International of which two are ongoing worth $421 million. These contracts support the DoD advisors that help Afghan MoD and MoI personnel improve resource management, procurement, logistics, maintenance capabilities, and overall sustainability. The audit covered the time period January 2015 to April 2018.

SIGAR determined that the DoD did not use its own guidance to assess whether its advisory efforts were meeting the goals and milestones of the program. Second, the DoD did not track progress because the advising goals and rating system used to measure progress changed frequently, and currently the DoD does not have a baseline to measure progress. Third, the DoD cannot measure progress of its ongoing contracts with DynCorp because DoD does not have measurable performance standards to assess the contractor’s performance, which is inconsistent with Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements. Fourth, SIGAR found that the DoD does not track and report when personnel are assigned to advising duties if they are already in Afghanistan. Finally, SIGAR determined that the DoD does not mandate pre-deployment advisor training, and during the audit Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) highlighted poor training as a key challenge to the advising efforts.

SIGAR recommended that the DoD comply with its own policies related to security cooperation assistance; incorporate specific, measurable performance standards into present and future ministerial advising contracts; develop a system to track assignments and reassignments of advisors; and enforce existing pre-deployment training for advisors to the Afghan MoD and MoI. Management agreed with these recommendations.

**Afghan National Police Women’s Compound at the Ministry of Interior: Construction Generally Met Requirements, but Use and Maintenance Remain Concerns**

SIGAR 19-04-IP; October 26, 2018

SIGAR conducted this inspection to determine whether the Afghan National Police (ANP) women’s compound within the MoI headquarters was constructed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and is being used and properly
maintained. The facility, which cost $3.1 million to construct, includes barracks, a childcare center, a conference center, and an administration building.

SIGAR found that the compound generally met contract requirements. However, SIGAR identified several deficiencies including improper fire extinguishers, barracks room doors without locks, and inoperable heaters. SIGAR notified the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, who directed the contractor to correct these deficiencies, and the contractor did so.

SIGAR also found that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did not consistently enforce its three-phase quality control inspection process, reducing its ability to oversee the contractor. SIGAR further found that while the ANP is using the compound, it is only partially using some facilities and other facilities not at all.

SIGAR recommended that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers enforce its requirements for personnel to adhere to its three-phase quality assurance inspection process, to include requiring the contractor to conduct all meetings during the preparatory and initial phases of work under the contract. Management agreed with the recommendation.

**ONGOING OVERSIGHT PROJECTS**

As of December 31, 2018, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 31 ongoing projects related to OFS. Tables 9 and 10 list the title and objective for each of these projects. Figure 11 describes the ongoing projects by strategic oversight area.

USAID OIG’s ongoing oversight projects for USAID activity in Afghanistan, which are unrelated to OFS, are listed in Table 11.

**Ongoing OFS Oversight Projects**

The following sections highlight some of the ongoing OFS-related projects by strategic oversight area.

**SECURITY**

The DoD OIG is evaluating U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) procedures for counter-intelligence screening, vetting, and biometric processes for force protection in Afghanistan. The DoD OIG is also evaluating the U.S. and coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators and Air Liaison Officers meet air-to-ground integration activities.

The GAO is auditing the extent to which the DoD has modified its approach for U.S. military personnel to advise and assist partner forces based on lessons learned. The GAO is also reviewing the Afghanistan Security Force Fund Training contracts.

SIGAR is auditing the Afghan Air Force’s ability to operate and maintain U.S.-provided aircraft. SIGAR is also auditing the DoD’s efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Army with ScanEagle Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

SIGAR is auditing the DoD’s strategy and programs to develop the MoD’s and MoI’s anticorruption initiatives.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

There are no ongoing oversight projects relating to Humanitarian Assistance and Development for OFS.

STABILIZATION

SIGAR is inspecting the ANA Garrison at South Kabul International Airport to determine whether the construction and utility upgrades were completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and whether the facilities are being used and maintained. SIGAR is also inspecting the ANA’s Northeastern Electrical Interconnect Power System in Pul-e-Khumri, and the Women’s Compound at the ANA Regional Training Center in Jalalabad.

SUPPORT TO MISSION

The DoD OIG is evaluating the theater linguist support for OFS to determine whether USCENTCOM and U.S. Army Intelligence Security Command have developed and implemented processes for satisfying contract linguist requirements. The DoD OIG is evaluating the V-22 Osprey Engine Air Particle Separator Design to determine if the air particle separator effectively protects the engine in high desert environments. The DoD OIG is also auditing the National Afghan Trucking Services 3.0 Contract to determine whether the Army provided proper oversight.

The DoS OIG is auditing the physical security features for the U.S. Embassy in Kabul as it relates to contract requirements and industry standards. The DoS OIG is evaluating the Camp Eggers Guard Housing contract termination to determine the reason for the failure to complete the contract terms and the extent to which the expenditures exceeded the budgeted amount.

The GAO is auditing the extent to which the DoD has separated amounts designated as overseas contingency operations from base amounts in the operations and maintenance accounts.

SIGAR is auditing the Afghanistan Integrated Support Services’ Technical Equipment Maintenance Program Contract, and the procurement of M2 Machine Guns for the ANA.

The Army Audit Agency is auditing reach-back contracting support to determine whether the Army has an effective plan, procedures, and organizational structure in place to directly provide contracting support during contingency and expeditionary operations.
### Table 9.
**Ongoing Oversight Projects by Lead IG Agency, as of December 31, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Evaluation of Theater Linguist Support for OFS</em></td>
<td>To determine if USCENTCOM and U.S. Army Intelligence Security Command have developed and implemented processes for satisfying Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan and OFS contract linguist requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of DoD’s Management of Cybersecurity Risks for Purchasing Commercial Items</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the DoD is assessing and mitigating cyber security risks when purchasing and using select commercial items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of the National Maintenance Strategy Contract in Afghanistan</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the DoD effectively developed the requirements for the National Maintenance Strategy contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the DoD implemented the Afghan Personnel and Pay System to accurately pay and track Afghan forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Summary Audit of Systemic Weaknesses in the Cost of War Reports</em></td>
<td>To summarize any systemic weaknesses in DoD’s accounting for costs associated with ongoing contingencies identified in <em>Cost of War</em> audit reports issued between 2016 and 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Army Oversight of National Afghan Trucking Services 3.0 Contract</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the Army provided oversight of the National Afghan Trucking Services 3.0 contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Evaluation of the V-22 Osprey Engine Air Particle Separator</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the V-22 Program Office developed the Engine Air Particle Separator to protect its engines in desert environments to increase the safety of the DoD personnel and maintain mission readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators and Air Liaison Officers</em></td>
<td>To evaluate whether U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators and Air Liaison Officers meet air-to-ground integration identified in operational plans and applicable policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Evaluation of OFS Force Protection Screening and Biometric Vetting Operations</em></td>
<td>To determine whether USFOR-A has effective procedures for conducting force protection counter-intelligence screening, biometrics, and vetting operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of Physical Security Construction in Kabul, Afghanistan</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations and other DoS stakeholders managed the construction of physical security features at U.S. Embassy Kabul’s newly constructed facilities to ensure that they met industry standards and contract requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Table 10.
Ongoing Oversight Projects by Lead IG Partner Agencies, as of December 31, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lessons Learned from Office of Inspector General Audits Concerning the Review and Payment of Contractor Invoices for Overseas Contingency Operations Contracts</strong></td>
<td>To identify 1) common challenges identified in DoS OIG’s series of invoice review audits and measures to address them; 2) best practices identified in DoS OIG’s audits that can be replicated across the DoS to improve the invoice review process for overseas contingency operations; and 3) the invoice review practices of other U.S. Government agencies involved in overseas contingency operations that can be adopted by the DoS to improve the efficacy of its invoice review process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation of Camp Eggers Guard Housing Contract Termination</strong></td>
<td>To determine the reason for the contractor’s failure to fulfill the contract terms and for the expenditures significantly increasing over the initial budgeted amount.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY AUDIT AGENCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Reach-Back Contracting Support</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the Army has an effective plan, procedures, and organizational structure in place to directly provide contracting support during contingency/expeditionary operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Advise and Assist Mission in Afghanistan</em></td>
<td>To review 1) the extent to which DoD, in conjunction with NATO, has defined advisor team missions, goals, and objectives; 2) the extent to which advisors were trained and equipped for their specific missions in Afghanistan; 3) the ability of the Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigade to meet current and future advisor requirements in Afghanistan and elsewhere; 4) what adjustments, if any, are being made to the manning, training and equipping, and deployment of the second and third Security Force Assistance Brigades; and 5) any other issues the Comptroller General determines appropriate with respect to the advise and assist mission in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Review of Afghanistan Security Force Fund Training Contracts</em></td>
<td>To review the DoD’s Afghanistan Security Force Fund (ASFF) training contracts to include the following key questions 1) what are the budgets, funding sources and transactions for all ASFF training contracts during FY 2017-2019; and 2) to what extent does DoD have processes and procedures to ensure that ASFF training contracts’ costs and pricing are reasonable, and contracts are executed in accordance with all applicable contracting laws, regulations and trade agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Feasibility of Separating Amounts Designated as OCO from Base Amounts</em></td>
<td>To determine 1) to what extent has the DoD included internal controls in its processes to account for OCO-designated amounts separately from amounts designated for base activities in the Operations &amp; Maintenance account; 2) what process, if any, does the Department of the Treasury use to account for OCO-designated amounts separately from amounts designated for the DoD base activities in the Operations &amp; Maintenance account; 3) to what extent do the DoD’s and Treasury’s processes to account for OCO-designated amounts separately from amounts designated for base activities in the Operations &amp; Maintenance account follow generally accepted accounting principles; and 4) what alternative approaches could be used to account for OCO-designated amounts separately from amounts designated for base activities in the Operations &amp; Maintenance account, and whether the DoD or Treasury have assessed any alternatives.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan Air Force’s Ability to Operate and Maintain U.S.-Provided Aircraft</th>
<th>To determine the extent to which the 1) aircraft the United States plans to provide the Afghan Air Force (AAF) address validated capability gaps identified by both the DoD and the MoD; 2) DoD synchronized the recruitment and training of aircrews and other critical personnel with estimated aircraft delivery schedules; and 3) DoD and the MoD have developed and implemented a plan to support the operation and maintenance of AAF aircraft provided by the United States that includes steps to address capability gaps within the AAF.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Women’s Compound at the Afghan National Police Regional Training Center–Jalalabad</td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the facilities are being used and properly maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives and Programs in the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior</td>
<td>To review DoD’s strategy and programs to develop the MoD’s and the MoI’s anti-corruption initiatives, DoD’s oversight of these efforts, and their efficacy and to determine 1) the extent of DoD’s efforts related to combatting corruption within the MoD and the MoI; 2) assess the effectiveness of DoD efforts to address corruption at the MoD and the MoI; and 3) identify specific challenges, if any, to the DoD’s efforts to promote anti-corruption initiatives at the MoD and the MoI, and how DoD is working to overcome those challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Integrated Support Services—Technical Equipment Maintenance Program Contract Follow-Up—Vehicle Spare Part Cost</td>
<td>To review the Technical Equipment Maintenance Program contract to 1) determine Afghanistan Integrated Support Services’ requirements for the purchase of spare parts for vehicle maintenance under the National Army’s Technical Equipment Maintenance Program contract; 2) describe weaknesses in the contractor’s purchasing practices, and identify the steps taken to minimize the impact of spare part cost increases; 3) determine the costs of spare parts purchased by Afghanistan Integrated Support Services over the course of the contract and compare costs of those spare parts to spare parts purchased through the Foreign Military Sales system; and 4) assess additional costs paid by CSTC-A for Afghanistan Integrated Support Services’ maintenance practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of Construction and Utility Upgrades for</strong></td>
<td>To inspect the construction and utility upgrades at the ANA garrison and determine whether 1) the construction and upgrades were completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the facilities and utilities are being used and properly maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>the Afghan National Army Garrison at South Kabul International Airport</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Defense’s Efforts to Train and Equip</strong></td>
<td>To assess the extent to which the DoD and its contractors 1) conducted the required oversight of the ScanEagle UAS contracts; 2) achieved their stated objectives and addressed implementation challenges; and 3) enabled the Afghan National Army to operate and sustain the ScanEagle UAS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procurement of M2 Machine Guns for the ANA</strong></td>
<td>To examine the DoD decision to provide the ANA with the M2 machine gun, and the method used by the DoD to procure and supply the weapons to the Afghan National Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. and Afghan Government Benefits to ANDSF Personnel Training in the United States</strong></td>
<td>To 1) examine benefits (and associated costs) provided to ANDSF personnel receiving official training in the United States; 2) identify the number of ANDSF trainees that have applied for asylum while receiving DoD funded training in the United States; and 3) examine the extent to which benefits change for ANDSF trainees following application to asylum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANDSF Small Arms Cleaning Materials</strong></td>
<td>To assess the quantity, cost, and appropriateness of materials provided to the ANA for small arms maintenance, from 2010 through December 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CERP Bridges: Ghazni</strong></td>
<td>To 1) determine if the location on record reflects the actual location of the bridges; and 2) assess the overall condition of the bridges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Divided Responsibilities for Security Sector Assistance in Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>To examine force generation, pre-deployment training, interagency coordination, synchronization of U.S. efforts with NATO, and the U.S. understanding of foreign military and police training programs outside of Afghanistan and external to NATO nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of the Afghan National Army’s Northeastern Electrical Interconnect Power System in Pul-e-Khumri</strong></td>
<td>To assess whether 1) construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the power system is being used and properly maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of the Women’s Compound at the Afghan National Police Regional Training Center in Herat</strong></td>
<td>To assess whether 1) construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the facilities are being used and properly maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of the Ministry of Commerce and Industries’ New Administrative Building in Kunduz</strong></td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the system is being used and properly maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of the Demolition and Construction of a Hangar at the Afghan National Army and Train Advise Assist Command–Air’s Joint Aircraft Facility I</strong></td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the hangar is being used and properly maintained.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ongoing USAID OIG Projects in Afghanistan

USAID OIG has ongoing oversight projects related to USAID’s activities in Afghanistan, which do not involve OFS-related programs or activities. As of December 31, 2018, USAID OIG had 24 ongoing oversight projects pertaining to USAID’s non-OFS-related activities in Afghanistan related to agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth, education, gender promotion, health and nutrition, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance. Table 11 provides the project title and objective for each of these ongoing projects.

Table 11.
Ongoing USAID OIG Oversight Projects in Afghanistan, as of December 31, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of The Asia Foundation</strong></td>
<td>To audit the Survey of the Afghanistan People, Grant 306-G-12-00003, for the period October 1, 2015, to April 30, 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of Purdue University</strong></td>
<td>To audit the Strengthening Afghanistan Agricultural Faculties grant 306-A-00-11-00516 for the period from July 1, 2015, to December 31, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of ICF Macro, Inc. Demographic and Health Surveys</strong></td>
<td>To audit contract AID-OAA-C-13-00095 for the period from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of Roots of Peace</strong></td>
<td>To audit the Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program cooperative agreement 306-A-00-10-00512 for the period from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of Tetra Tech ARD</strong></td>
<td>To audit the Initiative to Strengthen Local Administration contract AID-306-C-15-00005 for the period from October 1, 2015, to September 30, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of Ministry of Education</strong></td>
<td>To audit the Basic Education, Learning and Training program for the period from December 21, 2014, to June 30, 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.</strong></td>
<td>To audit Services under Program Project Offices for Results Tracking, contract AID-306-C-12-00012, for the period from July 5, 2016, to April 4, 2018; and Assistance for development of Afghan Legal Access, contract AID-306-TO-16-00007, for the period from April 15, 2016, to September 30, 2017.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ACA Financial Audit of Di-Democracy International

To audit Afghanistan Electoral Reform and Civic Advocacy, cooperative agreement 306-A-00-09-00522, for the period from January 1, 2016, to June 30, 2017.

### ACA Financial Audit of FHI 360


### ACA Financial Audit of ID-International Government Services, LLC

To audit Monitoring Support Project-South West Provinces TO 2, contract AID-306-TO-15-00070, for the period from August 9, 2015, to August 10, 2017.

### ACA Financial Audit of IRD-International Relief and Development

To audit Engineering, Quality Assurance, Contract number is 306-C-00-11-00512, for the period from January 1, 2016, to April 17, 2016; and Kandahar Food Zone KFZ, cooperative agreement 306-AID-306-A-13-00008, for the period from October 1, 2016, to December 31, 2017.

### Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s New Development Partnership (NDP)

To audit USAID/Afghanistan’s New Development Partnership to determine if USAID/Afghanistan has 1) adequately verified the achievement of completed indicators under the NDP for any payments made to date; and 2) adopted internal policies and procedures to adequately verify the achievement of NDP indicators contained in the July 25, 2015, NDP results framework.

### Follow-Up Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Multi-tiered Monitoring Strategy

To audit USAID’s Multi-Tiered Monitoring Strategy for Afghanistan to determine the extent that USAID has used its multi-tiered monitoring strategy to manage programs and serve as the basis for informed decision making.

### PLANNED OVERSIGHT PROJECTS

As of December 31, 2018, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 37 planned projects related to OFS. Tables 12 and 13 list the project title and objective for each of these projects. Figure 12 describes the planned projects by strategic oversight area.

The following highlights some of the planned OFS oversight projects by strategic oversight area.

#### SECURITY

The [DoD OIG](https://www.dodiis.mil) intends to evaluate whether the Military Services are providing enough credentialed counter-intelligence personnel to meet OCO requirements.

[SIGAR](https://www.dodiis.mil) intends to audit Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units to determine the extent to which the units are achieving their goals. SIGAR is also planning to audit the Afghan Air Force’s use and maintenance of MD-30, A-29, and PC-12 aircraft, and examine the Security Force Assistance Brigade’s efforts in Afghanistan and their effects on ANDSF capabilities.
GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

SIGAR intends to review DoD's Gender Advising programs for the MoD and MoI, and to audit CSTC-A’s efforts to implement conditionality through its commitment letters with the MoD and MoI.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

There are no additional planned oversight projects relating to humanitarian assistance for OFS.

STABILIZATION

SIGAR intends to audit DoD’s Women Participation projects to determine if the planning and use of Afghan National Army and Police facilities were built for female members and their families. SIGAR also intends to inspect the Afghan National Army’s MoD headquarters’ infrastructure and security improvements.

SUPPORT TO MISSION

The DoD OIG intends to audit whether the DoD military services and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service accurately calculated hostile fire pay and imminent danger pay, family separation allowance, and combat zone tax exclusion for combat zone deployments.

The DoS OIG plans to audit the Aviation Working Capital Fund cost center to determine whether the fees collected were sufficient to cover all costs required to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The DoS OIG also plans to audit the DoS’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons to determine whether the administration and oversight of grants complied with Federal regulations and DoS guidance. Another DoS audit will determine whether DoS contractors providing armoring services to the DoS comply with contract terms and conditions.

The Army Audit Agency plans to audit Army prepositioned stock to determine whether munitions were properly managed and maintained.

The Air Force Audit Agency plans to audit container management to determine whether personnel maintained accountability and effectively determined requirement for containers within the U.S. Central Command region.

SIGAR intends to audit the DoD’s end use monitoring of equipment purchased for the ANDSF. SIGAR also intends to conduct a follow-up audit of the Afghan National Police personnel and payroll systems.
Table 12.
Planned Oversight Projects by Lead IG Agencies, as of December 31, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of the DoD Counterintelligence Workforce Capacity Development</td>
<td>To determine whether the Military Services are providing enough credentialed counter-intelligence personnel to meet OCO requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Department of Defense Military Payroll for Combat Zone Entitlements</td>
<td>To determine whether the DoD military components and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service accurately calculated hostile fire pay, imminent danger pay, family separation allowance, and combat zone tax exclusion for combat zone deployments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Aviation Working Capital Fund Cost Center</td>
<td>To determine whether the fees collected by the Aviation Working Capital Fund cost center were sufficient to cover all costs required to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of DoS Armored Vehicle Procurement Process</td>
<td>To determine whether DoS contractors are providing armoring services to the DoS that comply with contract terms and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Administration and Oversight of Grants within the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons</td>
<td>To determine to what extent the DoS Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons’ administration and oversight of grants are in accordance with applicable Federal acquisition regulations and DoS guidance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13.
Planned Oversight Projects by Lead IG Partner Agencies, as of December 31, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE AUDIT AGENCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container Management</td>
<td>To determine whether personnel maintained accountability and effectively determined requirements for containers within the Air Forces Central Command area of responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Office of Special Investigations Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Funds</td>
<td>To determine whether Air Force Office of Special Investigations officials effectively managed and accounted for emergency and extraordinary expense funds at deployed locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY AUDIT AGENCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Prepositioned Stock 3: Munitions Management</td>
<td>To determine if Army Prepositioned Stock 3 munitions were properly managed and maintained, and that quantities were based on authorized stock levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Review of Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units</strong></td>
<td>To audit Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units to 1) determine the extent to which counternarcotic police specialized units are achieving their goals; 2) assess the oversight of salary payments made to personnel in the specialized units; and 3) assess the long-term sustainability of the specialized units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of its PC-12s</strong></td>
<td>To review lessons learned for the Afghan Special Mission Wing’s use and maintenance of its fleet of PC-12s and assess 1) the extent to which the Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s; and 2) the DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s, including any contracts the DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of its A-29 Fleet</strong></td>
<td>To 1) describe the DoD’s process for selecting the A-29 as a platform for the Afghan Air Force; 2) assess the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the A-29, including the DoD’s measures for determining success; 3) assess the DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the A-29s, including any contracts the DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services; and 4) determine the extent to which the Afghan Air Force will be able to sustain this fleet in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of its MD-530 Fleet</strong></td>
<td>To 1) describe the DoD’s process for selecting the MD-530 as a platform for the Afghan Air Force; 2) assess the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the MD-530, including the DoD’s measures for success; 3) assess the DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the MD-530s, including any contracts the DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services; and 4) determine the extent to which the Afghan Air Force will be able to sustain this fleet in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan’s Efforts to Implement Conditionality through its Commitment Letters with the Ministries of Defense and Interior</strong></td>
<td>To 1) identify the conditions CSTC-A has included in its commitment letters with the MoD and the MoI, and how these conditions have changed over time; 2) assess the extent to which the MoD and MoI met those conditions; and 3) assess the extent to which CSTC-A implemented the penalties described in the commitment letters when the MoD and MoI did not meet those conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DoD’s Gender Advising Programs for the Ministries of Defense and Interior</strong></td>
<td>To 1) identify the DoD’s gender-related goals for the MoD and MoI, and determine how the DoD has incorporated these goals in its strategies, plans, and other directives related to its ministry advising efforts; 2) identify how the DoD measures the results of its gender-advising efforts and the extent to which these efforts have been met and are effective; and 3) identify what impediments, if any, may be prohibiting greater success in gender-related areas of improvement at the MoD and MoI, and how the DoD is addressing those issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procurement, Use, and Maintenance of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</strong></td>
<td>To 1) describe the process(es) by which the DoD develops intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance for the ANSDF; 2) assess the extent to which the DoD oversees these procurement processes; 3) assess the extent to which the DoD evaluates the performance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance once fielded and makes adjustments, if needed; and 4) review DoD's plans for sustaining this equipment once fielded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation of DoD’s Follow-on Contract to Operate and Maintain Critical ANDSF Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>To assess the extent to which: 1) the follow-on national maintenance contract for critical ANDSF infrastructure is achieving its contractual requirements and DoD’s broader goal of developing the ANDSF’s capacity to independently operate and properly maintain this infrastructure, and 2) the U.S. Corps of Army Engineers developed measurable performance standards for the follow-on national maintenance contract to enable evaluation of work performed against those standards, and assess the contractor’s performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of DoD’s Women Participation Projects</strong></td>
<td>To review the planning and use ANA and ANP facilities built for female members of the ANDSF and their families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Review of the Security Force Assistance Brigades in Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>To examine the efforts of Security Force Assistance Brigade in Afghanistan and their effect on ANDSF capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Review of CSTC-A’s Vaccines for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police</strong></td>
<td>To review CSTC-A’s procurement and management of vaccines for the ANA and ANP including vaccination schedules and distribution plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of ANDSF Pharmaceutical, Medical, and Surgical Materials (Class VIII)</strong></td>
<td>To assess the extent to which DoD and the ANDSF 1) developed and validated ANDSF Class VIII needs; 2) provided needed Class VIII supplies in accordance with DoD and ANDSF requirements; and 3) oversee the proper storage, maintenance, and usage of Class VIII supplies and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit to the Train Advise Assist Command-Air (TAAC-Air) Training Program</strong></td>
<td>To assess the extent to which 1) the procurement of training services was done in accordance with the terms of the contract(s); 2) TAAC-Air provided administrative, logistical, and operational support to Air-to-Ground Integration personnel; and 3) TAAC-Air has been able to recruit, train, and retain sufficient and qualified Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators (ATACs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of the DoD’s End Use Monitoring of Equipment Purchased for the ANDSF</strong></td>
<td>To determine the extent to which the DoD 1) has implemented an end use monitoring program in accordance with Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act; 2) is conducting post-delivery monitoring, both routine and enhanced, of end-use items; and 3) is reporting and investigating end-use violations in accordance with applicable regulations, policies, and procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DoD’s Use of Funds Appropriated to Recruit and Retain Women in the ANDSF</strong></td>
<td>To determine 1) how much of the funding Congress appropriated to support women in the ANDSF DoD has spent and identify the efforts the department has implemented using this funding; 2) how the DoD selects which efforts to fund; and 3) how these efforts have promoted recruitment and retention of women in the ANDSF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Project Title

**Inspection of the Women's Participation Program—New ANP Women’s Compound, Jalalabad**

To determine the extent to which 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of ANA Mazar-e Sharif A29 Repair Taxiway**

To determine the extent to which 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of ANA-ANP NEI Kunduz/Asqalan**

To determine the extent to which 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of Women’s Participation Program—ANP Kabul Police Academy 2**

To determine the extent to which 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of ANA NEI Camp Shaheen/Dahti Shadian**

To determine the extent to which 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of ANA AEI Electrical Infrastructure MFNDU/Darulaman/Commando**

To determine the extent to which 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of ANA MOD HQ Infrastructure & Security Improvements**

To determine the extent to which 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of Women’s Participation Program—New ANP Women Compound, Gardez**

To determine the extent to which 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of Women’s Participation Program—ANP Regional Training Center PD-9 Training Building**

To determine the extent to which 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of ANP MOI HQ Entry Control Points, Parking, and Lighting**

To determine the extent to which 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of ANA AEI Electrical Infrastructure Pol-i-Charkhi**

To determine the extent to which 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.
**Project Title** | **Objective**
--- | ---
*Inspection of ANA KNMH Entry Control Point 1&2* | To determine the extent to which 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.

*U.S. Efforts to Counter Drug Trade-Related Funding in Afghanistan* | To 1) identify the strategies and polices that guide U.S. Government counternarcotics activities and efforts to counter Afghan terrorists' and insurgents' drug trade-related sources of funding; 2) identify the activities and how much funding the U.S. Government has directed to counter Afghan terrorists' and insurgents' drug trade-related sources of funding; 3) assess the extent to which the involved U.S. Government agencies measure and evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts to counter Afghan terrorists' and insurgents' drug trade-related sources of funding; and 4) identify the challenges that impact U.S. Government’s efforts and how they are addressed.

*Follow-up Audit of Afghan National Police Personnel and Payroll Systems* | To assess 1) the processes by which CSTC-A, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Afghan government collect personnel and payroll data for ANP personnel assigned and present-for-duty; 2) how CSTC-A, UNDP, and the Afghan government store, access, transfer, and use this data; and 3) the extent to which CSTC-A, UNDP, and the Afghan government verify and reconcile ANP personnel and payroll data to determine the accuracy of the data.

**INVESTIGATIONS**

During the quarter, the investigative components of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies continued to conduct criminal investigations related to OFS. The Lead IG agencies use criminal investigators forward deployed to the region, as well as criminal investigators in the United States, to investigate OFS-related fraud and corruption. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the criminal investigative component of the DoD OIG, has an office in Bagram Airfield and in Kabul, within the NATO Resolute Support Compound. The DoS OIG maintains an office in Frankfurt, Germany, from which investigators travel to Afghanistan.

In addition, these investigative components continue to investigate “legacy” cases pertaining to actions committed during Operation Enduring Freedom, which concluded in December 2014. USAID OIG also conducts investigations in Afghanistan that are unrelated to OFS.

**OFS Investigative Activity**

Lead IG investigations this quarter included one arrest, one criminal charge, and two convictions. The two convictions were the result of guilty pleas stemming from two investigations by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command; one for conspiracy to defraud the U.S. Government, and one for possession of a machine gun. The arrest and criminal charge are related to a joint DCIS and SIGAR fraud investigation discussed on page 62.

Investigative branches of DoS OIG and DoD OIG and their partner agencies closed 9 investigations, initiated 11 new investigations, and coordinated on 37 open investigations. The
ACTIVITY BY FRAUD AND CORRUPTION
INVESTIGATIVE WORKING GROUP

OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL
As of December 31, 2018

OPEN INVESTIGATIONS
35

Q1 FY 2019 RESULTS

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criminal Charges</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Convictions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspensions/Debarments</td>
<td>—/—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Actions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative Actions</td>
<td>—</td>
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</table>

Q1 FY 2019 ACTIVITY

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases Opened</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases Closed</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q1 FY 2019 BRIEFINGS

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Briefings Held</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefings Attendees</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Some investigations are joint with more than one agency and some not joint with any other agency. Therefore, the total number of Joint Open Cases may not equal the total number of Open Cases. Open Cases as of 12/31/2018.
investigations involve a variety of alleged crimes including procurement fraud, corruption, grant fraud, theft, program irregularities, computer intrusions, and trafficking-in-persons. This quarter, the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group conducted 37 fraud awareness briefings for 333 participants.

**Former Contractor Indicted for Allegedly Selling Falsified Resumes and Counterfeit Training Certificates**

Based on a joint investigation with SIGAR and DCIS, a former U.S. Government contractor was arrested and charged in an indictment filed on December 12, 2018, for his alleged role in selling falsified resumes and counterfeit U.S. Government training certificates to individuals seeking employment on U.S. Government contracts in Afghanistan between 2012 and 2015. Antonio Jones was charged in the District of South Carolina with one count of conspiracy to defraud government contractors and the United States, nine counts of wire fraud and three counts of false statements. The indictment alleges that Jones created an entity known as Wolverine Inc., through which he offered job placement services to clients seeking employment with U.S. Government contractors in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Jones allegedly falsified his clients’ resumes and manufactured counterfeit U.S. Government training certificates for his clients to make them appear more qualified than they actually were. Jones and his clients then used the falsified documents in job applications that were submitted to U.S. Government contractors. At least two contractors, including one based in South Carolina, working on a multibillion-dollar DoD contract, hired personnel allegedly based on false documents that Jones created and supplied or caused to be supplied to them.

A consolidated depiction of the OFS-related activities of these investigative components during this quarter is shown in the dashboard on the previous page, and an example of investigative activity is provided below.

**Investigative Activity Related to Legacy Cases**

The Lead IG and its partner agencies have 28 ongoing “legacy” case involving the OFS area of operation that occurred prior to the designation of OFS.

**Former Recruiter of U.S. Military Language Interpreters Indicted for Alleged Scheme That Resulted in Unqualified Language Interpreters Being Deployed with U.S. Combat Forces in Afghanistan**

Based on a legacy Operation Enduring Freedom investigation by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, assisted by SIGAR, a former recruiter of U.S. military language interpreters was indicted in connection with his role in an alleged scheme to recruit unqualified language interpreters to be deployed with U.S. combat forces in Afghanistan in 2011 and 2012. Abdul Aman, 34, of Fairfax, Virginia, was charged in the District of Maryland with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud and one count of major fraud against the United States. The indictment alleges that Aman, while working as a recruiter for a U.S. Government contractor, circumvented procedures designed to ensure that candidates for jobs as language interpreters for the U.S. military met minimum proficiency standards, which resulted in unqualified language interpreters being hired and later deployed alongside U.S. combat forces in Afghanistan.
Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation to Pay $28.5 Million for False Claims Act Violation

Based on a legacy Operation Enduring Freedom investigation conducted jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, Falls Church, Virginia, agreed to pay a total of $27.45 million to settle False Claims Act allegations. The civil settlement with the Department of Justice was based on allegations that Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation overstated the number of hours its employees worked on two battlefield communications contracts with the Air Force while working in the United Arab Emirates from 2010 through 2013, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Additionally, Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation agreed to forfeit $4.2 million in a separate agreement to resolve a criminal investigation into fraudulent billing on the contract. Criminal charges were dropped against Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation in exchange for admitting its employees’ misconduct, making full restitution, and agreeing to cooperate in the ongoing criminal investigation.

Afghan Company Admits to Paying Gratuities for Kandahar Contracts

The U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of North Carolina, filed a three-count criminal information procedure, charging Hikmat Shadman Logistics Services Company with one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and two counts of providing a gratuity to a public official. A forfeiture notice for $190,000 was also filed. These actions are based on a legacy Operation Enduring Freedom investigation conducted jointly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, SIGAR, and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command.

Hikmat Shadman, an Afghan national, owned and operated the company and provided transportation and logistics support to U.S. forces operating in and around Kandahar, Afghanistan. Former Captain David Kline was deployed to Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan, from January 2008 to April 2009, and was the officer in charge of the Movement Control Team that facilitated the award and payment of transportation contracts to local Afghan vendors to move supplies such as fuel and military equipment. Former Sergeant 1st Class Robert Green was also deployed as part of the Movement Control Team and was supervised by Kline. Kline and Green have previously entered guilty pleas to receiving gratuities from Shadman during this deployment for and because of favorable contract actions. Green admitted to receiving approximately $140,000 and Kline admitted to receiving approximately $50,000. On January 3, 2019, the corporate plea was accepted and Shadman’s company was sentenced to a fine of $810,000 and five years’ probation. At that time, a hearing for the civil settlement was scheduled for February 14, 2019.

USAID OIG Investigative Activity in Afghanistan

The USAID OIG Afghanistan office consists of two Foreign Service national investigators and one investigative analyst located in Kabul, Afghanistan, along with three Foreign Service criminal investigators based in Washington, D.C. Two of the three D.C.-based criminal investigators returned to Kabul following the restoration of funding in late January.

During the quarter, the USAID OIG received 23 new allegations. As of December 31, 2018, USAID OIG continued to maintain 13 open investigations, including one joint investigation with SIGAR involving Afghanistan-related programs and operations. The office submitted...
four information only referrals to USAID/Afghanistan, one to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, and one to the USAID prime implementer Development Alternatives Inc. In addition, the USAID OIG conducted nine fraud awareness briefings in Afghanistan during the quarter for 134 participants.

HOTLINE ACTIVITY

This quarter, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies opened 53 cases because of hotline complaints. Hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means to report allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse without fear of reprisal. Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency. The OIG hotline representatives process the complaints they receive and refer these complaints to the appropriate entity in accordance with their respective protocols. Any hotline complaint that merits referral is sent to the responsible organization for investigation or informational purposes.

The DoD OIG employs an investigator to coordinate the hotline contacts received among the Lead IG agencies and others, as appropriate. Some hotline complaints include numerous allegations that result in multiple cases. However, not all complaints result in the opening of investigative cases. The cases opened this quarter were referred within the DoD OIG and the IGs for the military services.

As noted in Figure 13, the complaints received during this quarter are related to personal misconduct and criminal allegations, procurement or contract administration irregularities, waste of Government resources, personnel matters, reprisal, safety and security, and trafficking in persons allegations.
APPENDICES

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A reflection from a puddle near Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. (DoD photo)
APPENDIX A

Classified Appendix to this Report

This classified appendix provides additional information related to counterterrorism and other activities in Afghanistan. The appendix will be delivered to appropriate government agencies and congressional committees.

APPENDIX B

Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Quarterly Report

This report complies with sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which requires that the designated Lead IG provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on an overseas contingency operation. The DoD IG is the designated Lead IG for OFS. The DoS IG is the Associate IG for the operation.

The USAID IG is designated by the Inspector General Act as the third IG responsible for overseas contingency operations, but USAID has no OFS-related programs or activities. However, the USAID OIG does conduct audits, investigations, and other activities in Afghanistan. USAID OIG coordinates those activities as appropriate, with other oversight entities.

This report contains information from the Lead IG agencies as well as from partner oversight agencies. This unclassified report covers the period from October 1, 2018, through December 31, 2018.
To fulfill its congressional mandate to produce a quarterly report on OFS, the Lead IG gathers data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, or evaluations mentioned or referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited all of the data and information provided by the agencies.

DATA CALL

Each quarter, the Lead IG directs a series of questions, or data calls, to federal agencies about their programs and operations related to OFS. Lead IG coordinates with the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), which also issues a data call to support its quarterly report, in developing the OFS data call to avoid duplication and minimize the burden on reporting agencies while maximizing the collective yield of the data calls. The Lead IG agencies use responses to these data calls to develop sections of the OFS quarterly report, as well as to inform decisions concerning future audits and evaluations.

Due to the partial government shutdown, only the Department of Defense and the Department of the Treasury responded to the data call. Personnel from the DoS and USAID were unavailable.

OPEN-SOURCE RESEARCH

This report also draws on the most current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report include the following:

- Information publicly released by U.S. Government agencies included in the data call
- Congressional testimony
- Press conferences, especially DoD and DoS Briefings
- United Nations (and relevant branches)
- Reports issued by non-governmental organizations
- Media reports

Materials collected through open source research provide information to describe the status of the operation and help the Lead IG agencies assess information provided in their agency data calls. However, the Lead IG agencies have not tested, verified, or independently assessed the assertions made by these agencies.

REPORT PRODUCTION

The Lead IG is responsible for assembling and producing this report. As the Lead IG, the DoD OIG coordinates with the DoS OIG and the USAID OIG, which draft sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies. Each of the three OIGs participates in reviewing and editing the entire quarterly report.

The DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG provide the agencies who have responded to the data call with two opportunities to verify and comment on the content of the report. During these reviews, agencies are asked to correct any inaccuracies and provide additional documentation. The three OIGs incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a final review for accuracy. Each OIG coordinates the review process with its own agency.

However, this quarter, due to the lapse in Federal appropriations and resulting partial government shutdown, the DoS OIG and USAID OIG did not participate in the production of this report. The DoS and USAID did not review this report or provide input. The DoS OIG and USAID OIG provided updated information about their oversight activities.
# Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Army Audit Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFAA</td>
<td>Air Force Audit Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA-TF</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Territorial Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghan Security Forces Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCIS</td>
<td>Defense Criminal Investigative Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNCA</td>
<td>Grand National Coalition of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Election Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>ISIS-K</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead IG</td>
<td>Lead Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead IG agencies</td>
<td>DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th AETF-A</td>
<td>9th Air Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>Overseas Contingency Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFS</td>
<td>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFAB</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>United States Forces-Afghanistan</td>
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Endnotes

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5. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/13/2018.
18. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/12/2018.
19. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/12/2018.
22. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/12/2018.
25. 9 AETF-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/16/2018; USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 9/24/2018.
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11. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/13/2018.
15. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/13/2018.
18. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/13/2018.
33. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/26/2018.
35. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/12/2018.
36. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/12/2018.
37. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/21/2018.
38. USFOR-A, responses to DoD OIG requests for information, 12/7/2018 and 12/26/2018.
40. USFOR-A, responses to DoD OIG requests for information, 12/7/2018 and 12/26/2018.
41. USFOR-A, responses to DoD OIG requests for information, 12/7/2018 and 12/26/2018.
44. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/12/2018.
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49. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/12/2018.
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54. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/26/2018.
56. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/26/2018.
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61. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/12/2018.
62. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/12/2018.
67. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/12/2018.
68. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/12/2018.
69. USFOR-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/17/2018.
70. USFOR-A, vetting comment, 2/5/2019.
74. According to data provided by USFOR-A, 21,161,144 Afghans (63.49 percent) live in districts rated as under Afghan government influence or control, out of a total population of 33,329,050. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR requests for information, 8/25/2018 and 12/26/2018.
75. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR request for information, 12/26/2018.
77. DoD OUSD(P), vetting comment, 2/5/2019.
78. DoD OUSD(P), vetting comment, 2/5/2019.
81. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR request for information, 12/10/2018.
82. DoD OUSD(P), response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/17/2018.
89. 9th AETF-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/16/2018.
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91. 9th AETF-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/16/2018.
94. 9 AETF-A, responses to DoD OIG request for information, 7/10/2018 and 9/24/2018.
95. 9th AETF-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/16/2018.
98. Resolute Support, website, “Mission.”
100. Resolute Support, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/16/2018.
101. Resolute Support, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/16/2018.
102. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR requests for information, 12/20/2018.
104. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR requests for information, 12/20/2018 and 1/19/2019.
105. DoD OUSD(P), response to DoD OIG request for information, 10/15/2018.
109. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/7/2018.
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129. 9 AETF-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/16/2018.
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131. 9 AETF-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/16/2018.
133. 9 AETF-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/16/2018.
135. 9 AETF-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/16/2018.
136. 9 AETF-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/16/2018.
137. 9 AETF-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/16/2018.
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147. USFOR-A, responses to SIGAR requests for information, 8/20/2018 and 12/12/2018.
159. DoD, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/8/2019.
160. DoD OUSD(P), response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/9/2019.

TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE RELATED TO OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND PROGRAMS, CONTACT:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOTLINE
dodig.mil/hotline
1-800-424-9098

DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOTLINE
oig.state.gov/hotline
1-800-409-9926 or 202-647-3320

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT HOTLINE
ighotline@usaid.gov
1-800-230-6539 or 202-712-1023