

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE

INCLUDING U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO

UKRAINE



APRIL 1, 2025–JUNE 30, 2025



On the cover: U.S. Army Soldiers prepare an unmanned aerial vehicle for flight during an individual crew qualification at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany. (U.S. Army photo)



We are pleased to present this Special Inspector General report to Congress on Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR). This report discharges our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2024 and Lead IG reporting responsibilities under 5 U.S.C. 419.

Section 1250B states that no later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal quarter, the Special Inspector General for OAR shall submit to Congress a report summarizing U.S. funding, programs, and operations for Ukraine with respect to that quarter.

This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the DoD, State, and USAID Offices of Inspector General, as well as the other U.S. oversight agencies that coordinate their activities through the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group.

This report addresses the following topics specified in Section 1250B:

- USEUCOM operations and related support for the U.S. military: pages 38-43
- Security assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 24-35, 43-58, 86-87
- Economic assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 19-20, 24-35, 62-66, 80-85
- Humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 24-31, 62-68, 72-73, 80-85
- Operations of other relevant U.S. Government agencies involved in the Ukraine response: pages 25, 27, 51-56, 71
- Description of any waste, fraud, or abuse identified by the OIGs: pages 88-94
- Status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits: pages 88-94, 101-102
- Status and results of referrals to the Department of Justice: pages 101-102
- A description of the overall plans for review by the OIGs of such support of Ukraine, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits: pages 95-100

Steven A. Stebbins
Special Inspector General
for OAR
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

Arne B. Baker
Associate Inspector General
for OAR
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of State

Toayoa Aldridge
Acting Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of
the Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International
Development



U.S. Army paratroopers and French soldiers conduct a combined chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear training exercise in Pabradė, Lithuania, during Swift Response 2025. (U.S. Army photo)

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Ukrainians liberated as part of the Ukraine-Russia prisoner exchange on May 23, 2025. This quarter, Russia and Ukraine agreed to transfer 1,000 prisoners and 6,000 sets of remains in the largest prisoner exchange of the war. (President of Ukraine Flickr photo)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since January 2024, Russian forces have seized approximately 5,000 square kilometers of additional Ukrainian territory, less than 1 percent of the country. In certain areas, such as Kharkiv, Russia's rate of advance is as little as 50 meters per day on average. These incremental gains have come at the cost of heavy losses.¹ This quarter, Russian casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war likely surpassed one million, including approximately 250,000 killed and 750,000 wounded, missing, or captured.² Russian fatalities during 3 years of war against Ukraine are 15 times greater than those experienced during the Soviet Union's decade-long war in Afghanistan.³

On June 1, Ukraine carried out Operation Spider Web, a complex unmanned aircraft system (UAS) strike against Russian strategic aircraft at four air bases located across the country. Ukraine launched 117 small, commercially available UAS armed with explosives from cargo trucks positioned in advance outside of the Russian bases. The Ukrainian government reported that the operation damaged more than 40 Russian fixed-wing aircraft, including strategic bombers and early warning and control aircraft, valued at more than \$7 billion.⁴ According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), at least 10 Russian strategic bombers were destroyed.⁵

Since February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$187.02 billion for OAR and the broader response to Russian aggression. At least \$153.37 billion—82 percent—has been obligated and \$93.97 billion—50 percent—has been disbursed through the quarter ending June 30, 2025. As of the end of the quarter, \$30.08 billion in appropriations for the Ukraine response remained available for obligation.⁶

Russia expanded its attacks on Ukraine, launching hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) at once to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.⁷ Russia's UAV operations increasingly targeted civilian areas and often included follow-on strikes targeting first responders.⁸ On July 9, Russia launched its largest air attack

U.S. Army Soldiers prepare a UAV for flight during an individual crew qualification at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany. (U.S. Army photo)



since the start of the war, with 728 UAVs and 13 missiles. During the concentrated salvo, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) were able to shoot down or electronically defeat 711 of the UAVs and 7 missiles.⁹

Russia continued to reject U.S. calls for a ceasefire, insisting that it will not relent in its offensive unless Ukraine agrees to major concessions. Russia's demands include Ukraine's neutrality, demilitarization, regime change, and acceptance of Russia's occupation of Ukrainian territory, all of which Ukraine has rejected.¹⁰ While the negotiations that took place in Istanbul in May and June did not lead to a ceasefire, they did result in the largest exchange of prisoners of war and remains of fallen soldiers since the war began.¹¹

On April 30, the United States and Ukraine agreed to establish a bilateral development fund. Revenues from the U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund will be shared, and the fund will be jointly managed by the two countries on an equal basis.¹² According to the White House, the agreement aims to strengthen the strategic partnership between the United States and Ukraine for long-term reconstruction and modernization.¹³ Ukraine has significant deposits of natural resources, but ongoing wartime conditions create significant challenges to attracting private investment and establishing new mining operations in certain parts of the country.¹⁴ The agreement does not require Ukraine to reimburse the United States for past military aid provided, but it counts any future U.S. military assistance to Ukraine as a capital contribution to the fund.¹⁵

On July 1, State assumed responsibility for administering most foreign assistance, including programs currently financed by and functions previously managed by USAID.¹⁶ The transition was accompanied by staffing constraints and limited time for planning, which hindered the effective transfer of institutional knowledge, restricted access to key information systems, and complicated risk management related to personnel, contractual matters, and partner oversight.¹⁷ The sudden termination of awards (followed in some cases by a reversal of the termination) disrupted implementers' internal controls, making it difficult to carry out proper closeout procedures.¹⁸

About the Special Inspector General for OAR

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Section 419) established the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the DoD, State, and USAID.

On August 18, 2023, the DoD designated OAR as an overseas contingency operation, triggering Section 419, and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency selected the DoD IG to be the Lead IG for OAR, effective October 18, 2023. The DoD IG appointed the State IG as the Associate IG for OAR.

Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2024 re-designated the Lead IG for OAR as the Special Inspector General for OAR. The Lead IG agencies conduct oversight of the Ukraine response individually under their own authorities and collaboratively, to carry out the following whole-of-government responsibilities:

- Submitting to Congress, on a quarterly basis, a report on the contingency operation and making that report available to the public no later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter.
- Developing a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensuring independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

In March 2024, the Special Inspector General for OAR launched a website to promote transparency and accountability in the comprehensive, whole-of-government effort to oversee U.S. security, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. UkraineOversight.gov is a centralized website that consolidates oversight work, funding data, open and closed recommendations, and reporting from the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs, as well as the Government Accountability Office and other participating members of the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group.

Long-range weapons on the production line at a facility in Ukraine. The poster on the wall says, "Debt will be repaid." (Office of the President of Ukraine Flickr photo)



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About the Special Inspector General for OAR

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COMPREHENSIVE OVERSIGHT

Since June 2022, oversight organizations from across the U.S. Government have coordinated their activities through the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group. The Working Group ensures open lines of communication and situational awareness across department and agency boundaries to ensure that all areas of the broader effort receive appropriate oversight coverage, and to avoid duplication of effort.

The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs have long-established field offices and personnel in Europe to support audits, evaluations, and investigations of activities related to OAR and the U.S. response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This pre-existing footprint in Europe means that the OIGs have deep familiarity with U.S. Government programs and activities in Europe, including past oversight work on assistance to Ukraine, and established connections with program personnel.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH NON-U.S. OVERSIGHT AGENCIES

The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs have signed memorandums of understanding (MoU) with their Ukrainian counterparts—such as the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), Ministry of Defense Main Inspectorate, and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO)—and other bilateral and multilateral organizations implementing programming in Ukraine. The MoUs formalize information sharing in support of criminal investigations and oversight work.

For DoD OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG personnel stationed in Washington, D.C., Kyiv, and elsewhere in Europe, those MoUs have helped increase cooperation between the two countries' complementary but structurally dissimilar oversight communities. OIG personnel routinely employ the MoUs as a mechanism for the exchange of information with their Ukrainian counterparts, including the Ministry of Defense Main Inspectorate and Ukrainian law enforcement agencies. The MoUs have resulted in regular meetings between OIG personnel and their Ukrainian partners, including law enforcement, to build relationships, quickly address inquiries and allegations, and work collaboratively to identify potential fraud, waste, and abuse.

The OIGs have also worked to leverage MoUs with international organizations and initiate regular information sharing processes that could be models for other international law enforcement relationships. This information sharing provides enhanced understanding of fraud risks with international oversight partners.

DETAILS ON OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

Further details about completed, ongoing, and planned work by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and partner agencies can be found in the following Appendixes.

- **Appendix E:** Completed Oversight Projects
- **Appendix F:** Ongoing Oversight Projects
- **Appendix G:** Planned Oversight Projects
- **Appendix H:** Hotline and Investigations



UkraineOversight.gov







A U.S. Army M1A2 Abrams tank fires on targets during a joint combined arms live-fire exercise at Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland. (DoD photo)

MISSION UPDATE

11 Security

19 Diplomacy

A UNHCR partner provides emergency assistance on site after a large-scale Russian attack on June 6, 2025. (UNHCR photo)



MISSION UPDATE

Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) is a Department of Defense (DoD) operation in the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility to demonstrate ongoing commitment to NATO allies and partners through a persistent military presence along NATO's eastern flank. According to USEUCOM, OAR aims to ensure the security and stability of Europe through continuous deployment of combat-credible forces. OAR encompasses activities across Europe, including in the Baltic states, Central Europe, and the Black Sea region.¹⁹

Table 1.

OAR Strategic Objectives

Support NATO and assure NATO allies in Eastern Europe of U.S. commitment to collective security.

- U.S. efforts support NATO-led activities in Eastern Europe.
- NATO allies in Eastern Europe are assured of U.S. commitments to collective defense.

Develop combined defensive and offensive capabilities of the United States and Eastern European NATO allies.

- The United States and Eastern European allies demonstrate interoperable military capabilities.

Russia is deterred from aggression against Eastern European NATO members.

- Russia perceives NATO as a credible alliance committed to the security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of its members.
- U.S. demonstrates commitment to the NATO alliance and its mission to defend the security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of its members.
- Russia is dissuaded from taking offensive (overt or covert) actions against NATO member states.

Source: USEUCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.2 OAR 007, 4/3/2024.

Since January 2024, Russia has lost roughly 1,149 armored fighting vehicles, 3,098 infantry fighting vehicles, 300 self-propelled artillery vehicles, and 1,865 tanks, according to think tank analysis.

The fundamental mission of OAR remained unchanged this quarter. The desired OAR end state is a stable and secure Europe, where NATO allies maintain high levels of interoperability, readiness, and collective defense capabilities. The DoD implemented no significant modifications to OAR's mission parameters or strategic objectives this quarter.²⁰

OAR began as a USEUCOM effort to provide rotational deployments of combat-credible forces to Europe in the wake of Russia's 2014 invasion of the Crimea region in Ukraine.²¹ Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the OAR mission has evolved in line with U.S. policy objectives.²² (See Table 1.)

In addition to security assistance, the U.S. Government provides financial, material, and technical assistance to Ukrainian institutions and civil society. Since the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump on January 20, 2025, State has been realigning its Ukraine-related goals to be consistent with the Administration's objectives.²³

SECURITY

Russia Gains Territory in Ukraine Slowly and at a High Cost

Since January 2024, Russia has seized approximately 5,000 square kilometers of additional Ukrainian territory—less than 1 percent of the country—mostly in the eastern provinces of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv. In contrast, Russia took 120,000 square kilometers in the first 5 weeks following its full-scale invasion. In certain areas, such as Kharkiv, Russia's rate of advance is as little as 50 meters per day on average.²⁴

As of June, Ukraine had lost control of roughly 20 percent of its overall territory. Russian forces recaptured all but a small portion of Russia's Kursk region and gained control of hundreds of square kilometers across Ukraine's Sumy, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions since January, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). With its position in Russia's Kursk region greatly reduced, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) had only a small foothold there to prevent Russian forces from advancing into Ukraine's Sumy region.²⁵

These Russian gains have come at a significant cost in both manpower and equipment. This quarter, Russian casualties in the Ukraine war likely surpassed one million, according to Western governments and independent analysts. This includes approximately 250,000 killed and 750,000 wounded, missing, or captured. Both Russia and Ukraine have been reluctant to publish precise casualty figures for their own forces and tend to understate their estimates.²⁶ According to a think tank analysis, Russian fatalities during 3 years of war in Ukraine are 15 times greater than those experienced during the Soviet Union's decade-long war in Afghanistan.²⁷

Additionally, Russia has lost significant quantities of equipment. Since January 2024, Russia has lost roughly 1,149 armored fighting vehicles, 3,098 infantry fighting vehicles, 300 self-propelled artillery vehicles, and 1,865 tanks, according to a think tank analysis. Russian losses of these platforms have been significantly higher than Ukraine's, at ratios varying from 5:1 to 2:1.²⁸

Meanwhile, the conflict continued to be characterized by exchanges of artillery and UAS strikes. Since last quarter, Russia's artillery fire rate increased from approximately 23,000 rounds per day to between 27,000 and 28,000 rounds per day.²⁹ Russia increased its expenditure of one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in one of its priority areas from 7,000 in April to 10,000 in May. The DIA said that, extrapolating from this one area, it is possible that Russia is expending up to 72,000 tactical UAVs per month in roughly nine main operational areas.³⁰

Operation Spider Web Destroys Russian Strategic Bombers with Small, Commercially Available UAS

On June 1, the Security Service of Ukraine carried out a complex unmanned aerial system (UAS) attack, striking four air bases across Russia. Codenamed "Operation Spider Web," the operation targeted high-value aircraft that are often used to strike Ukraine, including Tu-22M3 supersonic strategic bombers, Tu-95MS heavy strategic bombers, and A-50 early warning and control aircraft. The Ukrainian government reported that the operation damaged more than 40 Russian fixed-wing aircraft and destroyed at least 13 of them.³¹ According to the DIA, at least 10 Russian strategic bombers were lost in this attack.³²

Ukrainian officials said the damaged aircraft represent approximately one third of Russia's capacity to deliver strategic cruise missiles. They estimated the monetary cost of the damage at \$7 billion.³³ According to media reporting, Russia had not built new Tu-95 or Tu-22M3 since 1991 and had only between 70 and 90 of those aircraft in its fleet prior to the June 1 strike.³⁴ However, the DIA said that those losses will only minimally degrade Russia's ability to continue cruise missile strikes against Ukrainian facilities.³⁵

The Security Service of Ukraine carried out Operation Spider Web by smuggling 117 small, first-person view UAVs into Russia in four cargo trucks, which were then positioned near targeted airfields.³⁶ The UAVs were launched in such close proximity to their targets that they were able to bypass key elements of Russia's layered air defense systems, according to media reporting.³⁷ The UAS used in the operation were commercially available models costing approximately \$600 to \$1,000 each.³⁸ Ukrainian officials told reporters that the operation involved 18 months of planning and that all personnel involved in the operation had returned to Ukraine before the strikes were launched.³⁹

Operation Spider Web included coordinated strikes on four bases, located thousands of miles apart, all of which support Russia's nuclear strike and deterrent force.⁴⁰ (See page 13.) A fifth truck, positioned near Ukrainka airfield in Russia's far eastern Amur region, caught fire and did not launch an attack.⁴¹

Ukrainian operators controlled the UAVs using commercial Russian mobile telecommunication networks. Each UAV was equipped with artificial intelligence capabilities to supplement and assist the human pilot with flight stability, targeting, navigation, and other functions. Artificial intelligence helped overcome challenges related to signal latency caused by using commercial telecommunication channels, according to media reporting.⁴²

In addition to Operation Spider Web, Ukraine maintained a high pace of long-range UAS attacks against Russian military targets, including airfields, defense industrial facilities, and

The Security Service of Ukraine carried out Operation Spider Web by smuggling 117 small, first-person view UAVs into Russia in cargo trucks, which were then positioned near targeted airfields.

OPERATION SPIDER WEB BY THE NUMBERS

Targeted Russian Airbases During Ukrainian Drone Operation



Types of Russian Aircraft Struck

Tu-22M3



Tu-95MS



A-50



\$600 to \$1,000

Approximate per unit cost of Ukraine's small UAVs

\$7 billion

Estimated cost of damage to Russia's strategic bomber fleet

117

Small UAVs launched from 4 container trucks

40

Russian aircraft Ukraine claims to have hit

13

Russian aircraft Ukraine claims destroyed

5

Time zones the attack spanned

Sources: Kateryna Bondar, "How Ukraine's Operation 'Spider's Web' Redefines Asymmetric Warfare," CSIS, 6/2/2025; Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Daria Novikov, Christina Harward, and Kateryna Stepanenko, "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1, 2025," Institute for the Study of War, 6/1/2025; Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Daria Novikov, Christina Harward, and Kateryna Stepanenko, "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2025," Institute for the Study of War, 6/2/2025.

ammunition storage positions.⁴³ The Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U) estimated that UAVs launched from Ukraine can consistently threaten targets up to 750 miles inside Russia.⁴⁴ Ukrainian strikes during the quarter disabled military equipment, forced Moscow to protect its interior positions, and partially affected the Russian military's ability to resupply its front-line forces, according to the DIA. After the mid-March, U.S.-backed moratorium on targeting energy infrastructure, the UAF generally avoided targeting strategic Russian energy infrastructure, and Ukrainian strikes have not had a significant impact on the Russian civilian population.⁴⁵

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) said that the United States supports Ukraine's use of U.S.-provided security assistance based on its immediate need for self-defense. The OUSD(P) said that it was unaware of any strikes the UAF conducted against targets prohibited by U.S. policy concerning the use of U.S.-provided weapons.⁴⁶

Notable Strikes this Quarter

On April 25, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, a deputy head of the main operational department in the General Staff of the Russian military, was killed by an explosive device placed in his car just outside of Moscow. The Ukrainian government did not comment on the attack.⁴⁷

On May 2, a Ukrainian naval uncrewed surface vessel operating near the Russian port city of Novorossiysk downed a Russian Su-30 fighter jet. This was the first time that an uncrewed naval vessel has shot down a manned, fixed-wing fighter jet in combat.⁴⁸

In early June, Russian troops advanced into the eastern edge of the Dnipropetrovsk region, an industrial and mining hub, for the first time since the full-scale war began in 2022.⁴⁹

On June 3, the Security Service of Ukraine conducted a sabotage operation aimed at destroying structural elements of the Kerch Bridge, which connects Crimea to Russia, the third Ukrainian strike against the bridge since the full-scale invasion began.⁵⁰ The bridge reopened within hours after the attack.⁵¹

On June 22, Ukraine conducted a UAV strike against a Russian military freight train carrying fuel in the Russia-occupied Zaporizhzhia region.⁵²

On June 26, Ukrainian resistance fighters in Zaporizhzhia, working with Ukrainian intelligence, destroyed a railway line used by Russian forces to move military cargo. This explosion shut down rail traffic on that line for more than a week, according to media reporting.⁵³

On July 1, Ukrainian operatives disabled a Russian locomotive shortly after it had entered a recently repaired segment of railway line. According to media reporting, those strikes on Russian rail assets significantly hindered Russian military logistics in occupied Ukraine.⁵⁴

In late June, Russian forces captured one of Ukraine's largest lithium deposits in the Donetsk region. Increased Russian control of Ukrainian mineral deposits risks imperiling the nascent U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund.⁵⁵ (See pages 19 and 20.)

Russia's large-scale strikes increasingly targeted civilian areas and often included follow-on strikes targeting first responders, according to Ukrainian officials.

Russian Massed UAS Attacks Strain Ukrainian Air Defenses

During the quarter, Russia expanded its UAS attacks on Ukraine, launching hundreds of UAVs at once to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, according to the DIA.⁵⁶ Russia's large-scale strikes increasingly targeted civilian areas and often included follow-on strikes targeting first responders, according to Ukrainian officials.⁵⁷

In many cases, the UAF was able to intercept or electronically suppress the incoming Russian UAVs, but some aircraft evaded Ukraine's integrated air defense system.⁵⁸ (See Table 2.) In addition, the UAF struggled to consistently use Patriot air defense systems to protect against Russian ballistic missiles due to recent Russian tactical improvements, including enhancements that enable their missiles to change trajectory and perform maneuvers rather than flying in a traditional ballistic trajectory.⁵⁹ For example, June 28 attack included seven ballistic missiles, of which the UAF shot down only one.⁶⁰ A massed attack on July 9—the largest air attack since the start of the war—included 13 missiles, of which the UAF shot down or suppressed 7.⁶¹

In July, Russia began launching missiles and UAVs at different altitudes and encircling Kyiv before approaching the city from all directions. According to media reporting, this did not result in significantly more munitions reaching their targets.⁶²

Russia Continues to Refine UAS Tactics

During the quarter, Russia expanded the use of fiber-optic UAS to strike Ukrainian troops along the front line. These UAS are guided by a length of fiber-optic cable rather than radio signals, making them resilient against electromagnetic countermeasures throughout the battlefield in Ukraine. Russia used the fiber-optic UAS to target Ukrainian logistics routes.⁶³

SAG-U described another emerging Russian tactic as “sleep and shoot,” whereby Russian forces in Ukraine position UAVs on the ground in a dormant state and trigger them to detonate as Ukrainian vehicles approach. Russian forces likewise used UAS as improvised anti-tank traps, with upward-facing shaped charges that function like traditional anti-tank munitions. Additionally, Russian forces employed UAS in saturation strikes, focused on short segments of roads with coordinated attacks, either striking the front, rear, and sides of a single vehicle or targeting multiple vehicles in a convoy simultaneously to maximize damage.⁶⁴

Table 2.

Select Russian Massed UAV Attacks and Percentage that Evaded Air Defenses

	UAVs Launched	UAVs Evaded	Percentage Evaded
May 25-26	355	67	19%
May 31-June 1	472	87	18%
June 28-29	447	1	>1%
July 9-10	728	17	2%

Sources: DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 OAR 039, 6/25/2025; Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Daria Novikov, Christina Harward, and Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29, 2025,” Institute for the Study of War, 6/29/2025; U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, vetting comment, 7/29/2025.

SAG-U said that these new tactics have enabled Russian forces to use UAS to disrupt the UAF's freedom of movement and supply lines. This approach allows them to exploit UAF vulnerabilities and more effectively disrupt its operations.⁶⁵

Another novel Russian tactic is using UAVs to deliver grenades filled with riot control agents, such as CS gas and Chloropicrin. USEUCOM reported that Russia deploys these UAVs to clear UAF from entrenched fighting positions and into more open or vulnerable areas. While these chemical agents are not considered lethal, Russia uses them to shape the battlefield and cause UAF casualties.⁶⁶

UAS employment continued to proliferate across the Russian military, with an increasing number of units incorporating UAS into their operations, according to SAG-U. This suggests a growing recognition of the value and versatility of UAS, SAG-U stated. Russian commanders were likely seeking to integrate UAS capabilities more broadly to achieve synergistic effects and enhance overall operational effectiveness.⁶⁷

USEUCOM reported that the Russian Intelligence and Security Services and their proxies continued to represent "a significant hybrid threat" in Europe.

Russia Continues Sabotage, Other Hybrid Warfare Operations in Europe

USEUCOM reported that the Russian Intelligence and Security Services and their proxies continued to represent "a significant hybrid threat" in Europe.⁶⁸ Russia and its proxies engage in subversion, disinformation, cyber operations, and sabotage to advance Russian foreign policy objectives and protect vital economic interests.⁶⁹

This quarter, Russia and its affiliates continued to conduct indirect actions against NATO and non-NATO European countries, primarily aimed at undermining their support for Ukraine, according to the DIA.⁷⁰ USEUCOM observed indirect actions—namely sabotage and arson—in Estonia, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.⁷¹ USEUCOM said that the lack of Russian state attribution for these attacks probably signals improved Russian tradecraft in hybrid warfare.⁷²

Additionally, Russia continued to advance longstanding narratives among domestic and international audiences to weaken international support for Ukraine, drive a wedge between the U.S. and Europe, justify Russian aggression against Ukraine, and dissuade Europe from strengthening its collective defense.⁷³

Russian hybrid warfare in Europe (outside Ukraine) declined in 2025 compared to the previous year, according to USEUCOM. This decline occurred amid the arrest of operatives in several European countries, Russia's increasing confidence in positive battlefield trajectories in Ukraine, and the electoral success of political parties that oppose continued military support to Ukraine in several European countries.⁷⁴

Despite this general decrease in activity, European countries accused Russia and its proxies of being involved in several malign operations this quarter. On May 14, German officials announced the arrest of three pro-Russian Ukrainian men in Germany and Switzerland for allegedly planning to sabotage European infrastructure on behalf of Russia. The German government alleged that the men were planning to ship incendiary and explosive devices to Ukraine, with the goal of having them explode in transit and destroy transport infrastructure.⁷⁵

This quarter, Ukrainian officials continued to cite manpower and equipment shortages as drivers of the UAF's inability to defend against the Russian military, which was larger and better equipped.

On July 8, a U.K. court found three men guilty of committing acts of arson against a London warehouse used to store generators, satellite communications equipment, and other materiel destined for Ukraine, according to media reporting. Prosecutors said the March 20, 2024, attack was planned by Russia's Wagner Group mercenaries, acting on behalf of Russian military intelligence. According to the prosecution, the Wagner Group used U.K.-based intermediaries to recruit the perpetrators of the attack.⁷⁶

In May, the U.K. National Cyber Security Centre alleged that Russia's intelligence service had been conducting cyberattacks against public and private organizations assisting Ukraine. Russia gained illicit access to systems responsible for coordinating and transporting materiel to Ukraine. Russia also attempted to hack into cameras at Ukrainian border crossings and near military bases to track aid shipments. In response, the U.K. government announced new sanctions against Russia and encouraged organizations involved with the Ukraine response to improve their cybersecurity practices to mitigate risk.⁷⁷

This quarter, USEUCOM reported a consistent increase in Russia's jamming of Global Navigation Satellite Systems along its borders, with a notable focus in the Baltic Sea region. This activity is likely part of a broader force protection measure as Russia fields more weapon systems. However, it is also likely that the intensification of jamming in the Baltic region is a response to the Baltic states supporting Ukraine. The navigation jamming had a significant negative effect on commercial air and maritime traffic in the region, according to USEUCOM.⁷⁸

Ukraine Continues to Suffer Manpower and Equipment Shortages

This quarter, Ukrainian officials continued to cite manpower and equipment shortages as drivers of the UAF's inability to defend against the Russian military, which was larger and better equipped.⁷⁹ The UAF had struggled with inadequate recruitment, desertions from the front line, refusals to fight, and undertrained personnel, resulting in most of its frontline brigades operating below combat strength. Russia's indirect fire and manpower advantages led to combat exhaustion among frontline UAF units, according to SAG-U.⁸⁰ Despite those challenges, the Ukrainian government continued to reject calls to lower the conscription age from 25 to 18 due to the potential long-term demographic effects and public opposition.⁸¹ However, on July 29, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a law increasing the maximum age for new recruits to 60.⁸²

Ukraine sought to bolster its ranks by recruiting contract soldiers from abroad. In May, Ukraine opened a new recruitment center and launched a digital advertising campaign concentrated on recruitment in Latin America.⁸³ Veterans of Colombia's drug war, trained in guerrilla tactics, represent a significant contingent of Ukraine's volunteers.⁸⁴ Ukraine has recruited approximately 27,000 soldiers per month, roughly 15,000 below Russia's recruitment rate. By offering contracts of up to \$3,000 per month, Ukraine aims to bolster this total by recruiting several thousand contract soldiers from abroad.⁸⁵

Russia Receives Materiel and Economic Support from its Partners

This quarter, North Korea, Iran, China, and Belarus continued to provide materiel, financial, and diplomatic support to Russia. However, that support was unlikely to increase Russia's ability to threaten NATO while the war in Ukraine persists, according to the DIA.⁸⁶

NORTH KOREA

In April, the Russian and North Korean governments publicly acknowledged the deployment of North Korean troops in the Kursk region for the first time, though their presence has been widely reported in the media for nearly a year.⁸⁷ Throughout the quarter, North Korean soldiers continued combat operations in Kursk, which the Russian military nearly completely recaptured in late April, according to the DIA. As of June, North Korean soldiers remained in Kursk, probably to support postwar reconstruction in the region. The DIA said it had no indications that North Korean troops will deploy to areas outside of Kursk.⁸⁸

North Korean troops in Russia have sustained heavy losses fighting in Kursk. Approximately 6,000 of these soldiers have been killed, wounded, or otherwise removed from the battlefield since they were sent there in Fall 2024, according to the DIA.⁸⁹ In June, Russian state media announced that North Korea will send 5,000 military construction workers and 1,000 sappers, or combat engineers, to Kursk to rebuild infrastructure and clear mines.⁹⁰ The DIA did not observe any significant changes to the command and control relationship between Russian and North Korean troops or the training or effectiveness of North Korean troops.⁹¹

North Korea continued to transfer ammunition to Russia, in total sending up to 9 million artillery rounds since beginning transfers in 2023. North Korea has also transferred towed, rocket, and self-propelled artillery to Russia.⁹²

CHINA

China continued to bolster Russia's economy in the face of international sanctions through trade, and Chinese defense firms provided dual-use components, including machine tools and microelectronics, to support Russia's defense industries. However, the Chinese government continued to deny lethal aid exports to Russia, allowing China to preserve its close ties with Russia while mitigating reputational or economic costs, according to the DIA.⁹³

According to media reporting, China was responsible for assisting Russia in evading about 80 percent of the sanctions imposed against Russia. Media also reported that the Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service accused China of supplying Russian factories with goods that could be used for military purposes.⁹⁴

This quarter, Chinese officials continued partnering with Russia to counter U.S. influence and advance China's vision for a multipolar international system. During a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in May, Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed China's ongoing interest in strengthening the China-Russia partnership. At the same time, China publicly supported U.S. involvement in Russia-Ukraine peace talks and offered its own peace proposals.⁹⁵

In April, the UAF captured two Chinese nationals fighting for Russia in the Donetsk region. Ukraine claimed there were at least 155 Chinese nationals fighting for Russia as of this

Throughout the quarter, North Korean soldiers continued combat operations in Kursk, which the Russian military nearly completely recaptured in late April, according to the DIA.

The Russian delegation reiterated previous Russian demands for Ukraine's neutrality, demilitarization, regime change, and acceptance of Russia's occupation of Ukrainian territory as a precondition for the cessation of hostilities.

quarter. The DIA reported that it did not know the Chinese fighters' command and control structure, roles in the Russian military, or military effectiveness. The Chinese government had publicly reiterated its neutrality and stated its opposition to Chinese citizens fighting in foreign conflicts. The captured Chinese nationals stated that they joined the Russian army independent of their government, according to the DIA.⁹⁶

DIPLOMACY

Istanbul Talks Yield Prisoner Exchange but No Ceasefire

Russian and Ukrainian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 and June 2 to discuss a potential ceasefire. The Russian delegation reiterated previous Russian demands for Ukraine's neutrality, demilitarization, regime change, and acceptance of Russia's occupation of Ukrainian territory as a precondition for the cessation of hostilities. Ukraine declared that it is prepared for an immediate ceasefire but rejected the Russian demands.⁹⁷

In a July 7 media interview, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia opposes a ceasefire, purporting that Ukraine and its allies would use the pause to regroup and reconstitute Ukraine's military. Lavrov also demanded international recognition of Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory, sanctions relief, and the return of frozen Russian assets.⁹⁸ This delaying tactic gives the Russian military time to press its advantage, including during temporary pauses in U.S. military assistance, and continue its gradual military gains in Ukraine.⁹⁹


On May 25, Russia and Ukraine exchanged 1,000 prisoners, completing the largest single prisoner of war exchange since the war started in February 2022.¹⁰⁰ Both sides agreed to trade the remains of as many as 6,000 fallen soldiers as well as prisoners who are sick, severely wounded, or under the age of 25.¹⁰¹ However, Ukrainian officials accused Russia of improperly identifying the bodies it sent to Ukraine. They told reporters that at least 20 sets of remains repatriated to Ukraine belonged to Russian soldiers, and in some cases, remains of different individuals were mixed and counted as a single transfer.¹⁰² Neither Russia nor Ukraine provided exact numbers of how many prisoners were exchanged. According to media reporting, this exchange has been the only tangible result from the Istanbul talks so far.¹⁰³

United States and Ukraine Sign Reconstruction Investment Fund Agreement

On April 30, the United States and Ukraine signed an agreement to create the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund. The bilateral fund will be jointly managed by the two countries on an equal basis with the goal of establishing a partnership for the reconstruction and long-term economic success of Ukraine.¹⁰⁴

Under the terms of the agreement, Ukraine will maintain complete ownership of its natural resources and infrastructure, including decisions on what resources to extract, and the United States will have the opportunity to acquire minerals and energy resources or to designate a purchaser. The United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund will receive 50 percent of royalties, licensing fees, and other payments from natural resource projects in Ukraine under this agreement, to be invested in new natural resource and related infrastructure projects in Ukraine.¹⁰⁵

Figure 1.

Locations of Major Mineral Deposits in Ukraine

According to a think tank analysis, the agreement provides for “a broader, long-term strategic alignment” between the United States and Ukraine.¹⁰⁶ The agreement does not require Ukraine to reimburse the United States for past military aid provided, but it counts any future U.S. military assistance to Ukraine in the form of ammunition, weapons systems, or training as a capital contribution to the fund.¹⁰⁷

Ukraine has significant deposits of oil, gas, and minerals, including lithium, graphite, rare earth metals, titanium, and uranium. Many of these minerals are essential components in manufacturing modern goods, such as aircraft, batteries, electronics, nuclear reactors, and weapons. However, significant stretches of these deposits are located either in Russian-controlled territory or near the front line. (See Figure 1.) Wartime conditions create logistical challenges and investor uncertainty that will make it difficult or impossible to establish new mining operations in certain parts of the country while the current level of fighting persists.¹⁰⁸

U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Resigns in Protest

On April 21, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink announced her resignation. On May 16—when she was no longer employed by State and therefore no longer speaking on behalf of the U.S. Government—Brink cited the Trump Administration’s policy, which

she said, “put pressure on the victim, Ukraine, rather than on the aggressor, Russia” as the reason for her resignation.¹⁰⁹ She described “Putin’s ambition to resurrect an imperial past” as an existential threat to the security of Europe and potentially emboldening China to pursue its own expansionist agenda. Ambassador Brink had led the U.S. diplomatic mission in Kyiv since May 18, 2022, after Russia’s full-scale invasion.¹¹⁰

U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Julie Davis assumed the role of Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv on May 5 while continuing to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus. According to State, she will lead both embassies until the President appoints a permanent ambassador to Ukraine.¹¹¹

NATO Allies Agree to Spend 5 Percent of GDP on Defense

At the NATO Summit in June, member states agreed to increase their defense spending from the previous target of 2 percent of GDP to 5 percent by 2035. The new target will consist of two main categories of defense spending: at least 3.5 percent of GDP will be spent on core national defense capabilities, and at least 1.5 percent will be spent on protecting critical infrastructure, defending communication networks, ensuring civil preparedness and resilience, fostering innovation, and building defense industrial bases.¹¹² As of 2024, no NATO ally, including the United States, spent 5 percent of its GDP on defense. Poland was closest to meeting that mark, spending slightly more than 4 percent.¹¹³

NATO’s 2024 Annual Report showed that Spain spent the least on defense—1.24 percent of GDP. Additionally, Albania, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Portugal, and Slovenia all spent less than 2 percent of their respective GDPs on defense in 2024.¹¹⁴



NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, U.K. Minister of Defence John Healey, and Ukrainian Minister of Defence Rustem Umerov at the Ukraine Defence Contact Group in Brussels on June 4, 2025. (NATO photo)





A U.S. Soldier speaks on the radio prior to a combined arms exercise at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany. (U.S. Army photo)

STATUS OF FUNDS

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- 32 Funding for Security Assistance
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STATUS OF FUNDS

In accordance with the Special Inspector General for Operation Atlantic Resolve's (OAR) legislative mandate, this section provides a comprehensive accounting of the amounts appropriated by the United States for the Ukraine response.

The Special IG for OAR collected funding data from all 14 Federal agencies authorized to receive funds through the Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts, including the DoD, State, and the USAID. (For details on sources, please see page 113.)

U.S. GOVERNMENT FUNDING OVERVIEW

Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$187.02 billion for OAR and the broader Ukraine response, of which at least \$153.37 billion—82 percent—has been obligated and \$93.97 billion—50 percent—has been disbursed through the quarter ending June 30, 2025. As of the end of the quarter, \$30.08 billion in appropriations for the Ukraine response remained available for obligation. (See Tables 3 and 6.)

Congress appropriated \$174.19 billion through the five Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts enacted FY 2022 through FY 2024, of which Federal government agencies allocated \$163.61 billion for OAR and the Ukraine response, and \$10.58 billion was allocated for other, primarily humanitarian, purposes. Additional funds of \$22.29 billion were allocated from annual agency appropriations, and \$1.12 billion was allocated from other supplemental appropriation acts. These three sources of funding have collectively provided \$187.02 billion in total appropriations for OAR and the Ukraine response.

The most recent appropriation act specifically for OAR and the Ukraine response was the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriation Act, 2024, enacted April 24, 2024, which provided \$60.78 billion in funding.¹¹⁵ Since that time, additional funds made available in the annual and continuing resolution appropriation acts have been obligated for these purposes. None of the appropriation bills enacted in the current fiscal year, including the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, enacted March 15, 2025; the budget reconciliation act, enacted on July 4, 2025; and the Rescissions Act of 2025, enacted June 24, 2025, have provisions appropriating or rescinding appropriated funds specifically for OAR or the Ukraine response.¹¹⁶

During the first quarter of FY 2025, the U.S. Government disbursed \$20.00 billion to a World Bank-administered trust fund for provision to Ukraine. Referred to as an Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan, these funds were collateralized by future earnings on immobilized Russian sovereign assets held primarily in the European Union. The Ukrainian government is a party to this complex, multi-party arrangement. The transaction involved the transfer by USAID of \$535.25 million from the Economic Support Fund to USAID's Sovereign Credit Program Account at the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), where it was obligated for loan guarantee subsidy costs. Treasury's Federal Financing Bank disbursed the \$20.00 billion loan. This loan is treated for budgetary purposes as a USAID loan, and its

Since February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$187.02 billion for OAR and the broader Ukraine response.

Table 3.


Status of U.S. Appropriations for Operation Atlantic Resolve, Including U.S. Government Activities Relating to Ukraine, Grouped by Implementing Agency, FY 2022 to FY 2025 Q3, in \$ Millions

Funds Appropriated by Agency and Account	Appropriated	Obligated	Disbursed
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE			
U.S. Military Support, Primarily for U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)	\$47,427.08	\$38,715.46	\$25,915.85
Replenishment of DoD Stocks	45,780.00	32,411.95	10,058.87
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	33,512.46	25,428.46	14,130.91
DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)	16.00	11.75	10.98
Department of Defense, Total	126,735.54	96,567.62	50,116.61
DEPARTMENT OF STATE			
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF)	7,094.53	5,732.53	2,343.92
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	1,404.95	1,378.47	833.03
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	1,191.51	1,191.51	1,152.11
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia & Central Asia (AEECA)	656.94	464.64	153.96
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	535.06	535.04	366.06
Diplomatic Programs (DP)	496.15	474.70	404.33
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)	414.51	365.01	216.54
Global Health Programs (GHP-State)	146.68	36.23	20.15
Embassy Security, Construction & Maintenance (ESCM)	110.00	57.44	56.18
International Military Education & Training (IMET)	84.28	84.28	61.19
Capital Investment Fund (CIF)	44.17	43.99	36.28
Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)	38.84	37.84	29.96
State Office of Inspector General (State OIG)	21.50	18.66	17.35
Emergencies in the Diplomatic & Consular Service (EDCS)	5.00	—	—
Department of State, Total	12,244.12	10,420.34	5,691.06
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT			
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	34,102.05	33,355.86	31,075.28
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	2,575.12	2,575.04	2,013.34
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)	2,462.21	1,690.57	908.71
Transition Initiatives (TI)	195.00	192.48	152.80
Global Health Programs (GHP-USAID)	90.34	90.16	38.20
Operating Expenses (OE)	86.00	58.47	41.49
USAID Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)	23.00	13.26	12.34
USAID, Total	39,533.71	37,975.84	34,242.18
ALL OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES			
U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)	4,035.78	4,035.78	881.65
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)	1,844.65	1,820.17	944.00
Department of the Treasury (Treasury)	1,130.18	1,122.54	1,115.47
Department of Energy (DOE)	844.86	814.42	563.50
U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM)	179.73	179.73	172.41
Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (EXIM)	156.56	156.56	—
Department of Agriculture (USDA)	150.00	137.89	122.37
Department of Justice (DOJ)	126.40	108.42	90.36
Department of Commerce (Commerce)	22.10	22.02	18.10
Government Accountability Office (GAO)	7.50	7.50	7.50
Five Agencies With Appropriations Under \$5 Million	11.04	—	—
Other U.S. Government Agencies, Total	8,508.80	8,405.04	3,915.35
TOTAL FUNDING	\$187,022.17	\$153,368.83	\$93,965.20

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Agency cumulative appropriation, obligation, and disbursement data is provided for funds appropriated or otherwise made available for obligation for OAR and the Ukraine response after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, through June 30, 2025, except for DoD data, which is presented as of May 31, 2025 (EDI), June 2, 2025 (USAI), and June 11, 2025 (all other); and for USAID ESF, USAID AEECA, GHP-State and USDA data, which is presented as of December 31, 2024. Appropriations for DFC and EXIM reflect obligations on financial product commitments and do not reflect positive subsidy amounts. The DoD OIG has not requested information on obligations and disbursements from four of the five agencies that manage appropriated balances under \$5 million.

Sources: See endnote on page 113.

Figure 2.

Cumulative Appropriations by Funding Category as of FY 2025 Q3, in \$ Billions

principal amount is not included in amounts reported herein as appropriated, obligated, or disbursed.¹¹⁷

Security: Nearly three-quarters of the funds appropriated for OAR and the Ukraine response are for security-related programs administered by the DoD and State. (See Figure 2 and Table 4.) Security-related appropriations had increased each year since the full-scale invasion began through FY 2024 and currently total \$133.90 billion.

The largest component of security-related funding is \$47.43 billion for increased U.S. military activity in Europe and the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), which supports the forward deployment of U.S. military forces and prepositioned stocks in Eastern Europe to deter aggression against NATO allies.

The second largest share of security-related funding consists of \$45.78 billion appropriated to the DoD to replace weapons and materiel donated to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). PDA is not a funding source but rather an authority that allows the President to provide military assistance from existing defense articles in the DoD's stocks, subject to a statutory cap.¹¹⁸ The long-standing statutory limit for PDA is \$100 million of weapons and equipment transferred worldwide per year.¹¹⁹ However, in response to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Congress increased the cap on PDA to \$11.00 billion for FY 2022, \$14.50 billion for FY 2023, and \$7.80 billion for FY 2024, providing \$33.30 billion in cumulative PDA. Supplemental appropriations provided funds for DoD Components to replenish items transferred to Ukraine. As of the end of this

Table 4.

U.S. Appropriations for Operation Atlantic Resolve, Including U.S. Government Activities Relating to Ukraine, Grouped by Funding Category, FY 2022 to FY 2025 Q3, in \$ Millions

Funds Appropriated by Agency and Account	Agency	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025	Total
SECURITY						
U.S. Military Support, Primarily for U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)						
Replenishment of DoD Stocks	DoD	\$12,059.90	\$14,677.37	\$17,852.37	\$2,837.44	\$47,427.08
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	DoD	6,300.00	12,300.00	14,612.46	300.00	33,512.46
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	State	5,015.00	292.62	1,786.91	—	7,094.53
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	State	31.41	26.47	26.40	—	84.28
Security, Total		35,956.31	40,676.46	54,128.14	3,137.44	133,898.35
GOVERNANCE & DEVELOPMENT						
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	Joint	9,380.83	17,407.28	7,849.00	—	34,637.11
U.S. International Development Finance Corp.	DFC	717.76	1,581.34	1,321.64	415.04	4,035.78
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)	Joint	1,130.50	350.00	1,638.66	—	3,119.15
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	State	699.16	385.79	320.00	—	1,404.95
Multilateral Assistance, Int'l Financial Institutions (IFI)	Treasury	650.00	—	340.00	—	990.00
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)	State	159.15	116.92	138.43	—	414.51
U.S. Agency for Global Media	USAGM	72.96	47.99	46.17	12.62	179.73
Export-Import Bank of the U.S.	EXIM	—	—	156.56	—	156.56
Global Health Programs (GHP-State)	State	37.83	53.82	55.03	—	146.68
Global Health Programs (GHP-USAID)	USAID	27.71	35.01	15.57	12.05	90.34
Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)	State	13.61	13.50	10.89	0.84	38.84
Governance & Development, Total		12,889.51	19,991.65	11,891.94	440.56	45,213.65
HUMANITARIAN						
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	USAID	1,652.78	342.88	579.46	—	2,575.12
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	State	596.02	273.22	322.26	—	1,191.51
Transition Initiatives (TI)	USAID	120.00	50.00	25.00	—	195.00
Department of Agriculture	USDA	100.00	50.00	—	—	150.00
Humanitarian, Total		2,468.80	716.10	926.72	—	4,111.63
AGENCY OPERATIONS						
Department of Health and Human Services	HHS	954.00	409.65	481.00	—	1,844.65
Department of Energy	DOE	63.41	489.00	292.46	—	844.86
Diplomatic Programs (DP)	State	299.09	137.05	60.00	—	496.15
Department of the Treasury	Treasury	113.00	—	18.93	8.25	140.18
Department of Justice	DOJ	126.40	—	—	—	126.40
Embassy Security, Construction & Maintenance (ESCM)	State	110.00	—	—	—	110.00
Operating Expenses (OE)	USAID	42.00	5.00	39.00	—	86.00
Capital Investment Fund (CIF)	State	34.17	10.00	—	—	44.17
USAID Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)	USAID	5.00	8.00	10.00	—	23.00
Department of Commerce	Commerce	22.10	—	—	—	22.10
State Office of Inspector General (State OIG)	State	8.00	5.50	8.00	—	21.50
DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)	DoD	—	8.00	8.00	—	16.00
Government Accountability Office	GAO	—	7.50	—	—	7.50
Emergencies in the Diplomatic & Consular Service (EDCS)	State	5.00	—	—	—	5.00
Five Agencies With Appropriations Under \$5 Million	Various	2.50	5.20	3.34	—	11.04
Agency Operations, Total		1,784.67	1,084.90	920.72	8.25	3,798.55
TOTAL FUNDING		\$53,099.29	\$62,469.12	\$67,867.52	\$3,586.25	\$187,022.17

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Agency cumulative appropriation data is provided for funds appropriated or otherwise made available for obligation for OAR and the Ukraine response after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, through June 30, 2025, except for DoD data, which is presented as of May 31, 2025 (EDI), June 2, 2025 (USAI), and June 11, 2025 (all other); and for USAID ESF, USAID AEECA, GHP-State and USDA data, which is presented as of December 31, 2024. Appropriations for DFC and EXIM reflect obligations on financial product commitments and do not reflect positive subsidy amounts. The DoD OIG has not requested information on obligations and disbursements from four of the five agencies that manage appropriated balances under \$5 million.

Sources: See endnote on page 113.

quarter, the DoD had \$3.86 billion in remaining PDA available, unchanged since the last PDA package was announced on January 9, 2025.

Security funds also provide for the procurement of weapons and materiel for Ukraine and other partners and allies through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Congress created the USAI as a means to help Ukraine provide for its self-defense following Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea and has appropriated \$33.51 billion for this purpose since February 2022. FMF is the U.S. Government's standing program through which State procures, and the DoD delivers, weapons, materiel, services, and training requested by partners and allies. (See pages 32-35.) A portion of total FMF funding of \$7.09 billion enables the U.S. Government to backfill the military stocks of partner nations that have been depleted through donations to Ukraine.

Key Budget Terms

Appropriation: A provision of law authorizing Federal agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) for specified purposes. Appropriations represent amounts that agencies may obligate during the period of time specified in the respective appropriation acts but do not represent the cash amounts set aside in Treasury for purposes specified in those acts.

Apportionment: The action by which the Office of Management and Budget distributes amounts available for obligation, including budgetary reserves established pursuant to law, in an appropriation or fund account. An apportionment divides amounts available for obligation by specific time periods (usually quarters), activities, projects, objects, or a combination thereof.

Obligation: Amounts representing orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, or similar transactions during an accounting period that will require payment during the same or a future period.

Disbursement: Amounts paid by U.S. federal agencies during the fiscal year to liquidate U.S. Government obligations.

Reprogramming: Realignment of budget authority within an appropriation or fund account for purposes other than those contemplated at the time of appropriation, usually to finance an emergent, unfunded requirement.

Transfer: The shifting of funds from one appropriation or fund account to another.

Expired Account or Appropriation: An appropriation or fund account in which the balance is no longer available for incurring new obligations but is still available to cover upward adjustments to prior year obligations and liquidating valid obligations. The account remains available for such purposes during the 5-year expiration period.

Source: DoD, Financial Management Regulation DoD 7000.14-R, "Glossary," 9/2021.

Governance and Development: Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$45.21 billion to six government agencies to administer governance and development programs for the Ukraine response, consisting of State, USAID, Treasury, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, U.S. Agency for Global Media, and Export-Import Bank of the United States. More than half of this funding has been disbursed for direct budget support (DBS), which provides funding through World Bank-administered trust funds to the Ukrainian government to continue operations and provision of public services. USAID, which administers DBS programming and funding through the Economic Support Fund,

Table 5.

Allocations of Selected U.S. Appropriations to Specific Countries for the Ukraine Response, Grouped by Funding Category, FY 2022 to FY 2025 Q3, \$ in Millions

Funds Allocated to Specific Countries by Agency and Account	Agency	For Ukraine	For Rest of Europe	For Rest of World	Total
SECURITY					
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	State	\$2,392.35	\$3,150.18	\$190.00	\$5,732.53
International Military Education & Training (IMET)	State	9.79	74.49	—	84.28
Security, Total		2,402.15	3,224.67	190.00	5,816.81
GOVERNANCE & DEVELOPMENT					
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	Joint	33,059.63	525.99	305.30	33,890.92
U.S. International Development Finance Corporation	DFC	2,111.35	1,922.72	1.71	4,035.78
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)	Joint	1,769.05	554.16	24.30	2,347.51
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	State	1,353.72	44.79	—	1,398.51
Multilateral Assistance, International Financial Institutions (IFI)	Treasury	680.18	50.00	400.00	1,130.18
Nonprolif., Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)	State	402.61	—	11.90	414.51
U.S. Agency for Global Media	USAGM	112.25	65.80	1.69	179.73
Export-Import Bank of the United States	EXIM	156.56	—	—	156.56
Global Health Programs (GHP-State)	State	146.68	—	—	146.68
Global Health Programs (GHP-USAID)	USAID	90.16	—	—	90.16
Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)	State	15.22	14.76	8.82	38.80
Governance & Development, Total		39,897.39	3,178.22	753.72	43,829.33
HUMANITARIAN					
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	USAID	2,570.38	4.74	—	2,575.12
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	State	1,191.51	—	—	1,191.51
Transition Initiatives (TI)	USAID	137.78	44.62	9.54	191.95
Department of Agriculture	USDA	—	—	150.00	150.00
Humanitarian, Total		3,899.67	49.37	159.54	4,108.57
TOTAL FUNDING, SELECTED ACCOUNTS		\$46,199.20	\$6,452.26	\$1,103.26	\$53,754.72

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Agencies have reported funds appropriated or otherwise made available for obligation following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, through June 30, 2025, and made country-specific allocations for these appropriations through that date, except for USAID, USAGM, and USDA, which have allocated their appropriations through December 31, 2024. Appropriations for DFC and EXIM reflect obligations on financial product commitments and do not reflect positive subsidy amounts. State and USAID jointly administer ESF and AEECA appropriations. FMF allocations exclude \$1.36 billion in Ukraine Defense Enterprise Program funds not yet allocated to specific countries. Europe is defined to include countries to the west of the Urals and north of the Caucasus including Georgia but not Armenia, Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan.

Sources: See endnote on page 113.

disbursed \$30.21 billion in DBS to Ukraine from 2022 to December 31, 2024. After July 1, responsibility for DBS and oversight thereof transferred from USAID to State.¹²⁰

Humanitarian Assistance: Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$4.11 billion for humanitarian assistance through State, USAID, and Department of Agriculture programs. More than half of this funding was appropriated for FY 2022 when the Ukraine refugee situation and disruptions to Ukrainian food production and distribution peaked following Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine.


Agency Operations: Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$3.80 billion for agency operations across multiple Federal agencies. This includes \$68.00 million for oversight provided by the DoD OIG, State OIG, USAID OIG, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

UKRAINE RESPONSE

State, USAID, and other agencies that were authorized to receive funding through the Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts developed programming that extended beyond Ukraine to other countries in Europe and in some cases, globally. Generally, DoD programming as defined under OAR was restricted to Ukraine assistance and NATO deterrence. Table 5 shows the allocation of selected U.S. appropriations for security, governance, development, and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine and other impacted countries. Notably, of the \$53.75 billion in funding allocated for the Ukraine response from these accounts, approximately 14 percent, or \$7.56 billion, was allocated for countries other than Ukraine.

Figure 3.

Status of Appropriated Funds as of FY 2025 Q3



FUNDING PIPELINE

The status of funds appropriated or otherwise made available for OAR and the Ukraine response of \$187.02 billion consist of the following broad categories: \$30.08 billion that has been appropriated and remains available for new obligations; \$59.40 billion that has been obligated but not yet disbursed; \$93.97 billion that has been disbursed; \$2.81 billion that has expired, meaning the funds are no longer available for obligation; and \$0.76 billion in other funding not available for obligation. (See Figure 3.)

The appropriation laws specify the number of years that each appropriation is available for obligation; typically, 1, 2, or 3 years, or until expended, and after this period of availability has ended, unobligated funds are said to “expire.”

The rate at which appropriated funds are obligated and disbursed varies significantly across accounts. (See Table 6.) Amounts appropriated for DoD Stocks Replenishment and the USAI have approximately one-quarter of these appropriations remaining available for obligation, while amounts appropriated to the Economic Support Fund are fully obligated and nearly fully disbursed. Funds appropriated but not yet obligated for FMF consist of notified Ukraine Defense Enterprise Program funds that have not yet been allocated to specific countries. Appropriated funds remaining available for possible disbursement of \$89.98 billion represent approximately one-half of cumulative appropriations of \$187.02 billion.

Table 6.

Appropriated Funds Remaining Available for Possible Disbursement, Six Largest Accounts and All Others, as of FY 2025 Q3, in \$ Billions

	Cumulative Appropriations	Funds Remaining for Possible Disbursement		
		Appropriated, Not Yet Obligated	Obligated, Not Yet Disbursed	Total Remaining
U.S. Military Support, Primarily for USEUCOM and EDI	\$47.43	\$6.85	\$12.80	\$19.65
DoD Stocks Replenishment	45.78	12.85	22.35	35.20
Economic Support Fund	34.64	—	2.45	2.45
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative	33.51	7.71	11.30	19.01
Foreign Military Financing	7.09	1.36	3.39	4.75
U.S. International Development Finance Corporation	4.04	—	3.15	3.15
Subtotal—Six Largest Accounts	172.49	28.76	55.44	84.21
All Other Accounts	14.54	1.32	3.96	5.28
TOTAL	\$187.02	\$30.08	\$59.40	\$89.48

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Agency funds appropriated or otherwise made available for obligation, funds obligated, funds disbursed, and the periods of availability for obligation have been analyzed to determine funds remaining available for possible disbursement as of June 30, 2025. See notes to Table 3 for several exceptions to the June 30 measurement date. Funds appropriated but not obligated exclude expired funds of \$2.81 billion that were not obligated within their period of availability for obligation as set forth in the appropriation laws, \$770 million in ESF funds that are under review, positive subsidy amounts transferred by State and USAID to DFC and EXIM of \$77.67 million, and funds appropriated to five agencies with account balances under \$5 million totaling \$11.04 million.

Sources: See endnote on page 113.

FUNDING FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Since February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$126.74 billion to the DoD, of which the U.S. Army has received the largest share at \$63.78 billion, and \$38.47 billion is for Defense-wide accounts. (See Table 7.) These appropriations include funding to support the full range of costs associated with the increased U.S. military presence in Europe, both to support Ukraine and to provide enhanced deterrence in Eastern Europe. The DoD uses these funds to replenish its stocks around the world that have been drawn down to deliver weapons and materiel to Ukraine under PDA and as USAI funding to provide direct support to Ukraine.

The FMF program encourages partners to divest from Russian equipment to disrupt support for the Russian military industrial complex and strengthen ties with the United States.¹²¹ State reported that, as of June 2025, it had obligated approximately \$6.25

Table 7.

Department of Defense, Funds Apportioned from Ukraine Supplemental Appropriation Acts and Annual Agency Appropriation Acts for Operation Atlantic Resolve, FY 2022 to FY 2025 Q3, \$ in Millions

U.S. Appropriations, Apportioned by Account	Army	Navy	Air Force	Defense-wide	Total
U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT, PRIMARILY FOR USEUCOM AND EDI					
Military Personnel	\$1,631.90	\$66.62	\$315.41	\$ —	\$2,013.93
Operation & Maintenance	16,985.54	3,817.94	3,358.66	2,801.76	26,963.90
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation	159.68	128.50	860.70	488.72	1,637.60
Procurement	8,296.94	428.85	5,446.79	111.74	14,284.31
Military Construction	361.73	320.63	799.94	—	1,482.30
Defense Production Act Purchases	—	—	—	600.00	600.00
Defense Health Program	—	—	—	28.00	28.00
Office of the Inspector General	—	—	—	16.00	16.00
Army & Defense Working Capital Funds	7.07	—	—	409.97	417.04
U.S. Military Support, Total	27,442.87	4,762.53	10,781.49	4,456.18	47,443.08
DOD STOCKS REPLENISHMENT					
Operation & Maintenance	1,010.22	607.29	744.18	91.96	2,453.64
Defense Production Act Purchases	—	—	—	313.80	313.80
Procurement	30,122.76	4,445.82	1,908.37	100.04	36,576.99
Procurement Replacement of DoD Stocks	5,207.13	313.14	915.30	—	6,435.57
DoD Stocks Replenishment, Total	36,340.11	5,366.24	3,567.85	505.79	45,780.00
UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE					
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, Total	—	—	—	33,512.46	33,512.46
TOTAL FUNDING	\$63,782.98	\$10,128.78	\$14,349.34	\$38,474.44	\$126,735.54

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Reflects apportionment of appropriated balances for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) as of May 31, 2025, for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) as of June 2, 2025, and for appropriated balances from the Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts and other annual Department of Defense appropriations as of June 11, 2025. Procurement Replacement of DoD Stocks consists of the apportionment of Procurement appropriations to the military services in P.L. 118-50, Div. B, for DoD Stocks Replenishment. EDI amounts apportioned may be higher than enacted due to revised planned execution.

Sources: See endnote on page 113.

billion in supplemental appropriations for FMF, including roughly \$2.44 billion directly to Ukraine. State also obligated nearly \$1.97 billion in FMF to the Ukraine Defense Enterprise Program, which helps Ukraine and other partners procure U.S. defense articles and address global defense production challenges.¹²² In addition, State obligated more than \$2.56 billion to other countries, mostly in Europe, to backfill donations made by countries actively supporting Ukraine's defense requirements.¹²³ As of June, State had disbursed approximately \$2.15 billion for the FMF program.¹²⁴ (See Table 8.)

As part of the foreign assistance review, State said that it paused FMF support to Ukraine from January 28 to March 7, when Secretary Rubio approved a waiver for all FMF programs worldwide.¹²⁵ State said that no new FMF obligations were made during the quarter, and that it was revalidating FMF programs to ensure compliance with the Administration's priorities.¹²⁶

DIRECT BUDGET SUPPORT

Prior to the January 25 Executive Order on Reevaluating and Realigining United States Foreign Aid, USAID Ukraine managed the \$30.2 billion in DBS, funded through U.S. bilateral assistance, for disbursement to the Ukrainian government through the World Bank—USAID's largest Ukrainian government support program.¹²⁷ In addition, USAID provided the \$535 million loan guarantee that secured a \$20 billion U.S. loan for Ukraine, provided through a World Bank Financial Intermediary Fund as part of the \$50 billion G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration plan paid for by the windfall proceeds earned from Russia's immobilized assets. Of the \$20 billion, \$16 billion was allocated for DBS.¹²⁸



Secretary of State Marco Rubio participates in the NATO-Ukraine Council Foreign Minister's Working Dinner in the Hague, the Netherlands on June 24, 2025. (State photo)

Table 8.

Countries, Value, Disbursements, and Purposes for Foreign Military Financing Programs Using Supplemental Funds as of June 2025, in \$ Thousands

Country	Program Value	Total Disbursed	Funding Purpose
Ukraine	\$2,436,580	\$586,310	See page 86.
Other European Countries			
Albania	32,000	15,759	UH-60 helicopter; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) protection equipment
Bulgaria	114,500	49,358	AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder missiles
Croatia	140,000	140,000	UH-60 helicopter; APX-123A Transponders and supplies
Czechia	325,520	322,835	Advanced Targeting Capability; UH-1Y helicopters; AH-1Z helicopters; spare engines
Estonia	164,350	129,500	High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
Finland	20,000	0	
Greece	108,000	26,675	Practice ammunition; Weapon System Program; M1117 and Aerosonde; CH-47 sustainment; F-35 support
Latvia	162,700	96,393	Naval air strike missiles; HIMARS
Lithuania	162,737	68,329	Blanket order training; AN/PRC-163; AN/PRC-167; Joint Threat Emitters; JCATS; Simple Key Loaders; NVGs and aiming lasers
Moldova	41,713	40,879	NVDs; body armor; small arms and ammunition; AN/PAS-13 MTWS and accessories; HMMWV; UAS-ISR; Radars AN; MC6 parachutes
Montenegro	35,900	20,900	Cybersecurity services, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle support; NVDs
North Macedonia	123,000	88,412	JLTVs; Strykers; Javelin missiles
Poland	395,000	275,000	F-16 engines, M1A1 tanks and support
Romania	441,000	50,460	Cybersecurity services, FOTS and SCOMAR equipment; BAK-12; PUMA AE and UAVs, Virtual battlespace software and support
Slovakia	234,000	207,328	JLTVs, M4 Rifles/Optics
Slovenia	57,500	30,156	JLTVs, Common Remote Weapons Systems
Other European Countries, Total	\$2,558,420	\$1,561,984	
Non-European Countries			
Nepal	100,000	0	Two helicopters, associated training, logistical, maintenance, and spare parts
Zambia	80,000	0	Bell 412 Helicopters
Non-European Countries, Total	\$180,000	\$0	
Residual Program Obligation	1,065,000	N/A	
GRAND TOTAL	\$6,240,000	\$2,148,294	

Notes: Ukraine total includes supplemental FMF funds obligated directly to Ukraine. The Ukraine Defense Enterprise Program (UDEP) is a country-neutral account from which funds are specifically allocated to Ukraine and other countries affected by the situation in Ukraine. The Residual Obligated UDEP total reflects the total amount not yet allocated to a specific country as of June 2025. Ecuador funding to be reprogrammed for Nepal pending approval by Administration. FMF grant totals include \$120 million in FMF grant assistance provided as loan subsidies for Poland (for more than \$11 billion in FMF loans and loan guarantees) and a \$60 million FMF grant loan subsidy for Romania for a \$920 million FMF loan, but excludes \$80 million in FMF for Taiwan as unrelated to Ukraine.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/9/2025; State, vetting comment, 7/28/2025.

USAID Ukraine reported that all staff supporting audits and fiscal oversight were terminated or subject to USAID's reduction in force, while State.

To ensure robust oversight of the DBS and in line with previous GAO and USAID OIG recommendations, USAID Ukraine contracted three accounting firms to provide oversight of the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan disbursements. However, following the foreign assistance review, all three received stop-work orders.¹²⁹

Audit: An international accounting firm audited DBS in accordance with international and U.S. Government auditing standards.¹³⁰ State lifted the stop-work order on this program and identified it for transfer to State.¹³¹

Spot-checks: A second accounting firm conducted multi-tier, independent verification of the flow of DBS funds.¹³² This contract was terminated in February 2025.¹³³ USAID Ukraine said that the contract's termination reduces the U.S. Government's visibility into the mechanism used to fund DBS and poses a risk to the integrity of the now-resumed audit. USAID said that assigning the same firm to both prepare and audit the financial statements creates a conflict of interest.¹³⁴ The Ukrainian government lacks the necessary systems, processes, and controls to produce DBS financial statements, according to USAID Ukraine.¹³⁵ Moreover, the U.S. Government is no longer in a position to evaluate internal controls, which will impact audit findings given the scale and volume of DBS disbursements, according to USAID.¹³⁶

Building Ukrainian audit capability: The third implementer, the U.S. Government Accountability Office's Center for Audit Excellence, helped the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine to audit DBS tranches 1 and 3 in line with international standards.¹³⁷ During the quarter, this program was in the process of being terminated.¹³⁸

USAID Ukraine reported that all staff supporting audits and fiscal oversight were terminated or subject to USAID's reduction in force.¹³⁹ Remaining USAID Office of Financial Management staff will depart by mid-August 2025 in compliance with their September 2 termination date. Due to the transition of USAID programs to State by July 1, the remaining 10 USAID staff will be focused on the operational closedown of USAID Ukraine and will no longer provide technical expertise or fiduciary oversight for State-managed awards.¹⁴⁰ For those transferred awards, State will be responsible for responding to audits, investigations, and recommendations and other oversight matters.¹⁴¹ USAID will respond to oversight matters pertaining to any legacy programs, payments, awards, grants, and functions conducted by USAID, such as closeout of awards being terminated by USAID.¹⁴²







U.S. Soldiers reload a Stryker-mounted machine gun during a combined arms exercise at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany. (U.S. Army photo)

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- 38 Regional Deterrence
- 43 Support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces
- 51 Other Security Assistance to Ukraine

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Under OAR, the United States seeks to show U.S. commitment to NATO's collective defense and deter Russian aggression against Eastern Europe. Security assistance to Ukraine remains the focus of this effort, including assistance funded through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), replenishment of stocks transferred under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). In addition, the United States supports military deployments and training activities throughout the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility. (See Figure 4.)

REGIONAL DETERRENCE


USEUCOM supports NATO's Euro-Atlantic deterrence operations by sending rotational forces, including armored brigade combat teams, aviation units, and support elements, to NATO countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania.¹⁴³

USEUCOM organizes OAR activities according to five lines of effort:

Persistent Presence: Maintaining a continuous rotation of U.S. forces along NATO's eastern flank to demonstrate commitment. Objectives include establishing a visible deterrent, maintaining operational readiness in theater, and providing options to rapidly respond to emerging threats.¹⁴⁴

Figure 4.

Total Appropriations for Security Assistance, FY 2022 to FY 2025 Q3





A small UAV flies through a simulated battlefield as part of a NATO combined training event. (U.S. Army photo)

This quarter, the DoD continued to deploy armor, infantry, and aviation units on an uninterrupted rotational basis, particularly in Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania, with units conducting field training exercises to maintain combat readiness while deployed.¹⁴⁵

During the quarter, the DoD maintained approximately 81,600 military and 7,400 civilian personnel in the USEUCOM area of operations.¹⁴⁶ This included two armor brigade combat teams and one infantry brigade combat team allocated to support OAR.¹⁴⁷ Those forces had elements located in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.¹⁴⁸ USEUCOM said the rotational forces aimed to deter Russia and assure NATO allies.¹⁴⁹

Enhanced Interoperability: Improving integration between U.S. and allied forces through standardized procedures and shared tactical understanding. Objectives include improving command and control integration and enhancing combined arms maneuver across multinational formations.¹⁵⁰

During the quarter, NATO allies engaged in several multinational training exercises, including combined arms live-fire exercises, command post exercises, and mission rehearsals. Those activities focused on standardizing tactics, techniques, and procedures and improving command and control across multinational formations, with emphasis placed on digital interoperability, joint fires coordination, and combined intelligence operations.¹⁵¹ During the quarter, DoD elements led or participated in 10 of those exercises.¹⁵² (See Table 9.)

Table 9.

Military Exercises in the USEUCOM Area of Operations this Quarter

Exercise, Date, and Location	Leadership and Participating Countries	Activities
At Sea Demonstration/ Formidable Shield May 4–23 Norway, United Kingdom	Led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe 6,900 troops from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom, United States	Integrated air and missile defense exercise involving live-fire events against subsonic, supersonic, and ballistic targets, incorporating multiple allied ships.
Swift Response May 11–31 Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden	Led by U.S. Army Europe 6,030 troops from Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States	Global exercise focused on combined joint airborne operations demonstrating U.S. and NATO force projection and readiness to respond to crises as an interoperable team.
Steadfast Deterrence May 19–28 Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, United States	Led by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 2,000 troops from NATO and international command and control entities	Training NATO and national headquarters in executing peacetime deterrence and vigilance activities, including with multi- domain operations against an adversary contesting NATO in peacetime and during crises.
Arcane Thunder May 20–27 Germany, Poland, United States	Led by U.S. Army Europe 300 troops from Estonia, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom, United States	Multi-domain task force training focused on synchronizing effects against adversaries in all domains to enable freedom of action.
Immediate Response May 26–June 9 Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Slovenia	Led by U.S. Army Europe 12,261 troops from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United States	Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of materiel for combat forces in the Adriatic Sea, eastern Mediterranean Sea, and Black Sea regions, dealing with simulated contested logistics and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threats, while multi- national forces conduct live-fire field exercises.
Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exploration, Experimentation, Examination Exercise June 2–20 Poland	Led by NATO 2,500 troops from Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States	Test and improve the interoperability of NATO and national command, control, and integration systems, testing both bilateral and multilateral experimental communication systems across a coalition.

Exercise, Date, and Location	Leadership and Participating Countries	Activities
BALTOPS June 5–20 Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Baltic Sea, Danish Straits	Led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe 5,940 troops from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Türkiye, United Kingdom, United States	Enhancing multinational maritime capabilities, command and control, mine counter measures, counter small unmanned system, and antisubmarine warfare of NATO allies and partners in the Baltic Sea.
Saber Guardian June 9–24 Germany, Hungary, Romania	Led by U.S. Army Europe 3,259 troops from Croatia, France, Hungary, Italy, Moldova, Romania, Spain, United States	Combined joint live-fire exercises to increase interoperability and rapidly project power in the Black Sea region.
Sea Breeze-1 June 1–20 Romania	Led by U.S. Marine Forces Europe 265 troops from Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States	Multinational maritime training exercise with a focus on amphibious and riverine warfare activities across all operational domains.
Sea Breeze-2 June 30–July 11 United Kingdom	Led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe 85 troops from Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Japan, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States	Improve interoperability in mine countermeasure vessel operations. This exercise also served as a fleet commanders' conference aimed to deepen mine countermeasure collaboration between NATO allies and partners and to develop a shared vision for post-war demining of the Black Sea.

Sources: USEUCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 OAR 067, 6/24/2025 and 25.3 OAR FOL067, 7/14/2025; USEUCOM, vetting comment, 7/28/2025.

Partner Capacity Building: Strengthening the defense capabilities of NATO allies through combined training, technical assistance, and professional military education. Objectives include improving allied tactical proficiency, developing sustainable defense institutions, and fostering self-sufficient security capabilities.¹⁵³

This quarter, U.S. forces trained with allies to develop advanced warfighting skills, improve maintenance capabilities, and develop leadership. Mobile training teams provided specialized instruction in areas such as anti-armor tactics, counter-unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operations, and electromagnetic warfare.¹⁵⁴ The United States also worked with NATO to establish a NATO Innovation Hub and develop a NATO Space Policy.¹⁵⁵

Strategic Messaging: Communicating U.S. resolve through deliberate information operations and public affairs activities. Objectives include demonstrating commitment to collective defense, countering adversary disinformation, and maintaining public support for a U.S. presence in Europe.¹⁵⁶

Public affairs activities this quarter highlighted the defensive nature of OAR, emphasizing the U.S. commitment to European security with messages focused on the multinational character of NATO operations and the importance of collective defense. U.S. forces also conducted counter-disinformation aimed at addressing false narratives about U.S. intentions and activities in the region.¹⁵⁷

Infrastructure Development: Improving military mobility and logistics capabilities across the USEUCOM area of responsibility. Objectives include enhancing reception, staging, onward movement, and integration capabilities, developing multi-domain logistics networks, and improving host nation support arrangements.¹⁵⁸

This quarter, USEUCOM said it continued efforts to improve rail networks, airfields, and port facilities that support military mobility in Europe. USEUCOM also worked to expand its prepositioning of equipment and strengthen host nation agreements to facilitate cross-border movement within NATO.¹⁵⁹

These lines of effort include a range of activities, including air policing missions, maritime operations, combined exercises, infrastructure investments, and integration of U.S. troops into NATO's command structure. USEUCOM said these efforts contribute to OAR's desired end states by deterring further Russian aggression, reassuring allies of the U.S. commitment to collective defense, and enhancing the readiness of NATO forces to respond to potential crises.¹⁶⁰

**U.S. Navy Sailors
conduct trench
reinforcement
training during
exercise BALTOPS 25
in Skrunda, Latvia.
(U.S. Navy photo)**



As of this quarter, U.S. actions had prevented the expansion of the war outside the borders of Ukraine and Russia by reinforcing NATO's eastern flank to ensure deterrence remains strong, according to the OUSD(P).

USEUCOM said that it assesses the status of OAR through regular meetings with NATO allies and partners to discuss progress and challenges; measures of performance and effectiveness to track progress toward desired end states; the conduct and evaluation of combined exercises and training events; the development and implementation of initiatives aimed at enhancing NATO's capabilities; and by reviewing quantitative changes to the number of U.S. troops in Europe and public support for NATO and U.S. forces in Europe.¹⁶¹

As of this quarter, U.S. actions had prevented the expansion of the war outside the borders of Ukraine and Russia by reinforcing NATO's eastern flank to ensure deterrence remains strong, according to the OUSD(P). However, the DoD constantly evaluates its force posture to align with U.S. strategic interests. Given the strategic reality of competition with China, the OUSD(P) emphasized a need to foster greater European leadership in providing for European regional security.¹⁶²

FORCE PROTECTION

USEUCOM reported that it made significant adjustments to maintain force protection within its area of responsibility this quarter. These changes were primarily driven by the evolving threat landscape, where the primary threats to U.S. and partner forces in Europe are increasingly cyber threats, terrorism, and hybrid warfare. Additionally, USEUCOM reported that Russia's use of destabilization tactics, including disinformation and propaganda campaigns, has become a growing concern.¹⁶³

USEUCOM said that it works closely with NATO to integrate force protection measures across the alliance. This includes participation in NATO-led exercises, training events, and operations, as well as collaboration on intelligence sharing, threat assessment, cyber defense, and NATO's overall force protection posture.¹⁶⁴

While the implementation of additional force protection measures has required some adjustments to operational planning and execution, USEUCOM said that it has worked to minimize any potential degradation of warfighting capabilities. It aims to do this by prioritizing flexibility and adaptability in its force protection posture, recognizing that the threat landscape is constantly evolving and that a dynamic response is necessary to stay ahead of emerging challenges.¹⁶⁵

SUPPORT TO THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES

The United States, NATO allies, and partners coordinate international security assistance to Ukraine through a variety of international mechanisms. (See Table 10.) NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) is responsible for coordinating allied logistics, training, and planning efforts. The Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U) is responsible for coordinating U.S. assistance.¹⁶⁶

Table 10.

Coordination of International Assistance to Ukraine

Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U)	• U.S. mechanism to coordinate and oversee the full spectrum of U.S. security assistance to the UAF. • Combined, joint service headquarters, established in November 2022. • Located in Wiesbaden, Germany, under the operational control of U.S. Army Europe and Africa. • As a Title 10 military command, can and does train and advise the UAF. • Includes SAG-U Operations Kyiv, a small contingent of advisors located in Ukraine.
NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU)	• The primary coordinating body for international training, sustainment, maintenance, and force development for Ukraine. • Successor to the International Donor Coordination Center. • Collocated with SAG-U in Wiesbaden. • The SAG-U commander is also the NSATU commander, but no command-and-control relationship exists between the two entities.
Ukraine Defense Contact Group	• Coalition of representatives, primarily Ministers and Chiefs of Defense, from more than 50 nations that meets approximately once a month to discuss Ukraine's security needs and ways to meet these needs. • First meeting in April 2022.
ODC-Kyiv	• Personnel based at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv who assess, inform, prioritize, and execute bilateral security assistance in support of Ukrainian defense and security forces. • Does not train and advise UAF troops in combat.

Sources: SAG-U, responses to DoD OIG requests for information, 24.1 OAR 026, 12/27/2023; 24.1 OAR 027, 12/27/2023; and 24.3 OAR 025, 7/2/2024; NATO, "NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine," 7/11/2024; NATO, press release, "New NATO Secretary General Visits Shape and NSATU," press release, 10/14/2024; SAG-U, vetting comment, 10/29/2024; ODC-Kyiv, vetting comment, 7/29/2024; OUSD(P), vetting comment, 1/26/2025.

Announced in July 2024, NATO established NSATU as a formal coordinating entity to replace the ad hoc International Donor Coordination Center, which was stood up in the immediate aftermath of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to SAG-U, NSATU has improved coordination and coherence among NATO allies, but certain challenges persist, including classified systems being unable to communicate with each other across international lines.¹⁶⁷

NSATU will eventually comprise approximately 700 personnel from NATO countries and partner nations.¹⁶⁸ As of the end of this quarter, NSATU and SAG-U had more than 350 U.S. personnel and 300 international personnel.¹⁶⁹

This quarter, SAG-U reported that all U.S. materiel provided to the UAF was delivered in fully mission capable condition except for items Ukraine had requested to receive in "as-is" status.¹⁷⁰ According to SAG-U, the UAF requests to receive certain items—particularly those with lengthy repair timelines—in "as-is" condition in some cases. These items are then delivered without further modification at the original stock location, whatever their condition.¹⁷¹

Ukraine's air defenses and F-16s remained insufficient to defend against Russia's overwhelming missile and drone attacks that were further damaging military and civilian infrastructure, according to the DIA.

EQUIPPING

This quarter, the DoD adjusted its assistance strategy to account for the March pause in security assistance. This involved halting the processing of new requests and holding materiel in place to ensure a coordinated response across the U.S. Government.¹⁷²

USEUCOM reported that a pause in U.S. assistance, from March 3 to March 11, had a tangible effect on the OAR mission, specifically hindering the cessation of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine and the restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty, according to USEUCOM. The delay in delivering munitions adversely affected the UAF's operational capabilities and weakened Ukraine's negotiating position in ongoing peace talks.¹⁷³

Additionally, USEUCOM said that the pause had significant residual effects on the delivery of security assistance, including Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System proximity fuzes and 155mm high-explosive ammunition. The temporary halt in processing new requests led to materiel being held in place while awaiting further U.S. policy determinations.¹⁷⁴

The pause also highlighted the importance of maintaining a resilient defense industrial base capable of sustaining large-scale combat operations, according to USEUCOM. The ability to rapidly produce and deliver munitions is critical to supporting Ukraine and deterring further Russian aggression. USEUCOM stressed that the United States and its NATO allies should continue to prioritize modernization and expansion of their defense industrial bases to ensure future pauses or disruptions do not undermine the collective defense posture.¹⁷⁵

As of this quarter, Ukraine had nearly exhausted its supplies of Soviet and Russian artillery and rocket ammunition, making the UAF almost entirely reliant on Western assistance.¹⁷⁶ Ukraine's air defenses and F-16s remained insufficient to defend against Russia's overwhelming missile and UAS attacks that were further damaging military and civilian infrastructure, according to the DIA.¹⁷⁷ Additionally, SAG-U said that global demand for critical components presented a challenge in fulfilling Ukraine's air defense needs.¹⁷⁸

On July 1, the DoD paused shipments of certain munitions to Ukraine, citing concerns about U.S. military stockpiles of those assets.¹⁷⁹ One week later, the White House announced that, following a DoD review of support to all foreign nations, President Trump restarted the delivery of weapons and equipment to Ukraine to help bring an end to the war.¹⁸⁰

Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the U.S. deputy chief of mission to discuss future security assistance to Ukraine. The foreign ministry told reporters that any delay in weapon and munition shipments will encourage further Russian aggression.¹⁸¹ Similarly, a Russian spokesperson told reporters that a reduction in weapons supplied to Ukraine will expedite the end of the war.¹⁸²

For a list of equipment that the United States has provided to Ukraine since 2022, see page 86.

Ukraine's Partners Pledge \$25 Billion in New Security Assistance

On April 11, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, composed of more than 50 countries, met at NATO headquarters in Brussels, where the group secured nearly \$25 billion in new commitments for military aid to Ukraine. British Minister of Defense John Healey told reporters that this was the largest increase in military support to Ukraine to date, and it adds to the more than \$23 billion NATO allies committed earlier in 2025.¹⁸³ Since President Trump took office, the United States has transitioned leadership of Contact Group meetings to the United Kingdom and Germany.¹⁸⁴

Germany announced that it would supply Ukraine with radar systems, air defense systems, ammunition, UAS, armored vehicles, tanks, and artillery systems, including thirty Patriot missiles, with nearly \$13 billion in support planned through 2029. The United Kingdom committed \$6 billion in military support for 2025, having previously announced it would deliver radar systems, anti-tank mines, UAS, and repair and maintenance support.¹⁸⁵ Additionally, Australia announced that it will donate 49 of its older model M1A1 Abrams tanks, valued at \$163 million, to Ukraine.¹⁸⁶

MAINTENANCE

During the quarter, NATO assumed control over the Logistics Enabling Node-Poland (LEN-P) and the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine (RDC-U). These organizations, co-located in Jasionka, Poland, were previously administered by the United States.¹⁸⁷ The LEN-P synchronizes the inbound aid receipt, transfer, and onward movement of donated materiel to the UAF.¹⁸⁸ The RDC-U is responsible for the maintenance and repair of equipment once donated to the UAF.¹⁸⁹ Poland, as the host nation, became the lead and framework nation for both sites.¹⁹⁰


U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) reported that it had moved all its supply functions from Jasionka to permanent facilities in Poland and Germany.¹⁹¹ As of June 1, all activities at Jasionka, including maintenance, logistics, and mentorship, were transitioned to NSATU or permanent locations elsewhere. Poland has assumed a substantial portion of the operational workload, and France, Germany, Norway, Romania, and the United Kingdom have taken on multiple operations and activities.¹⁹² Security assistance to Ukraine continued in a coordinated and synchronized manner with NATO allies, partners, and the Ukrainians through NSATU, according to USAREUR-AF.¹⁹³

The DoD ceased performing physical maintenance and supply operations at the RDC-U on May 1 and May 6, respectively. Those activities shifted to elements of the 16th Sustainment Brigade near Jaworzyna Slaska, Poland, which included 4 military personnel, 4 DoD civilians, and 128 contractors as of June 24. Repairs of M1A1 Abrams, M2 Bradleys, HIMARS, Strykers, and M109-series howitzer systems will be conducted in Kaiserslautern, Germany. Maintenance of Patriot, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile, and AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel radar systems will be conducted at a contractor facility in Jasionka, Poland. DoD personnel will conduct radar systems maintenance at the Regional Technical

Figure 5.

OAR on the Move

From April 1 through May 28, the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) supported the following movement of personnel and assets in support of OAR.



Source: USTRANSCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 OAR 025, 6/23/2025.

Workshop in Zurawica, Poland. Army and contractor personnel continued to perform tele-maintenance activities at the RDC-U, but they will not perform any physical maintenance activities there.¹⁹⁴


According to USAREUR-AF, the RDC-U performed maintenance on 20 platforms this quarter, including HIMARS, M1A1 Abrams tanks, an M2A2 Bradley fighting vehicle, an M109-series Paladin howitzer, armored personnel carriers, Stryker vehicles, heavy trucks, and power generators. RDC-U mentors also taught Ukrainian partners how to maintain Bradley transmissions. USAREUR-AF said that RDC-U maintainers have made significant strides in training the UAF, though requests for U.S. support to repair Bradleys, Strykers, and HIMARS remain high. This quarter, the RDC-U ordered a total of 57,885 spare for 21 different platforms. Since the handover of control of the RDC-U from the United States to NSATU, the DoD has spent approximately \$75 million to maintain UAF fleet readiness.¹⁹⁵

The U.S. Army Patriot batteries, which had previously provided air defense for the site, were transitioned to alternate sites in Germany. They were replaced in Poland by a German Patriot unit. The short-range U.S. Army Avenger air defense units were similarly relieved and replaced by a Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System unit.¹⁹⁶

END-USE MONITORING

Federal law requires end-use monitoring (EUM) of certain transfers of defense equipment and services to foreign entities to ensure the items are being used in accordance with terms and conditions of the transfer agreement and applicable Federal law.¹⁹⁷ The DoD, through the Golden Sentry program, conducts EUM of items transferred via Foreign Military Sales or other U.S. Government security cooperation programs on a government-to-government basis. State, through the Blue Lantern program, conducts pre- and post-license checks of some articles and services exported through direct commercial sales that may be funded by various means, including FMF.¹⁹⁸

Figure 6.

Disposition of EEUM Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine, as of June 2025

Certain defense items are subject to enhanced EUM (EEUM) if they incorporate sensitive technology, particularly vulnerable to diversion or other misuse, or if the diversion or other misuse of those items could have significant consequences for U.S. national security.¹⁹⁹ Of the 19 types of designated defense articles that required EEUM, 8 types had been provided to Ukraine as of the end of the quarter.²⁰⁰ (See Figure 6.)

The Office of Defense Cooperation-Kyiv (ODC-Kyiv) reported that it has not observed any indications or credible evidence of loss, misuse, or diversion of any U.S.-origin defense articles provided to Ukraine under ODC-Kyiv security assistance authorities. ODC-Kyiv said that it has received “exemplary” cooperation from the UAF regarding requests for information and access to inventory records for U.S.-origin defense articles with EEUM requirements for accountability purposes. During the 2025 Compliance Assessment Visit in January, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency assessed ODC-Kyiv and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense compliance as “satisfactory,” the highest rating.²⁰¹

During the quarter, State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) staff from the embassy had inspected 23 sites and 3,700 assets subject to EUM in 2025. State INL stated that its staff completed 11 monitoring visits during the quarter, including trips to review progress on refurbishment of the State Border Guard Service (SBGS) and National Police of Ukraine (NPU) training facilities. Staff also observed training for future operators of State INL-donated Vector UAS to be used in front-line and border areas.²⁰²

From May 16 to 20, State INL received shelters, weapons, ammunition, UAS, and other equipment procured through U.S. businesses to be donated to the approximately 100,000 SBGS and NPU personnel who serve on or near the front lines.

State INL also described the steps it took to facilitate EUM for newly arrived equipment. From May 16 to 20, State INL received shelters, weapons, ammunition, UAS, and other equipment procured through U.S. businesses to be donated to the approximately 100,000 SBGS and NPU personnel who serve on or near the front lines.²⁰³ State INL staff completed the initial inspection and tagging of all the defense articles and dual-use equipment subject to EUM received in May.²⁰⁴ State INL reported that State terminated its agreement with the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, which helped State INL with EUM throughout Ukraine. As a result, State INL relied on embassy staff to tag more than 62,000 assets during the quarter to meet EUM requirements.²⁰⁵

State reported that as of June, embassy staff had inspected 12 sites and 145 assets subject to EUM in 2025, with efforts ongoing beyond this reporting period. These included visits to various offices of SBGS and State Customs Service of Ukraine to inspect articles, such as data storage, vehicles, and security screening equipment.²⁰⁶

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)), Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the Israel-Hamas conflict the following year have created a set of demands and corresponding risks for the U.S. defense industrial base. The defense industry has been called on to surge production of military equipment in large quantities, especially munitions—from 155mm military artillery shells to the most sophisticated missile defense systems.²⁰⁷

U.S. support to NATO deterrence has required the U.S. defense industry to quickly adjust from a peacetime, efficiency orientation to a more intense, wartime rate of production. According to the OUSD(A&S), this transition revealed gaps in the defense industrial base and spurred a new wave of investment. Increased demand for munitions and equipment highlighted the replenishment needs for munitions such as Javelins, Stingers, HIMARS, and 155mm artillery ammunition. Aid to Ukraine has partially depleted U.S. stockpiles, triggering urgent need for an increase in defense production. The DoD has made investments under the Defense Production Act to expand production capacity for critical defense items and address supply chain bottlenecks, utilizing multi-year procurement contracts, and engaging with industry to understand their challenges and needs.²⁰⁸

The OUSD(A&S) reported that it had obligated \$913.8 million from Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts to create, expand, or modernize domestic production capabilities for items such as artillery rounds, air defense systems, and other critical equipment. The DoD is also taking advantage of a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2023 that allows the DoD to buy select critical munitions using multi-year contracts.²⁰⁹

The National Defense Industrial Strategy identifies four long-term strategic priorities for industrial action and resource prioritization in support of the development of a modernized defense industrial base. These priorities are resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, flexible acquisition, and economic deterrence to serve as guiding beacons.²¹⁰ Through this strategy, the DoD aims to improve the industry's ability to better support missile and munition production, strategic and critical materials, computer chips and microelectronics, the Replicator Initiative, and the submarine industrial base.²¹¹

The OUSD(A&S) said that it is working to develop an assessment of the defense industrial base's ability to meet current DoD needs, and it did not have any such assessments completed as of this quarter.²¹² The OUSD(A&S) stated that it assesses its supply chains for several factors including: single or sole source, foreign ownership, adversarial ownership or capital, obsolescent parts, capacity limitation, aging equipment or facilities, single sub-contractor supplying multiple vendors, high complexity designs requiring specialized workforce, workforce for manufacturing, and testing equipment or facilities. The DoD's ability to address defense industrial base shortcomings is limited by a lack of visibility into the operations of lower-level sub-contractors.²¹³

The National Defense Industrial Strategy calls for a shift from late 20th Century policies that supported a narrow defense industrial base to a more modern defense industry that includes the traditional defense contractors as well as innovative new technology developers, academia, research labs, technical centers, manufacturing centers of excellence, service providers, government-owned and contractor-operated facilities, and finance streams, especially private equity and venture capital.²¹⁴

TRAINING

The United States and its international partners provide varied training to the UAF, including basic, collective, leadership, and platform-specific training.²¹⁵ U.S. military trainers located at Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany, as well as other locations in Europe and the United States, provide primarily collective, leadership, and equipment training to the UAF.²¹⁶

SAG-U reported that UAF training requests remained largely unchanged during the quarter, with a continued focus on receiving instructor and leadership training.²¹⁷ USAREUR-AF reported minimal challenges regarding receiving UAF trainees in Europe. Ukrainian liaisons assigned to SAG-U coordinated with U.S. forces in the vicinity of the Poland-Ukraine border on movement of trainees to U.S. training facilities in Grafenwoehr, Germany.²¹⁸

U.S. training facilities previously lacked the capabilities to provide sufficient training on trench operations, but this quarter, Grafenwoehr Training Area opened a new trench system designed to replicate battlefield conditions.²¹⁹

F-16s: The United States, in coordination with the Denmark and the Netherlands, co-led the Air Force Capability Coalition training of Ukrainian F-16 pilots and maintainers with anticipated graduation this year.²²⁰

The UAF lost one of its F-16 fighter jets in its effort to repel a June 28 Russian air assault. The fighter was engaged in shooting down Russian missiles and UAVs over residential areas of Ukraine. This is the fourth F-16 aircraft, and the third F-16 pilot, the UAF has lost since it began flying the F-16 in summer 2024.²²¹

UAS: U.S. trainers established a UAS cell to provide various systems for UAF personnel and simulated opposing forces to use during training exercises. According to USAREUR-AF, those additions will more accurately simulate battlefield conditions and lead to more practical training.²²²

U.S. military trainers located at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany, as well as other locations in Europe and the United States, provide primarily collective, leadership, and equipment training to the UAF.

In the short term, the UAF faces a shortage of doctors, nurses, paramedics, and specialists, especially in frontline areas, leading to overwhelmed facilities and reduced access to care.

MEDICAL READINESS

Ukraine continued to request from NSATU and SAG-U additional armored medical evacuation vehicles and medical training for UAF personnel. SAG-U said that partner nations consistently provided UAF medical personnel with high-quality training, aligned with NATO standards, emphasizing trauma care, tactical combat casualty care, and prolonged field care. However, requests for that training exceeded the supply. Additionally, the non-availability of armored medical evacuation vehicles led the UAF to request a less-equipped vehicle that can be modified to transport patients expeditiously from the front line.²²³

Knowing that effective medical support is available provides a psychological effect that increases troop confidence and resilience, contributing to a greater willingness to engage in offensive operations and maintain defensive positions under fire, according to SAG-U. The UAF has implemented decentralized medical facilities, pushing life-saving interventions closer to the point of injury. In addition to expediting care for serious injuries, this reduces reliance on centralized medical facilities that are vulnerable to attack.²²⁴ However, having many medical entities integrated into different UAF organizations creates a logistical challenge, according to SAG-U. Specifically, one medical entity may request supplies while another is the recipient, leading to a lack of fidelity on equipment requests.²²⁵

Western aid has provided the UAF with improved medical equipment, which surpasses the capabilities of much of the equipment available to Russian forces at the individual soldier and unit levels, including monitoring devices, portable ultrasound, and more effective hemorrhage control tools, according to SAG-U. Russian forces receive more tactical medical training that focuses on tourniquet application and evacuation, and the quality and consistency of training varies across Russian units. SAG-U also cited anecdotal reports that Russian forces do not prioritize the evacuation of casualties.²²⁶

In the short term, the UAF faces a shortage of doctors, nurses, paramedics, and specialists, especially in frontline areas, leading to overwhelmed facilities and reduced access to care. The remaining healthcare workers are experiencing significant trauma and burnout, further exacerbating staffing issues. Additionally, SAG-U reported that the UAF does not always employ trained medical personnel according to their specialty, and dentists are often employed as infantry soldiers.²²⁷

OTHER SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE

DEFENDING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Critical national infrastructure includes energy- and transportation-related infrastructure, as it enables governance and the deployment of military capabilities, which are necessary for Ukraine to continue to fight, according to USEUCOM.²²⁸

Since October 2022, Ukraine has lost more than half of its total pre-war power generation capacity, according to the Department of Energy (DoE). This quarter, Ukrainian-controlled nuclear power plants accounted for approximately half of Ukraine's power generation, with six of nine Ukrainian-controlled reactors providing energy to the grid. According to the DoE,

the loss of nuclear power generation increases the strain on Ukraine’s already overburdened electrical grid. The loss of non-nuclear generation increases the strain on—and potential risk to—the nuclear power plants.²²⁹

Ukraine has had to change its approach to energy to include the development of distributed power generation capabilities and installation of equipment to operate in emergency conditions throughout various regions. Ukraine continues to rely heavily on nuclear power, with renewable sources supplementing about 10 percent of Ukraine’s energy needs during the daytime.²³⁰

Table 11.

Ukraine Task Force Activity this Quarter

Line of Effort and Objective	Activity During the Quarter
Capacity Building Support Ukrainian capacity for nonproliferation, nuclear and radiological security, counter nuclear smuggling, and emergency preparedness and response.	Training: Conducted a cybersecurity training course for Ukrainian site security officers and security vendors that work at radiological sites. This training focused on identifying cyber threats in the field, recognizing potential vulnerabilities, and implementing mitigation controls. The Ukrainian agencies in attendance sponsored a joint interagency exercise in Ukraine and conducted training events focused on counter nuclear smuggling. Exercises: Supported regional exercises on responding to a nuclear detonation led by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in coordination with local administrative authorities. Equipment delivery: Delivered counter nuclear smuggling equipment to Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service, National Police, National Guard, and State Security Service.
Crisis Management Plan and prepare to respond to nuclear and radiological incidents in Ukraine.	Exercises: Conducted monthly communications checks between emergency operations centers with the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine, State Emergency Service of Ukraine, Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Center, State Space Agency of Ukraine, and Armed Forces of Ukraine Calculation and Analytical Center. Crisis response: Continued to monitor, assess, and report on risk at nuclear power plants in and around Ukraine.
Remote Sensing Build capabilities to remotely and rapidly acquire data to deter, prevent, and respond to nuclear and radiological incidents in Ukraine.	Dose rate sensors: Configuration and debugging of systems at the Radon Association sites. Began certification of donated radiation sensors. All efforts support transition of capability to Ukrainian partners so they are self-sufficient beginning in FY 2026. Air sampling: Held multi-national xenon measurement training event, including Ukrainian participation, to build capacity for independent analysis and to share responsibilities with stakeholders. Gas air sampler installed at a third site and is now operational. This equipment is sensitive to small quantities of atmospheric radioactive xenon isotopes that are typically generated by the fission process. Increased levels of atmospheric radioactive xenon can be indicative of a reactor accident or nuclear detonation. Explosion Monitoring: Completed delivery of seismic-acoustic sensors and communication systems to the State Space Agency of Ukraine. The equipment has been integrated into their national sensor network and is now collecting and transmitting data in support of remote monitoring operations. Collaborating with the State Space Agency of Ukraine on a technical assessment of a seismic-acoustic event at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in early February.

Line of Effort and Objective	Activity During the Quarter
Resilience Increase the resilience of Ukraine's nuclear power plants, including critical nodes of the electrical grid, upon which nuclear power plants rely for safe operation	Training: Hosted an insider threat and sabotage mitigation workshop to provide training on fitness for duty and behavior and observation programs for Ukraine's nuclear sector. Equipment delivery: Delivered diesel generators to serve as emergency backups for critical services, such as water, heating, sewage, and hospitals, in Ukraine's nuclear power plant satellite cities. Passive Protection Design: Continued to refine passive protection designs based on the results of a December 2024 field test. Ukraine's Ministry of Energy has indicated support for construction of a pilot structure at a site to be determined. Testing of mesh netting protection components continued in June 2025. Nuclear Power Plant Upgrades: Funded the construction of an oil drainage management and collection system for an autotransformer that specifically supports the Rivne nuclear power plant Unit 2, enhancing resilience of the autotransformer and reducing probability of greater damage in the event of a strike. The funding also replaced a damaged throttling disk in the non-nuclear side of the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant system that keeps the specific unit from operating at full capacity and reduced maintenance efficiency at a time when nuclear power in Ukraine is essential to supporting and delivering baseload to the grid.

Sources: DoE, responses to DoD OIG requests for information, 25.3 LIG OAR WOG 006, 25.3 LIG OAR WOG 007, 25.3 LIG OAR WOG 008, 25.3 LIG OAR WOG 009, and 25.3 LIG OAR WOG 010, 7/3/2025.

The Ukraine Task Force, which includes staff from across the DoE—including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and National Laboratories—works to refine requirements at critical energy sites for future assistance packages and to promote U.S. national security objectives in Ukraine. Specifically, the task force focuses on nuclear and radiological risk reduction, emergency preparedness and response, and critical energy infrastructure resilience.²³¹ (See Table 11.)

The DoE reported that implementers have encountered issues accessing sites in Ukraine to perform remote sensor maintenance due to Russian strikes and wartime restrictions. The Ukrainian government lacks funding necessary to hire personnel to take on radiation monitoring activities performed by international partners. However, the DoE continues to pursue various options for sustainability and efficiency of remote sensing priorities.²³²

The NNSA continued to explore ways to strengthen Ukrainian energy infrastructure resilience through distributed generation and passive protection this quarter, with assistance from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The NNSA engaged with senior Ukrainian leaders and international counterparts to define priorities and identify opportunities, with a special emphasis on burden-sharing with European partners for financial support. The Civil Military Support Element–Ukraine, through its network of partners, continued to monitor changes in critical infrastructure with a specific emphasis on maintaining access to power and clean drinking water.²³³

State reported that during the quarter, the Ukraine Foundational Infrastructure for the Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) program resumed implementation of its activities following the foreign assistance pause. The FIRST program discusses with its Ukrainian beneficiaries how small modular reactors may use U.S.-origin advanced reactor technology in Ukraine's energy production and steelmaking

sectors. State anticipates that the FIRST program will commence producing deliverables for beneficiary review and acceptance during summer 2025 through the duration of the respective awards' periods of performance.²³⁴

State INL reported that it continued its support for Ukraine's Mobile Firing Teams (MFT). MFTs are tasked with protecting Ukraine's critical and civilian infrastructure as well as U.S. Embassy personnel from Russian UAS attacks. State INL coordinated deliveries of MFT equipment and training to use the systems provided to them. State INL said that Ukrainian operators shared combat experience with their American trainers, as well as manufacturers of UAS equipment, which provides feedback for the U.S. defense industry.²³⁵

In May, State INL supported night vision goggle training for SBGS personnel. The training was the first in a series of four sessions to enhance the SBGS' ability to use night vision devices to increase the effectiveness of border surveillance and nighttime operations.²³⁶

Impact of the foreign assistance pause: The DoE and the NNSA paused \$45 million in appropriations transfers from State and USAID in compliance with the Executive Order on Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid and State guidance. As directed, DoE and NNSA issued stop-work orders to the contracted entities, a DoE National Laboratory and an NNSA National Laboratory. Concurrently, the DoE and the NNSA reviewed foreign assistance activities, as directed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to determine whether to continue, modify, suspend, or terminate each activity.²³⁷

This quarter, following the completion of the foreign assistance review, the DoE and the NNSA resumed activities related to distributed power generation and passive protection, including completing the full obligation of \$45 million in appropriation transfers received from State and USAID.²³⁸ (See Table 12.) The DoE said that the foreign assistance pause delayed the progress on both of these efforts and required additional consultation with the Ukrainian government to update priorities and project plans.²³⁹

Table 12.

DoE Programs in Ukraine Affected by the Foreign Aid Pause

Activity	Amount	Status
Procure, deliver, and install small-scale generators at select cities near Ukraine's nuclear power plants to ensure reliable power generation to local critical infrastructure responsible for clean water, sewage systems, healthcare, and heating.	\$25 million	Temporarily halted and resumed
Analysis of electrical grid stability and power generation, transmission, and distribution.	\$14.7 million	Some tasks resumed; others are being reprogrammed
Design infrastructure enhancements for critical energy infrastructure nodes that enable the safe, secure, and reliable operation of nuclear power plants.	\$20 million	Temporarily halted and resumed
Develop operational procedures and make hardware modifications to enable nuclear power plants to deal with disturbances in the electrical grid resulting from wartime conditions and reduce potential damage resulting.	\$10 million	Temporarily halted and resumed

Source: DoE, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 LIG OAR WOG 012, 7/3/2025; DoE, vetting comment, 7/28/2025 ; DoE, vetting comment, 8/7/2025.

State INL reported that it completed its final delivery of 176 mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles and 50 armored personnel carriers in April.

CIVILIAN SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

State INL has provided equipment and capacity building for Ukrainian law enforcement and border security partners to maintain civilian security. Partners include the Ministry of Internal Affairs, NPU, SBGS, National Guard of Ukraine, and Ministry of Health.²⁴⁰

Equipment: State INL reported that it completed its final delivery of 176 mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles and 50 armored personnel carriers in April. State INL stated that to comply with the foreign assistance pause, the vehicles remained in storage until State INL received an exception to transport them. Prior to transfer to Ukrainian partners, all vehicles were tagged and logged for EUM. With all deliveries complete, those vehicles will help Ukrainian law enforcement partners counter illicit trafficking, maintain law and order for a durable peace, and help secure a future ceasefire line, which is essential for implementing the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund.²⁴¹

Training: During the quarter, State INL-supported training for Ukrainian partners focused on: use of U.S.-made, fixed-wing UAS; use of UAS for surveillance and reconnaissance; and life-saving medical skills for use on the battlefield before evacuation.²⁴² In May, State INL supported Ukrainian combat medics' participation in the annual Special Operations Medical Association international conference in the United States.²⁴³ This week-long conference is the largest gathering of special operations medical providers in the world, with a focus on prehospital, tactical, wilderness, austere, disaster, and deployed medicine.²⁴⁴

State also reported that in June, State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Department of Justice's (DoJ) International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, and the Transportation Security Administration led a 5-day aviation security seminar with focus areas on increasing countries' ability to counter illicit proliferation of advanced conventional anti-aircraft weaponry and the threats they pose to civil aviation. Attendees included civil aviation officials from several Eastern European nations.²⁴⁵

Counternarcotics: In April, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) resumed activities funded by State INL that had been paused as a result of the foreign assistance review. However, as of the end of the quarter, procurement of technical surveillance and surreptitious entry equipment requested by the Kyiv office to support Ukrainian law enforcement remained frozen. Procurement of information technology equipment and investigative software licensing renewals also remained frozen while under review.²⁴⁶

On June 2 to June 6, State INL sponsored the DEA-led Basic Clandestine Laboratory Course in Krakow, Poland, for 30 participants from the NPU and SBGS. This training was focused on dismantling clandestine drug laboratories with a focus on lab identification, hazard and toxicology awareness, proper use of personal protective equipment, site control, emergency protocols, and evidence handling. Practical simulations reinforced participants' ability to operate in hazardous environments safely.²⁴⁷

NONPROLIFERATION, EXPORT CONTROLS, AND BORDER SECURITY

State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) provides equipment, supplies, expertise, and training to the Ukrainian government and regional stakeholders to prevent and roll back the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threats.²⁴⁸ State ISN also works to enhance the effectiveness of the global Russian and Belarussian sanctions regime by enabling partners to understand and enforce sanctions and export controls.²⁴⁹ State ISN coordinates with the Ukrainian government and other partners in the region to increase their capacity to prevent arms diversion, enhance the capabilities of border security agencies, and respond to threats from Russia and arms traffickers, and other regional threats.²⁵⁰

State ISN reported that during the quarter, it worked with the Ukrainian government to conduct intensive training for information technology professionals from Ukraine’s Ministry of Health, National Health Service, and four CBRNE detection and response laboratories.²⁵¹ This advanced cybersecurity training provided technology specialists with tools to strengthen cyber threat prevention, detection, and response capabilities.²⁵²

State ISN also reported that its Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism participated in a 2-day intersessional meeting of the Nuclear and Radiological Security Working Group, a G7-led, 31-nation working group. State ISN encouraged the group’s members to increase contributions to address Ukraine’s radiological and nuclear threat reduction needs and highlighted the need for burden-sharing on international CBRNE assistance more broadly.²⁵³

The Department of Commerce (Commerce) regularly reviews exports from the United States to identify items of concern for potential diversion to Russia and Belarus. Commerce conducts end-use checks on exports of concern and initiates enforcement actions for exports identified as unfavorable. Commerce reported notable successes in three criminal cases during the quarter.²⁵⁴ (See Table 13.)

Table 13.

Actions Related to Russian and Belarussian Evasion of Exports Controls During the Quarter

• 21 detentions of goods valued at more than \$1.2 million.
• 13 seizures of goods valued at more than \$12.2 million.
• Arrested three individuals.
• Sergei Zharnovnikov pleaded guilty in connection with the illegal export of firearm parts and magazines to Russia via Kyrgyzstan.
• Bence Horvath pleaded guilty in connection with the illegal export of dual-use communication radios valued at nearly \$100,000 to Russia.
• Oleg Patsulya was sentenced to 70 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release, a \$4,582,288 forfeiture, and a \$200 special assessment in connection with the illegal export of aircraft parts to Russia.

Source: Commerce, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 SIG OAR WOG 007, 7/25/2025.

The foreign assistance pause froze the delivery of \$3.8 million in grants, \$1.65 million in interagency implementation, and \$1.55 million in contracts for subject matter expert support, training, and equipment.

Impact of the foreign assistance pause: In response to the foreign assistance pause, State ISN pivoted away from sending personal protective and detection equipment to the Ministry of Health and instead found recipients in the UAF. State ISN hoped to complete the equipment shipment in June, but it was delayed until August.²⁵⁵ In addition, because of the foreign assistance pause, two equipment deliveries in transit to Ukraine were returned to the United States pending the conclusion of the review. State amended those contracts to reflect necessary cost adjustments.²⁵⁶

State ISN's Office of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund said it lifted all stop-work orders involving its Ukraine activities, effective March 3. The stop-work orders affected the delivery of CBRNE detectors and personal protective equipment to Ukrainian security forces; the completion and delivery of specialized armored vehicles to CBRNE units; planning for a national-level CBRNE critical infrastructure protection forum; and planning for additional technical validation exercises with Ukrainian partners in cooperation with the NNSA. Deliveries scheduled for the second quarter of FY 2025 were halted and are now scheduled for early in the fourth quarter of FY 2025.²⁵⁷

In addition, the foreign assistance pause froze the delivery of \$3.8 million in grants, \$1.65 million in interagency implementation, and \$1.55 million in contracts for subject matter expert support, training, and equipment. The subject matter expert contract and the interagency implementation were ultimately terminated.²⁵⁸

State ISN also reported that following the stop-work order, its offices resumed or were working to resume relevant monitoring and evaluation activities.²⁵⁹

DEMINING

State's Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) leads the U.S. Government's demining efforts in Ukraine, with additional contributions from State INL.²⁶⁰ State PM/WRA's efforts focus on deploying survey, clearance, and risk education teams to liberated areas of Ukraine to improve civilian security, restore land to productive use, and provide training and equipment to Ukrainian deminers.²⁶¹

Mine clearance: During the quarter, State PM/WRA supported implementers and Ukrainian government operators in clearing 11,200 acres of land in Ukraine, most of which was agricultural, and in destroying 4,556 landmines and items of unexploded ordnance. The implementers also provided explosive ordnance risk education to 8,042 people living in or near minefields.²⁶² State INL reported that as of June 2, it had supported explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units' responses to 107,854 calls for assistance, demined more than 175 square miles of land, seized 373,477 pieces of ordnance, and disposed of 160,503 pieces of ordnance.²⁶³

Training: Through a train-and-equip project, State PM/WRA supported training 111 Ukrainian government deminers. Since the project began in 2022, it has trained 2,196 Ukrainian government deminers.²⁶⁴ During the quarter, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense agreed to take ownership of the U.S.-funded training facility in western Ukraine by October. State PM/WRA reported that the transition will allow Ukraine to train more deminers and ultimately become less reliant on U.S. foreign assistance.²⁶⁵

Equipment: State PM/WRA also provided 104 sets of personal protective equipment, 151 detectors, and 52 vehicles to Ukrainian government deminers, strengthening their ability to conduct demining operations without external assistance.²⁶⁶ State INL reported that following the pause it transferred EOD equipment, including metal detectors and x-ray scanners to NPU partners for demining efforts throughout Ukraine.²⁶⁷

In June, State INL facilitated the FBI-led Hazardous Device Fusing and Threat Mitigation training in Tallinn, Estonia, for SBGS and NPU officers. The training focused on advanced techniques for detecting explosives, increasing knowledge of electronics used in improvised explosive devices, and safety skills. In May, State INL supported the Ukrainian NPU's EOD unit at an interoperability exercise in the United States. The U.S. Army funded the exercise, which was led by the DoJ's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.²⁶⁸

State PM/WRA said that its active awards had been approved to resume activities in the second quarter following the foreign assistance review. Two implementers delayed the procurement of vehicles and demining machines because of uncertainty about future pauses or cancellations of U.S. assistance to Ukraine. In both cases, the implementers rented vehicles or used demining machines provided by other donors, resulting in no impact on U.S.-funded operations. Additionally, State PM/WRA's third-party monitoring project resumed operations, so there was no impact on its ability to monitor its demining programs during this quarter.²⁶⁹

State PM/WRA also provided 104 sets of personal protective equipment, 151 detectors, and 52 vehicles to Ukrainian government deminers, strengthening their ability to conduct demining operations without external assistance.









A sign warns of unexploded ordnance. Ukraine is considered one of the most heavily contaminated countries in the world, with more than a third of its territory affected by the war, of which 5 to 10 percent is estimated to require proactive area clearance. (WFP photo)

DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

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DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

STATUS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE

State reported that while some foreign assistance programs for Ukraine and other countries affected by Russia's invasion continued following the foreign assistance pause, other programs were amended or terminated.²⁷⁰

State provided limited information on the status of these programs as of the end of the quarter.²⁷¹ Eleven bureaus provided information to State OIG with varying levels of detail.²⁷² Of the 163 foreign assistance programs for which State provided information, 85 were terminated, 76 continued unchanged, and 2 were amended.²⁷³

WFP delivers food kits and ready-to-eat rations primarily to hard-to-reach and frontline areas where commercial supply lines are disrupted and access to food is unreliable. (WFP photo)



Table 14.

Available Data on Status of Assistance Programs in Ukraine

Bureau	Program Status
State	
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)	4 active: the Ukraine Rapid Response Fund, Veterans Rehabilitation and Reintegration, an IDP-focused program, and an evaluation contract. 2 terminated: UN Women and the Conflict Observatory.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL)	12 active: valued at \$22 million. 6 terminated: valued at \$8 million (with \$4 million already disbursed), including a grant to deliver refrigerated units to mortuaries.
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)	1 active: Ukraine Cultural Heritage Response Initiative project. 10 terminated: Ukraine Cultural Heritage Response Initiative projects; as well as the Academy for Women Entrepreneurs programming in Bulgaria and Germany.
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR)	The MEASURE contract continued to provide monitoring of U.S. assistance, but routine reporting was paused or interrupted.
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)	35 terminated: included most anti-corruption programs and an agreement with the DoJ's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, which assisted State INL with end use monitoring activities throughout Ukraine.
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)	55 active: valued at \$62 million, including armored vehicles and Ukraine logistics. 1 program for \$8 million was approved with a reduced scope for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive detection equipment. 11 terminated: valued at \$7 million.
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES)	1 active: including 1 continued program valued at \$20 million and 1 amended program valued at \$45 million. 4 terminated: valued at \$40 million.
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)	1 active: the Ukraine Ministry of Strategic Industries advisory project.
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)	3 active: included awards to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for \$91 million, the UN Children's Fund for \$53 million, and the International Organization for Migration for \$41 million for the Ukraine regional response. 5 terminated: included two World Health Organization awards, one award to the UN Population Fund, and two \$25,000 awards to non-governmental organizations.
USAID	
Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA)	19 active: valued at \$770,635,483, including awards for life-saving medical services, food, and clean water. 9 terminated: valued at \$208,016,464, including programs that provided medical care for 3.6 million children and pregnant women, and nearly 900,000 more with essential treatment and protection services. 4 status unknown: valued at \$115,020,716, including programs that provided food, safe shelter, clean water, and building materials to repair war-damaged homes and communal shelters.

(continued on next page)

Bureau	Program Status
Office of Financial Management (OFM)	10 active: valued at \$688,365,540, including programs supporting Ukraine's energy and agriculture sectors, as well as health programs (including PEPFAR). 15 terminated: valued at \$3,057,858,041, including awards supporting energy, good governance, and anti-corruption efforts. 5 under stop-work order: valued at \$678,772,566: included health and government reform programs.
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)	1 terminated: valued at \$195,000,000, including support of activities in the democratic transition, civic resilience, and rapid-response stabilization efforts.


Sources: State, response to State OIG request for information, 6/20/2025; USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/13/2025.

USAID reported that as of the end of the quarter, 25 programs in Ukraine had been terminated, 29 remained active, 5 were under stop-work orders, and 4 were status unknown. USAID Ukraine reported that it transferred management of the 29 USAID-funded active programs, the 5 under stop-work orders, and oversight of the \$50 billion in Direct Budget Support (managed by the World Bank) to State effective July 1.²⁷⁴

While State formally concluded its foreign assistance review on March 19 and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released its foreign assistance review recommendations, the appeal process was ongoing as of the end of the quarter. State continued to review the OMB's recommendations.²⁷⁵

Figure 7.

State and USAID FY 2025 Obligated Development Funding, by Sector, April-June, 2025



Termination settlement costs are expected to exceed those of a standard closeout (such as final report submissions) and may include early lease cancellations, staff contract terminations, and additional disposition efforts.

OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

The termination of third-party monitoring contracts has further limited USAID's ability to oversee programs. Reports from third-party monitors support real-time programmatic adjustments and inform both current and future decision-making. These reports highlight key activity success, challenges, and feedback from beneficiaries and local stakeholders.²⁷⁶ USAID said that, without independent monitoring, it cannot verify that programs are being implemented in line with award terms, increasing the risk of waste, fraud, and abuse—especially in conflict-affected areas, where there is a heightened potential for diversion of funds.²⁷⁷

The Ukraine Monitoring and Learning Support program provided third-party monitoring for the non-humanitarian portion of USAID Ukraine's assistance activities. This program was paused under the global stop-work order and was subsequently terminated, despite repeated requests for an exemption based on the need to continue oversight of nearly \$1 billion in ongoing awards.²⁷⁸ No third party-monitoring visits were conducted for development assistance programs this quarter.²⁷⁹ A separate mechanism for third-party monitoring for humanitarian assistance programs remains operational.²⁸⁰

Following the termination of many USAID Ukraine awards, technical staff pivoted monitoring efforts to focus on the remaining active awards.²⁸¹ USAID Ukraine conducted at least eight direct site visits during the quarter.²⁸² USAID Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) conducted one in-person and four virtual site visits during the quarter.²⁸³ The cancellation of the Ukraine Monitoring and Learning Support program and other evaluation mechanisms halted several evaluations midway or just before finalization, limiting USAID's capacity to assess program outcomes and the effectiveness of past investments.²⁸⁴

USAID Ukraine reported that it was also unclear to what extent any third-party monitoring plans exist for assistance awards in Ukraine following the absorption of USAID awards into State.²⁸⁵ With the termination of its contract with USAID, the implementing partner for the Ukraine Monitoring and Learning Support declared bankruptcy.²⁸⁶ While the implementer's head office in the United States is still operating in a reduced status, the local office in Kyiv has been closed, all staff terminated, and data and physical equipment disposed of.²⁸⁷

State's Bureau of Europe and Eurasian Affairs (EUR) reported that its monitoring and evaluation contract, MEASURE, continued to provide performance and outcome data oversight to Ukraine assistance funded with supplemental appropriations, including the USAID projects being absorbed by State.²⁸⁸

State EUR stated that during the quarter, stop-work orders, terminations, State restructuring, USAID integration, and payment disbursement challenges temporarily interrupted or paused routine implementing partner reporting under MEASURE.²⁸⁹ MEASURE has continued to offer technical assistance on ad hoc basis when the U.S. Government requested.²⁹⁰

TRANSITION OF USAID PROGRAMS TO STATE

USAID staff identified the following challenges and emerging risks with U.S. assistance programs in Ukraine—including programs terminated because of the ongoing foreign assistance review and USAID-financed active programs that transferred to State effective July 1.

TERMINATED PROGRAMS

In late March and in late May, State notified Congress that it intended to realign foreign assistance programs from USAID to State after July 1. After that date USAID activities shifted to focus on closing out terminated foreign assistance programs.²⁹¹ For implementers, the closeout process includes concluding relationships with community members and sub-grantees, preparing financial statements for USAID, dismissing staff, and accounting for program equipment.²⁹² Several State bureaus also conducted site or end use monitoring visits.

In May, USAID started providing tailored guidance to implementers with terminated awards, asking for estimated costs associated with termination and closeout phases.²⁹³ These termination settlement costs are expected to exceed those of a standard closeout (such as final report submissions) and may include early lease cancellations, staff contract terminations, and additional disposition efforts.²⁹⁴ The closeout process for many awards is expected to take a year or more.²⁹⁵

However, the sudden termination of awards (followed in some cases by a reversal of the termination) disrupted implementers' internal controls, making it difficult to carry out proper closeout procedures.²⁹⁶ Staffing cuts limited their capacity for documentation, oversight, audits, and monitoring.²⁹⁷ The accelerated closure of sub-awards created pressure to spend remaining funds quickly, raising the risk of financial mismanagement.²⁹⁸

ACTIVE PROGRAMS

As of July 1, State assumed responsibility for administering most foreign assistance, including awards currently financed by and functions previously managed by USAID. This transition occurred under an accelerated timeline and with limited staffing; the majority of USAID staff worldwide and in Washington had been placed on administrative leave in February, leaving a significantly reduced staff to conduct operations.²⁹⁹

USAID Ukraine reported that nearly 80 percent of the mission's technical and contract personnel had departed by June 25 in order to comply with the July 1 deadline for their separation from service.³⁰⁰ This included most contracting officers, who managed the approximately \$1 billion in active awards and more than \$3 billion in terminated awards that still require formal closeout.³⁰¹

As of the end of the quarter, a small number of USAID U.S. direct hire employees were expected to remain at some USAID Missions and in Washington, following the July 1 transition, with a final termination date in early September.³⁰² USAID Ukraine reported that nine American former USAID staff were being hired by State to manage assistance programs in Ukraine. State reported that it plans to hire some former USAID foreign service nationals

As of July 1, State assumed responsibility for administering ongoing USAID foreign assistance programs and certain statutory functions on behalf of USAID.

Since February 2022, about 20,000 Ukrainian children have been forcibly deported to Russia and Belarus or detained in occupied territories in Ukraine, according to the European Parliament.

to manage assistance programs in Ukraine, but this had not yet occurred as of the end of the quarter., according to USAID.³⁰³

As of mid-June, State had not yet formally identified contracting and grants officers for many USAID programs.³⁰⁴ This limited the ability of USAID staff to bring State counterparts up to speed and address specific contracts and grants questions.³⁰⁵ For at least part of the quarter, USAID and State staff were unable to access proprietary systems that contain details about the awards as well as USAID grant provisions that govern awards, which had been taken offline.³⁰⁶ Further, USAID staff said that much of the direction they received regarding the transition was informal in nature, often with no follow-up to document decisions taken.³⁰⁷ This could lead to uncertainty regarding oversight responsibilities, unauthorized commitments, invalid modifications, and approval delays.³⁰⁸

Meanwhile, implementers encountered significant payment delays, which hindered the full resumption of humanitarian activities for some implementers.³⁰⁹ These delays stem from intermittent staff access to payment systems, reduced staffing due to administrative leave and terminations, and the evolving nature of approval processes—often involving individuals not previously engaged in award management.³¹⁰ Following the January 20 executive order that directed the foreign assistance review, all payments to USAID awardees were stopped as of January 22.³¹¹ USAID shut down its “Phoenix” financial system, blocking USAID Ukraine staff access to the system; access was restored in mid-March.³¹² As of April 8, approximately \$216 million in payments were delayed and another approximately \$88 million in payments approved and certified for payment had not been released to Treasury for check issuance, according to USAID Ukraine.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES

State INL and the Office of Global Criminal Justice (GCJ) reported that their implementing partners’ achievements in human rights and accountability for atrocities has been limited due to uncertainty related to the foreign assistance review.³¹³

Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group of Ukraine (ACA): The United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom continued their coordinated support for the ACA. State GCJ funds ACA activities that build Ukrainian authorities’ capability to hold war criminals accountable.³¹⁴ This quarter, ACA experts participated in a workshop on collecting and processing evidence of crimes against cultural heritage. In addition, the ACA’s lead implementer supported an educational visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina for 18 Ukrainian criminal justice practitioners in early May.³¹⁵

Return of Abducted Children: Since February 2022, about 20,000 Ukrainian children have been forcibly deported to Russia and Belarus or detained in occupied territories in Ukraine, according to the European Parliament. As of May 21, Russia had returned 1,307 children to Ukraine.³¹⁶ During the June 2 peace negotiations in Istanbul, Ukrainian officials provided Russian officials with a list of names of children and demanded their return.³¹⁷

Register of Damage for Ukraine: During the quarter, State EUR made a one-time contribution of \$1 million to the Register of Damage for Ukraine. Established by the Council of Europe, the register compiles and maintains evidence and claims of damage since February 24, 2022. According to State, these claims are necessary for understanding a realistic, objective total value of all claims. The goal is to use this total as leverage in peace negotiations and for reconstruction planning. Forty-three countries and the European Union are dues-paying participants to the register, while Canada, Japan, and the United States are associate members. State reported that payment of U.S. dues gives the United States certain rights and abilities to influence the register’s priorities and outcomes.³¹⁸

Capacity Building: State INL continued to support activities to build capacity of Ukrainian authorities to hold war criminals accountable. A State INL implementer advised and mentored the NPU on the preparation and analysis of open-source materials for war crimes investigations. These alleged war crimes include Russia’s use of civilian detention and filtration camps to interrogate Ukrainian citizens before involuntarily deporting them to Russia, often separating parents from their children. In the past 3 months, National Police of Ukraine (NPU) war crimes investigators’ issued 21 new notices of suspicion for Russian soldiers and 63 such notices since the program started in 2023.³¹⁹

The implementer also helped the NPU advocate for INTERPOL cooperation in issuing “red notices,” which are effectively arrest warrants circulated among member countries, listing individuals wanted for extradition.³²⁰ Additionally, in May, an implementer held an open-source intelligence training for NPU war crimes analysts and investigators from Kyiv and regional offices. The course focused on techniques and strategies for protecting digital assets, minimizing risks associated with online investigations, photo forensics image analysis, geolocation, and exploitation of social media.³²¹

During the quarter, State EUR made a one-time contribution of \$1 million to the Register of Damage for Ukraine.

ANTI-CORRUPTION

CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

During the quarter, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) focused investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption which helps ensure that government and donor funds are spent appropriately and fostering a predictable and favorable business environment for international companies operating in Ukraine.³²² (See Table 15.)

On July 22, President Zelenskyy signed into law a bill that effectively eliminated the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office’s (SAPO). The bill granted the presidentially appointed Prosecutor General control over both agencies.³²³ Following several days of protests against the new law and the negative response from international partners, the Ukrainian government reversed course, and President Zelenskyy signed a bill repealing the law on July 31.³²⁴ President Zelenskyy said that the July 31 law is a guarantee of the proper independent functioning of Ukraine’s anti-corruption bodies and all law enforcement agencies.³²⁵

State INL reported that it conducted three training programs in May and June.

State INL reported that it conducted three training programs in May and June. One session covered financial investigations, money laundering, and asset recovery for NABU detectives, SAPO prosecutors, and judges from the High Anti-Corruption Court. A second session focused on international asset recovery for prosecutors from the Office of the Prosecutor General, with particular emphasis on requests for mutual legal assistance and cross-border cooperation. The third session focused on autonomous money laundering, aiming to strengthen the capacity of SAPO prosecutors and NABU detectives to investigate and prosecute money laundering as a standalone offense, independent of underlying corruption or other predicate crimes.³²⁶

This quarter, the DoJ's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) supported criminal cases brought by Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office, NABU, and SAPO. The DoJ resident legal advisor in Ukraine conducted 53 consultation and mentorship engagements with Ukrainian counterparts to share U.S. best practices, advance U.S. interests, and strengthen Ukraine's ability to address complex prosecutions.³²⁷ OPDAT worked with Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office, acting on a request by a U.S. corporation, to help draw prosecutors' attention to a potential fraud scheme operating in Ukraine that was negatively affecting U.S. business interests.³²⁸

Two planned OPDAT programs during the quarter—a 4-day cryptocurrency tracing program and a program on procurement fraud specific to the defense sector—were postponed due to the foreign assistance review.³²⁹

Table 15.

Key Anti-Corruption Activity by Ukrainian Law Enforcement During the Quarter

- In April, NABU and SAPO issued notices of suspicion to two attorneys and the de facto head of the Defense Bar Association for unauthorized access to court decision data regarding their clients
- In May, NABU and SAPO alleged that President Zelenskyy's former Deputy Head of Office, Andriy Smyrnov, laundered illicit funds and accepted a \$100,000 bribe. The High Anti-Corruption Court ordered Smyrnov into pre-trial detention with bail set at \$430,000.
- In June, NABU exposed a \$3 million energy embezzlement scheme. Leonid Mindich, a relative of a famous Ukrainian businessman, was charged with embezzlement from Kharkivoblenergo, a major Ukrainian energy company. The alleged embezzlement involved partial contract fulfillment and inflated prices of transformers and meters for energy systems
- In June, NABU and SAPO charged Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Chernyshov with involvement in a large-scale illegal land grab scheme, alleging that he undervalued state land by fivefold—resulting in a loss of \$24 million—and had received discounted apartments worth \$346,000 in return.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 5/29/2025; State vetting comment, 7/28/2025.

Audit Finds NABU is Somewhat Effective

In May, an independent commission released its report on NABU’s effectiveness. The commission reported that, overall, NABU was substantially or moderately effective in each dimension that it assessed. It did not rate any of these dimensions as highly effective or ineffective. (See Table 16.) Using a weighted scale from 0 to 3, the audit gave NABU an overall effectiveness rating of 1.4, which is considered moderately effective.³³⁰

From 2023 to 2024, NABU reported increases in the numbers of criminal proceedings initiated, indictments, and convictions. However, even as NABU operations have improved, the organization lacked a clear strategy to mature its capabilities and concrete metrics to measure its progress. The audit noted that NABU recently approved a new development strategy and was working on an implementation plan for it.³³¹

The audit identified several challenges in NABU’s current operations. The risk of improper disclosure of information remains a significant risk for the NABU. For example, NABU investigators largely used personal cell phones to conduct official investigations, creating a significant information security risk. The audit also found that NABU did not effectively prioritize cases in key sectors, such as defense procurement. Additionally, NABU’s procedures for protecting internal whistleblowers from retaliation were not sufficient to foster a culture in which the bureau’s employees felt confident that they could report problems without fear of reprisals.³³²

The audit made a total of 26 recommendations for how to improve how NABU plans its activities, collects data, monitors its progress, and performs other functions. These include revising procedures to better protect the identities of whistleblowers and developing a comprehensive strategic plan with goals, objectives, and metrics.³³³

Table 16.

NABU Audit Overall Conclusions

Substantially Effective	Moderately Effective
Detecting and investigating high-level corruption	Integrity, accountability, and transparency
International cooperation	Interagency cooperation
	Leadership, strategy, and resource management

Source: Commission for Conducting the External Independent Evaluation (Audit) of Effectiveness of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, “Effectiveness of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine: External Independent Evaluation (Audit) Report 2025,” 5/2/2025.

DEFENSE SECTOR

Ukrainian government documents, exposed by media in May, revealed significant corruption in Ukraine’s procurement process since the beginning of the war. \$770 million paid for weapons and ammunition that arrived incomplete, unusable, or not delivered at all. This level of corruption probably contributed to ammunition shortages and limited Ukrainian Armed Forces’ (UAF) effectiveness along the front line, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).³³⁴

Russian capture of Ukrainian territory, followed by the wholesale destruction of generation, transmission, and distribution systems has caused rolling blackouts across the country.

In early June, Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention announced that a former key figure within the UAF Logistics Forces had embezzled \$290,000 and had stolen other weapons. Corrupt activities in the UAF Logistics Forces, which are responsible for delivering supplies and maintenance to UAF troops at the front line, probably minimally diminished the UAF's capacity to counter Russian forces due to the relatively small scale of the scheme, according to the DIA. Ukrainian officials also pursued other instances of localized corruption that involved low-ranking individuals, which probably limited the impact to the battlefield.³³⁵

DoD advisors, working with Ukraine's Ministry of Defense and other parts of the Ukrainian government, continued to share best practices and lessons learned from relevant U.S. oversight models. The advisor for acquisition has conducted multiple department- and agency-level engagements to evaluate the Ukrainian defense procurement process, including for requirements generation, procurement policy determination, contracting, prototyping, life cycle management, and quality control, according to the DoD.³³⁶

TASK FORCE KLEPTOCAPTURE

The DoJ OIG reported that U.S. Attorney General Pamela Bondi disbanded Task Force Kleptocapture and the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force on February 2, 2025.³³⁷ Additionally, the DoJ's War Crimes Accountability Team ceased its operations last quarter.³³⁸

The Biden Administration established this task force after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine to enforce U.S. and partner nation sanctions, export restrictions, and other economic countermeasures against Russia.³³⁹ Task Force Kleptocapture charged a sanctioned Russian oligarch and the President and Chairman of a Russian state-owned bank with participating in schemes to violate U.S. sanctions. The oligarch evaded sanctions and laundered funds to support two superyachts, collectively worth more than \$135 million.³⁴⁰

Additionally, the DoJ charged a Russian national with various offenses related to a years-long scheme to illegally smuggle devices used in counterintelligence operations from the United States to Russia's Federal Security Service and to North Korea.³⁴¹

ENERGY

Russia has conducted an intensive campaign to destroy Ukrainian electricity infrastructure as part of its effort to weaken the Ukrainian people's resolve to continue the fight.³⁴² Russian capture of Ukrainian territory, followed by the wholesale destruction of generation, transmission, and distribution systems has caused rolling blackouts across the country.³⁴³ Since Russia launched its full-scale war invasion of Ukraine, USAID, through its ESP, has been helping Ukraine to make its energy infrastructure resilient to attacks, ensuring Ukrainians have electricity, gas, heat, and hot water.³⁴⁴

The USAID Securing Power, Advancing Resilience and Connectivity (SPARC) activity, successor to the Energy Security Project (ESP), sought to increase the resilience of Ukraine's energy supply, improve the legal and regulatory environment, and enhance the reliability, affordability, and security of the electricity, natural gas, and district heating sectors.³⁴⁵ During

the quarter, SPARC focused on procuring equipment and materials to repair damaged energy infrastructure, including transformers, generators, mobile boiler houses, bucket trucks, pipes, valves, and cables.³⁴⁶ Both SPARC and ESP were paused in February due to the foreign assistance review; SPARC was later re-started, but ESP was terminated.³⁴⁷

Of the \$940 million obligated to SPARC and the ESP to support Ukraine's energy sector, all but \$8 million was committed to subcontracts and operations at the time of the stop-work order. With the termination of the ESP, the SPARC program (implemented by the same partner) absorbed ESP's remaining work, including \$114 million in equipment and services.³⁴⁸ To maintain operations and avoid legal action, the implementer reported that it used as much as \$100 million of its own funds to pay suppliers.³⁴⁹ The implementer also absorbed significant financial risk, including a 90-day delay on a \$49 million invoice.³⁵⁰

Although the implementer reported no stranded assets and stated that all goods have been accounted for in accordance with regulations, uncertainty regarding contract substitutions after July 1 has hindered advance planning beyond that date.³⁵¹

During the quarter, State's Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR) resumed work on two projects, temporarily halted by the foreign assistance pause, to provide technical assistance to natural gas projects in Ukraine. Activities this quarter included technical trainings; technical reports on exploration and development in Ukraine; identification of greenfield prospects and exploration of brownfield development; an integrated petrophysical analysis in key reservoir zones; and developing opportunities for the gas company to partner with U.S. and western companies to develop Ukraine's energy assets.³⁵²

HEALTH

The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv reported that due to the humanitarian waiver to the assistance pause, funding continued to allow the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to continue to provide medicine to people with HIV. The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv stated that this is necessary to keep Ukraine's HIV epidemic from spreading to other countries and to prepare Ukraine to transition to a durable peace. However, the embassy said that it had ceased some PEPFAR prevention activities as the waiver only allowed prevention programming for pregnant and breastfeeding women, though the pregnant and breastfeeding population does not drive the HIV epidemic in Ukraine. Instead, HIV is mainly transmitted among people who inject drugs, mobilized soldiers, and those adjacent to them. The embassy said that it is prepared to resume all permitted activities following the foreign assistance review.³⁵³

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has created a significant humanitarian crisis for the Ukrainian population.³⁵⁴ According to the United Nations, approximately 12.7 million Ukrainians (approximately one third of the population) will need humanitarian assistance in 2025.³⁵⁵

USAID BHA

During the quarter, USAID BHA's non-governmental organization and international partners continued to provide critical humanitarian support to beneficiaries, including food, shelter, water, sanitation, hygiene, protection of vulnerable populations, health, and nutrition services.³⁵⁶ USAID BHA supported World Food Programme (WFP) deliveries of emergency food distribution, reaching more than 550,000 food-insecure Ukrainians with in-kind assistance—including 30-day rations, rapid response rations, and bread.³⁵⁷ The WFP also provided cash assistance to more than 500,000 people to help meet their monthly food needs.³⁵⁸ USAID BHA supported UNICEF's efforts to provide nearly 550,000 people with safe water and sanitation services through support to 25 water utilities.³⁵⁹ UNICEF also repaired three schools in Kryvyi Rih, Odesa, and Kyiv, and rehabilitated shelter infrastructure at four schools in Zaporizhzhia, allowing 1,709 students to return to in-person learning.³⁶⁰

As of May 16, State PRM assumed responsibility for new disaster responses; USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Team shut down soon after.³⁶¹ State PRM assumed responsibility for new disaster responses, while State regional bureaus took over management of existing USAID BHA awards on June 15, according to USAID BHA.³⁶² To support the transition, three USAID BHA staff embedded with State to coordinate the handover of core capabilities, including Urban Search and Rescue agreements, interagency agreements, and other key workstreams essential to establishing State new emergency response office.³⁶³ By the end of June, Embassy Kyiv had hired one former USAID staffer with experience managing USAID humanitarian programs in Ukraine, with plans underway to hire others.³⁶⁴ As part of its transition "suitcase," USAID BHA provided materials outlining risk management processes, including internal guidance documents, templates, and relevant Automated Directives System chapters related to risk management and partner vetting.³⁶⁵

STATE PRM

State's PRM reported that its implementing partner in Ukraine, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), continued to be one of the primary first responders to populations impacted and displaced by Russian attacks. For example, in response to a series of missile attacks in Kharkiv in May, UNHCR provided emergency shelter and basic need items to nearly 400 people. Similarly, in areas outside of Kyiv hit by attacks in late April, UNHCR provided immediate, life-saving support to 600 people, including repairing shelters and emergency cash assistance. Between January and April 2025, UNHCR provided emergency shelter assistance to more than 44,000 people and basic need items to more than 30,000 people impacted by Russia's ongoing attacks. State PRM also reported that in April and May,

UNHCR provided cash assistance to 17,500 people to meet life-saving needs, including food, shelter, and basic household items for vulnerable refugees, including older people and people with chronic illnesses.³⁶⁶

Throughout the region, UNHCR continued to address the needs of Ukrainian refugees through cash assistance and provision of basic need items, such as hygiene kits, blankets, and bedding. State PRM stated that in April, UNHCR reached more than 300 households in Bulgaria with cash assistance, 450 households living in communal shelters in Poland with hygiene kits, and 5,700 refugees in Romania with hygiene kits, bedding, and clothing. UNHCR Moldova has also continued to focus on child safeguarding, working with the Moldova National Centre for Child Abuse Prevention to train educators and other school staff on identifying and reporting signs of child abuse among Ukrainian children.³⁶⁷

State PRM said that although some humanitarian assistance programs in Ukraine and the region restarted after the foreign assistance review, its partners reported delays and gaps in program implementation due to stop-work orders. Partners delayed the launch of certain activities and refrained from issuing sub-awards to implementing partners during the stop-work period, which set back their implementation timelines. In places like Poland and Moldova, many local non-governmental organizations that served as implementers for UN programs scaled back or shut down entirely due to a lack of funding.³⁶⁸ State PRM also reported that after the pause was lifted, barriers to monitoring program implementation and effectiveness continued this quarter, including logistical and security related barriers.³⁶⁹



Information Environment and Messaging

Russia routinely uses its intelligence service, proxies, and influence tools for malign influence campaigns and illicit cyber activities. Russian actors have increasingly adapted their methods to hide their involvement by developing a vast ecosystem of proxy websites, personas, and organizations that give the false appearance of being independent news sources.³⁷⁰

Public Diplomacy: State said it continued to conduct public diplomacy activities during the quarter, including amplifying U.S. messaging promoting a peaceful resolution to the conflict.³⁷¹ The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv's Public Diplomacy Section reported that it conducted more than 50 educational and cultural outreach programs in multiple cities throughout Ukraine.³⁷²

USEUCOM Information Operations: This quarter, the U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) targeted messaging reached more than 600,000 audience members in Ukraine and neighboring countries. More than half of those engagements were in Ukraine, 9.6 percent in Moldova, 8.4 percent in Russia, 6.6 percent in Belarus, and 4.2 percent in Poland.³⁷³ Among the narratives promoted by USEUCOM, those which achieved the greatest readership included:

- Captured North Korean soldiers told interrogators that their forces are suffering heavy losses fighting for Russia.
- Russia is experiencing a demographic “death spiral,” in which its death rate exceeds its birth rate.
- Baltic states disconnect from Russia’s power grid and align their energy systems with Europe.
- Ukraine offers coal to ease the energy crisis in Transnistria.
- Ukraine destroyed more than 26,000 Russian aerial weapons in 3 years of war.³⁷⁴

According to USEUCOM, the three major target audiences for those narratives are victims who have suffered from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; academics and other researchers; and Russian military members or those who consume and spread Russian military propaganda. Although the target audiences were in Ukraine, Moldova, Poland, and Latvia, USEUCOM reported significant spill-over of its messaging into Russia and Belarus, with promoted messaging ranking highly on Russia’s main search engine.³⁷⁵

Educational and Cultural Affairs: State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) said that though some of its programs were terminated following the foreign assistance review, other programs continued this quarter. For example, 564 Ukrainian exchange visitors started BridgeUSA exchange programs, most embarking on summer work travel.³⁷⁶

Through EducationUSA, Ukrainian advisors conducted nearly 80 in-person and virtual initiatives to recruit Ukrainians to study in the United States. The advisors reached more than 4,100 Ukrainian students through virtual and in-person outreach. State ECA also stated that from April through June, 24 leaders from Ukraine participated in seven International Visitor Leadership Program projects focused on national security and economic issues, including port security, technical education in the energy sector, global health cooperation, transparency and accountability in government, and global challenges facing NATO.³⁷⁷





The MV ARC Endeavor arrives at the port of Narvik, Norway, carrying more than 200 pieces of equipment to support the Swift Response training exercise. (U.S. Army photo)

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APPENDIX A

Classified Appendix to this Report

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) and the U.S. Government's response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.



APPENDIX B

Methodology for Preparing this Special IG Quarterly Report

This report complies with Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2024 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The Inspector General Act requires that the DoD IG—as the previously designated Lead IG for OAR and now the Special IG for OAR—provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on each overseas contingency operation.

This report covers the period from April 1 to June 30, 2025, and select events that took place after the quarter ended. The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and partner oversight agencies contributed to this report.

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OAR, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes and notes on tables and figures. Except in the cases of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the OIGs have not independently verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or from Federal agencies. The information provided represents the view of the source cited in each instance.

INFORMATION COLLECTION FROM AGENCIES AND OPEN SOURCES

Each quarter, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs gather information about their programs and operations related to OAR from Federal agencies. This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources. The following sources may be included:

- U.S. Government statements, news conferences, and reports;
- Reports issued by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks; and
- Media reports.

The Lead IG agencies use open-source information to supplement information obtained through their agency information collection process and provide additional details about the overseas contingency operation.

REPORT PRODUCTION

The DoD IG, as the Special IG (and previously designated Lead IG) for OAR, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The OIGs for the DoD, State, and USAID draft input for the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Special IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The three OIGs incorporate agency comments where appropriate and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the OIGs for the DoD, State, and USAID as independent oversight agencies.

APPENDIX C

Status of USAID Activities in Ukraine

Table 17.

Active USAID Ukraine Activities, as of May 30, 2025

Award Name Scheduled Duration Amount Obligated to Date	Activity Goals
Securing Power, Advancing Resilience & Connectivity Activity 4/1/2024–3/31/2029 \$447,326,058	Provide strategic technical and procurement assistance to the Ukrainian government, focused on enhancing the resilience, reliability, and security of the electricity, district heating, and natural gas sectors.
Support TB Control Efforts in Ukraine 10/1/2019–9/30/2025 \$55,499,451	Reduce the TB epidemic in Ukraine through early detection, appropriate care, and prevention for people living with TB, DR-TB and HIV/TB.
SAFEMed 9/1/2017–9/1/2025 \$53,000,000	Strengthen pharmaceutical sector governance, optimize financing, and increase availability and appropriate use of essential medications.
Community Action for HIV Control (PEPFAR) 7/1/2021–6/30/2026 \$29,497,603	Strengthen 1) HIV service delivery models for prevention, testing, and linkage to care; 2) community-based organizations' ability to implement and sustain models through civil society engagement and community empowerment; and 3) key population access to rights-oriented and client-centered HIV services.
Re-Envisioning Excellence and Accessibility in Clinic-based HIV Services (REACH 95) Activity (PEPFAR) 8/1/2023–7/31/2028 \$18,999,999	Strengthen HIV testing strategies for optimized case-finding and improved linkage to prevention and treatment services in public health facilities; expand high-quality, person-centered approaches to HIV service delivery; and develop health care facility capacity to provide full range of HIV services at the primary care level.
Rehabilitation for Ukraine (Rehab4U) 7/1/2024–6/30/2029 \$40,000,000	Strengthen national, regional, and local leadership, management, and governance capacity related to the physical rehabilitation sector; increase access to and availability of rehab services; and promote inclusion and participation of persons with disabilities and civilian victims of war.
USAID Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure in Ukraine (CCI) 5/18/2020–9/16/2025 \$128,000,000	Strengthen the resilience of Ukraine's critical infrastructure to withstand cyberattacks by establishing trusted collaboration among key cybersecurity stakeholders. It includes broader range of initiatives critical for bolstering Ukraine's cybersecurity infrastructure and capabilities during and following the current conflict.

Award Name Scheduled Duration Amount Obligated to Date	Activity Goals
Agriculture Growing Rural Opportunities (AGRO) 11/15/2019–11/13/2026 \$205,000,000	Accelerate the economic development of rural Ukrainian communities with the greatest need through a better governed agricultural sector that encourages more productive, modern, and profitable micro, small, and medium agricultural enterprises that are successfully integrated into competitive markets both in Ukraine and internationally.
Direct Budget Support (DBS) Audit Activity 9/12/2023–9/11/2028 \$15,057,320	Support the U.S. Government's efforts to ensure that DBS funds provided to the Ukrainian government have been used for their intended purposes and as agreed to by the Ukrainian government down to the individual (i.e. end-beneficiary) recipient.
Ukraine Reconstruction Support (URS) 9/15/2023–7/14/2028 \$45,144,000	Provide American architecture and engineering support and oversight for all USAID Ukraine construction and infrastructure programming, including sectors such as energy, health, transportation, democracy, and governance.
Energy Sector Transparency (EST) 2/1/2019–12/31/2025 \$6,000,000	Promote Ukraine's energy security by reducing opportunities for sector corruption.
Bringing Innovations to Treat TB in Ukraine Activity 12/1/2021–11/30/2025 \$2,500,000	Implement operational tuberculosis research and support its scale-up as established clinical practice.

Source: USAID Ukraine, response to USAID OIG request for information, 5/30/2025.

Table 18.

Terminated USAID Ukraine and Office of Transition Initiatives Activities, as of May 30, 2025

Award Name Scheduled Duration Amount Obligated to Date	Activity Goals
Ukraine Civil Society Sectoral Support Activity 10/1/2019–9/30/2025 \$19,974,249	Improve the operating environment for civil society organizations (CSO) and strengthen their capacity to advance the self-reliance of the civic sector in Ukraine. In the context of the war, the activity provided flexible, demand-based organizational and technical support to a range of civil society entities.
U-RAP Ukraine Responsive and Accountable Politics Program* 4/1/2016–3/31/2026 \$116,000,000	Strengthen political processes and institutions, leading to political competition that is fair and more transparent and political actors that are more connected to society and responsive to citizens.

(continued on next page)

Award Name Scheduled Duration Amount Obligated to Date	Activity Goals
Decentralization Offering Better Results and Efficiency (DOBRE) 6/8/2016–9/30/2025 \$107,000,000	Help support local governance to deepen democracy, improve conditions for community development, and promote stability in Ukraine. In the context of the war, the program supported local government emergency response and recovery efforts and local civil society vital operations in government-controlled territories and occupied and displaced local government during the war and post-war period.
ENGAGE–Civil Society 10/1/2016–9/30/2025 \$62,000,000	Increase citizen awareness of and engagement in civic actions at the national, regional, and local levels. In the context of the war, supported CSOs' vital operations and restoration after the war.
The Media Program in Ukraine 10/1/2018–9/30/2025 \$75,000,000	Strengthen the civically relevant role of media in democratic processes in Ukraine and expand citizens' access to quality information to counter malign influence and support European integration. In the context of the war, special emphasis placed on investigative journalism for reconstruction and recovery effort oversight.
The Democratic Governance East Activity 10/1/2018–9/30/2026 \$157,051,252	Strengthen the connection and trust between citizens and their government in eastern Ukraine. Although the activity focused on eastern Ukraine, since the start of the full-scale invasion, the program expanded its geographic scope of assistance to neighboring regions, such as Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv and other areas that have received large numbers of IDPs.
Transformation Communications Activity (TCA) 7/1/2020–6/30/2026 \$45,691,988	Increase the resilience of Ukraine's democracy with innovative communications initiatives about democratic transformation and European integration. In the context of the war, all the interventions aimed to increase the Ukrainian government's quality and quantity of strategic communications against Russia's full-scale invasion and the flow of disinformation.
Ukraine National Identity Through Youth (UNITY) Activity 8/10/2020–2/9/2027 \$58,000,000	Foster vested ownership among young people in Ukraine's democratic European future by mobilizing youth leadership of a values-based conception of Ukrainian identity grounded in innovation, engagement, and pluralism. In the context of the war, the activity implemented additional interventions to improve access to education that is relevant to changes in the operating context and supporting Ukrainian youth's role in Ukraine's resistance and recovery.
USAID Governance and Local Accountability (HOVERLA) Activity* 3/19/2021–3/18/2027 \$150,000,000	Facilitate the creation of Ukrainian local governance systems and processes that are more self-reliant, accountable to citizens, inclusive and able to provide services. In the context of the war, activity was pivoted to accommodate emergency response assistance.
USAID Justice For All (J4A) 10/1/2021–9/30/2026 \$62,000,000	Strengthen justice systems, services, and societal engagement to deliver responsive solutions to Ukrainians' legal problems and justice needs. Provided critical present and post-war support focused on continuity of court operations, ensured accountability for war crimes, and expanded access to justice that helps strengthen Ukraine's ability to deliver responsive solutions to meet the justice needs of Ukrainians.
RADA the Next Generation (RANG) Activity 10/1/2021–9/30/2026 \$25,000,000	Address the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine's (VRU), the unicameral parliament of Ukraine's, most critical challenges and enabled VRU to become a modern, effective institution that promotes accountability and democratic development in Ukraine. Supported VRU on war-related activities, preparation for peace and post-war environment.

Award Name Scheduled Duration Amount Obligated to Date	Activity Goals
Domestic Oversight of Elections and Political Processes (DO EPP) Activity* 11/1/2022–1/31/2026 \$8,000,000	Support Ukrainian civil society advancements for a more democratic and participatory electoral and political processes.
Promoting Integrity in the Public Sector Activity (Pro-Integrity)* 12/4/2023–12/3/2028 \$90,000,000	Support reduction of corruption incidents and risks to build back a better Ukraine.
Digital Transformation Activity (DTA) 12/6/2023–12/5/2028 \$150,000,000	Bolster Ukraine’s digital transformation to promote nation’s economic revitalization, transparency in reconstruction, and democratic governance during the ongoing war and beyond.
Healing & Accountability Through Human Rights Activity 5/15/2024–5/14/2029 \$25,000,000	Support Ukrainians to achieve justice and address social divisions resulting from Russia’s full-scale invasion by supporting processes aimed at accountability for war crimes, fostering dialogue on difficult questions related to post-conflict recovery, and beginning healing and reconciliation using human rights-based approaches including transitional justice tools.
GROW Project (Finance for Micro and Small Enterprise Expansion) 7/1/2024–9/30/2028 \$10,000,000	Work with Ukrainian credit unions to adapt to new and upcoming prudential regulations as the regulatory environment of Ukraine’s credit unions shifts toward European Union (EU) accession. Focus on the ability to deliver cost effective, sustainable financing depending on credit unions having proportional burdens of compliance, and their ultimate inclusion in the deposit guarantee system.
Competitive Economy Program (CEP) 10/16/2018–10/15/2025 \$170,000,000	Support startup businesses and small- and medium-sized enterprises, increased domestic market competition, and supported the competitiveness of Ukrainian firms in international markets.
Economic Resilience Activity (ERA)* 8/27/2018–8/16/2026 \$325,000,000	Focus on improving Ukraine’s overall economic resilience in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, which disrupted critical market linkages, catalyzed the economic decline of previously dominant industries and caused massive population disruption.
State-Owned Enterprises Reform Activity (SOERA) in Ukraine, IDIQ* 4/26/2021–4/25/2028 \$100,000,000	Improve the management and transparency of SOEs and facilitate competitive privatization of selected SOEs.

(continued on next page)

Award Name Scheduled Duration Amount Obligated to Date	Activity Goals
State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) Reform Activity in Ukraine, Task Order 1* 4/26/2021–4/25/2026 \$100,000,000	Build upon previous interventions to strengthen state-owned enterprises business operations and transparency, improving governance and oversight, advancing privatization of selected SOEs and developed strategic management model for SOEs remaining in state ownership.
Harvest Activity* 4/1/2024–3/31/2029 \$249,925,252	Support grain and oilseed farmers to return production and income for target commodities to at least pre-war levels while improving production efficiency and profitability that will position farmers to market their crops more successfully and profitably in the war-affected context. Focus on barley, corn, soybean, sunflower, and wheat farming.
USAID Communications Operational Support 8/23/2024–8/22/2025 \$169,980	Assist the Mission's Development Outreach and Communications staff in increasing awareness among communities across Ukraine about the purpose and positive impact of USAID assistance programs in Ukraine.
Ukraine Monitoring and Learning Support (UMLS)* 3/2/2020–3/1/2027 \$36,403,723	Assist the USAID Regional Mission for Ukraine and Belarus in its overall monitoring, collaborating, learning, adapting, evaluating, and strategic communication needs over the implementation of its 2019-2024 Country Development Cooperation Strategy extended until 2026.
Energy Security Project (ESP) * 7/1/2018–6/30/2025 \$920,000,000	Enhance Ukraine's energy security, improving the energy legal and regulatory environment and increasing resilience of energy supply that will help the mission achieve broad-based, resilient economic development to sustain Ukrainian democracy.
Ukraine Confidence Building Initiative (UCBI) 2/1/2023-9/5/2026 \$252,042,400	Build the resilience of war-affected communities by strengthening the ability to respond to attacks and other direct impacts of the war, help businesses remain open and ensure that services such as education remain available. This flexible mechanism could be used to support the peace process or other policy priorities.
Health Reform Support (HRS) Program 4/27/2018–4/25/2025 \$137,311,167	Improve health sector governance, support the transformation of the healthcare financing model, and strengthen the health workforce.
Accounting Chamber of Ukraine Capacity Strengthening Activity (ACCSA) 12/27/2022–2/27/2026 \$5,400,000	Build the capacity of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine to conduct audits in line with International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions to strengthen the accountability of Ukraine's recovery.

*Note: Waiver decision pending

Source: USAID Ukraine, response to USAID OIG request for information, 5/30/2025.

Table 19.

USAID Ukraine Activities Under Stop-Work Orders, as of May 30, 2025

Award Name Scheduled Duration Amount Obligated to Date	Activity Goals
Public Health System Recovery and Resilience Activity 5/10/2022–5/9/2027 \$93,141,587	Strengthen national, regional, and community preparedness and response to infectious disease and other public health threats. Increased access to and sustainability of mental health and psychosocial support services for war-impacted populations.
Furthering Health Reforms and Recovery (FHR) 10/25/2024–10/24/2029 \$90,000,000	Improve the Ukrainian health system's accountability, efficiency, and transparency to optimize the use of scarce resources, provide equitable access to quality services and expand universal healthcare coverage to meet the new and emerging health needs for Ukrainians during and following the war.
Revenue and Expenditure Governance Reforms Operationalized Activity 11/22/2024–11/21/2029 \$51,370,754	Enhance state revenue generation and financial management in Ukraine while promoting fiscal resilience, transparency and accountability.
Investment for Business Resilience Activity 7/13/2022–7/12/2027 \$93,000,000	Support systemic changes in Ukraine's economy and increased the supply of finance available to Ukrainian businesses. Transform the country's financial sector into a sophisticated, well-functioning, competitive market aligned with the EU standards and integrated into international financial systems. Provide financing to enterprises for recovery and sustained economic growth in Ukraine.

Source: USAID Ukraine, response to USAID OIG request for information, 5/30/2025.



APPENDIX D

U.S. Weapons, Equipment, and Ammunition Committed to Ukraine

Air Defense

- Three Patriot air defense batteries and munitions
- 12 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions
- HAWK air defense systems and munitions
- AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles for air defense
- More than 3,000 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles
- Avenger air defense systems
- VAMPIRE counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) and munitions
- c-UAS gun trucks and ammunition
- Mobile c-UAS laser-guided rocket systems
- Other c-UAS equipment
- Anti-aircraft guns and ammunition
- Air defense systems components
- Equipment to integrate Western launchers, missiles, and radars with Ukraine's systems
- Equipment to support and sustain Ukraine's existing air defense capabilities
- Equipment to protect critical national infrastructure
- 21 air surveillance radars

Ground Maneuver

- 31 M1A1 Abrams tanks
- 45 T-72B tanks
- More than 300 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles
- Four Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicles
- 400 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers
- More than 900 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers
- 400 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles
- More than 1,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs)

- More than 5,000 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)
- More than 200 light tactical vehicles
- 300 armored medical treatment vehicles
- 80 trucks and more than 200 trailers to transport heavy equipment
- More than 1,000 tactical vehicles to tow and haul equipment
- 153 tactical vehicles to recover equipment
- 10 command post vehicles
- 30 ammunition support vehicles
- 29 armored bridging systems
- 20 logistics support vehicles and equipment
- 239 fuel tankers and 105 fuel trailers
- 58 water trailers
- Six armored utility trucks
- 125mm, 120mm, and 105mm tank ammunition
- More than 1,800,000 rounds of 25mm ammunition
- Mine clearing equipment
- Anti-armor and Small Arms
- More than 10,000 Javelin anti-armor systems
- More than 120,000 other anti-armor systems and munitions

Fires

- More than 40 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition
- Ground-based Small Diameter Bomb launchers and guided rockets
- More than 200 155mm howitzers and more than 3,000,000 155mm artillery rounds
- More than 7,000 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds
- More than 100,000 155mm Remote Anti-Armor Mine Systems (RAAM) artillery rounds

- 72 105mm howitzers and more than 1,000,000 105mm artillery rounds
- 10,000 203mm artillery rounds
- More than 400,000 152mm artillery rounds
- Approximately 40,000 130mm artillery rounds
- 40,000 122mm artillery rounds
- 60,000 122mm GRAD rockets
- More than 300 mortar systems
- More than 700,000 mortar rounds
- More than 100 counter-artillery and counter-mortar radars
- More than 50 multi-mission radars

Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Systems

- 20 Mi-17 helicopters
- Switchblade Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
- Phoenix Ghost UAS
- CyberLux K8 UAS
- Higher-600 UAS
- Jump-20 UAS
- Hornet UAS
- Puma UAS
- ScanEagle UAS
- Penguin UAS
- Raven UAS
- Other UAS
- Two radars for UAS
- High-speed Anti-radiation Missiles (HARMs)
- Air-to-ground munitions
- Support equipment for F-16s
- More than 6,000 Zuni aircraft rockets

- More than 20,000 Hydra-70 aircraft rockets
- Munitions for UAS

Other Capabilities

- M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions
- C-4 explosives, demolition munitions, and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing
- Obstacle emplacement equipment
- Counter air defense capability
- More than 100,000 sets of body armor and helmets
- Tactical secure communications systems and support equipment
- Four satellite communications (SATCOM) antennas
- SATCOM terminals and services
- Electronic warfare (EW) and counter-EW equipment
- Commercial satellite imagery services
- Night vision devices, surveillance and thermal imagery systems, optics, and rangefinders
- Explosive ordnance disposal equipment and protective gear
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment
- Medical supplies, including first aid kits, bandages, monitors, and other equipment
- Field equipment, cold weather gear, generators, and spare parts
- Support for training, maintenance, and sustainment activities.

Source: State, fact sheet, "U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine," 3/12/2025.

APPENDIX E

Final Reports by Special IG Agencies

From April 1 to June 30, 2025, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued 11 oversight reports related to OAR and the Ukraine response, as detailed in the following summaries. Reports issued by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and other oversight agencies are available on their respective websites and ukraineoversight.gov.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the DoD's Prioritization of Military Construction Projects for the European Deterrence Initiative

DODIG-2025-115; June 24, 2025

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine the extent to which DoD officials effectively prioritized and funded military construction in support of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).

The U.S. Government established EDI to reassure U.S. allies in Europe of a continued U.S. commitment to their security in the wake of Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea. Since June 2014, the United States has used the EDI funding to enhance the U.S. deterrence posture; increase the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe; support the collective defense and security of NATO allies; and bolster the security and capacity of U.S. allies and partners.

The DoD OIG found that the DoD has a process in place to prioritize overseas operational military construction projects and made one recommendation to improve the effectiveness of the process. The DoD OIG directed the recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans and Posture, responding for the Assistant Secretary, disagreed with the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and will remain open until the DoD OIG receives additional information to close the recommendation.

Evaluation of the Movement of Ukraine- and Israel- Bound Equipment Through Aerial Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States

DODIG-2025-113; June 12, 2025

The DoD OIG conducted this evaluation to assess how effectively DoD Components accounted for and processed defense materials from their points of origin through aerial ports of embarkation (APOE) for delivery to Ukraine and Israel. From June 2023 through September 2024, the U.S. Army's Joint Munitions Command tracked that 12 APOEs shipped 14 million defense articles to Ukraine in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve.

The DoD OIG found that the DoD Components were mostly effective in following processes for providing defense articles to Ukraine and Israel from points of origin through APOEs in the continental United States. For example, the DoD OIG determined that Blue Grass Army Depot, Dover Air Force Base, and Military Service officials communicated effectively to coordinate, transport, and load onto aircraft a shipment of arms, ammunition, and explosives from its point of origin through Dover APOE.

However, the DoD OIG determined that U.S. military personnel at the Logistics Enabling Node-Poland's Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group were unaware of and unprepared to receive opportune cargo that was added to approximately 10 to 20 percent of arriving flights. This occurred because airfield personnel did not have access to either a Global Air Transportation Execution System terminal or the Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence system at their office. As a result, airfield personnel may spend more time verifying the accuracy of cargo load manifests before the cargo can be released to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Additionally, the DoD OIG determined that Security Assistance Group-Ukraine contracting personnel did not ensure that contractors consistently returned transportation materials, including pallets, cargo nets, and ratchet straps from the Logistics Enabling Node-Poland to the nearest Air Mobility Command Air hub within 3 days, as required by the Defense Transportation Regulation.

The DoD OIG made two recommendations to the Commander of the U.S. European Command. First, the DoD OIG recommended that the Commander requires Logistics Enabling Node-Poland airfield personnel to maintain consistent access to the Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence system for visibility of in-transit air cargo. Second, the DoD OIG recommended that the Commander establish and implement procedures for returning transportation materials from the airfield personnel to an Air Mobility Command hub within 3 days, in accordance with the Defense Transportation Regulation.

The 21st Theater Sustainment Command implemented actions to gain in-transit visibility of air cargo manifests, which meets the intent of the first recommendation. The Division Chief for Logistics Operations (J43), responding for the Commander of the U.S. European Command, did not agree with the second recommendation but stated that the U.S. European Command will implement actions that are sufficient to meet the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. The DoD OIG will close the recommendations once the agreed-upon actions have been verified.

Audit of U.S. European Command Force Protection Measures at Installations in Poland that Support Operation Atlantic Resolve

DODIG-2025-103; May 28, 2025

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine whether the U.S. European Command implemented force protection measures in accordance with DoD policy at the Jasionka Base Cluster (Jasionka) in Poland. Jasionka is composed of smaller locations, such as logistical Support Area Eagle, the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine, and the Aerial Port of Debarkation South (APOD South), and is located on land owned by a Polish citizen rather than the Polish government. As a result, Jasionka is not a facility or area covered by or obligated to adhere to force protection requirements in DoD policy and international agreements between the United States and Poland. Therefore, force protection measures and activities at Jasionka are coordinated with the host nation, Poland.

The DoD OIG found that when Army components physical security surveys identify force protection recommendations, they do not track the implementation of the corrective actions therefore the recommendations could remain unresolved. Additionally, the Army components do not establish guidance for communicating counterintelligence vulnerability assessments (CIVA) to commanders and follow up on recommendations.

The DoD OIG made six recommendations to the Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF). They included establishing a process for personnel to record, track, and

resolve deficiencies found during physical security surveys, including the March 2023 physical security survey of Jasionka, and assessing whether other installations in Poland that supports Operation Atlantic Resolve have outstanding physical security survey recommendations and are in need of an established process to record, track, and resolve deficiencies.

The Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF, responding for the Commander, USAREUR-AF, agreed with all six recommendations and USAREUR-AF personnel took action to address them. Specifically, they established physical security survey processes and CIVA guidance, formalized the physical security survey and CIVA recommendation follow-up process, and directed a risk assessment of APOD South. As a result, the DoD OIG closed all six recommendations after verifying that all agreed-upon corrective actions were implemented.

Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Collect, and Integrate Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned from the Russia/Ukraine Conflict

DODIG-2025-101; May 19, 2025

The DoD OIG conducted this evaluation to determine the effectiveness of the DoD's collection and use of observations, insights, and lessons learned from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the DoD's support to Ukraine, to inform DoD doctrine, planning, training, and equipping. This report contains classified information, and no redacted version is available. To file a Freedom of Information Act Request, please submit a request to FOIA.gov.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspection of Embassy Ankara and Constituent Posts, Türkiye

ISP-I-25-09; June 13, 2025

State OIG inspected the executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of Embassy Ankara. The inspection included Consulate General Istanbul, Consulate Adana, Consular Agency Izmir, and Branch Office Gaziantep. Türkiye is a NATO partner, controls access to the Black Sea, and has been the site of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.

The inspection found that the Chargé d'Affaires and acting Deputy Chief of Mission led Mission Türkiye in a professional and collaborative manner. It also found that the mission played a key role in facilitating approval by Türkiye for the accession of Finland and Sweden to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and provided essential support to regional crises such as assisting Syrian refugees, assisting U.S. citizens, and responding to a devastating earthquake in Türkiye.

However, the report also identified several challenges. Specifically, the inspection found that crisis management and workload growth strained limited managerial capacity. In addition, the mission had internal control deficiencies related to property management, contract administration, and procurement. Furthermore, it identified that the mission's local compensation plan and human resources policies required updates, and the mission was missing required facility and residential safety inspections.

State OIG issued 27 recommendations to Embassy Ankara. In its comments on the draft report, the embassy concurred with all 27 recommendations. At the time the report was issued, State OIG considered all recommendations resolved, pending further action. The recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

Audit of the Department of State's Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Programs and Activities in Central and Eastern Europe

AUD-GEER-25-18; June 9, 2025

From FY 2018 through FY 2023, State administered approximately \$51 million in grants, cooperative agreements, voluntary contributions, international agreements and sanctions to support anti-corruption efforts in Hungary, Moldova, Poland, and Ukraine. State OIG conducted this audit to determine whether State implemented and monitored anti-corruption assistance programs and activities in Central and Eastern European countries in accordance with Federal and State requirements.

State OIG found weaknesses in State's tracking, monitoring and evaluation, and strategic planning of anti-corruption activities in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite the strategic priority placed on anti-corruption efforts, State had not taken steps to fully integrate its anti-corruption efforts. State OIG determined that State did not have internal controls in place to systematically track and capture the entirety of anti-corruption programs and activities in Central and Eastern Europe and provide reliable and timely financial information on them. State OIG also found that State bureaus and overseas posts did not consistently monitor and evaluate anti-corruption grants and cooperative agreements. In addition, State OIG found that key bureaus' guidance and resources for project design did not conform with State's established best practices. Moreover, State lacked a department-wide anti-corruption strategy, and its implementation plan met few requirements.

State OIG made five recommendations to improve internal controls related to developing, monitoring, and evaluating anti-corruption strategies and activities. The relevant State bureaus concurred with two recommendations and neither agreed nor disagreed with three recommendations. At the time the report was issued, State OIG considered three recommendations unresolved, one recommendation resolved, pending further action, and one recommendation closed. The four open recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

Inspection of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs

ISP-I-25-11; May 14, 2025

State OIG inspected the executive direction, foreign policy priorities, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. The bureau is responsible for formulating and implementing international economic policies that protect and advance U.S. economic, political, and national security interests. At the time of the inspection, the bureau led the execution of various Executive Orders, legislative mandates, and State initiatives in international economic diplomacy. Under Executive Order 14024, for example, from February to October 2022, the bureau prepared approximately 1,500 new sanctions cases and amended approximately 750 existing sanction cases directed against Russia. In addition, State received delegated authority for the Secretary of State, acting through the bureau, to implement high profile economic sanctions programs against Russia, Iran, Syria, and other countries.

State OIG found that 1) the acting Assistant Secretary set a positive tone for the bureau and generally led the bureau in accordance with State leadership and management principles; 2) State and interagency stakeholders described the bureau as a collaborative partner in the interagency policy process; 3) staff reported concerns that resources did not keep pace with

workload growth related to sanctions actions, debt restructuring, investment screening, business conduct mediations, infrastructure security, and foreign assistance programs; 4) the bureau lacked standard operating procedures and capacity to manage its foreign assistance programs; 5) the bureau's contract and contracting officer's representative files did not comply with State standards; and 6) the bureau's information management operations had deficiencies in records management, the performance of information systems security officer duties, and knowledge management processes.

State OIG made six recommendations to the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. The bureau concurred with all six recommendations, and at the time the report was issued, State OIG considered all six recommendations resolved, pending further action. The recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

PEPFAR in Ukraine: USAID/Ukraine Achieved Mixed Results When Implementing Programs Due to Wartime Challenges and Did Not Conduct Independent Performance Monitoring

8-121-25-003-P; June 27, 2025

Before Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, an estimated 260,000 people in Ukraine were living with HIV, the second-highest number of cases in Europe. USAID and other government agencies implemented U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programs to support Ukraine's efforts to end HIV as a public health threat by 2030. USAID OIG conducted this audit to assess the extent to which USAID/Ukraine implemented and monitored selected PEPFAR programs to achieve its intended results. USAID OIG assessed USAID/Ukraine's implementation and monitoring of two programs—Healthlink and Community Action for HIV Control—from January 2022 through September 2023 and focused on PEPFAR indicators for HIV testing and HIV case identification.

USAID OIG found that USAID/Ukraine did not achieve all its intended results when implementing PEPFAR-funded programs due to wartime challenges. Throughout fiscal years 2022 and 2023, HealthLink and Community Action for HIV Control continued to operate, but the programs did not fully achieve USAID/Ukraine intended results for HIV testing and HIV case identification. Mission and implementer staff reported a range of war-related challenges that hindered full achievement of the intended results, specifically infrastructure damage, continuous population migration, program site staffing, and safety and security. USAID OIG also found that USAID/Ukraine did not conduct independent performance monitoring or adapt its monitoring practices in response to the war. USAID/Ukraine officials stated that for fiscal years 2022 and 2023, they generally relied on PEPFAR program implementers to conduct self-monitoring of activities, report program data, and perform data quality assessments. The mission did not conduct independent performance monitoring as required by the Agency or adapt its monitoring practices to the wartime environment by using remote, virtual, or third-party monitoring.

USAID OIG made one recommendation for USAID/Ukraine to implement independent performance monitoring methods to verify activity and performance data reported by PEPFAR implementers in Ukraine. USAID agreed with the recommendation.

FINAL REPORTS BY LEAD IG PARTNER AGENCIES

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Ukraine: DOE Could Better Assess Fraud Risks and Formalize Its Transition Plans for Nuclear Security and Safety Efforts

GAO-25-108444; June 12, 2025

The GAO conducted this study in response to a provision included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2023, which tasked the GAO with conducting oversight of the supplemental funding. This report addresses government agencies' efforts to support nuclear and radiological security and safety in Ukraine and the Department of Energy's (DoE) National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) steps to mitigate fraud risks and NNSA's planning to transition responsibility for relevant efforts to Ukrainian partners.

The GAO found that the NNSA leads U.S. efforts to support nuclear and radiological security and safety in Ukraine. The NNSA has used its supplemental funding for efforts such as providing security upgrades at nuclear facilities, training for nuclear incident response, and countering nuclear smuggling. The DoD, State, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission used supplemental or regular appropriations or a combination, to conduct a smaller range of related activities. These included providing radiation detection equipment and helping reduce Ukrainian nuclear reactors' dependency on Russian nuclear fuels.

The GAO recommended that the DoE require timely fraud risk assessments for programs that experience structural changes or a changed operating environment or add new services, as happened for NNSA programs responding to the invasion of Ukraine. The GAO also recommended that the NNSA formalize plans for transitioning responsibility to Ukrainian partners, as appropriate. The DoE and NNSA agreed with the GAO's recommendations.

Presidential Drawdown Authority: Guidance Should Reflect Expanded Use

GAO-25-107475; May 15, 2025

The GAO conducted this study in response to a provision included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2023, which provided resources for the GAO to exercise oversight of the funding provided in the Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts. Additionally, a House Report accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2024, included a provision asking the GAO to review the DoD's execution of PDA and related funding and notifications since February 24, 2022.

The GAO found that since 2022, the President, with special authority from Congress, has greatly expanded the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). The authority is used to provide defense items from DoD inventories, such as ammunition and missiles, and services to foreign partners—especially Ukraine. From FY 2022 to 2024, Congress used its authority to add billions of dollars to the \$100 million yearly ceiling for PDA. From October 2021 through January 2025, the President authorized the drawdown of \$31.7 billion of defense articles and services to Ukraine.

In doing so, the DoD and State have generally followed Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) steps for developing the PDA packages for Ukraine, Taiwan, and Haiti; however, the GAO identified some gaps in guidance. Specifically, the GAO found that the DoD has not conducted Operation and Maintenance (O&M) budget impact assessments for the 21 packages the GAO

reviewed. These assessments have previously identified the adverse impact of diverting funds from other activities to support PDA packages. In a 2016 GAO report, the GAO recommended directing the Secretaries of the Military Departments to develop guidance that assigns responsibility for the preparation of O&M budget impact assessments and includes direction on how such assessments should be conducted as part of drawdown planning. However, the Military Services have not yet implemented this recommendation and absence of this guidance may prevent DoD officials from making fully informed decisions, potentially depriving decision-makers of information about impacts of PDA packages on the Services' O&M budgets.

Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the DoD has received \$45.8 billion to replace equipment provided to Ukraine using PDA. According to DoD officials, the DoD had planned to obligate all the remaining \$45.8 billion of replacement funding and would require an additional appropriation to replace some defense articles and services previously included in drawdown packages for Ukraine. The replacement funding was a part of the five Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts, which provided \$174.2 billion to help combat Russian aggression and to preserve Ukraine's territorial integrity. The GAO found that the DoD has not developed guidance that accounts for the potential that the services will need to replace defense articles provided through PDA, but DoD officials told the GAO that a draft instruction may do so. Adjusting or developing new guidance on using funds available to replace DoD equipment provided to partners through PDA would help ensure U.S. military Services do not face greater than anticipated readiness impact.

The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to ensure PDA guidance address how replacement needs should be considered when developing PDA packages. The recommendation remains open and will close once the GAO confirms the agreed upon actions have been taken.

Ukraine: DOE Could Better Assess Fraud Risks and Formalize Its Transition Plans for Nuclear Safety Efforts (Restricted)

GAO-25-107015SU; April 16, 2025

The GAO conducted this study to evaluate how the Department of Energy and other agencies have used supplemental appropriations to address nuclear and radiological security and safety risks in Ukraine. This report is classified.



APPENDIX F

Ongoing Oversight Projects

Tables 20 and 21 list the titles and objectives for the Special IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OAR and Ukraine.

Table 20.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs as of June 30, 2025

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of Defensive Cyberspace Operations in the U.S. European Command (Project no. D2025-D000CU-0013.000)

To assess the effectiveness of defensive cyber operations in the U.S. European Command.

Audit of the Army's Management of Repairs to Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission Requirements (Project no. D2025-D000AH-0030.000)

To assess the effectiveness of the Army's management of repairs to ensure that Bradley Fighting Vehicles transferred to U.S. Army Europe and Africa units meet mission requirements.

Evaluation of the DoD's Development of Arctic Infrastructure, Communications Capabilities, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Europe (Project no. D2025-DEV0PD-0088.000)

To determine whether the DoD Components are effectively developing infrastructure, communications capabilities, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to deter threats in the European Arctic in accordance with the DoD 2024 Arctic Strategy.

Evaluation of DoD's Effectiveness in Negotiating Fair and Reasonable Prices with Contractors for Ukraine Security Assistance (Project no. D2024-DEV0SO-0116.000)

To assess the effectiveness with which DoD contracting officers negotiated fair and reasonable prices with contractors for Ukraine security assistance.

DoD and Department of State Joint Audit of U.S. Assistance Provided in Support of Ukraine Through the Foreign Military Financing Program (Project no. D2024-D000RL-0120.000)

To determine whether the DoD and Department of State appropriately administered and managed foreign military financing provided in response to Russia's war against Ukraine.

Audit of the Army's Administration of Noncompetitive Contracts in Support of Ukraine (Project no. D2023-D000RH-0082.001)

To determine whether, in support of the Ukraine response, DoD contracting officials properly administered noncompetitively awarded contracts in accordance with Federal regulations and DoD guidance.

Audit of the DoD's Processes for Providing Supplies and Equipment Funded Through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (Project no. D2024-D000AX-0151.000)

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's processes for ensuring the quality and timeliness of supplies and equipment provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces funded through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

Audit of Controls Over Funds Provided for the Replenishment of Defense Articles and the Reimbursement for Services Provided to the Government of Ukraine Through Presidential Drawdown Authority (Project no. D2024-D000FI-0161.000)

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's internal controls over the use of funds appropriated for the replenishment of defense articles and the reimbursement for services provided to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown Authority.

Evaluation of DoD Processes to Provide Repair Parts to Support the Ukrainian Armed Forces (Project no. D2024-DEV0PD-0182.000)

To assess the efficiency and effectiveness of DoD processes for providing repair parts for U.S. equipment to Ukraine.

Evaluation of the Demilitarization of Damaged, Destroyed, and Expended Defense Articles Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring in Ukraine (EEUM VII) (Project no. D2025-DEV0PC-0039.000)

To assess the effectiveness with which DoD Components demilitarized damaged, destroyed, and expended defense articles transferred to Ukraine that require enhanced end-use monitoring.

Evaluation of Defense Logistics Agency Land and Maritime Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine Shop Stock List Items (Project no. D2024-DEV0PD-0182.001)

To assess the efficiency and effectiveness of DoD processes for providing shop stock list items.

Audit of Air Force's Processes for Providing Supplies and Equipment Funded Through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (Project no. D2024-D000AX-0151.001)

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's processes for ensuring the quality and timeliness of supplies and equipment provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces funded through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Classified Inspection of Embassy Ankara, Türkiye, and Constituent Posts (Project no. 24ISP042.01)

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Türkiye, and constituent posts.

Inspection of Embassy Riga, Latvia (Project no. 25ISP012.00)

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Riga, Latvia.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Riga, Latvia (Project no. 25ISP012.01)

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Riga, Latvia.

Review of Leahy Vetting Processes in Select Countries with Leahy Ineligible Unit Agreements (Project no. 24ISP041)

To determine whether State: 1) has developed policies and procedures for instances where recipient units cannot be identified prior to the transfer of assistance, and 2) is implementing Leahy law requirements in accordance with policies and procedures in select countries.

DoD and Department of State Joint Audit of U.S. Assistance Provided in Support of Ukraine Through the Foreign Military Financing Program (Project no. 24AUD027)

To determine whether the DoD and Department of State appropriately administered and managed foreign military financing provided in response to Russia's war against Ukraine.

Audit of Emergency Preparedness in Selected Eastern European Countries (Project no. 25AUD010)

To determine whether U.S. embassies in selected Eastern European countries are prepared to respond and recover from emergencies.

Audit of War Crimes Accountability Capacity Building in Ukraine (Project no. 25AUD023)

To determine whether the Global Criminal Justice Grant for War Crimes Accountability Capacity-Building in Ukraine is achieving intended results.

Audit of Department of State Energy Security and Diversification Initiatives in the Black Sea Region (Project no. 25AUD025)

To determine whether State efforts to coordinate and advance energy security and diversification initiatives have achieved desired results.

Review of Remote Monitoring for Department of State Programs in Ukraine (Project no. 25ISP034)

To determine: 1) the number of State bureaus with implementing partners in Ukraine, 2) the extent to which such bureaus used remote methods or third-party contractors to monitor their programming in Ukraine, and 3) any barriers to remote monitoring in Ukraine.

Review of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' Property Accountability in Ukraine (Project no. 25ISP009)

To determine whether the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL): 1) followed applicable Federal, State, and INL property management processes for commodities donated to government of Ukraine entities, and 2) authorized exceptions to INL property management and donation processes.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of USAID's Direct Budget Support to the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance Fund (Project no. 991U0124)

To determine how USAID oversees its contributions to the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance Fund and assess the extent to which USAID's contributions to the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance fund supported eligible internally displaced persons.

Audit of Bureau for Resilience and Food Security Response to the Humanitarian Crisis Caused by Russia's War Against Ukraine (Project no. 991U0123)

To examine steps taken by USAID's Bureau for Resilience and Food Security to respond to world-wide food security concerns resulting from the Ukrainian crises.

Inspection of USAID's Oversight of Starlink Satellite Terminals Provided to the Government of Ukraine (Project no. EU1U0224)

To determine how: 1) the Government of Ukraine used the USAID-provided Starlink terminals, and 2) USAID monitored the Government of Ukraine's use of USAID-provided Starlink terminals.

Audit of Selected Asset Disposition for Terminated USAID Awards in Ukraine (Project no. 8U1U0425)

To determine the status of USAID-funded physical assets procured under selected awards.



Table 21.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by Partner Agencies, as of June 30, 2025**DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL*****Audit of the Bureau of Industry and Security's Enforcement of Russia and Belarus Export Controls (Project no. 2023-470)***

To assess the actions taken by Bureau of Industry and Security to detect and prosecute violations of Russia and Belarus export controls.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE***DoD and NATO Logistics in Europe***

To review DoD and NATO capacity to transport personnel and materiel within Europe and consideration of related lessons learned from the effort to support Ukraine.

U.S. Direct Budget Support to Ukraine

To evaluate the transparency and accountability of the direct budget support USAID has provided to the Government of Ukraine through the World Bank's Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) project, and other related matters.

U.S. Government Ukraine Recovery Planning

To assess State and USAID planning for recovery, the extent to which ongoing efforts align with U.S. priorities, and the coordination of these efforts with other donor nations and the Ukrainian government.

Russia/Ukraine Sanctions and Export Controls

To examine the objectives of sanctions and export controls related to the war in Ukraine and progress toward those objectives; changes in key Russian economic indicators since sanctions and export controls were imposed; and the amounts and uses of resources that agencies have received to implement and enforce those sanctions and export controls.

Combatting Human Trafficking during Armed Conflicts, Including Ukraine

To assess the implementation of State and USAID programs and projects to counter human trafficking in Ukraine and compare them with similar efforts in other countries experiencing armed conflict.

Ukraine Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Assistance

To examine U.S. Government assistance to Ukrainian refugees and internally displaced persons, including efforts to coordinate internally as well as with international partners on a comprehensive strategy for addressing the crises and migration challenges.

HHS Refugee Assistance for Ukrainians

To review HHS' use and oversight of Ukraine refugee assistance funding and any factors that have affected Ukrainians' temporary resettlement in the United States.

Ukraine Aid Outcome Monitoring

To examine State's Monitoring, Evaluation and Audit Services for Ukraine Reporting (MEASURE) contract, and the extent to which State is addressing any challenges to the contractor's ability to monitor, evaluate, and report on outcomes of U.S. foreign assistance to Ukraine.

Audit of Use of Army Prepositioned Stock Equipment (Project no. A-2025-FIZ-037)

To determine if Army Prepositioned Stocks-2 equipment was returned at the Army maintenance standard.

Audit of Storing Ammunition in Europe (Project no. A-2025-FIZ-061)

To determine if Army units in Europe stored ammunition in accordance with policy.

Audit of Funds Management at Army Ammunition Facilities (Project no. A-2025-ALZ-049)

To determine whether Army ammunition facilities executed supplemental funding within established goals and timeframes.

APPENDIX G

Planned Oversight Projects

Tables 22 and 23 list the titles and objectives for Special IG and partner agencies' planned oversight projects related to OAR and Ukraine.

Table 22.

Planned Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs, as of June 30, 2025

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the DoD's Facilities Sustainment in the U.S. European Command

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's management of facilities sustainment in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility.

Audit of the Management of Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway Equipment

To assess whether the Marine Corps effectively managed the maintenance of the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway inventory and conducted proper oversight of logistical support provided through a bilateral agreement with the Government of Norway.

Audit of the DoD's Purchase of Medical Materiel for Medical Treatment Facilities in the U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility

To determine whether the DoD effectively managed the ordering process of medical materiel for medical treatment facilities (MTFs) in the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of Department of State Efforts to Address Global Food Security Following Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

To determine whether State's Bureau of Global Food Security's programs and activities designed to counter the impact of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on global food security are achieving intended results.

Audit of Department of State Policies and Practices for Imposing, Enforcing, and Evaluating Economic and Financial Sanctions

To determine whether State, in coordination with the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce established and implemented policies and practices to impose, enforce, and evaluate the effect of sanctions.

Evaluation of Department of State Administration of Foreign Assistance Program from the U.S. Agency for International Development

To describe State's administration of U.S. Agency for International Development foreign assistance programs and associated awards transferred to State.

Review of the Management and Oversight of the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loan to the Government of Ukraine

Assess the management and oversight of the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loan to the Government of Ukraine and the extent to which the funds are being used for eligible expenditures.

Review of Realignment and Re-organization of US Foreign Assistance

Examine the new/interim strategies, policies, and procedures that are in place to ensure ongoing and new foreign assistance aligns with broader U.S. foreign policy.

Review of Prompt Payment and Anti-Deficiency Act Violations

Provide a descriptive account of Prompt Payment and Anti-Deficiency Act violations, flag major root causes, and help USAID/State get payments back on track to avoid additional fees and noncompliance with the law.

Review of USAID's Disposition of Government-Owned Property, Plan, Vehicles, and Equipment

To assess USAID's plans and actions to dispose of selected U.S. government-owned assets.

Review of Closeout Procedures for Terminated USAID Awards

To assess USAID's efforts to close out terminated awards in accordance with Federal regulations and Agency policies and procedures.

Review of Stop Work Orders for USAID Awards

To determine how many USAID awards were paused, the amount of funding for the awards, and how many resumed or were terminated.

Table 23.

Planned Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by Partner Agencies, as of June 30, 2025

ARMY AUDIT AGENCY

Audit of Storing Repair Parts in Europe

To determine if U.S. Army Europe and Africa properly stored and cared for repair parts and components for Army ground combat systems in accordance with the Army Care of Supplies in Storage program.

Audit of Flying Hour Program in Europe

To determine if Army units in Europe properly planned and executed rotary-wing flying hour requirements.



APPENDIX H

Hotline and Investigations

HOTLINE

The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs each maintain their own hotline to receive complaints specific to their agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report suspected violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority. Each OIG Hotline office evaluates complaints received through the hotlines and forwards them to the respective investigative entity for review and investigation.

During the quarter, DoD OIG Hotline investigators referred 15 cases related to OAR for further criminal or administrative investigation. State OIG received 10 allegations and referred 3, and USAID OIG received 16 allegations and no referrals. In some instances, a case may contain multiple subjects and allegations.

INVESTIGATIONS

Law enforcement personnel from the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs investigate allegations of misconduct that might compromise U.S. Government programs and operations. Additionally, investigators identify, coordinate, and de-conflict fraud and corruption investigations; share best practices and investigative techniques; and coordinate proactive measures to detect and deter the criminals who would exploit U.S. Government assistance to Ukraine.

The Special Inspector General and its oversight partners coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support regarding the Ukraine response. The investigative partner agencies include the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS, the DoD OIG's criminal investigative component), State OIG, USAID OIG, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Homeland Security Investigations.

The Special IG agencies have positioned criminal investigators in Germany, Poland, and Ukraine to investigate allegations of fraud, corruption and potential diversion of weapons or technology. DCIS agents in Kyiv continue working jointly with U.S. Embassy partners and Ukrainian authorities to assess any reported discrepancies related to accounting for weapons and military equipment requiring enhanced end use monitoring.

As of June 30, 2025, Special IG and investigative partner agencies reported 49 open investigations and 19 investigations closed and referred 2 cases to the Department of Justice.

In previous quarterly reports, the Special IG has discussed the various memoranda of understanding (MOU) that have been signed between the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and their Ukrainian counterparts, including the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), Ministry of Defense, and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), to formalize information sharing in support of criminal investigations and oversight work.

This quarter, DoD OIG personnel stationed in Washington, D.C. and Kyiv continued to report that these MOUs have facilitated the nascent but increasing cooperation between two complementary but structurally dissimilar oversight communities.

DoD OIG investigators reported that they routinely employ these MOUs as a mechanism for the exchange of information with their Ukrainian counterparts. DoD OIG personnel met regularly with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and other investigative partners, and through these relationships, facilitated by the MOUs, addressed inquiries promptly. The DoD OIG continues to build relationships with Ukrainian government entities to facilitate efforts to account for U.S. investments in Ukraine.



ACRONYMS


Acronym	
ACA	Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	aerial ports of embarkation
BHA	USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
DBS	direct budget support
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DoE	Department of Energy
DoJ	Department of Justice
DRL	State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EDI	European Deterrence Initiative
EEUM	enhanced end-use monitoring
ENR	State Bureau of Energy Resources
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
ESP	Energy Security Project
EU	European Union
EUM	end-use monitoring
EUR	State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIRST	Foundational Infrastructure for the Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FY	fiscal year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GCJ	State Office of Global Criminal Justice
HIMARS	High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems
INL	State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
ISN	State Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
MEASURE	Monitoring, Evaluation and Audit Services for Ukraine
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NABU	National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NSA	National Nuclear Security Administration

Acronym	
NPU	National Police of Ukraine
NSATU	NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine
O&M	Operation & Maintenance
OAR	Operation Atlantic Resolve
ODC-Kyiv	Office of Defense Cooperation-Kyiv
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPDAT	DoJ Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training
OUSD(A&S)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
OUSD(P)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
PDA	Presidential Drawdown Authority
PEACE	World Bank Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PM/WRA	State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
PRM	State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
RDC-U	Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
SAG-U	Security Assistance Group-Ukraine
SAPO	Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office
SBGS	Ukrainian State Border Guard Service
SPARC	Securing Power, Advancing Resilience and Connectivity activity
State	Department of State
TSC	Theater Sustainment Command
Treasury	Department of the Treasury
UAF	Ukrainian Armed Forces
UAS	unmanned aerial system (refers to one or more aircraft, plus the launch and recovery system)
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle (refers to a single aircraft)
UNHCR	UN Refugee Agency
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
USAGM	U.S. Agency for Global Media
USAI	Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAREUR-AF	U.S. Army Europe and Africa
USEUCOM	The U.S. European Command
WFP	World Food Programme

Map of U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility



Map of Ukraine



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INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINE

The United States is committed to supporting the Ukrainian people during Russia's war of aggression. We are dedicated to providing oversight of the funds and resources American taxpayers have provided in support of Ukraine.

We encourage you to confidentially report any of the following suspected activities related to the programs or operations of the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of State (including the U.S. Agency for Global Media), and the U.S. Agency for International Development to the appropriate Hotline listed below.

Corruption
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
Fraud, Waste, Abuse, Mismanagement
Trafficking In Persons



dodig.mil/hotline



stateoig.gov/hotline



oig.usaid.gov/report-fraud



+1 703-604-8799 or
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+1 202-712-1070

