OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

OCTOBER 1, 2019–DECEMBER 31, 2019
ABOUT THIS REPORT

In January 2013, legislation was enacted creating the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. This legislation, which amended the Inspector General Act, requires the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide quarterly reports to Congress on active overseas contingency operations.

The DoD Inspector General (IG) is designated as the Lead IG for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). The DoS IG is the Associate IG for OFS. The USAID IG participates in oversight of the operation.

The Offices of Inspector General of the DoD, DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. Other partner agencies also contribute to oversight of OFS.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out their statutory missions to:

- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the contingency operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and evaluations.
- Report quarterly to Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead IG agencies.

METHODOLOGY

To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies submit requests for information to the DoD, DoS, and USAID about OFS and related programs. The Lead IG agencies also gather data and information from open sources, including congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports.

The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, or evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the data and information provided by the agencies. For further details on the methodology for this report, see Appendix B.

CLASSIFIED APPENDIX

This report includes an appendix containing classified information about the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. The Lead IG provides the classified appendix separately to relevant agencies and congressional committees.
FOREWORD

This Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report to the U.S. Congress is our 19th report on Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). This report discharges our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978.

OFS has two complementary missions: the U.S. counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Khorasan (ISIS-K), and their affiliates in Afghanistan; and U.S. military participation in the NATO-led Resolute Support mission to develop the capacity of the Afghan security ministries and to train, advise, and assist the Afghan security forces.

This quarterly report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OFS, as well as the work of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development to promote the U.S. Government’s policy goals in Afghanistan, during the period from October 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019.

We have organized the information in this report in five sections:
• Status of the Conflict;
• Capacity Building;
• Diplomacy and Political Developments;
• Development and Humanitarian Assistance; and
• Support to Mission.

This report also discusses the completed, ongoing, and planned oversight work conducted by the Lead IG Offices of the Inspector General and our partner oversight agencies during the period from October 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019.

Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on this contingency operation.

Glenn A. Fine  
Principal Deputy Inspector General  
Performing the Duties  
of the Inspector General  
U.S. Department of Defense  

Steve A. Linick  
Inspector General  
U.S. Department of State  

Ann Calvaresi Barr  
Inspector General  
U.S. Agency for International Development
On the Cover

(Top row): A CH-47 Chinook helicopter prepares to land in order to extract soldiers (DoD photo); Soldiers conduct live-fire mortar operations in southeastern Afghanistan (DoD photo); U.S. Special Forces and Afghan Special Security Forces work and train together (U.S. Air Force photo); U.S. Soldiers conduct security following an advise and assistance mission (DoD photo).

(Bottom row): Dust kicks up as a CH-47 Chinook helicopter prepares to land in southeastern Afghanistan (DoD photo).
MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL

I am pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS).

The conflict in Afghanistan remains at a “strategic stalemate,” according to the Department of Defense, and the United States restarted peace negotiations in Doha, Qatar, on December 7.

At the same time, the Taliban continued its strategy of fighting while participating in negotiations. As a result, 2019 was the most violent year in Afghanistan since OFS began in 2015. While the frequency of attacks remained high this quarter, the proportion of attacks in which people were killed or injured decreased. U.S. forces said that this may signify that the Taliban is conducting smaller-scale attacks in an effort to conserve forces.

However, coalition and Afghan personnel remain at risk, not just from Taliban attacks, but from a high rate of insider attacks, such as an attack that killed 2 U.S. soldiers in February 2020 and another that killed 23 members of an Afghan National Army Territorial Force unit in December 2019.

This quarter, pressure from coalition and Afghan forces, as well as from the Taliban, drove ISIS-K to abandon its historical stronghold in Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan. More than 300 ISIS-K fighters and their family members surrendered, while most of the rest fled the province. President Ashraf Ghani declared ISIS-K “obliterated” in Nangarhar, but ISIS has shown—in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq and Syria—the ability to adapt, move underground, recruit, and remain a threat.

In addition, as the peace negotiations with the Taliban continued, China, Russia, and Iran also diplomatically engaged with both the Afghan government and the Taliban. As our report describes, all three countries share some interests with the United States in Afghanistan, such as countering ISIS-K, but each pursues disparate interests that at times conflict with U.S. interests.

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China likely sees Afghanistan as a place where it can cooperate with the United States, given its concern about terrorist activity crossing the border from Afghanistan. In contrast, the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that Russia and Iran likely see Afghanistan as an area where they can exert pressure on the United States. For example, Russia has exaggerated the threat of ISIS-K to bolster its military presence in Central Asia. Iran seeks a central role in Taliban reconciliation talks—in addition to trying to influence elections and politics—to ensure Iranian influence on any future Afghan government.

During this quarter, U.S. and coalition forces continued their mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces, but the combination of changing and unclear measures the coalition uses to assess progress hampered the ability to track long-term developments. For example, this quarter, coalition advisors were developing new metrics to assess Afghan police capability development, but these new metrics may not be directly comparable to past data. Similarly, coalition advisors reported they were making progress reducing the number of checkpoints employed by Afghan forces, but advisors have repeatedly reported progress since at least 2016, without sufficient evidence to demonstrate enduring effects.

My Lead IG colleagues and I remain committed to oversight of overseas contingency operations, including OFS. We thank the Offices of Inspector General employees who are deployed abroad, who travel to the region, and who work here in the United States to perform this important oversight work.

Glenn A. Fine
Principal Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense
CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................... 2

THE QUARTER IN REVIEW ................................. 9
 Status of the Conflict ........................................... 10
 Capacity Building ................................................. 17
 Diplomacy and Political Developments .............. 26
 Development and Humanitarian Assistance .......... 29
 Support to Mission ............................................... 33

OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES ................................... 39
 Strategic Planning ............................................... 40
 Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Activity ............ 42
 Investigations and Hotline Activity ......................... 49

APPENDICES ...................................................... 53
 APPENDIX A
 Classified Appendix to this Report ......................... 54
 APPENDIX B
 Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Quarterly Report ......................................................... 54
 APPENDIX C
 Ongoing OFS Oversight Projects ............................... 56
 APPENDIX D
 Planned OFS Oversight Projects .............................. 60
 Acronyms .......................................................... 64
 Map of Afghanistan ................................................. 65
 Endnotes ............................................................. 66
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE QUARTER IN REVIEW

VIOLENCE CONTINUES AS PRESIDENT TRUMP RESTARTS U.S.-TALIBAN TALKS

This quarter, U.S. forces sought to exert military pressure on the Taliban in an attempt to set favorable conditions for a return to peace negotiations. The Taliban continued its “fight and talk” strategy, conducting an elevated number of attacks while simultaneously pursuing a potential peace agreement with the U.S. Government.1

On November 28, President Donald Trump visited U.S. service members in Afghanistan and announced that the United States would restart peace negotiations with the Taliban. The talks restarted in Doha, Qatar, on December 7. The United States sought Taliban concessions to reduce the level of violence in Afghanistan, but the Taliban continued to attack U.S., coalition and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) following the resumption of talks. The Taliban attacked Bagram Airfield, one of the coalition’s main bases in Afghanistan, less than 1 week after peace talks resumed. During the attack, Taliban fighters attempted to breach the outer perimeter of the base, killed 2 Afghan civilians, and injured more than 70 civilians.2

Despite the peace talks and a history of decreasing attacks as the winter months begin, the number of enemy attacks this quarter was the second highest in a quarter since Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) began in January 2015.3 This quarter’s violence was second only to last quarter, making 2019 the insurgents’ most active year since 2015. However, the proportion of “effective” enemy-initiated attacks—attacks that cause a casualty or damage equipment—decreased this quarter, as did the number of high-profile bombings.4 According to U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), this might reflect a strategic decision by the Taliban to limit its own casualties resulting from direct engagements with the coalition and ANDSF. Furthermore, USFOR-A reported that coalition forces and the ANDSF have prevented some possible effective attacks by the Taliban.4

SELECTED KEY EVENTS, 10/1/2019-12/31/2019

OCTOBER 23
China invites Taliban and Afghan government representatives to Beijing for intra-Afghan talks following the suspension of U.S. peace talks in September

NOVEMBER 19
The Afghan government and Taliban release prisoners; American Kevin King and Australian Timothy Weeks released after 3 years of captivity

NOVEMBER 11
Acting Afghan Interior Minister Massoud Andarabi claims ISIS-K is defeated in Nangarhar province

NOVEMBER 22
More than 300 ISIS-K militants and their family members surrender to Afghan forces in Nangarhar
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

NOVEMBER 28
President Trump visits Afghanistan to facilitate the resumption of peace talks

DECEMBER 11
Taliban attacks Bagram Airfield, killing 2 and injuring more than 70 civilians

DECEMBER 7
U.S. and Taliban representatives meet in Doha, Qatar

DECEMBER 22
Preliminary election results show President Ashraf Ghani won reelection by a small margin

DECEMBER 14
An insider attack on an Afghan military base in Ghazni province kills at least 23 Afghan soldiers
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND TALIBAN RELEASE PRISONERS

Shortly before President Trump’s November visit to Afghanistan, the Afghan government and the Taliban both released several prisoners. President Ghani described the release as a gesture intended to start peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban.6 The Taliban released American Kevin King and Australian Timothy Weeks after more than 3 years of captivity. Both men were professors at the American University of Afghanistan.7 The Afghan government released three senior commanders of the Haqqani Network. Both the Taliban and United States hailed the releases as building goodwill.8

GHANI SAYS ISIS-K “OBLITERATED” IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE

Under OFS, the United States conducts a counterterrorism mission against ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan. For several quarters, U.S. forces targeted ISIS-K fighters and leaders in Nangarhar province, the group’s center of operations since ISIS-K formed in 2015. The Taliban ideologically opposes ISIS-K and the two groups have regularly clashed in Nangarhar and throughout the country.

Following months of sustained pressure from both the United States and the Taliban, ISIS-K militants in Nangarhar surrendered en masse. More than 300 fighters and their family members turned themselves in to Afghan officials, while most of the other fighters fled the province.9 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani declared that ISIS-K was “obliterated” in Nangarhar.10

While estimates of ISIS-K numbers are uncertain and vary widely, U.S. officials estimated in September 2019 that there were 2,000 to 5,000 ISIS-K fighters in Afghanistan.11 USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that it was unclear how many ISIS-K fighters remained in the country this quarter, although USFOR-A estimated that ISIS-K “lost more than half of its fighters” due to coalition and Afghan strikes, Taliban ground operations, and ISIS-K surrenders.12
General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that ISIS-K had been “severely hurt,” but added that it had not been destroyed. Furthermore, as seen in Iraq and Syria, and discussed in Lead IG reports on Operation Inherent Resolve, ISIS has evolved after losing territory and has created clandestine cells that are working to resurge.

**USFOR-A CHANGES APPROACHES TO LONG-TERM INITIATIVES**

Coalition advisors have reported for years that the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) devote a significant portion of their forces to man small, static checkpoints throughout the country, thereby leaving personnel vulnerable to attack and reducing the forces available for operations elsewhere. This quarter, President Ghani ordered ANA and ANP leaders to reduce the number of checkpoints. Additionally, coalition advisors reported that they were advising their counterparts to reduce checkpoints. However, these efforts follow years of similar advising efforts since the beginning of OFS. It remains unclear how the current approach is different or whether long-term progress is being made.

Over the years, the coalition has adopted new and varying measures to assess progress. For example, this quarter, the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) reported that advisors to the ANP were developing new metrics to assess police capability development. CSTC-A reported that the new measures of progress will accompany a new tracking system and are designed to be “enduring.” However, the DoD OIG continues to have difficulty assessing long-term progress because the changing metrics hamper the ability to track long-term developments in the ANSF.

The ANDSF has also struggled to maintain its own vehicles. The National Maintenance Strategy–Ground Vehicle Support contract, which went into effect in 2017, was designed to address the deficiency. According to the DoD, the contract differs from previous approaches by setting specific goals for a progressively increasing share of work that Afghan maintainers are expected to attain. Since then, according to DoD officials, the ANA and ANP performed a greater share of their own ground vehicle maintenance.

**REGIONAL POWERS COMPETE IN AFGHANISTAN**

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), China, Russia, and Iran each engage diplomatically with Afghanistan. While all three countries have some shared interests with the United States, each pursues interests that at times conflict with U.S. interests. The DIA reported that China likely sees Afghanistan as a place where it can cooperate with the United States to a limited extent to further regional stability. In contrast, the DIA stated that Russia and Iran likely see Afghanistan as an area where they can expand pressure on the United States.

According to the DIA, Russia’s regional objectives include the continued bolstering of its bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, pushing for closer military cooperation with them, and preventing an expansion of U.S. military logistics access in Central Asia. Moscow continues to overstate the threat of ISIS-K to justify closer security cooperation with its Central Asian neighbors, according to press reporting.
The DIA also reported that Iran seeks a central role in reconciliation talks—in addition to trying to shape Afghan elections and politics—to ensure Iranian influence on any future Afghan government. In November, Iran hosted a senior Taliban delegation to discuss the Afghan peace process for the second time since U.S.-Taliban talks broke down in September, according to press reports. However, U.S.-released intelligence reports suggest Taliban control of Afghanistan is not in Iran’s long-term interests.

HEALTHCARE INITIATIVES IN AFGHANISTAN MAY NOT BE SUSTAINABLE

According to USAID, it has spent more than $1.3 billion in Afghanistan for health programming since 2003. Since 2011, the Afghan government tripled governmental health expenditures and doubled per capita health spending. However, healthcare gains, such as increased access and significant declines in maternal and child mortality rates, may not be sustainable because a large proportion of health programs in Afghanistan are highly dependent on international grants, according to USAID. Currently, more than 70 percent of the healthcare facilities in Afghanistan are supported by donor nation funding from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. In spite of increasing health expenditures, the Afghan government only funds 3 percent of total health expenditures.

LEAD IG OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

The Lead IG and partner agencies completed four audit and evaluation reports related to OFS from October 1 through December 31, 2019. Table 1 lists the released reports by agency.

These reports examined various activities that support OFS, including DoD efforts to ensure sustainable training, mentoring, and contractor logistics to meet ANDSF needs for vehicle maintenance; the Naval Air Systems Command’s ability to develop an aircraft safety feature; and the military services’ ability to provide credentialed counterintelligence personnel to meet overseas contingency operations requirements.

As of December 31, 2019, 40 projects were ongoing and 34 projects were planned.
Table 1.
Oversight Reports Issued this Quarter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Release Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Military Service Capacity to Fill Combatant Command Requests for Counterintelligence Support</td>
<td>December 30, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODIG-2020-045</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODIG-2020-026</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of the V-22 Engine Air Particle Separator</td>
<td>November 7, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODIG-2020-006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund: DoD Has Processes for Identifying Training Needs and Maintaining Visibility over Contracts</td>
<td>November 18, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO-20-99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INVESTIGATIONS**

The investigative components of the Lead IG and partner agencies continued to conduct investigative activity related to OFS during the quarter. The Lead IG agencies use investigators forward-deployed to the region, including at Bagram Airfield and in Kabul, as well as in Germany and Washington, D.C., to investigate OFS-related fraud and corruption.

During the quarter, investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies closed 12 investigations, initiated 7 new investigations, and coordinated on 94 open investigations. The investigations involve a variety of alleged crimes, including procurement fraud, corruption, grant fraud, theft, program irregularities, computer intrusions, and human trafficking. This quarter, the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group conducted 37 fraud awareness briefings for 336 participants.

**HOTLINE ACTIVITY**

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority. The DoD OIG has an investigator to coordinate the hotline contacts among the Lead IG agencies and others, as appropriate. During the quarter, the investigator referred 38 cases to Lead IG agencies or other investigative organizations.
THE QUARTER IN REVIEW

Status of the Conflict .................................................. 10
Capacity Building ............................................................. 17
Diplomacy and Political Developments ......................... 26
Development and Humanitarian Assistance ............... 29
Support to Mission ............................................................. 33
THE QUARTER IN REVIEW

STATUS OF THE CONFLICT

The quarter began with heightened levels of violence, which had increased to record levels in September. The United States broke off peace talks with the Taliban on September 7, and intensified military operations. The Taliban escalated its attacks surrounding the September 28 presidential election. Since the election, Taliban-initiated attacks against the NATO-led coalition and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) decreased but were still above historical norms. Meanwhile, U.S. and coalition forces continued the train, advise, and assist mission and counterterrorism mission without apparent changes in strategy following the cessation of peace talks between the United States and the Taliban. On November 28, President Donald Trump visited Afghanistan and announced the resumption of U.S. talks with the Taliban. For more on the U.S.-Taliban talks see page 26, and for more on the Afghan presidential elections, see page 27.

This quarter, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Khorasan (ISIS-K) abandoned nearly all of its territory in Nangarhar province, which had been the center of its operations since the group formed in 2015. According to USFOR-A, this resulted from sustained U.S. and ANDSF counterterrorism operations against ISIS-K, as well as clashes between ISIS-K and the Taliban. In November, more than 300 ISIS-K fighters and their families surrendered to Afghan forces, while others fled the region. For more about ISIS-K, see page 13.
Taliban Uses Violence to Attempt to Set Conditions for Reconciliation

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), since the September 28 election, the Taliban has sought to secure a peace agreement with the United States while continuing its military campaign.1

U.S.-Taliban peace talks resumed in Qatar on December 7 with an initial meeting focused on reducing violence.2 Despite media reporting that the Taliban agreed to a ceasefire during the peace talks, the Taliban stated at the end of December that it did not agree to such terms.3

Taliban attacks continued after the resumption of talks, including an attack on a medical facility under construction on the Bagram Airfield perimeter 4 days after the resumption of peace talks in Qatar.4 According to the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior Affairs, the attack killed at least 2 civilians and injured more than 70 civilians.5

Taliban Carries Out Fewer Attacks in Kabul

According to the DoD, Afghan and international forces have prioritized preventing high-profile attacks in Kabul, particularly after a truck bomb attack in May 2017 that killed approximately 150 people.6 The DoD stated in its semiannual report to Congress that the Taliban and ISIS-K conduct high-profile attacks in Kabul because they “attract media attention, create the perception of widespread insecurity, and undermine the legitimacy of operations on May 1, 2003. Subsequently, the United States and international coalition partners continued to work with the nascent Afghan government to build democratic institutions in the country.

However, as the new Afghan government developed, the Taliban regrouped and launched increasingly deadly attacks to recapture lost territory. To address the deteriorating security situation, the United States increased its troop strength from 37,000 in early 2009 to approximately 100,000 from 2010 to 2011. The “surge” succeeded in reversing Taliban momentum. The United States reduced its force level to 16,100 by December 2014 and 11,000 in 2016.

OFS began on January 1, 2015, when the United States ended its primary combat mission in Afghanistan and transitioned to a train, advise, and assist role under the NATO Resolute Support mission, while continuing counterterrorism operations. In August 2017, in response to Taliban gains since the start of OFS, President Trump announced a new “conditions-based” South Asia strategy, which included an increase of approximately 3,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, bringing the total to approximately 14,000 troops.

ABOUT OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL

MISSION
U.S. forces carry out two complementary missions under Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS): 1) counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, ISIS-K, and their affiliates in Afghanistan; and 2) participation in the NATO-led Resolute Support mission, under which the United States trains, advises, and assists Afghan forces and the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs to build their institutional capacity. In addition, under OFS authorities, U.S. forces provide combat enablers, such as aerial strikes, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, to the Afghan security forces as they fight the Taliban and terrorist organizations. The Department of State supports OFS through diplomatic efforts to reach a negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan, among other activities.

HISTORY
On October 7, 2001, the United States launched combat operations in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom to topple the Taliban regime and eliminate al Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. The Taliban regime fell quickly, and U.S. officials declared an end to major combat operations on May 1, 2003. Subsequently, the United States and international coalition partners continued to work with the nascent Afghan government to build democratic institutions in the country.

However, as the new Afghan government developed, the Taliban regrouped and launched increasingly deadly attacks to recapture lost territory. To address the deteriorating security situation, the United States increased its troop strength from 37,000 in early 2009 to approximately 100,000 from 2010 to 2011. The “surge” succeeded in reversing Taliban momentum. The United States reduced its force level to 16,100 by December 2014 and 11,000 in 2016.

OFS began on January 1, 2015, when the United States ended its primary combat mission in Afghanistan and transitioned to a train, advise, and assist role under the NATO Resolute Support mission, while continuing counterterrorism operations. In August 2017, in response to Taliban gains since the start of OFS, President Trump announced a new “conditions-based” South Asia strategy, which included an increase of approximately 3,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, bringing the total to approximately 14,000 troops.
the Afghan government.” NATO defines a high-profile attack as an incident that involves a suicide bomber or vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED).

According to open source reporting, there was 1 high-profile attack in Kabul this quarter, a decrease from 23 reported last quarter. On November 13, a VBIED killed 12 people and wounded 20 more. Press reports indicated that the car bomb targeted a Canadian private security company. Among those killed in the attack were employees of the security company. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

**Enemy-Initiated Attacks Are Less Effective, More Frequent Than One Year Ago**

According to data provided by USFOR-A, as shown in Figure 1, while the number of enemy-initiated attacks this quarter was similar to the historically high number of last quarter, their effectiveness decreased. According to Afghan government data compiled by Resolute Support, there were 8,204 enemy-initiated attacks, a 3 percent decrease from the record high last quarter. There were 3,027 enemy-initiated attacks that resulted in at least one casualty (called “effective” enemy-initiated attacks), about a 20 percent decrease from last quarter.

While the number of attacks decreased from last quarter, as is typical for the winter months, it was still the second-highest number since OFS began in 2015. These figures include attacks

**Figure 1.** *Enemy-Initiated Attacks, 2015-Present*
by the Taliban, ISIS-K, and other anti-government groups. Resolute Support told the DoD OIG that it cannot verify this data and assumes a 10 percent margin of error.  

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported 6,654 security-related incidents from August 9 to November 7, a 14 percent increase over the previous three months. UNAMA’s definition of “security incidents” includes attacks initiated by pro-government forces, including the ANDSF and coalition forces, in addition to attacks by the Taliban, ISIS-K, and other anti-government groups. UNAMA reported that during this period, the highest number of security incidents occurred in the southern provinces. As during the previous quarter, armed clashes accounted for the largest share of attacks (55 percent). Incidents involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) increased 9 percent compared to the previous year, while suicide attacks increased by 24 percent.  

The increase in the number attacks and decrease in the proportion of effective attacks may indicate the Taliban adjusted its strategy to conduct fewer high-profile attacks and a higher volume of small-scale attacks. USFOR-A assessed that in doing so, the Taliban may be attempting to limit its own casualties resulting from direct engagements with the coalition and ANDSF. In addition, USFOR-A reported that coalition forces and the ANDSF have prevented the Taliban from conducting some effective attacks.  

**ISIS-K Abandons Nangarhar Province**

Since announcing the establishment of ISIS in Afghanistan in January 2015, ISIS-K has operated primarily in eastern Afghanistan, particularly Nangarhar province. Operations against ISIS-K are conducted by U.S., Afghan, and coalition forces, as well as by the Taliban, who declared war against ISIS-K in January 2015. In addition to Nangarhar, ISIS-K maintains active cells in Kunar and Herat provinces and Kabul city, with smaller groups of supporters in other parts of the country, including Helmand, Kapisa, and Baghlan provinces.

USFOR-A estimated, with low confidence, that ISIS-K “lost up to half its force” this quarter due to coalition and Afghan strikes, Taliban ground operations, and ISIS-K surrenders, possibly decreasing to fewer than 1,000 fighters in Afghanistan this quarter. More than 300 ISIS-K fighters and 400 of their family members surrendered to Afghan forces in November, after which Afghan President Ghani stated that ISIS-K was “obliterated” in Nangarhar province.

U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, stated that while ISIS-K remains a threat, the ISIS-K surrenders and the loss of territory show “real progress.” While U.S. and Afghan officials reported that ISIS-K’s stronghold in Nangarhar province was collapsing, General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that ISIS-K had been “severely hurt” but not destroyed. As Lead IG reports on operations in Iraq and Syria have shown, losing territory does not equate to the end of ISIS and its affiliates. Even when ISIS-K was based in Nangarhar, it had established cells in other parts of the country and demonstrated the ability to spread and recruit. ISIS-K remains an enduring threat because it can still use the internet to encourage attacks through anti-Western propaganda and inspiring sympathizers, even after the loss of its physical territory.
**U.S. Aircraft Release Record Number of Weapons in 2019**

Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said that after the suspension of the U.S.-Taliban talks in early September, U.S. forces “dialed up” their attacks on the Taliban. This “dialed up” pressure is reflected in data from U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) about air operations in Afghanistan. AFCENT reported that U.S. and coalition aircraft under its control released 777 weapons in October, 519 weapons in November, and 696 weapons in December. October and December set records for the most weapons released in the respective months since OFS began in 2015. There were 7,423 weapons released in 2019, the most of any year under OFS. AFCENT’s methodology for tallying weapons releases counts groups of some smaller munitions as a single weapons release, so reported totals from month to month are not directly comparable. However, use of such longitudinal data can reveal general trends in the airpower campaign, including the increase in airstrikes conducted during the quarter.

**Civilian Casualties Decrease Compared to Same Period the Previous Year**

The final quarter of FY 2019 saw unusually high levels of civilian casualties, as compared to the same period in previous years. This quarter, civilian casualties were lower than in the same period last year. Resolute Support reported that it verified 1,878 civilian casualties (627 killed and 1,251 wounded) during the October-December period, compared to 4,009 during the previous quarter, a decrease of more than 50 percent. Casualties typically decrease in the winter months following the conclusion of the insurgents’ “fighting season.” However,
there were 479 fewer casualties this quarter than during the same quarter last year. The most common cause was IEDs, which accounted for 952 civilian casualties. The provinces with the greatest numbers of civilian casualties were Nangarhar, Ghazni, Parwan, Baghlan, and Herat.24

UNAMA also provides a quarterly report of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. However, this quarter’s UNAMA report was not available at the time of publication of this Lead IG report.

While Resolute Support and UNAMA often report similar overall trends in civilian casualties, their data also expose differences in total numbers and attribution of responsible parties. This is due, in large part, to differences in methodology. Resolute Support assesses reports of civilian casualties using ANDSF and coalition operational reports, aircraft video footage, records of U.S. and Afghan weapons releases, and other coalition and Afghan government-generated information.25 UNAMA investigates reports of civilian casualties using witness accounts and statements from Afghan officials.26 In addition, the two organizations use different definitions of the term “civilian,” which UNAMA defines more broadly than Resolute Support.27

**U.S. and Afghan Casualties**

Three U.S. military personnel died in Afghanistan during the quarter, according to the DoD.28 Two soldiers died in Logar province when their helicopter crashed on November 20, and a soldier died in combat in Kunduz province on December 22.29 Including the deaths from this quarter, 17 U.S. service members were killed in action in calendar year 2019.30 Since OFS began on January 1, 2015, 83 U.S. military personnel and 2 DoD civilians have died.31

The U.S. deaths reported during the quarter are consistent with the low number of U.S. and coalition deaths in Afghanistan since the ANDSF took responsibility for major combat operations and the Resolute Support mission began in January 2015.32 The Afghan government does not publicly release data about casualties suffered by ANDSF personnel.

In addition to combat operations, coalition and ANDSF personnel remain at risk of insider attacks. On December 14, an insider attack at an ANDSF base in Ghazni killed 23 ANA Territorial Force members, according to media reporting. The lone survivor claimed that the attacker—a member of the ANA Territorial Force—killed all the members in the unit while they slept, then drove a stolen Humvee to deliver the unit’s weapons and ammunition to the Taliban.33

**China, Russia, and Iran Pursue Their Own Agendas in Afghanistan**

According to the DIA, China, Russia, and Iran very likely will seek to balance their interests in regional stability with their concerns about a long-term U.S. presence in Central Asia.34 While all three countries have some shared interests with the United States, each pursues interests that at times conflict with U.S. interests. All three countries engage diplomatically with both the Afghan government and the Taliban while maintaining a counter-ISIS-K position. The DIA reported that China likely sees Afghanistan as a place where it can cooperate with the United States to a limited extent to further regional stability.35 In contrast, the DIA stated that Russia and Iran likely see Afghanistan as an area where they can expand pressure on the United States.36
The DIA reported to the DoD OIG that China’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan include combating Uighur militants along its western border in Xinjiang and safeguarding its economic and infrastructure investments in the region as part of its expansionist global development strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative. The DIA reported that to further regional stability required for its objectives, China engages both the Afghan government and the Taliban diplomatically. For example, in October, China invited Taliban and Afghan government representatives to Beijing for intra-Afghan talks following the suspension of U.S. peace talks in September.

According to the DIA, Russia’s regional objectives include the continued bolstering of its bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, pushing for closer military cooperation with them, and preventing an expansion of U.S. military logistics access in Central Asia. The DIA reported that to expand its influence and mitigate instability in Central Asia, Russia engages a wide range of actors in Afghanistan, including the Afghan government, northern Afghan power brokers, and the Taliban. Moscow continues to overstate the threat of ISIS-K and “paints a picture of ISIS spilling over into Central Asia” to justify closer security cooperation with its Central Asian neighbors, according to General John Nicholson, the previous commander of USFOR-A.

Amid discussion of a U.S. troop drawdown, Russia expanded its efforts to influence reconciliation talks, cast the United States as an unreliable security partner, and bolster military capabilities in its Central Asian partners, according to the DIA. In November 2019, as part of its defense modernization, Russia moved an S-300PS missile system to its base in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and other equipment—including Mi-8MT helicopters and P-18-2 radar stations—to its Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan, according to press reporting.

The DIA reported to the DoD OIG that Iran’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Central Asia are maintaining stable central governments and security along Iran’s eastern border, protecting Shia populations, eliminating ISIS-K, countering U.S. presence in the region, and securing Iranian economic interests. According to the DIA, Iran executes this strategy by engaging Kabul politically and economically, while also providing economic and political support to regional power brokers as well as lethal aid to the Taliban. However, U.S.-released intelligence reports suggest that Iranian support to the Taliban is minimal as Taliban control of Afghanistan is not in Iran’s long-term interests.

The DIA also reported that Iran seeks a central role in reconciliation talks—in addition to trying to shape elections and politics—to ensure Iranian influence on any future Afghan government. In November, Iran hosted a senior Taliban delegation to discuss the Afghan peace process for the second time since U.S.-Taliban talks broke down in September, according to press reports.

**Pakistan Fears Strategic Encirclement**

According to the DIA, Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan include countering Indian influence and mitigating spillover of Afghan instability into its territory. The DIA reported that Pakistan’s objectives toward Central Asia are driven by these same concerns, but that Pakistan views its western neighbor as a more immediate and direct threat. The DIA stated that Pakistan views Afghanistan as a sanctuary for anti-Pakistan militant groups.
which conduct cross-border attacks. The DIA assessed that Pakistan believes that an Indian presence and influence in Afghanistan poses a potential threat of “strategic encirclement,” Pakistan views as providing India with the ability to threaten Pakistan from both the east and the west.

The DIA also told the DoD OIG that it assessed that current tensions in Kashmir have not fundamentally altered Pakistan and India’s strategies and actions relating to Afghanistan and regional threat networks, but Pakistan is probably more concerned with Kashmir than it is with Afghanistan. Although Islamabad’s policies toward Afghanistan have not appreciably changed since tensions over Kashmir escalated after August 2019, Pakistani officials claimed that tensions with India could force Pakistan to redeploy forces, currently allocated to the Afghan border, to its eastern border. Pakistan may seek to garner international support for its plight in Kashmir in exchange for its efforts to encourage the Afghan peace process, the DIA assessed.

Diplomatic tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan eased after initially flaring during this quarter. On December 27, the Afghan Consulate in Peshawar reopened and resumed full consular services after shuttering operations on October 11 due to a longstanding land dispute. Pakistan’s Embassy in Kabul also resumed full consular services in late December after it had halted visa processing in early November due to alleged safety concerns for Pakistan’s diplomatic personnel in Afghanistan.

**CAPACITY BUILDING**

Under the NATO-led Resolute Support mission, the United States works with 39 NATO member states and partner states to train, advise, and assist the ANDSF. This includes efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Air Force (AAF), the Afghan Local Police (ALP), and the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) as these forces battle the Taliban and terrorist groups in Afghanistan, and efforts at the ministerial level to build ANDSF administrative capacity and long-term sustainability. U.S. advisory efforts under the Resolute Support mission are implemented by the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) at the ministerial level and by the regional Train Advise and Assist Commands at echelons from the ANA corps level and below.

Much of the advising, particularly advising at the battalion level and lower, is conducted by members of a U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). The 3rd SFAB completed its training in September and deployed to Afghanistan to replace the 2nd SFAB on November 15.

**President Ghani Orders the ANDSF to Reduce Checkpoints**

The ANDSF has maintained an extensive number of checkpoints for years, with many located in remote areas where there is little support from the ANDSF and seemingly little security benefit for the local population. USFOR-A told the DoD OIG that attacks on poorly defended checkpoints are a leading cause of ANDSF casualties. This quarter, however, President Ghani issued a decree that specifically directed the ANDSF to reduce the number of checkpoints throughout the country.
CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that the Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs acknowledged President Ghani’s decree, developed plans, and “made great progress” in reducing and reinforcing checkpoints. CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that it expected the progress made this quarter to last because the Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs could see the positive outcomes of the checkpoint reduction strategy and therefore would strengthen their commitment to reduction. Additional information on the reduction of checkpoints is contained in the classified appendix.

U.S. advisors to the Ministry of Defense reported two obstacles to checkpoint reduction this quarter. First, CSTC-A reported that the ANDSF lacked a clear definition of a checkpoint, which complicated checkpoint counting and reduction efforts. In response, CSTC-A developed a draft definition and associated terms and shared the documents with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs. Second, CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that many checkpoints are in remote areas and that limited access hampers reduction efforts. CSTC-A reported that coalition advisors coordinate with ANA and ANP counterparts every week to refine checkpoint reduction plans.

Checkpoint reduction initiatives also struggle to achieve long-term gains because local Afghan politicians and populations want ANDSF checkpoints in their areas, because they see checkpoints as evidence the government is providing security, according to the DoD. As a result, the ANDSF continues to install new checkpoints as it eliminates them in other areas.

Furthermore, U.S. forces have reported progress in checkpoint reduction in the past with little evidence to demonstrate enduring progress. Last quarter, CSTC-A reported that advisors “took positive steps” to reduce checkpoints. The quarter before that, “the ANDSF took steps” to reduce checkpoints. A 2018 Lead IG report stated that the Ministry of Defense and Interior Affairs leaders “made commitments to reduce unnecessary checkpoints,” but the DoD reported that the checkpoint reduction effort “has not progressed.” In 2017, USFOR-A reported that the ANDSF “attempted to reduce the number of defensive, vulnerable checkpoints.” In 2016, the DoD reported that the ANDSF was “continuing to reduce” checkpoints.

**ANDSF Prepares to Use APPS Data to Aid Recruiting**

Last quarter, the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) reported a total ANDSF force of 253,850 personnel as of July 28, about 100,000 below the 352,000 personnel the international community has agreed to fund. While the ANDSF had never been fully staffed, the APPS numbers revealed that the ANA had approximately 18,000 fewer soldiers than previously reported. As discussed in last quarter’s Lead IG report, the APPS numbers did not reflect a sudden loss of ANDSF personnel. Instead, the numbers were a more accurate count and showed there had been fewer ANDSF personnel than reported all along.

The fact that there are fewer ANDSF personnel than previously believed could explain some of the challenges the ANDSF has had in making progress against the Taliban. In December, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper characterized the conflict as a “strategic stalemate” and stated that, “the [Afghan government] is not going to militarily defeat the Taliban.” While a larger number of ANDSF could possibly change that dynamic, the DoD OIG has not seen evidence that the ANDSF would be able to increase recruiting and training to increase the force size in the short run.
The APPS data also do not directly correlate to the ANDSF structure and size requirements, according to CSTC-A. Instead, APPS is designed to provide more accurate and timely personnel records than its predecessor, the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System. The ANDSF biometrically enrolls soldiers into APPS and links them to a valid position in the approved personnel structure. In this way, APPS is designed, in part, to prevent “ghost soldiers”—personnel who do not exist or do not serve—from being authorized for payment.

Although the APPS data provide the number of personnel assigned to validated positions, there is no feedback process from APPS to the personnel requirements development process for the ANDSF. In other words, the ANDSF is not using APPS data to determine if it has the proper numbers of forces in each specialty and is filling vacancies accordingly. CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that the number of personnel filling valid positions is not intended to affect changes in personnel requirements. Instead, CSTC-A identifies and incorporates the needs of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior Affairs into the manning documents. CSTC-A reported that it did not make any major changes to the ANDSF personnel requirements during the quarter. CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that once the APPS data are analyzed, the results can be used to forecast attrition and recruiting needs and improve force planning capabilities.

CSTC-A reported that attrition is one of the major challenges facing the ANDSF, as personnel losses reduce combat capabilities and increase recruiting requirements. The ANA Chief of General Staff told commanders to reduce attrition and increase re-contracting in order to reduce the strain on recruiting to maintain combat readiness and instead allow recruitment efforts to focus on enlisting better qualified recruits into the ANA. According to CSTC-A, the ANA is implementing the directive by working to improve facilities, accountability, and maintenance concerns, thereby addressing some of the root causes of its attrition problems.

**ANA Specialty School Attendance Low, but Improving**

Last quarter, CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that ANA units lack soldiers trained in essential military occupational specialty skills, which in turn makes the units unable to sustain continuous operations. The problem stems from low attendance rates at schools in which soldiers learn military occupational specialties such as logistics or maintenance.

Graduation rates at the ANA Basic Warrior Training courses increased this quarter, according to CSTC-A. Basic Warrior Training is the initial 12-week course that all ANA recruits must complete before they are assigned to an army unit. Three Basic Warrior Training courses finished during the quarter, and of the 4,304 enrolled in those courses, 3,908 graduated. The graduation rate of 91 percent was an improvement from last quarter’s 3,462 graduates (83 percent graduation rate) and represented a return to previous levels. CSTC-A attributed last quarter’s low number to a normal fluctuation in a training and recruiting cycle.

While Basic Warrior Training attendance and graduation rates remained relatively high, advanced specialty training school attendance remained low. A Ministry of Defense directive states that all ANA Basic Warrior Training graduates are supposed to go directly to advanced training for their specialty role in the army. The ANA currently has 11 schools for its specialty branches. However, the ANA Chief of General Staff contradicted the Ministry of Defense
directive in 2017 when he issued guidance that all basic training graduates be assigned immediately to their units, which then decide whether the soldiers should attend advanced training. Since then, the ANA has faced low attendance rates at specialty schools and therefore a commensurate low rate of soldiers proficient in their military occupational specialties.

As shown in Table 2, utilization rates at the ANA branch schools this quarter remained low. Of note, utilization rates are high for infantry but very low in schools that train soldiers in roles that support CSTC-A’s top 10 priorities, such as logistics, finance, and human resources. Last quarter, CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that it advised the ANA to ensure ANA soldiers complete the mandated training program and that the branch schools and the professional military education should “receive priority attention” and persistent support from CSTC-A advisors. Attendance at specialty schools has increased since December 2018.

### ANP Performance Metrics in Development

The Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs published a 10-year vision for the Afghan National Police in 2018 that stated its end goals were unity, capability, and trustworthiness. To support the Afghan objectives of unity and capability, CSTC-A reported that it designed coalition train, advise, and assist efforts to help the ANP become a nationally structured, community-based force that serves as the primary law enforcement provider.

CSTC-A reported that the Ministry of Interior Affairs follows a “5-3-1 focus areas approach,” which aligns with CSTC-A priorities, to achieve its vision (see Table 3). Coalition advisors prioritize interactions with Afghan counterparts by targeting the “decisive people, places, and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANA Branch School</th>
<th>Utilization Rate Dec. 2018</th>
<th>Utilization Rate Dec. 2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Arms Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Support Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Service Support Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td></td>
<td>9%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Services Branch Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious and Cultural Affairs</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Logistics, Finance, and Human Resources schools reported as one in December 2018. **Not reported. Source: CSTC-A.
processes” that have the greatest need within the focus areas. CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that the “five points” signify the actions that coalition advisors prioritized as most important for the ANP, the “three points” are initiatives that affect each of the “five points,” and all points lead to the “one point,” the overarching goal.

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that it changed the method by which they assess, monitor, and evaluate progress within the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior Affairs. CSTC-A reported that as of the end of the quarter, its Ministerial Advisory Group for Interior was developing standardized metrics to assess the effectiveness of train, advise, and assist (TAA) efforts by incorporating the “assess, monitor, and evaluate” objectives that guide CSTC-A’s advising efforts. According to CSTC-A, the new method measures efforts that support the institutional priorities under the CSTC-A commander’s campaign objectives.

However, the strategies and means to assess progress have changed frequently, which makes it difficult to assess long-term progress. CSTC-A stated that the new quantitative and qualitative metrics are designed to be “enduring,” as they measure the key capabilities and capacities necessary for the ministries to be “effective, affordable, sustainable, and institutionally viable.” However, CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that it changes metrics as necessary to adapt to the changing environment and that changes in metrics do not necessarily mean a change in strategy.

According to CSTC-A, the new metrics will be incorporated into the new “Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate” tool within the Advisor Network system next quarter. CSTC-A said it plans to establish baseline assessments of the ministries and refine advising efforts accordingly as the system matures.
Afghan Air Force Receives New Aircraft

Train, Advise, and Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air)—the Resolute Support component that advises the Afghan Air Force (AAF)—reported that it reduced the number of advisors from 183 to 150 this quarter as part of a reorganization of advising efforts that began last quarter. According to TAAC-Air, there was no reduction in advising capabilities and TAAC-Air can still meet the training needs of the AAF with fewer advisors. DoD officials told the DoD OIG that TAAC-Air was able to reduce advisors because AAF capability improved.

TAAC-Air reported that the AAF had 193 aircraft as of the end of the quarter. The AAF fleet has been growing each quarter, in accordance with the AAF Modernization Plan established in 2016. The AAF added five UH-60 Black Hawk and five MD-530 helicopters to its fleet during the quarter. The DoD also announced this quarter that the aviation modernization plan was adjusted to only purchase 53 of 159 UH-60 helicopters and 10 of 32 AC-208 attack aircraft originally planned. The DoD reported it also plans to purchase CH-47 Chinook helicopters for the Special Mission Wing—the aviation component of the Afghan Special Security Forces—to replace its Mi-17 helicopters. The DoD stated in a December report that it plans to complete fielding of the aircraft by 2023.

Of the AAF total fleet of 193 aircraft, 167 aircraft were usable at the end of the quarter (see Figure 3). TAAC-Air defined a “usable” aircraft as an aircraft that is in the country and...
available for missions or in short-term maintenance. TAAC-Air reported that the AAF did not have any “Class A” events during the quarter, referring to mishaps that cause a loss of life, serious injury, or more than $1 million in damage to the aircraft. While the AAF added 10 aircraft to its fleet, the number of usable aircraft only increased by 9 because an Mi-17 was listed as unusable when it reached its flight hour limit before a scheduled overhaul. Of the three helicopter types, the Mi-17 had the highest utilization rate—the average hours flown per aircraft per month—and the fewest number of usable aircraft. The average Mi-17 utilization rate was 34.2 hours during the quarter, while the average for the UH-60 was 20.4 and the average for the MD-530 was 19.3.

Afghan Maintenance Capabilities Improve Under New Maintenance Strategy

The ANDSF is not self-sufficient in maintaining its ground vehicles and equipment and relies heavily on contractor logistics support. In the past, maintenance contracts included the requirement to train Afghan mechanics but did not include specific training benchmarks. According to the DoD, the requirements changed in 2017 when the new National Maintenance Strategy–Ground Vehicle Support contract laid out a series of specific goals for a progressively increasing share of work that Afghan maintainers would be expected to attain.

Under the contract, a DoD contractor provides maintenance services on ANDSF ground vehicles and training to ANDSF ground vehicle maintenance technicians. Over the 5 years of the contract, the contractors are expected to develop the capacity of the ANA and ANP so they can assume an increasing share of maintenance tasks. CSTC-A reported to the DoD OIG...
that the ANA should be able to perform 90 percent of maintenance tasks and the ANP should be able to perform 65 percent of such tasks by the end of the fifth contract year in 2023.\textsuperscript{106}

According to data provided by DoD, the ANA and ANP conducted almost none of their own maintenance in late 2017.\textsuperscript{107} This quarter, the ANA was close to meeting its goal of a 55 percent work share of ground vehicle maintenance.\textsuperscript{108} The ANP surpassed its goal of 10 percent and performed between 21 and 24 percent of its vehicle maintenance (see Table 4).\textsuperscript{109}

In addition, CSTC-A reported that the ANP increased its weekly rate of closing of work orders from 54 last quarter to 168 for this quarter.\textsuperscript{110} Last quarter, CSTC-A directed the contractor to implement new “surge” tasking for the ANP to continue increases in training and the operational readiness of the fleet. CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that the ANP, with the support of the contractor, continued an upward trend in achieving their workshare goals, but the DoD OIG found that the ANP workshare was not significantly greater than the 20 to 24 percent CSTC-A reported last quarter.\textsuperscript{111}

The contract—and associated workshare ratios—does not include tasks performed outside of maintenance facilities by contractor “contact teams.”\textsuperscript{112} A contractor contact team is a group of contractors who perform maintenance outside of designated maintenance facilities. For example, a contact team may be responsible for the repair of a disabled vehicle that cannot be transported to the maintenance facility. The number of contractor contact team work orders performed on ANA vehicles is often double the number of contractor tasks performed at the maintenance centers.\textsuperscript{113}
Like the ANA and ANP, the AAF and the Special Mission Wing rely on contracted logistics support to provide most maintenance on their growing fleet. Afghan aircraft maintenance consists of three levels of increasing complexity: launch and recovery, organizational, and intermediate.\(^{114}\) Depot-level maintenance for extensive repairs and overhauls is required for the AAF’s and SMW’s Mi-17 helicopters and the AAF’s C-130 fixed wing aircraft and is performed exclusively by contracted maintenance support in specialized facilities. The other AAF aircraft do not have an overhaul requirement.

Launch and recovery maintenance, the most basic level, involves activities to prepare the aircraft for each mission, such as conducting pre- and post-flight inspections, cleaning aircraft, managing logbooks and records, and servicing the aircraft with fuel and oil. Most launch and recovery tasks are performed by Afghan mechanics (see Table 5).\(^{115}\)

Organizational maintenance involves inspecting, servicing, lubricating, adjusting, and replacing parts and minor assemblies. With the exceptions of the UH-60 and C-130 aircraft, Afghan mechanics also perform most organizational maintenance.\(^{116}\)

Intermediate maintenance is more complex and relies heavily on contracted logistics support. Intermediate maintenance involves repairing components and assemblies and more thorough inspections of the aircraft.\(^{117}\)

Contracted, non-Afghan logistics support currently provides all maintenance tasks for the C-130 and UH-60 aircraft. TAAC-Air reported that there are no plans to train Afghans to maintain the AAF’s three usable C-130s. TAAC-Air plans to begin UH-60 launch and recovery maintenance training in the summer of 2020.\(^{118}\) TAAC-Air also does not train, advise, and assist any maintenance for the Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters. TAAC-Air reported that the AAF is responsible for all Mi-17 maintenance.\(^{119}\)

### Table 5.
Percentage of AAF Maintenance Capability by Aircraft Type (non-CLS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A-29</th>
<th>C-208</th>
<th>AC-208</th>
<th>C-130</th>
<th>MD-530</th>
<th>UH-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engine and Body</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch and Recovery</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avionics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch and Recovery</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weapons</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch and Recovery</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: TAAC-Air.*
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Afghan Government and Taliban Release Prisoners

On November 19, the Afghan government and the Taliban released several prisoners. President Ghani described the release as a gesture intended to start peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The Taliban released American Kevin King and Australian Timothy Weeks. The Taliban-affiliated terrorist group, the Haqqani Network, had held Mr. King and Mr. Weeks since they were kidnapped in August 2016 in Kabul, where they both worked as professors at the American University of Afghanistan. Three days after releasing the two professors, the Taliban also released 10 members of the ANDSF. The Afghan government released three senior commanders of the Haqqani Network. A Taliban spokesman described the releases as progress in building goodwill that could aid the peace process. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo issued a statement welcoming the “goodwill gesture.”

U.S. and Taliban Resume Talks: U.S. Presses for Ceasefire and Dialogue; Taliban Insists on Withdrawal of Forces

As reported previously, President Trump suspended the U.S.-Taliban peace talks in early September 2019. According to Department of State (DoS) officials, following his visit to Afghanistan at the end of November, the President authorized Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR), to resume the talks with the Taliban with the goal of achieving a reduction in violence that would enable the peace process to move forward.

On December 9, the media reported that talks between the U.S. Government and the Taliban had resumed in Qatar. Ambassador Khalilzad led the U.S. negotiating team. The Taliban negotiating team included Anas Haqqani, one of the prisoners released by the Afghan government. Anas Haqqani is the younger brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the head of the designated terrorist organization, the Haqqani Network. DoS officials stated that the objectives of the talks remained unchanged from before the talks’ temporary suspension in September. According to the DoS, the U.S. negotiators’ objective was to pivot to intra-Afghan negotiations, where the Taliban will meet with representatives of the Afghan government and a cross-section of Afghan society to discuss a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire and to chart a political roadmap for the future of their country.

President Trump, in his announcement of the resumption of talks, stated that the Taliban was ready to agree to a ceasefire. According to Afghan media, the U.S. negotiators urged the Taliban to agree to a ceasefire during the December talks. At the end of the quarter, media outlets reported that the Taliban had agreed to a nation-wide ceasefire. However, the Taliban denied that they had come to such an agreement. The Taliban stated that the only issue up for discussion was a reduction in violence and they had “no intention” of declaring a ceasefire.

A Taliban spokesman, Suhail Shaheen, stated to media representatives that once an agreement to withdraw international forces from Afghanistan was complete, the Taliban
would observe a ceasefire with U.S. and NATO forces to facilitate their departure. Mr. Shaheen further stated that a nationwide ceasefire would be a matter of discussion for the intra-Afghan portion of the negotiations. In December, the Afghan government stated that a ceasefire would be a pre-condition for talks with the Taliban.

Similarly, U.S. negotiators have stated to the Taliban that the current level of violence is not conducive to peace and that the United States seeks a reduction in violence that leads to intra-Afghan negotiations and a ceasefire. DoS officials stated that for a peace process to move forward, the Taliban will need to demonstrate that they are committed and able to reduce violence and eventually abide by a ceasefire.

According to the DoS, the United States directly consulted with President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah, and a range of Afghan officials and Afghans outside the government regarding the talks during the quarter.

**Ministry of Peace Replaces the High Peace Council, Begins Preparations for Peace Process**

During the quarter, according to the DoS, the Afghan Ministry of Peace Affairs (MoP) became operational and began preparations for the intra-Afghan dialogue and broader Afghan peace process that would follow any U.S.-Taliban peace agreement. Specifically, the Ministry established seven regional “Peace Jirgas” throughout the country in anticipation of an agreement. The MoP was nominally established by President Ghani in June 2019 and slated to take over for the High Peace Council due to that organization’s history of substandard results.

Unlike the High Peace Council, which was appointed by, but operated relatively arms-length from, the Government, the MoP is a cabinet ministry. As a cabinet ministry, the head of the MoP will report directly to the President. According to the DoS, the MoP will be the Afghan government entity responsible for coordinating the Afghan government side of the peace process.

On December 30, the Afghan parliament approved the MoP as an official agency within the Afghan government. According to DoS officials, given that Afghanistan has a National Unity Government, the MoP may not be the entity the Chief Executive chooses to represent his interests in the peace process. Moreover, according to the DoS, political opposition factions, civil society groups, or others who will represent the Afghan government in peace talks may choose not to coordinate their negotiating positions via the MoP.

**Election Commission Reports Narrow Ghani Victory in Preliminary Results amid Accusations of Electoral Fraud**

On December 22, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced the preliminary results of the September 2019 presidential election. According to the IEC, President Ghani received 50.64 percent of the votes tallied, followed by Chief Executive Abdullah, with 39.52 percent of the vote. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar came in a distant third, with 3.85 percent of the vote. By gaining more than 50 percent of the vote, President Ghani would avoid a second round of voting, if the count is confirmed.
According to Afghan elections rules, candidates have 72 hours to dispute the preliminary results by filing complaints with the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). The ECC then has 15 working days to review them. On January 14, 2020, after the end of the quarter, the ECC announced that it had identified 5,300 polling stations to be recounted. The Ghani, Abdullah, and Hekmatyar campaigns filed more than 16,500 complaints. The ECC estimated that assessing the complaints would take 39 days. The Provincial Electoral Complaints Commissions issued their decisions on those cases by January 21, 2020. As of January 19, 2020 (the end of the appeal window), around 6,292 appeals had been registered for the ECC to adjudicate.

On December 23rd, President Ghani stated in a press conference that he welcomed the preliminary results. Rival candidate Abdullah discounted the legitimacy of both the results and the process in a series of social media posts and he pledged to defend the “clean votes” at any cost. In a separate press conference, Hekmatyar called the preliminary results “false” and stated that his party, Hizb-e-Islami, had the “power to protect its rights.”

Prior to the announcement of the preliminary elections results, the candidates had already begun disputing the vote counting process. Abdullah’s campaign boycotted recounts conducted by the IEC in early November, stating that approximately 300,000 votes should not be included in the preliminary results. Their objections stemmed from allegations that the votes were cast outside of official voting hours; were initially quarantined for various types of discrepancies; or were identified as fraudulent votes based on biometric data (such as duplicate photos, photos taken of photos, photos of people too young to vote, or photos that did not resemble the voters). In addition to the boycott, thousands of Abdullah supporters delayed the vote recount by surrounding voting centers in seven provinces.

On November 29, thousands of Abdullah supporters held a protest in Kabul against the inclusion of the allegedly invalid ballots. Similarly, Hekmatyar claimed in early November that 44 percent of the total votes cast were fraudulent because they were not biometrically verified. In December, the Abdullah campaign team walked out of a nationally televised meeting between the presidential campaign teams and IEC officials, stating that the officials did not give them adequate time to convey their objections.

Afghan Government Finalizes Asset Recovery Regulation

To seek to mitigate the financial effects of corruption, the Afghan government this quarter finalized the draft Asset Recovery Regulation, which is currently under final review and expected to be approved by presidential decree in early 2020. Asset recovery, in this case, refers to the legal process for the Afghan government to retrieve funds diverted or stolen from their intended recipient by corruption. Within the Afghan government, the Afghan Attorney General’s Office includes an Office of Asset Recovery. However, according to the DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the Asset Recovery Office has remained largely dormant since its inception in 2018. INL representatives stated that the Asset Recovery Regulation will provide the potential for increased recovery of the proceeds of corruption. For example, the Kabul Bank scandal in 2011 netted the perpetrators of the fraud nearly $1 billion, with only half of that money ever recovered. The new asset recovery regulation could, in theory, aid in the eventual recovery of the remainder of these stolen funds.
DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

USAID Has Invested $1.3 Billion for Health and Nutrition Programming Since 2003, but Efforts May Not Be Sustainable

USAID reported to USAID OIG that as of September 2019, it has spent more than $1.3 billion in Afghanistan for healthcare programming since 2003, although Afghanistan may not be able to sustain efforts given the large role of donor funding. Of that $1.3 billion, $256.5 million was programmed through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) since fiscal year 2015.

According to USAID, USAID healthcare programming originally supported healthcare infrastructure, service delivery, and technical assistance to build capacity and sustainable healthcare systems. In 2015, USAID began reducing its healthcare programming spending and ended support for construction of new infrastructure. Over time, USAID funding for healthcare service delivery shifted from support to international and local nongovernmental organizations to direct support to the Afghan government.

Currently, USAID supports healthcare programming through the World Bank-administrated ARTF and also provides technical assistance to improve quality and sustainability of healthcare services through several off-budget (funds that do not go through the Afghan government) implementing mechanisms (see Figure 4).

USAID healthcare programming in Afghanistan aligns with USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Afghanistan, which seeks to improve health outcomes and increase the government’s capacity to deliver basic health services.

Figure 4.
Historical USAID Funding for Healthcare Programming in Afghanistan (Disbursements, in $ Millions)
healthcare outcomes in support of advancing social gains. To improve healthcare outcomes, USAID programming is intended to improve the quality and availability of public healthcare services and to strengthen governance of the healthcare system, according to the CDCS.

However, healthcare gains, such as a significant decrease in the mortality rate for children under five, a decrease in maternal mortality rates, and increased access to healthcare facilities, may not be sustainable because off-budget funding supports a large proportion of public expenditures, according to USAID. Moreover, with approximately 70 percent of the healthcare facilities in Afghanistan supported by the non-profit Sehatmandi project through ARTF, the majority of healthcare facilities operate with some level of donor support.

While public healthcare expenditures have risen over time, they are a small portion of total healthcare spending in Afghanistan. According to the World Bank, expenditures for the Ministry of Public Health more than tripled, and per capita public spending on healthcare doubled since 2011. The Ministry of Public Health's share of the national budget also increased from around four percent in 2011 to six percent by 2019. However, current levels of total healthcare expenditures are highly dependent on international grant support (especially off-budget support). USAID's 2017 Political Economic Analysis stated that the Afghan government funded only three percent of total national healthcare expenditures. For the overall Afghan public expenditures, off-budget funding through international donors accounts for 34 percent of civilian expenditures, and 55 percent of civilian grants are delivered off-budget, according to the World Bank.

To build a more sustainable healthcare system, the Afghan government developed a revenue generation strategy aimed at reducing dependency on external aid from 75 percent of total public expenditure on healthcare in 2018 to 50 percent by 2022, according to USAID. This would be accomplished through new taxes on imported tobacco products, vehicles, fuel, the import and production of certain beverages, user fees at hospitals, and the implementation of healthcare insurance plan models for beneficiary coverage.

**USAID Announces $591 Million Five-Year Health Project**

USAID recently announced a $591 million 5-year project, Basic and Essential Health Technical Assistance and Resources (BEHTAR), to improve healthcare outcomes in Afghanistan through sustaining availability of healthcare services, strengthening governance of the healthcare system, and improving the quality of healthcare services. According to USAID, the program will seek to sustain and expand gains in the healthcare sector, provide targeted capacity development to the Ministry of Public Health, work with the private sector to improve access and quality of healthcare services, focus on urban areas, prioritize women’s healthcare, and balance on-budget (funds to the Afghan government through ARTF) support with off-budget assistance to improve quality of care.

According to USAID, this program will be implemented through 20 different activities including a combination of the World Bank-administered Sehatmandi project through ARTF and other contracts, cooperative agreements, Public International Organization grants, and funding from other USAID projects. Sehatmandi, part of BEHTAR, is a $600 million USAID reported that it contributes $90 million to Sehatmandi, 3-year program expected to
end in June 2021, that is implemented by the Afghan Ministry of Public Health.\textsuperscript{176} It seeks to increase the utilization and quality of healthcare, nutrition, and family planning services across all 34 provinces in Afghanistan, according to USAID.\textsuperscript{177} In addition to funding Sehatmandi and a planned follow-on through ARTF, USAID reported an additional 11 active awards and 4 planned awards related to the healthcare sector.\textsuperscript{178}

**Child and Maternal Mortality Rates Declined, but Healthcare System Struggles to Expand Service and Access**

Since 2003, the healthcare sector in Afghanistan has made significant gains. The mortality rate for children under 5-years old fell 42 percent, from 117.9 deaths per 1,000 births in 2003 to 67.9 deaths by 2017, according to UNICEF.\textsuperscript{179} The World Bank reported that maternal mortality rates declined 64 percent, from 1,100 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 396 by 2015.\textsuperscript{180}

However, USAID also noted that Afghanistan’s healthcare facilities, in addition to roads and reliable supplies of water and power, are not sufficient to support expanded healthcare service delivery.\textsuperscript{181} There is also a nation-wide shortage of qualified public sector healthcare workers and doctors, including female medical staff and doctors, making it more difficult for the Ministry of Public Health to further reduce child and maternal mortality, especially in remote areas.\textsuperscript{182} According to USAID, healthcare workers are mainly concentrated in large urban areas, and absenteeism is a problem at healthcare facilities due to inadequate personnel management.\textsuperscript{183}

While the number of healthcare facilities have increased in Afghanistan, access is still limited in some provinces. According to USAID, more than 2,800 healthcare facilities were operational, more than 95 percent of all public healthcare facilities had at least one female healthcare provider, and 90 percent of the population had access to a healthcare facility within two hours of their home.\textsuperscript{184} However, USAID’s 2017 Political Economic Analysis for healthcare cautioned that geographic “coverage is not the same as access” and that access was also limited by affordability, cultural constraints, and instances where facilities may not be staffed.\textsuperscript{185} While the number of healthcare facilities has grown significantly since 2004 from 496 to 2,800 in 2019, according to USAID, some members of parliament reportedly demanded more facilities in their provinces.\textsuperscript{186} As a result, the number of healthcare facilities per person ranged (in 2017) from as low as 1 per 4,400 in Uruzgan to 1 per 22,000 in Kabul, and the number of healthcare facilities per square kilometer varied from 1 per 2,926 square km in Nimroz to 1 per 21 square km in Kabul.\textsuperscript{187}

**Polio Cases Increased Following Taliban Halting of Vaccination Campaigns, Threatening Global Eradication Efforts**

While 96 percent of Afghanistan is polio-free, according to UNICEF, there was a spike of 21 cases reported in 2018 and another 22 cases reported in 2019, due to lingering mistrust of vaccinations.\textsuperscript{188} In April 2018, the Taliban banned the World Health Organization and the International Red Cross from operating in areas of Afghanistan under its control, which effectively halted all polio vaccination campaigns.\textsuperscript{189} As a result, service providers were unable to reach more than half of the 1.5 million children in the three southern provinces of Afghanistan targeted for immunization.\textsuperscript{190} While the ban was lifted in September, access
problems and the inability to conduct house-to-house vaccination campaigns remain. In certain areas, particularly in and around Kandahar and in southeastern Afghanistan, some people refused to be vaccinated.

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative, a public-private partnership led by national governments and non-governmental organizations, stated that polio in Afghanistan is in crisis mode, and the program is not on the right track to eradicate polio. Transmission is ongoing and, according to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, there is an increasing risk of a large, expanding outbreak with 5 million people not covered by vaccination campaigns since March 2019 and an ongoing polio outbreak across the border in Pakistan.

**Afghanistan Faces Challenges Regulating Private Sector Healthcare**

The private sector plays a significant role in Afghanistan’s health system, according to USAID, and accounts for nearly 75 percent of health expenditures. The private sector provides 62 percent of healthcare services with more than 200 private health facilities in the five largest cities in Afghanistan (Kabul, Jalalabad, Herat, Kandahar, and Mazar-i-Sharif). Until 2008, when the Ministry of Public Health began the private health sector stewardship initiative, the private sector was unregulated. The next year, the Ministry of Public Health established the Private Sector Coordination Office to develop and implement policies and procedures related to the private health sector, including minimum standards for healthcare. Implementation of policies and standards remains a challenge, according to USAID, due to the Ministry of Public Health’s limited regulatory capacity and the large number of private facilities.

Although almost $765 million is spent each year on medicines from private sector pharmacies, nearly 90 percent (nearly $740 million) of these medicines are imported. There is only one laboratory in Afghanistan that certifies pharmaceutical quality and, with limited capabilities and capacity, it is unable to process sufficient numbers of tests to ensure a safe drug supply. USAID noted that one of the goals of the BEHTAR project will be to support private sector contributions and investment into the healthcare system to reduce expenditures in improving pharmaceutical quality and capture some of the $285 million currently spent each year on treatment overseas.

**Number of People in Need in 2020 Projected to Increase Nearly 50 Percent**

The 2020 Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview was released on December 17, 2019 by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and projected that the estimated number of people in need of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan in 2019, 6.3 million, will increase by nearly 50 percent in 2020, to 9.4 million people. This increase is expected as a result of changes in the security environment, the lingering impacts of the previous drought, diminished resilience among people because of the longevity of the war, an increase in poverty, and the effect of the worsening economic situation in Iran, according to OCHA. Deteriorating security conditions have also resulted in the number of internally displaced persons in Afghanistan increasing by 27 percent from...
332,900 displaced in 2018 to 423,600 displaced in 2019, as of December 29, 2019, according to OCHA.205 Despite the end of drought conditions, over 14 million people are forecast to be in crisis or emergency food insecurity in early 2020.206

The Humanitarian Response Plan for Afghanistan, 2018-2021, updated on December 31, 2019 by OCHA, requested $733 million, an increase of $121 million from the 2019 mid-year request for $612 million, to reach 7.1 million of the 9.4 million in need.207 As of January 15, 2020, 75.3 percent of the 2019 mid-year request for $612 million, had been funded.208 Included in the 9.4 million Afghans in need in 2020, the Humanitarian Response Plan also projected an additional 500,000 IDPs will require assistance.209

SUPPORT TO MISSION

U.S. Maintains the Same Number of Military Personnel in Afghanistan

The DoD reported that there were approximately 13,000 U.S. military service members and 800 DoD civilians in Afghanistan during the quarter, the same number reported last quarter.210 The DoD also reported that there were 26,545 DoD contractors serving in Afghanistan, an apparent increase of more than 2,000 from September 2019. The increase was due to a problem in the July-September quarter in which a delay exercising a contract option caused many contractors’ letters of authorization to expire, and the contractors were
automatically removed from the tracking database. The issue was resolved and the contractors are again included in the contractor census for October-December.\textsuperscript{211}

CSTC-A told the DoD OIG that it also reduced personnel and contract costs by transforming its train, advise, and assist methodology this quarter. CSTC-A reorganized the groups that advise the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs to provide more flexibility to advisors and reduce military, civilian, and contractor personnel. In addition to reducing personnel needs, CSTC-A instituted a contract management review process that identified $621.5 million of potential cost savings and avoidance and a reduction of over 300 contractors.\textsuperscript{212}

**DoS Counternarcotics and Rule of Law Funding Decrease While Narcotics Production Increases**

The DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is the DoS bureau responsible for implementing counternarcotics and rule of law programs.\textsuperscript{213} The staffing review at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul reduced the number of INL direct hire and contract support personnel in Kabul by 87 percent.\textsuperscript{214}

DoS funding for Afghan counternarcotics and rule of law programs has been on a downward trajectory for several years. INL acknowledged to the DoS OIG that its programs would not be sustained at current levels moving forward. Figure 6 includes INL funding for Afghanistan from FY 2002-2020.

*Figure 6.*

**DoS INL Funding for Afghanistan, Total and Counternarcotics 2002-2019 (in $ Thousands)**

![Graph showing DoS INL Funding for Afghanistan](image)
While not at the record levels of 2017, opium cultivation in Afghanistan in 2018 (the latest year for which statistics are available) was the second-highest on record.\textsuperscript{215} In addition to the ongoing production of opium, there was a significant increase in the seizures of locally produced methamphetamine in 2019.\textsuperscript{216} According to INL, insecurity, lack of focus and will on the part of the Afghan government, and corruption have facilitated narcotics production in Afghanistan. The Taliban controls the majority of the territory where poppy is cultivated, and there is a symbiotic relationship between the insurgency and illegal drug trafficking, whereby the traffickers provide weapons, funding, and material support to the insurgency in exchange for “protection.” INL stated that the Afghan government has acted slowly to implement its national drug control strategy and that there is a lack of central government focus on counternarcotics and a lack of political will for eradication. Furthermore, corruption leads to government officials personally benefitting from the drug trade by facilitating drug activities and thwarting arrests and prosecutions.\textsuperscript{217}

**USAID Afghanistan Funding Gradually Declines**

USAID has spent nearly $19.5 billion in Afghanistan since 2002, including approximately $1.7 billion in humanitarian assistance. Since its peak of approximately $2.1 billion in 2011, USAID spending per year in Afghanistan has remained between just over $500 million and $1.4 billion (see Figure 7).

![USAID Funding in Afghanistan, 2002-2019 (Disbursements, in $ Millions)](image-url)
FY 2020 Appropriations Provide Modest Increase for DoD OCO Funding

On December 20, 2019, President Trump signed two appropriation bills to fund the federal government through FY 2020. The legislation provides the DoD with a total of $713.2 billion in FY 2020, which includes $634 billion in base funding, and $71.3 billion in OCO funding. This represents an increase of approximately 4 percent from FY 2019’s total DoD appropriation of $685.6 billion and a 3.6 percent increase in the OCO budget from the FY 2019 appropriation of $68.8 billion.

The DoD’s OCO appropriation for FY 2020 includes $4.2 billion in funding for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, a 14.3 percent decrease from the $4.9 billion appropriated for this fund in FY 2019 (see Figure 8). The ASFF is the principal funding stream for U.S. support to sustain the ANDSF.

The FY 2020 appropriation for the DoS, USAID, and related agencies is $54.7 billion, which includes $8 billion in OCO funding. This represents an increase of approximately 1 percent from the FY 2019 appropriation of $54.2 billion.

This quarter, the DoD Comptroller released the DoD’s congressionally mandated Cost of War report, which details the DoD’s spending on overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere through September 30, 2019. According to this report, the DoD has spent $1.57 trillion in support of contingency operations since September 11, 2001. The total cost of operations in Afghanistan over that time was $776 billion, of which $197.3 billion has been obligated in support of OFS since that operation began in 2015.223

The Comptroller reported that the DoD obligated $39.4 billion for OFS during FY 2019, which was approximately 4.4 percent less than the $41.2 billion spent on OFS in FY 2018. Average monthly spending on all OCOs in FY 2019 was reported at $4.2 billion, of which $3.3 billion was in support of OFS. According to the DoD Comptroller, these obligations cover all expenses related to the conflicts, including war-related operational costs, support for deployed troops, and transportation of personnel and equipment.224
OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Strategic Planning .................................................. 40
Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Activity ...................... 42
Investigations and Hotline Activity ......................... 49
OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

This section of the report provides information on Lead IG strategic planning efforts; completed, ongoing, and planned Lead IG and partner agencies’ oversight work related to audits, inspections, and evaluations; Lead IG investigations; and Lead IG hotline activities from October 1 through December 31, 2019.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Pursuant to Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, the Lead IG develops and implements a joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each overseas contingency operation. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed oversight, management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects. The Lead IG agencies issue an annual joint strategic plan for each operation.

Joint Strategic Oversight Plan Activities

In 2015, upon designation of the DoD IG as the Lead IG for OFS, the three Lead IG agencies developed and implemented a joint strategic oversight plan for comprehensive oversight of OFS. That oversight plan is updated each year. The FY 2020 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, effective October 1, 2019, organized OFS-related oversight projects into three strategic oversight areas: 1) Military Operations and Security Cooperation; 2) Governance, Humanitarian Assistance, Development, and Reconstruction; and 3) Support to Mission. The oversight plan for OFS was included in the FY 2020 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S. Government-funded activities supporting overseas contingency operations, including those relating to Africa, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. The Joint Planning Group meets quarterly to provide a forum for information sharing and coordination of the broader federal oversight community, including the military service IGs and audit agencies, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and the OIGs from the Departments of Justice, the Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security.

The most recent meeting of the Joint Planning Group in November 2019 featured DoS Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood. Mr. Hood shared experiences from his career working throughout the Middle East, including as Deputy Chief of Mission in Iraq and Kuwait, as well as duty in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Qatar.
FY 2020 Lead IG Strategic Oversight Areas

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION
Military Operations and Security Cooperation focuses on determining the degree to which the contingency operation is accomplishing its security mission. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Conducting counterterrorism operations against violent extremist organizations
- Conducting unilateral and partnered counterterrorism operations
- Providing security assistance
- Training and equipping partner security forces
- Advising, assisting, and enabling partner security forces
- Advising and assisting ministry-level security officials

GOVERNANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND RECONSTRUCTION
Governance, Humanitarian Assistance, Development, and Reconstruction focuses on some of the root causes of violent extremism. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Countering and reducing corruption, social inequality, and extremism
- Promoting inclusive and effective democracy, civil participation, and empowerment of women
- Promoting reconciliation, peaceful conflict resolution, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces, and other rule of law efforts
- Providing food, water, medical care, emergency relief, and shelter to people affected by crisis
- Assisting and protecting internally displaced persons and refugees
- Building or enhancing host-nation governance capacity
- Supporting sustainable and appropriate recovery and reconstruction activities, repairing infrastructure, removing explosive remnants of war, and reestablishing utilities and other public services
- Countering trafficking in persons and preventing sexual exploitation and abuse

SUPPORT TO MISSION
Support to Mission focuses on U.S. administrative, logistical, and management efforts that enable military operations and non-military programs. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- Ensuring the security of U.S. personnel and property
- Providing for the occupational health and safety of personnel
- Administering U.S. Government programs
- Managing U.S. Government grants and contracts
- Inventorying and accounting for equipment
AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION ACTIVITY

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations.

Some oversight staff from the Lead IG agencies are stationed in offices in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, and Germany. Oversight teams from these offices and from offices in the United States travel to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other locations in the region to conduct fieldwork for their projects.

This quarter, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies completed four reports related to OFS. These reports examined various activities that support OFS, including DoD efforts to ensure sustainable training, mentoring, and contractor logistics to meet Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) needs for vehicle maintenance; the Naval Air Systems Command’s ability to develop an aircraft safety feature; and the military services’ ability to provide credentialed counterintelligence personnel to meet overseas contingency operations requirements.

As of December 31, 2019, 40 projects were ongoing, and 34 projects were planned.

Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Evaluation of Military Service Capacity to Fill Combatant Command Requests for Counterintelligence Support
DODIG-2020-045; December 30, 2019

The DoD OIG evaluated whether the military services are providing enough credentialed counterintelligence personnel to meet overseas contingency operations requirements. The report is classified. A summary of this report with its findings and recommendations is contained in the classified appendix to this report.

Audit of the DoD Requirements for the National Maintenance Strategy–Ground Vehicle Support Contract
DODIG-2020-026; December 13, 2019

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine whether the DoD developed training, mentoring, and contractor logistics support requirements for the National Maintenance Strategy–Ground Vehicle Support Contract (NMS-GVS) meets the ANDSF needs for maintaining and sustaining its vehicles.

The contract, awarded in May 2017, is a key aspect of the Resolute Support mission to train, advise, and assist the ANDSF to perform vehicle maintenance and for them to become self-sufficient. Prior to the NMS-GVS, from December 2010 through May 2017, the U.S. Army procured vehicles, associated maintenance, and training for the ANDSF through other contract mechanisms. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) developed the requirements for the NMS-GVS contract to provide logistics
support to maintain various classes of military vehicle readiness. The contract also requires the contractor to train the ANDSF to track vehicle inventory, maintenance work orders, and vehicle supplies and parts. Additionally, in the contract, CSTC-A established a work split requirement between the contractor and the ANDSF for completing maintenance work orders in an effort to encourage the ANDSF to gradually become self-sufficient.

The DoD OIG determined that CSTC-A developed requirements for the contract that were not measurable or achievable. Specifically, CSTC-A did not develop training and mentoring requirements that measured progress or develop an achievable work split requirements for the ANDSF.

The DoD OIG audit made several recommendations, including that the CSTC-A Commander develop training and mentoring requirements that track and measure ANDSF capabilities over time, conduct semiannual reviews and document the ANDSF’s ability to meet the agreed-upon work split, and modify the contract requirements based off of the results. The DoD OIG also recommended that CSTC-A coordinate with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior to develop agreements to reinforce ANDSF’s trainees attendance for the NMS-GVS training program.

The DoD management agreed with the recommendations to develop training and mentoring requirements, conducting semiannual reviews, and documenting results. CSTC-A also responded that those requirements had been in place since the award of the contract. Management disagreed with the recommendation to develop an agreement to reinforce ANDSF’s trainees’ attendance for the training program, stating that it is not an agreed upon requirement. That recommendation remains open.
Evaluation of the V-22 Engine Air Particle Separator
DODIG-2020-006; November 7, 2019

The DoD OIG conducted this evaluation to determine whether the Naval Air Systems Command V-22 Joint Program Office developed an Engine Air Particle Separator (EAPS) system to adequately protect V-22 engines during operations in all desert environments.

The V-22 aircraft combines the capabilities of a helicopter and an airplane, and missions include personnel and cargo transport. The environments where the V-22 operates, including Afghanistan in support of OFS, have varying mixtures of soil composition. Operations in a desert environment, such as southern Afghanistan, can result in large amounts of soil being blown into the air and ingested into the V-22 engine, which can contribute to premature engine failure. The EAPS’ purpose is to separate soil from the air that enters the engine.

The V-22 Joint Program Office at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland, manages the V-22 program. The program office recognized that the V-22 EAPS was not removing enough soil from the air entering the engine and initiated two EAPS redesign efforts in 2010 and 2011. However, the program manager determined that neither redesign was a viable option. Specifically, the first EAPS redesign had inconsistent test results, and the second EAPS redesign adversely affected the ability of the V-22 to operate in airplane mode.

In 2018, Joint Program Office initiated a third EAPS redesign effort, intended to increase the ability of the EAPS system to separate soil from the air entering the engine by improving existing EAPS components.

The DoD OIG determined that the program office did not develop an EAPS that protects the V-22 engine while operating in all desert environments. Specifically, the Joint Program Office did not include a specification in the original EAPS design that required the EAPS to meet the engine manufacturer’s specification for cleanliness of the air flowing into the engine. The DoD OIG also determined that the third EAPS redesign effort will also not meet the engine manufacturer’s specification. Specifically, the soil ingested into the engine would be four times greater than the engine manufacturer’s specification allows.

While Joint Program Office officials stated that it is not technically feasible to meet the engine manufacturer’s specification for air quality in a desert environment, they could not provide analysis that demonstrated whether this redesign would adequately protect the engine. Additionally, the program office intends to test the third EAPS redesign with soil that is not representative of all environments where the V-22 operates, relying instead on military standard soil compositions and soil concentrations based on testing from a single desert environment. This occurred because program managers are not taking advantage of the ability to tailor military standard soil samples. As a result, the V-22 remains at risk despite more than nine years of EAPS redesign attempts. Additionally, the program office cannot be certain that the third EAPS redesign will correct long-standing problems with the V-22.

The DoD OIG recommended that the V-22 Joint Program Office Commander conduct a review of alternatives for the EAPS system and V-22 engine to adequately protect the engine in all desert environments, and to develop a plan to include more representative soil
sampling relative to those found in actual V-22 operational environments in EAPS and V-22 engine testing.

Joint Program Office management agreed that V-22 operations in desert environments are a critical capability for the program. However, management disagreed with the DoD OIG recommendation to conduct a review of alternatives for the EAPS and V-22 engine. The program office does have a multi-layered approach in place to reduce risk to an acceptable level allowing safe operation of the V-22. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open.

Management did not address the specifics of the DoD OIG recommendation for additional soil sampling. The DoD OIG revised the recommendation to clarify that soil samples should be representative of actual operational environments. The revised recommendation remains open pending additional response.

Final Reports by Partner Agencies

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund: DoD Has Processes for Identifying Training Needs and Maintaining Visibility over Contracts

GAO-20-99; November 18, 2019

The GAO conducted a review of DoD Afghanistan Security Force Fund (ASFF) training contracts to determine the levels of budgets, funding sources, and transactions for all ASFF training contracts during fiscal years 2017 to 2019; and to what extent does the DoD have processes and procedures to ensure that ASFF training contracts’ costs and pricing are reasonable, and contracts are executed in accordance with all applicable contracting laws, regulations, and trade agreements.

Since 2005, Congress has appropriated more than $78.8 billion for the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF. Over that period, nearly $4.3 billion has been expended to support the training and operations of the Afghan National Army. Training requirements are primarily fulfilled through contracts. In recent years, Congress has raised concerns about the high costs of some of these training contracts.

The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, included a provision directing the GAO to examine the ASFF training contracts. The resulting report describes DoD’s processes to identify Afghan National Army training needs and associated funding requirements; develop and execute ASFF training contracts; and provide visibility over ASFF training contracts.

Among the GAO’s findings were that CSTC-A has established processes to identify capability gaps within the ANDSF, develop and select training needed to address those gaps, and identify associated funding requirements. CSTC-A generally includes these requirements in the ASFF budget justification book. Many of the key decisions and associated cost assumptions on how CSTC-A and Train Advise Assist Command–Air (in the case of Afghan pilot training) intend to carry out ASFF training efforts are proposed 18 to 24 months before the training will occur.
ASFF-funded training contracts are developed and executed under a process modeled on the U.S. Government’s Foreign Military Sales program. Prior to April 2019, most ASFF-funded training requirements were filled under a single-award indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract that supported a wide range of DoD training needs. The government places orders for individual requirements. According to an Army official, that contract’s broad scope and high contract value ceiling made it a highly expedient way to contract for various types of training for the ANDSF. However, contracting officials stated that using a single-award contract limited DoD’s ability to negotiate some costs. At that point, the DoD began to transition to an approach using several contracts, including one with multiple providers. Given that the DoD executed its first task order under these new contracts in April 2019, it was too early for the GAO to comment on the efficacy of this new approach in this report.

The DoD has varying degrees of visibility over ASFF-funded contracts. DoD officials stated that they have visibility at the broadest level of the overall execution of the ASFF budget, including funding associated with Afghan National Army training. At the individual contract level, the military services’ contracting commands maintain contract files, but the services’ systems do not interface with one another. According to DoD officials, although the DoD can obtain visibility over ASFF training contracts in the aggregate, the department must work with the contracting commands at the respective military services to gather information specific to training contracts.

The GAO provided a draft of this report to the DoD. Management responded that it would not be providing formal comments. The DoD did provide technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

**Ongoing Oversight Activities**

As of December 31, 2019, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 40 ongoing projects related to OFS. Figure 9 describes the ongoing projects by strategic oversight area.

Tables 6 and 7, contained in Appendix C, list the title and objective for each of these projects. The following sections highlight some of these ongoing projects by strategic oversight area.

**MILITARY OPERATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION**

- The DoD OIG is evaluating whether U.S. Forces–Afghanistan has effective procedures for conducting force protection counter-intelligence screening, biometrics, and vetting operations.
- The DoD OIG is evaluating civilian casualty evaluation and reporting procedures to determine if there are accurate accounts of potential civilian casualties resulting from OFS airstrikes.
• The **GAO** is conducting an audit to determine the extent to which the DoD has modified its approach for U.S. military personnel to advise and assist partner forces based on lessons learned.

• **SIGAR** is conducting an audit to determine to what extent the DoD and its contractors have conducted the required oversight of the ScanEagle unmanned aircraft systems contracts.

**GOVERNANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND RECONSTRUCTION**

• The **DoS OIG** is conducting an audit to determine whether Federal assistance awards provided by the Global Engagement Center (GEC) align with its statutory mandate and authority and whether the GEC has monitored those awards in accordance with Federal requirements, DoS policies and guidance, and the terms and conditions of each award.

• **SIGAR** is inspecting the ANA’s Northeastern Electrical Interconnect Power System in Pul-e-Khumri and the Women’s Compound at the Afghan National Police Regional Training Center in Herat.

**SUPPORT TO MISSION**

• The **DoD OIG** is conducting an audit to determine whether the military services properly stored, tracked, and safeguarded pharmaceuticals at their overseas locations supporting overseas contingency operations.

• The **DoS OIG** is conducting an audit to determine whether the DoS considered established procedures, guidance, and best practices to adjust the size and composition of Missions Afghanistan and Iraq.

• **USAID OIG** is conducting an audit of USAID’s risk management and project prioritization in Afghanistan to determine to what extent USAID applied risk management in selecting staff positions and programs for reduction in Afghanistan.

• **USAID OIG** is conducting an audit to determine whether USAID’s Multi-Tiered Monitoring Strategy for Afghanistan to determine the extent that USAID has used this strategy to manage projects.

• The **Army Audit Agency** is conducting an audit to determine whether reach-back contracting support to the Army has an effective plan, procedures, and organizational structure in place to directly provide contracting support during contingency and expeditionary operations.
**Planned Oversight Projects**

As of December 31, 2019, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 34 planned projects related to OFS. Figure 10 describes the planned projects by strategic oversight area.

Tables 8 and 9, contained in Appendix D, list the project title and objective for each of these projects. The following highlights some of these planned projects by strategic oversight area.

**MILITARY OPERATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION**

- The DoD OIG intends to evaluate whether Theater Support Activity’s tactical signals intelligence processing is sufficient to satisfy priority intelligence requirements.
- The DoS OIG intends to inspect the programs and operations of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance.
- SIGAR intends to conduct an audit to determine to what extent the DoD’s use of appropriated funds have promoted recruitment and retention of women in the ANDSF.

**GOVERNANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND RECONSTRUCTION**

- The DoS OIG intends to conduct an audit to determine whether the DoS properly and effectively identifies and manages risks before awarding funds to international organizations.
- SIGAR intends to review DoD’s gender advising programs for the MoD and MoI, and to audit CSTC-A’s efforts to implement conditionality through its commitment letters with the MoD and MoI.
- SIGAR intends to inspect the Afghan National Army’s MoD headquarters’ infrastructure and security improvements, as well as the ANP’s MoI headquarters’ entry control points, parking, and lighting.

**SUPPORT TO MISSION**

- The DoD OIG intends to conduct an audit to determine whether the DoD Military Services and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service accurately calculated hazard pay and other supplemental pay rates for combat zone deployments.
- The DoS OIG intends to conduct an audit to determine to what extent DoS oversight of grants complied with Federal regulations and DoS guidance. Another DoS audit will determine whether DoS contractors providing armoring services to the DoS comply with contract terms and conditions.
- SIGAR intends to conduct a follow-up audit of the ANP personnel and payroll systems.
INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE ACTIVITY

Investigations
During the quarter, the investigative components of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies continued to conduct criminal investigations related to OFS. The Lead IG agencies use criminal investigators forward deployed to the region, as well as criminal investigators in the United States, to investigate OFS-related fraud and corruption. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), which is the criminal investigative component of the DoD OIG, has an office at Bagram Airfield and in Kabul, within the NATO Resolute Support compound. The DoS OIG has three auditors at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, and also maintains an office in Frankfurt, Germany, from which investigators travel to Afghanistan. DoS investigators in Washington also travel as necessary to Afghanistan. USAID OIG’s Afghanistan office consists of two Foreign Service criminal investigators and two Foreign Service national investigators located in Kabul, along with one investigative analyst based in Washington.

In addition, these investigative components continue to investigate “legacy” cases pertaining to actions committed during Operation Enduring Freedom, which concluded in December 2014.

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY RELATED TO OFS
This quarter, the investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies closed 12 investigations, initiated 7 new investigations, and coordinated on 94 open investigations. The investigations involve a variety of alleged crimes, including procurement fraud, corruption, grant fraud, theft, program irregularities, computer intrusions, and human trafficking. This quarter, the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group conducted 37 fraud awareness briefings for 336 participants.

The dashboard on page 50 contains a consolidated listing of these investigative components.

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY RELATED TO LEGACY CASES
The Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies have 41 ongoing “legacy” cases involving the OFS area of operation that occurred prior to the designation of OFS as an overseas contingency operation.

Contractor Accepts $27 Million Settlement for Improper Billing
A Virginia-based defense contracting company agreed to pay $27 million to resolve allegations, based on a legacy Operation Enduring Freedom joint DCIS and Army CID fraud investigation into an Afghanistan logistics contract.

The Dubai-based ANHAM FZCO provided logistics support to U.S. troops in Afghanistan under two contracts (the Subsistence Prime Vendor contract for Afghanistan, and the National Afghan Trucking contract). ANHAM FZCO subcontracted work for the contracts through three other companies: ANHAM USA, Inc., Tracks for Logistics Services LLC, and UniTrans. A joint DCIS and Army CID investigation resulted in a civil complaint
**OPEN INVESTIGATIONS**

**94**

**Q4 FY 2019 ACTIVITY**

- Cases Opened: 7
- Cases Closed: 12

**Q4 FY 2019 BRIEFINGS**

- Briefings Held: 37
- Briefings Attendees: 336

**Q4 FY 2019 RESULTS**

- Arrests: —
- Criminal Charges: —
- Criminal Convictions: —
- Fines/Recoveries: —
- Personnel Actions: —
- Contract Terminations: —

---

*Some investigations are conducted with more than one agency and some are conducted by a single agency. Therefore, the total number of Joint Open Cases may not equal the total number of Open Cases. Open Cases as of 12/31/2019.*
alleged that the companies engaged in a fraudulent scheme and made false and fraudulent statements to the United States to win contracts by allegedly knowingly and falsely certifying compliance with Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

In December 2019, Unitrans agreed to pay $27 million to resolve allegations under the False Claims Act. Specifically, Unitrans along with ANHAM fraudulently induced the Defense Logistics Agency and the Army to award wartime contracts under the National Afghan Trucking contract by knowingly and falsely certifying compliance with United States sanctions against Iran. The civil settlement will credit $13.5 million of Unitrans’ payment under the negotiated proposed agreement and require an additional payment by Unitrans of $13.5 million.

In addition to the civil action, in November 2018, three corporate officials from the involved companies were indicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Washington, D.C. on eight counts related to fraud, conspiracy, and other charges. Their trial is pending.

**Hotline**

This quarter, the Lead IG partner agencies opened 38 cases because of hotline complaints. Hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means to report allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse without fear of reprisal. Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency. Hotline representatives process the complaints they receive and refer these complaints to the appropriate entity in accordance with their respective protocols. Any hotline complaint that merits referral is sent to the responsible organization for investigation or informational purposes.

The DoD OIG employs an investigator to coordinate the hotline contacts received among the Lead IG agencies and others, as appropriate. Some hotline complaints include numerous allegations that result in multiple cases. However, not all complaints result in the opening of investigative cases. The cases opened this quarter were referred within the DoD OIG and the IGs for the military services.

As noted in Figure 11, the complaints received during this quarter are related to personal misconduct and criminal allegations, procurement or contract administration irregularities, waste of Government resources, personnel matters, reprisal, safety and security, and human trafficking allegations.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
classified Appendix to this Report ..................... 54

APPENDIX B
Methodology for Preparing Lead IG Quarterly Report .............................................. 54

APPENDIX C
Ongoing OFS Oversight Projects......................... 56

APPENDIX D
Planned OFS Oversight Projects.......................... 60

Acronyms ................................................................. 64

Map of Afghanistan .................................................. 65

Endnotes .................................................................. 66
APPENDIX A

Classified Appendix to this Report

This unclassified report includes a classified appendix that provides additional information on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS), as noted in several sections of this report. The appendix will be delivered to appropriate government agencies and congressional committees.

APPENDIX B

Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Quarterly Report

This report complies with sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which requires that the designated Lead Inspector General (IG) provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on an overseas contingency operation. The Department of Defense (DoD) IG is the designated Lead IG for OFS. The Department of State (DoS) IG is the Associate Lead IG for this operation.

This report contains information from the three Lead IG agencies—DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG), DoS OIG, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) OIG—as well as from partner oversight agencies. This report covers the period from October 1 through December 31, 2019.

To fulfill its congressional mandate to produce a quarterly report on OFS, the Lead IG gathers data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, or evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or requests for information to Federal agencies.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

Each quarter, the Lead IG gathers information from Federal agencies about their programs and operations related to OFS. The Lead IG coordinates with SIGAR, which also issues requests for information to support its quarterly report, to avoid duplication and minimize the burden on reporting agencies while maximizing the collective yield of the requests. The Lead IG agencies use responses to these requests for information to develop sections of the OFS quarterly report and conduct oversight planning.

Various DoD, DoS, and USAID offices participated in information collection for OFS this quarter.
OPEN-SOURCE RESEARCH

This report also draws on the most current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report include the following:

- Congressional testimony
- Press conferences, official U.S. Government briefings
- United Nations reports
- Reports issued by nongovernmental organizations and think tanks
- Media reports

Materials collected through open-source research provide information to describe the status of the operation and help the Lead IG agencies assess information provided in their agency information collection process.

REPORT PRODUCTION

The DoD OIG, as the Lead IG, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG draft the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies. The Lead IG agencies then provide those offices that provided information with opportunities to verify and comment on the content of the report.

Each OIG coordinates the review process with its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask their agencies to correct inaccuracies and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review. Each Lead IG agency participates in reviewing and editing the entire quarterly report.
APPENDIX C
Ongoing OFS Oversight Projects

Tables 6 through 7 list the title and objective for Lead IG and partner agencies’ ongoing oversight projects.

Table 6.
Ongoing Oversight Projects by Lead IG Agency, as of December 31, 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation of OFS Force Protection Screening and Biometric Vetting Operations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine whether U.S. Forces–Afghanistan has effective procedures for conducting force protection counter-intelligence screening, biometrics, and vetting operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Contracting Command-Afghanistan's Policies and Procedures for Contingency Contracting Risks** |
| To determine whether the Army Contracting Command–Afghanistan’s award and administration of contracts mitigate contingency contracting risks, such as non-performance and improper payments, specific to Afghanistan. |

| **Evaluation of U.S. Central Command Kinetic Targeting Processes and Reporting Procedures** |
| To evaluate U.S. Central Command’s target development and prosecution processes, as well as post-strike collateral damage and civilian casualty assessment activities. |

| **Audit of the Core Inventory Management System Implementation** |
| To determine whether the DoD’s implementation of the Core Inventory Management System improved weapons and vehicle accountability. |

| **Audit of Management of Pharmaceutical Inventories in Support of Overseas Contingency Operations** |
| To determine whether the military services properly stored, tracked, and safeguarded pharmaceuticals at their overseas locations supporting overseas contingency operations. |

| **Evaluation of DoD Processes to Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices** |
| To evaluate the process to counter improvised explosive devices by using tactical jammers. |


| **Audit of Coalition Partner Reimbursement of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Services in Afghanistan** |
| To determine whether the DoD properly calculated, requested, and received reimbursement from coalition partners in Afghanistan for logistics support, services, and supplies provided under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of the Approach Used to Adjust the Size and Composition of Missions Afghanistan and Iraq</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine whether the DoS used established procedures, guidance, and best practices in its approach to adjust the size and composition of Missions Afghanistan and Iraq and has aligned resources invested at these missions with established U.S. Government foreign policy priorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Inspection of United States Mission to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva
To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva.

Inspection of the Bureau of Counterterrorism
To evaluate the programs and operations of the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism.

Review of Delays Encountered Constructing the New Embassy Compound in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan
To examine the genesis of the delays encountered in constructing the new embassy compound in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan; status of efforts to resolve them; and cost and impact of the delays to the DoS.

Audit of Global Engagement Center’s Execution of its Mandate to Coordinate Federal Government Efforts to Counter Disinformation and Propaganda Designed to Undermine the United States
To determine whether Federal assistance awards provided by the DoS Global Engagement Center align with its statutory mandate and authority and whether the Global Engagement Center has monitored those awards in accordance with Federal requirements, DoS policies and guidance, and the terms and conditions of each award.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of USAID’s Workforce Transformation and Data Use
To determine how USAID accounts for its workforce, evaluate how USAID uses information to strategically plan and make workforce decisions, and assess how Human Resources Transformation Strategy activities support strategic workforce planning.

Follow-Up Audit of USAID’s Multi-Tiered Monitoring Strategy for Afghanistan
To audit USAID’s Multi-Tiered Monitoring Strategy for Afghanistan and determine the extent that USAID has used the strategy to manage programs and serve as the basis for informed decision making.

Audit of USAID’s Self-Reliance Initiative
To determine to what extent USAID’s self-reliance metrics are incorporated into its development programming strategy; and identify what challenges USAID faces in implementing development activities as envisioned under the Journey to Self-Reliance Initiative.

Audit of USAID’s Initiative Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
To determine to what extent USAID has taken action to prevent and detect sexual exploitation and abuse; and the effectiveness of USAID’s process for responding to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

ACA Financial Audit of American University of Afghanistan
To audit cooperative agreement No. 306-A-13-00004 for the period from August 1, 2015, to July 31, 2017.

Audit of USAID’s Risk Management and Project Prioritization in Afghanistan
To audit USAID’s downsizing efforts in Afghanistan to determine if risk management was considered as part of this process, and what impact these recommended changes could have on current and future programming.

Audit of USAID’s Contract Termination Practices
To assess USAID’s procedures guiding acquisition award termination, and if selected acquisition awards were terminated in line with established requirements.

Audit of the USAID Compliance with the Senator Paul Simon Water for the World Act of 2014
To determine to what extent USAID has designated high priority countries and allocated water access, sanitation, and hygiene funding based on the Senator Paul Simon Water for the World Act of 2014.
Table 7.  
**Ongoing Oversight Projects by Lead IG Partner Agencies, as of December 31, 2019**

| AIR FORCE AUDIT AGENCY |  |
|------------------------|--| |
| **Air Force Office of Special Investigations Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Funds**  
To determine whether Air Force Office of Special Investigations officials effectively managed and accounted for Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Funds at deployed locations. |  | |
| **Security Forces Equipment and Training**  
To determine the sufficiency of the condition and quantity of security forces’ individual protective and deployable equipment and whether security force personnel have received necessary training on equipment needed to perform mission requirements. |  | |

| ARMY AUDIT AGENCY |  |
|------------------|--| |
| **Reach-Back Contracting Support**  
To determine whether the Army has an effective plan, procedures, and organizational structure in place to directly provide contracting support during contingency/expeditionary operations. |  | |

| GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE |  |
|----------------------------------|--| |
| **Advise and Assist Mission in Afghanistan**  
To review 1) the extent to which the DoD, in conjunction with NATO, has defined advisor team missions, goals, and objectives; 2) the extent to which advisors were trained and equipped for their specific missions in Afghanistan; 3) the ability of the Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) to meet current and future advisor requirements in Afghanistan and elsewhere; 4) what adjustments, if any, are being made to the manning, training and equipping, and deployment of the second and third SFABs; and 5) any other issues the Comptroller General determines appropriate with respect to the advise and assist mission in Afghanistan. |  | |

| SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION |  |
|----------------------------------------------------------|--| |
| **Audit of Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan’s Use of Conditionality**  
To examine Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan’s use and enforcement of conditionality to improve accountability and transparency in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. |  | |
| **Afghanistan Integrated Support Services—Technical Equipment Maintenance Program Contract Follow-Up—Vehicle Spare Part Cost**  
To review the Technical Equipment Maintenance Program contract to determine Afghanistan Integrated Support Services’ requirements for the purchase of spare parts for vehicle maintenance under the ANA’s Technical Equipment Maintenance Program contract; describe weaknesses in the contractor’s purchasing practices, and identify the steps taken to minimize the impact of spare part cost increases; determine the costs of spare parts purchased by Afghanistan Integrated Support Services over the course of the contract and compare costs of those spare parts to spare parts purchased through the Foreign Military Sales system; and assess additional costs paid by CSTC-A for Afghanistan Integrated Support Services’ maintenance practices. |  | |
| **Inspection of Construction and Utility Upgrades for the Afghan National Army Garrison at South Kabul International Airport**  
To inspect the construction and utility upgrades at the ANA garrison and determine whether the construction and upgrades were completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and the facilities and utilities are being used and properly maintained. |  | |
| **Department of Defense’s Efforts to Train and Equip the Afghan National Army with ScanEagle unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)**  
To assess the extent to which the DoD and its contractors conducted the required oversight of the ScanEagle UAS contracts; achieved their stated objectives and addressed implementation challenges; and enabled the Afghan National Army to operate and sustain the ScanEagle UAS. |  | |
Department of Defense’s End-Use Monitoring Efforts for Defense Articles Provided to the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces
To determine the extent to which the DoD has, since FY 2017 implemented an end-use monitoring program in Afghanistan in accordance with applicable laws and regulations; conducted required routine monitoring of end-use items and enhanced post-delivery monitoring of end-use items provided to the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces; and investigated and reported potential end-use violations in Afghanistan.

Inspection of the Afghan National Army’s Northeastern Electrical Interconnect Power System in Pul-e-Khumri
To assess whether construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and the power system is being used and properly maintained.

Inspection of the Women’s Compound at the Afghan National Police Regional Training Center in Herat
To assess whether construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and the facilities are being used and properly maintained.

Inspection of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police Northern Electrical Interconnect Expansion Project in Kunduz
To inspect the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police Northern Electrical Interconnect Expansion project in Kunduz. Specifically, to assess whether the design and construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and the resulting product is being used and properly maintained.

Inspection of Afghan National Army Ministry of Defense Headquarters Infrastructure & Security Improvements Project in Kabul
To determine whether construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications, and the facility is being used and properly maintained.

Inspection of the Demolition and Construction of a Hangar at the Afghan National Army and Train Advise Assist Command–Air’s Joint Aircraft Facility I
To assess whether the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and the hangar is being used and properly maintained.

U.S. Government Counter Threat Finance Efforts Against the Afghan Terrorist and Insurgent Narcotics Trade
To identify the strategies and polices that guide the U.S. Government’s counternarcotics effort, including efforts to counter Afghan terrorists and insurgents’ drug trade-related sources of funding; identify the activities and funding U.S. Government agencies have directed to counter Afghan terrorists and insurgents’ drug trade-related sources of funding; determine the extent to which U.S. Government agencies measure and evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts to counter Afghan terrorists and insurgents’ drug trade-related sources of funding; and identify the challenges, if any, that affect these efforts and how the agencies are addressing these challenges.

Review of Afghan National Army Vaccination Process
To determine where the ANA maintains soldiers’ vaccination records, and if the system of record is sufficient to ensure that soldiers are vaccinated in accordance with schedules; and the extent to which ANA has the capacity to procure vaccines for soldiers in accordance with assessed needs, and distributes and stores vaccines in a manner that minimizes spillage.

Department of Defense’s Effort to Develop a Professional Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing
To examine the extent to which the DoD ensures that the Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing recruit, train, and retain qualified personnel needed to operate and maintain the aircraft currently in and expected to be added to their fleets; and the Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing modernization plan addresses validated capability gaps.

U.S. Accountability for Fuel Provisions to the Government of Afghanistan’s Ministries of Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI)
To determine the extent to which the DoD has, since April 2018, acted upon SIGAR recommendations to review and assess fuel accountability, including coordinating with the MoD and MoI; and planned to ensure accountability and oversight for Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces fuel provisions in the future.
APPENDIX D
Planned OFS Oversight Projects

Tables 8 through 9 list the title and objective for Lead IG and partner agencies’ planned oversight projects.

Table 8.
Planned Oversight Projects by Lead IG Agencies, as of December 31, 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of the Department of Defense Military Payroll for Combat Zone Entitlements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine whether the DoD military components and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service accurately calculated hostile fire pay, imminent danger pay, family separation allowance, and combat zone tax exclusion for combat zone deployments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation of Tactical Signals Intelligence Processing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine whether Theater Support Activity’s tactical signals intelligence processing is sufficient to satisfy priority intelligence requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of Entitlements and Allowances for Processing for Military Service Reserve Deployments</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine whether the deployment process resulted in accurate and timely entitlements and allowances for deployed members of the military service Reserves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of the U.S. Air Force’s Contract for Maintenance of the RQ-4 Global Hawk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine whether the U.S. Air Force monitored the RQ-4 Global Hawk maintenance contract to ensure the contractor provided proper maintenance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of Afghanistan Air Theater Movement Contracts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine whether U.S. Transportation Command performed adequate oversight of air theater movement services contracts in Afghanistan to ensure contractor’s performance complied with contract requirements, such as aircraft provision, operational readiness, and reporting requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of Depot-Level Maintenance for U.S. Military Heavy Lift Helicopters</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine whether the depot-level maintenance for U.S. military heavy lift helicopters enables the fleet to maintain required aircraft availability and readiness rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Systems Contract Oversight</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine whether Army Contracting Command monitored contractor performance for the National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Systems contract to ensure the contractor provided training, maintenance, and supply chain management support services to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of the U.S. Army Central Command’s Modernized Enduring Equipment Set in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine whether the Army’s implementation of the modernized enduring equipment sets in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility is meeting mission goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation of U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine whether U.S. Special Operations Command’s Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center provides U.S. combatant commanders the increased capability to conduct Internet-based information operations globally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of DoS Management of Awards to International Organizations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine whether the DoS’s effort to identify, assess, and manage risks before awarding funds to international organizations are effective; and assess whether DoS policies, processes, and guidance for monitoring awards to international organizations are effective in ensuring that funds are managed and spent to further U.S. goals and objectives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Audit of Food Service Support under the Afghanistan Life Support Services Contract** |
| To determine whether the DoS is administering the food services task order under the Afghanistan Life Support Services contract in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and whether the contractors are complying with contract terms and conditions. |

| To determine whether the DoS Office of Global Women’s Issues has tailored applicable DoS engagements and program to help women be more prepared for, and able to participate in, decision-making processes related to conflict and crisis; established metric and targets to evaluate, measure, and report DoS performance; and created a process to modify or redirect program resources on the basis of performance that informs resource allocation and planning. |

| **Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance** |
| To evaluate the programs and operations of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance. |

| **Audit of DoS Post Security Program Reviews** |
| To determine whether the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security manages the Post Security Program Review process in accordance with DoS policies and guidelines. |

| **Audit of the Special Immigrant Visa Program (Afghanistan)** |
| To determine whether the DoS administered the Special Immigrant Visa program in Iraq and Afghanistan in accordance with Federal law. |

| **Audit of Use of Sole Source Contracts in Overseas Contingency Operations** |
| To determine whether acquisition policy was followed in awarding sole source contracts, there were urgent and compelling needs to justify awarding sole source contracts, and the DoS is paying more by having sole source contracts than it would pay if contracts were competitively awarded. |
Table 9.
Planned Oversight Projects by Lead IG Partner Agencies, as of December 31, 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Review of Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units**
To audit Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units to determine the extent to which counternarcotic police specialized units are achieving their goals; assess the oversight of salary payments made to personnel in the specialized units; and assess the long-term sustainability of the specialized units. |
| **Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of its PC-12s**
To review lessons learned for the Afghan Special Mission Wing’s use and maintenance of its fleet of PC-12s to assess the extent to which the Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s; and the DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s, including any contracts the DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services. |
| **Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of its A-29 Fleet**
To determine the DoD’s process for selecting the A-29 as a platform for the Afghan Air Force; the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the A-29, including the DoD’s measures for determining success; the DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the A-29s, including any contracts the DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services; and the extent to which the Afghan Air Force will be able to sustain this fleet in the future. |
| **Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of its MD-530 Fleet**
To determine the DoD’s process for selecting the MD-530 as a platform for the Afghan Air Force; the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the MD-530s, including the DoD’s measures for determining success; the DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the MD-530s, including any contracts the DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services; and the extent to which the Afghan Air Force will be able to sustain this fleet in the future. |
| **DoD’s Gender Advising Programs for the Ministries of Defense and Interior**
To identify the DoD’s gender-related goals for the MoD and MoI, and determine how the DoD has incorporated these goals in its strategies, plans, and other directives related to its ministry advising efforts; identify how the DoD measures the results of its gender-advising efforts and the extent to which these efforts have been met and are effective; and identify what impediments, if any, may be prohibiting greater success in gender-related areas of improvement at the MoD and MoI, and how the DoD is addressing those issues. |
| **Procurement, Use, and Maintenance of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces**
To describe the process(es) by which the DoD develops intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; assess the extent to which the DoD oversees these procurement processes; assess the extent to which the DoD evaluates the performance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance once fielded and makes adjustments, if needed; and review DoD plans for sustaining this equipment once fielded. |
| **Department of Defense’s Construction of Infrastructure for Women in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces**
To identify DoD projects to build infrastructure supporting women in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and determine how these projects were selected; assess the extent to which the DoD measured the success of these projects; and assess the extent to which facilities are being used for their intended purposes. |
| **Audit of ANDSF Pharmaceutical, Medical, and Surgical Materials (Class VIII)**
To assess the extent to which the DoD and the ANDSF developed and validated ANDSF Class VIII needs; provided needed Class VIII supplies in accordance with DoD and ANDSF requirements; and oversee the proper storage, maintenance, and usage of Class VIII supplies and equipment. |
**DoD’s Use of Funds Appropriated to Recruit and Retain Women in the ANDSF**

To determine how much of the appropriated funding meant to support women in the ANDSF the DoD has spent and identify the efforts the DoD has implemented using this funding; how the DoD selects which efforts to fund; and how these efforts have promoted recruitment and retention of women in the ANDSF.

**Inspection of Women’s Participation Program—Afghan National Police Kabul Police Academy 2**

To determine whether the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of the Afghan National Army’s Northeastern Electrical Interconnect Power System in Dashti Shadian**

To inspect the Naiabad substation expansion and the construction of the new substation at Camp Shaheen. Specifically, to assess whether the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and the power system is being used and maintained properly.

**Inspection of Afghan National Army Afghan Electrical Interconnect Electrical Infrastructure Marshal Fahim National Defense University/Darulaman/Commando**

To determine whether construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications, and the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of Afghan National Army Afghan Electrical Interconnect Electrical Infrastructure Pol-i-Charkhi**

To determine whether construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications, and the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Inspection of Afghan National Army Kabul National Military Hospital Entry Control Point 1&2**

To determine whether 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications; and 2) the facility is being used and properly maintained.

**Follow-up Audit of Afghan National Police Personnel and Payroll Systems**

To assess the processes by which the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Afghan government collect personnel and payroll data for Afghan National Police personnel assigned and present-for-duty; how the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, UNDP, and the Afghan government store, access, transfer, and use this data; and the extent to which the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, UNDP, and the Afghan government verify and reconcile Afghan National Police personnel and payroll data to determine the accuracy of the data.

**Audit of the Afghan National Army-Territorial Forces (ANA-TF)**

To determine to what extent U.S. Forces-Afghanistan evaluated and implemented the ANA-TF program in accordance with guidance; the ANA-TF are being recruited, mobilized, and performing; the ANA-TF program met cost expectations.

**Review of National Maintenance Strategy**

To determine to what extent the Afghan National Army is meeting the intermediate objectives as defined in the national maintenance strategy; what the monitoring and evaluation standards are to ensure the contractor enables the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces to take over maintenance responsibilities from the contractor; and to what extent the national maintenance strategy is incorporating lessons learned to avoid problems with contracted maintenance support identified in previous audits.

**Ministry of Interior’s Accountability for Vehicles**

To assess the extent to which the DoD and the Ministry of the Interior have developed and implemented policies and procedures to account for vehicles purchased with U.S. funds; and the policies and procedures enable the DoD and the Ministry of the Interior to accurately account for those vehicles.
### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACJC</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Justice Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA-TF</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Territorial Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPS</td>
<td>Afghan Personnel and Pay System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghan Security Forces Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSF</td>
<td>Afghan Special Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUAF</td>
<td>American University of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCIS</td>
<td>Defense Criminal Investigative Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>Food for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Election Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL</td>
<td>International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS-K</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lead IG</td>
<td>Lead Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD OIG</td>
<td>DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>Overseas Contingency Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFS</td>
<td>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIR</td>
<td>Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMW</td>
<td>Special Mission Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRAR</td>
<td>Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>United States Forces-Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES

Executive Summary

1. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/6/2020; USFOR-A CJIOC, vetting comment, 2/5/2020.
5. USFOR-A CJIOC, vetting comment, 2/5/2020.
15. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/17/2019.
17. DoD OUSD(P), vetting comment, 2/5/2020; DoD OUSD(P), vetting comment, 2/13/2020.
18. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/6/2020.
19. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/6/2020.
20. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/6/2020.
22. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/6/2020.

The Quarter in Review

1. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/6/2020; USFOR-A CJIOC, vetting comment, 2/5/2020.
34. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/6/2020.
35. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/6/2020.
36. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/6/2020.
38. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 01/6/2020.
40. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 01/6/2020.
41. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 01/6/2020.
43. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 01/6/2020.
45. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 01/6/2020.
46. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 01/6/2020.
47. Shawn Snow, “Iran’s Support To The Taliban, Which Has Included MANPADS And A Bounty On US Troops, Could Be A Spoiler For Peace In Afghanistan,” Military Times, 1/14/2020.
48. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 01/6/2020.
50. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 01/6/2020.
52. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 01/6/2020.
53. DoS SCA/P, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/14/2020.
57. CSTC-A MAG-D/MAG-I, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/18/2019.
58. CSTC-A MAG-D/MAG-I, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/18/2019.
60. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/18/2019.
68. CSTC-A HRM, responses to SIGAR requests for information, 9/1/2019.
71. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/20/2019.
73. CSTC-A, vetting comment, 2/5/2020.
74. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/20/2019.
75. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/20/2019.
76. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/20/2029.
78. CSTC-A, vetting comment, 2/5/2020.
79. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/7/2018.
80. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/7/2019.
81. CSTC-A FD, response to DoD OIG request for information, 9/10/2019.
84. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/7/2019.
85. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/7/2019.
86. CSTC-A, vetting comment, 2/5/2020.
89. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/17/2019.
90. CSTC-A, vetting comment, 2/5/2020.
91. CSTC-A, vetting comment, 2/5/2020.
93. TAAC-Air, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/5/2020; TAAC-Air, response to DoD OIG request for information, 10/24/2019.
94. TAAC-Air, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/5/2020.
96. TAAC-Air, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/5/2020.
97. TAAC-Air, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/5/2020; TAAC-Air, response to DoD OIG request for information, 10/3/2019.
99. TAAC-Air, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/5/2020.
100. TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR request for information, 12/30/2020.
101. TAAC-Air, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/5/2020.
102. TAAC-Air, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/5/2020.
103. TAAC-Air, response to DoD OIG request for information, 1/5/2020.
105. DoD OUSD(P), vetting comment, 2/13/2020.
106. CSTC-A, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/17/2019.
110. CSTC-A OS, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/17/2019.
111. CSTC-A OS, response to DoD OIG request for information, 12/17/2019; CSTC-A OS, response to DoD OIG request for information, 9/10/2019
113. CSTC-A OS, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/14/2019.
114. TAAC-Air, response to DoD SIGAR request for information, 12/30/2019.
115. TAAC-Air, response to DoD SIGAR request for information, 12/30/2019.
116. TAAC-Air, response to DoD SIGAR request for information, 12/30/2019.
117. TAAC-Air, response to DoD SIGAR request for information, 12/30/2019.
118. TAAC-Air, response to DoD SIGAR request for information, 12/30/2019.

146. USAID, response to USAID/OIG request for information, 1/23/2020.


157. USAID/OAPA, USAID response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/19/2019.

158. USAID/OAPA, USAID response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/19/2019.

159. USAID/Afghanistan, “Request for Approval of the Basic and Essential Health Technical Assistance and Resources Project and Associated Activities,” 12/20/2018.


162. USAID/Afghanistan, “Request for Approval of the Basic and Essential Health Technical Assistance and Resources Project and Associated Activities,” 12/20/2018.


164. USAID/Afghanistan, “Request for Approval of the Basic and Essential Health Technical Assistance and Resources Project and Associated Activities,” 12/20/2018.

165. USAID/Afghanistan, “Request for Approval of the Basic and Essential Health Technical Assistance and Resources Project and Associated Activities,” 12/20/2018.

166. USAID/Afghanistan, “Request for Approval of the Basic and Essential Health Technical Assistance and Resources Project and Associated Activities,” 12/20/2018.


197. USAID/Afghanistan, “Request for Approval of the Basic and Essential Health Technical Assistance and Resources Project and Associated Activities,” 12/20/2018.
199. USAID/Afghanistan, “Request for Approval of the Basic and Essential Health Technical Assistance and Resources Project and Associated Activities,” 12/20/2018.
201. USAID/Afghanistan, “Request for Approval of the Basic and Essential Health Technical Assistance and Resources Project and Associated Activities,” 12/20/2018.
214. Lead IG personnel interview with Embassy Kabul personnel, 10/7/2019.
224. DoD Comptroller, Cost of War Update as of 9/30/2019, DoD Comptroller, response to DOD OIG request for information, 1/14/2020.
TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE RELATED TO OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND PROGRAMS, CONTACT:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOTLINE
dodig.mil/hotline
1-800-424-9098

DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOTLINE
stateoig.gov/hotline
1-800-409-9926 or 202-647-3320

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT HOTLINE
ighotline@usaid.gov
1-800-230-6539 or 202-712-1023