OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. Agency for International Development

West Africa: USAID Could Improve Implementation, Measurement, and Oversight of Activities to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism

Audit Report 4-624-25-003-P
July 31, 2025

Audit

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. Agency for International Development

DATE: July 31, 2025

TO: Jeremy P. Lewin
Deputy Administrator for Policy and Programming & Chief Operating Officer
USAID

FROM: Gabriele Tonsil /s/
Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

SUBJECT: West Africa: USAID Could Improve Implementation, Measurement, and
Oversight of Activities to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism

This memorandum transmits our final audit report. Our audit objective was to determine to what extent the USAID West Africa Regional Mission implemented, measured, and conducted oversight of selected activities to prevent and counter violent extremism (PCVE). In finalizing the report, we considered your comments on the draft and included them in their entirety, excluding attachments, in Appendix C.

The report contains our audit findings and no recommendations. Consequently, no management decisions are needed. However, as the administration determines the future of foreign assistance, we suggest decisionmakers consider enhancing the implementation, outcome measurement, and oversight of future PCVE programs in nonpermissive environments.

We appreciate the assistance you and your staff provided to us during this audit.

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Report in Brief

Why We Did This Audit

Violent extremism has afflicted West Africa for several years. Militant violence and related fatalities have increased. The northern border regions of Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, for instance, are facing greater difficulties from militant groups attempting to increase tensions between communities. Benin and Togo have also seen a rise in fatalities due to violent extremism. The general regional instability has led to five military coups since 2020. Exploiting this instability, Russia has intervened to support coup leaders, most recently in Niger.

U.S. officials feared violent extremism in West Africa would spill over to the neighboring coastal countries. Violent events linked to extremist organizations along the borders of coastal West African countries has increased by more than 250 percent in the last 2 years.

USAID's West Africa Regional Mission (USAID/West Africa) established preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) as an objective in its 2020–2025 Regional Development Cooperation Strategy. The mission provided PCVE assistance awards to advance U.S. national security interests by supporting peace, prosperity, and stability overseas while reducing threats to Americans at home and abroad.

We conducted this audit because of the threat violent extremism poses to West Africa and broader U.S. foreign policy and national security interests in the region. Our objective was to determine to what extent USAID/West Africa implemented, measured, and conducted oversight of selected activities to prevent and counter violent extremism.

What We Include for Consideration

We suggest that the administration consider enhancing the implementation, outcome measurement, and oversight of future PCVE programs in nonpermissive environments.

What We Found

Start-up delays hindered USAID/West Africa's efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. The three PCVE awards that we selected for the audit had implementation delays during the first year because of various challenges. As a result, the implementers of the awards missed nearly all performance indicator targets or did not report the first-year results. However, USAID/West Africa did not conduct lessons-learned exercises focused on first-year delays to strategically inform and adapt PCVE activities to achieve results. USAID risked encountering similar challenges if it did not systematically learn from past experiences, reflect on implementation, and apply lessons to future PCVE activities.

USAID/West Africa's mission-level performance indicator did not measure progress toward the overall goal of preventing and countering violent extremism. The indicator—which tracked the number of PCVE regional, national and local efforts implemented—did not measure the outcomes or impact of those efforts. Specifically, this indicator did not provide USAID officials and other stakeholders with the information on the effect those efforts had on changing public attitudes, perceptions, or behaviors related to community cohesion or preventing violent extremism.

USAID/West Africa's oversight did not include third-party monitoring in nonpermissive environments, which could have hindered efforts to achieve PCVE goals. Due to unsafe conditions and security-related travel restrictions, USAID staff could not access PCVE project sites to monitor the three selected awards' progress in meeting goals. Further, the mission did not use third-party monitors, which the Agency often used in nonpermissive environments, to mitigate this challenge.

Introduction

The U.S. government offered assistance, including USAID funding, to help coastal West African countries develop programs to address the risks of instability. These programs were implemented with the aim to advance U.S. national security interests by supporting peace, prosperity, and stability overseas while reducing threats to Americans at home and abroad.

Violent extremism[1] perpetrated by violent extremist organizations[2] has plagued West Africa for several years. Countries in this region have seen an increase in militant violence and associated fatalities. This instability has resulted in military coups in five countries since 2020: Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, and Niger. Exploiting this instability, Russia has intervened to support coup leaders, most recently in Niger. Security ties between Russia and Niger have deepened since the military junta asked French forces to leave the country in December 2023 and the U.S. military to do so in September 2024.[3]

U.S. officials feared that violent extremism in West Africa would spill over into neighboring coastal countries and cause instability in the region. The annual number of violent events linked to extremist organizations along the borders of coastal West African countries has increased by more than 250 percent over the past 2 years.[4] The northern border regions of Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, for instance, are facing strains from militant groups attempting to increase tensions between communities. Benin and Togo have also seen a rise in fatalities due to violent extremism.

We initiated this audit because of the threat that violent extremism poses to West Africa and broader U.S. foreign policy and national security interests in the region. Our objective was to determine to what extent the USAID West Africa Regional Mission (USAID/West Africa) implemented, measured, and conducted oversight of selected activities to prevent and counter violent extremism (PCVE).[5]

We reviewed PCVE awards USAID/West Africa managed for programs implemented during fiscal years 2022, 2023, and parts of 2024 that were expected to continue past 2024. We

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[1] USAID's April 2020 *Policy for Countering Violent Extremism Through Development Assistance* refers to violent extremism as "advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated violence to further social, economic, political, or religious objectives."

[2] Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda affiliates are examples of violent extremist organizations.

[3] Prior to the coup in Niger, there were about 1,000 U.S. troops in the country, according to a Congressional Research Service report on Niger dated January 21, 2025.

[4] Africa Center for Strategic Studies, *Recalibrating Coastal West Africa's Response to Violent Extremism*, Africa Security Brief No. 43, July 2024.

[5] USAID/West Africa does not define the term "preventing and countering violent extremism." Instead, it uses the term to encompass "countering violent extremism," which involves "proactive actions to preempt or disrupt efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence, and to address specific factors that facilitate recruitment and radicalization to violence. CVE encompasses policies and activities to increase peaceful options for political, economic, and social engagement available to communities and local governments and their abilities to act on them," as defined in USAID's April 2020 *Policy for Countering Violent Extremism Through Development Assistance*. "Prevention" involves establishing and supporting "capabilities to engage in peacebuilding and anticipate and prevent violent conflict before it erupts," as defined in the *U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability* (2020).

judgmentally selected three of the four PCVE awards identified. We omitted one award that focused on research rather than implementing activities. We reviewed policies, strategies, plans, and progress reports to assess implementation of PCVE awards. To supplement our analyses and sample testing, we interviewed knowledgeable USAID staff and officials, implementers' staff, and other key stakeholders and visited project sites in Cote d'Ivoire and Benin. We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix A provides more detail on our scope and methodology.

Background

Programming for West Africa—which comprises 21 countries—was administered through USAID/West Africa, located in Ghana. This mission delivered programs and support services in coordination with other missions in the region to advance the Agency's goals and development objectives. Figure 1 shows the countries of coastal West Africa, the Sahel countries, and the broader West Africa region.

Figure 1. Map of West Africa

Source: *USAID West Africa and the Sahel Regional Development Cooperation Strategy 2020–2025*.

Overall strategic direction for USAID/West Africa's activities was contained in the Regional Development Cooperation Strategy (Cooperation Strategy). The strategy defined the highest-order goal and development objectives that the mission planned to address in collaboration with development partners such as host-country governments. USAID/West Africa's

Cooperation Strategy for 2020–2025[6] stated that the mission would address the risks of instability from violent conflict and prioritize PCVE interventions across the region. These interventions reflected priorities in Agency policy[7] and congressional legislation.[8]

USAID/West Africa monitored programs by using performance indicators with associated targets to track whether expected results were being achieved at the individual award level.[9] It also used mission-level performance indicators in the mission's performance management plan[10] that measured the aggregate efforts of a group of awards to track progress toward overall Cooperation Strategy objectives. Performance indicators for these objectives were meant to measure expected outcomes of USAID assistance—the conditions of people, systems, and institutions that reflect the degree of progress toward achieving goals—rather than only outputs, which are the tangible, immediate, and intended consequences of an activity within USAID's control or influence.[11]

The four PCVE awards USAID/West Africa managed since fiscal year 2021 were expected to continue after 2024 and total $85 million. For this audit, we selected three awards that totaled $66.4 million—Coastal Stability System Mechanism (CSSM), Resilience for Peace (R4P), and Programme d'Appui à la Résilience Communautaire au Cameroun (PARC)—which were implemented in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Cameroon (see Table 1). We did not select the fourth award because it was focused on research to inform PCVE and did not implement PCVE in the field.

Table 1. USAID/West Africa's PCVE Activities Fiscal Years 2022–2024

Award	Place of Performance	Performance Period	Total Estimated Cost
Coastal States Stability Mechanism (CSSM)	Benin, Togo, and Ghana	April 2023–April 2026	$29.7 million
Resilience for Peace (R4P)	Cote d'Ivoire	February 2021–February 2026	$20.7 million
Programme d'Appui à la Résilience Communautaire au Cameroun (PARC)	Cameroon	March 2022–March 2027	$16 million
Total			**$66.4 million**

Note: On April 3, 2025, a USAID/West Africa official reported that all three awards had been terminated.
Source: USAID Bureau for Africa and USAID/West Africa.

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[6] USAID/West Africa and USAID/Senegal and its Sahel Regional Office developed the Cooperation Strategy.
[7] USAID, *Policy for Countering Violent Extremism Through Development Assistance,* April 2020.
[8] The Global Fragility Act of 2019 required the President to report on and implement a 10-year Global Fragility Strategy to (1) help stabilize conflict-affected areas, (2) address global fragility, and (3) increase U.S. capacity to be a leader in international efforts to prevent extremism and violent conflict.
[9] USAID, Automated Directives System, Chapter 201, "Program Cycle Operational Policy," Section 201.3.5.5, September 2021.
[10] ADS 201, "Program Cycle Operational Policy," September 2021. Definitions: A performance management plan is a mission-wide tool used to document a mission's plans to monitor, evaluate, and learn from the implementation of its strategy.
[11] ADS 201, "Definitions," September 2021. Definitions.

Start-Up Delays, Limited Performance Indicators, and Restricted Oversight in Nonpermissive Environments Hindered USAID/West Africa's Efforts to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism

Three main factors hindered USAID/West Africa's efforts to implement, measure the progress of, and oversee the selected PCVE awards. First, the implementers for the PCVE awards had start-up delays due to a variety of challenges that prevented them from achieving expected first-year results. Second, the performance indicator USAID/West Africa used for PCVE did not assess progress toward the expected outcomes of these efforts at the mission level. Third, USAID staff were restricted in their ability to conduct oversight of PCVE activities due to the nonpermissive environment in some areas where the work was carried out.

All Three Selected Awards Experienced Start-Up Delays in Their Efforts to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism

The implementers of PCVE activities under three of the awards that USAID/West Africa oversaw experienced start-up delays. Due to the delays, CSSM, R4P, and PARC did not have any results to report or missed nearly all award-level performance indicator targets for the first full year of implementation.[12] Specifically:

- CSSM did not report results for 19 of 19 performance indicators for its first year ending March 2024.[13]

- R4P missed 18 of 19 performance indicator targets for its first year ending March 2022. Due to the first-year delays, the award missed some performance indicator targets in fiscal years 2023 and 2024.

- PARC missed 6 of 7 performance indicator targets for its first full year ending September 2023. See Appendix B for a list of first-year indicators, targets, and results for each award.

USAID staff identified several factors that contributed to delays:

- All three awards struggled to secure timely approvals from the host-country government. For example, when implementers identified a need in border communities, they had to request approval from ministries and border entities before moving ahead with interventions due to the instability in these areas.

- USAID and implementer staff faced challenges hiring personnel and managing subawards. For instance, the CSSM implementer had difficulty identifying staff with fluency in both English and French—necessary because the award involved anglophone and francophone

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[12] CSSM and PARC completed the first full year of implementation in the middle of fiscal year 2024 and the end of fiscal year 2023, respectively. R4P's first full year ended during fiscal year 2022.

[13] CSSM was a 3-year award set to end in April 2026. USAID staff said the implementer for CSSM did not report results after the first year because the award was in the early phases of activity implementation. Specifically, CSSM started to implement grants, such as providing schools with school supplies, in February 2024.

countries. We also found that the R4P implementer had to replace a sub-implementer that was not meeting expectations.

- Increased interest from key stakeholders—including host-country governments, the U.S. Department of State, and other donors (Germany and the Netherlands)—introduced additional expectations to coordinate management of the three awards. Since PCVE activities were in less stable border areas, host-country government officials and the Department of State understandably wanted to know about and be part of the interventions. This required more time and effort to achieve a higher level of coordination.

Some implementation delays are unavoidable in complex environments. However, USAID's Automated Directives System (ADS) Chapter 201 prioritized collaboration, continuous learning, and adaptation from these experiences. The policy stated that operating units should adopt an intentional approach to collaboration, learning, and adaptation within the activity. The Agency's CVE policy also required continuous learning and adaptation because the problem is complex and evolving.

While USAID/West Africa adopted a mission-wide collaboration, learning, and adaptation mission order, some USAID staff told us that they did not formally discuss lessons learned from prior PCVE awards with their counterparts. USAID staff suggested that documenting lessons learned after the first year could prove valuable, as many delays occur during the start-up phase. However, the mission did not conduct lessons learned exercises focused on first-year delays to strategically inform and adapt PCVE activities. Doing so would have demonstrated that the mission was continuously learning and adapting its approach to implementing these awards based on actual experience.

Conducting lessons learned during the implementation period places agencies in a better position to address issues before they create delays. Delays affected USAID's ability to achieve its broader PCVE strategic objectives and contribute to broader U.S. foreign policy and national security goals in West Africa, which face escalating extremist threats. Agencies risk encountering similar challenges in the future if they do not systematically learn from experience, reflect on implementation, and apply lessons learned to future PCVE activities.

USAID/West Africa's Performance Indicator Did Not Measure the Mission's Progress Toward Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

USAID/West Africa relied on a single performance indicator to track its PCVE efforts at the mission level. However, this indicator—which tracked the number of regional, national and local PCVE activities implemented—did not measure the outcomes or impact of those efforts.

USAID policies specified general requirements for mission-level performance indicators and specific requirements for PCVE activities. Per ADS 201 and its supplemental guidance, missions must have at least one mission-level performance indicator, which should measure expected outcomes of USAID assistance. Performance indicator requirements for PCVE were further developed in USAID's *Policy for Countering Violent Extremism Through Development Assistance*, dated April 2020. According to the policy, USAID should set clear PCVE objectives and evaluate progress and impact systematically. Metrics to gauge the effectiveness of PCVE

programming should measure changes in public attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors related to issues such as community cohesion and the ability of governments and civil society to prevent violent extremism.

USAID/West Africa did not fully meet these requirements. The mission met the minimum ADS requirement by establishing one mission-level indicator in its performance management plan. However, the indicator captured output—i.e., the number of PCVE efforts implemented—and did not measure the outcome or impact of the mission's PCVE efforts.

Furthermore, according to ADS 201 and its supplemental guidance, mission-level indicators should be continuously updated over the life of the mission's strategy as circumstances warrant. However, USAID/West Africa did not update its indicator to better track progress toward outcomes for PCVE.

Various USAID staff we interviewed recognized the need to improve the indicator so that it would measure progress. A senior USAID/West Africa official said the indicator was not particularly useful for measuring progress toward PCVE goals. The official added that a lack of knowledge was not the reason for the poor indicator because PCVE had been implemented previously in other countries in the region. The official said the reason was likely because those who developed the indicator preferred to get it done, regardless of quality. Another mission official remarked that looking at the number of PCVE efforts implemented would not provide information on progress on preventing and countering violent extremism. Instead, one would need to examine each individual award to determine progress, according to another mission official. The mission indicated there were plans to update the indicator for the upcoming Cooperation Strategy.

Ultimately, USAID/West Africa's output-focused indicator did not give Agency officials and other stakeholders the ability to assess the effect the PCVE efforts had on changing public attitudes, perceptions, or behaviors. As a result, the mission could not discern the impact of PCVE efforts in the 21-country region as it implemented its 2020–2025 Cooperation Strategy.

USAID/West Africa's Oversight Did Not Include Third-Party Monitoring in Nonpermissive Environments, Which Could Have Hindered Efforts to Achieve PCVE Goals

Although the three selected PCVE awards operated in nonpermissive environments, USAID/West Africa did not use third-party monitoring (TPM) mechanisms to mitigate the challenge of conducting performance monitoring and program oversight in these environments.

USAID defined performance monitoring as the ongoing and systematic collection of performance indicator data and other quantitative or qualitative information to oversee program implementation and understand progress toward results. According to ADS 201, missions must perform site visits to provide oversight. Thus, missions were required to inspect implementation progress and deliverables, verify monitoring data, and learn from implementation.

However, travel restrictions and unsafe conditions often created nonpermissive environments that prevented USAID staff from visiting and monitoring PCVE projects for the selected awards. For example:

- R4P: In Cote d'Ivoire, the agreement officer's representative (AOR)[14] stated that security-related travel restrictions for U.S. embassy staff hindered their ability to conduct site visits and monitor activities. These restrictions reportedly covered roughly 90 percent of the area where PCVE activities were implemented.
- CSSM: In Benin, a USAID staff member reported that travel restrictions north of Kandi occasionally prevented staff from monitoring PCVE activities. An April 2023 mission notice restricted travel to this area.
- PARC: In Cameroon, the AOR indicated that unsafe conditions at times prevented site visits to areas in the north where PCVE activities were implemented.

Our review of embassy travel restrictions in areas of Cote d'Ivoire, Benin, and Cameroon with PCVE activities corroborated the statements from USAID staff. In addition, we were subject to the same travel restrictions during our visits to Cote d'Ivoire and Benin. For example, we were prohibited from traveling beyond Kandi, Benin, in August 2024.

USAID established guidance for missions implementing programs in nonpermissive environments. In an August 2021 document, *Third-Party Monitoring in Non-Permissive Environments,* USAID acknowledged the challenges of implementing monitoring policies in such settings, particularly with Agency staff. To overcome this challenge, the guidance stated that missions often use third parties to monitor their projects. This general guidance is also reflected in USAID's April 2020 PCVE policy, which stated that because violent extremism is in conflict-affected and fragile countries, the Agency should consider this context in designing, managing, and monitoring programming. Furthermore, USAID should utilize multimethod monitoring, evaluation, and learning to measure PCVE-specific processes and outcomes.

USAID staff acknowledged that mechanisms for using TPMs were available, but staff had not fully evaluated their applicability for PCVE activities across USAID/West Africa before our fieldwork. Staff managing individual awards recognized the potential value TPMs could bring to their oversight efforts. For instance, the AOR for R4P in Cote d'Ivoire stated that incorporating TPMs could enhance monitoring. While the AOR had considered adopting a TPM option, the discussion stalled due to leadership transitions and uncertainties about the appropriate scope of TPM use. Similarly, the AOR for PARC in Cameroon initially said they were not familiar with the TPM mechanism before our site visit but, after discussing the matter with us, had begun planning to implement TPMs in March 2025. As CSSM's first year of implementation was mostly spent setting up offices on the ground and had just ended during our audit work, the challenges in monitoring and oversight of activities only became an issue during our visit. Nonetheless, the AOR for CSSM indicated during our fieldwork that adding a TPM could assist with monitoring.

Utilizing a TPM option provides foreign assistance managers with additional safeguards for monitoring and verifying U.S.-funded activities in West Africa's nonpermissive environments. Moreover, such oversight could improve reported results and help identify problems in the field

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[14]An agreement officer's representative is an individual tasked with ensuring day-to-day technical and administrative oversight of the activity.

or with implementers' performance that could prevent the selected awards from achieving their intended results.

Conclusion

Since establishing PCVE as an objective in its Cooperation Strategy 2020–2025, USAID/West Africa has funded PCVE activities in the region. However, challenges associated with working in the region hindered USAID/West Africa's ability to implement those activities. Furthermore, the mission's insufficient performance measurement and lack of TPM prevented it from determining the extent to which its PCVE activities were achieving their intended results. Addressing activity implementation challenges, improving outcome measures, and enhancing oversight would help promote stability in West Africa. Given that USAID has terminated all three PCVE activities USAID/West Africa managed and the Agency's current operating status, we are not making recommendations at this time.

Considerations for Future Foreign Assistance

As the administration determines the future of foreign assistance, particularly efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism in West Africa, we suggest decision makers consider the following actions:

1. Conduct and document strategic-level lessons learned exercises for programs in nonpermissive environments, such as preventing and countering violent extremism in West Africa.

2. Ensure performance indicators meaningfully measure progress toward intended results and are consistent with strategic goals for foreign assistance.

3. Assess the costs and benefits of using third parties to monitor program performance in nonpermissive environments.

OIG Response to Agency Comments

We provided our draft report to USAID on June 3, 2025. On July 7, 2025, we received the Agency's response, which is included as Appendix C of this report. The Agency's response provided clarifying and technical comments, which we considered and incorporated as appropriate.

The report did not include any recommendations to be addressed; therefore, no management decisions are needed.

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

We conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards from February 2024 to July 2025. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Our audit objective was to determine to what extent USAID/West Africa implemented, measured, and conducted oversight of selected activities to prevent and counter violent extremism.

The scope of our audit was PCVE awards USAID implemented in West Africa from fiscal year 2022 through parts of fiscal year 2024. We conducted our work in Pretoria, South Africa; Accra, Ghana; Cotonou and Parakou, Benin; and Abidjan and Korhogo, Cote d'Ivoire.

In planning and performing the audit, we gained an understanding and assessed internal controls that were significant to the audit objective. Specifically, we designed and conducted procedures related to three of the five components of internal control as defined by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO): Risk Assessment, Information and Communication, and Monitoring.[15] These procedures included determining how USAID/West Africa identified performance indicators to achieve PCVE objectives, reviewing annual performance reports to determine whether the associated results were on track, and reviewing monitoring plans.

We selected a judgmental sample of PCVE awards to answer our objective. To identify all PCVE activities performed in West Africa, we requested that USAID's Bureau for Africa and USAID/West Africa identify all PCVE awards implemented during fiscal years 2022, 2023, and 2024 that were expected to continue in the region after 2024. Given that we judgmentally selected the audit sample, we are not extrapolating to the entire universe of PCVE awards. To ensure the responsiveness and availability of USAID staff and officials overseeing awards and that potential recommendations could be made to a single entity, we defined our universe as PCVE awards that USAID/West Africa managed with periods of performance that continued beyond 2024, resulting in four awards. We then removed one award—Peace Through Evaluation, Learning and Adapting II—because its work was research oriented and primarily based in Washington, DC.

We selected the remaining three awards—R4P, based in Cote d'Ivoire; CSSM, based in Ghana, Togo, and Benin; and PARC, based in Cameroon—as our sample for additional testing. We visited the U.S. Embassy in Accra, Ghana, in April 2024 to gain USAID/West Africa's insights to past and future PCVE programming. We also visited project sites and implementers' offices for PCVE awards in Benin and Cote d'Ivoire in August 2024 to observe implementers' progress, discuss results with beneficiaries, and obtain host-government perspectives from their coordinating officials.

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[15] GAO, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* (GAO-14-704G), September 2014.

To gain an understanding of USAID's approach to PCVE in West Africa, we reviewed policies and training materials, including USAID's April 2020 *Policy for Countering Violent Extremism Through Development Assistance* and *West Africa and the Sahel Regional Development Cooperation Strategy 2020–2025*. To assess progress on goals and objectives, we reviewed the mission's results framework and the associated performance management plan. To assess progress of specific PCVE awards, we reviewed tables of performance indicators and associated results. Additionally, we reviewed the selected awards' monitoring plans and quarterly and annual reports to better understand challenges to achieving results. We focused our analysis on each of the awards' performance spanning across fiscal years 2022, 2023, and parts of 2024 to compare progress and identify trends.

To supplement our analyses and sample testing, we interviewed knowledgeable USAID officials and staff, implementer staff, and other key stakeholders. Specifically, we interviewed USAID program officials and technical staff, including agreement officer's representatives and USAID/West Africa management to understand challenges to achieving results and identify opportunities for improvement. We also interviewed U.S. embassy officials and staff, including Department of State and Department of Defense staff, to understand how PCVE work is coordinated across agencies. We asked USAID program officials about their access and monitoring mechanisms, including the extent to which they used third-party monitoring in nonpermissive environments. Finally, we interviewed senior Department of State and USAID representatives in the region to understand the strategic importance of PCVE activities.

To evaluate risk assessment activities, information and communication, and monitoring activities related to USAID/West Africa's PCVE activities, we reviewed reported results and conducted site visits. We interviewed USAID officials and staff to understand their oversight efforts and how they addressed implementation challenges. We also interviewed beneficiaries to corroborate the reported results.

We did not use computer-processed data during this audit. However, to test the reliability of reported results, we reviewed documentation of USAID's results reporting; interviewed knowledgeable Agency officials; analyzed datasets for missing data, outliers, and obvious errors; and traced selected sample to data source documents. We determined that the data was sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

Appendix B. First Full Year Performance Indicators for the Selected PCVE Awards

Table B.1. Performance Indicators for CSSM Activities Between April 2023 and March 2024

Number	Indicator	Results Reported	Target
1.	Number of PCVE regional, national and local efforts implemented.	None reported	None established
2.	Number of U.S. government (USG) assisted, consensus-building processes resulting in an agreement.	None reported	None established
3.	Percent of respondents reporting an increased feeling of security in their community in the preceding 6 months.	None reported	None established
4.	Percent of respondents who report they would contact the security forces if they witnessed a crime, were victim of a crime, or required urgent security forces assistance.	None reported	None established
5.	Percent of local authorities who report taking an action to respond to local populations' basic needs as a result of CSSM's intervention.	None reported	None established
6.	Percent of local authorities who report an improvement in the level of trust and collaboration with communities since program onset.	None reported	None established
7.	Percent of beneficiaries in communities who report an improvement in the level of trust and collaboration with local authorities.	None reported	None established
8.	Percent of respondents who rate the government's delivery of basic services as good.	None reported	None established
9.	Number of government policies or actions that support community-led initiatives.	None reported	None established
10.	Percent of community members who can identify and articulate potential destabilizing factors in their local area.	None reported	None established
11.	Percent of respondents reporting to have taken action to addressing instability risks.	None reported	None established
12.	Percent of respondents that report receiving government support for community led initiatives.	None reported	None established
13.	Percent of beneficiaries reporting increased agreement with the concept that males and females should have equal access to social, economic, and political resources and opportunities.	None reported	None established
14.	Number of local women participating in a substantive role or position in local instability risk mitigation process.	None reported	None established
15.	Number of initiatives conducted with CSSM assistance that are designed to promote the participation of women or the integration of gender perspectives.	None reported	None established
16.	Number of consultations that conducted CSSM in target zones.	None reported	None established

Number	Indicator	Results Reported	Target
17.	Number of local core groups formed and active in CSSM target zones.	None reported	None established
18.	Number of initiatives taken by groups created through CSSM support.	None reported	None established
19.	Number of persons actively participating in Integrated Community Stabilization Approach local core groups (Male/Female).	None reported	None established

Source: CSSM documents and USAID staff.

Table B.2. Performance Indicators for R4P Activities Between April 2021 to March 2022

Number	Indicator	Results Reported	Target
1.	Percent of research and analysis consumers reporting that R4P products are relevant and actionable.	None reported	70 percent
2.	Percent of identified analytical gap areas around community resilience to violent extremism addressed through practical research and analysis.	None reported	100 percent
3.	Number of internal and external collaborative learning and adapting meetings held.	3	12
4.	Number of groups trained in conflict mediation/resolution skills or consensus-building techniques with USG assistance.	3	15
5.	Number of consensus-building forums (multi-party, civil/security sector, and/or civil/political) held with USG assistance.	2	14
6.	Percent increase of CVE-relevant media products across media platforms.	None reported	20 percent
7.	Percent of non-state media outlets or platforms assisted by R4P who produce a viable operations plan lasting at least 6 months.	None reported	25 percent
8.	Number of times awareness materials (CVE-relevant media products) broadcasted or published.	102	952
9.	Number of hours broadcast and rebroadcast of local CVE-relevant media products by radio partners on issues of peace and governance linked to violent extremism.	2	520
10.	Number of non-state news outlets assisted by USG.	11	12
11.	Number of functional interaction platforms for generating content and gathering feedback developed with R4P support.	1	21
12.	Number of debates on CVE-related topics taking place in cultural / traditional structures.	None reported	22
13.	Percent of social media training participants (journalists, bloggers, influencers, etc.) that acted to counter the spread of fake news and hate speech.	None reported	60 percent
14.	Number of new groups or initiatives created through USG funding, dedicated to resolving the conflict or the drivers of the conflict.	4	21

Number	Indicator	Results Reported	Target
15.	Number of activities that include natural resource management as a way to understand and influence conflict dynamics.	2	7
16.	Number of people trained in CVE-related topics with USG assistance.	23	365
17.	Number of studies, analysis or research papers, training materials, or tools created/produced to address knowledge, learning, and understanding on community resilience to violent extremism in Cote 'd Ivoire border communities.	9	42
18.	Number of training or capacity-building activities that include NRM/environmental best practices.	None reported	3
19.	Number of CVE-relevant media products created with the support of USG (interactive and educational media transmissions, written press, etc.).	20	47

Source: R4P documents and USAID staff.

Table B.3. Performance Indicators for PARC Activities Between October 2022 and September 2023

Number	Indicator	Results Reported	Target
1.	Number of persons trained with USG assistance to advance outcomes consistent with gender equality or female empowerment through their roles in public or private sector institutions or organizations.	84	25
2.	Percent of USG-assisted organizations with improved performance.	None reported	75 percent
3.	Percent of PARC-Cameroon-supported civil society organizations (CSO) demonstrating increased advocacy capacity.	None reported	75 percent
4.	Percent of beneficiaries participating in context monitoring trainings with improved knowledge on identifying community needs.	None reported	75 percent
5.	Number of CSOs receiving USG assistance engaged in advocacy interventions.	3	5
6.	Number of citizen-driven service delivery programs implemented.	15	25
7.	Number of youth trained in soft skills/life skills through USG assisted programs.	298	300

Source: PARC documents and USAID staff.

Appendix C. Agency Comments

USAID | WEST AFRICA
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

MEMORANDUM

Date: **July 7, 2025**

From: **Catherine "Kitty" Andang, Acting Regional Mission Director /s/**

Subject: USAID/West Africa's Response to draft audit report, "West Africa: USAID Could Improve Implementation, Measurement, and Oversight of Activities to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism (P/CVE) (Task No. 44100123)

The USAID/West Africa Regional Mission (USAID/WA) and our bilateral offices (USAID/Benin, USAID/Cameroon, and USAID/Cote d'Ivoire) would like to thank the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the opportunity to provide comments on the subject draft report.

The Mission has a number of concerns with the draft audit report starting with the selection of activities and the OIG's decision not to review P/CVE activities managed by our Office of Transition Initiatives. As a result, the report does not take into account important contextual factors that we raised at the outset of the OIG's review. For example, the Mission did not receive any annual appropriations for countering violent extremism funds (PS1.2) for any of the fiscal years reviewed. While the Mission did receive Global Fragility Act (GFA) funding, which supports P/CVE, this funding primarily focuses on conflict mitigation and stabilization.

We hope that the OIG will carefully consider our feedback which points out factual inaccuracies, clarifications on the reporting structure between multiple operating units, and misinterpretations that impact the methodology used and the ability of OIG to measure applicability/compliance with ADS 201. Furthermore, we request that after OIG's review of these comments, the draft report be revised accordingly.

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