

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE

INCLUDING U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO

UKRAINE



APRIL 1, 2024–JUNE 30, 2024



On the cover: U.S. President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. hosts a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris, France, on June 7. (DoD photo)



We are pleased to present this Special Inspector General (Special IG) report to Congress on Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR). This report discharges our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2024 and Lead IG reporting responsibilities under 5 U.S.C. 419.

Section 1250B states that no later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal quarter, the Special IG for OAR shall submit to Congress a report summarizing U.S. funding, programs, and operations for Ukraine.

This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the DoD, State, and USAID Offices of Inspector General (OIG), as well as the other U.S. oversight agencies that coordinate their activities through the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group.

This report addresses the following topics specified in Section 1250B:

- USEUCOM operations and related support for the U.S. military: pages 27–30
- Security assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 30–46
- Economic assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 46–48, 52–58, 62–65
- Humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 65–74
- Operations of other relevant U.S. Government agencies involved in the Ukraine response: pages 94–97
- Description of any waste, fraud, or abuse identified by the Special IG: pages 123–135
- Status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits: pages 123–135
- Status and results of referrals to the Department of Justice: pages 145–146
- A description of the overall plans for review by the OIGs of such support of Ukraine, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits: pages 143–144

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A Romanian Air Force pilot flies an F-16 fighter during a joint training mission between the Alabama National Guard and Romania. (U.S. Army National Guard photo)

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The Arc Integrity Vehicle Carrier vessel lifts the roll-on roll-off ramp in the port of Kemi, Finland, as DEFENDER 24 closes out. (U.S. Army photo)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) is the U.S. contingency operation to deter Russian aggression against NATO and to reassure and bolster the alliance in the wake of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. OAR also includes security assistance activities in support of Ukraine.¹

Congress has appropriated more than \$174 billion in supplemental funding for the U.S. Ukraine response. On April 24, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. signed into law the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, a \$61 billion aid package for further support to Ukraine and the broader response to Russian aggression in Europe. This includes funding to provide weapons to Ukraine, to replenish DoD stocks already transferred to Ukraine, and to support an enhanced DoD presence in Europe.²

The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) continued to ask for donations of munitions, while certain types of ammunition that are no longer produced or sourced by the United States have run critically low.³ Projected ammunition donations are sufficient for near-term objectives but may not support mid-term offensive goals. The current level of donations for artillery systems will not meet the UAF reconstitution and force generation requirements.⁴ The supplemental appropriations since 2022 included a total of \$6.3 billion for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Ukraine and countries impacted by the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which allows recipients to purchase U.S.-made defense materials and related training.⁵

Russian forces launched a new offensive in the Kharkiv region though the overall front line remained largely stable.⁶ The UAF used U.S.-supplied artillery and rocket systems to target Russian assets, including in Russian-occupied Crimea and just over the border from Kharkiv.⁷ Russian forces and the UAF also continued to strike energy infrastructure within each other's territory.⁸



NATO concluded Steadfast Defender 24, the largest series of military exercises in Europe since the end of the Cold War.⁹ The exercise included approximately 90,000 troops from all 32 NATO countries, including the newest NATO member countries, Finland and Sweden.¹⁰ The exercise sought to demonstrate NATO’s ability to defend the sovereign territory of its members and the commitment by NATO allies to protect each other with collective self-defense.¹¹ The exercise demonstrated the ability of U.S. and partner forces to operate jointly in Europe, while addressing the challenges inherent in coordinating large, complex, and multinational military operations.¹²

Spanish and Polish Leopard tanks, French Leclerc tanks, U.S. Army Abrams tanks, as well as other military vehicles from Türkiye and Slovakia, line up in a covered area in Poland. (NATO photo)

The United States and partner countries moved to seize Russian sovereign assets outside of Russian control and transfer them to Ukraine for reconstruction. The Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians Act, enacted on April 24, authorizes the President “to seize, confiscate, transfer, or vest any Russian aggressor state sovereign asset, in whole or in part, and including any interest or interests in such assets.”¹³ The United States, members of the G7, and other nations supporting Ukraine are forming plans to deploy the assets for Ukraine’s benefit.¹⁴

The U.S. Government expanded sanctions as Russia and its allies developed evasion strategies. The sanctions aim to disrupt and hinder sanctions evasion, State said, and target individuals, financial institutions, and other corporations in multiple countries, including Russia, Belarus, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).¹⁵ State expressed particular concern for the “scale and breadth” of the PRC’s exports of dual-use goods, which can have military as well as civilian uses, to Russia.¹⁶ In April, the United States and the United Kingdom announced a new ban on the importation of Russian-origin metals, specifically aluminum, nickel, and copper.¹⁷ State also applied sanctions on two Russian mining-industry corporate networks, which are significant players in Russia’s metallurgical coal and gold mining industries.¹⁸

The U.S. Government and international partners deepened efforts to strengthen anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine and the broader region. State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation delivered training and technical support across Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies to strengthen their independence and capabilities, and provided training and equipment on digital forensic methods, criminal uses of cryptocurrency, organized crime, and other priority areas.¹⁹ State also took further steps to support Ukraine’s war-related investigations and prosecutions.²⁰ State signed an agreement with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development to support and strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to fight foreign bribery in international business through enhanced legislation and enforcement structures.²¹

USAID continued to provide support to small and medium enterprises in Ukraine.

This assistance supported industries including agriculture, furniture, wood processing, information technology, light manufacturing, and apparel.²² Since February 2024, USAID has provided support to approximately 26,600 small and medium enterprises to generate revenue for the Ukrainian government and create additional employment.²³

U.S. President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. hosts a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris, France, on June 7. (DoD photo)

Security restrictions limited in-person site visits and other monitoring of

U.S. assistance to Ukraine.²⁴ Given these restrictions, USAID reportedly prioritized third-party monitoring visits for rapid expansion in order to perform critical oversight.²⁵ However, only one USAID activity was covered by third-party monitoring mechanism during the quarter while five others were in the process of implementing third-party monitoring.²⁶







U.S. Airmen load pallets of ammunition onto a contracted aircraft bound for Ukraine at Travis Air Force Base, California. (U.S. Air Force photo)

MISSION UPDATE

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U.S. Army Infantry Soldiers participate in a force training exercise near Tapa, Estonia. (U.S. Army photo)



MISSION UPDATE

Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) is the U.S. Government’s operation in and around the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility to deter Russia’s aggression against NATO and to reassure and bolster the alliance in the wake of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In addition, OAR also includes security assistance activities in support of Ukraine.²⁷

OAR is part of the broader U.S. policy agenda and activities to respond to Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine. The U.S. Government’s Integrated Country Strategy for Ukraine, updated in August 2023, outlines five mission goals for the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv. (See Table 1.) This strategy details specific objectives related to U.S. security, development, humanitarian assistance activities, and U.S. Embassy operations.

Table 1.

U.S. Mission Goals in Ukraine

Win the War: Ukraine effectively uses security, humanitarian, economic, and diplomatic tools to prevail on the battlefield and set conditions for a just and lasting peace.

Win the Future: Ukraine strengthens its civil society and democratic and economic institutions and implements anti-corruption, justice sector, and corporate governance reforms to achieve sustainable momentum toward Euro-Atlantic integration to win a secure and just future that delivers prosperity for all its citizens.

Hold Russia Accountable: Ukraine and its allies hold Russia and its enablers accountable for war crimes and damage to Ukraine.

Account for U.S. Taxpayers: Ensure U.S. assistance is spent as intended, with oversight and accountability.

Rebuild the U.S. Mission in Ukraine: Bring back staff and rebuild the embassy platform to ensure proper execution of administrative objectives and rebuild the parts of the embassy destroyed at its closure in February 2022.

Source: State, website, “Integrated Country Strategy: Ukraine,” 8/29/2023; State, vetting comments, 4/29/2024 and 8/7/2024.

As of the end of this quarter, since February 2022 the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than \$174.19 billion in supplemental funding for the U.S. response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

FUNDING

As of the end of this quarter, since February 2022 the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than \$174.19 billion in supplemental funding for the U.S. response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This includes security, direct budget, development, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine; security assistance for NATO allies and other partner nations; funding to support enhanced U.S. military presence and activity in Europe; and replenishment of U.S. and other nations' military stocks transferred to the UAF.²⁸


President Biden signed the fifth supplemental appropriation for Ukraine into law on April 24, 2024. Enacted as part of a larger national security funding bill, this legislation provides nearly \$60.78 billion for the U.S. Government's Ukraine response, of which more than \$48.43 billion will be administered by the DoD, nearly \$11.62 billion by State and USAID, and approximately \$0.73 billion by other U.S. Government agencies.²⁹ (See Figure 1 and Table 2.) Additional U.S. Government funding for the Ukraine response has been provided through the annual U.S. Government agency appropriations acts.³⁰

The U.S. Government provides security assistance to Ukraine and regional partners through a wide range of programs and authorities. Below are some of the major programs funded through the Ukraine supplementals:

Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA): PDA is not a funding source but rather an authority that allows the President to provide military assistance from existing defense articles in the DoD's stocks, subject to a statutory cap.³¹ The statutory limit for PDA is

Figure 1.

FY 2022–FY 2024 Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations



\$100 million worth of weapons and equipment transferred worldwide per year.³² However, in response to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Congress increased the caps on PDA to \$11.00 billion for FY 2022, \$14.50 billion for FY 2023, and \$7.80 billion for FY 2024 in the Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts, providing \$33.30 billion in cumulative PDA through June 30.³³

As of the end of the quarter, the DoD reported more than \$24.75 billion in PDA drawdowns for FY 2022 through FY 2024.³⁴ The DoD notified Congress in 2023 that it had overvalued previously reported PDA by more than \$6.23 billion, and it has since applied more than \$3.32 billion of this recovered PDA authority for PDAs 44 through 56, announced from August 14, 2023, through April 24, 2024.³⁵ Annual PDA drawdowns net of recovered authority did not exceed each fiscal year cap.³⁶ During the quarter, the DoD OIG issued an audit of the DoD's revaluation of the PDA support, which identified an additional \$1.91 billion overvaluation in previously announced PDAs.³⁷

As of the end of the quarter, the DoD reported more than \$24.75 billion in PDA drawdowns for FY 2022 through FY 2024.

Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI): Congress created the USAI in 2015 as a funding source for DoD security assistance to Ukraine's military and other security forces, including intelligence support, training, equipment, logistics, supplies, and services. The USAI aims to enhance Ukraine's ability to defend itself from aggression and defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity against Russia and Kremlin-backed separatists.³⁸ State concurrence is required on all USAI notifications before they are sent to Congress.³⁹

As of June 1, 2024, the DoD had obligated approximately \$18.23 billion of its \$32.67 billion in supplemental and FY 2022-2024 base USAI appropriations.⁴⁰

European Deterrence Initiative (EDI): The EDI was first established in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015. Originally known as the European Reassurance Initiative, it provides funding to support five lines of effort: increased presence; exercises and training; enhanced prepositioning; improved infrastructure; and building partner capacity. Between 2015 and 2023, EDI funding supported more than \$30 billion in requirements to enhance the United States' ability to deter aggression against NATO and to respond should deterrence fail.⁴¹

Starting in FY 2022, EDI funding transitioned from the former Overseas Contingency Operation budget to the base budget. The EDI does not provide centralized funding in a separate account. Recognizing this transition from Overseas Contingency Operation to base funding, in February 2023, the DoD provided guidance to all DoD components for continuing to capture EDI-associated investments in their base budgets that align with the original five lines of effort. EDI-associated activities and investments are funded through the DoD's base budget rather than the Ukraine supplemental funds.⁴²

Since FY 2022, Congress has authorized approximately \$11.64 billion in DoD appropriations for EDI, of which the DoD had obligated approximately \$7.43 billion as of June 1, 2024.⁴³

Foreign Military Financing (FMF): Under the FMF program, the U.S. Government provides funding to facilitate a partner nation's purchase of U.S. defense articles.⁴⁴ FMF funds do not belong to the recipient nation but rather are executed by U.S. Government agencies, and the funded items are transferred to the recipient country.⁴⁵

Table 2.

U.S. Appropriations to Support Ukraine and the Response to its Invasion by Russia in the Five Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Acts, FY 2022 to FY 2024, in \$ Millions

Funds Appropriated by Agency and Account	FY 2022		FY 2023		FY 2024	TOTAL
	PL 117-103	PL 117-128	PL 117-180	PL 117-328	PL 118-50	
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE						
Military Personnel (MILPERS)	\$195.50	\$15.05	\$122.75	\$91.73	\$238.19	\$663.22
Operation and Maintenance (O&M), Military Services	1,753.71	2,629.37	1,391.57	4,495.78	6,312.95	16,583.38
Operation and Maintenance (O&M), Defense-Wide						
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	—	6,000.00	3,000.00	9,000.00	13,772.46	31,772.46
Available for Transfer to Other Accounts for Replacement of Defense Articles and Reimbursement of Defense Services	3,500.00	9,050.00	1,500.00	11,880.00	13,414.43	39,344.43
Other O&M, Defense-Wide	311.58	206.82	213.54	280.74	743.89	1,756.58
Procurement	227.95	1,174.06	1,443.82	1,780.37	13,306.92	17,933.12
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)	130.35	413.62	136.31	318.96	633.38	1,632.61
Defense Working Capital Funds (DWCF)	409.00	0.97	—	—	—	409.97
Office of Inspector General (OIG)	—	—	2.00	6.00	8.00	16.00
All Other	—	613.90	—	14.10	—	628.00
Department of Defense, Total	6,528.09	20,103.79	7,810.00	27,867.67	48,430.23	110,739.78
DEPARTMENT OF STATE						
Diplomatic Programs (DP)	125.00	190.00	—	147.05	60.00	522.05
Capital Investment Fund (CIF)	—	10.00	—	—	—	10.00
Office of Inspector General (OIG)	4.00	4.00	—	5.50	8.00	21.50
Embassy Security, Construction & Maintenance (ESCM)	—	110.00	—	—	—	110.00
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	30.00	400.00	—	375.00	300.00	1,105.00
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	1,400.00	350.00	—	1,535.05	—	3,285.05
Nonprolif., Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)	—	100.00	—	105.00	100.00	305.00
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT						
Operating Expenses (OE)	25.00	17.00	—	5.00	39.00	86.00
Office of Inspector General (OIG)	4.00	1.00	—	8.00	10.00	23.00
APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT, IMPLEMENTED BY STATE AND USAID						
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	647.00	8,766.00	4,500.00	12,966.50	7,899.00	34,778.50
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)	1,120.00	—	—	350.00	1,575.00	3,045.00
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	650.00	4,000.00	—	80.00	1,600.00	6,330.00
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	2,650.00	4,348.00	—	937.90	—	7,935.90
Transition Initiatives (TI)	120.00	—	—	50.00	25.00	195.00
Department of State and USAID, Total	6,775.00	18,296.00	4,500.00	16,565.00	11,616.00	57,752.00
ALL OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES						
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)	—	954.00	—	2,400.00	481.00	3,835.00
Department of Treasury (TREAS)	61.00	702.00	—	—	—	763.00
Department of Energy (DOE)	30.00	—	35.00	426.30	247.46	738.76
Department of Agriculture (USDA)	100.00	20.00	—	55.00	—	175.00
Department of Justice (DOJ)	59.40	67.00	—	—	—	126.40
U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM)	25.00	—	—	—	—	25.00
Department of Commerce (DOC)	22.10	—	—	—	—	22.10
Government Accountability Office (GAO)	—	—	—	7.50	—	7.50
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)	—	2.00	—	—	—	2.00
National Security Council (NSC) and Other*	—	0.17	0.50	1.08	2.00	3.75
Other U.S. Government Agencies, Total	297.50	1,745.17	35.50	2,889.88	730.46	5,698.50
TOTAL FUNDING	\$13,600.59	\$40,144.97	\$12,345.50	\$47,322.55	\$60,776.67	\$174,190.27

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. *Appropriations to the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council of \$1.00 million, the Intelligence Community Management Account of \$2.58 million, and the Legislative Branch of \$0.17 million. DoD OIG notes that not all Ukraine supplemental appropriations presented above are intended for assistance to Ukraine or the broader response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The annual appropriation acts have also funded assistance to Ukraine and the response to its invasion by Russia. Appropriations for the Critical Munitions and Acquisitions fund under the Defense Production Act of \$600.00 million and Defense Health Program of \$28.00 million.

Sources: DoD OIG analysis of Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts, consisting of Pub. L. No. 117-103, Division N, 3/15/2022; Pub. L. No. 117-128, 5/21/2022; Pub. L. No. 117-180, Division B, 9/30/2022; Pub. L. No. 117-328, Division M, 12/29/2022; and Pub. L. No. 118-50, Division B, 4/24/2024; OSD(C), vetting comment, 8/9/2024.

Table 3.

Detailed OAR and Ukraine Funding Data

Further details about the use of Ukraine Supplemental, EDI, and other State and USAID funding can be found in the appendixes:

Appendix E DoD Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD Execution of the First through Fifth Ukraine Supplemental Funds • DoD Execution of European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) Funding • DoD Execution of Base Budget to Support Ukraine
Appendix F State and U.S. Agency for Global Media Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Available to the Department of State • Application of State Ukraine Supplemental Assistance Funds • Administration of Foreign Affairs Funds • U.S. Agency for Global Media Supplemental Funding
Appendix G USAID Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID Development Funding Related to Ukraine • USAID Humanitarian Assistance Funding Related to Ukraine

The Ukraine supplementals appropriated a total of \$6.33 billion for FMF for Ukraine and other countries affected by the war through June 30, 2024.⁴⁶ These funds allow recipients to purchase U.S.-made defense materiel and U.S.-provided training. According to State data on FMF programming, as of June 2024, State had obligated \$4.4 billion of the FMF funds appropriated in the Ukraine supplementals, including more than \$1.7 billion for Ukraine.⁴⁷ Most of the remainder was obligated to countries in Europe, though two countries outside the region, Taiwan and Zambia, received some funding for helicopters and unmanned aerial systems (UAS).⁴⁸

PERSONNEL

During the quarter, approximately 7,800 U.S. Service members from the U.S. Army Europe and Africa and an estimated 300 U.S. Service members from the U.S. Air Forces in Europe directly supported OAR. In total, there are approximately 80,000 U.S. Service members in the USEUCOM area of responsibility.⁴⁹

Staffing and Movement Restrictions Continue to Challenge Embassy Operations in Kyiv

Staffing Cap: Given the security and logistical constraints in Ukraine, State and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv have a staffing cap that limits the number of U.S.-based and third-country national staff, some third-party contractors, and official visitors who may be in Ukraine for multi-day durations.⁵⁰

Despite a significant increase in the staffing cap in January 2024, staffing remained a challenge this quarter.⁵¹ State said that the high number of embassy employees in country for short periods of time created significant turnover, detracted from building a sustainable work culture and developing host-nation contacts, and presented logistical support challenges.

In January, the embassy, in consultation with State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, adopted an expanded movement zone within which embassy leadership could approve movements outside but near Kyiv without Washington clearance.

These impacts were especially observed in DoD programs.⁵² DoD elements were often unable to maintain full coverage of their standard portfolios and could only provide limited administrative and logistics support for DoD activities.⁵³


In June, State approved a 35 percent increase to the staffing cap.⁵⁴ Most of the increase derived from authorizing additional DoD personnel at the embassy.⁵⁵ The remaining requested positions were for security and management support staff that were needed, in part, to account for additional requirements deriving from the increased DoD staffing levels.⁵⁶

Hiring: Due to large-scale migration, military conscription of the labor force, and deteriorating security conditions, it has been difficult to hire expatriate or local nationals to fill key positions for roles at USAID and with implementing partners.⁵⁷ Across the embassy, it has also been difficult to provide competitive compensation for locally employed staff, in part due to the shortages of professional staff. Ukrainian professionals have the option to work elsewhere in the European Union under temporary protected status.⁵⁸

Movement Restrictions. Travel for embassy staff in country is dependent on security conditions, resource availability and, increasingly, is postponed due to visits by high-level staff. In January, the embassy, in consultation with State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, adopted an expanded movement zone within which embassy leadership could approve movements outside but near Kyiv without clearance from State headquarters.⁵⁹ Movements related to diplomatic engagement and program monitoring increased significantly in March and April following the cap increase and new movement policy.⁶⁰ However, the number of movements for diplomatic and program engagement decreased in May, likely due to a large increase in movements for high-level officials that visited Ukraine that month, including the Secretary of State, the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery, and a Congressional delegation, according to State.⁶¹

Figure 2.

Number of Embassy Kyiv Personnel Movements for Diplomatic and Program Engagement and High-level Visitors



During the quarter, embassy staff made 58 movements in and around Kyiv, and 38 movements in central and western Ukraine, mostly to Lviv.⁶² DoD personnel conducted movements to two locations requiring State headquarters approval: an engagement-related event in Odesa in April and a high-level visit to Dnipro in May.⁶³ (See Figure 2.)

In late May, State issued a new, updated movement policy and procedures that allow the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv to approve movements without review from Washington in two zones: in and around Kyiv and in central and western Ukraine.⁶⁴ Movements to locations controlled by Ukraine but near combat areas, such as in Odesa, Dnipro, and Mykolaiv, may occur, but they will still require approval from State headquarters.⁶⁵ Movements to locations in Ukraine occupied by Russia are not authorized.⁶⁶

This quarter, USAID reported that it was in the process of procuring a Partner Security Liaison Operations platform to be the hub for USAID implementer security incident reporting in Ukraine.⁶⁷ USAID modified current awards to include incident reporting requirements, which will be triggered upon the award of the Partner Security Liaison Operations contract.⁶⁸ According to USAID, its implementers are in ongoing communication with their respective mission points of contacts regarding security conditions that may affect implementation of USAID-funded programs.⁶⁹

Since June 2022, oversight organizations from across the U.S. Government have coordinated their activities through the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group.

OVERSIGHT OF OAR AND THE UKRAINE RESPONSE

The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs have long-established field offices and personnel in Europe to support audits, evaluations, and investigations of activities related to OAR and the U.S. response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. (See Table 4.) This preexisting footprint in Europe means that the OIGs have deep familiarity with U.S. Government programs and activities in Europe, including past oversight work on assistance to Ukraine, and established connections with program personnel.

Since June 2022, oversight organizations from across the U.S. Government have coordinated their activities through the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group. The working group follows a proven interagency oversight model—the Lead Inspector General framework—that the U.S. oversight community employs for overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and other locations across the globe. While not all agencies that participate in the working group were actively conducting oversight related to Ukraine assistance as of the publication of this report, each has equities related to the broader U.S. Government response effort. The Working Group ensures open lines of communication and situational awareness across department and agency boundaries to ensure that all areas of the broader effort receive appropriate oversight coverage and to avoid duplication of effort.

Table 4.
OIG Staff Focused on OAR and Ukraine Assistance Oversight

	Total Staff	Staff Presence in Europe
DoD OIG	More than 200	30 in Europe, including 4 in Kyiv
State OIG	More than 100	11 in Germany and 5 in Kyiv
USAID OIG	Dozens	12 in Germany and 6 in Kyiv

Table 5.

Details on Oversight Activity

Further details about completed, ongoing, and planned work by the DoD OIG, State OIG, USAID OIG, and partner agencies can be found in the appendices:

Appendix H	Completed Oversight Projects
Appendix I	Ongoing Oversight Projects
Appendix J	Planned Oversight Projects
Appendix K	Investigations and Hotline Activity

The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs have signed several memorandums of understanding (MoU) with Ukrainian counterparts, including the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), to formalize information sharing in support of criminal investigations and oversight work.

The **DoD OIG** signed an MoU in June with the European Anti-Fraud Office that formalizes operational and investigative cooperation and information exchange between the two oversight organizations. The DoD OIG also has MoUs with Ukrainian counterparts, including NABU, SAPO, the Ukrainian MoD Main Inspectorate, the State Bureau of Investigations, and the Ukrainian National Police.

The **State OIG** also maintains MOUs with oversight bodies within UN agencies participating in the Ukraine response, including the Office of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

The **USAID OIG** has a longstanding information-sharing relationship with the European Anti-Fraud Office in addition to its relationships with oversight counterparts within the UN World Food Programme, World Health Organization, World Bank, and other bilateral and multilateral organizations implementing programming in Ukraine.



The Director of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the DoD OIG sign a memorandum of understanding to further increase cooperation in combating fraud and corruption related to Ukraine support. (DoD OIG photo)





Tennessee National Guardsmen fire a rocket from a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) as part of a combined arms exercise in Bulgaria. (U.S. Army National Guard photo)

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE

The United States provides security assistance to Ukraine and other European nations under OAR and, in some cases, programs funded and managed by State.

The full scope of the OAR mission and related mission goals is classified. OAR began as a U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) effort to provide rotational deployments of combat-credible forces to Europe in the wake of Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea.⁷⁰ Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the OAR mission has evolved in line with U.S. policy objectives. The most recent mission statement is outlined in a classified Executive Order dated August 31, 2023.⁷¹

The current OAR strategic objectives maintain an emphasis on NATO-wide collective security and deterrence capability.⁷² The Integrated Country Strategy for Ukraine outlines further objectives for Ukraine to strengthen its military and non-military security capability. (See Table 6.)

U.S. Army Soldiers load into a CH-47 Chinook helicopter during an exercise at the Sodankyla Airfield in Finland. (U.S. Army Reserve photo)



Table 6.

U.S. Goals Related to Security**OAR Strategic Objectives****Support NATO and assure NATO allies in Eastern Europe of U.S. commitment to collective security.**

- U.S. efforts to support NATO-led activities in Eastern Europe.
- NATO allies in Eastern Europe are assured of U.S. commitments to collective defense.

Develop combined defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. and Eastern European NATO allies.

- U.S. and Eastern allies demonstrate interoperable military capabilities.

Russia is deterred from aggression against Eastern European NATO members.

- Russia perceives NATO as a credible alliance committed to the security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of its members.
- Russia perceives U.S. commitment to the NATO alliance and its mission to defend the security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of its members.
- Russia is dissuaded from taking offensive (overt or covert) actions against NATO member states.

Integrated Country Strategy

Ukraine leverages existing partnerships and establishes new ones to ensure continued supplies of military and security assistance and provision of training for new military capabilities.

Ukraine has the tools to protect civilians and critical infrastructure, including the energy grid, heating, cyber networks, media environment and information space.

Source: USEUCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.2 OAR 007, 4/3/2024; State, “Integrated Country Strategy-Ukraine,” 8/29/2023.

STATUS OF THE WAR

UAF Blunts Russian Advances but Loses Territory

During the quarter, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) continued to defend against Russian military advances in the Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk regions. Russian forces continued to prioritize capturing the Donetsk region and achieved incremental territorial gains.⁷³

On May 10, Russian forces initiated new offensive operations around Kharkiv according to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials have frequently promoted establishment of a buffer zone to protect Russian territory from Ukrainian strikes.⁷⁴


The Kharkiv offensive was a test for the UAF, forcing the Ukrainian forces to reinforce Kharkiv at the expense of other regions, according to the DIA.⁷⁵ However, the UAF has limited Russia’s Kharkiv offensive to within a few miles of Russian-controlled areas, with heavy Russian losses. Fighting along a stabilized frontline has concentrated in the directions of Vovchansk, Lyptsi, and Starytsia.⁷⁶

The UAF also used U.S.-supplied artillery and rocket systems to target Russian assets inside Russia, near the border with Kharkiv.⁷⁷ In May, President Biden authorized Ukraine to use


UKRAINE CONFLICT TRENDS

During the quarter, the front lines of the conflict remained mostly unchanged and attacks continued at a similar pace. Neither side reported any significant gains. According to data compiled by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the share of air and drone attacks did not meaningfully change, while armed clashes increased.

Attacks by Quarter and Type, February 24, 2022–June 30, 2024



Locations of Attacks during the Quarter, April 1–June 30, 2024



The DIA reported that as of the end of the quarter, Russia retained enough reserves to maintain its buffer zone operation but not enough to threaten a deeper advance into Ukrainian-held territory, such as Kharkiv city.

certain types of U.S.-provided weapons to strike military targets inside Russia if Russia is attacking or about to attack from its territory into Ukraine.⁷⁸ U.S. policy with respect to prohibiting the use of Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) or long-range strikes inside of Russia has not changed. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) stated that all evidence, including bilateral dialogue at the leadership level suggests that Ukraine continues to abide by its previous commitments regarding employment of U.S. weapons into Russian territory.⁷⁹

The DIA reported that as of the end of the quarter, Russia retained enough reserves to maintain its buffer zone but not enough to threaten a deeper advance into Ukrainian-held territory, such as Kharkiv city.⁸⁰ Russia is deliberately exploiting its quantitative advantage to exhaust Ukraine. Russia's current pace of offensives is designed to seize additional Ukrainian territory, especially in Donetsk, albeit at high personnel and equipment costs, the DIA stated.⁸¹

The UAF continued to suffer heavy attrition rates and lack sufficient capabilities and munitions—particularly artillery, air defense, and long-range strike capabilities—to overcome Russia's air and ground advantages. As of June, U.S. munitions began arriving on the front line.⁸² However, this aid almost certainly will remain insufficient to match or overcome Russia's daily fire rate of 10,000 artillery rounds, the DIA stated. Ukraine probably remains capable of continuing defensive operations but not conducting large-scale counter-offensives for at least the next 6 months, according to the DIA.⁸³

Russia Threatens Retaliation After UAF ATACMS Strikes in Crimea

During the quarter, the UAF used U.S.-provided ATACMS to strike Russian air defenses in Crimea.⁸⁴ Russian forces lost several of their most advanced S-400 missile systems as a result of the strikes.⁸⁵

The ATACMS strikes, along with UAF use of U.S.-provided High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) have required Russian forces to reinforce their air defense systems. Following the Crimea attacks, Russian forces deployed their most advanced air defense system, the S-500, to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge, the DIA stated.⁸⁶ The S-500 system has not yet been demonstrated to be fully operational in Ukraine, which DIA views as an indication of Russia's struggle to provide adequate air defense of Crimea. Russian forces have also redeployed several of their S-400 assets from Crimea to Belgorod to protect Russian assets from UAF HIMARS, which can now strike Russian air defenses in Belgorod.⁸⁷

Despite these losses, the DIA said, Russia's S-400 and overall integrated air defense system remains one of the most advanced in the world. Russia continues to use unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for surveillance and to inform front line soldiers of changes in the battlespace, the DIA stated.⁸⁸

On June 23, UAF ATACMS struck Russia's Center for Long-Range Space Communications in Crimea.⁸⁹ Russia claimed that at least four people died and 151 were injured in the attack. Russia blamed the attack on the United States and formally warned the U.S. ambassador to Russia that retaliation would follow, according to media reporting.⁹⁰



Ukraine Targets Russia's Black Sea Fleet

Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian forces have sought to undermine the UAF maritime forces and block exports of Ukrainian agricultural products via ports on the Black Sea. Ukraine estimated that it lost 80 percent of its fleet after the occupation of Crimea, but it has since rebuilt its capability to defend ports and shipping lanes.⁹¹

The DIA reported that during the quarter, the UAF conducted up to five successful strikes against Russian Navy and other maritime-related assets, resulting in Russia continuing to shift its naval operations from Sevastopol, Crimea to Novorossiysk, Russia, for force preservation.⁹²

- On April 21, a Ukrainian missile attack caused a fire aboard the Black Sea Fleet's Kommuna-class rescue ship in Sevastopol Bay, probably causing superficial and temporary damage.⁹³
- On May 5, Ukraine claimed to have destroyed a Russian Coast Guard Mangust-class patrol boat in northwest Crimea using Magura uncrewed surface vessels (USVs).⁹⁴
- On May 18, a Ukrainian ATACMS missile strike on Sevastopol sank the Uragan-class corvette Tsiklon.⁹⁵
- On May 30, Ukraine claimed to have destroyed two Russian Coast Guard Tunets-class patrol boats in northwest Crimea using Magura USVs. Also on May 30, a Ukrainian missile strike damaged two ferries supporting road and rail transit across the Kerch Strait.⁹⁶

In July, Russia's Black Sea Fleet departed Crimea.⁹⁷ According to the DIA, aside from the Russian Navy's Black Sea Fleet, the broader Russian military effort along the front line remains largely unaffected by these Ukrainian naval strikes.⁹⁸

Ukrainian Navy ships UKS Cherkasy and UKS Chernihiv docked at King George V Docks in Glasgow, Scotland, on June 23. (DoD photo)

Table 7.

Equipment and Training Support to the UAF Maritime Forces During the Quarter

	Equipment	Training
Maritime Flotilla Mine counter measure operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unmanned underwater vehicles (requested, no timeline for delivery) -eight of nine current vehicles are in the U.K. for maintenance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UAF maritime forces requested explosive ordnance disposal training.
Marine Corps	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Amphibious capable personnel carriers (UK-delivered) Small rigid hull inflatable “Zodiac” boats (requested) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NATO-level Marine Corps training (Italy/ Netherlands) Plans to establish a training center in Romania
Riverine Flotilla	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 riverine command boats, 12 riverine assault boats, 22 riverine patrol boats (scheduled delivery throughout 2024) CB-90 fast assault crafts (Sweden– scheduled July/August 2024) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Boat operating training for first-class fast assault crafts (Sweden)
Naval aviation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unmanned aircraft to improve ISR (requested) Sea King helicopters (pledged by Germany, no timeline for delivery) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sea survival training (Germany)
Coastal Missile Brigade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Harpoon, Exocet, RBS-17, and NSM missiles (requested) 	

Source: SAG-U, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.3 OAR 046, 6/27/2024.

UAF Strikes Russia’s Energy Infrastructure

During the quarter, the UAF continued to strike energy infrastructure sites inside Russia. (See Table 8.) President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indicated in May that Kyiv had every right to strike Russian oil refineries to force Moscow to halt its attacks against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. With Ukraine experiencing growing difficulty in protecting its infrastructure from Russian air attacks, Kyiv probably views its efforts to target Russian oil as the best means of inflicting cost with its limited domestic capabilities, according to the DIA.⁹⁹ The Russian military has conducted large-scale bombardment of Ukraine’s energy production and transmission networks in response to UAF strikes on Russian energy infrastructure.¹⁰⁰ (See page 24.)

On May 17, the UAF launched a large-scale UAS attack on targets in Crimea and the port town of Novorossiysk on Russia’s southwestern Black Sea coast.¹⁰¹ Ukraine’s strikes on Crimea focused on Sevastopol, striking an electricity substation and causing rolling blackouts in the city.¹⁰² Ukraine’s efforts to attack Novorossiysk are of strategic importance, as the city hosts large-scale seaborne oil export facilities.¹⁰³

During the quarter, Russia appeared to partially recover from the damage caused by Ukrainian strikes earlier in the year. The DIA reported that disruptions to Russia’s refining sector decreased from a high of 14 percent of overall capacity in April to probably less than 10 percent as repairs were completed at damaged refineries. Russia installed passive-protection measures at oil refineries in an attempt to mitigate damage from UAS attacks.¹⁰⁴

Table 8.

Damage to Russia's National-Level Energy Infrastructure in April-June 2024

Target	Date	Outcome
Taneco Refinery	April 2	Damaged one primary processing unit.
Novobryansk Transformer Station	April 19	Extent of damage unknown.
Ilsky Refinery	April 26	Damaged auxiliary components
Slavyansk Refinery	April 27	Damaged one primary processing unit.
Ryazan Refinery	May 1	Damaged one primary processing unit.
Salavat Refinery	May 9	Damaged secondary processing unit.
Volgograd Refinery	May 12	Damaged one primary processing unit.
Novorossiysk Export Terminals	May 17	Damaged storage tanks.
Gaiduk Transformer Station	May 17	Damaged a transformer.
Tuapse Refinery	May 17	Damaged auxiliary components.
Slavyansk Refinery	May 19	Damaged auxiliary components.
Novoshakhtinsk Refinery	June 6	Damaged two primary processing units.

Source: DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.3 OAR 033, 6/27/2024.

As of May 20, Moscow paused the temporary ban on gasoline exports that was initially implemented in March following a series of Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries and unplanned refinery maintenance. Earlier in the year, Russian gasoline and diesel prices temporarily increased between 20 and 30 percent, prompting Moscow to implement an export ban to shore up fuel supplies for the domestic market. The pause of the export ban indicates that Ukraine's strikes had a temporary and minor effect on domestic prices and no effect on the availability of fuel for the Russian military and civilian population according to the DIA.¹⁰⁵

Russia Attacks Ukrainian Energy Infrastructure

During the quarter, Russia launched hundreds of missiles and one-way drones, striking Ukrainian electric grid infrastructure, including substations and energy production facilities such as the Dnipro Hydroelectric Power Plant.¹⁰⁶ Ukraine has taken various measures to protect its critical infrastructure. However, continued Russian strikes against electrical facilities, combined with other energy production challenges, have resulted in nationwide power shortages.¹⁰⁷

Russia's spring 2024 attacks have new characteristics and tactics compared to previous attack patterns.¹⁰⁸ Starting in March 2024, attacks primarily struck generation capacity at hydropower facilities and coal power plants, including the Trypilska power plant, the largest power facility in the Kyiv region and the main power supplier for three Ukrainian regions.¹⁰⁹ The April 11 missile attack that targeted energy infrastructure across Ukraine destroyed the

In June, President Zelenskyy was quoted in the media stating that Russia had destroyed half of Ukraine's electricity-generating capacity since it began striking energy facilities in late March.

Trypilska facility, causing an electricity blackout for nearly a quarter-million people in the Kyiv metro region, media reported.¹¹⁰

In addition, Russia has targeted Ukrainian natural gas storage facilities.¹¹¹ In June, President Zelenskyy was quoted in the media stating that Russia had destroyed half of Ukraine's electricity-generating capacity since it began striking energy facilities in late March.¹¹² Kharkiv and eastern Ukraine have been the hardest hit.¹¹³ Targeted attacks on Kharkiv's energy facilities, including the Kharkiv Central Heat and Power Plant, have resulted in local residents experiencing regular load-shedding (intentional, managed blackouts), apart from nation-wide management of power deficits, because local transmission and generation are limited.¹¹⁴

New Laws in Ukraine Aim to Ready More Forces

In April, President Zelenskyy signed four laws intended to increase the number of Ukrainian men eligible for mobilization, the ability of the UAF to find potential conscripts, and punitive measures for those who fail to register or appear for service. Since then, 1.4 million men have updated their contact details in the UAF electronic database. The UAF has indicated a need to increase by up to 500,000 personnel, although publicly stated mobilization needs have varied, the Embassy in Kyiv noted. The arrival of newly mobilized soldiers will provide replacements for undermanned units.¹¹⁵

USEUCOM estimated that during the quarter, the UAF numbered approximately 700,000 personnel, of whom approximately 300,000 were located on the front line. On the battlefield, Russian forces typically outnumber UAF forces.¹¹⁶

To increase the number of soldiers at the front, the UAF has deployed soldiers from rear areas, such as soldiers guarding bridges and other infrastructure in uncontested areas of Ukraine. Additionally, Ukraine passed a law that allows prisoners to serve in the UAF, which qualifies approximately 20,000 prisoners for service. Prisoners are required to serve for the duration of the war. As of June 2024, Ukraine made dual citizens of other countries liable for military service and prohibited them from leaving Ukrainian territory, according to USEUCOM.¹¹⁷

USEUCOM reported that as of March 2022, Ukraine claimed that approximately 20,000 foreign volunteers from 52 countries had volunteered to join the UAF. As of August 2022, some international volunteers were under the authority of Ukrainian military intelligence and some under the UAF. Additionally, Ukraine employs non-Ukrainian nationals in irregular roles, including paramilitary organizations similar to the Russian Volunteer Corps, and maintains a small reconnaissance company composed of non-Ukrainians that is part of the UAF 59th Brigade.¹¹⁸

Russian Recruitment Efforts Sufficient for Attrition Warfare Approach

In June, President Putin stated that Russia does not need to conduct another mobilization wave. Putin asserted that ongoing Russian recruitment efforts are sufficient for Moscow's attritional approach.¹¹⁹ So far in 2024, Russia has recruited 160,000 new volunteer troops.

The Russian military has not deployed additional conscripted troops to Ukraine, according to the DIA. However, Moscow continues to coerce citizens into signing military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense, part of a broader recruitment campaign that uses a combination of coercion and financial incentives. The recruitment campaign allows the Russian military to expand combat power without conducting general mobilization.¹²⁰

In February 2023, following an attempted rebellion by the Wagner Group private military company, the Russian Defense Ministry established its Volunteer Corps.¹²¹ According to the DIA, the Russian Defense Ministry probably uses the Volunteer Corps as the primary entity for maintaining administrative and command control of all private military companies, including the Wagner Group, and volunteers fighting in Ukraine.¹²² In May, Africa-based Russian private military companies were deployed to support the Kharkiv offensive, likely subordinate to the Volunteer Corps.¹²³

So far in 2024, Russia has recruited 160,000 new volunteer troops.

Putin Orders “Major Reshuffle” of Military Leadership

President Putin replaced Sergei Shoigu with Andrei Belousov as Russian Minister of Defense on May 12, moving Shoigu to the position of Security Council Secretary.¹²⁴ A Russian government spokesperson said that Belousov was selected because of a need for “innovation.”¹²⁵

The DIA stated that President Putin’s appointment of Belousov demonstrates Putin’s attempt to streamline Russia’s defense industry to boost productivity for the war effort. Belousov, who has regularly called for increasing military spending and government interference in the economy, is trusted by Putin and widely regarded as a man able to put Russia’s whole economy on a war footing.¹²⁶ The DIA noted that Moscow has repeatedly altered the Russian military command structure in Ukraine and dismissed several high-ranking commanders since the start of the war, although Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov has remained in his post.¹²⁷

U.S. Adversary Nations Continue Military Aid to Russia

During the quarter, several U.S. adversary nations, including Belarus, Iran, and North Korea, continued to provide direct military aid to Russia’s war in Ukraine, while China continued its more general support to Russia, the DIA stated.¹²⁸

Belarus continued to provide military and economic assistance to Russia and facilitate Russia’s forced deportations of children from occupied Ukraine. As of June, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka continued to publicly repeat Russian justifications of its war with Ukraine.¹²⁹ In May, Lukashenka stated that Belarus and Russia are jointly attempting to avoid Western sanctions, with Belarus becoming a gateway for sanctioned goods to enter Russia, the DIA stated.¹³⁰ Belarusian defense industry companies provided maintenance of Russian military vehicles.¹³¹

The **People’s Republic of China (PRC)** continued to maintain a cautious approach to providing materiel assistance to Moscow, the DIA stated.¹³² The PRC supports Moscow’s defense industrial base by providing needed commodities and dual-use components for arms manufacturing, helping Russia continue its operations in Ukraine.¹³³ In April, Secretary Blinken condemned the PRC’s continued provision of components, including machine

tools and microelectronics, which enable Russia to continue producing weapons and munitions. Secretary Blinken stated that Russia would struggle to continue the war without the PRC's support.¹³⁴

Iran continued to provide Russia with UAS to support combat operations in Ukraine.¹³⁵ According to media sources, Iran was preparing to provide Russia with a large shipment of short-range ballistic missiles to replenish Russian stocks and provide enhanced capacity to strike targets deep within Ukrainian-held territory.¹³⁶ Additionally, Russia and Iran moved closer this quarter to signing a comprehensive agreement on military cooperation to formalize their military collaboration against Western security interests.¹³⁷

North Korea continued to transfer artillery ammunition to Russia during the quarter. Pyongyang hosted Putin for meetings on June 18 and 19, during which Putin thanked North Korea for its support and both parties signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty.¹³⁸ North Korea has sent an estimated 10,000 containers of munitions to Russia since the full-scale invasion began, according to media reporting. The June NATO summit included a discussion about strengthening security ties with Japan and South Korea in light of the deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.¹³⁹

REGIONAL DETERRENCE

U.S. policy toward Russia seeks to protect U.S. interests and those of its allies, USEUCOM said. The United States desires an environment in which Russia is a productive member of the international community, respecting the international rules-based order, and not threatening other nations' security and sovereignty. The United States is committed to ensuring its allies and partners are strong and ready to defend themselves from Russian aggression.¹⁴⁰

The DIA stated that Russia is very likely incapable of seizing and holding territory inside a NATO country.¹⁴¹ The DIA said its assessment is based on the severe degradation to the quality of its ground forces. Russia almost certainly still poses a cyber and indirect actions threat inside these NATO countries, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia, and retains the capability to conduct long-range strikes against their critical sites.¹⁴²

The exercise included approximately 90,000 troops from all 32 NATO countries and involved more than 80 air platforms, 50 naval ships, and 1,100 combat vehicles.

NATO Wraps Up Joint Military Exercises Involving 90,000 Troops

During the quarter, NATO concluded Steadfast Defender 24, the largest series of military exercises in Europe since the end of the Cold War. The exercise began January 23 and ended on May 31.¹⁴³ The exercise included approximately 90,000 troops from all 32 NATO countries and involved more than 80 air platforms, 50 naval ships, and 1,100 combat vehicles.¹⁴⁴

The newest NATO member countries, Finland and Sweden, both took part in the exercise.¹⁴⁵ The first part of the exercise focused on securing the Atlantic up to the NATO's Arctic territory, and the second part focused on moving troops across Europe, from the High North to Central and Eastern Europe. The goal of Steadfast Defender was to demonstrate NATO's

ability to defend the whole of its territory and the commitment by NATO allies to protect each other from external threats.¹⁴⁶

Steadfast Defender involved the deployment of land forces from North America to Europe and the organization of the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of U.S. forces with those of NATO. It served as a framework exercise for other exercises listed below.¹⁴⁷

The United States participated in several Steadfast Defender exercises:

Saber Strike: This exercise deployed a brigade task force to Poland and a battalion task force into the Baltics. It conducted interoperability training with allies and conducted a combined arms exercise, a tactical road march from Germany into Lithuania, and force-on-force training. Overall, USEUCOM said, Saber Strike was successful but highlighted a need for improvement in coordinating road march and diplomatic clearances for ground movement through Germany, Poland, and Lithuania.¹⁴⁸

Saber Strike involved approximately 2,900 U.S. military personnel and 2,200 partner force personnel from Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain.¹⁴⁹

Immediate Response: This exercise established a Far North Task Force to improve Arctic capability. Participating units conducted a rail gauge change between Sweden and Finland, deployed a brigade task force into Central Europe, and drew equipment from U.S. Army prepositioned stocks. They also conducted a multinational live fire exercise and a field training exercise, including river crossings at Drawsko Pomorskie Combat Training Center in Poland. USEUCOM said that many of these elements were successful but also identified areas for

U.S. Army Soldiers conduct a river crossing exercise at the Drawsko Combat Training Center, Poland, in support of Immediate Response 24. (U.S. Army Reserve photo)





A Swedish Marine prepares to disembark a Swedish CB90 class fast assault craft during a casualty evacuation exercise event for BALTOPS 24. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

improvement. For example, battle space management and training area capacity presented a challenge in sustainment and terrain management at Drawsko Pomorskie. Additionally, USEUCOM said that synchronizing the deployment and redeployment of disparate U.S. forces from multiple sites in the United States was a challenge, as was synchronizing them with ports of debarkation in Europe.¹⁵⁰

Swift Response: This exercise involved six near-simultaneous airborne entry operations across Europe. USEUCOM reported that major challenges included coordinating fixed wing, heavy lift support for multiple airborne operations, and coordinating airspace clearances for partner forces into an active military airbase.¹⁵¹

Swift Response involved approximately 3,000 U.S. military personnel and 11,000 partner force personnel from Czechia, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom.¹⁵²

Astral Knight: This exercise aimed to strengthen and validate allied and partner interoperability and maneuverability of integrated air and missile defense capabilities in a theater-wide, coalition architecture. Six NATO allies participated: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It featured more than 50 aircraft engaged in simulated combat scenarios, concentrated in Poland and the Baltic states. Airmen and aircraft from the U.S. Air National Guard also participated. USEUCOM said that while integrating systems between partners always presents challenges, the collaboration with NATO allies in the exercise strengthened collective defense capabilities across the European theater to deter aggression by potential adversaries.¹⁵³

Astral Knight involved approximately 900 U.S. military personnel and 700 partner force personnel from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.¹⁵⁴

Baltic Operations (BALTOPS): The BALTOPS exercise incorporated the assets of 20 allied nations, including 55 ships, 85 aircraft, and 9,000 personnel, interoperating in the Baltic Sea for 2 weeks. This was the first time that assets from two combatant commands (USEUCOM

and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command) were employed in such an exercise. It was also the first time that three simultaneous amphibious landings occurred across the Baltic Sea. BALTOPS was the largest amphibious task force and medical countermeasures task force ever assembled within a NATO construct. USEUCOM said that the exercise demonstrated many successes but also proved that it was unable to provide U.S. cruiser-destroyer support to the exercise due to real-world operations.¹⁵⁵

BALTOPS involved approximately 3,400 U.S. military personnel and 8,400 partner force personnel from Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom.¹⁵⁶

SUPPORT TO UKRAINIAN FORCES

The United States and its partners and allies coordinate international security assistance to Ukraine through a variety of international mechanisms ranging from high-level Ukraine Defense Contact Group meetings to informal discussions between the U.S.-led Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U), the International Donor Coordination Center (IDCC), and representatives from donor nations. (See Table 9.) At SAG-U and the IDCC, staff evaluate Ukrainian requests for training and equipment, identify which partner nation can provide the assistance, and ensure that the assistance is delivered in a timely manner.¹⁵⁷

The U.S. Embassy’s Office of Defense Cooperation-Kyiv (ODC-Kyiv) evaluates, prioritizes, and executes security assistance in support of Ukrainian defense and security forces. The ODC-Kyiv said that it cooperates with USEUCOM, the Service components, and SAG-U on a daily basis. SAG-U has a larger staff and thus greater capacity, and its work involves multilateral coordination with partners and allies. With its smaller long-term staff, the ODC-


Table 9.

Coordination of International Assistance to Ukraine

<p>Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. mechanism to coordinate and oversee the full spectrum of U.S. security assistance to the UAF. • Established in November 2022. • Joint Service headquarters consisting of approximately 500 multinational service members. • Located in Wiesbaden, Germany, under the operational control of USAREUR-AF.
<p>International Donor Coordination Center (IDCC)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The primary coordinating body for international military assistance to Ukraine. • Established in March 2022. • More than 50 nations represented. • Voluntary entity to share information and synchronize efforts, led by a U.K. Brigadier General. • Collocated with SAG-U in Wiesbaden but no command-and-control relationship exists between them.
<p>Ukraine Defense Contact Group</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coalition of defense chiefs from approximately 50 nations that meets monthly to discuss Ukraine’s security needs. • First meeting in April 2022.

Source: Sources: SAG-U, responses to DoD OIG requests for information, 24.1 OAR 026, 12/27/2023; 24.1 OAR 027, 12/27/2023; and 24.3 OAR 025, 7/2/2024.

Figure 3.

Capability Coalitions and Lead Member Countries

Kyiv engages in bilateral cooperation with the Ukrainian government. The ODC-Kyiv has a staff of American and locally-employed Ukrainian personnel with security assistance expertise and cultural insight, whereas SAG-U is largely staffed with military personnel on shorter term deployments. Because the ODC-Kyiv is under State authorities, it cannot train and advise the UAF, whereas SAG-U, as a Title X military command, can and does provide training and advising to the UAF.¹⁵⁸

SAG-U describes the multinational train, advise, and assist structure as a “coalition of the willing.” International coordination between the U.S. team at SAG-U and international military counterparts is entirely voluntary and is dependent upon shared will and personal relationships.¹⁵⁹

In addition to SAG-U and the IDCC, which focus on near-term requirements for the UAF, eight recently established “capability coalitions” seek to address both near- and long-term warfighting requirements.¹⁶⁰ The capability coalitions operate under the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.¹⁶¹

The capability coalitions are collaborative civilian-military bodies established to enable a multinational, capability-centric approach to security assistance for Ukraine, SAG-U said.¹⁶² In addition to training, advising, and equipping needs, each coalition is tasked with addressing issues related to the defense industrial base, production issues, and backfill.¹⁶³ Each coalition is led by two or three nations with expertise in that area along with Ukrainian partners.¹⁶⁴ (See Figure 3.)

Short Rotations and Movement Restrictions Continue to Challenge UAF Support Efforts

SAG-U noted that many of its personnel are reservists on short-term deployments, which limits the formation of strong personal relationships and the transfer of institutional knowledge and expertise.¹⁶⁵ In addition, increased multinational coordination has led to greater requirements for digital systems to share information and products, often across multiple networks and classification systems.¹⁶⁶

In addition, SAG-U noted the challenge of meeting the UAF's timeframes for some types of support.¹⁶⁷ For example, the UAF announced a plan to establish and equip 14 brigades over a 3-month window. While the international community is working rapidly to meet UAF requirements, 3 months is not enough time to source the requirements and get the support to the required locations, SAG-U said.¹⁶⁸

Supplemental Funding for Ukraine Improving Maintenance and Training Efforts

SAG-U reported that the passage of new supplemental funding for Ukraine provided much-needed resources for its train, advise, and assist efforts. Before receiving the supplemental funds, SAG-U supported its mission by using EDI funds to cover contract modifications and other requirements. Once it received the first tranche of supplemental funds—\$30 million on May 14—SAG-U repaid the EDI funds. SAG-U stated that the supplemental funds will allow it to cover its requirements through the end of calendar year 2024.¹⁶⁹

SAG-U stated that the approval of the FY 2024 defense budget and new supplemental funding for Ukraine allowed the Military Services and SAG-U to restart maintenance and refurbishment lines in the United States for PDA-provided equipment, and to remove requirements that limited spare parts requisitions to just high priority parts to support the UAF. The funding also allows for the continuation of support services at DoD facilities in Wiesbaden, Germany, and Jasionka, Poland.¹⁷⁰

SAG-U Establishes Advisory Unit in Ukraine

During the quarter, SAG-U established SAG-U Operations-Kyiv, a small group of rotational U.S. military advisory personnel in Kyiv. SAG-U personnel do not serve in a combat role. Instead, they work directly with UAF leadership to facilitate effective employment of U.S. military assistance. The SAG-U personnel are stationed at the U.S. Embassy and operate under Chief of Mission authority.¹⁷¹

SAG-U reported that its staff in Ukraine experienced no major barriers to accessing Ukrainian military personnel or locations. Access requires approval from and coordination with the Ukrainian government and is dependent on security and vehicle support from the Embassy.¹⁷²

SAG-U advisors are typically in Ukraine for only a few months, so they have limited time to build relationships with Ukrainian counterparts. On June 4, SAG-U issued a requirement that all of its U.S. personnel in both Wiesbaden and Kyiv must complete training intended to familiarize and orient them with the SAG-U operational environment. SAG-U personnel who will serve in Kyiv complete additional training designed to expose them to select mission and cultural skills required to be successful in their advise and assist roles.¹⁷³

SAG-U stated that the approval of the FY 2024 defense budget and new supplemental funding for Ukraine allowed the Military Services and SAG-U to restart maintenance and refurbishment lines in the United States for PDA-provided equipment, and to remove requirements that limited spare parts requisitions to just high priority parts to support the UAF.

New NATO Body to Assume Coordination of Ukraine Assistance

During the quarter, the international community prepared for an enhanced NATO role in the provision of security assistance to Ukraine. In July, NATO formally announced the establishment of NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU). NSATU will be led by a U.S. three-star general and will include nearly 700 U.S. and other allied personnel from across NATO countries. Once fully mission capable, it will assume some elements of the mission executed by SAG-U and the IDCC since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NSATU will align military-equipment donations with Ukraine's needs and coordinate deliveries.¹⁷⁴ The goal is to build institutional momentum and spread the knowledge of the logistics involved in coordinating donations from numerous countries to Ukraine's borders.¹⁷⁵ However, the establishment of NSATU, under international law, will not make NATO a party to the conflict.¹⁷⁶

NATO has outlined plans to enhance Ukraine's defense capabilities through the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center and the appointment of a NATO Senior Representative in Ukraine. These efforts aim to increase Ukraine's interoperability with NATO and support its defense transformation.¹⁷⁷

EQUIPPING

The United States and partner nations review UAF requests for equipment regularly. SAG-U reported that whether the U.S. fills the request depends on the availability of equipment, noting that, even when requests are granted, there is usually a long lead time from request to fulfillment.¹⁷⁸

During the quarter, the DoD announced four packages of equipment to be sent to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), with a combined estimated value of \$1.9 billion.¹⁷⁹ (See Table 10.) SAG-U reported that since March there has been a rapid increase in donations of armored platforms, including main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers.¹⁸⁰

SAG-U stated that UAF personnel are employing U.S.-provided weapons and equipment in a manner consistent with the technical aspects of those weapons and equipment.¹⁸¹ However, the battlefield is different than the environments for which some of those weapons were designed, and so challenges exist in the implementation of those weapons in Ukraine. SAG-U added that the UAF are not yet employing U.S.-provided weapons consistent with an effective joint operations capability; they are improving, and U.S. advisors are working with them to develop that capability. SAG-U stated that it continues to document its observations of UAF weapons and equipment use in light of the evolving tactics on the battlefield. SAG-U said that it was continuing to work toward remedies for identified deficiencies.¹⁸²

Table 10.

Equipment to be Provided Through PDAs 56-59

Missiles	HAWK air defense systems; Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; RIM-7 and AIM-9M missiles; PATRIOT missiles; precision aerial munitions; equipment to integrate Western equipment with Ukrainian systems.
Ammunition	155mm Howitzers; 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds; 81mm mortar rounds; 60mm mortar rounds; HIMARS ammunition; TOW missiles, high-speed anti-radiation missiles; small arms ammunition and grenades; demolitions munitions.
Vehicles	Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles; M113 Armored Personnel Carriers; MRAPs; HMMWVs; logistics support vehicles; tactical vehicles and trailers to transport heavy equipment.
Maritime	Coastal and riverine patrol boats.
Other	Night-vision devices; helmets and body armor; airfield support equipment; CBRN protective equipment; anti-armor mines; spare parts.

Source: DoD, press release, “Biden Administration Announces Significant New Security Assistance for Ukraine,” 4/24/2024; DoD, press release, “Biden Administration Announces Significant New Security Assistance for Ukraine,” 5/10/2024; DoD, press release, “Biden Administration Announces Significant New Security Assistance for Ukraine,” 5/24/2024; DoD, press release, “Biden Administration Announces Significant New Security Assistance for Ukraine,” 6/7/2024.

UAF Artillery Faces “Critical Shortfall”

SAG-U has reported that the UAF has continued to ask for donations of artillery systems and related munitions, including propellant, fuses, primer, 155mm artillery systems, and repair parts and barrels. The UAF has increased its request for specialized artillery propellants to increase the effective range of its howitzers. The UAF has requested crew, instructor, and maintenance training for all new equipment they have received.¹⁸³

SAG-U assessed that the UAF continues to maximize its use of artillery on the battlefield through rocket, cannon, and mortar fires. Rocket and missile fires continue to prove extremely effective, SAG-U stated.¹⁸⁴

UAF inventories of certain types of ammunition that are no longer produced or sourced by the United States have become critically low, a situation which is exacerbated by continued Russian one-way attack UAS and cruise missile barrages. These attacks threaten the UAF’s ability to defend against air-based threats and makes protecting critical national infrastructure and the defense industrial base more challenging, SAG-U said. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Procurement Agency continues to seek options for direct procurement from other nations and sources to fulfill shortfalls.¹⁸⁵

According to SAG-U, the UAF was facing “critical shortfalls” of 155mm artillery systems, ammunition, and repair equipment. Projected ammunition donations are sufficient for near-term objectives but may not support mid-term offensive goals. The current level of donations for artillery systems will not meet the UAF reconstitution and force generation requirements. Additionally, maintenance of these systems often must take place outside of Ukraine, according to the support contracts.¹⁸⁶

The UAF has requested roughly 2.5 million short-range first-person view unmanned aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) UAS, and one-way attack unmanned aircraft, along with various other utility and support UAS components, SAG-U reported.

According to SAG-U, the largest challenges associated with meeting UAF requirements stem from the industrial production capacity for 155mm munitions and associated propellants. Production numbers are steadily increasing but it will take time before the effects are fully realized. Successes include the donation of several precision munitions that have proven effects on the battlefield, as well as the establishment of support contracts between Ukraine and various industry partners.¹⁸⁷

UAF Seeks to Expand UAS Capabilities

According to SAG-U, the UAF began training one brigade (roughly 250 personnel per brigade) per month to support UAF UAS capabilities, which have proven effective on the battlefield. The UAF has requested roughly 2.5 million short-range first-person view unmanned aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) UAS, and one-way attack unmanned aircraft, along with various other utility and support UAS components, SAG-U reported.¹⁸⁸

SAG-U, the UAF, and the ODC-Kyiv continuously collaborate to identify methods for timely procurement of UAS and components via economic support from coalition efforts and funding, sourcing, and procurement. While the UAF has made no new specific requests for maintenance support it has asked that donated ISR platforms come with line replaceable packages to enable frontline basic repairs.¹⁸⁹

Weak Documentation Hinders Transparency in Ukraine Shipments

The DoD transports equipment to Ukraine by air, ship, rail, and truck via a complex network that spans multiple European countries. During the quarter, the DoD used 29 ports across Europe to offload cargo.¹⁹⁰ USEUCOM stated there were no changes to overall U.S. logistics processes to transport equipment to Poland during the quarter.¹⁹¹

A DoD OIG evaluation released during the quarter found that the DoD had accounted for, and rapidly transported, defense materials for Ukraine within the United States for onward transport to Ukraine. However, PDA execute orders do not provide guidance on how to account for and transport material, which at times resulted in inaccurate or inadequate documentation of items during transport.¹⁹²

Similarly, USEUCOM reported that tracking individual pieces of equipment as they arrive in Europe and cross the border into Ukraine has been a challenge. Previous records did not necessarily specify by lot number, national stock number, or PDA number associated with the equipment transferred to Ukraine. USEUCOM said that it was coordinating with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to include explicit guidance in PDA execute orders dictating the information required on property and transportation documents. USEUCOM also stated that it was working to digitize shipment and property transaction documents for previous and current defense articles transferred to Ukraine under PDA.¹⁹³

Equipment Shortages Could Challenge U.S. Readiness

Alongside the effort to send U.S. weapons, ammunition, and equipment to Ukraine is an equally challenging effort to replace that equipment for use by U.S. forces. This has required the mostly private companies that produce those items—referred to as the defense industrial base—to rapidly increase their production.¹⁹⁴

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in April that the DoD had identified multiple long-standing supply chain challenges related to weapons replacement, which were exacerbated in some cases by the COVID-19 pandemic. The challenges include long lead times required to procure parts and raw materials and the inability of some suppliers to scale up production to meet increased demand. Some parts are no longer produced or require significant upgrades to operate properly.¹⁹⁵

Many of the items sent to Ukraine under PDA came from prepositioned stocks in Europe and elsewhere around the world. USEUCOM stated there were no significant changes in plans to replenish Army Prepositioned Stock-2 (APS-2) levels in Europe since the previous quarter. APS-2 had 76 percent of equipment on hand with a 76 percent operational readiness rate as of March 2024. Due to the equipment shortages, APS-2 has six equipment sets that do not fully meet the requirements for USEUCOM's most demanding potential operational plan.¹⁹⁶ An equipment set is a full unit's worth of major end items, such as a brigade's worth of armored vehicles, as well as the supplies and equipment needed for that unit to execute its mission.¹⁹⁷

EEUM Processes Improved, Still Challenged by Wartime Environment

Federal law requires end-use monitoring (EUM) of certain transfers of defense equipment and services to foreign entities to ensure that the items are being used in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement and applicable federal law.¹⁹⁸ The DoD, through the Golden Sentry program, conducts EUM of items that were transferred via FMS or other U.S. Government security cooperation programs on a government-to-government basis. State, through the Blue Lantern program, conducts EUM of articles and services exported through direct commercial sales that may be funded by means including FMF.¹⁹⁹ In addition, State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) tracks all of the equipment it donates to Ukraine's law enforcement agencies, which does not fall under the Blue Lantern program, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement and applicable federal law.²⁰⁰


Certain defense items are subject to enhanced EUM (EEUM) if they incorporate sensitive technology; are particularly vulnerable to diversion or other misuse; or whose diversion or other misuse could have significant consequences for U.S. national security. Of the 19 types of designated defense articles that required EEUM, 8 had been provided to Ukraine as of the end of the quarter.²⁰¹ (See Figure 4.)

The ODC-Kyiv said that its main challenges for conducting EUM during the quarter were the embassy personnel cap and movement restrictions due to wartime conditions, though modifications to the personnel cap during the quarter have yielded some improvements.²⁰² Force protection and logistical constraints due to wartime conditions have limited the DoD's

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Figure 4.

Disposition of EEUM Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine, as of June 2024



ability to conduct in-person EUM and EEUM site visits at locations far outside of Kyiv or Lviv. Most EEUM-designated articles are forward-deployed to frontline units outside of approved travel zones.²⁰³

The DSCA, which administers the Golden Sentry program, has modified standard EEUM requirements to account for non-permissive conflict environments. In Ukraine under these special standards, U.S. representatives may accept reports from Ukrainian forces about the status of defense articles in lieu of direct observation by U.S. personnel.²⁰⁴ Ukrainian forces self-report their EEUM inventories on a quarterly basis to complement the ODC-Kyiv’s on-site inspection regime.²⁰⁵

According to DSCA data, 87.6 percent of EEUM defense articles provided to Ukraine were “active” as of the end of the quarter, meaning they were believed to be still in use on the battlefield, of which 83.7 percent were observed by U.S. or Ukrainian personnel during the quarter. (See Figure 4.) While the percentage of active articles declined slightly compared to two quarters ago, the percentage of observed articles increased during the same period.²⁰⁶ Oversight of EEUM in Ukraine has been a key focus of the DoD OIG audits and evaluations. The DoD OIG has completed five oversight projects related to EEUM and had three ongoing as of the end of this quarter.

MAINTENANCE

The UAF often evacuates Western-donated equipment that suffers damage on the battlefield to other countries, most often to the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine in southern Poland.²⁰⁷ There, the United States and partner forces conduct major repairs and train UAF maintenance technicians. The U.S. maintenance experts also conduct remote maintenance sessions leveraging Ukrainian translators and secure voice, video, and chat channels to guide UAF personnel in Ukraine through the entire maintenance process of weapons systems they may find unfamiliar.²⁰⁸

SAG-U reported that there were no changes in the type of maintenance support provided to Ukraine during the quarter, just a demand for more of it.²⁰⁹

The United States and international partners continue to improve the maintenance support provided to Ukraine, SAG-U said. Over the last quarter SAG-U and partner nation representatives worked to enable more contracted support for previously unsupported systems. The United States and international partners strived to deliver greater numbers of spare parts to enable UAF to fix their systems inside Ukraine. However, this has not translated into positive impacts to the operational readiness rates, SAG-U said.²¹⁰

In addition, the constant rotation of personnel at the maintenance facilities requires intensive management and time to build staff members' knowledge up to an effective level of expertise. Select capabilities in Poland are provided by personnel from the German and Italian militaries, which rotate personnel every 3 months. However, nine new positions created in the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine will improve materiel and maintenance management of U.S.-donated platforms from a supply and maintenance perspective, according to SAG-U.²¹¹

The DoD has stressed the importance of training UAF maintenance crews on providing in-country support.²¹² SAG-U reported that Ukraine is often able to overhaul and rebuild many of their weapon systems using parts produced domestically.²¹³ SAG-U reported that in recent months, operational readiness rates of UAF vehicles improved following platform-specific maintenance training.²¹⁴

SAG-U reported that the UAF is attempting to mature their maintenance capability by increasing their ability to conduct advanced maintenance functions within Ukraine. During the quarter, the United States saw a large request for higher-skilled maintenance training on dozens of U.S.-donated platforms.²¹⁵ This is likely to increase as the international community donates more non-mission capable platforms to the UAF.²¹⁶

However, SAG-U reported that it struggles to meet the UAF's desire to expand their capability to conduct the highest level of maintenance: depot level maintenance. The UAF requested to source U.S. depot level repair parts and training for UAF technicians. However, there currently is no avenue for the United States to provide depot level training. Also, there is currently no process in place for UAF to requisition depot level repair parts through the U.S. supply system, although FMF cases are being developed to support the in-country repair for select platforms.²¹⁷ As of the end of the quarter, the DoD OIG had two ongoing oversight projects related to maintenance of military equipment donated to Ukraine.

TRAINING

The United States and its international partners provide a variety of training to the UAF, including basic, collective, leadership, and platform-specific training.²¹⁸ U.S. military trainers located at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany, as well as other locations in Europe and the United States, provide primarily collective, leadership, and equipment training to the UAF.²¹⁹ (See Tables 11 and 12.) SAG-U stated it is not aware of any UAF requests for training that were denied during the quarter.²²⁰

According to the OUSD(P), Ukraine would improve its ability to fight its current war with Russia by continuing to adopt Western approaches to warfare.²²¹ Doing so would allow Ukraine to better integrate the systems and capabilities that the international community has provided, USEUCOM said. It would also facilitate future interoperability with NATO, which would help Ukraine and its partners collectively counter Russia.²²² Ukraine continues to make progress in adopting Western military principles, including in areas such as standardizing aspects of training and force generation, but challenges remain, the OUSD(P) stated.²²³

Table 11.

Countries Training the UAF by Type

Type	Countries Providing Training
Platform/Specialist Training	Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
Leadership Training	Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Latvia, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom, and United States.
Collective Training	Czechia, Germany, Spain, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and United States.
Basic Training	Germany, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia.

Sources: SAG-U, responses to DoD OIG request for information, 24.2 OAR 061, 3/29/2024 and 24.3 OAR 063, 6/27/2024.

Table 12.

Examples of Training Provided During the Quarter

Type	Training Provided
Platform	Gepard, M1117, M2A2 Bradley, Patriot, Hawk, Leopard 1.
Specialist	Chaplain, combat medic, engineer, legal advisor, forward observer.
Leadership	Battalion headquarters, exercise planning, company command.
Maritime	Initial training, Viking BvS10
Air	F-16

Sources: SAG-U, responses to DoD OIG requests for information, 24.2 OAR 061, 3/29/2024 and 24.3 OAR 063, 6/27/2024.

U.S. Training Focuses on U.S.-donated Equipment

During the quarter, approximately 600 UAF personnel were enrolled in 21 U.S.-led courses at Grafenwoehr Training Area and other locations in Europe.²²⁴ USAREUR-AF reported no challenges in facilitating or executing training.²²⁵

USAREUR-AF stated that U.S.-led training during the quarter shifted away from collective training to training UAF personnel to operate U.S. and other Western equipment. This shift reflects evolving UAF training requests, USAREUR-AF stated.²²⁶ At the same time, SAG-U noted that the UAF made fewer requests for equipment training during the quarter. SAG-U attributed this shift to the UAF already having instructors to run the required courses and a need to keep training within Ukraine.²²⁷

U.S. military trainers provided courses on how to operate key platforms that the United States and other allies donated to the UAF during the quarter: the M88 recovery vehicle, Stryker combat vehicle, M1117 armored security vehicle, and the M2A2 Bradley fighting vehicle. The trainers described the courses as “soup-to-nuts” that include how to operate, maneuver, and perform basic maintenance on the vehicle. The trainers adjust the course based on Ukrainian requests and time availability.²²⁸

A DoD OIG audit released during the quarter reported that U.S. trainers did not have enough linguists available during a PATRIOT missile training course because they did not have sufficient advance notice of the number of UAF personnel that would be participating in the course.²²⁹

U.S.-led leadership training continued this quarter, including tactical courses and company-level courses split between company commander, platoon leader, and non-commissioned officer roles. USAREUR-AF said that the courses combine classroom instruction on tactics and operations planning at the company level with practical exercises in the field.²³⁰ USAREUR-AF said that it expects the volume and type of leadership training provided to change in the next quarter with the introduction of the Combat Leaders Course.²³¹

USAREUR-AF reported that the U.S. trainers assess and monitor students in the classroom and, in the leadership courses, in a field environment. Based on assessments during course instruction, evaluators conduct program reviews before, during, and after each course in order to adjust training objectives based on student proficiency. The trainers also conduct pre- and post-assessments of each leadership student to gauge initial proficiency and then comprehension of training conducted.²³²

Ukrainian F-16 Pilots Train in Advance of Aircraft Delivery

Through the Air Force Capability Coalition—co-led by Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United States—the United States continued to support Ukraine’s future fourth-generation fighter capability, including through the training of Ukrainian pilots.²³³

During the quarter, more than a dozen pilots trained on the F-16 in Denmark and the United States, the OUSD(P) stated.²³⁴ SAG-U reported 11 UAF personnel were in pilot training during the quarter while an additional 40 were in language training that is a prerequisite for flight instruction.²³⁵ U.S.-led training occurs at an Air Force base in Arizona.²³⁶

During the quarter, approximately 600 UAF personnel were enrolled in 21 U.S.-led courses at Grafenwoehr Training Area and other locations in Europe.



U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons sit parked during Astral Knight 24, at Geilenkirchen NATO Air Base, Germany. (U.S. Air Force photo)

UAF pilots trained by the United States complete the standard Air National Guard course that teaches basic proficiency in air-to-air and air-to-surface operations.²³⁷ However, the UAF pilots are being trained on an accelerated timeline which can fluctuate and will continue to depend on student experience, English language skills, and progression through the training program.²³⁸

According to the OUSD(P), the current training timeline is on track to support the initial donation of aircraft by Denmark in the summer of 2024, as well as other donations from partner nations later in the year.²³⁹ However, the Ukrainian government has formally requested that the U.S. and other nations expand the availability of training for future F-16 pilots, according to media reporting.²⁴⁰

Ukraine Seeks to Build Domestic Training Capability

SAG-U stated the UAF is working to develop its force development capacity through its domestic training pipelines. During the quarter, the UAF requested train-the-trainer support for commonly donated platforms. This support will empower the UAF to train future operators in Ukraine, SAG-U said.²⁴¹

For U.S. platforms, the requests included training on the M2A2 Bradley and the M1117 Armored Security Vehicle. The first M2A2 Bradley train-the-trainer course began on May 13, with 6 personnel projected to graduate in July. The first M1117 Armored Security Vehicle train-the-trainer course concluded in June.²⁴² In addition to these ongoing courses, SAG-U seeks to develop a train-the-trainer course on the HIMARS.²⁴³

CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

During the quarter, State INL delivered approximately \$48 million worth of emergency vehicles and other equipment to Ukrainian law enforcement partners, State reported.²⁴⁴ This included 110 MRAPs, ammunition, tactical gear, medical kits, IT equipment, and tools for explosive ordnance disposal.²⁴⁵

In addition, State INL provided approximately \$25 million in fixed-wing UAS and plans to provide additional UAS before the end of 2024.²⁴⁶ State INL also continued to train the National Police of Ukraine (NPU) and the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (SBGS) on operating UAS.²⁴⁷ The NPU and SBGS can now use UAS for their law enforcement duties on or near the front lines, according to State.²⁴⁸ INL plans to train more than 100 additional UAS operators through the end of 2024, State reported.²⁴⁹

INL also funded courses for Ukrainian law enforcement during the quarter, including:

Intellectual property and cyber crimes: This course, at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, Hungary, focused on providing advanced skills in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting intellectual property and cybercrimes using lessons from real-world case studies. This support is intended to foster intellectual property law enforcement cooperation and information-sharing for combating transnational crime, State said.²⁵⁰ Participants included three investigators and three police officers.²⁵¹

Ballistics: Also held at the ILEA and delivered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), these courses focused on ballistics analysis, documentation, and evidence collection for high-velocity projectiles, wound ballistics, and fundamentals in combat post-blast investigations. This training is intended to work toward prosecuting Russia's war crimes, State reported. Participants included law enforcement personnel from 13 Ukrainian regions where war crimes have been reported.²⁵²

Patrol police supervisors: This training aims to enhance the leadership skills and operations of supervisors, including delegating authority to, and empowering subordinate staff.²⁵³ The supervisory training is meant to replace the Soviet-style model State described as "pinnacle-only decision-making."²⁵⁴ The course covers fundamentals and refresher-level coursework in crisis negotiations, practical exercises, and related training.²⁵⁵ Participants included 30 NPU officers.²⁵⁶

Narcotic investigations: The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) attaché conducted two 5-day courses on narcotics investigations, in Poland.²⁵⁷ The course focused on money laundering, cryptocurrency, and cyber investigations, according to State. Participants included 60 personnel from NPU and SBGS.²⁵⁸

In addition to its activities in Ukraine, State INL continued to provide assistance to Moldovan law enforcement partners.²⁵⁹ The bureau conducted five training events on working with polygraph technologies for more than 70 participants from the Moldovan Forensics Lab and Moldova's National Anticorruption Center Service for State Protection and Guard, State reported.²⁶⁰ The bureau led a 5-day visit for Moldovan officials to Washington, DC, where they studied the best practices of the U.S. Marshals Service, State

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According to media reporting, approximately 30 percent of Ukraine's territory—an area larger than Florida—may be covered with mines, which would make Ukraine the most heavily mined country in the world.

said.²⁶¹ Other training for Moldovan participants addressed hacking and cyber IP crimes, human trafficking, and child exploitation, according to State.²⁶² State INL likewise funded a June conference on women in law enforcement attended by 75 Moldovan female police officers from five separate state law enforcement authorities, according to State.²⁶³

During the quarter, State INL made donations to the Moldovan Forensic Lab's unit for digital forensics, including information technology improvements and more than \$200,000 in hardware donations.²⁶⁴

DEMINING

The Russian military has made extensive use of land mines in Ukraine, especially in areas formerly occupied by Russian forces. According to media reporting, approximately 30 percent of Ukraine's territory—an area larger than Florida—may be covered with mines, which would make Ukraine the most heavily mined country in the world.²⁶⁵ These mines range from anti-tank and anti-vehicle mines to anti-personnel mines and booby traps. Land mines have proven a significant obstacle for the UAF and slowed the pace of counter-offensive operations. The mines have also proven deadly for Ukrainian civilians. Land mines and other explosive remnants of war will present a serious challenge to post-war reconstruction.²⁶⁶

Several U.S. Government agencies support humanitarian demining efforts in Ukraine. According to State financial data, as of the end of the quarter, the U.S. Government had obligated approximately \$179 million and expended more than \$120 million in Ukraine in supplemental and base budget funds to implement demining programs.²⁶⁷ U.S. assistance seeks to demine land areas and shorten the food insecurities associated with unusable agriculture land in Ukraine, and to help the Ukrainian people return to a normal way of life, SAG-U said.²⁶⁸

During the quarter, State obligated \$1.9 million to extend its project with a third-party monitor to conduct field visits of ongoing and completed U.S.-funded humanitarian demining activities.²⁶⁹ State expended approximately \$16 million to support efforts to clearing land mines.²⁷⁰ The funds, administered by State's Bureau of Political Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), advance existing programs to train and equip Ukrainian government deminers and deploy NGO demining teams, State said.²⁷¹

Identifying unexploded ordnance: Ukrainian demining operatives and partners continue to identify and verify places of unexploded ordnance and potentially mined areas, SAG-U reported. This has included use of newer technologies, such as artificial intelligence to determine highly probable areas of mined locations. Most efforts have involved the use of unmanned aircraft fitted with updated sensors and cameras to detect and identify mines and unexploded ordnance, both surface and buried.²⁷²

Remove unexploded ordnance: During the quarter, PM/WRA funded the deployment of approximately 70 demining teams to survey and clear minefields and provide explosive ordnance risk education.²⁷³ The teams continue to augment the Ukrainian government's demining and explosive ordnance disposal capacity, according to SAG-U, citing the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine.²⁷⁴

However, the continuous fighting has impeded the ability of demining teams to operate in areas near the frontline.²⁷⁵

Train and Equip Ukrainian teams: State said PM/WRA provided humanitarian demining training and equipment to Ukrainian government deminers in the NPU, State Special Transport Service, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU), and the Ministry of Defense Support Service Engineers.²⁷⁶ All training is compliant with International Mine Action Standards, State said, and by June 30, PM/WRA's contractor Tetra Tech trained more than 950 individuals and awarded more than 1,395 completion certificates in explosive ordnance disposal, manual mine clearance and battle area clearance, non-technical survey, hook-and-line training, and mechanical clearance.²⁷⁷ Most of the training has occurred in the U.S.-funded humanitarian demining training school in western Ukraine that Tetra Tech established in September 2023.²⁷⁸

Under a separate project with the Danish Refugee Council, in April PM/WRA supported manual mine clearance and battle area clearance training for 40 participants from SESU and the National Mine Action Center and information management training for 5 SESU participants, non-technical survey training for 10 SESU personnel in May and June, and advanced explosive ordnance disposal training in May and June for 12 personnel in SESU, the NMAC, and National Mine Action Authority Secretariat.²⁷⁹

State INL has provided equipment and training to the NPU's explosive ordnance disposal units. In addition to acting as a first responder, these units support critical demining efforts in recently liberated Ukrainian territories to allow police and border guards to safely operate.²⁸⁰ Since the beginning of the war, State INL has provided Ukraine with \$9.8 million worth of equipment for explosive ordnance disposal operations, including 44 vehicles, metal detectors, x-ray and blasting machines, hook-and-line kits, and personal protective equipment.²⁸¹ In May, State INL-funded training on the use of a recently transferred unmanned explosive ordnance disposal platform for an NPU unit in Zhytomyr and planned to send another platform by the end of June. Such platforms allow explosive ordnance disposal teams personnel to clear up to three acres per day.²⁸²

The NPU unit will focus its demining work in Kharkiv oblast. Forty percent of that territory is currently mined, according to State.²⁸³ State noted that the NPU had expanded its explosive ordnance disposal personnel from 400 to nearly 550 officers.²⁸⁴ State also said that as of May, these units had responded to at least 5,190 calls for assistance; demined at least 87,364 acres of land; seized 295,960 and disposed of 118,231 pieces of explosive ordnance.²⁸⁵

Capacity Building: During the quarter, PM/WRA implemented a new \$1.5 million demining program, in partnership with the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining.²⁸⁶ The program plans to operate for 3 years, State said, with a focus on planning support and senior leadership training.²⁸⁷ The program also seeks to revise Ukrainian national mine action standards, which currently lack criteria to allow authorities to quickly designate demined lands ready for a return to productive use, according to State.²⁸⁸

Also during the quarter, another program concluded that created a mine reporting management system, and technical capacity-building at Ukraine's National Mine Action Authority.²⁸⁹ When the initial project concluded, 26 mine action organizations were

During the quarter, PM/WRA implemented a new \$1.5 million demining program, in partnership with the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining.

contributing to a unified database. In addition, State reported that the project delivered a variety of courses and training to mine technicians and other stakeholders.²⁹⁰ State said that the initial grant has been foundational to subsequent demining programs.²⁹¹

State reported that it closely monitors and oversees demining programs.²⁹² State’s oversight practices include weekly reports and regular phone calls, as well as cooperation with a third-party monitoring implementer on the ground in Ukraine. Embassy staff supported demining oversight through site visits when and where possible.²⁹³

NONPROLIFERATION, EXPORT CONTROLS, AND BORDER SECURITY

State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) continued to provide assistance in two areas: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) scientific response; and prevention of arms diversions and border security.²⁹⁴ Overall, State ISN has obligated \$94 million and expended \$46 million appropriated in the Ukraine supplemental funding for these efforts.²⁹⁵ (See Table 13.)

State said that during the quarter, State ISN continued to monitor the performance of its CBRN and arms diversion programs in Ukraine supplemental appropriations by holding biweekly calls with implementers, attending ISN-led training sessions, and conducting site visits to three grant-receiving institutions.²⁹⁶

Table 13.

ISN Nonproliferation and Border Security Programs Related to Ukraine

Pillar	Activity
<p>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Scientific Response</p> <p>Obligated: \$81 million</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continued ongoing workshop on critical infrastructure protection, working with Ukraine’s National Security Defense Council and the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection to support development of a security assessment program for chemical facilities in Ukraine. Delivered hardware and software products to Ukraine’s National Health Service, to support establishment of a Laboratory Information Management System to protect Ukraine’s health data from outside cyber intrusion. Provided the second of four planned programs to train Ukrainian scientists on reducing proliferation risk of CBRN weapons. Began the purchasing process for radiation monitoring equipment for use in the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site’s exclusion zone.
<p>Preventing Arms Diversion and Border Security</p> <p>Obligated: \$13 million</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) unit conducted 59 in-person EUM checks and received 23 reports from 38 secondary check locations. Thirteen items remained in delayed-EUM status due to their locations within conflict zones, and therefore cannot be reached via secondary methods, State reported. ISN conducted site visits to three SBGS locations, including in the Zhytomyr region, Odesa region, and the Mukachevo area in western Ukraine.

Note: Funding as of June 2024.

Source: State, responses to State OIG request for information, 6/21/2024 and 7/9/2024.

State Cites “Significant Success” in Border Security Amid Challenges

The Embassy’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) unit noted “significant success” in certain aspects of its partnership with the SBGS from longer-running programs.²⁹⁷ As a part of this partnership, EXBS and SBGS established a surveillance program along Ukraine’s borders with Russia and Belarus in late 2022. The program included testing of micro-camera surveillance systems and techniques, training, and advising, State reported.²⁹⁸ Following testing, SBGS requested large-scale deployment of the same system, according to State.²⁹⁹

As of late June, EXBS had delivered eight border-surveillance station kits and related training.³⁰⁰ Another eight station kits and associated training are due for delivery in summer 2024.³⁰¹ EXBS’ equipment donations amounted to nearly \$1 million in value, according to State.³⁰²

EXBS is coordinating with other U.S. agencies and other, potential partner countries for further equipment procurements, State reported.³⁰³ Longer-term, the EXBS-SBGS partnership will consider more permanent improvements, including organizational changes to enhance their partnership, and enhanced surveillance operations across SBGS, according to State.³⁰⁴

EXBS also confronted a number of substantial challenges during the quarter, State said.³⁰⁵ Given security conditions on the ground in Ukraine, EXBS delivered trainings outside the country, mostly in Moldova.³⁰⁶ This resulted in higher costs and logistics and personnel constraints, State reported.³⁰⁷ EXBS is assessing the possibility of expanding trainings to Ukraine, likely in the western part of the country, State reported, which would bring new start-up costs and logistical challenges.³⁰⁸

State noted that SBGS has a significant combat role in addition to border security responsibilities, which has demanded much of the SBGS senior leadership’s time and attention. Likewise, SBGS personnel rotations on and off the front impose further organizational strain.³⁰⁹ Wartime demands limit the progress of border-specific technical capacity improvements, according to State.³¹⁰

CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Ukraine Implementing Rolling Blackouts Due to Fragile Energy Infrastructure

Due to Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy sector, rolling blackouts occurred regularly across Ukraine during the quarter, especially during evening hours, when demand for electricity is highest.³¹¹ Blackouts are often rotated between regions or sectors (such as industrial versus residential consumers) so part of the country was lacking some power generation at any given time.³¹² The National Bank of Ukraine downgraded Ukraine’s expected GDP growth in 2024 from 3.6 percent to 3 percent, in part due to the Russian attacks.³¹³

As of late June, EXBS had delivered eight border-surveillance station kits and related training.

Table 14.

DoE and NNSA Activities to Support Ukrainian Nuclear Infrastructure During the Quarter

	Activity
Nuclear Power Plant Resilience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delivered equipment and consumables for Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants, including diesel fuel and replacement and spare parts. Provided significant nuclear security upgrades to Ukrainian nuclear and radiological facilities, including physical protection upgrades, response force equipment, and cybersecurity improvements.
Remote Sensing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deployed a network of sensors throughout Ukraine to rapidly detect and identify potential nuclear or radiological incidents. Maintained the sensors and provided the underlying data architecture and communications and electrical systems on which they rely.
Equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provided equipment for radiation detection, radioactive source security, public health and safety, nuclear forensics, and emergency response, both before and during the current evolution of the conflict. Completed delivery and installation of more than \$1.5 million of specialized medical equipment for the National Research Center on Radiation Medicine. The equipment and associated infrastructure upgrades significantly improve the center’s ability to provide specialized treatment for individuals affected by radiation, including its ongoing treatment of Ukrainian troops exposed to radiation following Russia’s incursion into the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone.
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Norwegian government, organized a tabletop exercise for officials from 10 government of Ukraine agencies focused on building local and provincial capabilities to respond to a nuclear detonation. Supported field exercises and trainings on countering nuclear smuggling, insider threat mitigation, basic radiation protection, nuclear forensics, and joint operations among law enforcement, armed forces, border guards, and emergency responders.

Source: DoE OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.3 WOG DOE 02, 7/3/2024.

The Ukrainian government has limited resources to rebuild the damaged units to bring power back into the grid before the winter.³¹⁴ Media reported that Ukraine’s energy losses since late March reached 9 gigawatts of the country’s installed capacity during the quarter—an amount equal to the peak power demand of the Netherlands.³¹⁵

Even with significant additional repairs or procurements ahead of this winter, continued attacks will prevent the ability of Ukraine’s power generation system to meet peak winter demand, the Department of Energy (DoE) said.³¹⁶ The Ukrainian government is working closely with international partners to procure materials for infrastructure repair. It was unclear this quarter how much generation capacity Ukraine can restore before the heating season begins this autumn.³¹⁷

USAID, State, the DoE, and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) provide support to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.³¹⁸ DoE and NNSA support has focused on nuclear and radiological risk reduction, emergency preparedness and response, and critical energy infrastructure resilience. This has included analytical or advisory support (training, exercises, technical reach-back) and material support such as equipment donations.³¹⁹

In particular, the DoE and NNSA have delivered equipment and consumables for Ukraine's operating nuclear power plants, including diesel fuel and replacement and spare parts. The DoE and NNSA have provided significant nuclear security upgrades to Ukrainian nuclear and radiological facilities, including physical protection upgrades, response force equipment, and cybersecurity improvements.³²⁰ (See Table 14.)

Since 2002, USAID, through its implementing partners, has supported the provision of electricity, heat, and water to the Ukrainian people, including efforts to strengthen the resilience of the electrical grid.³²¹ USAID Ukraine and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv engage regularly with the Ukrainian government to prioritize energy sector assistance among various energy organizations such as district heating utilities, energy generation and distribution companies, and gas and electricity transmission operators.³²² USAID validates needs and specifications, and it is currently contracting for equipment focused on repairs of critical energy-related assets over the coming months.³²³

USAID also announced a new \$439 million energy sector-related award this quarter.³²⁴ This project aims to build on prior efforts to strengthen Ukraine's energy security by providing technical and procurement assistance to ensure affordable, reliable, and secure electricity, natural gas, and district heating.³²⁵ The program also aims to provide emergency energy response procurements and support reforms needed to develop a competitive energy market, integration with the EU, and increased private sector investment.³²⁶ However, given unexpected emergency needs due to Russia's spring 2024 attacks on energy infrastructure, part of this funding is now being shifted for immediate use in the Mission's existing Energy Security Project (total award value of \$920 million).³²⁷ As of the end of the quarter, USAID had sub-obligated \$41 million into this new award.³²⁸

USAID also announced a new \$439 million energy sector-related award this quarter.







USAID provided \$2.3 million in critical equipment to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine. (USAID photo)

DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

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DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE


In addition to security assistance, the U.S. Government provides direct budget support, development, and humanitarian assistance to support Ukraine and its people. State’s Integrated Country Strategy for Ukraine outlines mission objectives related to a variety of U.S.-funded activities in Ukraine.³²⁹ USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy for Ukraine further identifies objectives and intermediate results related to U.S.-funded development activities in Ukraine.³³⁰

DIPLOMACY

During the quarter, the United States, the European Union, and other international partners engaged in several significant diplomatic efforts to plan for Ukraine’s economic recovery, both in the near and long terms, and to further its integration with Europe. The Ukraine Recovery Conference in Germany and the Summit on Peace in Ukraine, which were both held in June;

Figure 5.

USAID and State Obligated Development Funding, by Sector, October 2023–June 2024, in \$ Millions



USAID also signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to increase collaboration on support to the infrastructure, economic growth, and energy sectors.

the commencement of EU accession negotiations for Ukraine in July; and a new agreement with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to support rebuilding Ukraine's infrastructure.

At Recovery Conference, International Community Reaffirms Support for Ukraine

The Ukraine Recovery Conference, held in Berlin from June 11 and 12, sought to mobilize continued international support for the resilience, recovery, reconstruction, reform, and modernization of Ukraine.³³¹ Cross-cutting issues, such as macro-economic stability, resilience, security, energy, critical infrastructure, housing, climate actions, green recovery, healthcare, education, environment, and gender were also discussed.³³²

The conference confirmed and validated the Ukrainian government's priorities for recovery, USAID said, particularly in the energy sector.³³³ Participants signed more than 110 agreements at the conference, totaling more than \$17.2 billion to support Ukraine's energy resilience, defense industry, social infrastructure, reconstruction of critical infrastructure and private sector development, and agriculture.³³⁴

USAID also signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to increase collaboration on support to the infrastructure, economic growth, and energy sectors.³³⁵ Additionally, USAID joined three initiatives with the Ukrainian Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development that seek to help Ukraine upskill workers in the private sector while promoting resilience, gender equity, and social inclusion. USAID said that in addition to ensuring that small businesses can grow during the conflict, these efforts will help local governments build the capacity to deliver essential services and foster economic recovery.³³⁶

From June 15 to 16, Switzerland hosted a Summit on Peace in Ukraine to discuss pathways toward a comprehensive, just and lasting peace for Ukraine.³³⁷ The summit drew representatives from more than 100 countries and international organizations, but Russia and China did not attend.³³⁸ In a joint communiqué, participants reaffirmed their support to the principles of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states, including Ukraine.³³⁹ The communiqué outlined three essential aspects for peace.³⁴⁰

First, the use of nuclear energy and nuclear installations must be safe, safe-guarded, and environmentally sound; the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant must operate under the full sovereign control of Ukraine and supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and the threat or use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine is inadmissible.³⁴¹

Second, global food security must not be weaponized in any way, since it depends on free, full, and safe navigations, as well as access to seaports; and that attacks on merchant ships, civilian ports, and their infrastructure is unacceptable.³⁴²

Third, all prisoners of war must be released, and all "deported and unlawfully displaced Ukrainian children, and all other Ukrainian civilians who were unlawfully detained, must be returned to Ukraine."³⁴³

As of June 28, 90 countries and international organizations had signed the joint communiqué.³⁴⁴

United States Pledges \$1.5 Billion for Ukraine Recovery

During the Summit on Peace in Ukraine, the United States announced that it would provide more than \$1.5 billion in support to Ukraine.³⁴⁵ The package includes \$500 million in new funding for energy assistance and redirecting \$324 million in previously announced funds toward emergency energy needs in Ukraine.³⁴⁶ The funding is intended to help Ukraine respond to Russia's attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure by repair and recovery, improving Ukraine's resilience to energy supply disruptions, and laying the groundwork to repair and expand Ukraine's energy system.³⁴⁷ It will repair energy infrastructure damaged in the war, expand power generation, encourage private sector investment, and secure energy infrastructure, according to USAID.³⁴⁸

The U.S. Government also announced more than \$379 million in humanitarian assistance for State and USAID to address the needs of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and conflict-affected communities impacted by Russia's invasion.³⁴⁹ This support includes food assistance, health services, shelter, water, sanitation, and hygiene services for millions of Ukrainians inside the country and in the region.³⁵⁰ The assistance also supports protection activities, including case management and psychosocial support services, as well as agriculture and livelihoods assistance to enable families to restore income and meet basic needs.³⁵¹

During the Summit on Peace in Ukraine, the United States announced that it would provide more than \$1.5 billion in support to Ukraine.

Recovery Planning Focuses on Foundational Issues and Key Economic Sectors

In September 2023, President Biden appointed former Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker as the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine's Economic Recovery. According to a State press release announcing the appointment, the Special Representative works with the Ukrainian government, the international community, and the U.S. private sector to help Ukraine move toward a future as a prosperous, secure, European democracy and to pursue integration into the European Union and NATO.³⁵²

State said that the Special Representative works to help Ukraine build a viable economy despite the conflict, focusing on "advancing foundational items necessary to promote and accelerate economic growth, key sectors that can generate government revenue and reduce future assistance needs."³⁵³ The Special Representative also facilitates broader planning and coordination efforts across international donors, international financial institutions, the private sector, and other partners to build the longer-term roadmap for Ukraine's economic recovery, according to State.³⁵⁴

State said that the Special Representative has identified three key issues necessary to foster a business environment conducive to private sector investment economic growth:³⁵⁵

Continued reforms and anti-corruption efforts: State said that ongoing reforms and anti-corruption measures are essential to creating the necessary business-enabling environment needed to attract private investment for economic recovery, accelerating Ukraine's accession into the European Union and other European-Atlantic institutions, and transforming Ukraine's economy and society to meet the expectations of the Ukrainian people.³⁵⁶ The Special Representative has amplified U.S. Government efforts around reforms through engagements with U.S. and Ukrainian partners and has worked with private sector CEOs to share their perspectives on the importance of reforms and anti-corruption.³⁵⁷



USAID distributes generators and emergency equipment to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in the Zaporizhzhia region. (USAID photo)

Expansion of risk management tools: State said the lack of risk management tools, such as war risk insurance, is a barrier to increased investment and economic recovery.³⁵⁸ In June, during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, working with the Special Representative, announced a package of risk management programs valued at \$357 million. The programs included: 1) a \$50 million reinsurance facility to build a portfolio of war risk insurance policies for companies operating in Ukraine; 2) \$150 million in political risk insurance to maintain existing operations in Ukraine’s agricultural export sector; 3) a \$152 million political risk contract to a Ukrainian company involved in the manufacturing sector; and 4) \$5 million in political risk insurance to support Ukrainian students’ wartime access to higher education.³⁵⁹

Strengthen coordination across donors: State said that the Special Representative is working to secure buy-in from donors on a Ukraine planning framework to help Ukraine advance effective economic recovery and reconstruction efforts. Such a framework would address the interrelated issues of reform, project planning, risk management, and private sector engagement.³⁶⁰ State noted that the Special Representative’s leadership within the Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform (MDCP) steering committee also facilitated the development of a Business Advisory Council to the MDCP during the Ukraine Recovery Conference.³⁶¹ State also said that the Special Representative has emphasized how private sector engagement is necessary for Ukraine’s economic recovery, noting that the Special Representative led CEO-level roundtables on infrastructure, insurance, agricultural value chains and cross-cutting private sector needs with the Ukrainian Prime Minister in Chicago and at the UN General Assembly in New York.³⁶²

State said that the Special Representative emphasizes six key economic sectors in which Ukraine maintains a competitive advantage: agriculture; technology; critical minerals, mining, and metals; energy; transportation and logistics; and defense manufacturing.³⁶³ State said that the Special Representative advances work in each of these areas in several ways, including by highlighting opportunities for U.S. companies to engage in various sectors, identifying value chain issues that constrain growth, and establishing interagency processes to advance work and deals in specific areas.³⁶⁴ State cited as an example an interagency “Deal Team” established to help expedite U.S. Government approvals for U.S. defense companies’ business with Ukraine, which, according to State, has already expedited several deals to support Ukraine’s defense manufacturing.³⁶⁵

European Union Opens Accession Negotiations with Ukraine

On June 25, the European Council, the governing body of the European Union, announced its launch of accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova.³⁶⁶ Council President Charles Michel noted that opening the negotiations is a key milestone and reflected “the immense progress both nations have made on their journey toward European integration.”³⁶⁷ The decision to open negotiations was based on “the transformative steps [both countries have] taken in areas such as rule of law, governance, and judicial systems,” Michel said, though both countries must continue substantial efforts to strengthen institutions and economic stability and to combat corruption.³⁶⁸

USAID and State reported that Ukraine has broadly progressed with its EU accession process.³⁶⁹ State reported that Ukraine has passed significant reforms, including asset declaration, anti-monopoly, energy pricing, judicial capacities and discipline, and corporate governance of state-owned enterprises, among others—many of which were passed within the last year.³⁷⁰ State also assessed that Ukraine must continue to pass and implement additional reforms “to create the business-enabling environment needed to attract investment, ensure the responsible stewardship of assistance dollars, and meet the demands of their own people to continue moving down a path toward EU accession.”³⁷¹

The Ukrainian government has committed to advancing its Ukraine Plan, a 4-year comprehensive reform and investment strategy, which seeks to set conditions for regular and more predictable macro financial assistance to Ukraine through the European Union’s \$53.9 billion Ukraine Facility.³⁷² The Ukraine Plan identifies 69 reforms and 10 investments, with 146 qualitative and quantitative indicators, that cover 15 areas of the Ukrainian economy.³⁷³ Several reforms were expected to help Ukraine’s efforts on the accession path by advancing alignment with the EU *acquis*, the collection of common rights and obligations that constitute the body of EU law and are incorporated in the legal systems of EU member states, notably in public administration, public finance management, anti-money laundering, public procurement, as well as the transport and agri-food sectors.³⁷⁴ Investments cover the fields of human capital, energy, transport, agri-food, business environment, and regional policies.³⁷⁵

USAID supports reforms and Ukraine’s EU accession process through activities that support democratic governance, transformational reforms, and transparent and accountable recovery at both the national and local level.³⁷⁶ USAID also works at the national level to further institutionalize Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture and supports the decentralization, judicial, parliamentary, and oversight-related reforms essential for Ukraine’s EU integration.³⁷⁷

DIRECT BUDGET SUPPORT

As it defends itself from Russia’s unprovoked invasion, the Ukrainian government’s expenditures have consistently outpaced revenues over the course of the war.³⁷⁸ In the first quarter of FY 2024, a USAID analysis estimated that the Ukrainian government’s budget gap—the difference between annual government revenues and expenditures—was approximately \$5.3 billion.³⁷⁹ This budget gap could grow further, depending on how much the Ukrainian government spends on military mobilizations.³⁸⁰

In the first quarter of 2024, a USAID analysis estimated that the Ukrainian government’s budget gap—the difference between annual government revenues and expenditures—was approximately \$5.3 billion. The gap is currently estimated at \$6 billion and may reach \$12 billion by the end of 2024, according to USAID.

USAID reported that in response to the gap in direct budget support funding, the Ukrainian government undertook emergency measures, including reducing salaries for government workers and reducing the size of the government workforce, which reduced the government’s ability to handle workloads.³⁸¹ Many planned government budget expenditures, including those that were intended for critical infrastructure restoration, were eliminated.³⁸²

Internal revenues for the State Budget General Fund for the first 5 months of 2024 increased to approximately \$18 billion, 44 percent higher than in the same period of 2023.³⁸³ Some local taxes were redirected to the central government, and the government rescheduled planned international borrowing.³⁸⁴ For example, the Ukrainian government took a loan from the World Bank, backed by Japan, a year earlier than initially planned.³⁸⁵ Fees were increased for essential services, including electricity fees increasing by 70 percent beginning June 1.³⁸⁶ Internal borrowing from the domestic market reached approximately \$5.2 billion in 2024.³⁸⁷ Since early June, demand for domestic government bonds at auction has exceeded supply by almost threefold.³⁸⁸

SUPPORT TO THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT

USAID has provided direct budget support to the Ukrainian government through three World Bank-managed trust funds, the Ukraine Second Economic Recovery Multi-donor Trust Fund, the Special Transfer to Ukraine Single Donor Trust Fund, and the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) multi-donor trust fund.³⁸⁹ (See Figure 5.)

USAID’s spend plan for the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2024 allocated \$7.85 billion from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) for Direct Budget support.³⁹⁰ According to USAID, the purpose of direct budget support is to provide the Ukrainian government with the financial stability necessary to maintain general government operations, not necessarily to support any specific program or expenditure.³⁹¹ The payments are made to the Ukrainian government on a reimbursement basis, following verification by the World Bank, based on approved expenditure categories.³⁹²


The PEACE Fund includes funding from the United States and 19 partner countries.³⁹³ The United States was the largest donor to the PEACE Fund, with USAID providing \$20.2 billion of the fund’s \$25.5 billion total.³⁹⁴ USAID made its last obligation to the PEACE Fund in September 2023 and these funds have been subsequently disbursed to the Ukrainian government and expended, according to USAID.³⁹⁵

The Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2024 directs that \$7.85 billion in Economic Support Fund provided by the act be made available for Ukraine.³⁹⁶ Subsequently, State and USAID identified these funds for budget support to the Ukrainian government to ensure that it can maintain operations as it continues to respond to Russia’s full-scale invasion.³⁹⁷

As of July 2024, the international community has provided \$66.7 billion in budget support—triple that provided by the United States—although some is delivered via mechanisms other than the World Bank trust funds.³⁹⁸ An expected \$24.9 billion of Ukraine’s estimated \$32.7 billion in official financing needs for 2024, excluding potential financing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and relief from debt operations, is anticipated to come from other G7+ partners.³⁹⁹ USAID said that the U.S. Government continues to press bilateral donors on

Figure 6.

Direct Budget Support to Ukraine Provided Through the World Bank Since February 2022



the need for fair burden sharing in meeting Ukraine's economic assistance needs and that approximately 75 percent of Ukraine's external financing needs in 2024 will come from sources other than the United States.⁴⁰⁰ USAID expects that U.S. assistance will not exceed 50 percent of the total amount provided by all donors.⁴⁰¹

OVERSIGHT

USAID continued to fund Deloitte to provide oversight of direct budget funding, utilizing technical support to the Ministry of Finance designed to strengthen controls and processes in their financial systems, in addition to spot checks down to the beneficiary level, and continuous monitoring and review.⁴⁰² Deloitte completed 351 spot checks in 2024 (through May 15) to review the existing monitoring, transparency, verification, and reporting systems, and it identified 23 discrepancies.⁴⁰³

In addition, KMPG began to audit direct budget support funds.⁴⁰⁴ USAID expects that this firm will complete its first audits of Ukraine's pension fund and its Ministry of Education and Science in November.⁴⁰⁵ The USAID-funded audit strengthening activity implemented by the GAO's Independent Center for Audit Excellence continues to work with the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine on audits of direct budget support.⁴⁰⁶ USAID OIG has an ongoing audit of USAID's direct budget support to the PEACE Fund to determine how USAID oversees its contributions to the fund and assess the extent to which USAID's contributions to the fund supported eligible IDPs.

In addition, the GAO has two ongoing audits of USAID’s direct budget support to the PEACE fund. The first review will describe the types and purposes of various oversight activities USAID is conducting and how much accountability the oversight provides. The second will evaluate how effective USAID’s oversight activities are in addressing any potential limitations, gaps in Ukrainian government processes, or data quality issues.

GOVERNANCE AND COUNTERING CORRUPTION

State and USAID operate several activities in Ukraine that seek to strengthen anti-corruption institutions, implement key criminal justice reforms, and increase transparency throughout the Ukrainian government. (See Table 15.) State INL provides technical assistance to the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG), High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC), and other Ukrainian institutions that investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate cases of high-level corruption.⁴⁰⁷

USAID works with the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption to improve policy frameworks to prevent corruption through legislative action; coordinates with State INL on support to the HACC and other counter-corruption and integrity functions within the judiciary; support watchdogs and investigative journalists; and strengthens digital services to reduce opportunities for corruption. USAID said that all of its activities in Ukraine include aspects to counter corruption.⁴⁰⁸

Table 15.

U.S. Goals Related to Counter-Corruption

Integrated Country Strategy
Ukraine implements sustainable reforms of its institutions, with a focus on anti-corruption laws, regulations, and enforcement; transparent financial and fiscal systems; and the justice sector.
Ukraine builds its capacity for regulatory oversight and holds accountable those responsible for committing malfeasance or misfeasance.
Country Development Cooperation Strategy
Increased health system transparency.
Economic impact of corruption reduced in likely sectors.
Strengthened anti-corruption systems and practices
<small>Source: State, “Integrated Country Strategy-Ukraine,” 8/29/2023; USAID Ukraine, “Ukraine Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2019-2024, Extended Through Jan 9, 2026,” 1/4/2024.</small>

ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION

During the quarter, State INL and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) signed an agreement to support and strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to fight foreign bribery in international business through enhanced legislation and enforcement structures.⁴⁰⁹ The goal of the project is to facilitate Ukraine’s accession to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and gaining full membership in the OECD’s Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions.⁴¹⁰ State INL noted that attaining membership status could facilitate reforms to align Ukraine’s anti-corruption legislation with that of the European Union and make Ukraine more attractive to foreign investment.⁴¹¹

As part of this effort, State INL said it helped develop legislation to amend Ukraine’s tax code to combat bribery of foreign officials engaging in international transactions.⁴¹² State INL

staff assisted legal experts, conducted trainings, and facilitated study tours to help meet the important benchmark.⁴¹³ State INL sponsored a delegation of Parliamentary Law Enforcement Committee members, the Justice Minister, and NABU representatives to participate in working group meetings. Meeting participants discussed progress developing the proposed legislative changes and described how the changes align with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.⁴¹⁴

State INL said that the Ukrainian parliament must fully approve the tax code changes, as well as make further changes to Ukraine’s legal framework to hold companies accountable for corruption-related offenses.⁴¹⁵ The OECD would evaluate Ukraine in 8 months on whether it has adopted all the required legislation to fully join the working group, which is a prerequisite for full OECD membership, State reported.⁴¹⁶

ANTI-CORRUPTION ADVISING AND TRAINING

During the quarter, State INL continued to support the development of NABU and SAPO’s counter-corruption capability through training and other technical support. (See Table 16.) In April, State INL donated three cryptocurrency analysis tools, including TRM, Blockchain, and Crystal.⁴¹⁷ State INL said these tools will help NABU develop modern forensic analysis capabilities for cryptocurrency, which is increasingly a part of high-level corruption. All 270 NABU detectives completed training in State INL-delivered cryptocurrency analysis from May 2023 to January 2024. NABU detectives have used these forensics capabilities to trace more than \$1.4 million in crypto assets linked to a former head of Ukraine’s State Service for Special Communications and Information, who is under investigation for embezzlement.⁴¹⁸

Table 16.

INL Sponsored Anti-Corruption Training During the Quarter

	Activity
<p>April</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Held the first of four offsite leadership seminars for NABU and SAPO managers. The seminar, attended by the heads to both agencies, addressed change management issues, focusing on creating efficient internal structures, increasing staff, and strengthening institutional independence. The remaining seminars will address efficient management, team building, and leadership. • Funded a 1-day workshop led by the DoJ Resident Legal Adviser on the use of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act-type laws, organized crime, and wiretapping for NABU and SAPO. • Attended an operative skills training for NABU detectives and met with NABU’s Regional Office in Lviv.
<p>May</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Held a 6-day psychological resilience training for 40 NABU and SAPO detectives, prosecutors, and civil servants. Instructors included members of the Israeli Trauma Coalition, and the course focused on strengthening mental wellness and resilience during war and mitigating risk of burnout from increased workloads and staff shortages. • Launched a pilot Leadership School for senior Ukrainian prosecutors. The 6-month program is led in partnership with INL, the OPG Training Center and the Center for Leadership at the Ukrainian Catholic University. • Supported a 10-day training to teach the fundamentals for NABU detectives conducting operative search activities and recruitment.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 6/21/2024.

During the quarter, State INL reported that it also supported programs that developed the capacity of anti-corruption and integrity agencies, including Moldova's Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office and National Anti-Corruption Center, while funding civil society to monitor these same agencies.

During the quarter, two grants under State INL management completed their respective periods of performance and programs.⁴¹⁹ One of the grants provided mentorship support to anti-corruption institutions and recommended possible reforms.⁴²⁰ The second grant trained NABU and SAPO on critical communications strategies, and helped them establish communications priorities, develop multimedia, and make approximately 40 appearances across national and local Ukrainian media.⁴²¹

ANTI-CORRUPTION SUPPORT IN MOLDOVA

State's anti-corruption efforts also used a regional approach, with activities beyond Ukraine in the neighboring country of Moldova. During the quarter, State INL reported that it also supported programs that developed the capacity of anti-corruption and integrity agencies, including Moldova's Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office and National Anti-Corruption Center, while funding civil society to monitor these same agencies. The programs covered a number of topics, including:⁴²²

Asset forfeiture: Officials from several Moldovan anti-corruption agencies participated in a week-long U.S. Marshals Service-led workshop designed to improve efficiency, coordination, and collaboration on asset forfeiture in line with international best practices, particularly on seized asset management.⁴²³

Digital forensics: State INL funded an FBI-led effort to coordinate digital forensic expertise, advise Moldovan law enforcement leadership on investigative strategy and multilateral operations coordination, and help obtain international corporate records to establish probable cause for warrants in support of ongoing investigations.⁴²⁴ State INL noted that with assistance from France and the FBI, the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office executed search warrants across Moldova to disrupt a transnational, multi-million-dollar bribery scheme involving evasion of INTERPOL Red Notices.⁴²⁵

Regulations and Operations: State INL supported efforts by embedded experts from the International Development Law Organization to support the Moldovan Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee, including by advising on anti-corruption legislation and regulatory advocacy and supporting ongoing operations and activities.⁴²⁶ State INL funds the International Development Law Organization logistical and administrative support to the Moldovan Prosecutor Vetting Commission, which is responsible for assessing approximately 400 prosecutors for potential financial anomalies or other corruption-related activity.⁴²⁷ State INL funds a contract to support the Prosecutor Vetting Commission Secretariat, as well as an anti-corruption and judicial reform expert, to assist with the Commission's pre-vetting and vetting activities.⁴²⁸

ECONOMIC GROWTH

Ukraine's economy continues to face many challenges as it endures a third year of conflict. Following the full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine's GDP fell by almost 30 percent.⁴²⁹ Ukraine lost key export markets in Russia and Belarus.⁴³⁰

In particular, Ukraine's workforce faces several constraints due to the war, State noted. Conscription has decreased the number of able-bodied men available to work in Ukraine's public and private sectors. Many veterans returning from service have physical injuries and mental health challenges that prevent their reintegration into the Ukrainian workforce, according to State.⁴³¹ The surge in refugees fleeing the country has also decreased the total available workforce in Ukraine, while the surge in IDPs has led to geographic shifts in the workforce. Russia's attacks on civilian populations, as well as its forced repatriation of Ukrainians in occupied territories, further reduces the available workforce, State reported.⁴³²

In addition, State noted that Russia's occupation of territory in eastern Ukraine and Crimea prevents Ukraine from leveraging the economic benefit of those regions, particularly the major Black Sea ports Mariupol and Sevastopol.⁴³³ Finally, Russia's war has damaged and destroyed factories, inventory, and other capital stock, creating a business risk profile that makes it challenging to attract foreign direct investment, according to State.⁴³⁴

Ukraine's Minister of Agriculture, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Restoration, and the head of the Agency of Restoration, whose organizations are important counterparts to some USAID activities, were either removed or resigned during the quarter.⁴³⁵ Although this cabinet turnover had no significant immediate impact on USAID's economic growth programming, USAID reported that focused attention is warranted to monitor how the situation evolves.⁴³⁶

SUPPORT FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES

USAID programming supports the private sector in Ukraine with the objective to increase exports and jobs and expand government revenue that will eventually reduce Ukraine's dependence on direct budget support.⁴³⁷ USAID's economic programming is organized around five complementary lines of effort: increase private sector investment and strengthen export-oriented value chains; create new jobs and reskill the Ukrainian workforce for economic recovery; promote a more competitive and transparent business-enabling environment that fosters innovation, and expand access to financing and de-risking tools (e.g. by providing interest rate buydowns on loans for small and medium enterprises).⁴³⁸

Table 17.

U.S. Goals Related to Economic Growth

Integrated Country Strategy

Ukraine rebuilds a transparent and competitive post-war economy through corporate governance, legislation to achieve de-oligarchization, especially in the energy and metals sectors, attract foreign investment, and generate sustainable government revenue.

Ukraine implements international best practices and continues decentralization while rebuilding social, physical, and critical infrastructure.

Country Development Cooperation Strategy

Strengthened subject matter expert competitiveness.

Increased productivity of agricultural SMEs through market systems.

Inclusive, innovative finance expanded.

Source: State, "Integrated Country Strategy-Ukraine," 8/29/2023; USAID Ukraine, "Ukraine Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2019-2024, Extended Through Jan 9, 2026," 1/4/2024.

Since February 2024, USAID has provided support to approximately 26,600 small and medium enterprises in Ukraine.

In particular, USAID supports Ukrainian small and medium enterprises that can generate revenue for the Ukrainian government and create additional employment.⁴³⁹ Ukraine defines a small or medium-sized enterprise as a business entity whose annual revenue does not exceed €50 million (approximately \$54 million) and whose number of employees does not exceed 250.⁴⁴⁰ Using this definition, USAID provides support to small and medium enterprises in a broad range of industries, including agriculture, furniture, wood processing, information technology, light manufacturing, and apparel.⁴⁴¹

Legal provisions in annual appropriations and USAID's internal policies prohibit activities that represent a high risk of incentivizing any enterprise that would move American jobs overseas, otherwise compete with American jobs, or cause substantial injury to American producers of export commodities.⁴⁴² USAID reported that it conducts analyses of its activities during the program design to ensure that they comply with these standards.⁴⁴³

Since February 2022, USAID has provided support to approximately 26,600 small and medium enterprises in Ukraine.⁴⁴⁴ This support included direct grant support, grants to financial institutions to increase lending to small and medium enterprises, technical and legal assistance, and support of trade missions, industry fairs, and global representation.⁴⁴⁵ In addition, some small and medium enterprises received in-kind assistance.⁴⁴⁶ Businesses that receive USAID support often target both internal markets and the domestic economy, as well as export markets, but the extent of this varies based on the sector and industry.⁴⁴⁷

Regardless of the destination of sale, all USAID activities in Ukraine's private sector directly contribute to domestic production.⁴⁴⁸ Even within the agriculture sector, which is traditionally export-oriented, USAID supports businesses to contribute to global food security through exports, but also diversify production to meet local demand for value-added products.⁴⁴⁹

USAID has provided support to small and medium enterprises primarily through four programs. (See Table 19.) In addition, USAID has the ability to transfer funds to the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to help pay the cost of guarantees and other DFC products to support small and medium enterprises.⁴⁵⁰ USAID has supported DFC guarantees with three Ukrainian banks (Bank Lviv, Raiffeisen Bank Ukraine, and ProCredit Bank), which have received 5 guarantees totaling \$107 million.⁴⁵¹ The Credit for Agriculture Producers activity (\$11.9 million award), via its liquidity fund, also issued 1,051 agribusiness loans via 19 credit unions for a total of approximately \$2.72 million.⁴⁵²

USAID reported that its activities select small and medium enterprises through a competitive process:

Announcement: Prospective recipients publicly release a Request for Applications, Annual Program Statement, or Request for Proposals, which are widely disseminated through various public sources and social media.⁴⁵³

Review of applications: A USAID-funded implementer leads a technical evaluation committee or merit review committee which reviews and evaluates each application against the selection criteria that were included in the solicitation.⁴⁵⁴ Applicants recommended by the committee for subaward/subcontract then go through a risk assessment process.⁴⁵⁵ Although the specific criteria for subawards/subcontracts may differ among programs,

Table 18.

USAID Support to Small and Medium Enterprises

Program	Activity Highlights
Agriculture Growing Rural Opportunities \$205 million award	Provided 83 grants to agricultural small and medium enterprises ranging in value from \$24,327 to \$1,115,207, with an average size of \$301,335.
Economic Resilience Activity \$325 million award	Established in FY 2023 by Worldwide Foundation for Credit Unions, serves as an additional source of liquidity for credit unions to undertake rural financing for small and medium enterprises, and has issued 120 loans for a total of approximately \$570,000.
Investment for Business Resilience \$93.3 million award	Completed 2 grant programs for financial institutions providing access to finance for small and medium enterprises and issued 4 grants totaling \$4.3 million, for an average of \$1.075 million per financial institution. The 4 grants supported 696 small and medium enterprises, including 566 agricultural enterprises, and helped unlock \$48.6 million in financing.
Competitive Economy Program \$170 million award	<p>Provided \$16.7 million in grants or cash assistance to small and medium enterprises, including 349 grants ranging in value from \$3,428 to \$934,822, with an average size of \$66,705, and supported over 4,000 beneficiaries. After an award modification in October 2023, the Competitive Economy Program began to track data on firm size. Since then, it has supported 1,854 small and medium enterprises.</p> <p>All grants are provided on a cost-sharing basis in which the small and medium enterprise must contribute, typically at least 50 percent, toward the equipment or services procured. In some instances, grants are accompanied by technical assistance and training to assure the equipment or services received through the grant are utilized to maximum affect, according to USAID.</p>

Source: USAID Ukraine, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/21/2024.

the above core processes are the same across all of USAID Ukraine's Office of Economic Growth activities.⁴⁵⁶ Selection criteria or merit review criteria vary depending on the goals of each USAID program to which a subaward activity will contribute.⁴⁵⁷ Core criteria include technical approach, expected impact, results sustainability, cost efficiency, and gender equality and social inclusion considerations.⁴⁵⁸ For example, selection criteria for one program may be specific to the agricultural sector, while other programs may be sector-agnostic.⁴⁵⁹

Risk management approach: USAID examines several factors: technical capacity – the basic capacity of the applicant or offeror to complete a sub-award or contract activity; safety and security – the location and nature of activities that have potential impacts on the safety and security of personnel (project and applicant/offeror) and/or equipment; reputational – external factors that affect applicants or offerors which may harm the reputation of USAID (i.e. criminal or commercial court cases, ownership issues, and debts); compliance – potential for loss through insufficient price analysis, fraud, waste, disallowance, or other sanctions; and management capacity – the capacity of an applicant organization or offeror to deliver program activities and/or deliverables.⁴⁶⁰

Pre-award risk assessment: Implementers screen apparently successful applicants/offerors and individuals through visual compliance software that includes the following denied parties lists: OFAC, System for Award Management, the Department of State Designated Foreign

Food supply shocks that stem from Ukraine have an outsized impact on the rest of the world: some 400 million people rely on Ukraine for their food supply, State said, citing data from the UN World Food Programme.

Terrorist Organizations List, and the UN Consolidated List.⁴⁶¹ They also screen applicants through the open source database YouControl, which flags foreign ownership – specifically when a company is a member of a joint holding with a counterparty that operates under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, as well as citizenship of a company’s ultimate beneficial owner and company directors.⁴⁶² YouControl also identifies criminal and commercial court cases and checks sanctions lists managed by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, European Union (Sanctions List of EU), United Nations (UN Security Council Sanctions) and national sanctions lists of Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.⁴⁶³ USAID reported that implementers have not found that any small or medium enterprises screened through these processes have connections with Russian oligarchs, firms associated with the Russian military, or ties to individuals accused or linked to allegations of corruption.⁴⁶⁴

DECARBONIZATION

State ISN has obligated approximately \$36.4 million in Ukraine supplemental assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) funds, as well as Economic Support Funds (ESF), to help Ukraine convert to less carbon-intensive clean technologies, including approximately \$9 million in obligations made during the quarter.⁴⁶⁵ Of these new funds, \$5 million were obligated to Project Phoenix, a program to aid the transition from coal-fired power to nuclear power across Europe and Eurasia, State said.⁴⁶⁶ Project Phoenix also plans to safeguard local jobs through workforce retraining.⁴⁶⁷ State ISN during the quarter awarded the third of three grants authorizing Project Phoenix, State said.⁴⁶⁸ State also obligated approximately \$3.8 million for the Clean Steel initiative, which seeks to decarbonize Ukraine’s steel making industry.⁴⁶⁹

State said its Bureau of Energy Resources continued programs to build Ukrainian capacity in sustainable mining operations.⁴⁷⁰ The bureau and Ukrainian stakeholder agencies have not yet identified the location where the funds would be applied, State reported.⁴⁷¹ The project’s completion is expected by September 2027, though State noted challenges to energy sector assistance, specifically the potential for delay on the part of the Ukrainian government administration of critical mineral sector assistance.⁴⁷² State said the bureau also continued to assist Ukraine with the installation of HESCO security barriers at Ukrainian energy infrastructure sites, as well as assistance in Ukraine’s natural gas sector.⁴⁷³

GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY

State during the quarter sustained its response to food security shocks resulting from Russia’s war in Ukraine, notably the disruptions to international trade of grain and other Ukrainian food export commodities, State said.⁴⁷⁴ Food supply shocks that stem from Ukraine have an outsized impact on the rest of the world: some 400 million people rely on Ukraine for their food supply, State said, citing data from the UN World Food Programme.⁴⁷⁵

State has obligated \$145 million in ESF and expended approximately \$59 million, according to State.⁴⁷⁶ ESF is managed primarily by State’s Bureaus of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) and International Organization Affairs.⁴⁷⁷

State said that OES did not obligate any additional Ukraine supplemental funds for global food security during the quarter.⁴⁷⁸ OES expended \$29.2 million during the same period, according

A Ukrainian agricultural firm uses grain train cars provided by USAID to continue moving their products to market. (USAID photo)



to State.⁴⁷⁹ In prior quarters, OES obligated approximately \$104 million for food security programs.⁴⁸⁰

The spend plan for USAID for the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2024 includes \$1.45 billion in Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) for USAID Ukraine and \$50 million for Global Food Security, which will be targeted to address the food security impacts of the Ukraine conflict, likely in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America regions, with specific countries to be determined.⁴⁸¹

State said that the programming benefits countries impacted by food security shocks resulting from Russia's invasion of Ukraine.⁴⁸² State cited three achievements during the quarter. The Africa Disaster Risk Finance program improved advanced real-time forecasting in Mozambique and Comoros that allow the nations to track and forecast tropical cyclones, thereby facilitating underwriting for cyclone insurance policies, State said.⁴⁸³ The Global Fertilizer Challenge, which the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) implements for OES, launched a new project in Brazil, Colombia, Pakistan, and Vietnam to help these countries with high fertilizer usage and loss, improve crop system efficiency through the adoption of efficient nutrient management practices and alternative fertilizers to support increased food chain efficiency.⁴⁸⁴ State also said that the USDA has partnered with the Foundation for Food and Agriculture Research to establish an Efficient Fertilizer Consortium to enable the adoption of efficient nutrient management and alternative fertilizers and agricultural activities.⁴⁸⁵

During the quarter, State's Bureau of International Organization Affairs obligated \$10 million in ESF, State said, bringing its total obligations for food security programs using Ukraine supplemental assistance funds to approximately \$30 million.⁴⁸⁶ State said that the new obligations would provide a voluntary contribution to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, to support developing countries adversely impacted by trade disruptions and volatile food commodity prices due to Russia's war in Ukraine.⁴⁸⁷ Specifically, State reported that the funds will go toward optimizing efficiency in the use of fertilizers in Africa to help improve soil health and boost agricultural yields.⁴⁸⁸ The funding supported similar food security measures in other risk-prone agricultural areas, spanning sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South America, and parts of south and southeast Asia, State said.⁴⁸⁹

Security Concerns Limit Direct Monitoring of Programs

Due to security restrictions imposed by the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, which address the heightened risk for Mission staff to travel, in-person site visits are difficult to plan and execute, according to USAID.⁴⁹⁰ USAID staff based in Kyiv conducted 19 site visits across 4 regions during the quarter, an increase from the previous quarter, although security restrictions prevented staff from conducting more visits.⁴⁹¹ The Embassy security policy was adjusted during the quarter and the embassy hired additional drivers and security staff.⁴⁹² (See page 13.) USAID said that it anticipates that these changes will result in more site visits next quarter.⁴⁹³

According to USAID Ukraine, the total number of visits performed by its third-party monitoring contractor was limited by the cost ceiling of a sole-source subcontract for field monitors that was put in place to initiate third-party monitoring as quickly as possible.⁴⁹⁴ A full and open solicitation for additional subcontractors, without a firm cost ceiling, is being finalized by the contractor to support expanding to cover additional activities.⁴⁹⁵ Deteriorating security conditions also posed a risk to future site visits for third-party monitoring, as USAID said that they cannot require subcontractors to violate internal safety protocols and perform visits they deem unsafe.⁴⁹⁶

USAID reported that five additional activities were in the process of implementing third-party monitoring through the development of data collection tools, agreements with implementing partners, and visit itineraries: Decentralization Offering Better Results and Efficiency, Democratic Governance East, USAID Governance and Local Accountability Activity, Energy Security Project, and the Competitive Economy Program.⁴⁹⁷ The Mission plans to expand third-party monitoring to further activities.⁴⁹⁸ In addition to the planned expansion to these five activities, USAID Ukraine's third-party monitoring contractor is in the process of procuring four subcontractors to support third-party monitoring of USAID Ukraine's activities in Ukraine, including the Office of Transition Initiatives.⁴⁹⁹

Although USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) staff, such as its Disaster Assistance Response Team, conduct site visits, they are generally limited to the Lviv region and Kyiv city and the immediate surrounding area.⁵⁰⁰ The Disaster Assistance Response Team in Kyiv conducted in-person site visits with partners during the quarter and is currently planning future visits.⁵⁰¹ Due to embassy restrictions, USAID BHA staff used third-party monitors because they could not travel to many of the conflict areas.⁵⁰² USAID BHA uses a contractor to provide support services, including third-party monitoring in Ukraine.⁵⁰³ USAID BHA relies heavily on third-party monitoring reports, in conjunction with regular written and verbal program updates from partners, to monitor programs.⁵⁰⁴ These third-party monitors faced access challenges due to changing security conditions and demands from audits and visits by other donors.⁵⁰⁵ Despite these challenges, all monitoring visits were rescheduled or adjusted to ensure implementer and third-party monitor staff safety and the integrity of the site visits.⁵⁰⁶

State said that PRM monitored implementing partners' performance inside Ukraine and the region through multiple avenues, including programmatic desk monitoring and financial desk monitoring, as well as site visits to implementing partners, sub-grantees, and others, and directly observe protection-related activities.⁵⁰⁷

(continued on next page)

Security Concerns Limit Third-Party Monitoring

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Within Ukraine, State PRM conducted such visits in Chernivtsi, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Vinnytsia, and Volyn regions, as well as in Kyiv, to observe UNHCR programs for IDPs.⁵⁰⁸ State PRM also conducted site visits within the region, including in Bulgaria, where it visited a United Nations Children’s Fund Safe Space in Harmanli, visited an accommodation center, held a roundtable discussion with refugees at a UNHCR community center in Plovdiv, and observed conditions for asylum seekers at the Pastrogor Transit Center.⁵⁰⁹

In Moldova, State PRM visited the Comrat Community Center and a UNHCR-sponsored mentoring program. State PRM also participated in UNHCR’s annual Ukraine response coordination meeting to ensure incorporation of PRM priorities and attended a UNHCR Donors Coordination meeting in May, which focused on the current and ongoing efforts to address the Ukraine humanitarian crisis. This is in addition to monthly donor coordination meetings which State PRM attends alongside USAID/BHA to ensure coordination of the humanitarian response.⁵¹⁰

The activities in Ukraine represent a marked increase in PRM’s in-person monitoring in the country, as the security situation has allowed.⁵¹¹ However, it remains unclear whether these monitoring activities reflect a clear monitoring strategy. A State OIG report released during the quarter found that the terms and conditions for selected voluntary contributions to public international organizations lacked measurable objectives and corresponding performance indicators.⁵¹² State PRM had completed a monitoring plan for voluntary contributions, but the plan failed to detail specific monitoring activities to be performed, and activities were not tied to PRM’s risk assessments for the awards, as required by State guidance.⁵¹³ In addition, State OIG reported that although State PRM conducted monitoring activities, it did not track progress against measurable objectives and performance indicators for the awards.⁵¹⁴ Absent specific, measurable objectives or corresponding performance indicators, State OIG said, State PRM was not positioned to track progress toward intended program results.⁵¹⁵

HEALTH

POLICY DEVELOPMENT

In early April, the National Health Strategy 2030 and its 2024-2026 Action Plan were presented for public discussion on the Ministry of Health website.⁵¹⁶ Various ministries, regional administrations, and health authorities could provide feedback until late April.⁵¹⁷ After incorporating comments from health donors and partners in 2023, the Strategy was revised and condensed to 30 pages.⁵¹⁸ The Action Plan was made available to partners and national stakeholders for the first time.⁵¹⁹

The Parliament Committee on National Health, Medical Care, and Medical Insurance is currently collaborating with the relevant executive agencies to draft laws that address key areas outlined in the Government Action Plan.⁵²⁰ These include enhancing mental health legislation, regulating rehabilitation services, and aligning with EU standards, such as regulating dietary supplements and establishing a unified system for biological safety and protection.⁵²¹

On November 22, 2023, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved a significant healthcare policy enhancing the role of Healthcare Facilities Supervisory Boards in decision-making and oversight.⁵²² This policy was developed with legal assistance from the USAID-funded Health

Within the network of medical facilities, 80 percent are equipped with backup boilers, while 20 percent still require this infrastructure.

Reform Support Activity.⁵²³ On March 26, the Health Reform Support Activity, in collaboration with the NGO Patients of Ukraine, conducted the inaugural online training session for 129 members of newly formed Healthcare Facility Supervisory Board Selection Committees across 21 regions.⁵²⁴ These committees, which are mandated by Ukrainian law, include representatives from patient rights groups, anti-corruption organizations, hospital owners, and local health authorities, tasked with recruiting and appointing independent board members.⁵²⁵ Moving forward, Health Reform Support Activity will continue to support healthcare facilities by providing training, tools, and capacity-building opportunities to enhance governance, accountability, and transparency within specialized healthcare facilities nationwide.⁵²⁶

HEALTH CARE

USAID continued to support the provision of healthcare services in Ukraine through activities that focused on disease mitigation, combatting vaccine misinformation, mental health, and other areas. (See Table 19.)

Health infrastructure: USAID reported that it remained committed to supporting the Ministry of Health’s Recovery Project Office in assessing and prioritizing needs for repairing and restoring services in communities affected by various challenges.⁵²⁷ In June, the ministry presented preparations for the healthcare system ahead of the winter season and potential blackouts.⁵²⁸ The presentation emphasized the goal for each medical facility to achieve autonomy in three critical areas: heating, electricity, and water supply.⁵²⁹ Within the network of medical facilities, 80 percent are equipped with backup boilers, while 20 percent still require this infrastructure.⁵³⁰ Additionally, out of 770 healthcare facilities in the network, 628 currently have generators, and an additional 136 facilities require generators, including 6 located in frontline areas.⁵³¹

Disease mitigation: Ukraine’s HIV epidemic continued to evolve, influenced by migration and the emergence of new risk groups such as military personnel and veterans.⁵³² As an implementing agency of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program, USAID Ukraine has responded by conducting 345,266 HIV tests, identifying 10,414 new HIV-positive individuals since January 2022.⁵³³ Each person diagnosed is offered access to treatment services.⁵³⁴ Additionally, PEPFAR, through USAID, has expanded its outreach through self-testing initiatives, distributing self-test kits to 185,389 individuals, especially targeting those who may not have access to traditional service delivery methods during wartime.⁵³⁵

Mental health: USAID funded additional mental health and psychosocial support spaces, known as “Taking Care of Myself” sites, with six becoming operational during the quarter. During Mental Health Awareness Month in May, USAID organized 86 events across 31 communities in 8 focus regions, engaging more than 2,600 participants.⁵³⁶ Forty counselors completed the 1-year Common Elements Treatment Approach training at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, receiving certification in June with USAID support.⁵³⁷ The Lisova Polyana Resource Training Center commenced trainings for service providers aiding survivors of captivity and torture.⁵³⁸ Additionally, 10 local sub-grants were launched to enhance access to community-based mental health services.⁵³⁹ During the quarter, USAID facilitated the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Education and the Mental Health Coordination Center to integrate a wellbeing program into the school curriculum for children aged 6 to 12 years.⁵⁴⁰

Table 19.

USAID Programs to Support the Ukrainian Health Sector

Program	Activity Highlights
<p>Rehabilitation for Ukraine (Rehab4U)</p> <p>\$40 million cooperative agreement (new award)</p>	<p>Seeks to establish sustainable, quality physical rehabilitation services within the Ukrainian health system at all levels of care by addressing both urgent short-term needs and long-term systemic requirements.</p> <p>Will provide enhanced physical rehabilitation services to enable Ukrainians to improve their quality of life and actively participate in the country's economic recovery and growth.</p> <p>The target groups include war victims, persons with disabilities, veterans, the rehabilitation workforce, training institutions, and the Ukrainian government.</p>
<p>Accelerating Ukraine's Efforts to End HIV (Healthlink)</p> <p>\$37 million</p>	<p>Concluded during the quarter after operating for nearly 7 years in 16 regions across Ukraine. As the flagship PEPFAR-funded initiative in Ukraine, this USAID program increased HIV awareness and expanded prevention, testing, and treatment services, protecting millions of lives.</p>
<p>Re-envisioning Excellence and Accessibility in Clinic-based HIV Services (REACH 95) activity</p> <p>\$19 million</p>	<p>A new 5-year HIV case finding activity that started full scale service provision during the quarter. The primary goal of the activity is to accelerate Ukraine's efforts to achieve HIV epidemic control by 2030 by improving equitable access to high-quality HIV service delivery at public health care facilities through optimized case finding, linkage to prevention and care, and support for decentralized treatment services.</p>
<p>Bringing Innovations to Treat TB in Ukraine (BIT-TB)</p> <p>\$2.5 million</p>	<p>Overall goal of 4-year USAID BIT-TB program is to improve treatment success rates, reduce mortality, and improve the TB treatment experience for XDR-TB and FQ-resistant TB patients by introducing a new treatment regimen within operational research settings and its scale up as established national clinical practice in parallel with continuation of supporting people enrolled in operational research in Ukraine. Operating in four regions of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Public Health System Recovery and Resilience</p>	<p>Developed recommendations to address legislative gaps in mobile immunization and school vaccination compliance.</p> <p>Provided recommendations for managing cervical, breast, and colorectal cancer patients at the primary healthcare level, which were submitted to the Ministry of Health and are anticipated to be adopted in during the quarter.</p> <p>Translated and adapted a comprehensive guide from the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on responding to biological incidents. This guide will be included in a national plan for biological threat preparedness and response.</p>
<p>Health Reform Support</p>	<p>Assists the Ministry of Health's Recovery Project Office, funding 9 consultant positions out of 12 total. Since January 2024, efforts have been coordinated to restore 2,795 healthcare facilities and initiate 2,162 restoration and renovation projects.</p> <p>Provided grants to enhance access to health services by supplying essential medical and office equipment. Through its Open Grants Application Program, HRS has supported minor repairs, such as window and door installations and provided office and IT equipment at 11 facilities.</p> <p>Facilitated the restoration of healthcare services at primary healthcare centers in four heavily affected regions—Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhya, and Kyiv oblasts—through the Reconnecting People to Care grants program. This initiative aims to restore and expand services at 93 facilities by the end of FY24.</p>

Program	Activity Highlights
Support Tuberculosis (TB) Control Efforts in Ukraine Activity	<p>Supported TB treatment initiatives to ensure universal access to treatment, timely enrollment of TB patients in suitable regimens, expanded use of shorter treatment regimens, improved treatment adherence, and better management of side-effects and comorbidities. Special attention is being given to pediatric TB care and the needs of internally displaced persons.</p> <p>Supported the National TB Program in scaling up TB contact investigation, preventive treatment, and infection prevention and control measures to strengthen TB prevention efforts.</p> <p>Due to ongoing attacks and resultant destruction by the Russian military, logistical challenges and program monitoring remain limited, particularly in remote project sites.</p>
Fighting Misinformation about Vaccines Activity (ended June 2024)	<p>Facilitated more than 405,000 consultations since 2022 for children and parents on vaccines via the National Hotline on Vaccination and Infant Feeding, “Jointly to Health,” established in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and the Ukrainian Catholic University. The activity conducted online educational vaccine events on UNICEF Ukraine’s social media reaching over 25,000 individuals.</p>

Source: USAID Ukraine, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/25/2024.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The U.S. Government, primarily through USAID, supports the provision of assistance for civilians affected by the conflict in Ukraine. USAID organizes its activities according to the UN Humanitarian Response Plan for Ukraine.⁵⁴¹ (See Table 20.)

USAID reported that with passage of the fifth supplemental funding bill in April, the agency will be able to provide more than double the previously planned humanitarian assistance funding to Ukraine than was previously planned for FY 2024.⁵⁴² However, this still represents a 50 percent reduction in funding compared to FY 2022 and FY 2023.⁵⁴³

USAID assessed that the Ukrainian government cannot respond to the unmet needs of IDPs and must rely on humanitarian NGOs and public international organizations, such as UN agencies.⁵⁴⁴ While the Ukrainian government plays a crucial role in social protection, including providing assistance to some IDPs, it lacks the capacity to promptly address urgent humanitarian crises and needs.⁵⁴⁵

Table 20.

UN Goals Related to Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian Response Plan
Provide principles and timely multisectoral lifesaving assistance to internally displaced people, non-displaced war affected people and returnees, ensuring their safety and dignity.
Enable access to basic services for internally displaced people, non-displaced war-affected people and returnees.

Source: UN OCHA, “Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan Ukraine,” 1/3/2024.

CHALLENGES

USAID Ukraine reported an incident where Ukrainian military authorities seized excavator equipment in the Chernivtsi region that had been previously transferred from USAID’s Decentralization Offering Better Results and Efficiency activity to a local community beneficiary.⁵⁴⁶ The excavator was confiscated in accordance with martial law, according to the Ukrainian government, and would be returned 30 days after the government demobilizes. USAID reported that although the seized equipment was no longer USAID property and thus, the seizure broke no Ukrainian or U.S. laws, the Mission Director met with the Ukrainian

UKRAINE: U.S. ASSISTANCE SNAPSHOT

April 1, 2024–June 30, 2024

The United Nations reported that the humanitarian situation in Ukraine deteriorated during the quarter. Continued Russian attacks killed or injured civilians and damaged homes, hospitals and schools. The Russian offensive in Kharkiv has displaced more than 18,000 people.

SECURITY: Continued Russian attacks, particularly in Kharkiv city and the Donetska region have resulted in a contraction of humanitarian access in those areas.

DISPLACEMENT: While some new displacement has occurred from areas near the front line, other IDPs have returned to their areas of habitual residence or moved abroad. As a result, the overall displacement situation across the country has remained relatively stable.

BORDER BLOCKADE: Polish truckers lifted the blockade of the border that had been in place since November 2023. The blockade had raised transit costs and lengthened delivery times for humanitarian organizations.

ENERGY: Russian attacks on energy infrastructure in 2024 has significantly reduced electricity production, raising concerns among relief actors of increased humanitarian needs during the upcoming winter season.



14.6 million

Ukrainians in Need of Humanitarian Assistance

3.5 million

IDPs in Ukraine

6 million

Ukrainian Refugees Globally

\$3.1 billion

Estimated Funding Required, According to the UN

\$3.2 billion

U.S. Government Humanitarian Assistance Since February 2022

Total U.S. Government Humanitarian Funding for the Ukraine Response in FY 2024

USAID BHA	\$242,479,738
State PRM	\$136,810,000
TOTAL	\$379,289,738

\$379 million

Additional U.S. Humanitarian Funding for Ukraine and the Region Announced During the Quarter

\$3.8 billion

Total value of USAID's 51 active awards during the quarter

Sources: USAID Ukraine, response to USAID OIG request for information, 7/9/2024; USAID, "Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #8," 6/18/2024; Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan: Ukraine," 12/31/2023.

A wave of Russian aerial attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in 2024 has significantly reduced electricity production, raising concerns among relief actors of increased humanitarian needs during the 2024-2025 winter season.

government Deputy State Secretary to raise concerns about the matter and reminded the Ukrainian government of USAID's statutory limitations on not providing any military assistance and asked that future granted materials follow both the letter and spirit of applicable statutes.⁵⁴⁷ This is the first instance, as far as USAID OIG was aware, where a Ukraine military entity has seized USAID funded items or material for military purposes.

Any USAID program with Ukrainian staff subject to mobilization, which includes males of conscription age, is potentially more impacted by the conscription law.⁵⁴⁸ USAID reported that its implementers are monitoring the rollout of the recent conscription law and have adjusted to mitigate challenges anticipated from the conscription of staff for military duty. USAID-funded implementers are responsible for interpreting local law for their staff and mitigating staffing risks, according to USAID.⁵⁴⁹ Implementers have reported issues due to the conscription of staff and have addressed these issues on an award-by-award basis.⁵⁵⁰

Additionally, electricity blackouts have impacted USAID programs, given the reliance of these programs on the grid for daily work, according to USAID.⁵⁵¹ To mitigate these impacts, USAID implementers have pivoted where operationally possible and within the terms of their awards, taking actions such as making use of virtual and remote staffing operations.⁵⁵² USAID operations at Embassy Kyiv have been largely unaffected, due to robust backup generation and IT redundancies.⁵⁵³

SUPPORT TO UKRAINIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

As of June 13, USAID has allocated nearly \$11.3 million in direct funding to three Ukrainian NGOs since February 2022, recognizing their role in addressing the crisis and enhancing local response capabilities.⁵⁵⁴ These NGOs deliver food, medical supplies, basic health services, hygiene items, and other essential relief commodities in conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas.⁵⁵⁵ The GAO has an ongoing audit reviewing State's and USAID's processes for selecting these implementing partners. This GAO audit is also undertaking a survey of the State and USAID implementing partners to learn about any challenges they had finding sub-partners to help deliver needed assistance.

Furthermore, USAID has contributed approximately \$83 million to two funds supporting localization efforts since February 2022.⁵⁵⁶

UN Ukraine Humanitarian Fund: This fund provides UN agencies and local NGOs with rapid funding to support food, shelter, and other basic needs.⁵⁵⁷ USAID has allocated \$67 million to the fund, distributed as follows: \$20 million in FY 2022, \$25 million in FY 2023, and an additional \$22 million committed during the quarter.⁵⁵⁸

UN Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund: This fund supports women-led national NGOs, Ukrainian national NGOs, community-based organizations, and volunteer groups.⁵⁵⁹ USAID has provided \$10 million to this fund, with \$5 million in both FY 2022 and FY 2023.⁵⁶⁰

WINTER RESPONSE

A wave of Russian aerial attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in 2024 has significantly reduced electricity production, raising concerns among relief actors of increased humanitarian needs during the 2024-2025 winter season.⁵⁶¹

In FY 2023, USAID provided \$184 million in funding to support nine international NGOs and three UN agencies' activities in Ukraine.⁵⁶² This funding is aimed at delivering multipurpose cash assistance; protection; shelter, and water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance to vulnerable populations during the 2023-2024 winter season.⁵⁶³ Additionally, USAID is facilitating the delivery of generators to health and water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities, along with essential winter relief commodities such as blankets, fuel, and mattresses.⁵⁶⁴

DISPLACED PERSONS

There are two general types of displaced persons: refugees, which includes people who have been forced to flee their homes and have departed their countries of origin, and internally displaced persons (IDP), which includes people forced to flee their homes but who have not departed their countries of origins.⁵⁶⁵ State's Bureau of Population, Migration, and Refugees (PRM) leads and is the primary implementer for the U.S. Government's refugee assistance for IDPs. State PRM also provides additional support for IDPs.⁵⁶⁶

As of June 30, State PRM had obligated approximately \$3.4 billion and expended approximately \$3.1 billion in Migration and Refugee Assistance that it received in the Ukraine supplemental appropriations.⁵⁶⁷ Of the \$3.4 billion, State PRM obligated more than \$862 million and expended approximately \$836 million to support the Ukraine response, both within Ukraine and across the region.⁵⁶⁸ The remainder of the funds were applied to crises other than the Ukraine response, as authorized by three of five Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts.⁵⁶⁹ Since February 2022, USAID BHA has provided more than \$2.2 billion to support populations in Ukraine and those displaced to neighboring countries.⁵⁷⁰

State PRM funds public international organizations for activities outlined in their appeals.⁵⁷¹ Because public international organizations have specialized mandates, this funding is not earmarked for specific sectors or activities to provide partners with flexibility to meet the most urgent needs for refugees, IDPs, and other vulnerable persons.⁵⁷² Moreover, according to State, PRM contributions are based on the organizations' respective specialized sectors within the Ukraine Regional Refugee Response Plan. State said PRM tracks progress using metrics such as the number of people reached by partners, as well as other, sector-specific measures to track protection, health, and livelihoods.⁵⁷³

Although data on assistance provided during the quarter was not yet available, State provided updated data for the previous quarter.⁵⁷⁴ State said that Ukraine Regional Refugee Response Plan partners across the Ukraine refugee response had provided basic needs assistance to 140,000 individuals; protection services to 139,000 individuals and child protection services to 71,000 children; individual counseling to 63,000 people; mental health and psychosocial support consultations to 48,000 people; and specialized gender-based violence programs to 40,000 individuals.⁵⁷⁵

As of June 30, State PRM had obligated approximately \$3.4 billion and expended approximately \$3.1 billion in Migration and Refugee Assistance that it received in the Ukraine supplemental appropriations.

USAID provided cash assistance through the World Food Programme, with nearly \$11 million distributed to more than 500,000 conflict-affected individuals across Ukraine in May.

CASH ASSISTANCE

According to State, cash assistance is the most efficient and effective way to provide humanitarian aid to populations with access to functioning markets—such as in large portions of Ukraine and in refugee-hosting countries.⁵⁷⁶ From January 1 to the first week of June, UNHCR provided \$42.7 million in cash assistance in Ukraine, and it planned to deliver an additional \$3.1 million by the end of June.⁵⁷⁷ State also said that, from January through the end of June, UNHCR expected to reach 302,832 individuals with Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance, as well as targeted cash assistance for shelter rehabilitation, rent, utilities, and livelihoods.⁵⁷⁸ State said that Ukrainians have used this cash assistance for food, health costs, utilities and bills, hygiene items, and clothes and shoes.⁵⁷⁹

USAID provided cash assistance through the UN World Food Programme, with nearly \$11 million distributed to more than 500,000 conflict-affected individuals across Ukraine in May.⁵⁸⁰ In addition, State said that from January to the first week of June, UNHCR provided a total of \$19.6 million in Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance to recipients in Bulgaria, Moldova, and Slovakia, and it planned to deliver an additional \$1.9 million by the end of June. State said that this assistance reached approximately 88,500 recipients.⁵⁸¹







Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken travels to Kiev, Ukraine, on May 13. (State photo)

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION

78 Public Diplomacy

80 Countering Disinformation

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Public diplomacy efforts during the quarter reflected the continuation of existing programs, State reported.⁵⁸² As of early June, the Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv had awarded 20 grants using AEECA funds, totaling about \$1.76 million, to advance efforts in democracy promotion, media development, and innovation and entrepreneurship.⁵⁸³

The grants supported the development of civil society and public engagement in Ukraine, contributed to open and competitive political systems, and boosted human rights protections, State said.⁵⁸⁴ The grants likewise supported advocacy for veterans' rights, vulnerable groups, and youth engagement, according to State.⁵⁸⁵ In media specifically, the Public Affairs Section assisted programs designed to strengthen independent journalism in Ukraine, particularly in the regions most affected by Russia's war.⁵⁸⁶ Ongoing support aims to bolster the commercial sustainability of Ukrainian media, thereby ensuring a strong and independent news ecosystem, State reported.⁵⁸⁷

The Public Affairs Section identified the most urgent cases of institutional vulnerability as a result of Russia's full-scale invasion and provided support to those working in defense of Ukrainian cultural heritage, State reported.⁵⁸⁸ Most grants are planned for a short duration, having a one-year period of performance and with expectations of implementation and completion by the end of that timeframe. No grants issued in FY 2024 have completed their performance periods, according to State.⁵⁸⁹

The Embassy, through the Public Affairs Section, and other State entities use a diverse set of social media platforms to disseminate public messaging on U.S. diplomatic priorities, State reported.⁵⁹⁰ The section's first-priority audiences were the Ukrainian public and media outlets; the second-priority audience was Western media outside the United States. State reported that the section used the following metrics to measure the effectiveness of its social media messaging: number of views, shares and reposts, and headlines generated in local Ukrainian media.⁵⁹¹ State did not disclose quantitative data on these metrics for the quarter.⁵⁹²

EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) initiated several programs and grants in Ukraine during the quarter using both base appropriations and Ukraine supplemental funds.⁵⁹³ Overall, ECA obligated more than \$16 million for these programs, including approximately \$11.5 million in base appropriations and \$5 million in Ukraine supplemental funds.⁵⁹⁴

As of early June, the Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv had awarded 20 grants using AEECA funds, totaling about \$1.76 million, to advance efforts in democracy promotion, media development, and innovation and entrepreneurship.

State ECA obligated \$11 million to administer recruitment, selection, travel, preparation, support, and alumni activities for the Future Leaders Exchange high school program for the 2025-2026 academic year. This program is active in 22 countries in Europe and Eurasia. State reported it plans to include 50 Ukrainian students in the 2025-2026 cohort at an estimated cost of \$1.3 million.⁵⁹⁵

State ECA also obligated approximately \$459,000 in base appropriations for two additional efforts under the International Visitor Leadership Program.⁵⁹⁶ The first effort will bring Ukrainian public servants, energy experts, and members of civil society to the United States to “explore approaches and challenges related to the consumption, production, transmission, distribution, and regulation of [renewable energy sources] and their role in developing a decentralized energy system in Ukraine.”⁵⁹⁷ Under the second effort, 10 rising Polish leaders, representing Polish organizations and institutions supporting Ukrainian and other refugees in Poland, will examine federal, state, and local government policies and programs to resettle and integrate refugees. These refugees arrive through the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program as well as through unofficial channels.⁵⁹⁸

Table 21.

State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Programs and Grants Funded Using Ukraine Supplemental Funds, April 1 to June 30, 2024

Program/Recipient	Purpose
Ukraine Cultural Heritage Initiative \$205,908	Develop capacities for assessing and monitoring damaged cultural heritage sites in Ukraine.
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization \$1,515,000	Preserve and protect the artistic works of the Ukrainian folk artist Maria Prymachenko and other Ukrainian women artists in Ukrainian museums.
BridgeUSA Ukrainian Academic Fellows Program \$500,000	Support Ukrainian academics through structured educational and cultural exchange programs in the United States.
Digital Connections Program \$675,000	Implement projects covering a range of goals, including targeted social programs for Ukrainian youth, cultural heritage preservation, and humanitarian relief efforts in the midst of the ongoing conflict.
American Film Showcase \$300,000	Establish a hub in Poland to focus on the inclusion and empowerment of Ukrainian refugees in the digital space, particularly related to Russia’s malign influence.
Global Media Makers \$700,000	Develop film projects focused on themes such as culture and identity, expression, freedom, resiliency, independence, and the value of human life.
TechCamp \$140,000	Ensure continued, close consultation and cooperation with Germany on countering Russia’s disinformation, including propaganda surrounding Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine.
Alumni Grants \$34,250	Address the limited capacities and capabilities of the Ukrainian police force and authorities in collecting, documenting, and processing evidence of atrocities committed during the war in Ukraine.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 6/21/2024

ECA also obligated more than \$5 million in Ukraine supplemental appropriations for a variety of educational and cultural exchange and capacity development programs.⁵⁹⁹ (See Table 21.)

COUNTERING DISINFORMATION

The U.S. Government has led and supported efforts in Ukraine to counter disinformation, thereby mitigating the negative impact of what State has called “the Kremlin’s self-serving narratives” and “fake historical narratives” both inside Ukraine and beyond its borders.⁶⁰⁰ In Russia-occupied parts of Ukraine especially, audiences have limited access to objective, independent, and reliable sources of information and news. Populations in these areas are therefore vulnerable to Russia’s propaganda and disinformation.⁶⁰¹

Amid the quarter’s surge of attacks on Kharkiv city and surrounding regions, State stressed the importance of continued support for local media.⁶⁰² The need for local media “remains critical” given Russia’s use of disinformation in frontline areas including Kharkiv, according to State.⁶⁰³

INFORMATION LANDSCAPE

Ukraine’s media environment under martial law—particularly limitations on freedom of speech and the continuing “United News” television marathon, a controversial public broadcasting channel—is predominantly responsible for the rise in Telegram’s popularity, USAID reported.⁶⁰⁴

Television: Ukrainian television viewership has declined over time in Ukraine, with older Ukrainians more likely to watch television news.⁶⁰⁵ Increased funding for Ukrainian government media channels comes at a cost of support to Suspilne, its public service broadcaster, according to USAID.⁶⁰⁶ The Ukrainian government has decreased funding to Suspilne from \$450,000 in 2024 to \$360,000 for 2025.⁶⁰⁷ This is only 25 percent of the amount of state funding that should be provided to Suspilne, according to the Law on Public Broadcasting.⁶⁰⁸

Social media: With audiences less reliant on public television, social media, especially Telegram, has risen to the top of news sources for Ukrainians with 72 percent of Ukrainians using Telegram.⁶⁰⁹ The concern, USAID said, is that Telegram is Russian-owned. A separate concern comes from the prevalence of unofficial, popular “dark” channels that seek to discredit independent voices and reform advocates both inside and outside the government.⁶¹⁰

Information freedom: According to USAID, a number of civic activists and investigative journalists, particularly those working on anti-corruption, have faced pressure or harassment, including Slidstvo.info, Bihus.info, Nashi Hroshi, AntAC, and the Kharkiv Anti-Corruption Center—all of whom are USAID partners.⁶¹¹

Media access in Russia: During the quarter, Russia placed increased restrictions on press freedom and access in Ukraine and domestically.⁶¹² On June 25, Russia announced that it had cut off access to more than 80 Western media outlets online, including some of the most prominent publications in Europe and the United States, according to media reports.⁶¹³ Since then, internet users in Russia have had little or no access to Western news

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President Joe Biden meets with the families of Evan Gershkovich, former U.S. Marine Paul Whelan, and journalists Alsu Kurmasheva and Vladimir Kara-Murza after their release in a prisoner swap with Russia on August 1. (White House photo)

providers.⁶¹⁴ Russia’s decision to block access formed what it said was a set of “proportional countermeasures” to an EU decision on May 17 restricting access to a group of Russian news outlets. EU authorities accused the Russian outlets of spreading and supporting Russia’s propaganda and its war of aggression against Ukraine, media reported.⁶¹⁵

People in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine have limited access to non-Russian sources, creating an information vacuum, according to one media observer.⁶¹⁶ Russia’s disinformation emphasized a constant message of a supposedly imminent Ukrainian defeat, which aims to break the morale of residents of the occupied territories.⁶¹⁷

Two U.S.-citizen journalists, Evan Gershkovich and Alsu Kurmasheva were held prisoner in Russia, along with at least 20 other journalists during the quarter.⁶¹⁸ The court proceedings of Gershkovich’s trial were held in secret. Officials from State were not allowed to attend the trial nor to speak with Gershkovich before it began, State reported.⁶¹⁹ On July 19, a Russian court convicted Gershkovich of espionage, to which he did not admit guilt, and sentenced him to 16 years in a high-security Russian penal colony, according to media.⁶²⁰ The same day, a separate Russian court convicted Kurmasheva of spreading false information about the Russian army, and sentenced her to six and a half years in a penal colony, media reported.⁶²¹ After the quarter ended, on August 1, Gershkovich, Kurmasheva, and several others were released as part of a prisoner swap between the Belarus, Russia, the United States, and several other NATO countries. President Biden acknowledged the “significant concessions” involved in the deal, including the release of a senior Russian intelligence operative convicted of murder in Berlin.⁶²²

In response to increasing Ukrainian government pressure on independent media, USAID’s media program has shifted resources to support physical and digital security resources for outlets under threat.⁶²³ USAID reported working closely with the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv and counterparts in the international community to communicate to the Ukrainian government the importance of independent media, even during wartime.⁶²⁴ In parallel, USAID supports independent media outlets, including Suspilne (which recently exited the United News Telemarathon, where the main channels have been broadcasting the same shared content in coordination with top state officials), to strengthen their ability to produce high-quality, engaging content.⁶²⁵

DOD MESSAGING IN EASTERN EUROPE

USEUCOM reported that during the quarter, it supported several multimedia marketing campaigns with NATO partners and allies with the goal of countering Russian disinformation and promoting pro-Western narratives. USEUCOM contributed to these information operation efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Latvia, Georgia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine.⁶²⁶

In many cases, these NATO-attributed multimedia campaigns focused on building increased awareness and confidence among selected audiences in NATO activities and the benefits of regional defense collaboration.⁶²⁷

According to USEUCOM, Russia has invested heavily in a disinformation campaign directed at sewing discord in the Polish population, but this campaign has been largely ineffective. According to public polling, popular support in Poland remains strong for providing humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, imposing sanctions on Russia, and supporting Ukraine's military.⁶²⁸

According to USEUCOM, Russia has invested heavily in a disinformation campaign directed at sewing discord in the Polish population, but this campaign has been largely ineffective.

STATE EFFORTS TO COUNTER DISINFORMATION

State continued to respond to Russia's disinformation campaigns. In April, State reiterated its denial of involvement in any possible sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, an energy pipeline running from Russia to Germany's northern coast.⁶²⁹ The September 2022 incident has suffered from Russia promoting disinformation of U.S. involvement, State said.⁶³⁰ "Russia has repeatedly called meetings on this topic for the sole purpose of spreading disinformation and casting aspersions" concerning the incident, State said.⁶³¹

State likewise rebuked Russia for its repeated efforts to link false theories of Ukraine-U.S. collaboration to the March 22 terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall venue in Moscow. Russia's assertions amounted to "false statements" and "the latest example in a series of Russian efforts to spread lies and disinformation in multilateral fora to justify its further invasion of Ukraine," State said, during an April 26 meeting at the United Nations.⁶³²

On June 6, the Chargé d'Affaires to the Permanent Council at the U.S. Mission to the OSCE deplored Russia's practice of miseducation about Ukraine in Russian schools.⁶³³ Speaking on behalf of State, the Chargé d'Affaires said, "President Putin's regime has used its state-controlled media and adulterated educational materials to spread lies about Ukraine's history. Russian textbooks now indoctrinate students with Russia's disinformation."⁶³⁴ Russia is undertaking similar reeducation measures in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, where occupation authorities have set up "ministries" to reeducate Ukrainians by using the Kremlin's version of Russia's culture and history, and purportedly to rectify what Russian officials call Ukraine's "historical myths," the Chargé d'Affaires said.⁶³⁵

These attacks on Ukrainian history and identity took a violent turn on May 27, when a Russian missile strike destroyed a Ukrainian publisher and book warehouse in Kharkiv.⁶³⁶ The attack killed seven and incinerated 50,000 books, according to the U.S. Mission to the OSCE.⁶³⁷

USAGM plans to use Ukraine supplemental funding to provide access to more than 14.7 million active VPN users per month in Russia.

U.S. AGENCY FOR GLOBAL MEDIA

The U.S. Government also seeks to counter disinformation through the global broadcast networks of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM).⁶³⁸ In Ukraine, USAGM provides news and related programming through several platforms, including Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).⁶³⁹

USAGM's Open Technology Fund supports establishment and use of virtual private networks (VPN) to aid the free flow of information into Russia and to combat Russian government censorship, USAGM said.⁶⁴⁰ VPNs enable audiences to securely access USAGM platforms from inside Russia, where direct access to USAGM's platforms is blocked.⁶⁴¹ More users have accessed USAGM platforms via VPNs this year, notably following the February 16 death of Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny.⁶⁴² The VPNs supported through OTF funds showed increased performance during the quarter, with various gains and declines across countries facing government censorship, USAGM data indicated.⁶⁴³ USAGM plans to use Ukraine supplemental funding to provide access to more than 14.7 million active VPN users per month in Russia.⁶⁴⁴

USAGM's Office of Policy and Research completed focus groups composed of Russian émigrés currently living in Central Asia, the Middle East, southern Europe, and parts of the former Soviet Union. The office will use the information to identify and provide information to audiences in areas that are most vulnerable to Kremlin disinformation, USAGM reported.⁶⁴⁵

USAGM reported in June that it had used a significant portion of its supplemental funding for new and recently launched projects, including \$1.4 million, as of June 2024.⁶⁴⁶ USAGM said that its new Ukraine-related projects have demonstrated their effectiveness during and prior to the reporting period.⁶⁴⁷

USAGM also stated its broadcast networks will keep operating at expanded levels to cover Russia's war in Ukraine but noted that without additional resources next year, USAGM would be forced to reduce spending and staff.⁶⁴⁸

VOICE OF AMERICA

USAGM reported that VOA delivered extensive reporting with a strong emphasis on U.S. support for Ukraine, particularly highlighting congressional actions regarding Ukraine aid.⁶⁴⁹ VOA conducted investigations into Russia's disinformation activities, producing a report series on Russia's methods and campaigns of disinformation, including the creation of fake social media channels and news sites that spread anti-Ukraine narratives.⁶⁵⁰ VOA also provided comprehensive coverage of the March 22 terrorist attacks in Moscow, debunking Russian official narratives that blamed Ukraine and the collective West for the attacks. The network broadcast exclusive interviews with key U.S. lawmakers and policymakers, and covered China's role in the war, including President Putin's summit with China's President Xi Jinping in May.⁶⁵¹

Similar anti-disinformation coverage took place across VOA's African, Armenian, Balkan, Georgian, and Spanish-language services during the quarter, which USAGM said reflected the breadth of Russia's disinformation efforts, and VOA's response to it.⁶⁵² VOA published 31 disinformation-related reports and fact-checks about Ukraine during the quarter, according to USAGM.⁶⁵³ Also during the quarter, the VOA Persian-language service continued to produce a

multi-part investigative TV documentary that exposes Iran’s clandestine support for Russia’s war, USAGM said.⁶⁵⁴ The series also explores the impact of Iran’s support for Russian’s foreign policy on Iran’s faltering economy and society.⁶⁵⁵

VOA launched no new radio or television programs during the quarter, USAGM said. VOA instead focused on “maintaining program surge” across its existing channels, including live reporting for Ukraine’s top-rated national networks, while enhancing digital content production and distribution, USAGM noted. Supplemental funding made those efforts possible, according to USAGM.⁶⁵⁶

VOA reported that its Russian- and Ukrainian-language platforms earned millions of views.⁶⁵⁷ VOA’s Russian- and Ukrainian-language services produce podcasts that have been available since the start of the war on several popular streaming platforms.⁶⁵⁸

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RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY

USAGM’s RFE/RL covered numerous stories in Ukraine during the quarter, USAGM reported.⁶⁵⁹ RFE/RL coverage earned millions of views across web and social media channels, USAGM said.⁶⁶⁰

RFE/RL’s regional network of journalists were among the first news organizations to film at the site of the May 25 missile attack on Epicenter, a retail store in Kharkiv, USAGM said.⁶⁶¹ Similarly, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service became the first news group to film the evacuation of Vovchansk village in Kharkiv region, State reported, amid Russia’s offensive in the region this spring.⁶⁶² The Ukrainian Service also covered the Russian-Ukrainian prisoner-of-war exchange on May 31, which prompted translation into English and coverage from RFE/RL’s Central Newsroom.⁶⁶³

RFE/RL’s deeper investigative reporting offered new information, according to USAGM, in the ongoing investigations of alleged war crimes committed in March 2022 at Bucha, outside Kyiv, during the first phase of Russia’s invasion.⁶⁶⁴ One report identified Russian military personnel alleged to have participated in abducting and murdering a Ukrainian law enforcement officer, amid the broader context of alleged large-scale crimes against humanity in Bucha.⁶⁶⁵ Published on May 26 and later added to multiple social media channels, the report has earned more than one million views.⁶⁶⁶

According to USAGM, Russia labeled RFE/RL an “undesirable organization” in February—adding the group to a list of more than 140 Russian and foreign entities.⁶⁶⁷ The possibility that Russia may block access to the YouTube video platform may only constrain information further, USAGM reported. As Russia seeks to limit digital distribution at home and in Ukraine, USAGM said it has adapted its use of technology to include pre-internet alternatives.⁶⁶⁸ RFE/RL broadcasts via MW/AM radio from Lithuania, allowing RFE/RL’s Russian Service to reach Russian-language audiences across the Baltic region, parts of Belarus, and parts of western Russia, including the Moscow and St. Petersburg metro areas, USAGM said.⁶⁶⁹

RFE/RL opened a new office in Lviv, Ukraine last year, USAGM said.⁶⁷⁰ Opening the Lviv office was logical in the wartime context, according to USAGM, because the location is safer and can operate at lower costs than in other Ukrainian cities like Kyiv.⁶⁷¹ RFE/RL Lviv can also stay functional under precarious wartime circumstances: it has its own electricity

generator and a basement studio that is protected from Russia's frequent air raids on the city, USAGM reported.⁶⁷²

Expanded Video Content Drives Traffic Above Pre-War Levels

RFE/RL's Ukraine-related coverage on new major social media platforms resulted in exponentially more viewers across a larger audience this quarter, USAGM reported.⁶⁷³ After launching a channel on TikTok last year, the Ukrainian Service's Radio Svoboda TikTok (Radio Liberty TikTok) posted content on key events from this quarter, especially the evacuation from parts of Kharkiv region, to realize exponential growth, USAGM reported.⁶⁷⁴

In May, Radio Svoboda TikTok reached 8 million views—a 485-percent gain from the previous month, according to USAGM data.⁶⁷⁵ A single video on the Kharkiv-area evacuation received 3.29 million views.⁶⁷⁶ RFE/RL's coverage on the Donbas region, via the Donbas Realii (Donbas Realities) platform on TikTok, also saw triple-digit growth, increasing by 163 percent, for a total of 2.8 million views, USAGM said.⁶⁷⁷

USAGM audience data showed that video views of RFE/RL and VOA content, which has been elevated since early 2022, remained steady during the quarter.

In contrast, USAGM web traffic and social media accounts experienced a decline from pre-war benchmarks, USAGM reported.⁶⁷⁸ According to USAGM, across all platforms, traffic spiked massively at the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.⁶⁷⁹ The data did not indicate what effect, if any, Russia's and other government limits on freedom of information may have played in the net decline of traffic on non-video media formats.⁶⁸⁰ The USAGM data summarized activities across 10 VOA services and 21 RFE/RL services or units—all of them targeted to audiences in or from Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.⁶⁸¹

GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER

State's Global Engagement Center (GEC) is the U.S. Government's hub for efforts against propaganda and disinformation.⁶⁸² On June 7, the GEC published a report countering disinformation on Russia's use of chemical weapons against Ukraine.⁶⁸³ In addition to exposing Russia's use of chemical weapons in this way, the GEC report emphasized the importance of U.S. sanctions, announced on May 1, to impose measures on three of Russia's government entities and four Russian companies with connections to Russia's use of chemical weapons against Ukraine.⁶⁸⁴

State recognized Poland as a key partner in fighting Russia's disinformation and malign influence.⁶⁸⁵ On June 10, the GEC spearheaded the launch of the Ukraine Communications Group, operating in Warsaw, State said. More than a Polish-U.S. effort, the UCG will lead multilateral efforts work among like-minded partner governments to coordinate messaging, promote accurate reporting on Russia's full-scale invasion, amplify Ukrainian voices, and expose Kremlin information manipulation, State reported.⁶⁸⁶

State said that the GEC, for its part, supports independent media and civil society organizations that work to counter Russia's disinformation in Ukraine and the broader region.⁶⁸⁷ This support extends to foreign media organizations that have been exiled, displaced, or otherwise negatively impacted by Russia's full-scale invasion.⁶⁸⁸



Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addresses the International Institute for Strategic Studies' 21st Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, on June 2. (DoD photo)

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND SANCTIONS

WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

INVESTIGATION OF WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

The U.S. Government continued its all-fronts approach to pursuing justice for war crimes and associated human rights abuses committed during Russia’s war in Ukraine.⁶⁸⁹ This includes supporting justice efforts through national and international pathways, sustaining partnerships with the Ukrainian government and other international partners, and civil society mechanisms.⁶⁹⁰

In April, the U.S. Mission to the OSCE released a report on Russia’s arbitrary detention of Ukrainian civilians through the OSCE Moscow Mechanism, an OSCE body supporting Ukraine in its defense against Russia’s aggression.⁶⁹¹ The report offered the most comprehensive documentation to date of Russia’s systematic, arbitrary detentions and associated human rights abuses, which can inform the work of justice and accountability authorities, State said.⁶⁹²

The DoJ reported that despite the extensive assistance provided by the United States, other national authorities non-profit governmental organizations, international bodies, and others, the sheer number of alleged Russian atrocity crimes—more than 127,000 and growing daily—poses a challenge to effective investigation and prosecution of war crimes. Ukrainian authorities are investigating and prosecuting these cases while their country is defending a brutal, large-scale illegal war launched by a neighboring global power that has overwhelmed Ukrainian law enforcement and prosecutors. In addition, the DoJ reported challenges in the United States associated with collecting evidence abroad during an active armed conflict, limited jurisdiction, and legal complexities associated with prosecuting such war crimes.⁶⁹³

On April 2, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice led a U.S. delegation at the Restoring Justice for Ukraine conference in The Hague, Netherlands that convened ministers and delegates from more than 50 countries, State reported.⁶⁹⁴ The Ambassador and the other U.S. delegates emphasized the importance of a comprehensive justice that prioritizes the needs of those most affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine, State said.⁶⁹⁵ The conference marked the opening of the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation Against Ukraine for submissions of claims.⁶⁹⁶ U.S. contributions to the register include \$1.2 million in voluntary contributions for 2023 and 2024.⁶⁹⁷

Table 22.

U.S. Goals Related to War Crimes and Human Rights

Integrated Country Strategy

Ukraine builds its capacity to document, investigate, and prosecute war crimes and enlists support from international partners to ensure perpetrators of war crimes are held to account.

Source: State, “Integrated Country Strategy-Ukraine,” 8/29/2023.

Table 23.

State Activities to Support Investigation of War Crimes in Ukraine

Bureau/Office	Activity
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs	<p>Provided equipment, including armored vehicles, rapid DNA and mobile forensics labs, and cameras, to the War Crimes Departments at OPG and the NPU. The hardware has assisted the ongoing investigation of Russia's May 25 attack on the Epicenter megastore, which killed 19 and injured more than 50.</p> <p>Supported investigations in the town of Bucha, northwest of Kyiv, where allegations of widespread human rights abuses surfaced after Russia's forces occupied the town from February to March 2022. The NPU has so far issued nine criminal charges, also known in Ukraine as Notices of Suspicion, against Russian individuals connected to crimes in Bucha during that period.</p>
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor	<p>Worked with and in support of the International Commission on Missing Persons, based in The Hague, to strengthen the capacities of the State Scientific Research Forensic Center, a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These authorities have established an Identification Hub, which uses two U.S.-funded genetic analysis machines.</p> <p>Provided psychological consultations to 853 individuals during the quarter and to nearly 2,300 people since the start of the effort, approximately 88 percent of whom were women. During the quarter it surveyed the frontline responders to assess their needs and determine how to make the counseling more effective. The survey identified several practices, tools, training, and topics recommended by psychologists providing the counseling.</p>
Office of Global Women's Issues	<p>Funded the Survivor-Centered Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Gender-Based Violence Recovery and Justice Project, based in Ukraine. A local implementing partner is coordinating with the Prosecutors Training Center of Ukraine on best practices for law enforcement approaches to survivors.</p>

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 6/21/2024.

The DoJ reported that its War Crimes Accountability Team and U.S. Special Prosecutor for the Crime of Aggression did their first in-person on-the-ground assessment in Kyiv during the quarter. The Team conducted numerous high-level meetings with the Ukrainian Prosecutor General, the Head of the War Crimes unit, and multiple line-level prosecutors, which the DoJ reported were “fruitful.”⁶⁹⁸ The Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) continued to request discrete training in the following areas: destruction of cultural property, community prosecution, additional victim/witness trainings.⁶⁹⁹

State's justice-focused bureaus took further steps to support Ukraine's war-related investigations and prosecutions, State reported.⁷⁰⁰ (See Table 24.) State noted that the continued insecurity due to the war has been the greatest challenge to program implementation across all of its programs in Ukraine.⁷⁰¹ State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Bureau stated that during the quarter, it became evident that many Ukrainian law enforcement bodies are at risk of being overwhelmed with security challenges and the thousands of war crimes investigations against Russia's military.⁷⁰²

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stated that its Homeland Security Investigations division coordinated with the FBI, DoD, and U.S. intelligence community to share information with Ukrainian law enforcement agencies on transnational organized crime, complex financial crime, and cybercrime investigations. Current support to Ukraine

is focused on countering the proliferation of weapons and sensitive technology and components, via Russia's state proxies, to Russian forces engaged within Ukraine. The Homeland Security Investigations division is also pursuing cases like the theft of cultural antiquities from Ukraine, and those involving war crimes and forced child deportations.⁷⁰³

The Homeland Security Investigations-led Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Center focused on opportunities to provide support to investigations where atrocities are uncovered, and where the United States can apply jurisdiction. From February 2022 through June 20, 2024, the Homeland Security Investigations division and its partners created subject records on 172 suspected human rights violators connected to Russia. While these efforts support the whole-of-government efforts to ensure accountability for Russian atrocities committed in Ukraine, they do not constitute direct support to Ukraine. The Center has not provided material nor training directly to Ukrainian military, police, security services or any other government entities.⁷⁰⁴

ATROCITY CRIMES WORKING GROUP

EU, UK, and U.S. authorities continued to coordinate and leverage support for Ukraine's domestic authorities in justice and war crimes during the quarter, State reported, notably through the advancement of the Atrocity Crimes Working Group of Ukraine (ACA).⁷⁰⁵ The ACA continued its efforts to provide coordinated strategic advice, capacity building, and operational assistance to Ukraine's OPG and other Ukrainian authorities in the investigation and prosecution of atrocity crimes in Ukraine, State said.⁷⁰⁶

Two State offices—the Office of Global Criminal Justice and State INL— fund ACA implementing entities, as do the United Kingdom and EU.⁷⁰⁷ ACA engagement this quarter included continued advice and mentoring to prosecutors from the OPG through small Cluster Groups organized around eight high-priority topics identified by the OPG: conflict-related civilian detentions, conflict-related sexual violence, the crime of aggression, crimes against and affecting children, environmental war crimes, genocide, and targeting of critical infrastructure, State said.⁷⁰⁸ The project clusters have met on a monthly basis, since April.⁷⁰⁹ State said that the ACA also continued to provide focused advice and support related to the strategies and operational procedures appropriate for specific types of crimes, including on working with survivors of conflict-related sexual violence and building cases related to environment-related war crimes.⁷¹⁰

A separate ACA initiative helped integrate a military analysis into atrocity crime investigations and prosecutions, according to State.⁷¹¹ ACA experts helped formulate advice for the OPG on military subjects relevant to criminal proceedings.⁷¹² ACA experts also helped apply their findings to the OPG's development of leadership-level prosecutions, State said.⁷¹³

In Ukraine, Mobile Justice Teams carried out regular visits beyond the Kyiv capital region, State said, to further support ACA capacity building in war-affected areas.⁷¹⁴ The visits took place in the Chernihiv, Dnipro, Kharkiv, and Sumy regions, among others, according to State.⁷¹⁵

From February 2022 through June 20, 2024, the Homeland Security Investigations division and its partners created subject records on 172 suspected human rights violators connected to Russia.

In similar efforts, State said that it has taken steps to impose visa restrictions on individuals known to be involved in Russia's war in Ukraine.

During the quarter, ACA implementers led a course on building Ukrainian authorities' understanding of the fundamentals of prosecuting international crimes, which saw an enrollment of nearly 30 Ukrainian prosecutors and other staff from the OPG's Victims and Witnesses Support Coordination Center, State said.⁷¹⁶

PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

Prosecuting Russian and other alleged war criminals remains a work in progress, with few concrete results to date, State reported.⁷¹⁷ The International Criminal Court has issued warrants of arrest for major Russian government leaders, including President Vladimir Putin; Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia's Commissioner for Children's Rights; Viktor Sokolov, Commander of Russia's Black Sea Fleet; and Sergei Kobylash, commander of long-range aviation in Russia's air force. The Court continued its investigations of these persons during the quarter, State said.⁷¹⁸

The United States supports the prosecution of alleged Russian war criminals in partnership with EU authorities, State reported.⁷¹⁹ Within the Eurojust offices at The Hague, the International Center for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine has provided a forum where Ukraine and partner countries can collaborate in building strong cases for future prosecution, according to State.⁷²⁰ Prosecutors from the United States and elsewhere work to achieve justice for crimes of aggression committed in Ukraine, according to State.⁷²¹ Eurojust also operates a Joint Investigation Team, with participants from Ukraine, six EU countries, the International Criminal Court, as well as Europol, the main EU law enforcement agency.⁷²² The U.S. Department of Justice holds cooperation agreements with all Joint Investigation Team participant countries, to facilitate exchanges of information and assistance for the prosecution of Russia's aggression in Ukraine, State said.⁷²³

In similar efforts, State said that it has taken steps to impose visa restrictions on individuals known to be involved in Russia's war in Ukraine.⁷²⁴ The number of visa restrictions pursued for such individuals exceeded 7,400 as of this quarter, State reported.⁷²⁵ State said that it has also taken steps to impose visa restrictions on individuals known to be involved in the forced transfer and deportation of Ukraine's children.⁷²⁶

USAID initiated a new award this quarter: the Healing and Accountability through Human Rights activity, a \$25 million award, to help Ukrainians achieve justice and address social divisions resulting from Russia's full-scale invasion.⁷²⁷ This activity will support processes aimed at accountability for war crimes, fostering dialogue on issues related to post-conflict recovery, and beginning healing and reconciliation using human rights-based approaches, including transitional justice tools.⁷²⁸ The objectives of this activity are to identify and deploy transformative, intersectional approaches to reconciling divided groups; increase acceptance of and adherence to human rights values; and increase access to victim-centered, gender-responsive transitional justice.⁷²⁹

SANCTIONS AND USE OF RUSSIA'S SOVEREIGN ASSETS

The United States, in coordination with the European Union and others, began applying sanctions against Russia following its 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine and Crimea.⁷³⁰ In response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States greatly expanded its approach, initiating an unprecedented range of comprehensive financial and trade sanctions.⁷³¹

SEIZURE OF RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN ASSETS

The push to use Russian sovereign assets (RSA) for Ukraine's benefit gathered momentum during the quarter. The idea of RSA seizure has gained substantial Western support, including from prominent legal experts and U.S. media.⁷³² On April 10, the Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform Steering Committee convened in Kyiv, where Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal named the use of frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's needs as one of the Ukrainian government's three main priorities, State reported.⁷³³ The assets have been immobilized, or frozen, as a result of sanctions and other measures imposed since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale war in Ukraine.

Total RSA, which lie mostly in EU and U.S. jurisdictions, amount to about \$300 billion.⁷³⁴ Of that total, about €190 billion (approximately \$205 billion) remains in Euroclear, a central securities depository based in Belgium, media reported.⁷³⁵ Only about \$5 billion are in reach of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), media reported.⁷³⁶ As of late June, State said the United States had not yet seized any RSA.⁷³⁷

United States: On April 24, President Biden signed into law the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians Act (also known as the REPO for Ukrainians Act), which authorized the President "to seize, confiscate, transfer, or vest any Russian aggressor state sovereign asset, in whole or in part, and including any interest or interests in such assets."⁷³⁸ The Act further stated the President "shall establish an account, to be known as the 'Ukraine Support Fund,' to consist of any funds" resulting from the seizure of the Russian Federation's sovereign assets.⁷³⁹ The Ukraine Support Fund "shall be available to the Secretary of State," in consultation with the USAID Administrator, "for the purpose of providing assistance to Ukraine for the damage resulting from the unlawful invasion by the Russian Federation that began on February 24, 2022."⁷⁴⁰

Under the REPO for Ukrainians Act, the funds may be used for three purposes: 1) making contributions to an international body, fund, or mechanism charged with determining and administering compensation or providing assistance to Ukraine; 2) supporting reconstruction, rebuilding, and recovery in Ukraine; and 3) providing economic and humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine.⁷⁴¹

Table 24.

U.S. Goals Related to Sanctions

Integrated Country Strategy

Ukraine and its allies leverage appropriate laws to use seized Russian assets to finance Ukraine's reconstruction and recovery.

Source: State, "Integrated Country Strategy-Ukraine," 8/29/2023.

State designated sanctions to some 630 new individuals and entities during the quarter, according to State.

European Union: On May 21, the European Union approved the seizure of profits from RSA held in EU jurisdictions for the purpose of buying weapons for Ukraine.⁷⁴² The approval, a first for the bloc, specified that only profits—not the underlying principal of the assets under deposit—would be seized. The profits would generate about \$3 billion annually, according to media reports.⁷⁴³

Group of Seven Nations (G7): In June, G7 leaders announced the launch of “Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration for Ukraine,” to make available \$50 billion as a loan to Ukraine to be repaid from future revenues from immobilized RSA, State reported.⁷⁴⁴ The funds would be eligible for a broad range of uses to support Ukraine’s “current and future needs in the face of a prolonged defense against Russia,” according to State.⁷⁴⁵

Western RSA and extraordinary revenue acceleration policies appear designed to remain applicable after the end of Russia’s war in Ukraine. G7 countries affirmed during the quarter that RSA held in Western jurisdictions will “remain immobilized until Russia ends its aggression and pays for the damage it has caused to Ukraine,” State said.⁷⁴⁶

In addition to RSA, State noted that the DoJ had seized assets of private Russian individuals and corporations since the February 2022 start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, the DoJ has seized, restrained, or obtained forfeiture judgments for assets belonging to Russian oligarchs and others, with a total value of more than \$600 million. These individuals have supported Russia’s war in Ukraine and evaded U.S. economic sanctions.⁷⁴⁷

The DoJ reported that it is providing for the maintenance and preservation of assets seized in connection with alleged sanctions violations, including for the superyacht *Amadea*, which is currently the subject of forfeiture proceedings in the Southern District of New York. The approximate monthly cost of the *Amadea*’s upkeep is \$743,750. These costs are currently being paid out of the funding provided in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022. If and when the *Amadea* is successfully forfeited, the liquidated value of the ship (publicly estimated to be worth \$230 million) will be available to offset the maintenance expenditures.⁷⁴⁸

SANCTIONS UPDATE

The U.S. Government continued during the quarter to impose and expand sanctions against individuals and entities supporting Russia in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, State said.⁷⁴⁹ State designated sanctions to some 630 new individuals and entities during the quarter, according to State.⁷⁵⁰ The quarter’s additions brought the total number of war-related individuals and entities under sanctions to nearly 4,800, whether in Russia or elsewhere.⁷⁵¹

State’s sanctions are likely to constrain future energy revenues by stalling the development of Russia’s Arctic LNG-2 megaproject and other Russian future energy projects.⁷⁵² State added entities in Belarus to its list of sanctions for that country’s support of Russia’s defense industrial base, State said.⁷⁵³

On June 12, Treasury announced new sanctions on Russia. Treasury stated that the sanctions “ratchet up the risk” of secondary sanctions for foreign financial institutions that deal with Russia’s war economy, restrict the ability of Russia’s military industrial base to take advantage of certain U.S. software and information technology services, and target more than 300 individuals and entities in Russia and elsewhere “whose products and services enable Russia to sustain its war effort and evade sanctions.” The new sanctions specifically targeted the architecture of Russia’s financial system, as well as transnational networks laundering gold in support of Russia’s purchases of unmanned aerial vehicles, chemical and biological weapons, and certain manufacturing components.⁷⁵⁴

The new sanctions also targeted foreign financial institutions aiding Russia’s military industrial base. Treasury stated that this means such institutions, such as Sberbank and VTB, two large Russian banks, run the risk of being sanctioned for “conducting or facilitating significant transactions, or providing any service, involving any person” under sanctions regimes. Treasury also added five Russian-owned financial institutions operating in India, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the PRC to its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.⁷⁵⁵

Treasury stated that it has imposed sanctions on more than 80 percent of Russia’s banking system, preventing access to the global system. Treasury has issued hundreds of designations, which have hindered Russia’s efforts to evade sanctions in third countries. Treasury has restricted Russia’s energy revenues through implementation of the oil price cap, alongside Treasury’s partners’ actions on oil. According to Treasury, Russia’s macroeconomic performance has been constrained due to the impact of the war and Treasury’s multilateral sanctions.⁷⁵⁶

The sanctions would serve to curtail Russia’s ability to exploit the international financial system to further Russia’s war in Ukraine, according to State.⁷⁵⁷ The latest round of sanctions followed other restrictive actions coordinated among the United States and its partners, with a focus on the financial exchanges where Russian mining and metals commodities are traded.⁷⁵⁸

On April 12, the U.S. and UK governments announced a joint ban on new trading of metals—specifically aluminum, nickel, and copper—on both the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the London Metal Exchange.⁷⁵⁹ These three metals account for \$40 billion in Russian metals sales during the past 2 years, according to media reporting.

Among the U.S. Government sanctions announced on June 12, State designated two Russian mining-industry corporate networks, which are significant figures in Russia’s metallurgical coal and gold mining industries.⁷⁶⁰ Other countries with individuals or entities under the June 12 sanctions include the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Singapore, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates.⁷⁶¹

For dual-use goods as well as for mining and metals commodities, the sanctions imposed during the quarter aim to further constrain Russia’s capacity to generate export revenue, thereby weakening Russia’s tax revenue, defense industrial base, and overall ability to fund the war, State reported.⁷⁶²

Treasury stated that it has imposed sanctions on more than 80 percent of Russia’s banking system, preventing access to the global system.

The DoJ reported that, in coordination with the U.S. Central Command, it seized more than 1.5 million rounds of ammunition and more than 5,000 AK-47s and other arms taken from flagless vessels en route from Iran to Yemen.

SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT

Task Force Klepto Capture is a DoJ-led interagency task force dedicated to enforcing the sweeping economic sanctions, export restrictions and economic countermeasures that the United States imposed in response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The task force investigates and prosecutes individuals and entities that support Russia's unlawful war in Ukraine, while additionally working towards seizing and ultimately forfeiting assets that can be transferred to Ukraine.⁷⁶³

The task force has criminally charged more than 80 individuals and entities with violating U.S. law, worked with foreign law enforcement partners to arrest multiple individuals, and seized, restrained or otherwise targeted for forfeiture more than \$600 million in assets belonging to Russian oligarchs and others who unlawfully supported the Russian regime and evaded U.S. economic countermeasures.⁷⁶⁴

The DoJ reported that, in coordination with the U.S. Central Command, it seized more than 1.5 million rounds of ammunition and more than 5,000 AK-47s and other arms taken from flagless vessels en route from Iran to Yemen. These armaments were subsequently transferred to the UAF.⁷⁶⁵

EVASION OF SANCTIONS

State underscored the challenges of maintaining effective sanctions, notably in the ability of sanctioned entities and their associates to circumvent restrictions:⁷⁶⁶

Evolving trade networks: Direct trade with Russia fell in some foreign jurisdictions, but pressure in one country encouraged increasingly complex, circuitous routes of diversion around trade restrictions in other countries, State said.⁷⁶⁷ The impact of U.S. sanctions required State to engage with a rising number of countries vulnerable to Russian evasion efforts, State reported.⁷⁶⁸

Dual-use items: Dual-use goods are products that can be adopted for civilian as well as military purposes.⁷⁶⁹ For example, Russia continues to evade sanctions and use circumvention networks to procure components like microelectronics—an otherwise legitimate type of civilian import product—which Russia then uses to make weapons, according to State.⁷⁷⁰ The sanctions announced June 12 target seven PRC-based entities that have supported Russia's war in Ukraine by supplying goods to Russia, according to State.⁷⁷¹ State expressed particular concern for the “scale and breadth” of the PRC's exports of dual-use goods to Russia.⁷⁷²

In coordination with the EU and U.K. governments, State during the quarter alerted other governments to its sanctions concerns, provided trade data on the scope of the problem, and encouraged stronger oversight and enforcement.⁷⁷³

Administration of Foreign Affairs

Diplomatic Programs funding continued to draw from the first four Ukraine supplemental appropriations, with \$462 million in total available funds from those appropriations acts, State reported.⁷⁷⁴ As of the start of the quarter, State had obligated or transferred \$283 million, leaving an unobligated balance of \$179 million. Diplomatic Programs funds from the first four Ukraine supplemental appropriations are scheduled to expire on September 30, 2024, meaning any unobligated sums would no longer be available for use. However, funds that have been obligated by September 30 would be available to expend for 5 years.⁷⁷⁵

During the quarter, State said that it obligated \$31.8 million and expended \$23.7 million of the Diplomatic Programs funds appropriated in the Ukraine supplementals.⁷⁷⁶ The funds continued to support mission-critical activities, including sustainment of locally employed staff at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv; transit expenses for personnel entering, exiting, or within Ukraine; operational costs at the Embassy; sanctions targeting and analysis; and public diplomacy and counter-disinformation activities, State reported.⁷⁷⁷

State worked during the quarter to secure Ukraine-related funds otherwise impeded from use, including by resolving holds and ensuring timely obligation of those resources.⁷⁷⁸ For example, until May, \$86 million in Ukraine funds remained on hold in Congressional committees; as of June, \$52.6 million remained on hold, State reported.⁷⁷⁹ Concerning the Capital Investment Fund, State had obligated about \$38 million of a maximum \$50 million in funds before the quarter; State reported transferring no additional funds during the quarter.⁷⁸⁰

During the quarter, State obligated \$14.8 million from the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance account for construction efforts at U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, in addition to an account expenditure of \$14.6 million from the previous quarter, according to State.⁷⁸¹ The funding enabled further progress toward reconstructing classified facilities, State said.⁷⁸²

EXPORT CONTROLS

State ISN works with Ukrainian authorities and implementing partners to expand the flow of sharable, open-source information on Russia's trade activities, including "what Russia is getting and how they are getting it," State reported.⁷⁸³

Outside Ukraine, State ISN engages key public- and private-sector audiences and partners globally to build awareness of the risks of violating sanctions, and the will and ability to execute sanctions and implement export controls.⁷⁸⁴ The bureau also focuses on compliance throughout the global supply chain, from the jurisdictions where sanctioned or restricted exports are produced to those through which illicit trade passes before transshipment to Russia or other restricted jurisdictions, State reported.⁷⁸⁵

During the quarter, State ISN's export control cooperation activities included, through implementing partners, a series of country-specific training programs for public-sector audiences in the Kyrgyz Republic, Panama, and Türkiye, according to State.⁷⁸⁶ In particular, trainees had access to the Dedicated Online Financial Integrity Network, a platform designed


to enhance sanctions implementation, State reported.⁷⁸⁷ The training programs included an opportunity to achieve certification in the platform's competencies.⁷⁸⁸

In Ukraine, State INL's implementing partners provided a tailored virtual training for Ukrainian policymakers and investigators, with the goal of enhancing Ukraine's investigative and information-sharing abilities, according to State.⁷⁸⁹ Similar training programs took place for public- and private-sector stakeholders in the former Soviet countries of Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova, State said.⁷⁹⁰

State INL efforts also included a series of engagements, training events, consultations, and U.S. Government travel related to other ongoing efforts, such as Ukraine's export control legislation, engagement with the banking sector in Cyprus on sanctions and export control compliance, and other support to sanctions-related coordination with key partners, State said.⁷⁹¹

The Disruptive Technology Strike Force, an interagency enforcement effort co-led by the DoJ and the Department of Commerce, pursues criminal prosecutions and other types of enforcement actions against those who engage in the illicit transfer of emerging technologies. Since it was announced in February 2023, the Strike Force has charged 16 criminal cases, including the prosecutions of individuals and entities accused of illicitly providing microelectronics and other advanced technologies to companies affiliated with the Russian government, including the Russian military.⁷⁹²





A U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon performs a flyover at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. (U.S. Air Force photo)



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APPENDIX A

Classified Appendix to this Report

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) and the U.S. Government’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees

APPENDIX B

About the Special Inspector General for OAR

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Section 419, previously found at 5 U.S.C. App, Section 8L) established the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Section 419 requires the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) to appoint a Lead IG from among the inspectors general of the Lead IG agencies upon the commencement or designation of a military operation that exceeds 60 days as an overseas contingency operation; or receipt of notification thereof.

On August 18, 2023, the DoD designated OAR as an overseas contingency operation. The CIGIE Chair selected the DoD IG to be the Lead IG for OAR, and the State IG to be the Associate Lead IG for OAR, effective October 18, 2023.

On December 22, 2023, Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2024 re-designated Lead IG for OAR the Special Inspector General for OAR. The law specifies that the re-designation does not limit the DoD OIG and its partner agencies from exercising their responsibilities under the Lead IG framework.

Lead IG oversight of the operation “sunsets” at the end of the first fiscal year after commencement or designation in which the total amount appropriated for the operation is less than \$100,000,000.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out the Lead IG statutory responsibilities to:

- Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis a report on the contingency operation and to make that report available to the public. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2024 specifies that the quarterly report for OAR be submitted to Congress no later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter.
- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

APPENDIX C

Methodology for Preparing this Special IG Quarterly Report

This report complies with Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2024 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Section 419). The Inspector General Act requires that the DoD IG—as the previously designated Lead IG for OAR and now the Special IG for OAR—must provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on each overseas contingency operation. This requirement is consistent with the requirement that the Lead IG publish a biannual report on the activities of the Inspectors General with respect to that overseas contingency operation.

This report covers the period from April 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024. The DoD OIG, State OIG, USAID OIG, and partner oversight agencies contributed to the content of this report.

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OAR, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the OIGs have not verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or from Federal agencies, and the information provided represents the view of the source cited in each instance.

INFORMATION COLLECTION FROM AGENCIES AND OPEN SOURCES

Each quarter, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs gather information about their programs and operations related to OAR from Federal government agencies. This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report may include the following:

- U.S. Government statements, press conferences, and reports
- Reports issued by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks
- Media reports

The Lead IG agencies use open-source information to assess information obtained through their agency information collection process and provide additional detail about the operation.

REPORT PRODUCTION

The DoD IG, as the Special IG (and previously designated Lead IG) for OAR, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs draft the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The three OIGs incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs as independent oversight agencies.

APPENDIX D

U.S. Weapons, Equipment, and Ammunition Committed to Ukraine

Air Defense

- One Patriot air defense battery and munitions
- 12 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions
- HAWK air defense systems and munitions
- AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles for air defense
- More than 2,000 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles
- Avenger air defense systems
- VAMPIRE counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) and munitions
- c-UAS gun trucks and ammunition
- Mobile c-UAS laser-guided rocket systems
- Other c-UAS equipment
- Anti-aircraft guns and ammunition
- Air defense systems components
- Equipment to integrate Western launchers, missiles, and radars with Ukraine's systems
- Equipment to support and sustain Ukraine's existing air defense capabilities
- Equipment to protect critical national infrastructure
- 21 air surveillance radars

Ground Maneuver

- 31 Abrams tanks
- 45 T-72B tanks
- 186 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles
- Four Bradley Fire Support Team vehicles
- 189 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers
- 300 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers
- 250 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles
- More than 500 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs)

- More than 2,000 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)
- More than 200 light tactical vehicles
- 300 armored medical treatment vehicles
- 80 trucks and 124 trailers to transport heavy equipment
- More than 800 tactical vehicles to tow and haul equipment
- 131 tactical vehicles to recover equipment
- 10 command post vehicles
- 30 ammunition support vehicles
- 18 armored bridging systems
- Eight logistics support vehicles and equipment
- 239 fuel tankers and 105 fuel trailers
- 58 water trailers
- Six armored utility trucks
- 125mm, 120mm, and 105mm tank ammunition
- More than 1,800,000 rounds of 25mm ammunition
- Mine-clearing equipment.

Fires

- 39 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and ammunition
- Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb launchers and guided rockets
- 198 155mm Howitzers and more than 2,000,000 155mm artillery rounds
- More than 7,000 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds
- More than 40,000 155mm rounds of Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems
- 72 105mm Howitzers and more than 800,000 105mm artillery rounds
- 10,000 203mm artillery rounds
- More than 200,000 152mm artillery rounds
- Approximately 40,000 130mm artillery rounds

- 40,000 122mm artillery rounds
- 60,000 122mm GRAD rockets
- 47 120mm mortar systems
- 10 82mm mortar systems
- 112 81mm mortar systems
- 58 60mm mortar systems
- More than 400,000 mortar rounds
- More than 70 counter-artillery and counter-mortar radars
- 20 multi-mission radars

Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Systems

- 20 Mi-17 helicopters
- Switchblade Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
- Phoenix Ghost UAS
- CyberLux K8 UAS
- Altius-600 UAS
- Jump-20 UAS
- Hornet UAS
- Puma UAS
- Scan Eagle UAS
- Penguin UAS
- Two radars for UAS
- High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMS)
- Precision aerial munitions
- More than 6,000 Zuni aircraft rockets
- More than 20,000 Hydra-70 aircraft rockets
- Munitions for UAS

Anti-armor and Small Arms

- More than 10,000 Javelin anti-armor systems
- More than 90,000 other anti-armor systems and munitions
- More than 9,000 Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles
- More than 35,000 grenade launchers and small arms
- More than 400,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades

- Laser-guided rocket systems and munitions
- Rocket launchers and ammunition
- Anti-tank mines

Maritime

- Two Harpoon coastal defense systems and anti-ship missiles
- 62 coastal and riverine patrol boats
- Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels
- Port and harbor security equipment

Other Capabilities

- M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions
- C-4 explosives, demolition munitions, and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing
- Obstacle emplacement equipment
- Counter air defense capability
- More than 100,000 sets of body armor and helmets
- Tactical secure communications systems and support equipment
- Four satellite communications (SATCOM) antennas
- SATCOM terminals and services
- Electronic warfare (EW) and counter-EW equipment
- Commercial satellite imagery services
- Night vision devices, surveillance and thermal imagery systems, optics, and rangefinders
- Explosive ordnance disposal equipment and protective gear
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment
- Medical supplies, including first aid kits, bandages, monitors, and other equipment
- Field equipment, cold weather gear, generators, and spare parts
- Support for training, maintenance, and sustainment activities

Source: DoD, fact sheet, "Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine," 6/7/2024.

APPENDIX E

DoD Funding for Ukraine Assistance

Table 25.

DoD Execution of First Ukraine Supplemental (P.L. 117-103), as of June 1, 2024, in \$ Thousands

Component	Appropriation Title	Period of Availability	Available Funds Apportioned	Cumulative Obligations	Cumulative Disbursements
Direct Military & Other Support					
Army	Military Personnel, Army	2022/2022	\$130,377	\$124,045	\$123,662
	Operation & Maintenance	2022/2022	1,113,234	1,100,981	1,055,501
Army Total			1,243,611	1,225,026	1,179,163
Navy	Military Personnel, Marine Corps	2022/2022	3,079	1,026	1,026
	Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps	2022/2022	21,440	21,440	13,172
	Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy	2022/2023	31,100	31,100	20,570
	Military Personnel, Navy	2022/2022	11,645	967	967
	Operation & Maintenance, Navy	2022/2022	202,797	202,797	190,792
Navy Total			270,061	257,330	226,528
Air Force	Other Procurement, Air Force	2022/2024	213,693	206,537	186,464
	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2022/2022	418,442	418,442	418,442
	Operation & Maintenance, Space Force	2022/2022	800	800	800
	Military Personnel, Air Force	2022/2022	50,396	40,226	40,226
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Air Force	2022/2023	47,500	47,414	44,847
Air Force Total			730,831	713,419	690,779
Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide	2022/2022	316,583	316,583	249,544
	Procurement, Defense-Wide	2022/2024	6,259	5,973	4,099
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Defense-Wide	2022/2023	51,745	51,485	47,907
	Defense Working Capital Fund	2022/2022	409,000	406,865	406,865
Defense-Wide Total			783,587	780,906	708,415
DIRECT MILITARY & OTHER SUPPORT TOTAL			3,028,090	2,976,680	2,804,885
DoD Stocks Replenishment					
Army	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2022/2022	351,367	349,917	141,893
	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2023/2023	48,799	48,784	30,503
	Missile Procurement, Army	2022/2024	1,298,497	1,293,226	489,159
	Procurement of Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army	2022/2024	933	920	914
	Procurement of Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army	2023/2025	278,400	271,771	14,337
	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	2022/2024	563,226	532,289	226,654
	Other Procurement, Army	2022/2024	77,615	70,093	20,839
Army Total			2,618,837	2,566,999	924,299
Navy	Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps.	2022/2022	23,437	23,437	23,437
	Procurement, Marine Corps	2022/2024	686,657	683,406	98,247
	Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps	2022/2024	32,902	32,896	3,473
	Operation & Maintenance, Navy	2022/2022	7,638	7,638	4,648
Navy Total			750,634	747,377	129,806

Component	Appropriation Title	Period of Availability	Available Funds Apportioned	Cumulative Obligations	Cumulative Disbursements
Air Force	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2023/2023	60,803	60,803	42,768
Air Force Total			60,803	60,803	42,768
Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide (PDA Replenishment)	2022/2023	69,726	—	—
Defense-Wide Total			69,726	—	—
DoD STOCKS REPLENISHMENT TOTAL			3,500,000	3,375,180	1,096,872
P.L. 117-103 TOTAL			\$6,528,090	\$6,351,860	\$3,901,758

Source: OUSD(C), response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.3 OAR 001, 7/8/2024.

Table 26.

DoD Execution of Second Ukraine Supplemental (P.L. 117-128), as of June 1, 2024, in \$ Thousands

Component	Appropriation Title	Period of Availability	Available Funds Apportioned	Cumulative Obligations	Cumulative Disbursements
Direct Military & Other Support					
Army	Military Personnel, Army	2022/2022	\$ 12,750	\$12,750	\$12,750
	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2022/2022	1,495,459	1,483,054	1,422,744
	Missile Procurement, Army	2022/2024	660,682	630,807	147,881
	Procurement of Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army	2022/2024	255	102	95
	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	2022/2024	45	45	45
	Other Procurement, Army	2022/2024	113,440	80,556	41,650
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Army	2022/2023	128,700	128,700	127,452
Army Total			2,411,331	2,336,014	1,752,617
Navy	Military Personnel, Marine Corps	2022/2022	675	—	—
	Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy	2022/2023	43,000	43,000	19,089
	Military Personnel, Navy	2022/2022	38	—	—
	Weapons Procurement, Navy	2022/2024	74,264	74,264	30,402
	Operation & Maintenance, Navy	2022/2022	939,779	927,317	843,137
	Other Procurement, Navy	2022/2024	1,250	1,250	1,001
Navy Total			1,059,006	1,045,831	893,628
Air Force	Aircraft Procurement, Air Force	2022/2024	28,500	28,500	18,226
	Missile Procurement, Air Force	2022/2024	114,097	111,730	52,420
	Other Procurement, Air Force	2022/2024	155,382	135,338	93,512
	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2022/2022	195,262	195,262	195,262
	Operation & Maintenance, Space Force	2022/2022	800	800	800
	Military Personnel, Air Force	2022/2022	1,590	1,545	1,545
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Air Force	2022/2023	119,815	119,789	56,731
Air Force Total			615,446	592,964	418,496
Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide	2022/2022	206,824	206,824	206,824
	Defense Health Program	2022/2022	13,900	686	686
	Procurement, Defense-Wide	2022/2024	24,218	16,784	11,760
	Defense Production Act Purchases, Defense	2022 until expended	600,000	403,299	59,062
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Defense-Wide	2022/2023	122,103	112,206	69,972
	Defense Working Capital Fund	2022/2022	965	904	902
Defense-Wide Total			968,010	740,702	349,206
DIRECT MILITARY & OTHER SUPPORT TOTAL			5,053,793	4,715,511	3,413,947

(continued on next page)

OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE

Component	Appropriation Title	Period of Availability	Available Funds Apportioned	Cumulative Obligations	Cumulative Disbursements
DoD Stocks Replenishment					
Army	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2022/2022	2,750	2,616	1,791
	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2023/2023	414,795	406,832	304,735
	Missile Procurement, Army	2022/2024	1,191,544	1,162,119	311,608
	Missile Procurement, Army	2023/2025	489,790	488,859	40,398
	Procurement of Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army	2022/2024	961,707	935,055	91,872
	Procurement of Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army	2023/2025	457,020	349,103	43,057
	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	2022/2024	1,016,077	987,220	466,225
	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	2023/2025	2,076,062	2,025,135	86,390
	Other Procurement, Army	2022/2024	291,901	274,631	38,151
	Other Procurement, Army	2023/2025	567,186	470,945	68,681
Army Total			7,468,832	7,102,516	1,452,908
Navy	Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps	2022/2022	38,446	38,446	32,556
	Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps	2023/2023	11,011	11,011	10,552
	Procurement, Marine Corps	2022/2024	51,074	50,990	18,275
	Procurement, Marine Corps	2023/2025	106,108	106,030	4,837
	Weapons Procurement, Navy	2022/2024	14,410	14,410	11,517
	Weapons Procurement, Navy	2023/2025	124,390	124,390	7,383
	Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps	2022/2024	24,875	24,319	725
	Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps	2023/2025	205,465	196,005	9,561
	Operation & Maintenance, Navy	2022/2022	55,795	55,795	129,913
	Operation & Maintenance, Navy	2023/2023	98,220	98,220	98,220
	Other Procurement, Navy	2022/2024	77,508	76,955	29,266
Navy Total			807,302	796,572	352,805
Air Force	Missile Procurement, Air Force	2023/2025	144,624	144,608	8,078
	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2022/2022	265,043	265,043	265,043
	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2023/2023	187,824	187,824	175,351
	Procurement of Ammunition, Air Force	2023/2025	1,016	1,010	86
Air Force Total			598,507	598,485	448,557
Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide	2023/2023	15,935	15,282	12,179
	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide [PDA Replenishment]	2022/2023	—	—	—
	Procurement, Defense-Wide	2023/2025	13,424	13,424	10,424
	Defense Production Act Purchases, Defense	2022 until expended	146,000	—	—
Defense-Wide Total			175,359	28,706	22,603
DOD STOCKS REPLENISHMENT TOTAL			9,050,000	8,526,279	2,276,873
USAI Defense-Wide					
USAI Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide [USAI]	2022/2023	6,000,000	5,987,280	5,985,437
USAI Defense-Wide Total			6,000,000	5,987,280	5,985,437
P.L. 117-128 TOTAL			\$20,103,793	\$19,229,070	\$11,676,258

Source: OUSD(C), response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.3 OAR 001, 7/8/2024.

Table 27.

DoD Execution of the Third Ukraine Supplemental (P.L. 117-180), as of June 1, 2024, in \$ Thousands

Component	Appropriation Title	Period of Availability	Available Funds Apportioned	Cumulative Obligations	Cumulative Disbursements
Direct Military & Other Support					
Army	Military Personnel, Army	2023/2023	\$110,107	\$110,107	\$110,107
	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2023/2023	654,696	653,230	548,509
	Missile Procurement, Army	2023/2025	450,000	450,000	75,337
	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	2023/2025	540,000	492,083	41,337
	Other Procurement, Army	2023/2025	3,890	3,890	3,357
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Army	2023/2024	3,300	3,300	2,885
Army Total			1,761,993	1,712,610	781,532
Navy	Military Personnel, Marine Corps	2023/2023	600	600	600
	Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps	2023/2023	34,984	34,984	25,370
	Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy	2023/2024	2,077	2,077	1,258
	Military Personnel, Navy	2023/2023	462	462	462
	Operation & Maintenance, Navy	2023/2023	433,035	433,035	359,287
	Other Procurement, Navy	2023/2025	2,170	2,170	685
Navy Total			473,328	473,328	387,663
Air Force	Other Procurement, Air Force	2023/2025	437,991	418,611	256,658
	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2023/2023	267,084	267,084	212,965
	Operation & Maintenance, Space Force	2023/2023	1,771	1,771	1,296
	Military Personnel, Air Force	2023/2023	11,582	11,582	11,582
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Air Force	2023/2024	99,704	96,346	69,787
Air Force Total			818,132	795,394	552,288
Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide	2023/2023	213,544	213,544	156,806
	Office of the Inspector General	2023/2023	9,770	9,634	3,327
	Procurement, Defense-Wide	2023/2025	31,230	19,787	16,604
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Defense-Wide	2023/2024	2,000	2,000	1,884
Defense-Wide Total			256,544	244,965	178,621
DIRECT MILITARY & OTHER SUPPORT TOTAL			3,309,997	3,226,297	1,900,104
DoD Stocks Replenishment					
Army	Missile Procurement, Army	2023/2025	606,701	572,870	19,109
	Procurement Of Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army	2023/2025	800,658	386,546	295
	Procurement Of Ammunition, Army	2023/2025	92,565	58,052	3,533
Army Total			1,499,924	1,017,468	22,937
Navy	Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps	2023/2025	36	—	—
Navy Total			36	—	—
Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide [PDA Replenishment]	2023/2024	40	—	—
Defense-Wide Total			40	—	—
DOD STOCKS REPLENISHMENT TOTAL			1,500,000	1,017,468	22,937
USAI Defense-Wide					
USAI Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide [USAI]	2023/2024	3,000,000	2,865,605	2,860,476
USAI Defense-Wide Total			3,000,000	2,865,605	2,860,476
P.L. 117-180 TOTAL			\$7,809,997	\$7,109,369	\$ 4,783,517

Source: OUSD(C), response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.3 OAR 001, 7/8/2024.

Table 28.

DoD Execution of the Fourth Ukraine Supplemental (P.L. 117-328), as of June 1, 2024, in \$ Thousands

Component	Appropriation Title	Period of Availability	Available Funds Apportioned	Cumulative Obligations	Cumulative Disbursements
Direct Military & Other Support					
Army	Military Personnel, Army	2023/2023	\$54,252	\$54,252	\$54,252
	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2023/2023	3,020,741	3,010,416	2,410,435
	Missile Procurement, Army	2023/2025	354,000	225,826	28,280
	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	2023/2025	687,000	574,730	335,786
	Other Procurement, Army	2023/2025	6,000	5,990	2,759
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Army	2023/2024	5,800	5,800	4,891
Army Total			4,127,793	3,877,014	2,836,402
Navy	Military Personnel, Marine Corps	2023/2023	1,400	1,400	1,400
	Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps	2023/2023	14,620	14,620	13,561
	Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy	2023/2024	38,500	38,500	34,591
	Military Personnel, Navy	2023/2023	1,386	1,386	1,386
	Operation & Maintenance, Navy	2023/2023	871,410	871,410	684,675
Navy Total			927,316	927,316	735,613
Air Force	Other Procurement, Air Force	2023/2025	730,045	615,336	360,854
	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2023/2023	580,266	580,266	385,020
	Operation & Maintenance, Space Force	2023/2023	8,742	8,742	5,234
	Military Personnel, Air Force	2023/2023	31,028	27,024	8,216
	Military Personnel, Space Force	2023/2023	185,142	155,122	132,110
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Air Force	2023/2024	3,663	3,663	—
Air Force Total			1,538,886	1,390,153	891,433
Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide	2023/2023	280,737	280,737	106,376
	Office of the Inspector General	2023/2023	14,100	644	644
	Defense Health Program	2023/2023	3,326	3,026	1,587
	Procurement, Defense-Wide	2023/2025	89,515	52,035	36,562
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Defense-Wide	2023/2024	6,000	6,000	5,650
Defense-Wide Total			393,678	342,442	150,819
DIRECT MILITARY AND OTHER DEFENSE SUPPORT TOTAL			6,987,673	6,536,925	4,614,267
DoD Stocks Replenishment					
Army	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2023/2023	6,064	6,064	3,679
	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2024/2024	12,685	12,539	9,234
	Missile Procurement, Army	2023/2025	3,165,231	2,000,279	284,058
	Missile Procurement, Army	2024/2026	634,950	—	—
	Procurement of Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army	2023/2025	2,142,508	1,123,539	80,102
	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	2023/2025	3,308,802	1,775,934	184,955
	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	2024/2026	209,512	20,195	8,053
	Other Procurement, Army	2023/2025	348,975	323,902	76,661
	Aircraft Procurement, Army	2023/2025	545	417	—
Army Total			9,829,272	5,262,869	646,742

Component	Appropriation Title	Period of Availability	Available Funds Apportioned	Cumulative Obligations	Cumulative Disbursements
Navy	Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps	2023/2023	598,735	263,334	12,899
	Procurement, Marine Corps	2023/2025	94,509	60,140	2,016
	Weapons Procurement, Navy	2023/2025	129,344	—	—
	Weapons Procurement, Navy	2024/2026	717,840	596,070	2,454
	Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps	2023/2025	124,639	124,639	124,639
	Operation & Maintenance, Navy	2023/2023	28,266	—	—
	Other Procurement, Navy	2023/2025	3,071	1,275	518
Navy Total			1,696,404	1,045,458	142,526
Air Force	Missile Procurement, Air Force	2023/2025	266,640	251,580	380
	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2023/2023	4,267	4,267	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2024/2024	29,091	1,504	769
	Procurement of Ammunition, Air Force	2024/2026	10,212	10,126	—
Air Force Total			310,210	267,477	1,149
Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide	2024/2024	100	—	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide [PDA Replenishment]	2023/2024	3,016	—	—
	Procurement, Defense-Wide	2023/2025	24,041	22,223	6,817
	Procurement, Defense-Wide	2024/2026	16,957	16,693	1,634
Defense-Wide Total			44,114	38,916	8,451
DOD STOCKS REPLENISHMENT TOTAL			11,880,000	6,614,719	798,868
USAI Defense-Wide					
USAI Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide [USAI]	2023/2024	9,000,000	8,476,634	8,376,233
USAI Defense-Wide Total			9,000,000	8,476,634	8,376,233
P.L. 117-328 TOTAL			\$27,867,673	\$21,628,278	\$13,789,368

Source: OUSD(C), response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.3 OAR 001, 7/8/2024.



Table 29.

DoD Execution of the Fifth Ukraine Supplemental (P.L. 118-50), as of June 1, 2024, in \$ Thousands

Component	Appropriation Title	Period of Availability	Available Funds Apportioned	Cumulative Obligations	Cumulative Disbursements
Direct Military & Other Support					
Army	Military Personnel, Army	2024/2025	\$207,158	—	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2024/2025	4,887,581	1,094,683	484,734
	Missile Procurement, Army	2024/2026	846,226	—	—
	Procurement Of Ammunition, Army	2024/2026	2,510,300	—	—
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Army	2024/2025	18,594	—	—
Army Total			8,469,859	1,094,683	484,734
Navy	Military Personnel, Marine Corps	2024/2025	3,538	—	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps	2024/2025	69,045	30,135	13,866
	Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy	2024/2025	13,825	—	—
	Weapons Procurement, Navy	2024/2026	157,974	—	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Navy	2024/2025	976,405	—	—
	Other Procurement, Navy	2024/2026	26,000	88	—
Navy Total			1,246,787	30,223	13,866
Air Force	Other Procurement, Air Force	2024/2026	3,284,073	—	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2024/2025	371,475	—	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Space Force	2024/2025	8,443	—	—
	Military Personnel, Air Force	2024/2025	23,302	—	—
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Air Force	2024/2025	406,834	6,200	909
	Military Personnel, Space Force	2024/2025	4,192	—	—
Air Force Total			4,098,319	6,200	909
Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide	2024/2025	743,900	—	—
	Procurement, Defense-Wide	2024/2026	46,780	—	—
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Defense-Wide	2024/2025	194,125	—	—
	Office of the Inspector General	2024/2025	8,000	—	—
Defense-Wide Total			992,805	—	—
DIRECT MILITARY AND OTHER DEFENSE SUPPORT TOTAL			14,807,770	1,131,107	499,509
DoD Stocks Replenishment					
Other DoD	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide [PDA Replenishment]	2024/2025	13,414,432	—	—
DOD STOCKS REPLENISHMENT TOTAL			13,414,432	—	—
Procurement Replacement of DoD Stocks					
	Procurement, Marine Corps	2024/2026	212,443	—	—
	Weapons Procurement, Navy	2024/2026	549,002	—	—
	Missile Procurement, Army	2024/2026	1,896,531	—	—
	Procurement Of Ammunition, Army	2024/2026	3,102,600	—	—
	Other Procurement, Army	2024/2026	308,991	—	—
	Missile Procurement, Air Force	2024/2026	366,001	—	—
Procurement Replacement of DoD Stocks Total			6,435,568	—	—
DOD STOCKS REPLENISHMENT TOTAL			11,880,000	—	—
USAI Defense-Wide					
USAI Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide [USAI]	2023/2024	13,772,460	—	—
USAI DEFENSE-WIDE TOTAL			13,772,460	—	—
P.L. 118-50 TOTAL			\$48,430,230	\$1,131,107	\$499,509

Source: OUSD(C), response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.3 OAR 001, 7/8/2024.

Table 30.

DoD Execution of Base Budget to Support Ukraine, as of June 1, 2024, in \$ Thousands

Component	Appropriation Title	Period of Availability	Apportionment	Cumulative Obligations	Cumulative Disbursements
Base Execution					
Army	Military Personnel, Army	2023/2023	—	\$381	\$381
	Military Personnel, Army	2024/2024	—	92,365	92,365
	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2022/2022	—	91,902	85,783
	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2023/2023	—	189,851	138,033
	Operation & Maintenance, Army	2024/2024	—	761,373	412,417
	Missile Procurement, Army	2022/2024	—	190	190
	Missile Procurement, Army	2023/2025	—	—	—
	Procurement of Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army	2022/2024	—	—	—
	Procurement of Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army	2023/2025	—	40	39
	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	2022/2024	—	—	—
	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	2023/2025	—	647	644
	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	2024/2026	—	43	4
	Other Procurement, Army	2022/2024	—	1,317	927
	Other Procurement, Army	2023/2025	—	17	7
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Army	2024/2025	—	1	1
Army Total			—	1,138,126	730,791
Navy	Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps	2022/2022	—	2,346	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps	2023/2023	—	14,960	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps	2024/2024	—	5,826	2,351
	Procurement, Marine Corps	2022/2024	—	633,805	—
	Procurement, Marine Corps	2023/2025	—	—	—
	Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy	2022/2023	—	78,305	3
	Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy	2023/2024	—	31,155	—
	Military Personnel, Navy	2023/2023	—	686	686
	Operation & Maintenance, Navy	2022/2022	—	10,444	10,570
	Operation & Maintenance, Navy	2023/2023	—	11,904	13,951
	Operation & Maintenance, Navy	2024/2024	—	277,486	227,848
Navy Total			—	1,066,916	255,409
Air Force	Missile Procurement, Air Force	2023/2025	—	—	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2022/2022	—	81,684	50,279
	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2023/2023	—	24,032	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Air Force	2024/2024	—	202,753	87,971
	Operation & Maintenance, Space Force	2022/2022	—	720	646
	Operation & Maintenance, Space Force	2023/2023	—	1,509	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Space Force	2024/2024	—	2,951	2,312
	Military Personnel, Air Force	2024/2024	—	492	492
	Military Personnel, Space Force	2024/2024	—	2,067	2,067
	Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, Air Force	2024/2025	—	4,200	—
Air Force Total			—	320,408	143,768

(continued on next page)

OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE

Component	Appropriation Title	Period of Availability	Apportionment	Cumulative Obligations	Cumulative Disbursements
Defense-Wide	Defense Working Capital Fund	2024/2024	—	—	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide	2022/2022	—	11,628	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide	2023/2023	—	113,706	—
	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide	2024/2024	—	17,284	9,594
	Defense Health Program	2024/2024	—	279	165
	Cooperative Threat Reduction Account	2020/2022	—	11,100	11,100
	Cooperative Threat Reduction Account	2021/2023	—	46,623	46,574
	Cooperative Threat Reduction Account	2022/2024	—	28,505	25,965
	Cooperative Threat Reduction Account	2023/2025	—	3,946	3,170
	Procurement, Defense-Wide	2022/2024	—	466	451
Defense-Wide Total			—	233,536	97,020
BASE EXECUTION TOTAL			—	2,758,987	1,226,988
USAI Defense-Wide					
USAI Defense-Wide	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide [USAI]	2022/2023	300,000	299,267	299,140
	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide [USAI]	2023/2024	300,000	299,946	299,946
	Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide [USAI]	2024/2025	300,000	300,000	—
USAI Defense-Wide Total			900,000	899,213	599,086
BASE EXECUTION TOTAL			900,000	3,658,199	1,826,074
GRAND TOTAL (SUPPLEMENTAL AND BASE EXECUTION)			\$111,639,783	\$59,107,883	\$36,476,484

Notes: Available Funds/Apportionment = fund from the Office of Management Budget (OMB) distributed by OUSD(C) P/B to the Military Services and Defense Agencies.
Cumulative Obligations = amounts of orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, and similar transactions during an accounting period that will require payment during the same or future period. Cumulative Disbursements = a payment to an individual or organization for goods furnished or services rendered.

Source: OUSD(C), response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.3 OAR 001, 7/8/2024.

Table 31.

DoD Execution of European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) Funding, as of June 1, 2024, in \$ Thousands

Component	Appropriation Title	FY 2022		FY 2023		FY 2024	
		Enacted	Cumulative Obligations	Enacted	Cumulative Obligations	Enacted	Cumulative Obligations
Army	Military Personnel, Army	\$173,241	\$277,621	\$310,131	\$258,379	\$295,671	\$159,861
	Operation and Maintenance, Army	1,580,906	1,569,050	1,635,631	1,691,987	1,697,212	1,214,808
	Aircraft Procurement, Army	6,087		8,309	7,398	4,567	1,567
	Missile Procurement Army	266,420		412,086	383,892	394,569	
	Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army	28,224		96,019	31,530	17,956	7,498
	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	24,664		37,546	3,905	6,365	6,032
	Other Procurement, Army	184,894		118,310	77,099	86,269	13,607
	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army	3,290			—		
	Military Construction, Army	121,285		224,292	—	1,638	
	National Guard Personnel, Army	11,794		12,128	11,629	11,152	5,219
	Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard				746		74
	Reserve Personnel, Army	10,630		10,784	10,413	9,452	5,358
	Working Capital Fund, Army	7,071					
Army Total		2,418,506	1,846,671	2,865,236	2,476,978	2,524,851	1,414,055
Navy	Military Construction, Navy and Marine Corps	131,375		112,181	—	77,072	
	Military Personnel, Navy		6,713	4,620	12,360	6,210	22,630
	Weapons Procurement, Navy	6,500		6,500	6,500	6,630	6,630
	Operation and Maintenance, Navy	13,222		82,136	72,527	18,448	10,821
	Other Procurement, Navy	86,335		54,995			
	Military Personnel, Marine Corps					430	84
	Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps	37,686	36,388	38,511	38,515	20,139	16,868
Navy Total		275,118	43,101	298,943	129,902	128,929	57,033
Air Force	Aircraft Procurement, Air Force				—		
	Missile Procurement, Air Force				—		
	Other Procurement, Air Force	171,697	132,139	34,727	28,543	130,120	
	Military Construction, Air Force	162,404	8,084	244,922	52,618	225,648	
	Operation and Maintenance, Air Force	338,364	393,655	367,273	391,462	378,562	224,732
	Military Personnel, Air Force	31,271	31,141	35,273	34,260	60,081	28,641
	Operation and Maintenance, Space Force						226
Air Force Total		703,736	565,019	682,195	506,883	794,411	253,599
Defense-Wide	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide	411,176	72,586	410,092	45,363	109,170	16,494
	Procurement, Defense-Wide	3,092		10,903		3,040	
	Military Construction, Defense-Wide						
Defense-Wide Total		414,268	72,586	420,995	45,363	112,210	16,494
GRAND TOTAL		\$3,811,628	\$2,527,377	\$4,267,369	\$3,159,126	\$3,560,401	\$1,741,181

Source: OUSD(C), response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.2 OAR 003, 4/3/2024.

APPENDIX F

State Funding for the Ukraine Response Foreign Military Financing

Table 32.

Application of State Ukraine Supplemental Assistance Funds by Funding Account, as of June 30, 2024, in \$ Thousands

Account	Cumulative Funding, as of June 30, 2024			Funds Used April 1 to June 30, 2024	
	Allocations	Obligations	Expenditures	Obligations	Expenditures
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)	\$295,265	\$241,930	\$81,742	\$2,990	\$5,965
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	534,703	491,020,	329,419	271,051	257,691
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	4,730,000	4,210,000	1,793,196	0	0
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	804,993	756,940	119,960	0	188
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	3,277,903	3,277,903	3,050,421	0	0
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, and Demining (NADR)	211,200	212,059	97,988	1,117	4,442
GRAND TOTAL	\$9,854,064	\$9,189,853	\$5,472,725	\$275,158	\$268,286

Note: Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding. Includes Ukraine supplemental funds directly appropriated to State, as well as funds appropriated to the President and subsequently allocated to State. MRA includes funds "for additional support for other vulnerable populations and communities," as authorized by the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 and the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023

Sources: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/9/2024 and 7/16/2024; State, vetting comment, 7/29/2024; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, P.L. 117-103, Div. N, 3/15/2022; Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, P.L. 117-128, 5/21/2022; Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023, P.L. 117-180, Div. B, 9/30/2022; Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023, P.L. 117-328, Div. M, 12/29/2022; Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, P.L. 118-50, Division D, 4/24/2024.

Table 33.

Application of State Ukraine Supplemental Assistance Funds by Type of Assistance, as of June 30, 2024, in \$ Thousands

Type of Assistance	Cumulative Funding, as of June 30, 2024			Funds Used April 1 to June 30, 2024	
	Allocations	Obligations	Expenditures	Obligations	Expenditures
Development and Economic	\$744,338	\$658,050	\$373,416	\$270,402	\$262,357
Agriculture	1,310	1,310	82	0	0
Democracy Assistance	241,315	184,215	45,680	6,652	7,068
Economic Assistance	282,599	279,182	265,640	255,000	255,000
Energy Assistance	51,271	36,350	795	8,750	288
Global Food Security	145,000	145,000	59,300	0	0
Health Assistance	9,250	5,100	0	0	0
Other	13,593	6,893	1,920	0	0
Humanitarian Assistance	3,281,903	3,281,903	3,052,567	0	65,971
Inside Ukraine	323,700	323,700	148,266	0	0
Ukraine Regional Response	538,488	538,488	535,410	0	41,610
Other	2,415,755	2,415,755	2,368,890	0	24,361
Security Sector Assistance	5,287,823	5,250,034	2,046,742	4,756	5,491
Civilian Security Assistance	892,273	833,647	168,602	4,756	5,182
Cyber Assistance	28,550	17,158	591	0	309
Demining Assistance	167,000	179,229	84,353	0	0
Military Assistance	4,740,000	4,220,000	1,7793,196	0	0
GRAND TOTAL	\$9,854,064	\$9,189,987	\$5,472,725	\$275,158	\$268,286

Notes: Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding. Includes Ukraine supplemental funds directly appropriated to State, as well as funds appropriated to the President and subsequently allocated to State. MRA "Other" includes funds allocated, obligated, and authorized "for additional support for other vulnerable populations and communities," as authorized under the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 and the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023.

Sources: State, responses to State OIG request for information, 7/9/2024 and 7/16/2024; State, vetting comment, 7/29/2024; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, P.L. 117-103, Div. N, 3/15/2022; Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, P.L. 117-128, 5/21/2022; Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023, P.L. 117-180, Div. B, 9/30/2022; Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023, P.L. 117-328, Div. M, 12/29/2022; Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, P.L. 118-50, Division D, 4/24/2024.

Table 34.

Application of State Ukraine Supplemental Assistance Funds by Standardized Programs Structure and Definitions (SPSD) Category, as of June 30, 2024, in \$ Thousands

SPSD Category	Cumulative Funding, as of June 30, 2024			Funds Used April 1 to June 30, 2024	
	Allocations	Obligations	Expenditures	Obligations	Expenditures
Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance	\$245,065	\$184,135	\$45,680	\$6,652	\$7,068
Economic Growth	480,180	461,842	325,817	263,750	255,288
Education and Social Services	12,343	6,343	1,746	0	0
Humanitarian Assistance	3,281,903	3,277,903	3,052,567	0	438
Health Assistance	5,500	5,000	0	0	0
Peace and Security	5,829,073	5,250,584	2,046,915	4,756	5,491
GRAND TOTAL	\$9,854,064	\$9,189,987	\$5,472,725	\$275,158	\$268,286

Notes: Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding. Includes Ukraine supplemental funds directly appropriated to State, as well as funds appropriated to the President and subsequently allocated to State. SPSD is an inventory of broadly agreed-upon definitions for foreign assistance programs, providing a common language to describe programs. MRA includes funds "for other vulnerable populations and communities," as authorized under the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 and the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023.

Sources: State, responses to State OIG request for information, 7/9/2024 and 7/16/2024; State vetting comments, 7/29/2024; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, P.L. 117-103, Div. N, 3/15/2022; Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, P.L. 117-128, 5/21/2022; Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023, P.L. 117-180, Div. B, 9/30/2022; Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023, P.L. 117-328, Div. M, 12/29/2022; Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, P.L. 118-50, Division D, 4/24/2024.

Table 35.

Application of State Administration of Foreign Affairs Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations, by Account, as of June 30, 2024, in \$ Thousands

Account	Cumulative Funding, as of June 30, 2024			Funds Used April 1 to June 30, 2024	
	Allocations	Obligations	Expenditures	Obligations	Expenditures
Capital Investment Fund	\$44,170	\$40,700	\$30,060	\$3,110	\$2,680
Diplomatic Programs	496,140	268,960	176,130	31,770	23,640
Transfers to Emergencies in Diplomatic and Consular Services	5,000	0	0	0	0
Transfers to Education and Cultural Exchanges	12,740	7,800	750	20	80
Embassy Security, Contraction, and Maintenance	110,000	29,400	28,990	14,760	14,640
Office of Inspector General	21,500	11,960	10,530	5,250	4,480
GRAND TOTAL	\$689,550	\$358,820	\$246,460	\$54,910	\$45,520

Notes: Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding. P.L. 117-103 authorized funds transfers from the Diplomatic Programs account to the Emergencies in Diplomatic and Consular Service and Capital Investment Fund accounts.

Sources: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/9/2024; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, P.L. 117-103, Div. N, 3/15/2022; Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, P.L. 117-128, 5/21/2022; Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023, P.L. 117-180, Div. B, 9/30/2022; Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023, P.L. 117-328, Div. M, 12/29/2022; Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, P.L. 118-50, Division D, 4/24/2024.

Table 36.

Application of USAGM Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations for the International Broadcasting Account, by Program and Activity, as of June 30, 2024, in \$ Thousands

Program/Activity	Cumulative Funding, as of June 30, 2024			Funds Used April 1 to June 30, 2024	
	Allocations	Obligations	Expenditures	Obligations	Expenditures
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty	\$9,013	\$9,013	\$7,932	\$0	\$1,184
Mobile Equipment	909	909	869	0	81
Travel, Emergency Relocation, and Realignment of Operations	401	401	401	0	0
New Capabilities and Programs	5,266	5,266	4,387	0	897
Marketing and Program Support	243	243	243	0	23
Kyiv and Regional Bureau Initiative	2,064	2,064	1,919	0	166
Baltic Waves Radio	130	130	113	0	17
Technology, Services, and Innovation	2,660	2,660	2,004	0	384
Astra 4A Satellite	849	849	630	0	82
Astra 19.2 Satellite	1,500	1,500	1,063	0	250
MW Transmissions–Armenia and Estonia	311	311	311	0	52
Voice of America	9,202	8,443	6,183		
Ukraine Regional Reporting	4,451	4,382	2,302	2,602	1,444
Content for New Ukrainian TV Channel	2,257	1,984	1,878	1,951	636
Expanded VOA Washington Coverage	1,404	1,207	1,187	251	329
Expanded Polygraph: Fighting Misinformation	1,090	870	816	255	266
Office of Policy and Research	2,429	1,592	222	146	212
Open Technology Fund	1,320	1,320	1,320	540	207
Rapid Response Fund	375	375	341	0	0
Providing Ukraine/Russia Coverage in Regional Markets to Counter Disinformation	125	125	125	30	28
Middle East Broadcasting Networks	125	125	125	0	0
Radio Free Asia	125	125	91	0	0
Office of Cuba Broadcasting	125	125	91	30	28
GRAND TOTAL	\$25,000	\$23,404	\$18,000	\$3,172	\$3,245

Note: Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.

Source: USAGM, response to State OIG request for information, 7/5/2024; USAGM, vetting comments 7/29/2024.

Table 37.

Foreign Military Financing Funds and Funding Purposes Specific to Ukraine, by Source, as of June 30, 2024, in \$ Thousands

FMF Source	Program Value	Funding Purpose
First Ukraine Supplemental (P.L. 117-103)	\$317,580	To procure: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-NATO standard (Soviet-era) weapon systems and ammunition • U.S./NATO long-range firing equipment, including multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS)/artillery • Armed UAS/counter-UAS, EDA overhead costs, armored vehicles, air defense systems (Soviet and NATO), artillery capabilities. • Rocket-propelled grenade launchers, sniper and counter-sniper equipment • Small arms • Night vision devices (NVDS), C2 and cyber capability equipment • Combat care training and equipment • Airfield equipment • Maritime domain awareness and coastal defense capabilities • River patrol boats
Second Ukraine Supplemental (P.L. 117-128)	1,000,000	Same as list above, plus: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fixed-wing capabilities • Professional military training (PME) • Combat training equipment, including improvised explosive devices (IED), Laser Engagement, Targeting and Urban Operations simulators, and small-scale construction supporting these systems
Second Ukraine Supplemental (P.L. 117-128)	225,000	Same as listed above.
Second Ukraine Supplemental (P.L. 117-128)	100,000	Same as listed above.
Second Ukraine Supplemental (P.L. 117-128)	100,000	Funds have yet to be account loaded or made available.
GRAND TOTAL	\$1,742,580	

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 6/17/2024.

Table 38.

Countries that Have Disbursed Foreign Military Financing Supplemental Funds with Intended Procurements, as of June 30, 2024, in \$ Thousands

Country	Program Value	Disbursed	Intended Procurements
Albania	\$17,000	\$15,758	UH-60 helicopter; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) protection equipment
Bulgaria	25,000	24,358	AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder missiles
Croatia	140,000	140,000	UH-60 helicopter; APX-123A Transponders and supplies
Czechia	325,520	305,520	Advanced Targeting Capability; UH-1Y; AH-1Z helicopters; spare engines
Estonia	157,500	157,500	HIMARS
Greece	60,000	60,000	Practice Ammo; Weapon System Program; M1117 and Aerosonde; CH-47 Sustainment; F-35 Support
Latvia	152,500	152,500	Naval air strike missiles; HIMARS
Lithuania	157,500	111,838	Blanket Order Training; AN/PRC-163; AN/PRC-167; Joint Threat Emitters; JCATS; Simple Key Loaders; NVGs and Aiming Lasers
Moldova	36,000	33,166	NVDs; Body armor; Small arms and ammunition; AN/PAS-13 MTWS and accessories; HMMWV; UAS-ISR; Radars AN; MC6 Parachutes
Montenegro	35,900	25,655	Cyber Security Services, JLTV Support; NVDs
North Macedonia	123,000	31,819	Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV); Strykers; Javelin
Poland	275,000	275,000	F-16 engines, M1A1 Tanks and Support
Romania	281,000	63,111	Cyber security services, FOTS and SCOMAR equipment; BAK-12; PUMA AE and UAVs, Virtual battlespace software and support
Slovakia	257,500	236,971	JLTV Common Remote Weapons Systems (CROWS); M4 Rifles/Optics
Taiwan	80,000	80,000	MQ-9 Modification
Zambia	80,000	80,000	Bell 412 Helicopters
TOTAL	\$2,203,420	\$1,793,196	

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 6/17/2024 and 7/16/2024.

APPENDIX G

USAID Funding for the Ukraine Response

Table 39.

USAID Development Funding Related to Ukraine, FY 2022-FY 2024, as of June 30, 2024

Account	FY 2022		FY 2023		FY 2024 Q1-Q3		
	Enacted (Disbursements)	Obligations	Enacted (Disbursements)	Obligations	Enacted (Disbursements)	Obligations	Unobligated (Pipeline) Funding
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)-Global Food Systems Institute (GFSI)	\$185,683	\$7,000,000	\$6,814,317	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)-Global Food Systems Institute (GFSI)-Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act (USAA)	0	46,000,000	38,966,591	3,000,000	8,730,292	0	0
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)-Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)	2,489,670	836,569	5,220,673	2,102,877	2,326,644	2,228,767	0
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)-SFOAA	188,230,571	164,405,168	175,277,471	45,914,185	26,665,009	6,094,466	0
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)-Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act (USAA)	494,768	53,338,937	152,867,020	219,992,746	125,183,047	121,908,619	0
Development Assistance (DV)	1,721,221	2,050,000	1,996,263	650,000	199,493	0	0
Economic Support Funds (ESF)	100,722	-89,549	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Support Funds (ESF)-Population Planning (DP)	48,507	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Support Funds (ESF)-APRA	1,804,453	5,233,891	4,406,324	0	482,553	0	0
Economic Support Funds (ESF)-Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations (AUSAA)	0	0	70,534,747	708,955,988	375,979,284	1,132,755,860	0
Economic Support Funds (ESF)-Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)	88,425	88,129	259,467	178,892	0	0	0
Gift Funds	3,263,359	1,675,771	4,166,411	3,996,520	4,228,202	15,714,722	0
Global AIDs Initiative (GAI)	14,756	0	0	13,200	3,923	0	0
Global Health (GH-H)	15,734,425	14,986,710	12,711,483	13,178,581	8,810,877	7,193,155	4,007,343
Global Health COVID (GH-C-CV)	152,331	0	31,984	0	18,681	0	0
Global Health Advocacy Incubator (GH-C-AI)	0	1,700,000	1,328,315	0	1,023,723	4,640,458	0
Global Health-TB	5,874,566	8,792,944	9,358,986	8,053,849	4,128,378	478,800	0
Transition Initiatives-X-UKR (Supp 1)	68,488,849	77,477,175	5,903,001	5,903,000	1,036,272	0	0
Transition Initiatives-X23-UKR (Supp 4)			6,986,257	39,700,000	20,942,987	0	
Transition Initiatives AEECA (EC 21/22)	10,000,000	10,000,000					
USAID TOTAL	\$298,692,306	\$393,495,745	\$496,829,310	\$1,051,639,838	\$579,759,365	\$1,291,014,847	\$4,007,343

Note: Obligations and expenditures are reported for the fiscal year that these actions occurred. As some expenditures were made against funds obligated in prior fiscal years, reported expenditures may exceed reported obligations. Obligations and disbursements that occurred during the fiscal year regardless of when funds were appropriated.

Source: USAID OTI, response to USAID OIG financial request for information, 7/9/2024.

Table 40.

USAID Humanitarian Assistance Funding Related to Ukraine, FY 2022-FY 2024 (Q1-Q3)

Account	FY 2022		FY 2023		FY 2024 Q1-Q3	
	Enacted (Disbursements)	Obligations	Enacted (Disbursements)	Obligations	Enacted (Disbursements)	Obligations
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	\$1,038,115,030	\$1,038,115,030	\$954,472,631	\$954,472,631	\$124,111,638	\$124,111,638
USAID BHA SUBTOTAL	\$1,038,115,030	\$1,038,115,030	\$954,472,631	\$954,472,631	\$124,111,638	\$124,111,638

Source: USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG financial request for information, 7/9/2024.



APPENDIX H

Completed Oversight Projects



FY 2024 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Operation Atlantic Resolve, including U.S. Government Activities Related to Ukraine

Within the quarter, April 1 to June 30, 2024, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs, as well as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued 1 management advisory and 15 oversight reports related to OAR and the Ukraine response, as detailed below. Completed reports by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and other oversight agencies are available on their respective websites and ukraineoversight.gov.

A complete list of related projects since Russia's full-scale invasion, including those prior to the designation of OAR as an overseas contingency operation, can be found in the *FY 2024 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Operation Atlantic Resolve, including U.S. Government Activities Related to Ukraine* which is available at www.dodig.mil.

FINAL REPORTS BY LEAD IG AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine Restructuring Contract Surveillance Planning and Contract Oversight

DODIG-2024-101; June 25, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine whether Army contracting personnel acted in accordance with Federal and DoD policies to properly award the contract for the maintenance of equipment at the Remote Maintenance Distribution Cell-Ukraine (RDC-U). Additionally, the audit was conducted to determine whether Army contracting personnel acted in accordance with Federal and DoD policies to appropriately plan for and establish controls to conduct surveillance of contractor performance and effectively monitor contractor performance.

During Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. began to provide more advanced weapon systems to Ukraine. The DoD realized that Ukraine would require maintenance and repair support to continue its defenses. As a result, in July 2022, the Army established the RDC-U in Jasionka, Poland, to support the maintenance and repair of U.S.-provided equipment for Ukraine. U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command personnel serve as the primary and alternate contracting officer's representatives for the RDC-U task order, and support the Army's oversight of the contractor maintenance performed at the RDC-U.

The DoD OIG found that Army contracting personnel planned and established controls to conduct surveillance of contractor performance at the RDC-U in accordance with Federal and DoD policies. Army contracting personnel also adjusted the surveillance procedures and number of oversight personnel located onsite to adapt to changing requirements in the RDC-U's mission to ensure continued surveillance of the contractor's maintenance efforts. In addition, Army contracting personnel tasked to conduct contract oversight at the RDC-U possessed the necessary experience and completed the required training in accordance with DoD policy. Furthermore, Army contracting personnel performed adequate contract oversight to ensure satisfactory contractor performance.

As a result, Army contracting personnel provided assurance that the contractor accomplished the task order requirements for providing maintenance, repair, and sustainment support to assist in Ukraine's defense against the Russian invasion. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this report.

Evaluation of the DoD's Accountability of Lost or Destroyed Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring

DODIG-2024-097; June 24, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this evaluation to determine whether the U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC)-Ukraine obtained complete loss reports for enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM)-designated defense articles provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) in a timely manner.

The purpose of the DoD's EEUM program is to safeguard defense articles that require additional layers of verification and protections. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) and the EEUM Concept of Operation detail the requirements for partner nations to provide reports to the Security Cooperation Organization, identifying the loss or destruction of EEUM-designated defense articles, for entry in the Security Cooperation Information Portal-End-Use Monitoring database. Personnel from the ODC-Ukraine, as the Security Cooperation Organization in Ukraine, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency provide these loss reports to State for review to identify any potential indicators of illicit diversion or misuse. USEUCOM supports the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and oversees the ODC-Ukraine to ensure compliance with the DoD's EEUM policy.

The DoD OIG found that DoD and UAF personnel collected, reviewed, and recorded loss reporting information for lost or destroyed EEUM-designated defense articles valued at \$62.2 million between March 1, 2022, and July 31, 2023. Of the items reported during this initial period, 99.4 percent were night vision devices, for many of which the DoD OIG previously recommended the DoD reconsider the need for enhanced monitoring. The DoD took steps to improve inventory reporting, including by requiring quarterly reporting from the UAF during the latter half of 2023. The DoD OIG extended the period of review to November 26, 2023, which increased the value and diversity of items reported, bringing the total overall value of reported lost or destroyed defense articles reported to \$62.2 million as of November 26, 2023. This increased reporting included not only NVDs, but items such as Javelin missiles and missile launch units. The ODC-Ukraine indicated that it cannot tell which of these items were lost and which were destroyed until it receives the circumstances of loss in the UAF loss reports.

The DoD OIG concluded that the ODC-Ukraine did not consistently obtain timely or complete loss reports in accordance with the SAMM, the Concept of Operation and the EEUM control plan submission standards. While not all reports contained the loss date, the average time from initial defense article loss to final loss report production was 301 days for those reports that contained loss dates. This average was approximately 10 times longer than the reporting requirement in the SAMM, and greatly exceeded the time requirements in the defense article control plans and the 2022 Concept of Operation.

This occurred because reporting timelines and information requirements were inconsistent, the SAMM did not provide sufficient guidance for partner nation self-reporting, and the timelines and requirements did not always provide adequate time for the UAF to investigate EEUM losses. The DoD OIG also concluded that USEUCOM personnel did not consistently review or analyze information received from initial loss notifications and final loss reports.

The absence of timely and complete EEUM loss reporting, along with the lack of thorough analysis of the loss reports, impedes the DoD's understanding of any potential end-use violations on EEUM-designated defense articles. As a result, this increases the risk that the DoD could lose accountability over EEUM-designated defense articles provided to Ukraine. It was beyond the scope of the evaluation to determine whether there has been diversion of such assistance. The DoD OIG's Defense Criminal Investigative Service continues to investigate allegations of criminal conduct regarding U.S. security assistance to Ukraine.

The DoD OIG made two recommendations to the ODC-Ukraine Chief and two recommendations to the USEUCOM Commander, in coordination with the ODC-Ukraine. The ODC-Ukraine Chief agreed with the recommendations to update the 2023 Concept of Operation and to publish procedures for faster retrieval of critical information from final loss report investigations. This recommendation is resolved and open. All other recommendations remain unresolved and open until the DoD OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

Audit of the DoD's Revaluation of the Support Provided to Ukraine Through Presidential Drawdown Authority

DODIG-2024-095; June 11, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine the extent and impact of the DoD's March 2023 estimation change for valuing assets provided under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), determine whether DoD Components followed the current policy when updating the value of items provided to the Ukrainian government through PDA, and assess whether the current PDA valuation policy complies with Federal laws and regulations.

On June 20, 2023, the DoD announced that during its review of defense articles provided to the Ukrainian government, it identified a net \$6.2 billion valuation overstatement (better known as the "\$6.2 billion accounting error") that required adjustments to the valuation of those defense articles. The DoD stated that this adjustment was due to incorrectly using replacement cost to value the items provided by PDA to the Ukrainian government. The DoD OIG focused this audit on the revaluation effort.

From August 2021 to May 2023, the DoD provided defense articles to the Ukrainian government through 37 PDAs. On June 20, 2023, the DoD announced that during its review of defense articles provided to the Ukrainian government, it identified a net \$6.2 billion valuation overstatement that required adjustments to the valuation of those defense articles. The DoD stated that this adjustment was due to incorrectly using replacement cost to value the items provided by PDA to the Ukrainian government. The DoD OIG focused this audit on the revaluation effort.

The DoD OIG selected a nonstatistical sample from the first 37 PDA Execute Orders of general equipment and operating materials and supplies (OM&S) defense articles. The audit team reviewed revaluation data for about 2,300 pieces of general equipment of defense articles subject to depreciation, such as Humvees, radar systems, tanks, and armored personnel carriers, and similar data for nearly 23,000,000 pieces of OM&S, such as ammunition and missiles that are expended, and not subject to depreciation. The DoD OIG determined that based on its sample review, the DoD overvalued defense articles provided to the Ukrainian government by an additional \$1.9 billion, comprised of \$653 million for general equipment and \$1.25 billion for operating materials and supplies. Combined with the previously acknowledged \$6.2 billion error, the total of overvalued defense articles provided through PDA is \$8.1 billion.

While each type of defense article has different requirements for calculating its value under PDA, the DoD OIG identified some common causes for the inaccurate revaluations. Specifically, the military departments did not accurately use the correct accounting valuation method for verifying the accuracy of general equipment and OM&S valuations, despite providing certifications that fully complied with the valuation criteria. Additionally, military department financial reporting material weaknesses plagued proper recording and reporting of PDA provided to the Ukrainian government. Finally, DoD policies need to be more specific on developing PDA estimates and reconciling PDA estimates to actual costs.

The DoD OIG made several recommendations, including that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (USD(C)/CFO) require the military departments to perform a full reconciliation of GE and OM&S provided to the Ukrainian government under PDA Execute Orders 1-37 to ensure the assets are valued according to applicable policy. Additionally, the DoD OIG recommended that in coordination with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the USD(C)/CFO determine policy for valuing GE with a net book value of zero and develop a standardized pricing methodology for OM&S. The DoD OIG also recommended the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) upgrade the DSCA 1000 system, update its' Security Assistance Management Manual to include information on developing initial estimates for valuing defense articles, and guidance on updating initial estimated costs to actual costs of the PDA Execute Orders. Finally, DoD OIG recommended coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to develop a centralized repository of serialized general equipment provided under PDA. The Marine Corps took corrective actions relating to the Marine Corps OM&S issues identified in the report. The Army provided its planned approach for corrective actions on the Army OM&S issues identified in the report.

The USD(C)/CFO, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the DSCA, and the military departments, agreed with all the recommendations. The nine recommendations are resolved but will remain open until the DoD OIG officials verifies that management has implemented corrective actions.

Management Advisory: Matters Regarding Naval Support Activity Crane Identified While Evaluating Accountability of Ukraine-Bound Equipment to Sea Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States

DODIG-2024-094; June 10, 2024

The DoD OIG issued this management advisory as part of an evaluation determine whether DoD Components effectively implemented policies and procedures to account for Ukraine-bound defense articles from their points of origin to seaports of embarkation within the continental United States. The DoD OIG identified the Crane Army Ammunition Activity and the Naval Support Activity Crane did not fully comply with security requirements for arms, ammunition, and explosives outlined in DoD regulations. The DoD OIG recommended the Commanders of the Joint Munitions Command and the Navy Region Mid-Atlantic promptly conduct a joint security review and threat assessment and develop and initiate corrective action plans to ensure that all required inspections of ammunition storage areas are consistently performed. The DoD OIG will close the recommendations once they verify that management has implemented corrective actions.

Evaluation of the Accountability of Ukraine-Bound Equipment to Sea Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States

DODIG-2024-093; June 10, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this evaluation to determine whether DoD Components are effectively accounting for defense materials being provided to Ukraine from their points of origin to seaports of embarkation within the continental United States.

When exercising PDA, the President issues a determination order directing the DoD to provide defense materials to Ukraine. Then, the DSCA issues an execute order to the Military Services and Defense agencies to send the equipment and provide information and instructions. DoD Components transport equipment designated for Ukraine from the point of origin to the seaport of embarkation using the Defense Transportation System and follow the policies and procedures in the Defense Transportation Regulation.

The DoD OIG found that the DoD has accounted for, and rapidly transported, defense materials for Ukraine from the points of origin to seaports of embarkation within the continental United States, as directed in the execute orders. However, more efficient processes for transporting and accounting for equipment would address numerous issues identified during the evaluation. The issues identified include, DoD Components often sent defense materials with inaccurate or inadequate documentation, DoD personnel could not easily identify defense materials being provided to Ukraine using military shipping labels or by querying transportation systems, and personnel at a seaport of embarkation did not always acknowledge auto generated reports of shipment for ammunition as required by the Defense Transportation Regulation.

These errors occurred because the instructions that the DSCA provided in the PDA execute orders did not provide specific guidance on accounting for and transporting PDA material. Additionally, PDA material did not have any unique identifier assigned to identify the Presidential Determination on military shipping labels or in transportation data systems. Lastly, personnel at a seaport of embarkation did not use and respond to reports of shipment because other transportation systems were more effective. As a result, DoD processes were less efficient and effective than they could be, and personnel were not complying with all Defense Transportation Regulation requirements.

The DoD OIG made two recommendations. The DoD OIG recommended that the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) Commander review shipping operations, document lessons learned from rapidly shipping defense materials to Ukraine and develop and implement procedures that simplify shipping acknowledgement processes and make it easier to track and identify PDA material. The DoD OIG also recommended that the DSCA Director update execution orders to direct shippers to use Foreign Military Sales transportation and documentation procedures for PDA shipments.

The USTRANSCOM Deputy Commander agreed with the recommendation to document lessons learned and identify best practices from providing support to Ukraine for use in future operations. The Deputy Commander partially agreed with the recommendation to simplify shipment acknowledgement processes and develop and implement procedures to make it easier to track and identify PDA shipments. The Deputy Commander stated that the Defense Transportation Regulation provides guidance and has different requirements based on different factors. Although they only partially agreed with the recommendation, the Deputy Commander stated that USTRANSCOM will work in coordination with the appropriate Service representatives to review opportunities to simplify shipment acknowledgement and receipt processes.

The Deputy Commander did not agree with the recommendation to use the Transportation Control Number construct to identify PDA shipments on military shipping labels and in electronic transportation systems, but proposed an alternative method for tracking that the DoD OIG found meets the intent of the recommendation. The DSCA Assistant Director (International Operations), agreed with the recommendation and stated that the DSCA will request the Services to include the PD order number on their military shipping label in each presidential determination order.

The recommendations are resolved but will remain open until DoD OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

Audit of DoD Training of Ukrainian Armed Forces: Patriot Air and Missile Defense System and Collective Training

DODIG-2024-090; May 31, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine the extent to which the DoD trained the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to operate and maintain U.S.-provided defense articles.

The DoD OIG found from January 15 through April 14, 2023, the Army trained UAF personnel to operate and maintain the Patriot. The 3-6 Air Defense Artillery Battalion facilitated operational and maintenance training on Patriot equipment, including the radar, launchers, and engagement control station. Additionally, the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command facilitated a training validation event to allow UAF personnel to demonstrate the capability of their U.S.-provided Patriot system in theater. The training and the training validation were sufficient to ensure UAF personnel could operate and maintain the Patriot.

From January 15 to May 19, 2023, the Army provided collective training to UAF battalions. The collective training provided to the UAF included multiple programs of instruction designed to support their progress from individual skills to battalion-level live fire exercises.

The DoD OIG determined that the 7th Army Training Command (ATC) did not have enough linguists to support training for UAF battalions that participated in collective training. This occurred because the 7th ATC did not know the number of UAF personnel it would need to train at one time or the platforms on which the UAF would require training until approximately 2 weeks before collective training. The shortage of linguists also occurred because the 7th ATC did not properly develop requirements when requesting contracted linguistic support. From April through July 2023, the 7th ATC increased the number of available contracted linguists, effectively resolving the linguist shortage. In addition, the 7th ATC clarified its linguist requirements; therefore, the DoD OIG did not issue recommendations related to the linguist shortage.

The DoD OIG determined that 7th ATC personnel did not formally assess the performance of the UAF personnel that received collective training from January 15 through May 19, 2023. This occurred because the 7th ATC did not implement a formal process to assess the performance of UAF personnel receiving collective training. As of July 10, 2023, 7th ATC personnel had developed a process to assess the UAF performance during collective training. However, the 7th ATC did not formalize this assessment process into a standard operating procedure.

The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander, 7th Army Training Command, ensure that the Commander, Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine formalizes the UAF assessment process into a standard operating procedure. The Chief of Staff, 7th ATC, responding for

the Commander, agreed with the recommendation. The comments and actions taken were sufficient for the DoD OIG to close the recommendation.

Evaluation of the Combatant Command Military Deception Planning

DODIG-2024-085; May 21, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this evaluation to determine the extent to which the combatant commands have effectively conducted military deception (MILDEC) planning in support of ongoing OAR operations. The report is classified at a level higher than the classified appendix to this report. To file a Freedom of Information Act Request, submit a request to FOIA.gov.

Audit of the DoD's Control for Validating and Responding to Ukraine's Requests for Military Equipment and Assistance

DODIG-2024-082; May 17, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine the extent to which the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) implemented controls for validating Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance and coordinated with partner nations. Specifically, the DoD OIG focused on the DoD military equipment and assistance provided to Ukraine from existing stocks through Presidential Drawdown Authority.

The use of the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) to provide military assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act allows for delivery of military equipment and assistance from DoD stocks to foreign countries to respond to unforeseen emergencies. As of March 12, 2024, the DoD had announced 55 Presidential Drawdowns, totaling \$26.2 billion, for military equipment and assistance for Ukraine.

The DoD OIG found that USEUCOM, the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U), and Service Component Commands (SCCs) had controls in place to validate Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance and that they continued to update those controls. USEUCOM established the Future Forces Ukraine Working Group to review Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance, and SAG-U and the SCCs established various command-unique controls for validating Ukraine's requests. However, USEUCOM, SAG-U, and the SCCs did not document the roles, responsibilities, processes, or procedures for validating Ukraine's requests. According to USEUCOM, SAG-U, and SCC officials, they did not document processes and procedures because of the fast-paced nature of the effort and sense of urgency to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF).

As a result, although USEUCOM, SAG-U, and SCC officials communicated and coordinated to support UAF requests for military equipment and assistance, they did not ensure seamless operation of the validation process for Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance. Documenting processes and procedures is critical due to the rate of rotation of personnel supporting the Ukraine security assistance efforts. Although the DoD coordinated at multiple levels on Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance with partner nations, there were challenges that made coordination with partner nations difficult. For example, DoD officials identified challenges with the large number of partner nations donating military equipment to Ukraine, classification levels of information, and partner nations wishing to remain discrete donors.

The DoD OIG made two recommendations to the USEUCOM Commander. First, in coordination with SAG-U and its SCCs, to document roles, responsibilities, processes, and procedures for validating the Ukraine requests for military equipment and assistance. Second, in coordination with the SAG-U Commander, to identify and implement courses of action to mitigate coordination challenges with partner nations regarding the classification level of information.

The recommendations are unresolved and will remain open until the DoD OIG receives documentation that agreed upon actions have been completed.

Audit of the Army's Award of Noncompetitive Contracts in Support of Ukraine

DODIG-2024-078; May 8, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine whether Army contracting officials properly awarded noncompetitive contracts in support of the Ukraine response in accordance with Federal, DoD, and Army regulations and guidance. This report was the first of two reports on the Army's award and administration of noncompetitive contracts in support of the Ukraine response. This report focuses on the award of the contracts; the second report will focus on the administration of the contracts.

The DoD OIG found that the Army contracting officials awarded noncompetitive contracts in accordance with Federal, DoD, and Army regulations and guidance. For the 13 contracts valued at \$1.3 billion, the DoD OIG found that the contracting officers were justified in awarding a noncompetitive contract. However, the DoD OIG identified some administrative errors in the awarding of noncompetitive contracts.

While these administration errors did not affect the validity of the noncompetitive award of the contracts, Army contracting officers can improve in meeting Federal, DoD, and Army regulations and guidance when awarding noncompetitive contracts. Officials cited administrative oversight and a lack of awareness as two of the reasons why the contracting errors occurred.

The DoD OIG recommended that the Commanding General, Army Contracting Command, develop and implement a quality control tool and train contracting officials to ensure proper documentation and adherence to Federal DoD, and Army regulations when awarding noncompetitive contracts.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement), responding for the Commanding General, Army Contracting Command, partially agreed with the recommendation. The Deputy Assistant Secretary noted the Army already requires Paperless Contract Files and the Army Cabinet Index folder structure to be used and this index has the list of everything needed in noncompetitive action. Additionally, Paperless Contract Files training is already provided. However, the Deputy Assistant Secretary's comments do not address the fact that the current processes did not prevent the deficiencies identified during the audit. Furthermore, the comments do not address what additional control mechanism the Army will put in place to ensure the current guidance is followed, nor do the comments make clear whether the training would prevent the deficiencies identified during the audit. Therefore, the recommendation will remain open until the DoD receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspection of Embassy Warsaw and Constituent Post, Poland

ISP-I-24-18; June 12, 2024

State OIG inspected the operating environment, executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of Embassy Warsaw and Consulate General Krakow.

State OIG found that the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission led Mission Poland in a professional and collaborative manner consistent with State leadership and management principles. Three areas significantly impacted Mission Poland's operations, 1) the effects of, and the mission's response to Russia's war against Ukraine, 2) the mission's outdated and inadequate facilities, and 3) locally employed staff wages not keeping pace with the cost of living and high inflation in Poland; guidance from the Bureau of European and Eurasian affairs on how to expend Ukraine supplemental funds was not always sufficient and clear; the embassy lacked some supporting documentation and justification for its use of Ukraine supplemental funds; in response to the increase in foreign assistance due to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Mission Poland created new coordination mechanisms; Mission Poland's public diplomacy grants management recordkeeping for closed awards did not fully comply with State standards; Mission Poland had deficiencies in the safety, health, and environmental management program, and the fire protection program; the motor vehicle, property, contracting officer's representative, and financial management programs did not fully comply with State standards; and Mission Poland also had deficiencies related to information security, non-enterprise networks, telephone system operational readiness, and mobile devices management.

State OIG made 38 recommendations, 36 to Embassy Warsaw, 1 to the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, and 1 to the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The embassy and the relevant State bureaus concurred with 37 recommendations and neither agreed nor disagreed with 1 recommendation. At the time the report was issued, State OIG considered all 38 recommendations resolved, pending further action. The recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed. This report also included classified findings. Details can be found in this quarterly report's classified appendix.

Audit of the Department of State's Humanitarian Response to the Ukraine Crisis

AUD-GEER-24-16; May 30, 2024

State OIG conducted this audit to determine whether 1) State's humanitarian assistance response to the Ukraine crisis was implemented in accordance with State policies, guidance, and award terms and conditions and 2) the intended objectives were achieved. To conduct this audit, State OIG reviewed four voluntary contributions, with a collective value of \$431.7 million, awarded to three public international organizations by the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) in FY 2022.

State OIG found that the terms and conditions of the voluntary contributions did not include measurable objectives, which is strongly recommended in State guidance as a result of a previous State OIG audit; absent specific, measurable objectives or corresponding performance indicators. State PRM was not positioned to track progress toward intended program results. Although State PRM completed a monitoring plan for the voluntary

contributions. This plan did not detail specific monitoring activities to be performed and was not tied to State PRM's risk assessment for the awards as required by State guidance. Although State PRM conducted monitoring activities, it did not track progress against measurable objectives and performance indicators for the awards and, therefore, State PRM was limited to broadly assessing alignment of public international organization activities against the organizations' appeals for assistance. Additionally, State PRM implemented internal controls to manage risk and developed best practices to guide the risk assessment process.

State OIG made nine recommendations to improve PRM's risk assessment process and the monitoring of these awards. State PRM concurred with all nine recommendations, therefore all nine recommendations resolved. The recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

Review of the Kyiv Transit Platform

ISP-I-24-17; April 26, 2024

The objectives of this review were to describe the current operating status of the Kyiv Transit Platform (KTP) and remote operations that support Embassy Kyiv and determine whether the KTP is carrying out its program responsibilities in accordance with applicable standards. Additional objectives were to determine whether the KTP is operating in compliance with applicable Department security standards outlined in 12 Foreign Affairs Manual 230, 12 Foreign Affairs Manual 300, and 12 Foreign Affairs Manual 500 for security personnel, facilities, and information systems. Lastly, State OIG conducted this review to determine whether the 2023 memorandum of understanding between Embassy Kyiv and Mission Poland reflects the roles and responsibilities of the two missions concerning the operations of the KTP and provides for an agreed-upon division of labor. In June 2023, Embassy Kyiv and Mission Poland concluded a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that described the functions of a jointly administered temporary support platform and the respective roles and responsibilities of Embassy Kyiv and Mission Poland in providing operational and management support to Embassy Kyiv in Poland. In August 2023, the platform, now called the Kyiv Transit Platform, moved from Rzeszow, Poland, to Consulate General Krakow. State OIG reviewed the KTP's operational effectiveness, assessed security and accountability issues, and reviewed the coordination between Embassy Kyiv and Mission Poland as outlined in the June 2023 MoU.

With respect to operational effectiveness, State OIG found that the KTP generally operated in accordance with State standards, with a few exceptions. The KTP lacked a standard operation procedure that documented the KTP's roles and responsibilities, including transit logistics. This reduced the KTP's efficiency and created risks that critical responsibilities such as managing the safe transit of staff to Ukraine would not be carried out effectively. In addition, the KTP's position descriptions for two recently filled locally employed staff positions did not accurately reflect their responsibilities or list the correct supervisory chain of command. The KTP also did not dispose and archive its records as required by State standards. Findings related to security and accountability are Sensitive But Unclassified. Regarding coordination, State OIG found that State, Embassy Kyiv, Embassy Warsaw, Consulate General Krakow, and the KTP had established constructive working relationships to further joint goals related to the transit of U.S. Government official visitors and staff to Ukraine. However, the June 2023 MoU between Embassy Kyiv and Mission Poland was outdated and did not reflect the current operating environment of the KTP. In January 2024, after State OIG identified this issue, Embassy Kyiv and Mission Poland amended the MOU to reflect the current operating environment.

State OIG made two recommendations in this report, both to Embassy Warsaw. Embassy Warsaw concurred with one recommendation and did not concur with the other recommendation. At the time the report was issued, State OIG considered both recommendations resolved, pending further action. The recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

This report includes classified findings. Additional information regarding classified findings is available in this quarterly report's classified appendix.

FINAL REPORTS BY LEAD IG PARTNER AGENCIES

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

UKRAINE: Status and Use of Supplemental U.S. Funding, as of First Quarter, Fiscal Year 2024

GAO-24-107232; May 30, 2024

The GAO conducted this audit to assess the status of the funds provided in the Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts and describe the types of activities agencies have funded with these appropriations.

Congress has appropriated more than \$174 billion under five Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts. About \$113.4 billion was appropriated in fiscal years 2022 and 2023 under four initial Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts. The majority of these initial funds were specified for the U.S. response to the Ukraine crisis and some of the funds were for other purposes. Some of these funds have expired and some remain available for future use.

As of December 31, 2023, of the approximately \$113.4 billion appropriated in the Ukraine acts, U.S. agencies had obligated about \$101.2 billion and disbursed about \$67.5 billion.

Of the approximately \$62.3 billion provided to the DoD, it had obligated about \$52.3 billion, such as for procuring missiles, ammunition, and combat vehicles for Ukraine and to replace U.S. stocks. In its own reporting, DoD combines this formal obligated amount with internal commitments to convey its financial commitments. Of the approximately \$46.1 billion provided to State and USAID, the two agencies had obligated about \$44.4 billion, such as to support the Ukrainian government's civilian budget, including salaries for first responders, health workers, and educators.

Of the approximately \$3.4 billion provided to the Department of Health and Human Services, it had obligated about \$3.1 billion, such as in grants for supporting Ukrainian refugees settling in the U.S. Of the approximately \$1.6 billion provided to eight U.S. agencies and offices covered in this review, they had obligated about \$1.4 billion, such as for nuclear security and sanctions enforcement.

The GAO did not make any recommendations in this report. This report is part of a series of reports that the GAO has underway evaluating the U.S. Government agencies' response to the crisis in Ukraine.

Foreign Assistance: USAID Should Strengthen Risk Management in Conflict Zones

GAO-24-106192; April 30, 2024

The GAO conducted this audit to evaluate USAID's processes for assessing and mitigating risks to delivering assistance in conflict zones and its sharing of related lessons learned, for the case study countries of Nigeria, Somalia, and Ukraine.

USAID has standard processes to assess risks to its delivery of assistance in countries worldwide. In countries affected by violent conflict, factors such as attacks on aid facilities can complicate delivery of assistance. Certain USAID processes target specific types of risk, including fiduciary risks, counterterrorism- or sanctions-related risks, and security risks. However, the GAO found that, contrary to leading practices, USAID did not comprehensively assess or document, in fraud risk profiles, all relevant fraud risks in the three conflict-affected countries that the GAO selected for its review—Nigeria, Somalia, and Ukraine. As a result, USAID cannot ensure it has identified and is mitigating all relevant fraud risks in these countries.

The GAO made nine recommendations to USAID, including that it comprehensively assesses and document fraud risks in Nigeria, Somalia, and Ukraine, provide guidance on third-party monitoring of risks, and develop a mechanism for systematically sharing risk-related lessons learned for use in conflict zones. USAID concurred with these recommendations, which will remain open until the GAO receives documentation that the recommendations are completed.

Ukraine: Status and Challenges of DoD Weapon Replacement Efforts

GAO-24-106649; April 30, 2024

The GAO conducted this review to evaluate the DoD's efforts to use \$25.9 billion provided by Congress to replace weapons sent to Ukraine, and actions the DoD is taking to address defense industrial base challenges that could delay replacement efforts.

Ammunition, missiles, and combat vehicles account for most of this spending. The DoD is also using some of the funding to expand production capacity in the defense industrial base (the companies that develop and manufacture weapon systems). For example, the DoD is investing \$2 billion of this funding to help companies get materials to increase the production of 155mm ammunition.

The DoD identified multiple supply chain challenges that weapon programs are experiencing. Generally, these are long-standing challenges made worse by events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and increased demands from Ukraine, among other factors. Long lead times associated with the delivery of supplier parts and raw materials are affecting many weapons programs. One missile program that the GAO reviewed reported a lead time increase from 19 to 34 months within the last 2 years for electronic parts, such as circuit card assemblies.

To address these challenges, the DoD is using some of the \$25.9 billion that Congress provided to expand the defense industrial base's production capacity. Since February 2022, the DoD has committed or obligated over \$2.8 billion to increase weapons production.

The DoD is also relying on multiyear procurement, a contracting approach that provides up to five years of requirements through one contract. Multiyear procurements can benefit the industrial base by providing a stable demand signal up front. This can drive cost savings for the government. For example, the DoD can generate discounted pricing by purchasing multiple years' worth of supplies at once.

The DoD is collecting lessons learned based on its first-time use of supplemental funding for replacement. These include observations on challenges and solutions for using multiyear procurement contracts, among other things.

Ukraine: Lessons from Other Conflicts Can Improve the Results of U.S. Recovery Assistance

GAO-24-107180; April 29, 2024

The GAO issued this report compiling lessons learned from the GAO's work assessing past U.S. experiences with reconstruction that could strengthen planning for Ukraine's recovery.

In Ukraine, Recovery efforts have begun as the country seeks to stabilize areas under its control. The United States has already started funding and implementing projects to address short-term recovery needs and to plan for longer-term efforts, even during the conflict. Applying lessons from prior U.S. efforts in countries engaged in recovery activities during and after a conflict can inform recovery efforts in Ukraine and increase the likelihood of sustainable results.

For example, U.S. assistance for recovery efforts should be guided by comprehensive strategies that, among other things, clearly define objectives and estimate costs. Rule of law assistance to countries of the former Soviet Union had limited results and was unsustainable. The GAO recommends that U.S. agencies create strategies with defined, sustainable outcomes. In Iraq and Afghanistan, challenges in rebuilding efforts underscored the importance of strategies that clearly articulate objectives and indicate the funding resources needed to achieve and sustain them. In Iraq, worsening security conditions led to delays and increased overall project costs beyond what was anticipated, emphasizing the need to revise timelines and estimated costs to reflect changes in security.

In addition, Practices that facilitate coordination among U.S. agencies and with the host country and other international donors increase awareness of ongoing programs. Establishing U.S. and host country accountability mechanisms for recovery assistance can increase transparency and the likelihood that any financial assistance is used as intended, helping to reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.

While the GAO did not issue any direct recommendations in these lessons learned report, it did offer several questions policymakers should consider for improving the results of recovery assistance to Ukraine. These included: Given that insecurity can threaten recovery, how can the United States make sustainable investments in Ukraine's recovery while the war is ongoing? Additionally, amid volatile security conditions, what accountability measures can the U.S. implement to mitigate corruption, fraud, and diversion risks?

APPENDIX I

Ongoing Oversight Projects

Tables 41 and 42 list the titles and objectives for the Special IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OAR and Ukraine.

Table 41.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs, as of June 30, 2024

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the DoD's Execution of Funds Provided for Assistance to Ukraine

To determine whether the DoD used Ukraine assistance funds in accordance with Federal laws and DoD policies. The President signed the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act with the purpose of responding to the situation in Ukraine. This audit will determine whether appropriated funds met that purpose.

Audit of DoD Maintenance Operations for Military Equipment Provided to Ukraine

To determine whether the DoD is effectively providing maintenance support for U.S. weapon systems and equipment provided for Ukraine operations.

Management Advisory: Follow-Up Evaluation of Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine

To determine the extent to which the DoD conducted EEUM of designated defense articles provided to Ukraine in accordance with DoD policy during the period after June 2, 2023. This evaluation is a follow-up to DODIG-2024-043, "Evaluation of the DoD's Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine," released on January 10, 2024.

Evaluation of the DoD's Validation of Repair Parts Requested by the Ukrainian Armed Forces

To determine the effectiveness of DoD's Components' processes for verifying the need for, and the accountability of, repair parts requested by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to maintain military equipment provided by the DoD.

Management Advisory: Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine Parcel of Land

To assess the extent to which the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine and its subordinate commands, in coordination with the U.S. Army Europe and Africa, have fully implemented plans and issued guidance to improve compliance with DoD information security policies.

Management Advisory: DoD Contingency Planning in Poland

To assess the extent to which the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine and its subordinate commands, in coordination with the U.S. Army Europe and Africa, have fully implemented plans and issued guidance to improve compliance with DoD information security policies.

Follow-Up Evaluation of Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine

To determine the extent to which the DoD conducted EEUM of designated defense articles provided to Ukraine in accordance with DoD policy during the period after June 2, 2023. This evaluation is a follow-up to DODIG-2024-043, "Evaluation of the DoD's Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine," released on January 10, 2024.

DoD and Department of State Joint Audit of U.S. Assistance Provided in Support of Ukraine Through the Foreign Military Financing Program

To determine whether the DoD and Department of State appropriately administered and managed foreign military financing provided in response to Russia's war against Ukraine.

Audit of Storage for U.S. Army Prepositioned Stocks in Belgium and the Netherlands

To assess the effectiveness of the Army's storage of prepositioned stocks in Belgium and the Netherlands (APS-2).

Evaluation of the DoD's Effectiveness in Negotiating Fair and Reasonable Prices with Contractors for Ukraine Security Assistance

To assess the effectiveness with which DoD contracting officers negotiated fair and reasonable prices with contractors for Ukraine security assistance.

Evaluation of the DoD's Replenishment and Management of 155mm High Explosive Ammunition

To determine whether the DoD developed a coordinated plan to meet total munition requirements for 155mm high explosive ammunition and an effective strategy to balance requirements for war reserve, training, operations, and testing.

Audit of U.S. European Command Force Protection Measures at Installations in Poland that Support Operation Atlantic Resolve

To determine whether the DoD implemented force protection measures at U.S. European Command installations in Poland in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve in accordance with DoD policy.

Evaluation of Classified Project

Please contact the DoD OIG for the objective.

Evaluation of Accountability Controls for Seaports of Debarkation in the U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility

To determine whether the U.S. European Command is effectively scaling, stocking, staffing, and preparing select seaports for movement of equipment provided to foreign partners.

Audit of the DoD's Management of European Deterrence Initiative Investments

To determine the extent to which DoD officials effectively prioritized and funded military construction and other investments under the European Deterrence Initiative to support the associated lines of effort.

Audit of the Army's Management of Unfinalized Contract Actions Awarded to Provide Ukraine Assistance

To determine whether Army contracting officials properly managed unfinalized contract actions awarded to assist Ukraine by obligating funds and finalizing actions within the required limits and adjusting profit for costs incurred, or properly waiving the requirements in accordance with Federal and DoD policies.

Evaluation of the DoD's Efforts to Protect U.S. Personnel and Operations Supporting the Ukrainian Conflict

To determine whether the DoD is effectively and efficiently protecting U.S. personnel and operations, to include executing counterintelligence activities, within the U.S. European Command in accordance with DoD policy.

Evaluation of Security and Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred to Ukraine through Romania

To determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD's security and accountability controls for U.S. defense items transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the Logistics Enabling Node in Romania.

Audit of Security and Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred to Ukraine through Slovakia

To determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD's security and accountability controls for U.S. defense items transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the Logistics Enabling Node in Slovakia.

Management Advisory: Audit of Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine Restructuring Contract Invoice Oversight

To determine whether Army contracting personnel awarded and monitored the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command contract for the maintenance of equipment provided to Ukraine in accordance with Federal and DoD policies.

Summary of Oversight Reports on DoD Security Assistance to Ukraine to Inform Possible DoD Efforts to Support Israel and Other Future Foreign Assistance Efforts

To summarize systemic challenges and recommendations to address them identified in oversight reports related to DoD security assistance to Ukraine, to inform possible DoD efforts to support Israel and other future foreign assistance efforts.

Evaluation of the Accountability of PDA Defense Equipment Deliveries to Ukraine (Property Book II)

To determine whether the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Military Services are effectively and efficiently accounting for the delivery of Presidential Drawdown Authority defense equipment to Ukraine in accordance with DoD property book and DSCA security assistance policy.

Follow-up Evaluation of Management Advisory: The Protection of Sensitive Mission Data by the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine and Its Subordinate Commands

To assess the extent to which the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine and Its subordinate commands, in coordination with the U.S. Army Europe and Africa, have fully implemented plans and issued guidance to improve compliance with DoD information security policies.

Follow-up Evaluation of Management Advisory: Sufficiency of Staffing at Logistics Hubs in Poland for Conducting Inventories of Items Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring

To assess the actions taken by the DoD to ensure that the Office of Defense Cooperation-Ukraine has sufficient capacity to effectively and efficiently conduct all required enhanced end-use monitoring inventories of designated defense articles prior to transfers into Ukraine.

Audit of the DoD Administration of Noncompetitively Awarded Contracts in Support of Ukraine-Administration

To determine whether, in support of the Ukraine response, DoD contracting officials properly administered noncompetitively awarded contracts in accordance with Federal regulations and DoD guidance.

Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Collect and Integrate Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned from the Russia/Ukraine Conflict

To determine the effectiveness of the DoD's collection and use of observations, insights, and lessons learned from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the DoD's support to Ukraine, to inform DoD doctrine, planning, training, and equipping.

Management Advisory: DoD Can Achieve EEUM Program Cost Savings and Efficiencies Through the Use of Barcode Scanners

To determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD's security and accountability controls for U.S. defense items transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the Logistics Enabling Node in Romania.

Management Advisory of Evaluation of Security and Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred to Ukraine through Romania

To determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD's security and accountability controls for U.S. defense items transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the Logistics Enabling Node in Romania.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Joint Audit of the DoD and Department of State Oversight of the U.S. Assistance to Ukraine Through the Foreign Military Financing Program

To determine whether the Departments of Defense and State implemented effective oversight over foreign military financing provided to Ukraine for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training.

Audit of Department of State Anti-Corruption Programs and Activities in Eastern Europe

To determine whether the Department of State implemented and monitored anti-corruption assistance programs and activities in Eastern European countries in accordance with federal and State requirements.

Review of Implementation of the Interagency Strategy to Counter Illicit Diversion of Advanced Conventional Weapons in Eastern Europe

To determine whether the Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is implementing the interagency strategy to counter illicit diversion consistent with leading practices for interagency coordination; the implementation plan includes measurable, outcome-based metrics; and implementation of the plan is consistent with strategic planning and program design guidance.

Inspection of Embassy Bucharest, Romania

To inspect the executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest, Romania.

Classified Inspection of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

To determine whether: 1) the Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' leadership is following the Department leadership and management principles; 2) the bureau is carrying out its program and policy implementation responsibilities in accordance with applicable standards; 3) the bureau is meeting requirements to plan and execute bureau outreach and messaging to key audiences and stakeholders; 4) the bureau manages its resources in accordance with Department standards; and 5) the bureau manages its information technology operations in compliance with applicable information security and management standards.

Inspection of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

To determine whether: 1) the Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' leadership is following the Department leadership and management principles; 2) the bureau is carrying out its program and policy implementation responsibilities in accordance with applicable standards; 3) the bureau is meeting requirements to plan and execute bureau outreach and messaging to key audiences and stakeholders; 4) the bureau manages its resources in accordance with Department standards; and 5) the bureau manages its information technology operations in compliance with applicable information security and management standards.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Bucharest, Romania

To inspect the executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest, Romania.

Audit of Department of State Anti-Corruption Programs and Activities in Eastern Europe

To determine whether the Department of State implemented and monitored anti-corruption assistance programs and activities in Eastern European countries in accordance with federal and State requirements.

Audit of the Disposition of Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicles in Advance of Evacuations at U.S. Embassies Kabul and Kyiv

To determine whether Embassies Kabul and Kyiv managed, safeguarded, and disposed of sensitive security assets in advance of the evacuation and suspension of operations at each post in accordance with Department of State guidance and what challenges were encountered upon reopening Embassy Kyiv.

Inspection of Embassy Moscow, Russia

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Moscow, Russia

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia.

Audit of Department of State Programs to Support Democracy and Human Rights in Selected European and Eurasian Countries

To determine whether the Department of State implemented democracy and human rights programming in selected European and Eurasian countries at risk of democratic backsliding in a strategic and coordinated manner and whether the programming is achieving intended results.

Audit of U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine, Records Retention for Electronic Messaging

To determine whether Embassy Kyiv has implemented measures to ensure Federal records created using electronic messaging applications are preserved.

Audit of the Worldwide Protective Services III Initial Training Consolidation Initiative

To determine whether the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's efforts to consolidate initial Worldwide Protective Services III training have improved training quality, enhanced oversight, and achieved the envisioned cost savings.

Management Assistance Report: Applying Lessons Learned from Previous Evacuations

To determine the extent to which the Department of State has aggregated lessons learned from past evacuations and included such lessons learned in formal guidance and instructions to aid in safeguarding, managing, or disposing of defensive equipment and armored vehicles at overseas posts.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of USAID's Direct Budget Support to the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance Fund

To determine how USAID oversees its contributions to the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance Fund and assess the extent to which USAID's contributions to the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance fund supported eligible internally displaced persons.

Evaluation of USAID's Due Diligence Over Funding to Public International Organizations

To determine to what extent USAID performed expected due diligence over funding to selected public international organizations, several of which are implementing programs in Ukraine

Audit of USAID Energy Activities in Ukraine

To assess USAID/Ukraine's oversight of the implementation of the Energy Security Project procurement process and determine whether USAID/Ukraine verified that the Energy Security Project delivered selected equipment and materials to recipients as intended.

Audit of USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance Localization Approach in Ukraine

To determine 1) the extent to which USAID has developed objectives and metrics for the program(s) under review, 2) determine progress toward achieving those objectives, and 3) determine how, and to what extent, USAID is monitoring implementer performance in accordance with USAID's standard policies and procedures.

Audit of the USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives Engagement of Local Partners in Ukraine to Contribute to Development Goals

To determine 1) the extent to which USAID has developed objectives and metrics for the program(s) under review, 2) determine progress toward achieving those objectives, and 3) determine how, and to what extent, USAID is monitoring implementer performance in accordance with USAID's standard policies and procedures.

Inspection of USAID Partner Controls to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Ukraine

To verify whether USAID held partners responding to the Ukrainian crisis to required sexual exploitation and abuse measures prior to executing awards and will review the internal controls reported by partners.

Audit of Bureau for Resilience, Environment, and Food Security Response to the Humanitarian Crisis Caused by Russia's War Against Ukraine

To examine steps taken by USAID's Bureau for Resilience, Environment, and Food Security to respond to world-wide food security concerns resulting from Russia's February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Audit of USAID/Ukraine's HIV/AIDS Prevention Activities

To determine the mission's role in ensuring that internally displaced persons living with HIV/AIDS have access to medical and social services, and medications during the war.

Review of USAID's Ukraine Staffing

To 1) describe USAID's current and pre-invasion staffing footprint, and changes in USAID-managed programming in Ukraine; and 2) identify challenges associated with—and actions taken in response to—changes to the staffing footprint and programming for Ukraine.

Incurred Cost Audits of USAID Resources

To determine whether costs claimed by 12 recipients of USAID's Ukraine-related awards and sub-awards for the period January 1, 2018, to December 31, 2022, are allowable, allocable, and reasonable in accordance with audit standards, award terms, and federal regulations.

Inspection of USAID's Oversight of Starlink Satellite Terminals Provided to the Government of Ukraine

Determine how 1) the Government of Ukraine used the USAID-provided Starlink terminals and 2) USAID monitored the Government of Ukraine's use of USAID-provided Starlink terminals.

Table 42.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by Partner Agencies, as of June 30, 2024**ARMY AUDIT AGENCY*****Managing Shop Stock for Armored Brigade Combat Teams Deployed to Europe***

To determine if armored brigade combat teams deployed to Europe managed shop stock lists per Army policy.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL***Audit of the Bureau of Industry and Security's Enforcement of Russia and Belarus Export Controls***

To assess the actions taken by the Bureau of Industry and Security to detect and prosecute violations of Russia and Belarus export controls.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE***Management of Presidential Drawdown Authority***

To assess agency implementation of the Presidential Drawdown Authority, including processes for 1) managing drawdowns and 2) potentially replacing defense articles provided to partners.

Oversight of U.S. Direct Budget Support to Ukraine

To examine the oversight that has been conducted and planned for the direct budget support USAID has provided to the Government of Ukraine through the World Bank's Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) project, and other related matters.

Cyber Operations with Allies and Partners

To identify DoD cyber operations and activities in Europe since January 2022 and the mitigation of challenges in undertaking those actions.

DoD and NATO Logistics in Europe

To review DoD and NATO capacity to transport personnel and materiel within Europe and consideration of related lessons learned from the effort to support Ukraine.

USAID and State's Use of Implementing Partners in Ukraine Assistance

To describe USAID's and the Department of State's implementing partners and sub-partners and how they were selected to provide certain non-security assistance in response to the war in Ukraine, including evaluating the extent to which the agencies reviewed potential partners' past performance.

DoD Funding in Support of Ukraine

To determine how the DoD has used and tracked funding in support of Ukraine and evaluated the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

Ukraine Security Assistance Donor Coordination

To review foreign donations of defense articles to Ukraine, the U.S. role in coordinating those donations, and U.S. agency efforts to monitor certain defense articles.

DoD Efforts to Train Ukraine's Armed Forces

To examine the DoD's approaches to training Ukraine's armed forces, determine how DoD assesses that training and collects lessons learned, and identify effects on U.S. military forces and training facilities in Europe.

Ukraine Asset Valuation

To assess whether the methodologies the DoD is using to value assets provided to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown Authority are consistent with relevant guidance, given the \$6.2 billion misvaluation DoD reported in 2023.

U.S. Direct Budget Support to Ukraine

To evaluate the transparency and accountability of the direct budget support USAID has provided to the Government of Ukraine through the World Bank's Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) project, and other related matters.

U.S. Government Ukraine Recovery Planning

To assess the Department of State's and USAID's planning for recovery, the extent to which ongoing efforts align with U.S. priorities, and the coordination of these efforts with other donor nations and the Ukrainian government.

Readiness Implications of U.S. Military Assistance to Ukraine

To assess the impact of the DoD's provision of military equipment to Ukraine on the Geographic Combatant Commands' readiness to prepare for and conduct operations, the military Services' training and equipping capabilities, and the Army's efforts to sustain its weapons systems.

Russia/Ukraine Sanctions and Export Controls

To examine the objectives of sanctions and export controls related to the war in Ukraine and progress towards those objectives; changes in key Russian economic indicators since sanctions and export controls were imposed; and the amounts and uses of resources that agencies have received to implement and enforce those sanctions and export controls.

U.S. Support for Nuclear and Radiological Security and Safety in Ukraine

To evaluate how the Department of Energy and other agencies have used supplemental appropriations to address nuclear and radiological security and safety risks in Ukraine.

Ukraine Security Training Coordination

To assess the extent that the DoD coordinates with the Government of Ukraine and partner nations on military training for Ukraine

Combatting Human Trafficking during Armed Conflicts, Including Ukraine

To assess the implementation of Department of State and USAID programs and projects to counter human trafficking in Ukraine and compare them with similar efforts in other countries experiencing armed conflict.

Ukraine Refugee and Internally Displaced Person Assistance

To examine U.S. Government assistance to Ukrainian refugees and internally displaced persons, including efforts to coordinate internally as well as with international partners on a comprehensive strategy for addressing the crises and migration challenges.

APPENDIX J

Planned Oversight Projects

Table 43 lists the titles and objectives for Special IG and partner agencies' planned oversight projects related to OAR and Ukraine.

Table 43.

Planned Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs, as of June 30, 2024

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of Contracts Funded Through Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative Appropriations

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's processes for providing quality and timely supplies and equipment to the Ukrainian Armed Forces funded through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of Emergency Action Planning at Selected U.S. Embassies in the Baltic States

To determine whether selected U.S. embassies in the Baltic States are prepared to respond and recover from emergencies.

Audit of Department of State Efforts to Address Global Food Security Following Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

To determine whether State's Bureau of Global Food Security's programs and activities designed to counter the impact of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on global food security are achieving intended results.

Audit of War Crimes Accountability Capacity Building in Ukraine

To determine whether the Global Criminal Justice Grant for War Crimes Accountability Capacity-Building in Ukraine is achieving intended results.

Audit of Department of State Energy Security and Diversification Initiatives in the Black Sea Region

To determine whether State efforts to coordinate and advance energy security and diversification initiatives align with relevant strategies, have defined program objectives, and are on track to achieve those objectives.

Audit of Department of State Policies and Practices for Imposing, Enforcing, and Evaluating Economic and Financial Sanctions

To determine whether State, in coordination with the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce, established and implemented policies and practices to impose, enforce, and evaluate the effect of sanctions.

Inspection of Embassy Ankara, Türkiye and Constituent Posts

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Türkiye, and constituent posts.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Ankara, Türkiye, and Constituent Posts

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Türkiye, and constituent posts.

Review of Remote Monitoring for Department of State Programs in Ukraine

To determine 1) the number of State bureaus with implementing partners in Ukraine, 2) the extent to which such bureaus used remote methods or third-party contractors to monitor their programming in Ukraine, and 3) any barriers to remote monitoring in Ukraine.

Audit of Emergency Action Planning at Selected U.S. Embassies in the Baltic States

To determine whether selected U.S. embassies in the Baltic States are prepared to respond and recover from emergencies.

Review of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' End Use Monitoring Property Management in Ukraine

To determine whether the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 1) followed applicable Federal, State, and INL property management processes for commodities donated to Government of Ukraine entities and 2) whether INL authorized exceptions to bureau property management and donation processes.

Inspection of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs

To determine whether the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs is 1) following State leadership and management principles, 2) carrying out program and policy implementation responsibilities in line with State standards, and 3) managing its resources and information technology operations in accordance with State standards.

Inspection of Embassy Riga, Latvia

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Riga, Latvia

Classified Inspection of Embassy Riga, Latvia

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Riga, Latvia.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**Audit of USAID/Ukraine's Activities to Ensure Access to Critical Health Services**

To determine the 1) extent to which USAID has developed objectives and metrics for the program(s) under review, 2) determine progress toward achieving those objectives, and 3) determine how, and to what extent, USAID is monitoring implementer performance in accordance with USAID's standard policies and procedures.

Audit of USAID's Agriculture Resilience Initiative for Ukraine

To determine how AGRI-Ukraine targets Ukraine's agricultural production and export challenges through 2023.



APPENDIX K

Hotline and Investigations Activity

HOTLINE ACTIVITY

The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs each maintain their own hotline to receive complaints specific to their agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report suspected violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority. USAID OIG's hotline also receives mandatory disclosures of allegations of misconduct by USAID-funded organizations, per the terms of their award agreements. Each OIG Hotline office evaluates complaints received through the hotlines and forwards them to the respective investigative entity for review and investigation.

During the quarter, the DoD OIG Hotline investigator received 16 allegations related to OAR and referred 13 cases for further criminal and or administrative investigation. The State OIG received 16 allegations and referred 3, and the USAID OIG received 24 allegations. In some instances, a case may contain multiple subjects and allegations.

INVESTIGATIONS

Law enforcement personnel from the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs investigate allegations of misconduct that might compromise U.S. Government programs and operations. Additionally, investigators identify, coordinate, and de-conflict fraud and corruption investigations; share best practices and investigative techniques; and coordinate proactive measures to detect and deter the criminals who would exploit U.S. Government assistance to Ukraine.

The Special Inspector General and the Lead Inspector General agencies and their partners continued to use the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group (FCIWG) framework to coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support regarding the Ukraine response. The FCIWG framework includes representatives from: the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS, the DoD OIG's criminal investigative component), State OIG, USAID OIG, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Homeland Security Investigations.


The Lead IG agencies collectively have criminal investigators positioned in Ukraine, Poland and Germany to investigate allegations of fraud, corruption and potential diversion of weapons or technology. For instance, DCIS agents in Kyiv are working jointly with U.S. Embassy partners and Ukrainian authorities to assess any reported discrepancies related to accounting for weapons and military equipment requiring Enhanced End Use Monitoring.

Lead IG criminal investigators also engage international counterparts on an ad hoc basis and in multilateral forums such as the European Fraud Working Group and the USAID OIG-sponsored Complex Emergency Working Group. In these forums, international agencies and bilateral oversight counterparts share best practices and lessons learned from previous operations that are applicable to Ukraine-related investigations and investigations in other complex emergency environments. In May, the European Fraud Working Group met for three days in Krakow, Poland. The DoD Inspector General provided keynote remarks to nearly 100 participants representing investigative and prosecutive agencies from Bahrain, the European Union, Latvia, NATO, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the U.S.

During the quarter, Lead IG agencies coordinating in the FCIWG reported 34 investigations initiated and 31 investigations closed. As of June 30, FCIWG agencies reported a total 57 open investigations. The open investigations involve grant and procurement fraud, corruption, theft, program irregularities, and diversion and counter-proliferation of technology of weapons systems components. Also, during the quarter, FCIWG agencies conducted 38 fraud awareness briefings for 727 participants. (See Figure 7.)

Figure 7.

Investigations Activity Related to OAR, April 1–June 30, 2024



ACRONYMS

Acronym	
ACA	Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine
AEECA	Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia
APS-2	Army Prepositioned Stock-2
ATACMS	Army Tactical Missile Systems
ATC	Army Training Command
BHA	USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DFC	International Development Finance Corporation
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
ECA	State Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs
EDI	European Deterrence Initiative
EEUM	enhanced end-use monitoring
EXBS	Export Control and Related Border Security
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GEC	State Global Engagement Center
HACC	High Anti-Corruption Court
HIMARS	High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems
IDCC	International Donor Coordination Center
ILEA	International Law Enforcement Academy
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INL	State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISN	State Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
KTP	Kyiv Transit Platform
MDCP	Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform
MoU	MoU Memorandum of Understanding
NPU	National Police of Ukraine
NSATU	NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine

Acronym	
OAR	Operation Atlantic Resolve
ODC	Office of Defense Cooperation
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OES	State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
OPG	Ukrainian Office of the Prosecutor General
OUSD(P)	Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
PEACE	World Bank Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance
PEPFAR	U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PDA	Presidential Drawdown Authority
PM/WRA	State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRM	State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
RDC-U	Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RSA	Russian sovereign assets
SAG-U	Security Assistance Group-Ukraine
SAMM	Security Assistance Management Manual
SAPO	Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office
SBGS	Ukrainian State Border Guard Service
SCC	Service Component Command
UNHCR	UN Refugee Agency
UAF	Ukrainian Armed Forces
UAS	unmanned aerial systems
USAGM	U.S. Agency for Global Media
USAI	Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USD(C)/CFO	Under Secretary of Defense and Chief Financial Officer
USEUCOM	The U.S. European Command
USTRANSCOM	The U.S. Transportation Command
VOA	Voice of America
VPN	virtual private network



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U.S. Soldiers fire their M1A2 Abrams tank during a fire support coordination exercise as part of Griffin Shock 23 held at Bemowo Piskie, Poland. (U.S. Army National Guard photo)



INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINE

The United States is committed to supporting the Ukrainian people during Russia's war of aggression. We are dedicated to providing oversight of the funds and resources American taxpayers have provided in support of Ukraine.

We encourage you to confidentially report any of the following suspected activities related to the programs or operations of the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of State (including the U.S. Agency for Global Media), and the U.S. Agency for International Development to the appropriate Hotline listed below.

Corruption
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
Fraud, Waste, Abuse, Mismanagement
Trafficking In Persons



dodig.mil/hotline



stateig.gov/hotline



oig.usaid.gov/report-fraud



+1 703-604-8799 or
+1 800-424-9098



+1 202-647-3320 or
+1 800-409-9926



+1 202-712-1070

