ABOUT THIS REPORT

In January 2013, legislation was enacted creating the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. This legislation, which amended the Inspector General Act, requires the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide quarterly reports to Congress on active overseas contingency operations.

The DoD Inspector General (IG) is designated as the Lead IG for Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines (OPE-P). The DoS IG is the Associate IG for OPE-P. The USAID IG participates in oversight for the operation.

The Offices of Inspector General of the DoD, DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. Other partner agencies also contribute to oversight of OPE-P.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out their statutory missions to:

- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the contingency operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and evaluations.
- Report quarterly to Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead IG agencies.

METHODOLOGY

To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies submit requests for information to the DoD, DoS, and USAID about OPE-P and related programs. The Lead IG agencies also gather data and information from open sources, including congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports.

The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, or evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the data and information provided by the agencies. For further details on the methodology for this report, see Appendix B.

CLASSIFIED APPENDIX

This report includes an appendix containing classified information about the U.S. counterterrorism mission in the Philippines. The Lead IG provides the classified appendix separately to relevant agencies and congressional committees.
FOREWORD

We are pleased to submit this Lead Inspector General quarterly report on Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines (OPE-P). This report discharges our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to the Inspector General Act.

The United States launched OPE-P in 2017 to support the Philippine government in its effort to counter Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) affiliates and other violent extremist organizations in the Philippines. In coordination with other U.S. Government agencies, the DoD conducts counterterrorism operations under OPE-P by, with, and through its Philippine partners.

In May 2017, approximately 1,000 ISIS-affiliated militants seized the city of Marawi, located in the southern Philippines with 200,000 residents, and held it for 5 months. Philippine forces, with U.S. assistance, liberated Marawi and killed nearly all of the ISIS fighters inside, including the group’s senior leaders. Since the siege of Marawi, the ISIS-affiliated groups in the Philippines have continued to carry out lower profile acts of violence, acting as a series of diffuse factions rather than a unified organization. Generally, these groups aim to disrupt a fragile peace agreement between former Islamist militants and the Philippine government.

This report’s Quarter in Review section includes an overview of the major developments in OPE-P, including the status of the conflict and strength of violent extremist organizations, U.S. capacity building support for Philippine security forces, diplomatic and political developments, and humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons and other civilians affected by the conflict.

The report also discusses the planned and ongoing oversight work conducted by the Lead IG Offices of the Inspector General and our partner oversight agencies during the period from October 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019.

Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on this contingency operation.

Glenn A. Fine
Principal Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties
of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

Steve A. Linick
Inspector General
U.S. Department of State

Ann Calvaresi Barr
Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International Development
On the Cover
(Top row): U.S. and Philippine Marines rush into a building during a close quarters battle training exercise (U.S. Marine Corps photo); U.S. and Philippine Seabees work together on a new two-classroom school at Malatgao Elementary School (U.S. Navy photo); A U.S. Navy landing craft approaches an amphibious transport dock ship in the Philippines (U.S. Marine Corps photo); Philippine Marines practice clearing the engine room aboard a ship in Ermita, Manila (U.S. Marine Corps photo). (Bottom row): A light armored vehicle fires its main gun during a training exercise at Colonel Ernesto Ravina Air Base, Philippines (U.S. Marine Corps photo).
MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL

I am pleased to present this Lead IG quarterly report on Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines (OPE-P).

This quarter, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) affiliates in the Philippines continued to engage in terrorist attacks against civilians and in armed combat with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The violent activity of these extremists was aimed at destabilizing the southern Philippines, as the region attempts to implement political reforms outlined in a 2019 peace agreement between the national government and former Islamist militants.

The Philippine government permitted martial law to expire in the southern Philippines on December 31, 2019, for the first time since May 2017. However, the Philippine government stated that it will continue to maintain an active counterterrorism campaign in the region.

This quarter, there was no significant change in the strength, capabilities, territory, or leadership of the Philippine ISIS affiliates. These terrorist groups, which range in size from several dozen to several hundred members, remain a destabilizing influence in an already volatile region. U.S. military advisors continue to advise and assist their Philippine partners in counterterrorism operations, particularly in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

According to USAID, approximately 70,000 residents of the city of Marawi have been displaced since the 2017 siege by ISIS affiliates destroyed much of the city’s infrastructure. Extended delays in reconstruction have exacerbated preexisting tensions between the local population and national government. An additional 232,000 residents were displaced this quarter by both armed conflict and natural disasters, further contributing to instability in the region.

My Lead IG colleagues and I will continue to report on and provide oversight of OPE-P and related U.S. Government activity in the Philippines, as required by the IG Act.

Glenn A. Fine
Principal Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense
CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................. 2

THE QUARTER IN REVIEW .............................. 5
  Status of the Conflict ................................ 5
  Capacity Building ...................................... 9
  Diplomacy and Political Developments ........... 11
  Humanitarian Assistance and Development ........ 12
  Budget and Execution ................................. 16

OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES ................................. 17
  Strategic Planning ..................................... 17
  Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Activity .......... 17
  Investigations and Hotline Activity ................ 19

APPENDICES ............................................... 20
  APPENDIX A
    Classified Appendix to this Report ................. 20
  APPENDIX B
    Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Quarterly Report ......................................... 20
  APPENDIX C
    Ongoing and Planned Oversight Projects .......... 22
    Acronyms .............................................. 24
    Map of the Philippines ............................. 25
    Endnotes .............................................. 26
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This quarter, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-East Asia (ISIS-EA) did not appear to demonstrate any changes in its strength, tactics, capabilities, or leadership structure in the Philippines, according to information provided by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). ISIS-EA remained confined to areas in the southern Philippines where it has historically operated and retains popular support.¹

On December 22, terrorists carried out a coordinated series of three bombing attacks on the island of Mindanao. The bombings took place the day before Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s visit to the regional capital of the recently established Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.² The presidential visit was in support of the 2019 peace agreement between former Islamist militants and the Philippine government, which led to the creation of this semi-autonomous regional government.³ However, ISIS-EA and other Islamist extremist groups reject the Bangsamoro peace deal, oppose the concept of regional autonomy, and maintain that they will fight for full independence from the Philippines, according to open source analysis.⁴

In mid-December 2019, President Duterte announced his decision not to extend the May 2017 declaration of martial law in the southern Philippines, allowing it to expire at the end of the year.⁵ While this ended the most intrusive military control in the region, such as curfews and warrantless searches, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) announced that its military presence in the region will not change, and its troops will continue to conduct an active counterterrorism campaign.⁶ Additionally, the region remains under a state of emergency, which provides Philippine security forces with special authorities to impose checkpoints and curfews in certain areas.⁷

U.S. military support to the AFP this quarter consisted primarily of advise and assist operations and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. USINDOPACOM stated that this support led to the neutralization of two “significant [ISIS-EA] targets” this quarter.⁸ U.S. military contractors also provided casualty evacuation support to Philippine troops wounded fighting ISIS-EA in the remote, mountainous regions of the Sulu archipelago.⁹

On November 5, the AFP killed three terrorists, including two Egyptians and one Filipino, who were likely planning a suicide attack.¹⁰ Although the Philippines has a long history of jihadist violence, historically the extremists have not employed suicide bombings. However, since mid-2018, terrorists have conducted or attempted five suicide attacks, although most of these involved foreign nationals.¹¹

USINDOPACOM reported to the DoD OIG its assessment that the recent increase in suicide bombings does not represent a major trend in the Philippines, and foreign fighters are not a significant presence.¹² A senior Department of State (DoS) official stated publicly this quarter that while Southeast Asia is not currently a major destination for ISIS affiliates, there is a risk it could become one without sustained efforts from the United States and regional partners.¹³
According to a DoS cable, the Philippine government’s extended delays in providing for the reconstruction of Marawi city has allowed violent extremist organizations (VEO) to regain a foothold in the area. Corruption scandals have also plagued the reconstruction efforts, according to the cable, which contributes to public perceptions that politically connected government contractors were benefitting at the expense of Marawi’s displaced residents and adds fuel to existing anti-government sentiments in the region.14

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) stated this quarter that the Philippine government demonstrated progress in meeting the shelter and water needs of the 70,000 Marawi residents who have been displaced since 2017.15 USAID estimated that 7,490 housing units were occupied, under construction, or planned for construction this quarter but estimated that an additional 4,455 units would be needed.16 USAID reported that permanent water supply was improving in Marawi’s transitional shelters, decreasing the need for water to be brought in by truck.17 However, Marawi evacuees testified to the Philippine Congress this quarter that they were only receiving about 30 percent of their daily water needs.18

This quarter, Lead IG and partner agencies had 10 oversight projects related to OPE-P ongoing and 7 projects planned. The investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partners closed one investigation and coordinated on three open investigations involving conflict of interest, fraud, and bribery.

ABOUT OPERATION PACIFIC EAGLE-PHILIPPINES

MISSION
On September 1, 2017, the Secretary of Defense designated Operation Pacific Eagle—Philippines (OPE-P) an overseas contingency operation. OPE-P is a counter-terrorism campaign conducted by USINDOPACOM, in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies, to support the Philippine government and its military forces in their efforts to counter ISIS affiliates and other priority violent extremist organizations in the Philippines.

HISTORY
The Philippines, an island nation with a predominantly Roman Catholic population, has struggled for decades with violent extremist separatist groups in the Muslim-populated regions of the country’s south. Many of these extremist groups, operating in the most impoverished parts of the country, are affiliated with international terrorist organizations.

The U.S. military conducted counterterrorism operations in the Philippines under Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines from 2002 until that operation concluded in 2015. In 2014, many of the Philippines’ local jihadist groups declared allegiance to ISIS. The international leadership of ISIS supported its Philippine branch with financing, media, foreign fighters, and recognition of its leader, Isnilon Hapilon, as the “emir” of ISIS in the Philippines. In May 2017, a force of approximately 1,000 ISIS-affiliated militants led by Hapilon seized the city of Marawi, a provincial capital with 200,000 residents, and held it for 5 months.

Philippine security forces liberated Marawi in October 2017 with U.S. assistance but suffered heavy casualties, including more than 160 dead. The fighting devastated the city’s infrastructure and displaced 353,000 residents of the city and surrounding area. Most of the ISIS-aligned fighters in the city, including Hapilon and his top lieutenants, were killed in the fighting.

Since then, ISIS affiliates in the Philippines have lacked a single leader. These groups now operate primarily along the lines of their constituent jihadist organizations, and ties with international ISIS leadership have been seriously weakened. However, the 300 to 500 remaining extremists who profess allegiance to ISIS continue to commit acts of violence to undermine peace and reconciliation in the southern Philippines.
STATUS OF THE CONFLICT

ISIS-EA Threat Remains Localized in Southern Philippines

According to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), there were no significant changes in ISIS-East Asia’s (ISIS-EA) capabilities, tactics, force strength, territory, or leadership structure this quarter. ISIS-EA continues to operate in areas of central Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago where it has historically enjoyed popular support, with no demonstrated capability to operate elsewhere in the country.

In response to questions from the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) about ISIS-EA’s capabilities and relationship with the international leadership of ISIS (ISIS-Core), USINDOPACOM provided no unclassified DoD-sourced information and instead referred the DoD OIG to available public information or noted the lack thereof. Specifically, USINDOPACOM based its responses on publicly available...
information indicating that ISIS-EA was incapable of carrying out large-scale attacks. USINDOPACOM previously defined “large-scale” attacks as having a casualty toll of more than 100, citing the 2002 Bali, Indonesia, bombings as an example.

In response to a question from the DoD OIG about the current size of ISIS-EA, USINDOPACOM cited publicly available information that the group had an estimated 300 to 500 members in the Philippines, similar to the last several quarters. USINDOPACOM stated that it relies on the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) estimates of the different factions that comprise ISIS-EA. This quarter, these estimates of ISIS-aligned militant groups in the Philippines included approximately 300 from ISIS-aligned Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) elements, 85 from the Esmael faction of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), 50 from the Maute Group, and 6 from Ansar Khalifah Philippines, similar to last quarter’s estimates.

More information about the activities, capabilities, and strength of ISIS-EA is contained in classified appendix.

**ISIS-EA Engages in Coordinated Attacks and Combat with the AFP**

**COORDINATED BOMBINGS TARGET SECURITY FORCES ON THE EVE OF PRESIDENT DUTERTE’S VISIT**

Three separate explosions in 3 different towns on the island of Mindanao wounded at least 17 people on December 22, according to AFP sources cited in the media. The first explosion occurred in Cotabato City, when terrorists threw a hand grenade into a military truck in front of a Catholic church, injuring nine soldiers and civilians. According to media reports citing an AFP spokesperson, this incident was immediately followed by 2 separate improvised explosive device attacks in the nearby towns of Libungan and Upi, injuring 12 civilians. The AFP spokesperson told reporters that ISIS-linked members of the BIFF were responsible for the attack in Cotabato City, but USINDOPACOM told the DoD OIG that as of the publication of this report, neither BIFF nor ISIS had claimed responsibility, and no perpetrator was confirmed.

These attacks took place approximately a week before the scheduled lifting of martial law in the region (see page 11) and the day before Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s planned visit to Cotabato City, the regional capital of the newly established Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The creation of this semi-autonomous region in January 2019 was the product of a peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a former Islamist militant separatist group.

The attacks did not impede the presidential visit, in which Duterte participated in the first ceremonial distribution of land titles to former MILF fighters under the terms of the 2019 peace agreement. The MILF leadership’s decision to enter into these negotiations for autonomy, rather than continue to fight for full independence, was the reason the BIFF split from the MILF in 2010. Although significantly smaller than the MILF in terms of both numbers and resources, the BIFF nonetheless remains a violent obstacle to peace in the region, and major factions of the group have declared allegiance to ISIS.
According to media reports, Duterte made statements in his December 23 speech to the MILF in Cotabato City that contradicted the terms of the peace deal, which expressly prohibits the development of an independent military or police force for the BARMM. In his speech, Duterte told the MILF chairman and acting administrator of the BARMM, Murad Ebrahim, to “arm yourself” and “you know how to kill terrorists.” This agreement to reserve responsibility for security to the national government was a key point of contention during the peace negotiations, according to media analysis. One week after Duterte’s visit, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana told reporters that Duterte’s comments should not be interpreted as an endorsement of creating an autonomous BARMM militia, but rather having local security personnel operate under AFP control.

PHILIPPINE FORCES ENGAGE IN HEAVY FIGHTING WITH THE BIFF ON MINDANAO

In early December, the AFP’s 33rd Infantry Battalion and 5th Special Forces Battalion engaged in heavy combat with the BIFF in Mamasapano and Shariff Aguak, two towns in central Mindanao where the BIFF has strongholds. The fighting resulted in the AFP overrunning nearly a dozen BIFF camps and killing at least seven militants. An AFP spokesperson told reporters that after the fighting was over, Philippine troops recovered heavy explosives, such as rocket-propelled grenades, grenade launchers, an anti-tank projectile, mortars, 34 improvised explosive devices, 10 rifles, and other small arms. USINDOPACOM told the DoD OIG that it did not have metrics on the number of AFP casualties but stated that “the general outcome was positive” and resulted in the removal of BIFF elements from the area and a reduction in violent extremist organization (VEO) activity.

This fighting resulted in a significant displacement of civilians, many of whom sought shelter in makeshift dwellings and other open spaces in neighboring communities, according to media reports. (For more on the impact of this fighting on the civilian population, see page 15.)

PHILIPPINE FORCES KILL SUSPECTED SUICIDE BOMBERS

An AFP spokesperson told reporters that three ASG fighters were killed in a clash with Philippine security forces in Indanan, Sulu, on November 5. The attackers, later identified as two Egyptians and a Filipino, were in possession of two suicide vests and detonators, a firearm, ammunition, and a hand grenade.

The AFP told reporters that soldiers set up a checkpoint in Indanan in response to reports of a planned suicide bombing in the metro area of Jolo, the capital of Sulu province. The suspects engaged with the soldiers at the Indanan checkpoint. The terrorists initiated a firefight that lasted approximately 5 minutes and resulted in the deaths of all three terrorists. No one else was killed in that incident.

The AFP stated that it believed the two Egyptian attackers were the husband and son of a female suicide bomber who had blown herself up at another military checkpoint in Indanan in September 2019, and a DNA test later confirmed her relationship to the son. The AFP
told reporters that the mother was involved in the twin church bombings that took place in Egypt on Palm Sunday 2017, which killed 43 people and wounded 126. Through its ISIS connections, the family had sought refuge with the ASG in Sulu, according to the AFP.38 AFP sources told the media that the Filipino terrorist was affiliated with ISIS-EA.39

Despite High-Profile Incidents, Foreign Fighter and Suicide Bombing Threat Remains Low

Last quarter, Philippine authorities arrested foreign fighters from Kenya, Jordan, and Sweden on various terrorism-related charges, and the Lead IG report last quarter discussed apparent trends toward increases in foreign terrorist fighters and suicide bombings in the Philippines. This quarter, USINDOPACOM stated that the individuals arrested last quarter were not linked to ISIS-EA, and publicly available information indicated that fewer than 20 foreign fighters were active in the Philippines.40

Media reports indicated that the Swedish national, arrested along with two local Muslim militants last quarter, was a member of an ISIS-linked group in Europe. The report stated that his local partners were connected to the ISIS-EA but provided no further information on the Swedish national’s affiliation. It was unclear whether the foreign nationals were in the Philippines to carry out attacks there or if they were gathering resources or training to conduct attacks or other operations elsewhere.41

Additionally, last quarter’s Lead IG report discussed the increase in suicide bombings in the Philippines, a country where VEOs have historically not engaged in these tactics. This quarter, USINDOPACOM said it still believes that the majority of Filipinos remain averse to conducting suicide attacks, stating that of the five suicide attacks that have occurred since mid-2018, including two that were disrupted, only two were carried out by Filipinos. USINDOPACOM stated that it anticipates that Filipino suicide attacks will remain rare and do not represent a significant new capability for ISIS-EA. U.S. military forces have not changed the nature of their operations in the Philippines as a result of these attacks, according to USINDOPACOM.42

This quarter, Ambassador Nathan Sales, the head of the Department of State (DoS) Bureau of Counterterrorism, told reporters that his office did not believe that the Philippines was a major destination for ISIS fighters. Ambassador Sales stated that ISIS-Core was actively encouraging its fighters to leave Iraq and Syria to carry out violence in other regions of the world, and there was “a clear indication of an interest” in Southeast Asia. However, he also noted that “it’s not one of the regions that ISIS fighters seem to be heading to in droves.”43 He stated that West Africa’s Sahel region, including parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, is a more pressing concern in the global campaign to defeat ISIS.44

While Ambassador Sales did not believe that Southeast Asia was a hotbed for ISIS affiliates, he added that the United States and its regional partners would need to work to ensure that it did not become one. Ambassador Sales told reporters that in order to prevent the relatively small ISIS- and al Qaeda-aligned groups from expanding their regional influence, the new Regional Counterterrorism Training Center the Philippine government is establishing with U.S. Government assistance will aim to deny terrorist groups the freedom of movement and financing that they need to expand their influence.45
Communist Rebels Complicate Counter-ISIS Fight

Unrelated to OPE-P and the fight against jihadist separatists in the southern Philippines, the AFP faces attacks from the communist New People’s Army (NPA) insurgency in the central-eastern region of the country. According to the DoS, the NPA formed in 1969 with the goal of overthrowing the Philippine government through guerrilla warfare. The NPA is strongly opposed to any U.S. presence in the country and carried out lethal attacks against U.S. military personnel in the 1990s. However, the DIA reported this quarter that it does not assess the NPA to be a major threat to U.S. interests in the Philippines at this time. The DoS designated the NPA foreign terrorist organization in 2002, and the Philippine government estimates that the group has approximately 4,000 members.

This quarter, the AFP stated that 6 soldiers were killed and 23 wounded in an improvised explosive device attack by the NPA that led to a 30-minute gun battle on Samar island. One insurgent was reported killed in the fighting. While there have been no reports of coordination between the NPA and ISIS-EA, the separate threats strain the AFP’s limited counterterrorism resources. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the AFP operates under tight budgetary, resource, and capability constraints, and its leadership often faces challenges balancing the operational demands of combatting the separate communist and Islamist insurgencies.

CAPACITY BUILDING

U.S. Support to the AFP Includes ISR, Casualty Evacuation, and Training

This quarter, under OPE-P, U.S. forces provided military advice and assistance to support the AFP’s campaign against the ASG in the Sulu archipelago, according to U.S. Special Operations Command-Pacific (SOCPAC). Additionally, U.S. forces provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) targeting assistance for 30 high-valued individuals, which resulted in the neutralization of 2 “significant targets” by Philippine security forces. Additionally, SOCPAC stated that U.S. special operations forces regularly co-located with AFP partners to assist in operational planning and casualty evacuation.

SOCPAC reported to the DoD OIG that U.S. advisors trained their AFP partners on analysis, reporting, and production of video ISR from unmanned aircraft systems. The advisors provided instruction during flights and also developed training profiles for future AFP ISR requirements. SOCPAC noted that overall capacity building is conducted under the authorities of the bilateral military relationship with the Philippines, while OPE-P is focused on advise and assist activity.

SOCPAC stated to the DoD OIG that it employs contracted casualty evacuation assets in support of the AFP when wounded Philippine troops must be transported to medical facilities with a higher level of care. These aerial evacuations are most common for urgent and priority casualties in the remote, mountainous areas of Sulu, where the ASG is most active. While the AFP is proficient in providing care under fire and prolonged field care, SOCPAC stated that the AFP has limited ability to evacuate patients via air, so U.S.
USINDPACOM stated to the DoD OIG that building partner capabilities is not the main focus of all its engagements with Philippine partner forces. Activities such as the annual Balikatan exercise are geared toward exercising and validating U.S. processes, but the bilateral interaction also promotes capacity and capability building for the partner forces, according to USINDOPACOM. The 2019 Balikatan exercise, for example, included more than 7,000 U.S. and Philippine troops focused on maritime security operations, close air support, amphibious operations, and humanitarian and civic assistance projects over the course of 12 days.

More information on U.S. support to the AFP is contained in the classified appendix.

**USAID Provides Technical Governance Support to the BARMM**

As part of the peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF, the Bangsamoro Organic Law was passed in July 2018 and ratified by voters in the Muslim-majority provinces of the southern Philippines in January and February 2019. This law established the BARMM as an autonomous political entity within the Philippines with broad authorities for self-governance. The law also provided for the appointment of the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority (BTA) to serve as an interim government until elections take place and a permanent government established, with the goal of accomplishing this by 2022. Subsequently, the BTA held its inaugural legislative session on March 29, 2019, and began work on the passage of rules for a parliament, the creation of committees to draft legislation, and the passage of a transition plan to guide the political transition.

USAID reported that it awarded a $2 million, 3-year cooperative agreement, “Forward Bangsamoro (FORWARD): Democratic Governance Assistance to the Bangsamoro Transition,” to the Asia Foundation in October to support the development of the BARMM regional government. This cooperative agreement is intended to provide technical support to the BTA in the implementation of its transition plan. It aims to accomplish this by
building the capacity of regional government institutions, ministries, and the BTA to carry out essential government functions, support the enactment of legislation, and increase civic awareness and engagement of the population.59

Through FORWARD, USAID intends to build long-term capacity of ministries and executive offices of the BARMAM government by identifying project-specific assistance to regional government institutions and ministries; developing a “master plan” for long-term capacity building for the BARMAM; and tailoring specific capacity building to the Office of the Chief Minister and specific ministries.60

To build the long-term capacity of the Bangsamoro Parliament, through FORWARD, USAID plans to assist the BTA to create a development plan for the future Bangsamoro Parliament; provide technical support on parliamentary procedures and rule-making to BTA; and provide technical support on parliamentary administrative functions. Through FORWARD, USAID also plans to coordinate priorities with Office of the Chief Minister at project start-up and then each quarter thereafter; provide technical assistance in key policy areas, such as the economy; and connect academic institutions to sustain and support the BTA. In addition, USAID plans to increase citizen awareness of and engagement in the BTA and the BARMAM through this program by supporting local communications efforts to explain citizens’ rights and responsibilities under the BARMAM; institutionalizing space for civil society organizations in BARMAM governance; and support training and coalition building for civil society organizations to engage the BTA and the BARMAM.61

More information on the BARMAM is contained in the classified appendix.

DIPLOMACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Philippine Government Ends Martial Law on Mindanao

On December 31, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana announced that the Philippine government would follow through on its plan to allow martial law in the southern Philippines to expire at the end of 2019. First imposed on May 23, 2017, the day after ISIS-EA seized control of Marawi, martial law provisions had imposed a nighttime curfew and given security forces enhanced authorities, such as the ability to conduct warrantless searches. The Philippine government extended martial law, most recently until the end of 2019, due to the continued security threat posed by ISIS-EA, according to a Philippine government press release. While ISIS-EA continues to cause instability in the southern Philippines, an AFP spokesperson stated that the security climate had improved sufficiently for the AFP to recommend that President Duterte not request a fourth extension of martial law, and he heeded the advice of his military advisors.62

While the lifting of martial law in the southern Philippines marks the end of the most intrusive military control in the region, the government said that it will continue to implement an active counterterrorism campaign there.63 According to media reports, this is a significant military presence, involving approximately 60 percent of the AFP’s 200,000 members.64 An AFP spokesperson stated that the military
would continue to establish checkpoints, such as the one that stopped three potential suicide bombers in November (see page 7). Additionally, the government stated that the region will remain under a “state of emergency,” which predates the declaration of martial law. Put in place after a September 2016 bombing that left 14 dead, the state of emergency provides Philippine security forces with a limited set of special authorities, including the ability to impose checkpoints and curfews in certain areas.

**DoD Civil Affairs Engagements Aim to Strengthen Regional Governance**

SOCPAC told the DoD OIG that its Civil Military Support Element aims to conduct one medical or educational civil affairs project in the southern Philippines each month. For example, on October 23, SOCPAC conducted a medical and dental outreach on Tawi-Tawi island in the Sulu archipelago. SOCPAC stated that the goal of this activity was to bring together Philippine security forces and local governments to address the medical needs of a local population that is “in a nexus of influence from VEOs and malign actors.” SOCPAC added that this program seeks to increase cooperation between Philippine security forces and local governments to identify and address the needs of vulnerable populations.

According to SOCPAC, civil affairs activities can be considered part of OPE-P when they are conducted to address the needs of populations vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by VEOs, to strengthen local governance, or in support AFP counterterrorism and countering violent extremism operations. SOCPAC stated that it develops civil affairs projects based on the needs of the local populations, which it identifies through non-governmental organizations, the local population, or local government units, including the BARMM. SOCPAC coordinates these civil affairs activities with USAID and other relevant U.S. Government organizations.

**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT**

**Philippine Government Claims Progress in Meeting IDP Shelter and Water Needs, but Some Residents Disagree**

The siege of Marawi by ISIS-EA ended nearly 2 years ago and, as of the close of this quarter, approximately 70,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) remained displaced, even as much of USAID’s post-siege IDP assistance had ended. The number of people displaced by the conflict reached a peak of 353,000 in December 2017, approximately 2 months after Marawi’s liberation, and it declined until about July 2018. The homes of most of these remaining 70,000 IDPs were destroyed entirely in the conflict, and until the city’s infrastructure is rebuilt, it will be impossible for them to return.

USAID reported to USAID OIG that the Philippine government demonstrated progress this quarter in meeting the transitional shelter and water supply needs of IDPs. USAID estimated that 7,490 transitional and permanent housing units were occupied, under construction, or planned for construction. According to USAID, the Philippine Housing Authority estimates that an additional 4,455 units will still be required to meet the needs of the estimated 12,000 displaced households. Previously, the Philippine National
Housing Authority reported that only 1,763 of the 12,000 needed transitional shelters had been completed as of the end of May 2019. Task Force Bangon Marawi, the Philippine government’s interagency task force overseeing Marawi recovery efforts, has been in the process of closing IDP evacuation centers since July 2019, according to a November DoS cable.

USAID stated that temporary water needs were decreasing in Marawi transitional sites and inside the city as permanent water sources were rehabilitated this quarter. For example, USAID stated that requirements for water delivery had decreased, and therefore USAID’s implementing partner, Action Against Hunger, decreased its water trucking from 100,000 liters of water per day at 3 sites in June to 30,000 liters of water per day to 1 site by November. USAID reported that emergency repairs of the Marawi water network were completed by Action Against Hunger in September, providing water services to 25,400 people, and Action Against Hunger is coordinating with the Asian Development Bank for a planned $25 million water supply rehabilitation project over the next 2 years in other areas of Marawi. USAID also stated that Action Against Hunger plans to focus on water supply for IDPs in outlying municipalities of Lanao del Sur province, of which Marawi is the capital, in 2020.

Contrary to these positive reports, this quarter, evacuation center residents testified to a Philippine congressional subcommittee that Task Force Bangon Marawi was only providing about 30 percent of their daily water needs. The witnesses said that their camp flooded during the most recent rainy season, and residents sought shelter on the grounds of Marawi’s severely damaged city hall.

A DoS cable stated that rumors had spread in the camps that the task force was reducing assistance to camp residents to incentivize them to leave. According to the cable, task force officials denied these claims and told U.S. Embassy officials that the reverse was true, that it was reducing support in response to people leaving the camps.

**Anger at Failed Marawi Rehabilitation Provides Fertile Ground for ISIS-EA Recruitment**

Public anger at the Philippine government’s extended delays in providing for the reconstruction of Marawi has allowed extremist elements to regain a foothold in the city, according to a November DoS cable. Independent analysts, government officials, researchers, and local residents told U.S. Embassy officials that extremist recruitment has outpaced the public benefits of rehabilitation in Marawi since the ISIS insurgency was defeated there in October 2017. The cable assessed that if this trend continues, Islamic extremists could eventually stage another high-profile operation like the 2017 attack on Marawi.

In response to signs of resurgent terrorist recruitment in Marawi and elsewhere, on November 21, the U.S. Embassy in Manila and the DoS Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations stated that the DoS had launched a $1.7 million program in Cotabato City to build local government and non-governmental organization capacity to design and implement programs to counter radicalization. The November cable stated that this DoS program is designed to complement USAID’s Marawi Response Project, aimed at helping IDPs recover economically and integrate into their new communities.
According to the cable, reconstruction has been delayed by multiple corruption scandals. The cable assessed that there is a public perception that politically well-connected government contractors are enriching themselves at the expense of Marawi residents, and this has reinforced extremist anti-government narratives and contributed to terrorist recruitment.86

The cable stated that Marawi residents welcome international assistance. According to the U.S. Embassy, these efforts have generally been pursued in consultation with the Philippine government, but this has contributed to public criticism of top-down government solutions from Manila that do not sufficiently respect the needs and wishes of local residents. According to the cable, many former residents of Marawi have expressed a belief that Philippine government grants only benefit select individuals with political connections.87

The cable stated that after 2 years of relative quiet, marked by declining levels of violence, there were signs that violence was returning to Marawi. ISIS media claimed responsibility on behalf of ISIS-EA for the October 6 shooting death in Marawi of a member of the AFP’s 553rd Engineer Battalion, a unit responsible for clearing unexploded ordnance. The U.S. Embassy confirmed that an assailant shot the soldier in broad daylight and stole his service weapons. ISIS propaganda showed weapons taken from the soldier as proof of a “targeted assassination,” and no arrests had been made as of the time the cable was written in November.88

Weeks before that shooting, AFP troops overran a camp of an estimated 30 combatants belonging to the local ISIS affiliate in nearby Piagopo. According to the November cable, a Philippine military officer told U.S. Embassy officials that the rehabilitation delay and other reconstruction challenges had helped ISIS-EA return to Marawi, noting that al Jazeera reporters had secured interviews with ISIS-EA members from within the city. According to the cable, a survey of IDPs conducted by the University of the Philippines found that 100 percent of respondents reported the presence of extremist groups within their camps. The cable stated that ISIS-affiliated recruiters were reportedly offering signing bonuses equal to $400 to join their organization. The professor who organized the survey said that many of the young men she interviewed “see no other option” and that the offer to fight was appealing to them.89

More information about the potential impact of delays in reconstruction is contained in the classified appendix.

**Bureaucratic Requirements Hamper Return to City**

According to the November DoS cable, Philippine Housing Secretary Eduardo del Rosario, who heads Marawi reconstruction efforts, announced that all the debris in the city’s most-affected area would be cleared by the end of November 2019 and that reconstruction would be fully completed by December 2021.90 According to USAID, approximately 63 percent of the structures that had been issued demolition permits (over half of the city’s pre-siege structures) had been demolished by mid-December.91

Separately, on October 22, del Rosario announced that the most-affected area of the city had been totally cleared of hazardous explosives, an announcement which the U.S. Embassy staff described as a “surprise.” However, the Philippine government stated that it would not permit residents to return to their homes until they secured proof of property ownership from the Marawi city government. The cable stated that requiring such proof is an emotional
flashpoint for grievances in a community with a long history of competing property claims. Additionally, according to USAID, the Philippine government had not approved any compensation for damaged homes in Marawi. The DoS cable assessed that Philippine law and government policy had prevented or slowed many former Marawi residents from returning to their homes. Before IDPs can return, the task force must first validate who is a legitimate evacuee from the city, working from a supposed master list compiled from five separate Philippine government agencies. The U.S. Embassy said in the cable that this list was insufficiently vetted and contained duplicate names, the names of deceased people, pseudonyms, and suspected cases of identity fraud. According to USAID, the Philippine government had approved only 20 percent of residents’ applications for building permits.

The cable also stated that several of the U.S. Embassy’s sources involved in reconstruction efforts said that the most-affected area had not yet been fully cleared of explosives and that Del Rosario’s statement was intended to give the false impression that progress was being made. Del Rosario has previously made predictions that later proved overly optimistic about the clearance of unexploded ordnance. In March 2019, he announced that Marawi IDPs would be able to return to their homes by July. His task force later revised this estimate to September and then again to November.

USAID reported to USAID OIG that as a result of these extended delays and perceived lack of transparency, international donors have become increasingly reluctant to support reconstruction efforts in Marawi, focusing their resources instead on IDP housing and infrastructure outside the city.

**Conflict and Earthquakes Cause Additional Displacement Across Mindanao**

This quarter, conflict and natural disasters displaced an estimated 232,000 civilians on Mindanao, more than 3 times the current number of IDPs caused by the Marawi crisis. AFP operations against the BIFF in Maguindanao province (see page 7) displaced more than 39,000 residents in late November and early December, according to USAID. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, an additional 10,150 civilians were displaced due to conflict and insecurity in other parts of Maguindanao, Sulu, North Cotabato, and areas of northeastern Mindanao. Government and humanitarian agencies provided assistance to these IDPs, with USAID reporting that it provided hygiene kits to 1,144 households in the Maguindanao and North Cotabato provinces during the quarter.

A series of earthquakes also struck North Cotabato province in mid- to late-October, displacing 182,750 residents. While natural disasters are outside the scope of OPE-P, they increase the strain on limited government resources to assist IDPs. While the Philippine government did not request international assistance for the earthquake response, USAID stated that it continued to support disaster risk reduction programs that bolster the Philippines preparedness and response capacity for future natural disasters or conflict-related crises.

More information on the Philippine government’s disaster preparedness status is contained in the classified appendix.
USAID Shifts Development Strategy from Countering Violent Extremism to Broader Development Goals

During and immediately after the Marawi siege in 2017, USAID reoriented several existing activities to provide assistance to IDPs, with the understanding that these activities would be for a limited duration. The Marawi Response Project, a grant awarded in August 2018, was designed to address the post-siege recovery needs of IDPs and communities hosting IDPs. This and other legacy programs incorporated efforts to counter violent extremism. However, USAID stated that as they wind down, it will adjust its focus to addressing the societal and economic drivers of violent extremism rather than attempting to mitigate terrorist recruitment and support by convincing people not to resort to violence.

USAID’s new draft Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for the Philippines shifts USAID’s focus away from the response to the Marawi crisis and toward nationwide objectives to strengthen democratic governance; expand inclusive, market-driven growth; and enhance environmental and community resilience. According to USAID, the new CDCS also accounts for the expected outcomes from the Trump Administration’s draft “Foreign Assistance Realignment,” which states that the United States should “end foreign assistance programs designed to address the supposed socioeconomic causes of terrorism.” While the previous strategy contained a specific development objective for peace and stability on Mindanao, an objective that included addressing the socioeconomic causes of extremism through governance and civic engagement, the new CDCS has no explicit development objectives related to either violent extremism or instability. Instead, USAID initiatives will aim to address terrorist recruitment and radicalization by strengthening government and community capacity to respond to transnational threats.

USAID’s Journey to Self-Reliance Country Roadmap is a report in which USAID uses standardized analytical tools to assess a country’s ability to meet a range of commitments and capacities. Of the 10 government, civil society, and economic capacities assessed in the roadmap for FY 2020, USAID assessed that, of the 10 capacities measured for the Philippines, “safety and security” ranked the weakest (0.31 on a scale of 0 to 1).

**BUDGET AND EXECUTION**

On December 20, President Trump signed two appropriation bills to fund the federal government through the end of FY 2020. This legislation provides the DoD with a total of $713.2 billion in FY 2020, which includes resources to conduct OPE-P.

According to USINDOPACOM, the DoD’s FY 2020 budget request for OPE-P was $72.3 million, which represented a 33 percent decrease from the FY 2019 request of $108.2 million. The FY 2020 enacted request included just three line items: $42.6 million for contracted ISR support, $24.8 million for contracted casualty evacuation support, and $4.9 million for base operation support. As of the end of this quarter, USINDOPACOM reported $21 million in commitments, $2 million in obligations, and $40,358 in liquidations in support of OPE-P.
OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

This section of the report provides information on Lead IG and partner agencies’ strategic planning efforts; their ongoing audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations; and hotline activities from October 1 through December 31, 2019, related to OPE-P.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Pursuant to Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, the Lead IG develops and implements a joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each overseas contingency operation. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed oversight, management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects. The Lead IG agencies issue an annual joint strategic plan for each operation.

FY 2020 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan Activities

The updated annual plan describing oversight activities for OPE-P, the *FY 2020 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines*, was issued on October 1, 2019.

The plan organized oversight projects related to OPE-P into three strategic oversight areas: 1) Military Operations and Security Cooperation; 2) Governance, Humanitarian Assistance, and Development; and 3) Support to Mission. The joint strategic oversight plan was included in the *FY 2020 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations* and will be updated annually for as long as OPE-P is subject to Lead IG oversight and reporting.

AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION ACTIVITY

The Lead IG agencies use permanent and temporary employees, and USAID additionally uses contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide strategic planning and reporting related to activities in the Philippines. Oversight teams travel to the Philippines and other locations in the region to conduct fieldwork for their oversight projects. In addition, the USAID OIG has a field office in Manila that covers USAID operations in Philippines and other countries in the region, enabling it to monitor events on the ground.

This quarter, the Lead IG agencies and partner agencies did not complete any reports related to OPE-P. As of December 31, 2019, 10 oversight projects related to the Philippines were ongoing, and 7 were planned. Project titles and objectives for the ongoing and planned oversight projects can be found in Appendix C.
Lead IG Strategic Oversight Areas

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION

Military Operations and Security Cooperation focuses on determining the degree to which the contingency operation is accomplishing its security mission. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Conducting unilateral and partnered counterterrorism operations
- Providing security assistance
- Training and equipping partner security forces
- Advising, assisting, and enabling partner security forces
- Advising and assisting ministry-level security officials

GOVERNANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT

Governance, Humanitarian Assistance, and Development focuses on some of the root causes of violent extremism. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Countering and reducing corruption, social inequality, and extremism
- Promoting inclusive and effective democracy, civil participation, and empowerment of women
- Promoting reconciliation, peaceful conflict resolution, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces, and other rule of law efforts
- Providing food, water, medical care, emergency relief, and shelter to people affected by crisis
- Assisting and protecting internally displaced persons and refugees
- Building or enhancing host-nation governance capacity
- Supporting sustainable and appropriate recovery and reconstruction activities, repairing infrastructure, removing explosive remnants of war, and reestablishing utilities and other public services
- Countering trafficking in persons and preventing sexual exploitation and abuse

SUPPORT TO MISSION

Support to Mission focuses on focuses on U.S. administrative, logistical, and management efforts that enable military operations and non-military programs. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Ensuring the security of U.S. personnel and property
- Providing for the occupational health and safety of personnel
- Administering U.S. Government programs
- Managing U.S. Government grants and contracts
INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE ACTIVITY

Investigations

The investigative components of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies continued to conduct investigative activity related to OPE-P during the quarter, with USAID OIG investigators located in Manila.

The Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies coordinate their investigative efforts through the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group, which consists of representatives from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS, the DoD OIG’s criminal investigative division), the DoS OIG, the USAID OIG, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

During this quarter, investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies closed one investigation and coordinated on three open investigations. The open investigations involve conflict of interest, fraud, and bribery.

Hotline

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority for independent review. A DoD OIG investigator coordinates the hotline contacts among the Lead IG agencies and others as appropriate. This quarter, the investigator did not receive any complaints related to OPE-P.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
Classified Appendix to this Report

This unclassified report includes a classified appendix that provides additional information on Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines (OPE-P), as noted in several sections of this report. The appendix will be delivered to appropriate government agencies and congressional committees.

APPENDIX B
Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Quarterly Report

This report complies with sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which requires that the designated Lead Inspector General (IG) provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on an overseas contingency operation. The Department of Defense (DoD) IG is the designated Lead IG for OPE-P. The Department of State (DoS) IG is the Associate Lead IG for the operation.

This report contains information from the three Lead IG agencies—DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG), DoS OIG, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) OIG—as well as from partner oversight agencies. This report covers the period from July 1 through September 30, 2019.

To fulfill its congressional mandate to produce a quarterly report on OPE-P, the Lead IG gathers data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, or evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or requests for information to Federal agencies.

INFORMATION COLLECTION
Each quarter, the Lead IG gathers information from Federal agencies about their programs and operations related to OPE-P. The Lead IG agencies use the information provided by their respective agencies for quarterly reporting and oversight planning.

Various DoD, DoS, and USAID offices participated in information collection for OPE-P this quarter.

OPEN-SOURCE RESEARCH
This report also draws on the most current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report include the following:

- Congressional testimony
- Press conferences, official U.S. Government briefings
- United Nations reports
- Reports issued by nongovernmental organizations and think tanks
- Media reports
Materials collected through open-source research provide information to describe the status of the operation and help the Lead IG agencies assess information provided in their agency information collection process.

**REPORT PRODUCTION**

The DoD OIG, as the Lead IG, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG draft the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies. The Lead IG agencies then provide those offices that provided information with opportunities to verify and comment on the content of the report.

Each OIG coordinates the review process with its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask their agencies to correct inaccuracies and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review. Each Lead IG agency participates in reviewing and editing the entire quarterly report.
APPENDIX C
Ongoing and Planned Oversight Projects

Table 1 lists the title and objective for Lead IG and partner agencies ongoing oversight projects. Table 2 lists the title and objective for Lead IG and partner agencies planned oversight projects.

Table 1.
Ongoing Oversight Projects by Lead IG and Partner Agencies, as of December 31, 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To evaluate security controls for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset supply chains.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Audit of Readiness of Mobile Medical Teams Supporting Contingency Operations in the U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility** |
| To determine whether the Defense Health Agency and the Military Services are providing effective training to mobile medical teams prior to deploying to U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command areas of responsibility in order to improve trauma care. |

| **Evaluation of Counterintelligence Mission Programs (Activities) in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility** |
| To determine whether the Defense Intelligence Agency and Military Services counterintelligence program support U.S. Indo-Pacific Command mission requirements in its area of responsibility. |

| To determine whether U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. European Command have established the capabilities to conduct counter threat finance and to deny, disrupt, or defeat and degrade adversaries’ ability to use global financial networks. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of United States Mission to the UN and Other International Organizations in Geneva</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Inspection of the Bureau of Counterterrorism**                          |
| To evaluate the programs and operations of the Bureau of Counterterrorism. |

| **Follow-up Audit of the Department of State Efforts to Measure, Evaluate, and Sustain Antiterrorism Assistance Program Objectives in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs** |
| To determine whether the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Counterterrorism have implemented corrective actions to address DoS OIG’s previous recommendations and whether those actions have improved the DoS’s efforts to measure, evaluate, and sustain the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program objectives within the East Asian and Pacific Affairs region. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of USAID's Self-Reliance Initiative</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine to what extent are USAID’s self-reliance metrics incorporated into its development programming strategy; and the challenges USAID faces in implementing development activities as envisioned under the Journey to Self-Reliance Initiative.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Audit of USAID’s Contract Termination Practices
To assess USAID’s procedures guiding acquisition award terminations, and if selected acquisition awards were terminated in accordance with established requirements.

Government Accountability Office

Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements
To review various aspects of DoD use of acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, including 1) a list of current agreements signed by the United States; 2) the criteria and processes used to determine the need for acquisition and cross-servicing agreements; 3) the DoD’s accounting of support provided under these agreements and receipt of reciprocal support or reimbursements from partner nations; 4) notifications to Congress of the DoD’s intent to sign an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement with a non-NATO member country; and 5) the use of these agreements as mechanisms for transfers of logistics support, supplies, and services to third-party countries for which there is no current agreement.

Table 2.
Planned Oversight Projects by Lead IG and Partner Agencies, as of December 31, 2019

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Evaluation of the Combatant Commands’ Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques
To determine whether U.S. Africa Command’s and USINDOPACOM’s oversight of intelligence interrogations adheres to applicable DoD policies and regulations, and the overall effect of these policies and regulations on the interrogation process.

Classified Evaluation of an Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines Intelligence Program
To determine if the intelligence information sharing requirements of the U.S. forces, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other regional partners in OPE-P are being satisfied by current policies, procedures, and supporting data architecture.

Evaluation of Tactical Signals Intelligence Processing
To determine whether Theater Support Activity’s tactical signals intelligence processing is sufficient to satisfy priority intelligence requirements.

Evaluation of U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center
To determine whether U.S. Special Operations Command’s Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center provides U.S. combatant commanders the increased capability to conduct Internet-based information operations globally.

Department of State Office of Inspector General

Audit of DoS Management of Awards to International Organizations
To determine whether the DoS’s effort to identify, assess, and manage risks before awarding funds to international organizations are effective; and assess whether the DoS’s policies, processes, and guidance for monitoring awards to international organizations are effective in ensuring that funds are managed and spent to further U.S. goals and objectives.

To determine whether the DoS Office of Global Women’s Issues has tailored applicable DoS engagements and program to help women be more prepared for, and able to participate in, decision-making processes related to conflict and crisis; established metric and targets to evaluate, measure, and report DoS performance; and created a process to modify or redirect program resources on the basis of performance that informs resource allocation and planning.

Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Training, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance
To evaluate the programs and operations of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Training, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance.
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARMM</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIFF</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTA</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Transition Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORWARD</td>
<td>Forward Bangsamoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS-Core</td>
<td>The core ISIS organization in Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS-EA</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-East Asia, formerly referred to as ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead IG</td>
<td>Lead Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD OIG</td>
<td>Department of Defense OIG</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoS OIG</td>
<td>Department of State OIG</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID OIG</td>
<td>USAID OIG</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>New People’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>overseas contingency operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPE-P</td>
<td>Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>Philippine National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCPAC</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USINDOPACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Indo-Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEO</td>
<td>violent extremist organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**IMPORTANT NOTE:** This document contains sensitive information. Only authorized personnel with a need-to-know should access this document.
ENDNOTES

1. USINDOPACOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
8. SOCPAC, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
9. SOCPAC, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
11. USINDOPACOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
12. USINDOPACOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
15. USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/19/2019.
16. USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/19/2019.
17. USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/19/2019.
19. USINDOPACOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
20. USINDOPACOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
34. USINDOPACOM, vetting comment to DoD OIG, 1/29/2020.
40. USINDOPACOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
42. USINDOPACOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019; SOCPAC, vetting comment to DoD OIG, 1/29/2020.
47. DIA, vetting comment to DoD OIG, 1/29/2020.
50. SOCPAC, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
51. SOCPAC, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019; USINDOPACOM, vetting comment to DoD OIG, 2/7/2020.
52. SOCPAC, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
53. SOCPAC, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
54. SOCPAC, vetting comment to DoD OIG, 1/29/2020.
55. SOCPAC, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019; SOCPAC, vetting comment to DoD OIG, 1/29/2020.
56. USINDOPACOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
67. SOCPAC, vetting comment to DoD OIG, 1/29/2020.
68. SOCPAC, vetting comment to DoD OIG, 1/29/2020.
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71. SOCPAC, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/30/2019.
74. USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/19/2019.
75. USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/19/2019.
76. USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/13/2019.
78. USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/19/2019.
79. USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/19/2019.
91. USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/19/2019.
92. USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/13/2019.
93. USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/19/2019.
95. USAID/OFDA and USAID/FPF, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/19/2019.
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