

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

AND OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO

IRAQ & SYRIA



APRIL 1, 2025–JUNE 30, 2025



On the cover: U.S. Ambassador Thomas Barrack raises the American flag over the ambassador's residence in Damascus, Syria, for the first time since the embassy closed in 2012. (USCENTCOM photo)



We are pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). This report fulfills our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

The United States launched OIR in 2014 to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), while setting the conditions for follow-on activities to increase regional stability. The U.S. Government strategy to defeat ISIS includes military operations and support for local security forces, diplomacy, governance, humanitarian assistance, and stabilization programs.

This quarterly report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OIR as well as the work of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to further the U.S. Government's policy goals in Iraq and Syria during the period of April 1 through June 30, 2025. This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies—the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs—and our partner oversight agencies.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Steven A. Stebbins".

Steven A. Stebbins
Lead Inspector General
for OIR
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Arne B. Baker".

Arne B. Baker
Associate Inspector General
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Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of State

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Toayoa Aldridge".

Toayoa Aldridge
Acting Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of
the Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International
Development





A U.S. Army Soldier overlooks an area near Erbil, Iraq, from a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter. (U.S. Army photo)

CONTENTS

APRIL 1, 2025–JUNE 30, 2025

2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

5 MISSION UPDATE

- 6 Introduction
- 8 The ISIS Threat

11 SYRIA

- 12 Diplomacy
- 15 Security Environment
- 20 Security Assistance
- 27 Repatriation and Reintegration
- 31 Stabilization
- 32 Humanitarian Assistance

39 IRAQ

- 41 Security Environment
- 42 Security Assistance
- 52 Governance
- 54 Economic Growth
- 55 Stabilization and Humanitarian Assistance

59 APPENDIXES

- 60 Appendix A: Classified Appendix to this Report
- 60 Appendix B: About the Lead Inspector General
- 61 Appendix C: Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Quarterly Report
- 62 Appendix D: Status of U.S. Assistance Programs in Syria
- 65 Appendix E: Completed Oversight Projects
- 66 Appendix F: Ongoing Oversight Projects
- 67 Appendix G: Planned Oversight Projects
- 67 Appendix H: Hotline and Investigations
- 68 Acronyms
- 69 Endnotes



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Coalition forces continued to advise Syrian and Iraqi partner forces while taking steps to reduce the U.S. military footprint in both countries. In Syria, U.S. forces departed from three bases as part of the first stage of a plan to consolidation plan.¹ In Iraq, CJTF-OIR continued the repositioning of troops following a brief pause last quarter.² As part of the plan, U.S. forces will depart from the Ayn al-Assad Air Base in Anbar province and will reposition within Iraq.³

The United States lifted sanctions on Syria and took steps toward normalizing diplomatic relations with the new Syrian government. On May 13, President Donald J. Trump recognized the Government of Syria and announced that the United States would cease sanctions against Syria to give the country a fresh start and allow partners and allies to help stabilize Syria.⁴ On May 14 in Saudi Arabia, President Trump met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and called on al-Sharaa to sign the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel; tell all foreign terrorists to leave Syria; deport Palestinian terrorists; help the United States to prevent the resurgence of ISIS; and assume responsibility for ISIS detention centers in northeast Syria.⁵ On May 23, President Trump issued an executive order terminating the Syria sanctions program and the national emergency with respect to Syria.⁶

Syrian partner soldiers practice movement techniques while U.S. Army Soldiers observe. (U.S. Army photo)



Negotiations to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian government remained at an impasse during the quarter.⁷ CJTF-OIR reported that Coalition forces continued to encourage and support negotiations between the SDF and Syrian government while enabling Syrian partners to maintain local stability.⁸ The new Syrian government's ability to consolidate control throughout the country remained a concern for the United States.⁹ Some armed minority and opposition groups remain outside the government's control.¹⁰

The United States continued to support the repatriation of displaced persons and detainees from Syria, as well as the return of Syrians to their home communities.¹¹

During the quarter, 2,622 Iraqis were repatriated from the al-Hol and Roj displaced persons camps in Syria.¹² Coalition forces continued to support SDF and Asayish operations to suppress ongoing ISIS activity at the al-Hol and Roj camps and to repatriate residents to their countries of origin.¹³ As of the end of the quarter, there were approximately 28,400 residents at al-Hol (most of them children), and 2,400 residents at Roj, according to State.¹⁴

On July 1, State assumed responsibility for administering most foreign assistance, including programs currently financed by and functions previously managed by USAID.¹⁵ Meanwhile, a reduced USAID workforce worked to close out contracts for programs terminated as a result of the foreign assistance review.¹⁶



U.S. Army Infantrymen fire a vehicle-mounted M2 .50-caliber machine gun and an M240 machine gun during weapons training at an undisclosed location. (U.S. Army photo)

MISSION UPDATE

6 Introduction

8 The ISIS Threat





A U.S. Army Soldier suppresses a target while other Soldiers move forward during a nighttime live fire exercise. (U.S. Army photo)

MISSION UPDATE

INTRODUCTION

The Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission is to advise, assist, and enable partner forces until they can independently maintain the enduring defeat of ISIS in Iraq and designated areas of Syria, and to set conditions for long-term security cooperation frameworks with partners in those countries.¹⁷

Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), which comprises troops from 20 countries, executes the OIR campaign.¹⁸ CJTF-OIR is part of the 89-member U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.¹⁹ In addition to military activity under OIR, the U.S. Government pursues several policy goals in Iraq and Syria that, while not directly a part of the OIR mission, are integral to the success of the OIR campaign.²⁰

On June 1, CJTF-OIR published a new campaign plan.²¹ The plan outlines conditions-based milestones against which to measure the mission’s progress, including the transition of OIR activities into a long-term security framework.²² CJTF-OIR reported no change to the plan’s lines of effort (LOE).²³ (See Table 1.)

Table 1.
OIR Lines of Effort

LOE 1:
Deny ISIS within the Combined Joint Operating Area

LOE 2:
Maintain Partner Force Capability and Capacity

LOE 3:
Sustain the Global Coalition

Source: CJTF-OIR, vetting comment, 7/15/2025.

During the quarter, the United States resumed transition of forces and bases in Iraq and began consolidating its forces in Syria.

Troop Repositioning Continues Despite Israel-Iran Conflict

During the quarter, the United States resumed transition of forces and bases in Iraq and began consolidating its forces in Syria.²⁴ The DoD described the consolidation as a “deliberate and conditions-based process” made possible by “major gains in the fight against ISIS.”²⁵

CJTF-OIR said that forces at some bases in Syria were either relocated to other CJTF-OIR bases or returned to the United States having completed their tour of duty.²⁶ CJTF-OIR continued to assess whether transfers of troops from additional bases were needed to continue the mission. In Iraq, the reposture of forces continued.²⁷

The Israel-Iran conflict had no significant impact on the OIR mission, though asset allocation—including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and defense counter-air systems—fluctuated on a day-to-day basis.²⁸ CJTF-OIR implemented temporary and localized changes to force protection measures as threats “emerged and abated,” but said that there was no change to the overall force-protection posture of Coalition troops during the Israel-Iran conflict.²⁹

CJTF-OIR said that Coalition troops continued to partner with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in operations against ISIS during the conflict.³⁰ Coalition advisers continued to assist the ISF and Peshmerga forces in their efforts to counter ISIS.³¹ CJTF-OIR reported that the conflict from June 12 to June 24 had a short-term effect of compressing the timelines of consolidation activities in Iraq and Syria.³²

CJTF-OIR: Iran-aligned Militias Reluctant to Target U.S. Forces

During the Israel-Iran conflict, Iran-aligned militia groups (IAMG) repeatedly threatened to target U.S. forces if the United States participated in the Israeli attacks on Iran.³³

At the same time, CJTF-OIR reported that the IAMGs were “noticeably reluctant” to strike U.S. personnel and facilities, noting a public statement by Kata’ib Hezbollah that indicated the group’s “disinclination to get involved in the broader fighting.”³⁴

Bases in Iraq and Syria were targeted by missiles and drones on June 14 and 15, but U.S. forces intercepted the attacks and no group claimed responsibility.³⁵ Similarly, no group took responsibility for an attack on two ISF bases on June 24 that damaged army radar systems.³⁶


CJTF-OIR reported that prior to hostilities against Israel, Iran increased the provision of advanced missile capabilities to its proxies in Iraq and that many proxy groups were capable of targeting Coalition personnel, including in Syria, should they have the intent.³⁷

THE ISIS THREAT

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) reported that the United States and the Coalition have achieved “significant successes” in denying ISIS control over territory and disrupting its networks. ISIS-claimed attacks remained at historically low levels in both countries.³⁸ (See Figure 1.) However, ISIS remnants “remain motivated to regain strength and support,” according to the (OUSD(P)).³⁹ The Department of Homeland Security issued a threat assessment in 2025 that stated that ISIS has the intent to conduct or inspire attacks in the United States and maintains worldwide networks of support that could carry out attacks.⁴⁰

Figure 1.

ISIS Attacks by Month, January 2023–May 2025



SYRIA

ISIS seeks to destabilize the new Syrian government, according to CJTF-OIR.⁴¹ In May, ISIS carried out the first acknowledged attack against the Syrian government, targeting an army truck in Suwayda governorate with an improvised explosive device (IED).⁴²

ISIS elements in Syria continued efforts to “opportunistically exploit the fragmented and volatile security situation” and try to rebuild in the wake of the December 2024 collapse of the Syrian government of ousted President Bashar al-Assad.⁴³

ISIS cells conducted small arms and IED attacks targeting Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and civilians in the northeastern governorates of Hasakah and Dayr az Zawr and attempted more sophisticated attacks. However, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) noted that the cells “probably failed” to successfully execute most of their planned attacks.⁴⁴

In June, the new Syrian government blamed ISIS for an attack on a Greek Orthodox church in Damascus that killed at least 20 people.⁴⁵

IRAQ

CJTF-OIR attributed the low number of ISIS-claimed attacks to ongoing counter-ISIS pressure.⁴⁶

ISIS elements in Iraq continued to assume a low operational profile and place priority on survival, according to the DIA.⁴⁷

ISIS presented only a “marginal threat” to the ISF and Iraqi civilians, the DIA said.⁴⁸

ISIS fighters killed a local shepherd and torched several civilian vehicles in Anbar province.⁴⁹ ISIS was blamed for setting a series of agricultural fires in northern Iraq, a tactic that the DIA said ISIS has employed during summer months in previous years.⁵⁰

Kurdish police arrested an ISIS-inspired Syrian national who conducted a knife assault at a festival near Erbil province.⁵¹







Syrian partner soldiers stand ready to start air assault training with UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and U.S. Army Soldiers. (U.S. Army photo)

SYRIA

- 12 Diplomacy
- 15 Security Environment
- 20 Security Assistance
- 27 Repatriation and Reintegration
- 31 Stabilization
- 32 Humanitarian Assistance



U.S. Army Soldiers returning to their post after fueling a UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter at Rumalyn Landing Zone, Syria. (U.S. Army photo)

SYRIA

State said that the United States must see progress in Syria on a number of issues, including preventing a resurgence of ISIS and assuming responsibility for ISIS detention centers and displaced persons camps in northeastern Syria.⁵² (See Table 2.) State said that the United States continues to work with partners to advance shared interests in Syria, including counterterrorism.⁵³

DIPLOMACY

United States Takes First Steps to Normalize Relations with the Government of Syria

At the start of the quarter, the United States did not recognize any entity as the Government of Syria.⁵⁴ By the quarter's end, relations had improved significantly. On May 13, President Donald J. Trump recognized the government of Ahmed al-Sharaa as the Government of Syria and announced that the United States would remove sanctions against Syria to give the country a fresh start and allow U.S. partners and allies to help stabilize Syria.⁵⁵

Table 2.

U.S. Policy Objectives in Syria

- Prevent Syria from being used as a base for ISIS, Iran-backed terrorism, or other terrorist groups that threaten the region;
- Complete and verifiable destruction of Syria's chemical weapons program; and
- Determine the fate of U.S. citizens missing in Syria and seek accountability for crimes committed against them.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 3/14/2025.


On May 14 in Saudi Arabia, President Trump met with President al-Sharaa and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Türkiye, who joined by phone.⁵⁶ President Trump told President al-Sharaa that to normalize relations with the United States, Syria must sign onto the Abraham Accords with Israel; tell all foreign terrorists to leave Syria; deport Palestinian terrorists; help the United States to prevent the resurgence of ISIS; and assume responsibility for ISIS detention centers in northeast Syria.⁵⁷

President Erdogan emphasized Türkiye's support for a stable and cooperative Syria, reaffirmed Ankara's support for Damascus in its fight against ISIS, and offered to help secure ISIS detention facilities, according to a State cable.⁵⁸

On May 15, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani in Türkiye.⁵⁹ The Secretary affirmed U.S. support for sanctions relief to stabilize Syria and welcomed Syria's calls for peace with Israel, efforts to end Iran's influence in Syria, commitment to ascertaining the fate of U.S. citizens in Syria, and elimination of all chemical weapons.⁶⁰ He underscored the importance of protecting human rights of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religion.⁶¹

On June 12, President Trump appointed U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye, Thomas Barrack, to be the Special Envoy to Syria.⁶² State's overseas Syria Regional Platform is located primarily in the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul.⁶³

Prior to his Special Envoy appointment, Ambassador Barrack participated in a flag-raising ceremony on May 29 at the U.S. Chief of Mission residence in Damascus, a symbol of renewed efforts to normalize U.S.-Syria relations, according to State and news outlets.⁶⁴ This was the first time the U.S. flag had flown in Damascus since the suspension of operations at the U.S. Embassy in February 2012, shortly after the start of the Syrian civil war.⁶⁵ Syria's Foreign Minister Shaibani joined Ambassador Barrack to raise the flag.⁶⁶ The United States has not resumed operations of the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, which suspended operations after protests against the Assad regime led to the start of civil war.⁶⁷



U.S. Ambassador Thomas Barrack raised the American flag over the ambassador's residence in Damascus, Syria, for the first time since the embassy closed in 2012. (USCENTCOM photo)

Asaad Al-Shaibani, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the new Syrian government, raises the new flag of Syrian Arab Republic during a flag raising event held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. (UN photo)



United States Lifts Sanctions on Syria

On June 30, President Trump issued an executive order terminating the Syria Sanctions Program and the national emergency with respect to Syria.⁶⁸ Effective July 1, the executive order revoked six prior executive orders that formed the foundation of the Syrian Sanctions Regulations.⁶⁹ Many individuals and entities were removed from Treasury’s list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, and their property and interests in property will be unblocked.⁷⁰ They will then be able to conduct transactions with U.S. persons, including U.S. financial institutions.⁷¹

While the Syria sanctions program is ending, sanctions remain in effect for individuals and entities linked to former President Bashar al-Assad, human rights abuse, Captagon trafficking, Syria’s past proliferation activities, ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates, and Iran and its terrorist proxies.⁷² Special Envoy Barrack said that removing sanctions against Syria “will preserve the integrity of the U.S. primary objective—the enduring defeat of ISIS—and will give the people of Syria a chance for a better future.”⁷³ The executive order also permits the relaxation of certain restrictions on U.S. exports to Syria.⁷⁴

As part of the U.S. lifting of sanctions, on May 23 Secretary Rubio issued a 180-day waiver of mandatory Caesar Act sanctions to ensure sanctions do not impede the ability of U.S. partners to make stability-driving investments, and advance Syria’s recovery and reconstruction efforts.⁷⁵ According to State, these waivers could facilitate improved energy, water, and sanitation, and enable a more effective humanitarian response across Syria.⁷⁶

On June 5, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved an amendment to remove Syria from the International Nuclear Energy Act of 2025’s list of rogue states as long as Syria continues to move in the direction of democracy, stability, and security.⁷⁷

Effective July 8, the United States announced that it was revoking the foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), President al-Sharaa’s former opposition group which spearheaded the ouster of the Assad regime. The removal of the FTO

State said that a stable Syria, which does not offer a safe haven for terrorist organizations, will likely support regional security and prosperity.

designation followed the dissolution of the HTS and the Syrian government's commitment to combat terrorism.⁷⁸ Secretary Rubio said in a statement that the United States "recognizes the positive actions" taken by the new Syrian government."⁷⁹

U.S. Continues Global Diplomacy Regarding Syria

On May 20, the United States hosted Türkiye in Washington, D.C., for a new round of the Syria Working Group, according to State.⁸⁰ Both delegations shared priorities in Syria, including the sanctions relief directed by President Trump's executive order and combatting terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, as the basis for the United States' and Türkiye's shared vision for Syria being stable and at peace with itself and its neighborhood, and allowing millions of displaced Syrians to return home.⁸¹ The United States and Türkiye also recognized the importance of maintaining the territorial integrity of Syria.⁸² State said that a stable Syria that does not offer a safe haven for terrorist organizations, will likely support regional security and prosperity.⁸³

On June 10, senior diplomatic officials from the Global Coalition to Defeat-ISIS met in Madrid, Spain, to address the ISIS security risks in Syria, including risks associated with the detained ISIS fighters and civilians in displaced persons camps in northeastern Syria, according to State.⁸⁴

The Coalition's primary objectives in Syria included increased border security, information sharing, and the return and repatriation of Syrians, Iraqis, and third-country nationals to their communities and countries of origin.⁸⁵ The Coalition reaffirmed efforts to disrupt foreign terrorist travel, operational planning, financial support networks, and recruitment efforts.⁸⁶

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Government of Syria Progresses in Bid to Unify Factions, but Resistance Remains

The Government of Syria's ability to consolidate control in Syria remained a concern for the United States.⁸⁷ Most former Syrian opposition factions support President al-Sharaa, but the new government continued to face resistance.⁸⁸ The government "at least nominally" controls most Syrian territory outside the SDF-governed northeast, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said, though some minorities and armed opposition groups—including Alawite, Druze, and al-Qaeda-linked fighters—remain outside the government's control.⁸⁹

The new government has the will to secure Syria from terrorist groups and has demonstrated success in foiling some ISIS attack plots, but its security forces are stretched thin.⁹⁰ The DIA did not observe a change in the Syrian government's weapons and capabilities during the quarter.⁹¹ Additionally, the government has poor command and control over forces subordinate to the new ministry of defense, including those responsible for atrocities committed against Alawites in Syria's western coastal areas in March.⁹²

Pro-Assad militants: During the quarter, Syrian government forces continued operations against insurgents from the Alawite sect in western Syria. The DIA reported that clashes

were not as intense as seen in March, when an insurgent ambush of Syrian security forces—and subsequent retaliation by armed groups aligned with the new government—resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians and fighters.⁹³ On May 15, Syrian government forces raided a warehouse containing anti-tank missiles and hundreds of IEDs in the majority Alawite town of Qardaha.⁹⁴ The DIA said that pro-Assad insurgents almost certainly would have used the weapons against government forces, and the seizure represents the largest of its kind since the new government came to power in December 2024.⁹⁵

Druze militants: Tensions have persisted between the government and parts of the Syrian Druze community in southern Syria.⁹⁶ In April, interim Syrian authorities responded to clashes in the suburbs around Damascus and in southern Syria between Druze and Sunni armed fighters, which also drew in civilians and militias.⁹⁷ The DIA assessed that Syrian government forces probably lack the capacity to uphold law and order in Druze majority areas.⁹⁸ On May 21, violence in southern Syria spread to Suwayda after the kidnapping of the leader of the predominantly Druze governorate; he was later released.⁹⁹

Hezbollah: Tensions along the border with Lebanon have eased since fighting erupted in March between interim authorities and Hezbollah-affiliated groups, after the Lebanese and Syrian governments reached a border security agreement.¹⁰⁰ Syrian government forces conducted a series of raids and interdiction operations to interrupt Hezbollah and Iran-affiliated smugglers during the quarter.¹⁰¹ The DIA assessed that absent a breakdown in bilateral agreements, the government probably will be able to maintain security at the border as it continues anti-smuggling operations.¹⁰²

Al-Qaeda: The DIA reported that the dissolution of the al-Qaeda affiliated Hurras al-Din (HaD) group in late January, combined with al-Qaeda leadership losses in Syria, probably weakened the group’s ability to disseminate guidance to its loyalists in Syria and probably reduced the potential for conflict between HaD and the Syrian government. It also probably enabled some HaD members to integrate into the government. However, the DIA assessed that some al-Qaeda aligned groups continued to operate with some degree of autonomy under the auspices of HTS, which enables former HaD elements freedom of movement. The DIA assessed that al-Qaeda will probably seek to influence the government’s formation and policies moving forward.¹⁰³

Syrian Government to Keep Foreign Fighters in Its Ranks

Since taking power, the new Syrian government has taken actions to absorb foreign fighters into its ranks. The DIA reported that foreign fighters hold a variety of positions within the government’s security forces, including leadership roles. These include Jordanian national Abdulrahman Hussein al-Khatib, commander of Syria’s Republican Guard, and Turkish national Omar Mohammed Jaftashi, commander of the Damascus Division.¹⁰⁴

In April, President al-Sharaa said in an interview that his government would consider giving Syrian citizenship to foreign fighters who lived in the country for many years and had proven their loyalty to the new government. He stated that Syria was committed to preventing its land from being used “in any way that can threaten any foreign country.”¹⁰⁵ Experts estimate that there are at least 3,000 foreign fighters in Syria (not including those in northeastern Syria) with the largest number being Uyghur fighters from western China and Central Asia.¹⁰⁶

On May 15, Syrian government forces raided a warehouse containing anti-tank missiles and hundreds of IEDs in the majority Alawite town of Qardaha.

CJTF-OIR said that Syrian government forces will provide security and stability in Aleppo, where more than 200,000 Kurdish residents have been hiding in their homes throughout the entirety of this crisis.

During his meeting with President al-Sharaa in May, President Trump called on the Syrian government to remove “foreign terrorists” from the country.¹⁰⁷ In early June, Ambassador Barrack indicated that the United States had softened its position on Syria’s absorption of foreign fighters into the national army, according to news reporting. Ambassador Barrack said that an understanding had been reached between the United States and Syria and that the U.S. Government sought transparency. Ambassador Barrack later praised President al-Sharaa for taking “meaningful steps” on foreign fighters, noting it was better to contain the fighters than to exclude them, as many are “very loyal” to the new government, according to media reporting.¹⁰⁸

SDF, Syrian Government Reach Local Security Agreements; Impasse Remains Over SDF Integration

Negotiations to integrate the SDF into the Syrian government continued during the quarter.¹⁰⁹ In the initial agreement in March, SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi agreed to integrate into the interim authorities by the end of the year, but the sides are at odds over the structure of the Syrian state and the status of SDF semi-autonomy.¹¹⁰ The SDF wants a federalized Syria, structural and geographical integrity of SDF units, and local security provisions.¹¹¹ The Syrian government wants centralized power and full control of all military forces.¹¹²

On April 1, the two sides reached a security agreement for Aleppo governorate, the scene of intense fighting between the SDF and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) forces following the fall of the Assad regime.¹¹³ CJTF-OIR said that Syrian government forces will provide security and stability in Aleppo, where more than 200,000 Kurdish residents have been hiding in their homes throughout the entirety of this crisis.¹¹⁴

On April 23, the SDF agreed to transfer control of the Tishreen Dam to the Syrian government. The dam, which bridges the Euphrates River between Aleppo and Raqqah governorates, was the site of bitter fighting between the SDF and SNA in December and January; the United States discussed the fighting with Türkiye.¹¹⁵ As of mid-June, however, the SDF had not transferred control of the dam to the Syrian government due to undisclosed security concerns of the SDF.¹¹⁶

The DIA reported that the Syrian government and the SDF met on June 1 to discuss the agreement and address unresolved security issues, such as the return of displaced persons and the management of Aleppo’s Kurdish neighborhoods. On June 2, the government and the SDF announced that they had exchanged more than 400 prisoners.¹¹⁷

CJTF-OIR reported that Coalition forces continued to encourage and support negotiations between the SDF and Syrian government while enabling Syrian partners to maintain local stability.¹¹⁸ This included both deconfliction and negotiation efforts between Coalition forces, the SDF, and the Turkish-backed SNA. CJTF-OIR said that military to military relationships had proven to be strategically important in the Tishreen Dam negotiations.¹¹⁹

At the same time, Coalition forces continued to deconflict SDF and government military operations to prevent escalation and miscalculation between them.¹²⁰ The SDF and government forces operate in proximity in Raqqah, and Dayr az Zawr governorates and the sides conduct minimal coordination—sufficient only to prevent conflict, CJTF-OIR reported.¹²¹

During the quarter, the U.S. Government condemned the appointment of Ahmad Ihsan Fayyad al-Hayes, leader of the Turkish-backed Syrian group Ahrar al-Sharqiya, as commander of the Syrian Army's 86th Division.¹²² The U.S. Government sanctioned Al-Hayes in 2021 for human rights violations, the extrajudicial killing of a Kurdish politician and her bodyguards, and ties to ISIS.¹²³ Kurdish leaders also condemned the appointment, as the 86th Division is responsible for the SDF-governed areas of Dayr az Zawr, Hasakah, and Raqqah governorates.¹²⁴

The DIA assessed that the appointment contributes to SDF mistrust of the Syrian government's intentions toward governing SDF areas.¹²⁵ CJTF-OIR said that mistrust already exists between the sides and the appointment likely will not have a substantial effect on relations between the SDF and the Syrian government.¹²⁶

Kurds Unify for Discussions with Syrian Government

In April, the first Kurdish national conference, (the "Kurdish Unity and Consensus in Western Kurdistan Conference") took place in the city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria, according to media outlets.¹²⁷ About 400 representatives from parties in Syria, the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, and Türkiye attended the conference.¹²⁸ The SDF commander, General Mazloun Abdi, also attended and delivered a speech.¹²⁹

The conference brought together northeastern Syria's two main political groups—the ruling Democratic Union Party and the main opposition Kurdish National Council—after more than a decade of limited discussion, according to the media outlet.¹³⁰ The primary goal was to create a unified front to strengthen the Kurdish position in discussions with the Syrian government.¹³¹ According to media reports, tensions with Türkiye and Syria have declined, as the SDF and the Syrian government, with the endorsement of Türkiye, made progress on their agreement to integrate the SDF into the national Syrian security forces.¹³²

Furthermore, a nine-member Kurdish delegation and representatives of the national conference will visit the Syrian government in Damascus to present key points and results of the Kurdish Unity Conference, which starts the negotiations with the Syrian government, according to a local news outlet.¹³³ On June 4, the delegation held its first meeting, with SDF Commander Mazloun Abdi in attendance.¹³⁴ The delegation decided to establish regular meetings after conference representatives stressed the need "to form a joint Kurdish delegation for dialogue with the Damascus government and the international and Kurdish parties, and in accordance with the common Kurdish vision on Syria and the Kurdish issue."¹³⁵

The United States supports a political transition in Syria that includes members from Syria's minority communities at the highest levels, and demonstrates credible, non-sectarian governance as the best path to avoid further conflict, according to State.¹³⁶

Syrian Government Forces Conduct Counter-ISIS Operations

During the quarter, ISIS claimed several attacks on government forces, its first such claims since the fall of the Assad regime.¹³⁷ These included a May 18 truck bombing at a security post in Mayadin in eastern Syria that killed five government troops, and two bombings in Suwayda in southern Syria in late May.¹³⁸

Just prior to the May 18 attack, Syrian government forces conducted a counter-ISIS operation in Aleppo.¹³⁹ The security forces recovered explosives, weapons, and uniforms bearing official insignias that may have originated from Assad regime stockpiles. The DIA said that the operation was likely conducted to disrupt ISIS attack planning against the government.¹⁴⁰ The operation indicated that the new government perceives ISIS as a threat that it must address.¹⁴¹

On June 22, a suicide bomber attacked a church filled with people attending mass on the outskirts of Damascus, killing and wounding dozens. The Syrian interior ministry blamed ISIS for the attack at the Mar Elias Church, and within days announced the arrest of several suspects, driving home the challenges the new Syrian government faces in asserting security in the fractured country where ISIS sleeper cells remain ready to attack.¹⁴²

SDF members await the start of a patrol at an undisclosed location. (U.S. Army photo)



CJTF-OIR reported that general security improvements in Syria have eased concerns of the Iraqi leadership, which questioned President al-Sharaa's true intention to fight ISIS, given his former ties to the group and his time spent fighting as an insurgent in Iraq.¹⁴³ Iraq shares a long border with Syria, where ISIS militants and smugglers operate. After the fall of the Assad regime, the ISF shifted its focus to border protection as a key element of its counter-ISIS activities.¹⁴⁴ While the SDF currently controls most Iraqi border crossing points in eastern Syria, Syrian government forces are present at the Albu Kamal–Al Qa'im border crossing point.¹⁴⁵

Syrian Government Cooperating with Chemical Weapons Convention Agency

The Syrian government continued to cooperate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to identify and destroy chemical weapons left by the Assad regime. However, government resources are extremely limited, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) reported. As a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Syrian government is working closely with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to execute a nine-point plan that will lead to the destruction of any chemical weapons remnants and avoid chemical weapons proliferation.¹⁴⁶

The Syrian government has rejected Assad's chemical program and strives for accountability for those involved in the program, State said.¹⁴⁷ However, Syria continues to be listed as non-compliant under the Chemical Weapons Convention because the Assad regime failed to fully declare and destroy its entire chemical weapons program when it acceded to the Convention in 2013, according to State.¹⁴⁸

OPCW Technical Secretariat teams visited Syria twice since the fall of the Assad regime—in March and in April—and have investigated 12 sites near Damascus, recovering documents but no chemical weapons. USCENTCOM said that there are more than 100 such sites across Syria that require assessing.¹⁴⁹ USCENTCOM also said that once U.S.-Syria relations are re-established, it would be able to assist Syria directly if tasked, and conduct security cooperation related to security, chemical weapons destruction, counterproliferation, and related activities.¹⁵⁰

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) works with vetted local partner forces in Syria, including the SDF in northeastern Syria and the Syrian Free Army (SFA) further south along Syria's southeastern border.¹⁵¹

While the consolidation of U.S. forces during the quarter altered the proximity of Coalition forces to the SDF in some areas, CJTF-OIR said that there were no changes to the relationship between U.S. and partner forces in the counter-ISIS fight in Syria. CJTF-OIR continued to partner with the SDF in northeastern Syria to advise, assist, and enable counter-ISIS operations and to sustain a robust network of counter-ISIS partners and with the SFA further south near the At Tanf Garrison.¹⁵²

CJTF-OIR reported that general security improvements in Syria have eased concerns of the Iraqi leadership, which questioned President al-Sharaa's true intention to fight ISIS, given his former ties to the group and his time spent fighting as an insurgent in Iraq.

Table 3.

CTEF Funding for Syria Train and Equip Requirements, in \$ Millions

Subcategories	Training and Equipping	Logistical Support, Supplies, and Services	Stipends	Infrastructure Repair and Renovation	Sustainment	TOTAL
FY24/25 Requested	\$35.0	\$31.1	\$71.9	\$6.0	\$12.0	\$156.0
FY24/25 Enacted	35.0	31.1	71.9	6.0	12.0	156.0
FY24/25 Obligated*	Obligation data is not available by sub-categories at the OUSD(C) level.					
FY24/25 Disbursed *	Disbursement data is not available by sub-categories at the OUSD(C) level.					
FY25 Requested	15.9	37.8	58.9	15.0	20.40	148.0
FY25 Enacted	15.9	37.8	58.9	15.0	20.40	148.0
FY25 Obligated	Obligation data is not available by sub-categories at the OUSD(C) level.					
FY25 Disbursed **	Disbursement data is not available by sub-categories at the OUSD(C) level.					
FY26 Requested**	15.6	32.4	65.0	1.6	15.3	129.9

Notes: *As of September 30, 2024. **As of May 30, 2025.

Source: OUSD(C), response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 OIR 013, 7/3/2025


CJTF-OIR also continued to provide assistance to vetted Syrian partners through the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF).¹⁵³ (See Table 3.) CJTF-OIR said that the assistance will remain at current funding levels through the end of FY 2025, provided the conditions-based consolidation is completed during FY 2025, but the consolidation will ultimately allow the reduction of CTEF expenditures for Syrian partners and the reallocation of the CTEF Syria funds to CTEF Iraq.¹⁵⁴

U.S. Forces Consolidate Bases and Forces in Syria

During the quarter, the United States began consolidation of its forces and bases in Syria.¹⁵⁵ Media reported that, through a phased process, CJTF-OIR planned to ultimately reduce its military presence by reducing the number of bases and reduce the number of troops stationed in Syria to fewer than 1,000.¹⁵⁶

CJTF-OIR reported that it executed the first phase of the consolidation as planned.¹⁵⁷ U.S. and Coalition forces departed from three bases in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) in May—Mission Support Site Euphrates, Mission Support Site Green Village, and H2—and either dismantled and removed or handed over infrastructure to the SDF.¹⁵⁸ The U.S. and Coalition forces either relocated to other CJTF-OIR bases in Syria or Iraq or returned to the United States after completing their tour of duty.¹⁵⁹

Figure 2.

Areas of Influence and Control in Syria

The OUSD(P) reported that the United States will “remain poised to strike against the remnants of ISIS in Syria.”¹⁶⁰ U.S. forces will work closely to ensure partner forces sustain their abilities to maintain pressure on ISIS and deny it the ability to find safe havens or regain strength. U.S. forces will also continue working to reduce the populations of displaced and detained ISIS-linked individuals in camps and detention facilities in northeastern Syria, the OUSD(P) said.¹⁶¹

The base consolidation took place in the MERV, where relations between Arab tribal leaders and the SDF remained strained. While reactions to the departure of U.S. forces from the area in news and social media posts were mostly neutral, CJTF-OIR said that it expected tensions to rise now that U.S. forces are not in place to bridge differences between the local Arab

communities and the SDF and its civilian arm, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), which administers the region.¹⁶²

Arab communities have expressed frustration and impatience with the SDF, a group they see as occupiers who consistently demonstrate cultural preference when dividing resources and protections, CJTF-OIR said. SDF forces are targets of small arms and limited indirect fire attacks in the region. U.S. forces have frequently mediated between the SDF and Arab tribes during heightened tensions and CJTF-OIR said that with the retrograde operations, it is likely that tensions could escalate between Arab tribal leaders and the SDF in the near term.¹⁶³

SDF Remains Capable Despite Changing Environment

CJTF-OIR reported that the SDF conducted several counter-ISIS operations during the quarter. The SDF and Asayish remained highly effective in supporting counter-ISIS operations, CJTF-OIR stated. Similarly, SDF force numbers remained largely unchanged.¹⁶⁴

In particular, the SDF continued to demonstrate full capability of maintaining security concurrent with addressing external threats during the tumultuous period of change in Syria, and there were no breakout attempts during the quarter. However, CJTF-OIR noted that measuring the SDF capability to provide security at detention facilities and displaced persons camps is difficult because the SDF guard force is frequently pulled away to address security demands caused by instability in the region and is therefore not consistently available to receive training.¹⁶⁵

CJTF-OIR said that while Coalition forces offer regular training with the SDF on detention facility security, the lack of a formal training program for the SDF guard force is its main shortcoming and limits Coalition visibility into any deeper problems that might exist.¹⁶⁶ Approximately 9,000 ISIS detainees are in SDF-run detention facilities, which are a mix of

**U.S. Army
Infantrymen resume
their patrol with
Syrian partners
after visiting a local
residence in the
Deconfliction Zone,
Syria. (U.S. Army
photo)**



purpose-built facilities and re-purposed buildings.¹⁶⁷ CJTF-OIR said that all the facilities have received a basic level of upgrade to make them secure against “normal” threats.¹⁶⁸ CJTF-OIR said that ISIS continued to threaten detention facilities during the quarter, but there were no attacks. Longer-term upgrade projects were still progressing but have not yet resulted in a marked increase in security.¹⁶⁹

CJTF-OIR said that it conducted training for SDF guard forces during the quarter on specialized skills: security operations in detention facilities, clearing operations, medical, marksmanship, and tactical ground maneuvers. Training consisted of both direct and “train-the-trainer” courses.¹⁷⁰ The reposture of Coalition forces in Syria has not impacted support to partner-managed detention facilities.¹⁷¹

SFA: Partnered Operations Continue After Formal Integration into Syrian Government Forces

CJTF-OIR reported that it continued to partner with the SFA following its formal integration into the Syrian government forces, as part of its 70th Division.¹⁷² During the quarter, the SFA and CJTF-OIR conducted 69 combined patrols in the deconfliction zone around At Tanf Garrison.¹⁷³ CJTF-OIR staff and leaders met regularly with their SFA counterparts to plan and coordinate patrols and support in future operations.¹⁷⁴ CJTF-OIR identified no threats within the operating area of At Tanf Garrison, and noted that the continued joint patrols with the SFA serve to deter malign actor activity.¹⁷⁵

In its new role as part of the 70th Division, the SFA deployed in early May to secure the Sayqal Airfield, east of Damascus in the Rif Dimashq governorate.¹⁷⁶ The SFA also continued to man security checkpoints along the M2 highway, which traverses from Damascus through the At Tanf Garrison to the Waleed border crossing with Iraq. CJTF-OIR reported that the SFA continued routine patrols to ensure unrestricted civilian movement along the M2 and to deter the reconstitution of ISIS within sparsely populated regions such as al-Safa and the al-Qaryatayn Mountains.¹⁷⁷

In June, the Syrian government announced the closure of the Rukban camp, once home to approximately 8,000 SFA fighters and their families until the fall of the Syrian regime and the subsequent end of a total blockade of supplies to the camp.¹⁷⁸ CJTF-OIR reported that the last civilian residents had departed Rukban in early May. CJTF-OIR also reported that the only civilians remaining in the deconfliction zone are merchants, SFA family members, and nomadic Bedouin tribes, who see the SFA as a legitimate force.¹⁷⁹

The SFA was also taking steps to rename itself as a sign of good faith to the new Syrian government, CJTF-OIR said. A change of unit name will augment the integration process and dispel any messaging of the SFA being a separate entity from Syrian government forces.¹⁸⁰ CJTF-OIR reported that the SFA operates as the sole entity in its areas of operation. Adjacent to the SFA’s area of influence, the Lions of the East operates within the Badiyah Desert to the MERV. Both groups remain on amicable terms and deconflict any patrols along the Iraqi-Syrian border.¹⁸¹

Approximately 9,000 ISIS detainees are being held in SDF-run detention facilities, which are a mix of purpose-built facilities and re-purposed buildings.

Third Parties in Syria

The operations of foreign governments and militaries in Syria during the quarter continued to pose complicating factors for President al-Sharaa as he sought to stabilize the country and integrate militia outliers into the Syrian Army.¹⁸² These included operations by Israel, Türkiye and Russia, all vying for security and political influence.¹⁸³

TÜRKIYE

CJTF-OIR reported that with the ascent of the Syrian government, Türkiye has expanded and enhanced its role in Syria.¹⁸⁴ Türkiye has maintained its intent to open a joint counter-terrorism operating center with Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.¹⁸⁵ It has also indicated it was examining the establishment of a training base in Syria to help train the Syrian government forces and had evaluated a number of sites in central Syria.¹⁸⁶ On May 26, President al-Sharaa was received by Turkish President Erdoğan in Istanbul with honors, according to a Syrian news organization. The report said that senior defense and intelligence officials participated in the meeting.¹⁸⁷

Türkiye and the Turkish-backed SNA have refrained from any fighting since the end of March.¹⁸⁸ The pause in hostilities extends from Kobane along the Euphrates River to Raqqah.¹⁸⁹

However, the calm was tenuous. Türkiye has views the SDF as an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization that waged a violent years-long insurgency in Türkiye. CJTF-OIR reported that Türkiye has consistently communicated its plans to eliminate the PKK from its border in Syria—and by implication the SDF— either militarily or through integration into the Syrian Army.¹⁹⁰ CJTF-OIR assessed that as long as the SDF continued to move forward in negotiations with the Syrian government, and solidify plans for integrating into the Syrian Army in the near future, Türkiye will not take adverse action against the SDF.¹⁹¹ The SDF continued to see the Turkish forces as a threat and CJTF-OIR said that it was unlikely the SDF will relocate forces away from the front lines.¹⁹²

Coalition forces are not providing any support to the SDF against the Turkish military or the Turkish-backed fighters.¹⁹³

ISRAEL

Israel continued to deploy its forces in southern Syria's Quneitra governorate during the quarter, as part of an effort since the fall of the Assad regime to maintain a "buffer zone."¹⁹⁴ CJTF-OIR said that Israel's declared intent to protect the Druze population in southern Syria had increased tensions between the Druze and the Syrian government.¹⁹⁵

Israel also continued to strike military targets in Syria, including equipment and weapons facilities held by the Syrian government in Damascus, Hama, Latakia, Dara, and Quneitra. The DIA reported that the targets included remaining Assad-era advanced weapons, such as anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as punitive strikes following a June 3 rocket attack into the Israeli Golan Heights.¹⁹⁶

(continued on next page)

Third Parties in Syria *(continued from previous page)*

President al-Sharaa confirmed in May that his country and Israel were engaged in indirect talks aimed at easing tensions. An international news organization reported in late May that security officials from Syria and Israel had held several face-to-face meetings in the border areas and inside Israeli territory.¹⁹⁷

Tensions rose during the quarter between Israel and Türkiye as they vied for security control and influence in Syria. An international news organization reported in early April that Israel bombed at least three airbases in Syria where Türkiye had been surveying possible sites for the deployment of joint forces with Syria. According to the report, Israel targeted the Tiyas and Palmyra airbases in Syria's Homs governorate and the main airport in Hama governorate.¹⁹⁸ Türkiye has reiterated that it had no intention of threatening Israel with a deeper military presence in Syria.¹⁹⁹

On April 10, Israeli and Turkish official began talks aimed at easing tensions in Syria and to set up deconfliction mechanisms and reduce tensions.²⁰⁰ CJTF-OIR said that through the talks, the sides reportedly established and frequently use deconfliction lines for their actions in Syria.²⁰¹ However, uneasy relations between Israel and Türkiye persisted. On May 3, Turkish fighters reportedly engaged in jamming operations against Israeli fighter aircraft targeting sites in Syria.²⁰² In late June, amid the conflict between Israel and Iran, the Turkish president accused Israel of illegal activities that threatened regional peace.²⁰³

RUSSIA

CJTF-OIR reported that Russia continued active negotiations with the Syrian government with the intent of retaining its two main bases in western Syria. CJTF-OIR said that Russia has publicly acknowledged its forces remain at the Hmeimim Air Base and the Tartus Naval Facility, both along Syria's Mediterranean coastline.²⁰⁴


President al-Sharaa said in an interview in late April that Syria had officially requested the extradition from Russia of Bashar al-Assad. Russia was a key ally of the Assad regime and gave the former dictator safe haven when opposition forces led by Ahmed al-Sharaa captured Damascus in December 2024. CJTF-OIR reported that President al-Sharaa has remained pragmatic in his approach to Russia's overtures, acknowledging Syria's reliance on Russian weaponry and existing economic agreements as reasons for continued military cooperation. The Syrian president emphasized that any future agreements must align with Syrian legal frameworks and regional security interests, noting that past agreements have been nullified and new ones are under development.²⁰⁵

CJTF-OIR reported that with Türkiye's enhanced influence with the Syrian government, Russia must increasingly factor Turkish interests into its Syrian strategy. During the quarter, Russian and Turkish deputy foreign ministers reportedly held consultations in Istanbul to discuss Middle East affairs, including Syria. Some analysts suggest that the Syrian government might view a continued, albeit renegotiated, Russian presence as a potential counterbalance to Turkish influence in the country, CJTF-OIR said.²⁰⁶

Figure 3.

Population of al-Hol and Roj Displaced Persons Camps During the Quarter

The al-Hol and Roj camps in Hasakah governorate are humanitarian camps for displaced persons and not detention facilities. The majority of the residents of both camps are women and children. Most of the small number of male residents, including 39 percent of the men at al-Hol, are Iraqi nationals.



Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/15/2025.

REPATRIATION AND REINTEGRATION

State said that repatriation or return of individuals to their countries or communities of origin is the only long-term durable solution to the security and humanitarian challenges of the al-Hol and Roj displaced persons camps in northeastern Syria, where ISIS continues to seek to indoctrinate residents and to infiltrate the detention facilities.²⁰⁷


As of the end of the quarter, there were approximately 28,400 residents at al-Hol (most of them children), and 2,400 residents at Roj, according to State.²⁰⁸ (See Figure 3.)

Repatriation Efforts Continue as the DAANES, Syrian Government Work on Transition

During the quarter, the United States called on the new Syrian government to work constructively with the United States and the SDF to assume responsibility for the detention facilities and al-Hol and Roj camps in northeastern Syria.²⁰⁹ The United States also called on UN member states to take responsibility for their displaced and detained nationals through expeditious repatriation and to support the return of displaced Syrians to their areas of origin.²¹⁰

On May 26, Kurdish authorities in northeastern Syria reached an agreement with the Syrian government for a “joint mechanism” to return families from al-Hol to areas under the

Figure 4.

Population of al-Hol Camp, October 2017–June 2025, in Thousands

government’s control, according to media reports, although administration of the camp would remain in Kurdish authorities’ hands. As of the end of the quarter, the facilities remained under SDF control. Under the preliminary agreement with the Syrian government, the SDF will transfer control of its detention facilities in northeastern Syria to the Syrian government.²¹¹

The DAANES, according to one international NGO, started work on a plan, in coordination with the UN, to empty al-Hol and Roj of Iraqis and Syrians in 2025.²¹² The NGO noted that U.S. cuts to foreign assistance programs created a chaotic situation, which “weakened basic services in the camps” in northeastern Syria, and that camp residents faced increased turmoil as “stop-gap resources run out and further cuts loom.”²¹³

CJTF-OIR reported that UN humanitarian organizations, including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), explored options to facilitate returns of Syrians and repatriations of Iraqis.²¹⁴

Displaced persons: The Iraqi government remained committed to repatriating its citizens from displaced persons camps and detention facilities, including from youth facilities.²¹⁵ During the quarter, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and other stakeholders worked to accelerate the repatriation of residents from the camps, including the complex process of transporting the residents and processing them for crossing the border.²¹⁶ During the quarter, more than 2,622 Iraqis were repatriated from the al-Hol and Roj camps.²¹⁷

The consolidation of Coalition forces did not impact the pace of repatriations from the camps, or of Iraqi or other foreign ISIS fighters in detention, CJTF-OIR said.²¹⁸

Table 4.

Repatriations from Syria to Iraq, April 1–June 30, 2025

Departure Date	Families/ Households	Individuals
al-Hol		
April 15	238	856
May 31	222	832
June 22	236	934
TOTAL	696	2,622

Source: Embassy Baghdad, cable, “Iraq: Accelerated Repatriations from Northeast Syria Continue Despite Gaps and Scarce Donor Resources,” 25 BAGHDAD 448, 4/16/2025; State, vetting comment, 7/15/2025.

In mid-April, al-Hol camp management began registering Iraqi families who wanted to repatriate to facilitate the clearance process for Iraqis who have not registered with Iraq, according to State.²¹⁹ Camp management registered about 2,000 Iraqis who wanted to repatriate, while approximately 400 Iraqis confirmed to camp management that they did not intend to depart al-Hol or return to Iraq.²²⁰

Al-Hol camp management also said that it had scheduled interview appointments for about 7,000 Iraqis to begin Iraq registration, according to State, but two thirds of those individuals did not show up for their appointment.²²¹ When camp management contacted some of the no-show households,

reasons stated for their absence included lack of interest in repatriation, tribal or family conflict, fear of arrest, and a desire to wait for the release of a detained family member.²²²

Detainees: Iraq repatriated three tranches of 50 detainees each in May and June.²²³ For U.S.-assisted detainee repatriation operations, State leads coordination of diplomatic and logistics efforts with other U.S. agencies, foreign governments, and the DoD. The DoD arranges military air transport and other logistics for country-of-origin representatives identifying and accompanying Foreign Terrorist Fighters repatriated out of Syria.²²⁴

Repatriations of third-country nationals continued at a similar pace as last quarter.²²⁵ As of the end of the quarter, State was aware of about 20 non-Iraqi third-country nationals who were repatriated to their countries of origin from al-Hol and Roj.²²⁶ State noted that some countries repatriate displaced persons without U.S. assistance. Syrian return efforts, which had been impossible under the Assad regime, are now being coordinated with the new Syrian government and UN agencies.²²⁷

CJTF-OIR said that the ISF is working to support the development of more effective and sustainable solutions for the management of ISIS detainees and their families. This includes the establishment of detention facilities, as well as programs aimed at de-radicalizing and reintegrating former ISIS fighters into their communities.²²⁸

U.S. Programs Facilitate Syrian Returns from al-Hol

In April, two State stabilization programs facilitated the voluntary return of 76 families (almost 300 Syrians) from al-Hol to areas of Dayr az Zawr governorate controlled by the SDF. Subsequently 34 of the families departed for Syrian government-controlled areas west of the Euphrates River while 42 families remained in SDF-controlled areas east of the river.²²⁹

State-funded stabilization programs and camp management worked with UNHCR to provide security and logistical support for the operation, according to State.²³⁰ Returnee safety and security teams vetted the families ahead of the return, established a hotline for reporting concerns, and will conduct follow-ups to monitor the security of the returnees and

communities they rejoin.²³¹ The camp management registered the individuals and facilitated their check-out from the camp.²³² The UNHCR provided protection services throughout the process.²³³ A State program provided vehicles to transport the families from al-Hol to a reception center in Dayr az Zawr.²³⁴ At the reception center, staff from the local council registered the arriving families by collecting their contact details and consent for follow-up, after which the families were released to travel to their final destinations.²³⁵ The Asayish provided security oversight for the entire operation.²³⁶

On June 15, 42 Syrian families (178 individuals) left from al-Hol to return to Aleppo governorate with support from the United States, camp administration, local authorities, and civil society partners, according to the U.S. Embassy Syria.²³⁷ At the same time, the U.S. Government terminated five USAID awards that had supported al-Hol returnees or communities to which former al-Hol residents had returned.²³⁸

Camp Conditions Remain Stable

CJTF-OIR reported that essential services to al-Hol—including trash and waste management, and distribution of water, food, and cooking oil—were not interrupted during the quarter. While healthcare, education, and protection services were reduced due to the termination of some U.S. foreign assistance programs, conditions were stable. However, uncertainty over future funding for partner organizations has created planning challenges.²³⁹

Humanitarian assistance at al-Hol remains underfunded, similar to the rest of the humanitarian response across Syria, according to State.²⁴⁰ State awards supporting camp management and coordination are ongoing as well as an award that supports child education and protection.²⁴¹ Partners reported that the overall reduction in services due to USAID award terminations, combined with an ongoing lack of sufficient support to the camp's youth population, has increased tensions in the camp.²⁴²

USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) noted that ending assistance activities in the al-Hol camp increases the vulnerability of women and children to abuse, exploitation, and radicalization.²⁴³

SDF and Asayish Conduct ISIS Clearance Operations in al-Hol and Roj Camps

During the quarter, Coalition forces continued to support SDF and Asayish operations to suppress ongoing ISIS activity at the al-Hol and Roj camps and to repatriate residents back to their countries of origin.²⁴⁴ This included ongoing efforts by Coalition forces to train SDF security forces to maintain security in the camps. CJTF-OIR reported that SDF maintained guard force manning levels and rotations during the quarter and conducted presence patrols. The SDF was able to maintain general security in the camps.²⁴⁵

In al-Hol, CJTF-OIR said that ISIS continued to pose a threat to the camp, but incidences of violence during the quarter were largely confined to minor vandalism and small arms fire in the vicinity of the camp.²⁴⁶

During the quarter, Coalition forces continued to support SDF and Asayish operations to suppress ongoing ISIS activity at the al-Hol and Roj camps and to repatriate residents back to their countries of origin.

According to CJTF-OIR, the Asayish assessed that ISIS is exploiting the current crisis in Syria to reorganize its sleeper cells and recent threats on the camp are credible. Asayish sources monitor ISIS social media messages, which the group uses as its primary means of organizing and communicating with cells, spreading propaganda, and encouraging unrest.²⁴⁷

In early April, a female force of the SDF launched a large-scale multi-day ISIS clearance operation in the Roj camp.²⁴⁸ A war monitor reported that the operation followed an ISIS attempt to infiltrate the camp that resulted in the death of a woman and child.²⁴⁹

In mid-April, Asayish and SDF forces launched an operation to clear ISIS operatives in al-Hol.²⁵⁰ The Asayish said in a statement on April 23 that during a 6-day operation, forces detained 20 ISIS members and collaborators and dismantled a “dangerous” ISIS cell that had been coordinating with other cells to conduct terrorist activities. The operation also thwarted a large escape attempt involving ISIS cells inside and outside the camp.²⁵¹

Coalition Supports Syrian Government Delegation Visit to al-Hol to Discuss Repatriations from Camp

In May, a Syrian government delegation visited al-Hol, the first of its kind. The delegation included intelligence and counter-terrorism officials in the Syrian government and representatives of interior and foreign affairs ministries. Coalition forces accompanied the Syrian officials.²⁵²

According to a war monitor report, the delegation held a closed-door meeting with representatives of the DAANES and the camp administration on ways to coordinate returning Syrian residents of the camp to their areas of origin.²⁵³ The report said the visit was to be the first in a series of anticipated meetings to address more complex issues related to the camp.²⁵⁴

STABILIZATION

As of the end of the quarter, USAID staff reported that all USAID stabilization programming in Syria and Iraq, including those supporting the al Hol Action Plan and awards for third-party monitoring, had been terminated. The U.S. Government had obligated more than \$107 million for these programs before their termination.²⁵⁵

State provided limited information on stabilization programs terminated during the quarter.²⁵⁶ State did not terminate any awards in Syria managed by its Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). Third-party monitoring continued and no implementing partners suspended work because of lack of payment.²⁵⁷ State terminated some awards managed by its Near East Affairs Bureau. Some programs that were under stop work orders have resumed their activities and have received funding from State, including third-party monitoring.²⁵⁸

The pause in assistance led to staffing reductions for most implementing partners, reducing operational capacity.²⁵⁹ This has resulted in a reduced level of programming for all State stabilization programs.²⁶⁰

For further details about the status of State and USAID stabilization programs, see Appendix D on page 62.

International Community Moves to Support New Government

In April, a Syrian delegation visited the United States to participate in the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank held in Washington, D.C., according to the International Monetary Fund and a news outlet.²⁶¹ The delegation included the Syrian Foreign Minister, the Syrian Minister of Finance, and the Governor of the Central Bank of Syria.²⁶²

According to a media report, the group discussed ways to reduce the effects of economic sanctions, facilitate financial transfers, and direct support toward productive sectors within the framework of a national economic recovery plan.²⁶³ The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank said that they will support Syrian policy efforts, early recovery and reconstruction needs, and promote private sector development and job creation.²⁶⁴

These steps are part of a comprehensive strategy of the new Syrian government aimed at rebuilding international confidence, attracting investments, and developing economic infrastructure to transition to the post-war phase with openness to regional and international integration.²⁶⁵

In May, Qatari, Turkish, and U.S. companies formed a consortium to develop a 5,000-megawatt energy project and support the restoration of Syria's war-battered electricity grid, according to a news outlet.²⁶⁶ In May, Saudi Arabia and Qatar paid off Syria's \$15.5 million debt to the World Bank's International Development Association.²⁶⁷ Qatar agreed to provide nearly \$90 million to support the salaries of Syrian public sector employees.²⁶⁸

The DIA said that Türkiye expects to be the primary contributor to Syrian reconstruction.²⁶⁹ Turkish officials also offered the Syrian government security assistance—such as intelligence sharing and military capacity-building—to combat terrorist groups, including ISIS, and have discussed providing broader military assistance, such as training, equipment, and establishing Turkish military bases in Syria. Türkiye also pledged both economic support and announced plans to increase natural gas exports to Syria to develop Syria's electricity production.²⁷⁰

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

At the start of 2025, USAID BHA Syria managed 29 programs valued at \$631,172,513. By the end of the quarter, 16 programs—worth \$218,174,924—were terminated, while 14 remained active, totaling \$412,998,589.²⁷¹ The pause and subsequent terminations resulted in the freezing of payments to implementing partners for both work that had already been completed, and advance payment for ongoing work.²⁷² As a result, many partners paused operations and the delivery of lifesaving humanitarian assistance, and in some cases terminated staff and closed offices, according to USAID BHA.²⁷³

USAID also reported that all awards for third-party monitoring of humanitarian assistance activities were canceled.²⁷⁴ Some partners still conduct internal monitoring, but it is less robust and frequent, according to USAID BHA.²⁷⁵ In the absence of third-party monitoring mechanisms, USAID lacks the capacity to independently verify activities in Syria; however, it continues to receive quarterly activity reports from all implementing partners.²⁷⁶

As of May, approximately 7.4 million Syrians were displaced, a number that has continued to grow even after the fall of the Assad regime.

At the start of 2025, USAID BHA Iraq managed six programs valued at \$28,450,000.²⁷⁷ By the end of the quarter, three programs—worth \$13,800,000—were terminated, while three remained active, totaling \$14,650,000.²⁷⁸

More than 674,000 Newly Displaced Since November

Displacement and population movements continued to affect large numbers of Syrians during the quarter. As of May, approximately 7.4 million Syrians were displaced, a number that has continued to grow even after the fall of the Assad regime.²⁷⁹

Between December 8 and May 20, USAID BHA reported that more than 500,000 refugees returned to Syria, with humanitarian actors anticipating an increase in returns in the coming months.²⁸⁰ The number of daily returns from Jordan rose significantly—averaging over 500 per day in May, up from 180 per day in March.²⁸¹ Many Syrian families in Jordan and Türkiye are also expected to return following the end of the academic year between May and July, according to USAID BHA.²⁸²

According to OCHA, ongoing funding shortages have severely affected UN implementer operations in last-resort sites and host communities.²⁸³ Reintegration efforts continue to face major challenges, including growing tensions among returnees, internally displaced persons (IDP), and host communities—driven by competition for limited resources, unresolved housing and land issues, and a lack of transitional justice mechanisms.²⁸⁴ Nationwide, protection services are being reduced due to significant funding gaps, particularly following the suspension of U.S. support.²⁸⁵

According to OCHA, Syria’s deteriorating economy—characterized by high unemployment, currency depreciation, and rising food prices—is deepening vulnerability among affected populations, particularly women and girls.²⁸⁶ This has been linked to a reported increase in early marriage, domestic and economic violence, and growing financial dependence on male family members, which limits women’s ability to seek support or leave harmful situations.²⁸⁷ At the same time, Syria faces a worsening water crisis driven by delayed rains, unpredictable precipitation, and historically low water levels in lakes, significantly impacting access to water for both communities and agriculture.²⁸⁸

According to OCHA, health needs are growing alongside increased returns, particularly in areas with damaged infrastructure, inadequate water and sanitation, and limited access to basic services.²⁸⁹ National authorities have also reported severe shortages of essential medicines, blood supplies, and dialysis services.²⁹⁰

USAID BHA reported, as of late May, that fewer than 60 percent of hospitals and just over a third of primary health care centers in Syria were fully operational due to prolonged conflict.²⁹¹ More than 30 facilities in areas previously affected by heavy fighting require immediate repairs.²⁹² In northeastern Syria, services had been suspended at 23 health centers, with nearly 70 additional facilities facing potential shutdown.²⁹³

USAID Maintains Food, Health Assistance in Syria

Global funding shortfalls have disrupted nutrition assistance across Syria, leading to the closure of some nutrition clinics.²⁹⁴ In many of the country's districts, more than half of children under age five with severe malnutrition are not receiving critical treatment, including medical care and specialized nutrition support, according to relief actors in Syria.²⁹⁵ Without timely intervention, affected children face an increased risk of wasting—the most life-threatening form of malnutrition.²⁹⁶ The World Food Programme projects that 14.6 million people in Syria will require food assistance in 2025.²⁹⁷

As of mid-May, eight humanitarian partners supported by USAID were delivering food and nutrition assistance across Syria.²⁹⁸ For example, between April and early May, a BHA implementer provided over 2,350 nutrition packets—including fortified foods and therapeutic supplements—to hospitals in Aleppo and Idlib, and distributed 1.4 million nutrient-rich food packets to 14,000 households in Idlib to help prevent malnutrition. Another organization delivered food, water, and hygiene supplies to communities affected by conflict in northeastern Syria, including 900 metric tons of flour and nearly 3.5 metric tons of yeast to bakeries—enabling the production of approximately 7.5 million loaves of bread for displaced populations, distributed either for free or at subsidized rates.²⁹⁹ The same implementer also enhanced sanitation and water access by removing over 1 million gallons of waste, cleaning 830 water tanks, repairing infrastructure, and installing 760 water taps to improve hygiene and reduce disease risk.³⁰⁰

Between January and April, with support from USAID and other donors, the UN Children's Agency (UNICEF) reached 3.3 million people across Syria—over half of them children—with child protection, health, nutrition, and water, sanitation, and hygiene services.³⁰¹ A USAID BHA implementer provided primary health care to more than 616,000 children and nearly 156,000 women.³⁰² In April alone, UNICEF screened nearly 61,000 children under five for malnutrition and supplied over 74,000 children in that age group with specialized nutrition to prevent and treat malnutrition.³⁰³ In response to water system disruptions, USAID BHA-supported emergency water trucking reached 8,000 people in Ar Raqqa's Al Mahmoudi camp between mid-March and late April.³⁰⁴ Additionally, UNICEF provided safe drinking water to 16,600 people in the al-Hol camp in April.³⁰⁵

With support from USAID BHA, community health workers screened over 5,700 children under five and nearly 400 pregnant and lactating women for malnutrition, enabling early detection and timely care.³⁰⁶ Nearly 1,200 individuals with severe malnutrition were referred for treatment. Additionally, the USAID-supported partner helped address broader health needs, including providing at least two prenatal consultations for approximately 6,800 women and assisting in more than 920 safe deliveries.³⁰⁷

The World Food Programme projects that 14.6 million people in Syria will require food assistance in 2025.

Challenges, Risks Facing U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs

Since January 2025, most USAID programs were terminated as a result of the ongoing foreign assistance review. As of July 1, State had assumed responsibility for administering foreign assistance, including awards financed by and selected statutory functions previously managed by USAID.³⁰⁸ USAID staff identified the following challenges and emerging risks for U.S. foreign assistance programs in Iraq and Syria associated with these changes.³⁰⁹

CLOSEOUT CHALLENGES

In late March and in late May, State notified Congress that it intended to limit USAID's role to closing out terminated foreign assistance programs.³¹⁰ For implementers, the closeout process includes concluding relationships with community members and sub-grantees, preparing financial statements for USAID, dismissing staff, and accounting for program equipment.³¹¹

USAID awards were terminated with little or no notice and little ability for implementers to plan in advance. USAID reported that several awards were erroneously terminated, later reinstated, and in some cases re-terminated—often without adequate documentation or clear communication.³¹² In certain instances, termination notices were sent to incorrect recipients.³¹³ This resulted in confusion, delays, and inefficiencies.³¹⁴

In May, USAID started providing tailored guidance to implementers of terminated awards, asking for estimated costs associated with termination and closeout.³¹⁵ These termination settlement costs are expected to exceed those of a standard closeout—such as final report submissions—and may include expenses like early lease cancellations, staff contract terminations, and additional disposition efforts.³¹⁶ Completing the closeout process for many of these awards is expected to take a year or more.³¹⁷

However, the rapid and chaotic termination of awards disrupted implementers' internal controls, making it difficult to carry out proper closeout procedures.³¹⁸ Staffing cuts limited their capacity for documentation, oversight, audits, and monitoring.³¹⁹ The accelerated closure of sub-awards created pressure to spend remaining funds quickly, raising the risk of financial mismanagement.³²⁰

In addition, USAID was unable to complete post-award vetting for certain awards because USAID and State have different standards for vetting implementers in Iraq and Syria.³²¹ At the end of the quarter, no final plan had been established for how these requirements will be managed during the transition to State, nor did implementers have clear points of contact for submitting their data.³²²

TRANSITION TO STATE

This transition of USAID programs to State occurred on an accelerated timeline and with limited staffing. The majority of USAID staff worldwide and in Washington had been placed on administrative leave in February.³²³ All USAID BHA staff working in Iraq, Syria, and the surrounding region were terminated as of July 1, with most staff departing their posts by mid-June to out-process in compliance with that date.³²⁴ A small number of USAID employees remain

(continued on next page)

Challenges, Risks Facing U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs

(continued from previous page)

at some USAID Missions and in Washington to close out operations, with a final termination date in early September.³²⁵

Further, USAID staff said that much of the direction they received regarding the transition was informal in nature, often with no follow-up to document decisions taken.³²⁶ In addition, the transfer and management of USAID awards requires access to and familiarity with proprietary, restricted USAID computer systems, some of which new personnel could not access until specifically designated.³²⁷

As late as mid-June, State had not yet formally identified contracting officers for many programs transitioning from USAID.³²⁸ (State did identify contracting and grant officers by the end of the quarter.) This limited the ability of USAID staff to bring State counterparts up to speed and address questions.³²⁹ Neither USAID staff nor their agency implementers were able to reference the rules governing all USAID awards because the Automated Directives System—USAID’s primary system for laying out policies and procedures—was taken offline in February.³³⁰ In addition, USAID and State staff were unable to access proprietary systems that contain details about the awards.³³¹ This uncertainty could lead to confusion regarding oversight responsibilities, unauthorized commitments, invalid modifications, and approval delays.³³²

CHALLENGES FOR ACTIVE AWARDS

Meanwhile, implementers of both active and terminated assistance awards faced significant payment delays, which hindered the full resumption of humanitarian activities for some implementers.³³³ These delays stem from intermittent staff access to payment systems, reduced staffing due to administrative leave and terminations, and the addition of new and evolving approval processes—often involving stakeholders not previously engaged in award management.³³⁴ In Syria, all USAID implementers were partially operational due to lack of payment.³³⁵

The termination of third-party monitoring contracts has further limited USAID’s ability to oversee humanitarian programs.³³⁶ Without independent monitoring, USAID said it cannot verify that programs are being implemented in line with award terms, increasing the risk of waste, fraud, and abuse—especially in conflict-affected areas, where there is a heightened potential for diversion of funds.³³⁷







Peshmerga soldiers listen to instructions at the Atrush Infantry Training Center in the Nineva province, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo)

IRAQ

- 41 Security Environment
- 42 Security Assistance
- 52 Governance
- 54 Economic Growth
- 55 Stabilization and Humanitarian Assistance



U.S. Army Soldiers conduct weapons qualification testing at Ayn al-Asad Air Base, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo)

IRAQ

During the quarter, Iraq continued a political, economic, and security transition shaped in part by instability in neighboring Syria and the region.³³⁸ The United States' high-level policy objectives for Iraq remained largely unchanged from previous quarters.³³⁹ (See Table 5.) The January executive order to pause U.S. foreign development assistance and subsequent termination of foreign assistance awards affected some key U.S. activities in Iraq.³⁴⁰

Table 5.

U.S. Policy Objectives in Iraq

- Promote inclusive economic reform.
- Support an Iraqi democracy that delivers for all citizens.
- Support a resilient Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR).
- Bolster Iraqi independence and advance regional integration.

Source: State, "Integrated Country Strategy-Iraq," 5/30/2023.

On June 12, State ordered the departure of more than 1,000 non-essential personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center, and the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

State Orders Staff Departures from Iraq

On June 12, State ordered the departure of more than 1,000 non-essential personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center, and the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil. According to State, the Iraqi government was given advance notice of the departures.³⁴¹

On June 21 and 22, an additional 500 Mission Iraq personnel and contractors departed Iraq. A State Department spokesperson quoted in the media said they departed “out of an abundance of caution and due to heightened regional tensions.”³⁴²

State reported no attacks against diplomatic personnel or facilities despite threats from Kata’ib Hezbollah, Iraq’s primary Iran-aligned militia group (IAMG), to attack U.S. personnel at facilities including the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center, if U.S. forces did not withdraw from Iraq.³⁴³

Militias Remain a Threat

State maintained that IAMGs remain a primary challenge to Iraq’s stability and sovereignty due to the military, political, and financial aid they receive from Iran. State assessed that the IAMGs risked dragging Iraq into a regional war by conducting attacks inside and outside of Iraq.³⁴⁴ Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) reported that IAMGs reconsolidated in Iraq following the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria.³⁴⁵

State said that it warned the Iraqi government of the dangers posed by armed groups acting independently and against Iraq’s interests. State has explicitly called on the Iraqi government to prevent attacks on U.S. personnel and interests in Iraq, emphasizing the importance of holding perpetrators accountable.³⁴⁶

State said that the United States strongly supports Iraqis’ desire for a country that is stable, sovereign, and secure, and maintained that militia groups destroy that possibility for the Iraqi people. State said that it will continue to call on the Iraqi government to be a responsible partner.³⁴⁷

On June 12, State designated IAMG Kata’ib al-Imam Ali and Harakat al-Nujaba deputy secretary-general Nasr Mohsen Ali Huthale, also known as Nasr al-Shammari, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorists pursuant to Executive Order 13224.³⁴⁸

Separately, State said that it is aware of reports that the Houthis, a U.S. designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO), maintain a presence in Iraq. According to State, the Houthis threaten to destabilize the region, and their presence in Iraq poses a threat to U.S. and international forces hosted by Iraq and threatens to undermine Iraq’s desire to attract foreign investment and improve regional relations. State said that it had raised these concerns with the Iraqi government.³⁴⁹

Iraq's Government Condemns Israeli Use of Its Airspace During 12-day Conflict with Iran

According to media reports, the Iraqi government condemned Israeli overflights of Iraq during attacks on Iran as violations of Iraqi airspace.³⁵⁰ Iraq's government also called on the United States to prevent Israeli breaches of its sovereignty and complained to the United Nations about the Israeli violations.³⁵¹

Iraqi parliamentary and militia leaders also condemned Israel's use of Iraqi airspace. According to local Iraqi media and a Washington think tank, the political wing of the Iran-aligned militia, Asaib Ahl al Haq, called for expelling foreign forces that use Iraqi airspace to target Iran.³⁵² The leader of Kata'ib Sayyid al Shuhada accused the United States of turning off Iraqi radar systems to protect Israeli fighter jets as they travelled to Iran.³⁵³ Further, a parliament member described the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement as a pretext for enabling Israeli incursions into Iraqi airspace.³⁵⁴

To increase security around diplomatic and government facilities, the Iraqi government closed Baghdad's International Zone (formerly the "Green Zone"), which houses government buildings and foreign embassies, including the U.S. Mission, according to media reports, and increased government security presence around the U.S. Embassy.³⁵⁵

Iraq's government also called on the United States to prevent Israeli breaches of its sovereignty and complained to the United Nations about the Israeli violations.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

CJTF-OIR pursues the OIR mission in Iraq by advising, enabling, and assisting components of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), and Kurdish Peshmerga forces.³⁵⁶

CJTF-OIR advising is conducted from three bases in Iraq: Union III in Baghdad, the Ayn al-Assad Air Base in Anbar province, and the Erbil Air Base in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR).³⁵⁷ CJTF-OIR reported that during the quarter, it resumed the reposture of forces from Union III and the Ayn al-Assad Air Base to bases outside of federal Iraq as part of a U.S.-Iraqi agreement signed in September 2024 to transition the U.S.-led OIR military campaign to a long-term U.S.-Iraqi bilateral security partnership.³⁵⁸

In the first phase of the reposture plan, CJTF-OIR will consolidate and reposture forces in federal Iraq by the end of September 2025, while advising, assisting, and enabling the Iraqi government in counter-ISIS efforts. In the second phase, CJTF-OIR will continue operations against ISIS in northeastern Syria from military bases in the IKR until September 2026. The timeline for executing both phases is subject to conditions on the ground and consultations between Iraq, the United States, and Coalition members.³⁵⁹

CJTF-OIR said that the reposture remains on track to meet timelines set out in a U.S.-Iraqi agreement announced in September 2024 that calls for an end to the OIR military mission in federal Iraq by September 2025 and the continuation of operations against ISIS in Syria from Iraq through September 2026.³⁶⁰

COALITION ADVISING IN IRAQ

Kurdish Peshmerga

Within the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, Coalition advisors work with the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA) to implement a 4-year reform plan established between the DoD and the Kurdistan Regional Government. The reform plan seeks to unify partisan Peshmerga forces under the MoPA, which is responsible for maintaining the territorial integrity of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and coordinating with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense in Baghdad.

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)

Coalition military advisors have daily contact with Ministry of Defense leaders at the Joint Operations Command–Iraq, located at Union III in Baghdad. ISF advising focuses on the four areas most important for defeating ISIS: sustainment/logistics, air operations, command and control, and intelligence. Coalition advisors have recently established irregular contact with ISF personnel outside of Union III, including Ministry of Defense headquarters and Iraqi Ground Forces Command to meet the focus area advisory requirements.

Non-OIR Advising and Support

The Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad conducts bilateral security assistance and security cooperation activities, including training, with partner forces. NATO Mission–Iraq advises ISF leaders at the ministerial level.

Note: OCs may not be shown in their actual location within each province.

Source: CJTF–OIR, vetting comment, 4/15/2025.

-  = Coalition Presence
-  = ISF Provincial Operations Command (OC)
-  = Iraqi Kurdistan Region
-  = Internal Area Claimed by the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and Federal Iraq

Counter Terrorism Service (CTS)

Coalition military advisors work with the CTS at the strategic and operational levels. Coalition advisement focuses on air-to-ground integration; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; site exploitation; and other areas to develop and assess CTS capabilities.



U.S. Forces Resume Reposture Activities

CJTF-OIR reported that during the quarter general security improvements in Syria had “tempered” calls by Iraqi political leaders for Coalition forces to remain in federal Iraq, and that the timeline to reposture troops to areas outside of federal Iraq remained on track.³⁶¹ During the quarter, Coalition forces were preparing to vacate designated bases in Iraq in accordance with the original timeline, CJTF-OIR said.³⁶²

On May 10, CJTF-OIR convened the Higher Military Council (HMC), a military-to-military body, to discuss the final disposition of Coalition assets and personnel in Iraq needed to meet the objectives of the transition plan, according to CJTF-OIR. The objectives include maintaining counter-ISIS operations, Coalition advising, and Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) funding, as well as support for the repatriation of Iraqi nationals residing in camps and detention facilities in Syria.³⁶³ Last quarter, CJTF-OIR had cancelled scheduled meetings of the HMC due to the security situation in Syria.³⁶⁴

CJTF-OIR reported that no additional HMC meetings were scheduled as of the end of the quarter.³⁶⁵

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) said that the United States and Iraq were moving towards the kind of long-term security relationship that the United States has with other countries. The OUSD(P) said that the ISF had made “tremendous strides” in counterterrorism capabilities and that the United States continued to support a sovereign, secure, and stable Iraq.³⁶⁶

U.S. Will Continue to Support Partner Forces Through the CTEF During Force Posture Changes

CJTF-OIR reported that it intends to sustain support to counter-ISIS operations through the provision of CTEF funding to partner forces in Iraq to the maximum extent possible during force reposture.³⁶⁷

Long-term U.S. support through CTEF remained in place, including the payment of Peshmerga stipends, although there is no provision for continuing them in the FY 2026 budget request pursuant to the 2022 memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the DoD and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).³⁶⁸ CTEF support also remained in place for logistical support, infrastructure repair and renovation, sustainment, and border security.³⁶⁹ (See Table 6.)

Congress appropriated \$1.18 billion for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Iraq from FY 2020 through FY 2024. Congress appropriated \$175 million for FY 2024, although State requested a reduced amount of \$75.5 million because previously appropriated FMF funds remained available. State requested \$90 million for FY 2025. As of June 30, State said that FY 2024 FMF funds had been allocated but none had been spent. At the end of the quarter, \$770.3 million (66 percent) of available funds had been spent.³⁷⁰

During the previous quarter, State reported two Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) funding pipelines for Iraq: \$6.9 million for NADR

During the quarter, Coalition forces were preparing to vacate designated bases in Iraq in accordance with the original timeline, CJTF-OIR said.

Table 6.

CTEF Funding for Iraq Train and Equip Requirements, in \$ Millions

Sub-categories	Training and Equipping	Logistical Support, Supplies, and Services	Stipends	Infrastructure Repair and Renovation	Sustainment	Border Security	TOTAL
FY24/25 Requested	\$41.7	\$12.3	\$135.0	\$10.5	\$42.5	\$—	\$241.9
FY24/25 Enacted	41.7	12.3	135.0	10.5	42.5	—	241.9
FY24/25 Obligated*	Obligation data is not available by sub-category.						
FY24/25 Disbursed*	Disbursement data is not available by sub-category.						
FY25 Requested	257.0	9.7	60.0	4.8	49.2	—	380.7
FY25 Enacted	257.0	9.7	60.0	4.8	49.2	—	380.7
FY25 Obligated**	Obligation data is not available by sub-category.						
FY25 Disbursed**	Disbursement data is not available by sub-category.						
FY26 Requested	175.0	17.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	—	212.0

Notes: *As of September 30, 2024. **As of May 30, 2025.

Source: OUSD(C), response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 OIR 013, 7/3/2025.

Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD) and \$1.5 million for NADR EXBS (export control and border security). State said that NADR CWD programming that addresses explosive remnants of war across Iraq remained active during the quarter.³⁷¹

As part of the Secretary’s individualized review of grants and contracts, State terminated two projects related to conventional weapons destruction totaling roughly \$4 million to focus assistance on the most pressing CWD needs while increasing the overall cost efficiency of the program. State said that programs and funding for export control and border security remained active pending the results of the OMB foreign assistance review; however, in March, State decided to curtail two previously funded activities amounting to \$512,000.³⁷²

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Coalition advisers based in Baghdad continued to advise the ISF on specific warfighting functions primarily through the Joint Operations Command-Iraq (JOC-I), a cross-functional organization that operates using Ministry of Defense assets, reports to the prime minister, and participates in operations against ISIS but does not command them.³⁷³

CJTF-OIR reported that the Iraqis continued to support counter-ISIS operations, border security operations, and airspace management, and that CJTF-OIR expects these operations to continue under a future bilateral security agreement.³⁷⁴ CJTF-OIR said that although the JOC-I does not command operations, it maintains a “critical role” in the intelligence fusion and deliberate targeting processes that culminate in airstrikes against ISIS and is involved

in command and control of operations when an operation requires joint effort, such as air support.³⁷⁵ The JOC-I also maintains public affairs and information operations capabilities.³⁷⁶

JOC-I Made Incremental Improvements in Warfighting Capabilities

CJTF-OIR reported that during the quarter, the JOC-I coordinated counter-ISIS operations that resulted in the arrest of hundreds of ISIS suspects and the deaths of at least 25 suspected ISIS militants. Many of these operations, supported by CJTF-OIR, took place in the northeastern mountainous region of the IKR and in provinces along the Kurdistan Coordination Line (KCL), including Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salah ad-Din, where ISIS exploits gaps in security between the IKR and federal Iraq.³⁷⁷ The JOC-I also coordinated counternarcotics operations, leading to more than 3,000 arrests. CJTF-OIR reported that drug smuggling operations are a major source of revenue for ISIS, so the counternarcotics operations indirectly affect ISIS capabilities.³⁷⁸

The operations that the JOC-I coordinates involve multiple ISF units, such as the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Special Operations Forces.³⁷⁹ The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that various Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units also frequently conduct joint counter-ISIS operations with ISF elements. However, the DIA described PMF operations as “unsophisticated clearance operations” or “simple raids of ISIS bed down locations” that do not require extensive coordination between units.³⁸⁰

During the quarter, the JOC-I made incremental gains in its ability to carry out some warfighting functions, but several gaps remained. (See Table 7.) Coalition advisers advised, assisted, and enabled the JOC-I in its efforts to execute these warfighting functions.³⁸¹ Specifically, CJTF-OIR reported that Coalition advisers provided advice related to joint fires, intelligence, sustainment, information operations, and command and control of operations that emphasized the importance of using common planning methods and processes.³⁸²

Table 7.

JOC-I Capabilities

Warfighting Function	Capability
Command and Control	Communications problems continued to hamper command and control of troops. Lower-level Border Guard units used unsecured communications methods even though the units have been issued secure Harris radios. Pilots used Rohde Schwarz radios, while ground forces used Harris radios, resulting in a communications gap. The positions of ground units continue to be updated manually and inconsistently because some units operate without Harris radios.
Airstrikes	The JOC-I can execute airstrikes using Cessna Caravan (AC-208) aircraft and Hellfire (AGM-114R) missiles on permissive, large signature targets. The JOC-I cannot laser-designate targets and lacks air controller capability to communicate with F-16s in all regions of Iraq.
Strike Cell	The JOC-I Strike Cell can coordinate ISR but cannot designate targets other than large signature targets. Additionally, the JOC-I continued to require Coalition and U.S. support to execute airstrikes from Iraqi F-16s, and to rely on a Coalition communication system to reach the F-16s to enable a strike.

Sources: CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 OIR 040, 25.3 OIR 041, and 25.3 OIR 044, 6/10/2025.

CJTF-OIR reported that the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service conducted several successful counter-ISIS operations further degrading ISIS leadership networks and operational effectiveness in Iraq.

CJTF-OIR and the JOC-I conducted a 5-week joint fires course on operational joint planning and joint fires integration processes, which all of the primary warfighting functions elements across the ISF attended.³⁸³ The course was scheduled to culminate with a training event at Balad Air Base in July that brought together elements of the CTS, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, Army Aviation, and Iraqi Air Force F-16s and AC-208s, with the JOC-I executing command and control.³⁸⁴

Additionally, CJTF-OIR advisors began conducting monthly Harris logistics reporting workshops at the headquarters of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command. CJTF-OIR reported that the Ground Forces Command might start tracking the logistical status of deployed units using the Harris radio software in the near future, which would allow for more rapid reactions to demand and more organized logistical operations.³⁸⁵

Counter Terrorism Service Recruits, Trains, and Develops New Capabilities

CJTF-OIR reported that the CTS conducted several successful counter-ISIS operations, further degrading ISIS leadership networks and operational effectiveness in Iraq. The CTS maintains the ability to maintain counterterrorism pressure with minimal Coalition support, CJTF-OIR said.³⁸⁶

In addition to ground operations against ISIS, CJTF-OIR reported that the CTS continued plans to develop several additional capabilities and to recruit and train new members.

Training, recruitment, and rehabilitation: The CTS has restructured its training academy and successfully conducted specialized courses, including integrated training with other government ministries. It plans to create a new department to manage the rehabilitation of wounded personnel and has hired new medical officers.³⁸⁷ The CTS continued to recruit staff through established recruitment practices.³⁸⁸

ISR: The CTS is working to acquire new equipment, the training of new operators, and the addition of new platforms from regional providers. It has made progress with unmanned aircraft systems and testing video feeds to the Operations Center. The CTS has refined intelligence processes and is implementing new planning procedures for unmanned aircraft missions.³⁸⁹

Air Wing: The CTS made progress in developing an organic air assault capability through the establishment of an air wing. It has successfully negotiated reduced pilot training timelines and secured the transfer of experienced helicopter crews. CTS leadership engaged with manufacturers for aircraft contracts while developing funding plans for aviation equipment. Air wing personnel were enrolled in language courses to meet technical training requirements.³⁹⁰

**Iraqi Armed Forces
Major General
Kairallah Issa speaks
with U.S. and Syrian
partners during a
meeting regarding
safety and security
at an Iraq border
station.
(U.S. Army photo)**



Desert Battalions Secure Border and Disputed Territories

CJTF-OIR reported that Iraq's five Desert Battalions conducted search and clearance operations along the Iraq-Syria border, in the Hamrin Mountains, and in areas along the KCL.³⁹¹

U.S. advising for the Desert Battalions was limited and reliant on training conducted by French advisors based at Ayn al-Assad Air Base in Anbar province. CJTF-OIR noted that the battalions operated at the tactical level without frequent advising support and are assessed to be capable of providing border security, manning and operating guard towers, executing entry control point operations, and can be tasked to other brigades for search and detain operations.³⁹² CJTF-OIR reported that the United States has provided more than \$22.7 million in equipment and ammunition to the Desert Battalions since 2023.³⁹³

KURDISH PESHMERGA

In September 2022, the United States revised and renewed an MoU with the KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA) to support reform measures that seek to create a unified, nonpartisan Peshmerga military organization. The non-binding MoU has served as an organizing framework for DoD counter-ISIS support to the MoPA since 2016 and will remain in effect until the end of September 2026, subject to the availability of funds.³⁹⁴

Transfer of personnel: According to the MoU, the DoD and KRG intend to reorganize the 70s and 80s partisan forces—which are commanded separately by the KRG's two main political parties—under MoPA authority into 11 light role infantry divisions under two Area Commands (equivalent to Corps Commands). During the quarter, three of the 11 planned divisions were at full operating capability and another three were at initial operating capability.³⁹⁵

Under the MoU, it is expected that the Peshmerga force size operating under the MoPA's command will be 138,000. As of late May, the MoPA had 72,000 Peshmerga under its authority, but many more remain outside of the MoPA and under the command of the preexisting partisan organizations of the 70s and 80s Forces. The MoPA personnel department anticipates that it will meet the September 2026 deadline outlined in the MoU.³⁹⁶

The DIA reported that partisanship persists in the MoPA amid continued efforts to create unified Peshmerga divisions and Regional Guard Brigades.³⁹⁷ Despite efforts at reforms meant to establish nonpartisan military units under one unified command, the brigades retain party-aligned commanders and operate in party-aligned territory, the DIA said.³⁹⁸

CJTF-OIR reported that the MoPA continued to train the personnel belonging to the six Peshmerga divisions that have been stood up and operate under its control.³⁹⁹ The MoPA continued to conduct initial entry training for new Peshmerga recruits. Additionally, Coalition advisors conducted medical and other non-combat training for MoPA personnel.⁴⁰⁰

Peshmerga officers and Coalition advisors take a tour during a key leader engagement at the Atrush Infantry Training Center in the Ninewa province, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo)

ACI Brigades: CJTF-OIR reported that Coalition advisors continued to assess the effectiveness of coordination between the Area of Common Interest (ACI) Brigades, previously known as Joint Brigades, that operate along the KCL and comprise units from the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga's Regional Guard Brigades.⁴⁰¹

The 1st ACI Brigade was equipped with the Harris radio communication system at brigade headquarters and subordinate battalion headquarters, and in key-leader vehicles.⁴⁰² CJTF-OIR advisers will assess the 1st Brigade's ability to communicate and synchronize with down-trace



units and the JOC-I's ability to use the Harris system during the next scheduled key leader engagement. The 2nd ACI Brigade is waiting to receive the Harris communication system.⁴⁰³

CJTF-OIR said that the brigades need persistent training on equipment usage, function, and maintenance to properly use and maintain U.S.-provided weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment. However, CJTF-OIR said that Coalition advisers can only reach the Joint Brigade headquarters by helicopter due to its location along the KCL.⁴⁰⁴

CJTF-OIR noted incremental progress in MoPA warfighting functions. (See Table 8.)

Table 8.

Status of MoPA Warfighting Functions During the Quarter

Function	Description
Mission Planning	The Peshmerga 1st through 4th Divisions demonstrate basic capacity to plan and execute missions using the Military Decision-Making Process methodology. The 5th and 6th Divisions are in the process of developing this capability and will conduct an internal command post exercise next quarter to test and confirm their progress.
Ground Operations	The 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions conducted deliberate clearance operations along their respective portions of the KCL without Coalition advising assistance, but did not directly target known ISIS positions. The 1st and 3rd Division maneuvered two of their four assigned Regional Guard Brigades in tandem with Iraqi Army Brigades on the opposing side of the KCL.
Command and Control	The most significant challenge facing MoPA force structure reform is the delay in establishing the Area Commands, the corps-level headquarters that will liaise between the MoPA and the 11 planned Divisions.
Intelligence and Targeting	The MoPA Intelligence Directorate demonstrates capability to re-analyze and refine intelligence products and has refined and updated environmental and enemy analysis based on Divisional and Brigade collection results and feedback. At the tactical level, Divisions remain reliant on their higher headquarters and Coalition support for deliberate targeting but demonstrate the capacity to anticipate enemy likely and most deadly courses of action.
Logistics and Sustainment	Recent operations demonstrate that Peshmerga divisions can organize and sustain operations for at least 24 hours. Budget shortfalls should be expected to continue until the KRG and MoPA streamline funding under a single line of accounting and approve a genuine operational budget for the MoPA. In most logistical locations, there is continuous improvement in ammunition safety and storage. Bulk fuel installations and ammunition bunkers are being built or have been established. Maintenance at all levels still proves challenging although the Peshmerga acknowledge the need for written doctrine and maintenance procedures and routines. Coalition advisors successfully introduced logistics status reports, which enable the logistics staff to consolidate requirements into a single document.
Joint Fires (artillery)	The Divisions have received 44 120mm towed mortars, which were distributed to the Regional Guard Brigades. They also have an array of legacy artillery pieces and mortars accrued over years, but these do not constitute a coherent, end-to-end Joint Fires capability. Peshmerga Joint Fires capability is nascent.
Information Operations	The General Directorate for Media and National Awareness, a department in the MoPA, has conducted information operations and presented a solid draft for the establishment of an Information Operations Center. CJTF-OIR advisers work with the Peshmerga media cell in support of KRG media operations, including mandatory analysis and planning courses. There were also small successes in distributing information operations campaign products.

Source: CJTF-OIR, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 OIR 046 and 25.3 OIR 047, 6/10/2025.



A German Armed Forces senior sustainment advisor inspecting ammunition crates at a Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs warehouse in the Erbil province, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo)

PKK Agrees to Disarm

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) agreed in June to disband and disarm as part of a peace initiative with Türkiye.⁴⁰⁵ The announcement came days after the PKK convened a party congress in northern Iraq, where it has maintained bases for decades.⁴⁰⁶

The DIA reported that PKK disarmament, if completed, is likely to have a positive effect on stability in northern Iraq, assuming it is accompanied by a withdrawal of Turkish military forces.⁴⁰⁷ According to media reports, Türkiye has maintained bases in northern Iraq for decades and conducted multiple military ground and air operations in northern Iraq to combat the PKK, which it considers a terrorist organization.⁴⁰⁸

Citing open sources, the DIA reported that PKK disarmament “currently lacks an agreed-upon process and timeline,” and said that the DIA had “not observed any effect of the disarmament announcement” on Peshmerga forces operating in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region or on the MoPA’s ability to conduct operations against ISIS.⁴⁰⁹

The DIA also said that the effect of the PKK disarmament process on the prospect of improved relations between the KRG’s two main political parties—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—would only become clear once a roadmap is determined.⁴¹⁰

However, the DIA assessed that Türkiye would likely work with Iraq’s central government in Baghdad and with the Kurds in Erbil, a KDP stronghold, rather than in Sulaymaniyah, a PUK stronghold, which may exacerbate KDP-PUK tensions.⁴¹¹

The DIA reported that it had not observed and does not anticipate any effect from a PKK disarmament process on Peshmerga reform efforts.⁴¹²

END-USE MONITORING OF MILITARY ASSETS PROVIDED TO IRAQ

Defense articles and materiel provided to Iraq under the Arms Export Control Act are subject to end-use monitoring (EUM) to ensure items provided to the ISF remain in the possession of the forces intended to receive them, and the articles and materiel are employed in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement.⁴¹³

Appointed monitors from the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq (OSC-I), under Chief of Mission authority, use both routine and enhanced methods to conduct EUM, according to State. Routine EUM is required for defense articles and services provided and occurs in conjunction with other security cooperation events. The Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, CTS, and the MoPA detail thousands of defense articles in quarterly reports. In addition, monitors have conducted 77 individual routine EUM checks of defense articles since their return from ordered departure in 2024.⁴¹⁴

In addition, State said that enhanced EUM is required for specific defense articles. In Iraq, night-vision devices and Stinger missiles comprise 95 percent of the nearly 5,900 enhanced EUM articles. Monitors must annually account for these articles in person. However, Iraq’s security environment poses challenges to enhanced EUM visits. The Chief of Mission-approved outer limits of travel loosely extend to greater Baghdad, greater Erbil, and other locations, so enhanced EUM is generally performed by ISF aggregating their enhanced articles at locations inside greater Baghdad that OSC-I personnel can visit. As a result, OSC-I personnel may not always be able to observe physical security measures at the place that the defense articles are normally stored, but this methodology allows the serial numbers of the enhanced-designated articles to be verified, maintaining compliance with regulations and applicable transfer agreements. Since the return from ordered departure in spring 2024, OSC-I personnel have verified 5,100 defense articles during 30 physical inspection visits. Defense articles are commonly scanned by bar code or are otherwise verified by serial number.⁴¹⁵

LEAHY LAW CERTIFICATION

State reported that it was not aware of any instances during the quarter in which the United States provided assistance to the ISF in violation of the Leahy laws. The Leahy laws refer to two statutory provisions prohibiting certain U.S. assistance from being provided to a unit of a foreign security force if the U.S. Government has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. State vets proposed recipients of such assistance to determine if there is credible information that they have committed a gross violation of human rights.⁴¹⁶

GOVERNANCE

Preparations for National Elections Continue

Iraq’s national parliamentary elections are scheduled for November 11. Registration for parties and coalitions closed in late May and the registration period for candidates closed on June 26.⁴¹⁷

On May 20, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced the formation of the “Reconstruction and Development Alliance” electoral coalition that includes his own “Furitan Movement” political bloc and numerous other political blocs. According to media reporting cited by State, the prime minister said the coalition’s electoral platform is to

Prime Minister Barzani announced major gas deals with two U.S. energy companies to develop the Miran and Topkhana gas fields in the IKR.

prioritize sustainable reconstruction, the national economy, public services, the completion of infrastructure and strategic projects, and security and stability in regional and international relations.⁴¹⁸

On May 27, former Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition Leader Nouri al-Maliki announced that he was running in the upcoming national elections after a two-term absence. Al-Maliki aimed to leverage his political legacy, popular support in Baghdad, and the Coordination Framework to position himself as a strong candidate and secure a significant electoral win, which is expected to trigger intense competition with current Prime Minister al-Sudani.⁴¹⁹

The biggest change from the 2021 election is among independent members of parliament, who won under the single non-transferable vote system. With its elimination, many candidates have pivoted to align with traditional and well-established parties, hoping that association will enhance their chances of reelection.⁴²⁰

Iraqi Government-KRG Tensions Grow Amid U.S.-Supported Gas Deals

In mid-May, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani traveled to Washington, D.C., to meet with U.S. Government officials. During his visit, Prime Minister Barzani announced major gas deals with two U.S. energy companies to develop the Miran and Topkhana gas fields in the IKR. Following the announcement, Iraq's Ministry of Oil said the deals were "a clear violation of Iraqi law," declaring the deals "null and void," citing concern that they were not negotiated through the federal Iraqi government. The Iraq government subsequently filed a lawsuit claiming that the gas deals were unconstitutional.⁴²¹

During his meeting with Prime Minister Barzani, Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed U.S. support for a strong and resilient IKR and commended the prime minister for finalizing the gas production deals. State's spokesperson emphasized that the United States supports economic deals that benefit all Iraqis. The United States encouraged the federal Iraqi government and the KRG to work together to expand domestic gas production as soon as possible.⁴²²

In late May, Iraq's Ministry of Finance informed the KRG that it would cease public sector salary payments for the remainder of 2025, claiming the KRG has already received more than its allotted 12.67 percent of the federal budget under the 3-year budget law. The KRG argued that this decision was motivated by its recent natural gas deals with U.S. firms and contended it remained entitled to the funds in line with Iraq's Federal Supreme Court ruling.⁴²³ As of the end of the quarter, Iraq's Federal Supreme Court had scheduled a hearing to review the matter in mid-July.⁴²⁴

The salary dispute highlights a long-standing conflict over budget allocations and oil revenue sharing between the Iraqi government and the KRG, which has been worsened by a strained fiscal situation and previous failures to reach a lasting agreement on revenue distribution.⁴²⁵

Iraqi media reported that State was urging both the federal Iraqi government and the KRG to abide by the financial payments terms of Iraq's constitution and settle the dispute quickly. In a statement to the media, State said that "resolving the issue of salaries quickly sends a message that Iraq puts the interests of its people in the first place."⁴²⁶

Embassy Baghdad Reduces Operating Expenses

During the quarter, State said the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad engaged in a multi-level approach to cost savings encompassing efforts related to contract management, aviation, security support, and infrastructure upgrades to bring operations more in line with other High Threat High Risk posts worldwide. Mission Iraq successfully re-awarded many of its contracts and has increased efforts to promote local Iraqi staff for contract positions rather than third-country nationals. Additionally, Mission Iraq has shifted from State-provided fixed-wing and helicopter support to commercial charter aircraft between Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center and Amman, Jordan, and transitioned to ground movements in lieu of helicopters.⁴²⁷

ECONOMIC GROWTH

United States, International Financial Groups Urge Iraq to Diversify its Economy

U.S., Iraqi, and international financial institution leaders have expressed concern about Iraq's financial condition and over-reliance on the volatile oil market to fund approximately 90 percent of its budget.⁴²⁸ The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have recommended the Iraqi government decrease the fiscal deficit by diversifying the economy, including increasing non-oil tax revenues and controlling public-sector wages. They also recommended completing the restructuring of state-owned banks, modernizing the banking system, expanding correspondent banking relationships, promoting private-sector growth through labor market reform, and improving the business environment.⁴²⁹

According to the IMF's latest World Economic Outlook, Iraq's economy is forecast to shrink 1.5 percent, a reduction from 4.1 percent forecast in October 2024.⁴³⁰ The IMF urged Iraq to adopt urgent reforms, noting that Iraq's budget break-even oil price is \$92 per barrel (year-to-date oil prices have averaged below \$70 per barrel). The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has expressed confidence that Iraq will find its footing in the short term and that it will continue to make progress under Prime Minister al-Sudani's plan to increase non-oil revenues. The Minister of Finance has expressed less optimism and has called for the CBI to fund its budget deficit.⁴³¹

At the end of the quarter, the Iraqi government and parliament had not finalized a 2025 budget. State said that although the current 3-year budget covers 2025, the budget implementation tables have not been approved, and the ministries are operating month-to-month based on the 2024 tables. Iraq's budget remains stretched due to spending on public-sector salaries and reduced oil revenues.⁴³² To address the revenue shortfall, State reported that the Iraqi government raised about \$32 billion in Treasury bond sales in late March. While this influx of funds provided some relief to Iraq's budget, it reduced the amount of cash circulating in the economy and lowered the reserves held in state-owned banks following their purchase of government bonds.⁴³³

Three USAID BHA awards, totaling more than \$13 million in obligations, have been terminated.

Türkiye Agrees to Increase Water Flow to Iraq

According to press reports and Iraqi government social media, in early May, Iraqi Prime Minister al-Sudani and Turkish President Erdogan signed 10 MoUs between Iraq and Türkiye. The agreements addressed water resource management, migration and voluntary return of Iraqis, judicial cooperation, higher education, disaster and emergency response, training for Interior Ministry units, defense industry cooperation, and scientific research. During the meeting, Prime Minister al-Sudani raised concerns about reduced water flows from Türkiye due to Turkish dams along the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and the two leaders also announced nine new projects on water cooperation and initiatives to promote economic cooperation.⁴³⁴ In a joint news conference, President Erdogan noted that bilateral trade volume between Türkiye and Iraq was nearly \$18 billion.⁴³⁵

On July 1, President Erdogan agreed to increase the flow of water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers to Iraq, effective the next day, following a meeting with Iraqi Parliamentary Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashadani, according to news reports. The increased water flow will help offset Iraq's water shortages during its hot summer months. The groundwork for the increase goes back to agreement between Prime Minister al-Sudani and President Erdogan last year to manage shared water resources.⁴³⁶

Also during the quarter, the Iraqi government, KRG, and international oil companies continued their discussions about resuming export through the Iraq-Türkiye Pipeline. The primary disagreement remains compensation for international oil companies operating in the IKR. After a glimmer of hope when talks on reopening the pipeline occurred at the level of the prime minister's chiefs of staff, the discussions broke down in late April.⁴³⁷

STABILIZATION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) reported it has four active awards remaining in Iraq, many of which were affected by stop-work orders and now require no-cost extensions to bridge the transition to State.⁴³⁸ Three USAID BHA awards, totaling more than \$13 million in obligations, have been terminated.

The expiration of USAID BHA's Iraq third-party monitoring contract poses challenges for monitoring ongoing programs in a non-permissive environment, as many implementer activities remain inaccessible to USAID staff.⁴³⁹ Most partners maintain internal monitoring and oversight mechanisms, with some utilizing their own third-party monitoring arrangements.⁴⁴⁰

Repatriations Surge at al-Amal Camp for Displaced Iraqis

According to USAID BHA, the Iraqi government has continued repatriating its citizens from Syria's al-Hol camp to the al-Amal Center for Psychological and Community Rehabilitation in Ninewa province.⁴⁴¹ These repatriations are part of broader efforts, announced in early January, to support the return of all 18,000 Iraqis residing in the al-Hol and Roj camps in Syria.⁴⁴²

USAID BHA noted that continued repatriations in the absence of an expedited security clearance process would likely exacerbate pressure on al-Amal’s reception capacity, even as relief actors warned of increasing needs in the center amid increasing gaps in services.⁴⁴³

As of the end of the quarter, al-Amal was near full-capacity, according to State. Iraq’s Ministry of Migration and Displacement said that it expected many families will be cleared to depart al-Amal for their home communities in coming weeks. The average number of individuals at al-Amal during the quarter was 5,063. State said that OIR is prepared to support a repatriation movement of Iraqi households from northeastern Syria as early as mid-July.⁴⁴⁴

The International Organization for Migration (IOM), with U.S. support, continued to work with MoMD to expand al-Amal’s capacity, bringing reserve sectors online, and expand into new areas.⁴⁴⁵ State PRM supported camp management, humanitarian assistance, and lifesaving services provided by IOM and water and sanitation provided by UNICEF. Partners have indicated that several households continue to raise concerns about deteriorating living conditions in al-Amal, particularly on limitation of services. For instance, funding restrictions limited the presence of specialized female staff, hindering access to health services by female residents. The suspension of the State PRM-supported WHO program has also reduced medical referrals outside al-Amal.⁴⁴⁶

Over 65 percent of surveyed residents reported recent declines in humanitarian services, including healthcare, water and sanitation, and psychosocial support.⁴⁴⁷ Access to food was increasingly identified as a priority need.⁴⁴⁸ Additionally, more than one-quarter of respondents noted that reduced services at the al-Amal Center may deter others from returning to Iraq from al-Hol, according to USAID BHA.⁴⁴⁹

Over 65 percent of surveyed residents reported recent declines in humanitarian services, including healthcare, water and sanitation, and psychosocial support.







A CH-47 Chinook helicopter flies over the mountains near Erbil Air Base, Iraq, during a sunset mission. (U.S. Army photo)

APPENDIXES

- 60 Appendix A:
Classified Appendix to this Report
- 60 Appendix B:
About the Lead Inspector General
- 61 Appendix C:
Methodology for Preparing this
Lead IG Quarterly Report
- 62 Appendix D:
Status of U.S. Assistance Programs
in Syria
- 65 Appendix E:
Completed Oversight Projects
- 66 Appendix F:
Ongoing Oversight Projects
- 67 Appendix G:
Planned Oversight Projects
- 67 Appendix H:
Hotline and Investigations
- 68 Acronyms
- 69 Endnotes

APPENDIX A

Classified Appendix to this Report

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), as noted in several sections of this report. The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

APPENDIX B

About the Lead Inspector General

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sections 401-424), established in section 419 the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Section 419 requires the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to appoint a Lead Inspector General from among the inspector generals of the Lead IG agencies upon the commencement or designation of a military operation that exceeds 60 days as an overseas contingency operation: or receipt of notification thereof.

Lead IG oversight of the operation “sunset” at the end of the first fiscal year after commencement or designation in which the total amount appropriated for the operation is less than \$100 million.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out Lead IG statutory responsibilities to:

- Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis a report on the contingency operation and to make that report available to the public.
- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S. Government-funded activities supporting overseas contingency operations, including those relating to the Middle East.

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations.

APPENDIX C

Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Quarterly Report

This report complies with section 419 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. sections 401-424), which requires that the designated Lead IG provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on each overseas contingency operation, and is consistent with the requirement that a biannual report be published by the Lead IG on the activities of the Inspectors General with respect to that overseas contingency operation. The Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the DoD IG as the Lead IG for OIR. The State IG is the Associate IG for the operation.

This report covers the period from April 1, 2025, through June 30, 2025. The three Lead IG agencies—DoD OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG—and partner oversight agencies contributed the content of this report.

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OIR, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or from Federal agencies, and the information provided represents the view of the source cited in each instance.

INFORMATION COLLECTION FROM AGENCIES AND OPEN SOURCES

Each quarter, the Lead IG agencies gather information from the DoD, State, USAID, and other Federal agencies about their programs and operations related to OIR. The Lead IG agencies use the information provided by their respective agencies for quarterly reporting and oversight planning.

This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report may include the following:

- U.S. Government statements, news conferences, and reports
- Reports issued by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks
- Media reports

The Lead IG agencies use open-source information to assess information obtained through their agency information collection process and provide additional detail about the operation.

REPORT PRODUCTION

The DoD IG, as the Lead IG for this operation, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs draft input to the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review process of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. During the quarter, due to the transition to State, USAID did not have staff available to comment. The final report reflects the editorial view of the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs as independent oversight agencies.

APPENDIX D

Status of U.S. Assistance Programs in Syria

Table 9.

Terminated USAID Stabilization Awards in Syria, as of June 30, 2025

Award Funds Obligated to Date	Description
Essential Services, Good Governance, and Economic Recovery (BRICC I) \$41,040,098	Works at the nexus of local governance, the private sector, and civic engagement to expand equitable access to essential services. Partners with communities liberated from ISIS to restore power, water, and irrigation services; rehabilitate schools and hospitals; strengthen local governance and civil society; and revive high-growth sectors of the economy.
Syria Elections & Political Process (EPP) \$7,700,000	Builds citizen engagement in responsive democratic processes to contribute to a political solution to the conflict in Syria, improve inclusive citizen-state relationships, and enhance citizens participation.
Strengthen Community Resilience in Northwest Syria Activity (White Helmets) \$18,210,903	Seeks to save lives, increase community stability and resilience, and directly contribute to reducing human suffering.
Local Works Strategic Fundraising \$226,156	Seeks to diversify the White Helmets funding streams so that they can become more financially sustainable and better able to strategically plan longer-term programs and avoid funding cliffs that threaten core operations.
Economic Growth Enabling Environment in non-regime Syria (EEE) \$3,500,000	Works to improve economic stability and strengthen the enabling environment for private sector-led economic growth and job creation; support the establishment of a sound economic governance strategy for stabilizing macro-financial, fiscal, and investment conditions; and reduce corruption and improve transparency in public sector budgeting, resource allocation, and regulatory frameworks in non-regime-held areas of Syria.
Syria Livelihoods Program (BRICC II) \$14,050,000	Partners with local businesses to create meaningful employment opportunities in key sectors such as construction, telecommunications, skilled trades, and professional services. The Syria Livelihoods Program's focus is on workforce development, vocational training, internships, and business coaching for vulnerable populations, such as women and persons with disabilities.
Growing Agriculture and Incomes in Syria (GROW) \$6,500,000	Seeks to improve food security and strengthen agriculture market systems in non-regime controlled areas of Syria.
Izdihar \$2,250,000	Seeks to restore market capacity and enhance the performance of local economies by improving access to financial services and/or increasing economic opportunity, and/or addressing other gaps that would improve private sector capacity and competitiveness.

Award Funds Obligated to Date	Description
Accountability and Research Team (ART) \$13,293,309	Third-party monitoring services to independently monitor, verify, and analyze the results of stabilization activities implemented in northeastern Syria.
Local Works Third Party Monitoring \$247,500	Third-party monitoring services to monitor local works activities, including the White Helmets activity, in northwestern Syria.

Source: USAID MEB, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/30/2025.

Table 10.

Active State Stabilization Awards in Syria, as of June 30, 2025

Program	Description
Community Policing Program in Syria Goal: Security services in northeastern Syria are provided in a more effective manner that inclusively serves, and is supported by, communities. Funds expended (lifetime of the award): \$12,237,452.	Supports the civilian security forces in northeast Syria and advances reintegration efforts of displaced persons in priority communities. Trains security providers and supports the return and reintegration of Syrians to their host or home communities.
Supporting Local Governance and Essential Services in Syria Goal: To build the capacity of local Syrian governance actors to better serve Syrian citizens by improving the quality of and access to essential services. Funds expended: (lifetime of the award): \$10,608,952.	Supports essential services in northeastern Syria, including firefighting response efforts, water station solarization, and vehicle maintenance. Facilitated al-Hol returns by providing technical, logistical, and operational support to the Social Affairs and Labor Committees, strengthening their capacity to guide reintegration efforts for returnee and host communities.
Supporting Education in Syria Goal: This project focused on key access points for high impact activities through technical assistance and sub-award funding to local education providers while simultaneously providing support and training to students, caregivers, out-of-work youths, and community members. Funds expended (lifetime of the award): \$20,892,011.	Supports remedial education efforts by providing technical assistance to local education providers, including education committees and community-based organizations. Supports and trains students, caregivers, out-of-work youth, and community members in both formal and non-formal settings, using tailored psychosocial support and social-emotional learning curricula to address groups most at risk for ISIS recruitment.

(continued on next page)

Program	Description
Supporting the Syrian Political Process Goal: To advance the UN-facilitated, Syrian-led negotiation process called for by UNSCR 2254 seeking a political settlement and ceasefire in Syria. Funds expended (lifetime of the award): \$2,290,934. Disaggregating expended funds for a quarter not yet completed is not possible.	Supports Syria’s political transition by fostering communication and cooperation across conflict lines. Provides support services upon return to make reintegration smoother and more enduring. Equips citizens, particularly women and youth, with skills for political engagement and advocacy through training, dialogue sessions, and advocacy efforts, enabling active contributions to Syria’s democratic transition.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 6/16/2025; State, vetting comment, 7/16/2025.

Table 11.

Active USAID Stabilization Award in Syria, as of June 30, 2025

Award Funds Obligated to Date	Description
Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) \$5,000,000 (Total U.S. contribution since 2013: \$70,000,000)	Promotes the stabilization and recovery of northern Syria through its interventions in agriculture, food security, health, water, electricity, access to finance/livelihoods and waste management.

Source: USAID MEB, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/30/2025.



APPENDIX E

Completed Oversight Projects

Between April 1 and June 30, 2025, the Lead IG and partner agencies issued one oversight report related to OIR. Completed reports by the Lead IG agencies are available on their respective web pages.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspection of Embassy Ankara and Constituent Posts, Türkiye

ISP-I-25-09; June 13, 2025

State OIG inspected the executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of Embassy Ankara. The inspection included Consulate General Istanbul, Consulate Adana, Consular Agency Izmir, and Branch Office Gaziantep.

The inspection found that the Chargé d’Affaires and acting Deputy Chief of Mission led Mission Türkiye in a professional and collaborative manner. It also found that the mission played a key role in facilitating approval by Türkiye for the accession of Finland and Sweden to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and provided essential support to regional crises such as assisting Syrian refugees, assisting U.S. citizens, and responding to a devastating earthquake in Türkiye.

However, the report also identified several challenges. Specifically, the inspection found that crisis management and workload growth strained limited managerial capacity. In addition, the mission had internal control deficiencies related to property management, contract administration, and procurement. Furthermore, it identified that the mission’s local compensation plan and human resources policies required updates, and the mission was missing required facility and residential safety inspections.

State OIG issued 27 recommendations to Embassy Ankara. In its comments on the draft report, the embassy concurred with all 27 recommendations. State OIG considers all 27 recommendations resolved.

APPENDIX F

Ongoing Oversight Projects

Tables 12 and 13 list the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OIR.

Table 12.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OIR by Lead IG Agencies, as of June 30, 2025

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of DoD Hotline Allegations Concerning a Program in Kuwait (Project no. D2024-D000RJ-0080.000)

Audit of DoD Hotline Allegations Concerning a Program in Kuwait.

Audit of the DoD's Management of the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) Program Resources for Detention Facilities and Displaced Persons Camps (Project No. D2025-D000RJ-0044.000)

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's management of CTEF program resources for the improvement of security and humane conditions at detention facilities and displaced persons camps for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria detainees.

Audit of the DoD's Oversight of Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund Equipment Designated for Iraq (Project No. D2025-D000RJ-0093.000)

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's oversight of CTEF equipment designated for Iraq.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the Department of State's Efforts to Counter Iran-Backed Groups (Project No. 24AUD021)

To determine whether State's efforts to counter Iran-backed groups have been 1) strategically developed and implemented with goals and objectives; 2) executed to promote coordination among implementing bureaus, posts, and interagency partners; and 3) designed to measure performance results and inform adjustments in its approach.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Ankara, Türkiye, and Constituent Posts (Project No. 24ISP042.01)

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Türkiye, and constituent posts.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of USAID's Management of the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance Warehouse in the United Arab Emirates (Project No. 88100724)

To determine the extent to which USAID has designed and implemented policies, procedures, and practices to manage humanitarian assistance supplies warehoused in the United Arab Emirates for deployment worldwide.

Table 13.

Ongoing Oversight Project Related to OIR by Lead IG Partner Agencies, as of June 30, 2025

ARMY AUDIT AGENCY

Audit of International Cooperative Administrative Support Services Program (Project No. A-2023-BOZ-0064.000)

To determine whether program reimbursement payments for International Cooperative Administrative Support Services were correct and supported, including U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) and Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR).

APPENDIX G

Planned Oversight Projects

The Lead IG and partner agencies did not have any planned oversight projects related to OIR during the quarter.

APPENDIX H

Hotline and Investigations

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority.

During the quarter, the DoD OIG Hotline referred 30 cases related to OIR to Lead IG agencies and other investigative organizations. In some instances, a case may contain multiple subjects and allegations. State OIG received 49 allegations and referred 38 cases and USAID OIG received 30 allegations. Most allegations during the reporting period related to personal misconduct, criminal allegations, procurement and contract administration and security.

The DoD OIG's criminal investigative component, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), maintained investigative personnel in Bahrain and Kuwait, where they worked on cases related to OIR. DCIS agents also worked on OIR-related cases from offices in the United States. State OIG and USAID OIG investigators worked on cases related to OIR from Washington, D.C., El Salvador, Germany, Israel, South Africa, and Thailand.

During this quarter, investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies ended the quarter with 27 open investigations, while 6 investigations were closed. No referrals were made to the Department of Justice during this quarter.

The Lead IG agencies and their partners coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support. The investigative partner agencies consist of representatives from DCIS, State OIG, USAID OIG, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.



ACRONYMS

Acronym	
ACI	Area of Common Interest
BHA	USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
CBI	Central Bank of Iraq
CJTF-OIR	Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve
CTEF	Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund
CTS	Counterterrorism Service
DAANES	Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
EUM	end-use monitoring
FTO	foreign terrorist organization
HaD	Hurras al-Din
HMC	Higher Military Council
HTS	Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
IAMG	Iran-aligned militia groups
IDP	internally displaced person
IED	improvised explosive device
IKR	Iraqi Kurdistan Region
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JOC-I	Joint Operations Command–Iraq
KCL	Kurdish Coordination Line

Acronym	
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
LOE	Line of Effort
MERV	Middle Euphrates River Valley
MoPA	Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs
NADR-CWD	Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs-Conventional Weapons Destruction
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OIR	Operation Inherent Resolve
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OUSD(P)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PRM	State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
SFA	Syrian Free Army
SNA	Syrian National Army
State	Department of State
Treasury	Department of the Treasury
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	UN Children's Agency
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	The U.S. Central Command



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