

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



OPERATION ENDURING SENTINEL

AND OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO

AFGHANISTAN



APRIL 1, 2025–JUNE 30, 2025



On the cover: Women attend a World Food Programme maternal and child health educational session at a health facility in Afghanistan. (WFP photo)



We are pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report to Congress on Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES). This report discharges our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to Section 419 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

In October 2021, the Department of Defense (DoD) initiated OES as the U.S. mission to conduct over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations against threats emanating from Afghanistan. The DoD also engages in security cooperation activities with Central Asian and South Asian regional partners to build their border security and counterterrorism capacity.

This quarterly report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OES, as well as the work of the DoD, the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to further the U.S. Government's policy goals in Afghanistan during the period April 1 through June 30, 2025. This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies—the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs—and our partner oversight agencies.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Steven A. Stebbins".

Steven A. Stebbins
Lead Inspector General
for OES
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Arne B. Baker".

Arne B. Baker
Associate Inspector General
for OES
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of State

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Toayoa Aldridge".

Toayoa Aldridge
Acting Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of
the Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International
Development





Women attend a World Food Programme maternal and child health educational session at a health facility in Afghanistan. (WFP photo)

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In a mobile repair shop in Kunar, Afghans learn new skills through World Food Programme supported vocational training, empowering them to support their families. (WFP photo)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The security threat emanating from Afghanistan continues to drive regional instability, State said.¹ Additionally, U.S. Central Command Commander General Michael “Erik” Kurilla told Congress that Central Asian states want help in securing their borders against threats emerging from Afghanistan.² General Kurilla said that the Afghanistan-based Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Khorasan is able to move freely in the region and maintains a significant network.³

State terminated all State- and USAID-funded development and humanitarian projects in Afghanistan.⁴ Affected projects in Afghanistan included humanitarian assistance previously granted waivers to continue, third-party monitoring contracts, and salaries for USAID in-country local staff.⁵ The sudden termination of awards disrupted implementers’ ability to carry out proper closeout procedures and heightened the risk of fraud and asset loss.⁶ USAID is reducing staffing through September 2, 2025, leaving a small team to support critical terminations and closeout efforts.⁷ USAID had to abandon more than \$119.3 million in equipment related to power system development projects.⁸ USAID implementing partners reported that following the terminations, local security forces repeatedly forcibly entered their compounds; seized vehicles, equipment, cash, and documents; and temporarily detained or interrogated staff.⁹

The abrupt return of 1.2 million Afghans from Pakistan and Iran is worsening the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan.¹⁰ Shortfalls in global humanitarian funding added to challenges faced by aid agencies in supporting Afghan returnees.¹¹ The mass returns are exacerbating the humanitarian situation and could potentially “destabilize the fragile situation” in Afghanistan, according to the UN Refugee Agency.¹²

State plans to conclude Enduring Welcome, the U.S. Government’s effort to relocate and resettle eligible Afghan allies and their families to the United States.¹³ Afghan Special Immigrant Visa recipients continued to voluntarily leave third countries and State’s relocation platform in Doha, Qatar.¹⁴ In addition, the Department of Homeland Security terminated Temporary Protected Status for Afghanistan, stating that “conditions in Afghanistan no longer meet the statutory requirements.”¹⁵ The decision impacts about 11,700 Afghans currently living and working legally in the United States under the program.¹⁶ State reported it had \$655 million in unobligated funds for EW as of June 30.¹⁷

On July 1, State assumed responsibility for administering most foreign assistance, including programs and functions previously managed by USAID.¹⁸ The transition was accompanied by staffing constraints and limited time for planning, which hindered the effective transfer of institutional knowledge, restricted access to key information systems, and complicated risk management related to personnel, contractual matters, and partner oversight.¹⁹



Pack animals transport World Food Programme food assistance in Badakhshan province. (WFP photo)

MISSION UPDATE

The mission of Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES) is to contain terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan and to protect the homeland by maintaining pressure on those threats. The DoD and State also engage in security cooperation activities with Central Asian and South Asian regional partners to foster counterterrorism partnerships.²⁰

SECURITY

The U.S. Government's most critical security interests in Afghanistan are protecting U.S. citizens, securing the release of all detained Americans, and mitigating terrorist threats, State said.²¹ The United States cooperates with partners and allies to prevent the re-emergence of external threats from Afghanistan, and to counteract terrorist recruitment efforts.²² The security threat emanating from Afghanistan continues to drive regional instability, State said.²³

U.S. military activity: The DoD provided limited publicly releasable information about U.S. military activity related to OES during the quarter. Further information is available in the classified appendix to this report.

Regional security cooperation: U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Commander General Michael "Erik" Kurilla told Congress during the quarter that the threats emerging from Afghanistan have motivated other Central Asian states—such as Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—to request U.S. assistance to strengthen their border security forces.²⁴

For FY 2026, the Military Services requested an estimated \$218 million in funding for OES.

State reported that, during the quarter, U.S. security cooperation with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan bolstered both countries' border security capabilities, particularly their borders with Afghanistan. U.S.-funded programs provided training and equipment to Uzbekistan's State Customs Committee and Border Troops. In addition, the United States has provided more than \$300 million in security sector assistance to Tajikistan. According to State, the United States has rebuilt and renovated 13 border posts, 9 border checkpoint facilities, 2 border guard detachments, and 3 training centers for border guards.²⁵

Funding: DoD funding for OES has declined since the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021. While the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer reported that DoD obligations for OES exceeded \$4.18 billion during FY 2025, this figure includes many costs for activities not related to Afghanistan.²⁶

This quarter, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer reported that it revised how it calculated costs associated with OES. For FY 2026, the Military Services requested an estimated \$218 million in funding for OES, a figure that reflects this revision.²⁷

Conventional weapons destruction: State terminated all conventional weapons destruction awards in Afghanistan as of April 4 as part of State's foreign assistance review. The award closeout process continued during the quarter and was expected to conclude on July 31, State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement said.²⁸ Prior to the award terminations, State supported U.S. conventional weapons destruction and related activities, including humanitarian demining, surveys, munitions destruction, mine-risk education, and victim assistance in Afghanistan.²⁹

THE VEO THREAT

ISIS-K

State said that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Khorasan (ISIS-K) is the most potent terrorist threat to U.S. interests in the region and aspires to attack the West, including the United States.³⁰ The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stated that during the quarter, ISIS-K probably prioritized reacting to counterterrorism pressure and attacks by other militant groups, such as Baloch separatists, and continued to conduct attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan.³¹

Counterterrorism pressure: Taliban counterterrorism pressure has disrupted ISIS-K, but the group retains a significant support network and freedom of movement, General Kurilla told Congress in June.³²

In April, the Turkish and Pakistani intelligence agencies cooperated to arrest ISIS-K operative Ozgur Altun at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, according to the DIA and a Turkish media report.³³ Altun played a key role in the group's media and logistics, according to the DIA, citing press reporting.³⁴ Altun is suspected of directing plots targeting concert venues and other civilian sites in Türkiye and across Europe, according to Turkish media.³⁵

On June 4, Iran announced that it had dismantled an ISIS-K cell plotting suicide attacks across the country, media reported.³⁶ Iranian officials said they arrested 13 members of the cell and confiscated explosives in four provinces. ISIS-K is active in Iran and the group has conducted several attacks inside Iran in recent years, media reported.³⁷

Attacks: In May, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a suicide attack in Peshawar, Pakistan, that killed two police officers, according to the DIA, citing a media report.³⁸ ISIS-K claimed a June improvised explosive device attack in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province, the DIA stated.³⁹

USCENTCOM stated that it did not observe any attacks in Afghanistan claimed by ISIS-K or other violent extremist organizations (VEO) during the quarter that met USCENTCOM’s definition of a high-profile attack.⁴⁰

Clashes with other VEOs: During the quarter ISIS-K circulated a video in which it claimed to be operating training camps in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, according to a media report.⁴¹ In the video, ISIS-K also declared war on the Balochistan Liberation Army and the Balochistan Liberation Front in retaliation for attacks on its fighters in Balochistan Province’s Mastung district, according to the DIA, citing press reporting.⁴²

Finances: The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) said that ISIS-K received funding from ISIS global leadership to conduct external operations.⁴³ ISIS-K relies heavily on virtual assets like cryptocurrency to receive funding from leadership and international donors, Treasury said.⁴⁴ ISIS-K publications like Voice of Khorasan include quick response codes linked to cryptocurrency wallets.⁴⁵

Recruiting: The DIA reported that ISIS-K continued to focus its media efforts on recruiting.⁴⁶ For example, ISIS-K’s al-Azaim Media, which publishes content in multiple languages, exploits ISIS-K’s successful attacks and perceived injustices within its target populations to drive fundraising and recruitment, and to inspire attacks, the DIA stated.⁴⁷ ISIS-K probably focuses on Central Asian countries, particularly Tajikistan and the Central Asian diaspora, for its recruitment.⁴⁸ ISIS-K likely views Central Asian groups as especially receptive to its messaging and having greater access to external targets than Afghans, the DIA stated, citing press reporting.⁴⁹

External Operations and Influence: On June 13, Nasir Ahmad Tawhedi pleaded guilty in U.S. federal court to conspiring with, and providing support to ISIS-K and attempting to receive firearms to commit a federal crime of terrorism, according to the Department of Justice.⁵⁰ Tawhedi, an Afghan who had been living under immigration parole in the United States since 2021, was accused of planning an Election Day attack in the United States.⁵¹ At least one media outlet reported that ISIS-K directed the terror plot.⁵² Tawhedi is awaiting sentencing and faces up to 35 years in prison for both charges.⁵³

ISIS-K probably focuses on Central Asian countries, particularly Tajikistan and the Central Asian diaspora, for its recruitment.

Table 1.
Estimated Number of VEO Fighters in Afghanistan and Region

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	4,000-6,000
ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K)	2,000
Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)	200
Al-Qaeda	Fewer than a dozen core members

Source: DIA, vetting comment, 8/11/2025; DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 OES 019, 7/8/2025.

ISIS-K Embracing AI to Fabricate and Anonymously Distribute Propaganda

At a June 10 gathering of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (D-ISIS) in Madrid, member nations expressed concern over growing ISIS-K capabilities to inspire and instruct detailed attacks globally through sophisticated propaganda operations powered by artificial intelligence (AI), State reported.⁵⁴ Coalition partners emphasized the need to focus on radicalization among youth, observing that teens are becoming the primary lone actors, State reported.⁵⁵ Some partner counter-radicalization programs and communications campaigns have already reached 14 million people in Afghanistan, and are expected to expand in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan within the next 6 months, State reported.⁵⁶

ISIS-K published the latest issue of its English language Internet magazine, Voice of Khorasan, during the quarter after a brief hiatus, according to media reporting.⁵⁷ The issue included a review of AI chatbots and warned readers that some models stored user data, logged IP addresses, or relied on Western servers vulnerable to surveillance. ISIS-K recommended the best chatbot that could be used to maintain operational anonymity.⁵⁸

This is not ISIS-K's first foray into AI. In 2024, ISIS-K used AI to simulate a news broadcast celebrating the group's March 22 terrorist attack on Crocus City Hall in Moscow, media reported.⁵⁹ After a May 17, 2024, ISIS-K attack on Western tourists in Bamiyan province in Afghanistan, a pro-ISIS-K supporter disseminated an AI-generated news segment in Pashto under the title of "Khurasan TV," featuring a male news anchor in formal western attire. The supporter later produced at least nine AI-generated Khurasan TV "broadcasts" by June that year.⁶⁰

AL-QAEDA

The DIA reported that al-Qaeda leaders probably continue to comply with Taliban restrictions against external attack planning and other operations.⁶¹ As of late June, there were no indications that al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were rebuilding an external attack capability in Afghanistan against the U.S. homeland, according to DIA and State.⁶²

According to news reporting, the Taliban appeared to have relocated some al-Qaeda and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) members and their families from border areas to other parts of Afghanistan. The Taliban continue to provide al-Qaeda core members safe haven, State reported.⁶³

VEOS IN PAKISTAN

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP): During the quarter, the TTP continued to conduct cross-border attacks from Afghanistan into Pakistan, particularly targeting Pakistani security forces. State said the Taliban continued to provide the TTP safe haven.⁶⁴ TTP leader, Noor Wali Mahsud, has pledged allegiance to the Taliban and TTP insurgents operate from the Afghanistan side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, State said.⁶⁵

On June 24, the TTP claimed responsibility for a series of coordinated attacks on Pakistani security forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. On April 23, gunmen with possible ties to

the TTP killed two security guards working with a polio vaccination team in Balochistan province, State reported.⁶⁶ State said that the TTP insurgency creates an environment of insecurity that transnational threats such as ISIS-K and al-Qaeda exploit.⁶⁷

On April 27, Pakistan’s military said that it had killed 54 militants trying to infiltrate the country from Afghanistan, according to news reporting. The operation took place in North Waziristan, a district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in northwestern Pakistan, according to news and UN reporting.⁶⁸ The Pakistani military claimed to have recovered a significant cache of arms, ammunition, and explosives from the scene, according to news reporting.⁶⁹

Baloch Liberation Army (BLA): The DIA, citing a press report, stated that in June, Baloch militants reiterated that they want independence from Pakistan.⁷⁰ The BLA predominately focuses attacks against Pakistani military, police, and commercial industries, according to the DIA, citing a violence-tracking database.⁷¹



Taliban leader
Haibatullah
Akhundzada, 1990
passport photo.
(File photo)

TALIBAN ACTIVITY

According to State, Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada has increasingly asserted near-absolute control over policy, decision-making, and key national and sub-national level appointments in Afghanistan.⁷² Akhundzada frequently reshuffles officials to maintain control and combat any armed opposition efforts, including from ISIS-K, State said.⁷³ According to the UN Secretary-General, although ISIS-K attacks in Afghanistan continue, the Taliban remained in control of territory and power.⁷⁴ The Taliban allows other terrorist groups to remain in Afghanistan, State said.⁷⁵

Internal security: According to State, the Taliban views ISIS-K as an existential threat to its power and has taken action against it within Afghanistan.⁷⁶ The DIA reported that Taliban security forces conducted a large-scale operation against an ISIS-K “hideout” in Kabul in June, resulting in the death of at least one ISIS-K member.⁷⁷ The DIA assessed that while the scope and scale of ISIS-K attacks probably will increase during the upcoming traditional summer fighting season, ISIS-K will not challenge Taliban authority.⁷⁸ The continued ISIS-K attacks indicate that the Taliban is unable to prevent ISIS-K operations, State said.⁷⁹

ISIS-K infiltrations: Taliban officials continued monitoring and investigating Taliban security forces to identify ISIS-K infiltrators during the quarter, the DIA stated.⁸⁰ However, the DIA stated that such infiltrations likely are insufficient to significantly impact security in Afghanistan over the next quarter.⁸¹ In late January, Taliban officials arrested a member of its General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), alleging ties to ISIS-K, according to the DIA, citing a news report.⁸²

Anti-Taliban opposition: During the quarter, the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front and the Afghanistan Freedom Front claimed attacks against the Taliban that resulted in Taliban deaths, State said.⁸³ According to a June UN Secretary-General report, the Afghanistan Liberation Movement claimed responsibility for three attacks in Afghanistan in April targeting Bagram Air Base, the Interior ministry in Kabul, and a district office in Kapisa province.⁸⁴

As of early June, the Taliban had imported civilian unmanned aircraft systems components from China, the United Arab Emirates, and Europe to enable domestic production of reconnaissance drones, according to the DIA, citing a news report.

Foreign support: As of early June, the Taliban had imported civilian unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) components from China, the United Arab Emirates, and Europe to enable domestic production of reconnaissance drones, according to the DIA, citing a news report.⁸⁵ The Taliban almost certainly uses UAS for counterterrorism operations, the DIA stated.⁸⁶

U.S.-origin equipment: The Taliban likely uses at least some of the U.S.-origin ScanEagle UAS captured from the former Afghan government for counterterrorism operations, according to the DIA, citing a news report.⁸⁷

Reprisals against former officials: The DIA assessed that Taliban leadership is almost certainly not directing a reprisal campaign against former Afghan government and military members.⁸⁸ But the DIA also stated it was not able to verify persistent claims of targeted persecution against such individuals. Attacks against former Afghan government and military personnel and any reprisals were “ad hoc” actions by low-level regime members, the DIA stated.⁸⁹

Reprisals against returning Afghans: In early June, the United States announced a travel ban restricting and limiting the entry of nationals from 12 countries including Afghanistan, according to a White House media release.⁹⁰ Following the announcement, Taliban acting Prime Minister Hassan Akhund encouraged Afghans to return to Afghanistan, according to the DIA, citing a news report.⁹¹ Akhund said returning Afghans would be protected, even if they had worked for U.S.-led forces, the DIA stated.⁹² However, the DIA also stated that it expected reported reprisals among returning Afghan populations to increase during the next 3 to 6 months.⁹³

REGIONAL STABILITY

The DIA reported that some Central Asian States, as well as China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia, have engaged the Taliban regime on economic development, security assistance, and migration. These actions will probably improve the Taliban’s ability to combat ISIS-K and anti-Taliban resistance groups during the next year, the DIA assessed.⁹⁴

Central Asian States: As of mid-June, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have engaged with the Taliban regime to resolve tensions, while Tajikistan has sought to bolster security along its shared border with Afghanistan, according to the DIA, citing news reporting.⁹⁵ In mid-April, Tajikistan and Russian forces conducted a bilateral counterterrorism exercise near the border with Afghanistan.⁹⁶ On June 30, foreign ministers from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian-led regional security alliance, met in Kyrgyzstan to discuss ways to counter radicalization, terrorism, and extremism in the region.⁹⁷ Additionally, during the quarter Uzbekistan became the 89th member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, State said.⁹⁸

China: China’s primary security objectives related to Afghanistan remain the protection of Chinese citizens and investment projects in country and the prevention of cross-border terrorist movement into China, according to the DIA, citing press reporting.⁹⁹ China expects that continued counterterrorism, humanitarian, and economic cooperation will contribute to Afghanistan stability and therefore achieve China’s security objectives, according to

the DIA, citing news reporting.¹⁰⁰ In May, Afghan, Chinese, and Pakistani officials held a series of tri-lateral discussions in Beijing to discuss regional stability and counterterrorism cooperation, according to State and media reporting.¹⁰¹

India: India continued to engage the Taliban to maintain stability in Afghanistan, especially through development projects, according to the DIA, citing news reporting.¹⁰² In late May, India announced that it would begin issuing visas to Afghan nationals for the first time since August 2021. In May, a phone conversation between Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi marked the highest-level contact between India and the Taliban since August 2021, according to the DIA, citing press reporting.¹⁰³

Iran: As of April, Iran and the Taliban have been planning to establish additional consulates in Farah, Afghanistan, and Birjand, Iran, according to the DIA, citing press reporting.¹⁰⁴ Senior Iranian officials have engaged with Taliban officials on economic cooperation, water-related issues, and the repatriation of approximately 8 million Afghan refugees residing in Iran, according to the DIA, citing press reporting.¹⁰⁵

Russia: In May, Russia's Special Representative for Afghanistan announced that Russia is prepared to collaborate with the Taliban in combating ISIS-K in Afghanistan, according to the DIA, citing press reporting.¹⁰⁶ Russia also implemented a program to start delivering weapons and military equipment beginning next year to Collective Security Treaty Organization member states, with a specific focus of strengthening the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, according to the DIA and media reports.¹⁰⁷

Additionally, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on May 8, where the two countries issued a joint statement mentioning increased importance of collaboration on Afghan affairs to address security threats emanating from across the region, media reported.¹⁰⁸ It is unclear whether China and Russia are coordinating Afghanistan-oriented security efforts, State reported.¹⁰⁹ According to State, Pakistan's foreign affairs ministry stated that it participated in a Pakistan-Russia Joint Working Group to Counter International Terrorism on April 22, in Moscow.¹¹⁰

DIPLOMACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

During the quarter, State officials called out Taliban leaders for not living up to their counterterrorism commitments under the Doha Agreement and continuing to give safe haven to terrorist groups in Afghanistan.¹¹¹ State encouraged other partners and allies to join the United States in holding the Taliban to its commitments, State said.¹¹²

State said that it only engages with the Taliban to advance policy priorities, including counterterrorism, securing the release of American detainees, counternarcotics, and curbing illegal migration.¹¹³ According to State, the U.S. Government's Afghanistan policy is currently under a comprehensive review.¹¹⁴ The U.S. Government did not discuss the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul with the Taliban during the quarter, State reported.¹¹⁵

During the quarter, State officials directly called out Taliban leaders for not living up to their counterterrorism commitments under the Doha Agreement and continuing to give safe haven to terrorist groups in Afghanistan.



Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of South and Central Asia for Afghanistan and Pakistan Mary Bischooping talks with Qatar's Minister of State Dr. Mohammad bin Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi regarding mutual interests in Afghanistan. (State photo)

State manages its interagency coordination on counterterrorism priorities, securing the release of detained U.S. citizens, and regional security issues related to Afghanistan through its Afghanistan Affairs Unit (AAU), based in Doha, Qatar.¹¹⁶ The AAU works with the Qatari government via a Protecting Power Arrangement to support American citizens in need in Afghanistan, State reported.¹¹⁷

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY

State Limits Engagement with Taliban Pending Progress on Detainees

In June, after meeting with Taliban officials in Doha, Mary Bischooping, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of South and Central Asia for Afghanistan and Pakistan, instructed AAU staff to limit engagement with the Taliban to only when the

Taliban can show tangible deliverables on counterterrorism commitments and the release of unjustly detained citizens, State reported.¹¹⁸

Prior to the directive to limit engagement, direct contact between U.S. and Taliban officials had generally decreased since the start of the Trump administration.¹¹⁹ In May, AAU Chargé d'Affaires Karen Decker met with acting Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Doha to discuss several administration priorities, State reported.¹²⁰

State officials demanded the immediate release of all detained Americans in every interaction with the Taliban during the quarter, State said.¹²¹ State reported that Qatari representatives, in their role as Protecting Power, visited two American detainees and reported on their condition during the quarter.¹²²

As of June 30, six U.S. citizens had been released from detention in Afghanistan, State reported.¹²³ Several U.S. citizens remained detained, though State did not report how many other Americans remain detained in Afghanistan during the quarter.¹²⁴ For privacy, safety, and operational reasons, State said that it does not speak publicly on all the cases.¹²⁵

On June 24, State's Rewards for Justice program issued a \$5 million reward for information leading to the location, recovery, and safe return of American businessman Mahmood Habibi, who was abducted and detained in Kabul on August 10, 2022. Habibi has not been heard from since his initial arrest by the Taliban GDI and as of June 24, the Taliban had not provided any information about his whereabouts or condition, State said.¹²⁶ In early July, a Taliban spokesperson denied any Taliban role in Habibi's disappearance, media reported.¹²⁷

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NOT RECOGNIZED ANY ENTITY AS THE GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

Any references in this report to so-called "Taliban governance," the "Taliban's ministries" and "officials," a "former" Afghan government, and similar phrases are not meant to convey any U.S. Government view or decision on recognition of the Taliban or any other entity as the government of Afghanistan. The U.S. Government has not recognized any entity, including the Taliban, as the government of Afghanistan.¹²⁸

State to Shutter Enduring Welcome

Enduring Welcome (EW) is a whole-of-government effort to relocate and resettle eligible Afghan allies and their families from Afghanistan to the United States.¹²⁹ The previous interagency effort to relocate Afghan allies, Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), formally ended on September 30, 2022, and was replaced with EW.¹³⁰ State said that it intended to close EW by the end of FY 2025.¹³¹

Under EW, State funded relocation and related support for individuals at risk if they remain in Afghanistan, including travel and other related expenditures. State said that it would use residual balances and recoveries from completed or cancelled contracts to settle remaining legal obligations as soon as practicable.¹³²

Special Immigrant Visas (SIV) Issuances Continue: The U.S. Government continued to issue SIVs, but at a reduced rate in 2025. Afghan SIV applicants may self-relocate to a third country for processing and, once a visa is issued, continue on to the United States.¹³³ The deadline for submitting an initial application for Chief of Mission approval to apply for an SIV is December 31, 2025.¹³⁴ SIV applicants were exempted from the June 2025 announcement that fully or partially restricted entry of nationals of 19 countries, including Afghanistan, into the United States.¹³⁵

Relocation Efforts Paused: On May 29, State notified Congress that, as part of State's reorganization plan, the functions of the Office of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE) would be realigned into the Office of Afghanistan Affairs within the Bureau of South and Central Asia.¹³⁶ Media reported that the entire CARE leadership team was included in State's July 11 reduction in force.¹³⁷


Afghan relocation flights from Kabul to processing platforms in Qatar and Albania remained paused; no Afghans were relocated this quarter pending continued review of the relocation program.¹³⁸

Afghans have elected to voluntarily repatriate to Afghanistan from Camp As-Sayliyah and from a smaller relocation platform in Albania. Several Afghans also entered the local integration program in Albania, State said.¹⁵¹

More than 9,000 Afghans were relocated to the United States in the first quarter and more than 1,500 in the second quarter of FY 2025.¹⁵²

Figure 1.

Special Immigrant Visa Issuances, October 2024–May 2025



\$655 million in unobligated funds for EW remain as of June 30.¹⁵³

Asylum Reviews Continue: The U.S. Government continued to prioritize asylum applications filed by Afghan aliens paroled into the United States under Operation Allies Welcome and EW.¹³⁹

Other Immigration Pathways Limited

Refugee Program Suspended: Executive Order 14163 suspended admissions under the U.S. Refugee Program, except as required by court orders.¹⁴⁰

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) Terminated: On May 12, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the termination of TPS for Afghanistan, effective on July 14.¹⁴¹ The decision affects Afghans currently living and working legally in the United States under the program, including those Afghan allies who helped U.S. military, diplomatic, and humanitarian assistance efforts in Afghanistan over the past 20 years, according to media reports.¹⁴²

DHS said that the decision was based on a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) review of country conditions and consultation with State.¹⁴³ Permitting Afghan nationals to remain temporarily in the United States was “contrary to the national interest of the United States,” the DHS stated.¹⁴⁴

State said that the security situation in Afghanistan has changed since the suspension of operations at the U.S. Embassy in 2021, and that State continues to see Afghans who elect to return to Afghanistan voluntarily. State said that its “do not travel to Afghanistan” travel advisory website reports the risks and recommended precautions for U.S. citizens—not foreign nationals—in a foreign destination. State also reported that the U.S. Government has not received credible reports of systemic targeting of Afghan citizens solely for their past employment with the U.S. Government or NATO forces and that the Taliban’s general amnesty order originally issued shortly after the fall of Kabul remained in place during the reporting period.¹⁴⁵ However, there have been multiple media reports of Afghans who worked for the U.S. Government being targeted.¹⁴⁶

Those who have not obtained a lawful basis to remain in the United States may be eligible for an exit bonus and a government purchased plane ticket if they leave voluntarily through a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) mobile phone application, according to the DHS.¹⁴⁷ Those who do not depart may be subject to enforcement actions, including but not limited to detention and removal, without an opportunity to make personal arrangements and return to their country in an orderly manner, the DHS reported.¹⁴⁸

Vetting of Afghans in the United States: The DHS stated that all Afghans paroled into the United States in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 are subject to recurrent vetting by DHS and interagency partners.¹⁴⁹ Non-citizens who are a threat to national security, public safety, and border security are prioritized for apprehension and removal, the DHS stated.¹⁵⁰

Less than 1,500 individuals at Camp As-Sayliyah in Qatar (CARE-Doha) continued to receive State support while awaiting processing.¹⁵⁴

505 asylum applications filed by Afghans paroled in the United States during FY 2025 as of May 19.¹⁵⁵

22,122 asylum applications filed by Afghans from October 1, 2022 to May 19, 2025. The USCIS completed 20,925 of those cases.¹⁵⁶

5,300 Afghans interviewed by USCIS for refugee status in FY 2025, before EO 14163.¹⁵⁷

11,737 Afghan TPS recipients in the United States as of June 9, including Afghan nationals as well as those with no nationality who last habitually resided in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁸

U.S. Reviewing Whether to Designate Taliban as a Foreign Terrorist Organization

In May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that the United States was reviewing whether to designate the Taliban as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).¹⁵⁹ The U.S. Government has already designated the Taliban as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), and the Haqqani Network remains designated as an FTO and an SDGT.¹⁶⁰

UN sanctions imposed upon Afghanistan target more than 130 Taliban members and affiliated entities, and include travel bans, asset freezes, and arms embargoes, media reported.¹⁶¹ There are 61 UN-designated individuals who hold official positions in the Taliban regime, including Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, acting Prime Minister Mohammad Hasan Akhund, and acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, according to State and media reporting..¹⁶²

During the quarter, UN-sanctioned high-level Taliban officials continued to receive exemptions and waivers to travel throughout the region for bilateral and multilateral meetings.¹⁶³ For example, Muttaqi met with foreign ministers from Organization of Islamic Cooperation countries, including Türkiye and Pakistan, in June in Istanbul and also travelled to Qatar and Iran.¹⁶⁴ Sanctions relief remains one of the Taliban's demands included in the UN's draft plan for engagement with Afghanistan, media reported.¹⁶⁵

More than 30,000 Afghan farmers and agribusiness owners stopped receiving alternative livelihood assistance because of State's program cuts.

U.S. Cuts Alternative Livelihood Assistance to Afghan Poppy Farmers

State said that while its recent termination of U.S.-funded alternative livelihoods and agricultural development assistance may result in increased pressures to subvert the ban on poppy cultivation in future years, other donors maintained alternative livelihoods programs that support former poppy farmers in vulnerable rural communities.¹⁶⁶ More than 30,000 Afghan farmers and agribusiness owners stopped receiving alternative livelihood assistance because of State's program cuts.¹⁶⁷

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) Afghanistan Opium Survey was the only active State-funded project related to counternarcotics in Afghanistan following State's foreign assistance review. The UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey provides analysis on the cultivation, production, and trafficking of illicit drugs that affect U.S. national security interests. According to State, the survey remains unchanged from prior years. The State funded portions of the program are based at the UNODC Information Centre in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and UNODC headquarters in Vienna, Austria. Non-U.S. donors fund the portions of the program that take place inside Afghanistan.¹⁶⁸

State continued to participate in the UN Counternarcotics Working Group and smaller working groups on law enforcement, alternative livelihoods, and drug treatment and prevention as part of the UN-led Doha Process.¹⁶⁹

Regional analysts observed that Russia was looking to improve its relationship with Afghanistan to increase Russia's security and economic influence as well as strengthen ties with other Central Asian states.

TALIBAN ACTIVITY

Russia Becomes First Country to Recognize the Taliban Government

On July 3, Russia officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate authority in Afghanistan, media reported.¹⁷⁰ In April, Russia removed the Taliban from Russia's terrorist list.¹⁷¹ On June 3, Russia upgraded the Taliban's diplomatic representative to ambassador, becoming the sixth country to upgrade relations.¹⁷² Regional analysts observed that Russia was looking to improve its relationship with Afghanistan to increase Russia's security and economic influence as well as strengthen ties with other Central Asian states.¹⁷³

The Taliban continued to use international engagements, including participation in conferences and bilateral engagements, in part to further legitimize its regime.¹⁷⁴ In June, Russia, Pakistan, and Türkiye accepted Taliban-appointed ambassadors in their capitals, following China, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan, State said.¹⁷⁵ As of the end of the quarter, 28 countries had allowed Taliban members to take up diplomatic posts in their capitals.¹⁷⁶ Pakistani officials said that the "upgrade" of its Chargé d'Affaires in Kabul to Ambassador would contribute to cooperation in security, counterterrorism, economics, and trade, according to State, citing media reporting.¹⁷⁷

During the quarter, media reported on a UN draft plan to engage the Taliban that reportedly included provisions for transferring control of Afghan diplomatic missions to the Taliban as part of broader political engagement that includes lifting sanctions.¹⁷⁸ Last year, the UN General Assembly's Credentials Committee deferred a decision on credentials for Afghanistan, allowing the current Chargé of Afghanistan's Permanent Mission to the UN to provisionally participate in the 79th Session of the General Assembly. There were no changes to Afghanistan's representation at the UN during the reporting period, State reported.¹⁷⁹

ECONOMY

Economic Conditions for Afghanistan's Youth Could Fuel Instability

In April, the World Bank said that strengthening domestic revenue, diversifying the economy, supporting private sector development, and leveraging the potential of youth—especially young women—will be essential for building a more resilient and self-reliant economy in Afghanistan.¹⁸⁰

The World Bank reported that Afghanistan's economy is estimated to have grown by 2.5 percent in 2024, but it anticipates aid disruptions will slow it to 2.2 percent in 2025, before gradually recovering to 2.5 percent growth in 2026 and 2027.¹⁸¹ The current pace of growth remains too modest to translate into noticeable improvements in living standards. According to the World Bank, out of desperation, Afghan families are sending more children, teenagers, and women into the workforce. Poverty and unemployment continue to be widespread, with households facing reduced purchasing power. Employment for youth aged 15 to 29 remains severely constrained, especially for women, and those employed face low wages and limited hours.¹⁸²

Afghanistan's youth population—a bulge once seen as a key asset due to pre-2021 access to education and related economic opportunities—now risks becoming a driver of instability, according to the World Bank. By 2030, the World Bank said that 1.7 million more young job seekers will enter an already saturated market, which is far beyond what Afghanistan's economy can absorb.¹⁸³ Afghanistan's population is increasing at an annual rate of 2.4 percent, driven by a high fertility rate of 5.3 births per woman. The World Bank said the increase in youth population intensifies demographic pressures as the Afghan economy struggles to expand at a pace sufficient to support rising demands for jobs, education, and healthcare. Additionally, the return of refugees, which are nearly 2 percent of Afghanistan's total population, places additional strain on economic resources. According to the World Bank, these factors collectively heighten the need for job creation, the expansion of public services, and sustainable livelihood opportunities, posing significant challenges to Afghanistan's economic stability and long-term development.¹⁸⁴

Taliban Cuts Budget Amid Revenue Challenges

In April, media reported that Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada ordered a 20 percent reduction in staffing and budget across all public institutions, including the military. The cuts include salary reductions for both civil servants and military forces.¹⁸⁵ According to the World Bank, the cuts amount to 90,000 positions.¹⁸⁶

In FY 2025, 93 percent of the Taliban regime's spending was on wages and salary, reflecting “both the scale of the public workforce and limited flexibility in reallocating resources towards development or service delivery,” the World Bank stated.¹⁸⁷

During the quarter, media reported that Taliban officials said overflights through Afghanistan's airspace increased following the conflict between Iran and Israel. The Taliban Ministry of Transportation and Aviation charges aircraft transiting Afghan airspace \$700 for navigation services.¹⁸⁸ However, the Taliban was unable to collect the fees due to the freezing of Afghan bank accounts and sanctions, media reported. Overflight payments collected by the Taliban are through third-party intermediaries such as the United Arab Emirates or trip support firms. Media reported 6-month to 1-year delays in receiving invoices from Afghanistan's aviation authority.¹⁸⁹


Afghan Fund Assets Worth More Than \$4 Billion; No Funds Disbursed

On June 11, the Afghan Fund's board approved the Fund's audited financial statements for 2024. In a statement issued during the quarter, the Afghan Fund announced the new U.S. representative to the Afghan Fund's board: Treasury's Robert Kaproth, who is performing the delegable duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Finance.¹⁹⁰

As of June 30, the Fund's assets, including interest, were worth \$4.02 billion.¹⁹¹ (See Figure 2.) Previously, the Fund's board said in a statement that it was open to disbursing funds to the Asian Development Bank to address Afghanistan's outstanding arrears; however, as of June 30, it had not disbursed any funds.¹⁹²

In FY 2025, 93 percent of the Taliban regime's spending was on wages and salary, reflecting “both the scale of the public workforce and limited flexibility in reallocating resources towards development or service delivery,” the World Bank stated.

Figure 2.

Assets of the Fund for the Afghan People, as of June 30, 2025, in \$ Millions

Treasury said that it did not take any action this quarter to unfreeze Afghan Central Bank assets held in the United States. On January 15, 2025, then-President Joseph R. Biden continued the national emergency underlying the freezing of Afghan Central Bank assets for 1 year. President Donald J. Trump will need to renew the national emergency no later than January 14, 2026, for these funds to remain blocked.¹⁹³

HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

State Takes Over Administration of U.S. Foreign Assistance on July 1

In late March and in late May, State notified Congress that it intended to limit USAID's role to closing out terminated foreign assistance programs and that State would assume responsibility for administering foreign assistance programs approved by State leadership to continue, including programs currently financed by and functions previously managed by USAID on July 1.¹⁹⁴

The transition of global programming from USAID to State occurred under an accelerated timeline and with limited staffing because most USAID staff worldwide and in Washington, D.C., had been placed on administrative leave in February, leaving a significantly reduced staff to conduct operations. USAID reported that staffing constraints and limited time for planning hindered the effective transfer of institutional knowledge, restricted access to key

A World Food Programme NGO partner's tent headquarters in a village in Nuristan province offers a safe space for female beneficiaries to receive education and cash assistance. (WFP photo)



information systems, and complicated risk management related to personnel, contractual matters, and partner oversight.¹⁹⁵

U.S. Government Terminates All U.S. Assistance in Afghanistan

On April 5, the administration terminated all remaining State- and USAID-funded projects in Afghanistan, including life-saving humanitarian assistance previously granted waivers to continue, third-party monitoring contracts, and salaries for USAID in-country local staff.¹⁹⁶ By the end of the quarter, only three programs had resumed.¹⁹⁷ For details about terminated and active programs, see Appendix D.

Prior to program terminations, the U.S. Government was the largest humanitarian donor to Afghanistan, having provided more than \$2 billion to support the Afghan people since U.S. troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021.¹⁹⁸ However, State reported that the U.S. approach to assistance was not “sustainable” and had failed to achieve intended results.¹⁹⁹ The situation in Afghanistan remains “dire” and the Afghanistan population continues to suffer from poverty, unemployment, limited access to basic services, and natural disasters, all made worse by the Taliban’s oppressive policies, State said.²⁰⁰

On May 16, USAID BHA demobilized its Afghanistan Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and Response Management Team and transitioned responsibility for emergency response in Afghanistan to the USAID BHA Office of Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.²⁰¹ Despite a 95 percent reduction in staff in Washington and worldwide, remaining USAID BHA humanitarian experts continued to assess ongoing needs and coordinate with key stakeholders, including State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), AAU staff, and humanitarian aid workers. A regional State PRM coordinator assigned to the AAU in Doha will continue to monitor and report on the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan and related policy issues, State said.²⁰²

Growing Returnee Population Challenges Afghanistan

More than 1.2 million Afghans have returned or were forced to return from Pakistan and Iran in the first half of 2025, making the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan worse, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). UNHCR stated that returns in such large numbers have the potential to “destabilize the fragile situation” in Afghanistan.²⁰³

Pakistan: Under Pakistan’s 2023 “Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan,” Afghans in Pakistan without valid identity cards were required to repatriate by April 30.²⁰⁴ During the quarter, Pakistan continued to deport undocumented Afghans to Afghanistan, State said.²⁰⁵ Between April 3 and May 3, Pakistan deported more than 109,000 Afghans to Afghanistan, according to International Organization for Migration (IOM).²⁰⁶ The end of the quarter, June 30, marked the Pakistani government’s deadline for the voluntary return of registered Afghan refugees from Pakistan. Pakistan was expected to enact the latest phase of the plan in July.²⁰⁷

Iran: On March 20, the Iranian government required all undocumented Afghans to leave Iran by July 6. According to the IOM, 714,572 Afghans returned to Afghanistan from Iran between January 1 and June 29, of whom approximately 70 percent were forcibly deported.²⁰⁸ In June, more than 250,000 Afghans returned to Afghanistan from Iran due to tensions in the region including the 12-day Iran-Israel conflict, media reported.²⁰⁹

Returnees to Afghanistan face significant challenges, including limited access to clean water, heightened disease risk, and critical shortages of medicines at health facilities.²¹⁰ Many are returning to areas lacking adequate housing and require emergency shelter, rental assistance, and long-term housing solutions.²¹¹ Additional needs include livelihood support, mental health and psychosocial services to address repatriation-related trauma, and vocational training to facilitate reintegration and income generation.²¹²

The spike in Afghan returns from Pakistan and Iran combined with shortfalls in global humanitarian funding created increased challenges for aid agencies to support Afghan returnees at border crossing points during the quarter, State reported.²¹³ UNHCR’s latest appeal to protect 1.4 million Afghans who returned to Afghanistan received approximately \$216 million—or 28 percent—of the required needs, due to donor cuts, including a 40 percent cut by the United States.²¹⁴

Despite ongoing challenges, aid organizations are actively supporting returnees.²¹⁵ IOM is providing cash assistance to help cover basic needs and transportation from border crossings to home areas.²¹⁶ The WFP distributed food aid at entry points from Pakistan and Iran, while health organizations are conducting disease screenings for returnees arriving from Pakistan.²¹⁷

U.S. Government Terminates Funding for Programs Benefiting Women, Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law

In April, State terminated nearly all awards with activities in Afghanistan related to the empowerment and education of women and girls.²¹⁸ A number of USAID programs had previously been terminated or put on stop-work orders.²¹⁹ The U.S. Special Envoy for Afghan Women, Girls, and Human Rights left her post before the change of administration

on January 20.²²⁰ State said that the position was slated to be abolished as part of State’s reorganization of foreign assistance plan, along with the Office of Global Women’s Issues.²²¹

In addition, State terminated all programs supporting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Afghanistan—and has reduced the number globally, with the closure of the programming office within State’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, as part of State’s reorganization plan.²²² State reported that to date, the Taliban has not changed its oppressive policies against the Afghan people as a result of any U.S. policy decisions.²²³

The Taliban has placed restrictions on women’s and girls’ mobility and has banned women’s voices from being heard in public. These restrictions further exclude women from the public sphere and have created barriers to healthcare and employment access.²²⁴ During the quarter, the Taliban’s Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice undertook extensive efforts at the ministerial, provincial, and district levels to ensure enforcement of the restrictions, State said.²²⁵

The Taliban bans women and girls from participating in secondary and tertiary education, including medical education. According to UN reporting, nearly 8 out of 10 Afghan women aged 18 to 29 are excluded from education, training, and the workforce. The UN report further stated that Afghanistan still has one of the largest workforce gender gaps in the world, with only 24 percent of women participating in the labor force, compared to 89 percent of men.²²⁶

State said that while the Taliban has not formally published discriminatory policies toward ethnic and religious minorities, it has restricted Shias from taking public sector jobs and blocked Shia teachings and religious festivals. Christians, Ahmadis, Bahais, Hindus, and Sikhs have all reported increased pressure.²²⁷ During the quarter, the Taliban reportedly arrested and convicted six teachers for promoting Christianity and “infidel culture” under the guise of teaching English.²²⁸ The Taliban continue to prioritize religious education and expand public and private madrassas, State reported.²²⁹

Donors Worldwide Reduce Humanitarian Funding for Afghanistan

During the quarter, humanitarian agencies reduced life-saving services in Afghanistan due to global funding shortfalls, State reported.²³⁰ State PRM said that it was not aware of other donors providing funding for terminated State-funded programs. Despite increased needs, donors worldwide have continued to reduce humanitarian funding for Afghanistan.²³¹

State PRM said that it has not conducted an evaluation to assess the impact of terminated programs on Afghan returnees and internally displaced persons. Reporting from former humanitarian partners indicated that, absent U.S. Government assistance, maternal and infant deaths will increase, food insecurity will continue to deteriorate, and women and girls will be further removed from public life.²³²

In 2024, U.S. funding contributed approximately \$735.7 million, or 47 percent, of the total humanitarian funding requested for Afghanistan, according to UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) data. USAID BHA reported that the termination of U.S. funding to Afghanistan has led the United Nations to reprioritize and

State reported that to date, the Taliban has not changed its oppressive policies against the Afghan people as a result of any U.S. policy decisions.



Roza Otunbayeva (left), Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and Sima Sami Bahous, Executive Director of UN Women, attend the Security Council meeting on the situation in Afghanistan on June 23, 2025. (UN photo)

reduce geographic coverage of its humanitarian programs in Afghanistan. Sixty-eight percent of OCHA's partners reduced their target, 45 percent reduced their geographical coverage, and 42 percent reduced their staff, according to a March OCHA survey.²³³

This reduction is expected to deepen service gaps in food aid, healthcare, and protection support, particularly for populations affected by conflict and displacement, according to USAID BHA.²³⁴ More than 366,000 individuals are projected to lose access to emergency food assistance. Reduced health services have heightened risks for women and girls, especially in rural areas, where maternal care is limited.²³⁵ As of April, an estimated 3.5 million children and 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women were experiencing acute malnutrition—a 20 percent increase from 2024.²³⁶ The UN World Food Programme (WFP) said that it would halt food assistance by the end of 2025 without an additional \$650 million in funding.²³⁷

Changing Status of Awards Prompts Confusion Among Implementers

According to USAID, many USAID awards in Afghanistan were terminated twice—initially at the end of February 2025, with the terminations rescinded in early March, and then again on April 5.²³⁸ (See Table 2.) These abrupt reversals, including the final decision on April 5 to terminate all U.S. financed awards in Afghanistan, were made without prior consultation or coordination with staff in the field and were expected to take effect immediately, leading to significant confusion, uncertainty, and resource inefficiencies, according to USAID.²³⁹ Implementing partners were forced to make rapid operational decisions—such as adjusting staffing levels, managing office leases, and handling vendor contracts—with little notice.²⁴⁰ In several cases, partners began downsizing following stop-work orders or terminations, only to incur additional costs to rehire staff when those decisions were reversed and then had to downsize once again after the final terminations on April 5.²⁴¹

Table 2.

USAID Programs Affected by Changing Status Determinations

Program	Activity and Status
Urban Health Initiative (UHI)	A 5-year technical assistance project aimed at improving access to and quality of essential health services in five cities, with a focus on women, children, and vulnerable populations, including internally displaced persons and slum communities. USAID Afghanistan initially received a waiver to continue the program; the program was terminated the following week.
Assistance to Families and Indigent Afghans to Thrive (AFIAT)	Sought to provide health and nutrition services in rural areas, expand access to evidence-based interventions, promote optimal health behaviors, and collaborate with partners to manage and finance the public health system. USAID Afghanistan initially received a waiver to continue the program; the program was terminated the following week.
American University of Afghanistan (AUAF)	On June 26, USAID Afghanistan was informed the AUAF program was reactivated after initially being terminated. Following the Taliban takeover the AUAF shifted its campus to Qatar, and it also runs online classes for students unable to leave Afghanistan.
Women's Scholarship Endowment	Funded 207 scholarships: 81 in Oman and the remainder online at the American University in Afghanistan. After initially being terminated, restarted, and then terminated once again, the program was finally allowed to conclude instead on June 30, 2025, at the end of the academic year. On June 26, USAID Afghanistan was informed the program was once again reactivated and would be transferred to State effective July 1, 2025.

Sources: Ruchi Kumar, "U.S. College Grants for 208 Afghan Women Are Cut, then Restored—Yet Still in Limbo," NPR, 4/23/2025; USAID Afghanistan OFM, response to OIG request for information, 5/13/2025; USAID Afghanistan, response to USAID OIG request for information, 4/30/2025; USAID Afghanistan, follow-up response to USAID OIG request for information, 7/28/2025.

USAID awards to international organizations, such as the United Nations, may have continued implementation after award termination using previously disbursed USAID funds.²⁴² At the time that the WFP award was terminated on April 5, the WFP was in possession of roughly 24,540 metric tons of USAID BHA-funded food commodities intended for distribution to more than 6 million highly vulnerable Afghans across the country.²⁴³ In accordance with the terms of the award and to the extent logistically possible, the WFP worked to distribute this food stock by July 4.²⁴⁴

In February 2025, USAID issued a stop-work order for its third-party monitoring program and subsequently terminated the activity in March.²⁴⁵ Without third-party monitoring, the likelihood of misappropriation of U.S.-funded goods, equipment, cash, or other assets increased significantly, USAID said.²⁴⁶

Stop-Payment Order Results in Extra Costs for the U.S. Government

As part of the program termination process, State PRM award recipients were reimbursed for costs incurred in accordance with federal regulations, State guidance, and award provisions as applicable.²⁴⁷ USAID implementers reported many were still awaiting

Unmanned warehouses have become vulnerable to looting and theft, raising concerns about the spoilage or expiration of food commodities and pharmaceuticals, according to USAID.

payment.²⁴⁸ Recipients were directed to responsibly end program work and not incur any new costs after the effective date of the termination as well as to cancel outstanding obligations to the greatest extent possible.²⁴⁹

Incurred program costs: USAID staff noted that the rapid implementation of the stop-work orders, and the lack of consultation before stop-work orders were issued, led implementers to continue incurring fixed and overhead costs without delivering programmatic outcomes, resulting in wasteful spending of U.S. Government funds on operational expenses without impact.²⁵⁰

Payment delays: On April 5, USAID halted all disbursements to Afghanistan, including for completed work, pending detailed reviews by USAID and State.²⁵¹ USAID Afghanistan reported that there was lack of clarity on the justification and legal basis for the sudden decision, and questions surrounding who authorized it.²⁵² This led to confusion among USAID staff and implementing partners, processing delays, unpaid wages including for USAID local staff based in Kabul and, for implementers, difficulty accessing lines of credit.²⁵³

Additional delays occurred when Phoenix, the USAID payment system, was temporarily taken offline and USAID controllers lost certification access.²⁵⁴ Although controllers' access to Phoenix was restored, priority was given to making payments to implementers party to an ongoing court case in the United States, according to USAID.²⁵⁵ However, for Afghanistan, all payments remained subject to repeated reviews and higher-level approvals.²⁵⁶ Moreover, after certification in Phoenix, a separate request must be made to release the payment, a step that was not clearly communicated initially and caused additional delays.²⁵⁷ According to USAID, since January 20, nearly \$13 million in payments were delayed, resulting in about \$52,360 in Prompt Payment Act interest accrued as of June 10.²⁵⁸

Abandoned assets: USAID reported that it had to abandon equipment at 21 construction sites across Afghanistan related to power system development projects.²⁵⁹ These abandoned assets include partially built substations, transmission lines, and construction materials stored near Kabul.²⁶⁰ The equipment was originally purchased for \$137.8 million and had a depreciated value of \$119.3 million, according to USAID.²⁶¹

State PRM and USAID worked with recipients to complete final reporting, provide disposition guidance, collect refunds, and reconcile final award balances. Any open obligations will be de-obligated. Since final payments have not been issued for terminated awards, State PRM was not able to provide an estimate for what could be de-obligated.²⁶²

Program Close-Out Hindered by Security Risks and Operational Gaps

The termination of all USAID in-country awards has created a range of operational, security, and administrative risks.²⁶³ Severance payments and lease terminations have exposed partners to legal and financial liabilities under local labor laws.²⁶⁴ In some areas, local unrest has heightened security concerns, with risks of violence against partner or USAID personnel and the seizure of vehicles or other assets.²⁶⁵ Unmanned warehouses have become vulnerable to looting and theft, raising concerns about the spoilage or expiration of food commodities and pharmaceuticals, according to USAID.²⁶⁶

Budget limitations, time pressures, and reduced staffing resulting from the award terminations may have hindered implementers' ability to effectively monitor closeout activities and promptly report instances of fraud, waste, or abuse to the OIG and USAID award management, as required.²⁶⁷ These challenges also weakened partners' internal control systems, compromising their ability to effectively close out awards, according to USAID.²⁶⁸ Many partners lacked the time and resources to complete required reports or follow proper procedures, while staffing reductions hindered documentation, oversight, audits, and monitoring.²⁶⁹ Rapid subaward wind-downs created pressure to spend funds quickly, increasing the risk of errors, fraud, or theft, and the unavailability of former staff may impede future investigations.²⁷⁰ These challenges also limit USAID BHA's ability—given its own staffing reductions—to engage with partners in mitigating such risks proactively.

The reduced staffing footprint in USAID's Vetting Support Unit, combined with the scheduled departure of direct-hire staff, has further constrained the vetting process for active and terminated awards—delaying partner payments and closeouts.²⁷¹

State and USAID Implementing Partners Under Taliban Pressure to Donate U.S.-funded Humanitarian Supplies

State said that its primary humanitarian objective in Afghanistan during the quarter was to prevent diversion of U.S. Government funds and assets to the Taliban following the termination of its humanitarian projects.²⁷²

USAID reported that the abrupt termination of all USAID awards in Afghanistan heightened the risk of fraud and asset loss, including potential theft of USAID BHA-funded goods or property damage by staff or local communities frustrated by the sudden decisions.²⁷³ With no other USAID or U.S. Government-funded foreign assistance programs operating in Afghanistan to receive transfers, there was also an increased risk of USAID BHA-funded assets being seized by the Taliban.²⁷⁴ According to USAID, when possible, implementers sought to responsibly repurpose assets by donating them to other donor-funded programs or organizations operating similar activities.²⁷⁵

State PRM reported that it did not receive reports of forced asset seizure by Taliban personnel. State's implementing partners in Afghanistan reported that they resisted pressure from local Taliban personnel to donate State-funded humanitarian supplies following the termination of State-funded humanitarian assistance.²⁷⁶

However, USAID implementers encountered growing difficulties in carrying out approved property disposition plans for terminated programs.²⁷⁷ Despite receiving necessary approvals, local authorities in several provinces obstructed efforts, leading to the confiscation of vehicles, equipment, and other valuable assets. Implementing partner staff also faced harassment, intimidation, and operational disruptions, raising concerns about their safety and further hindering disposition activities.²⁷⁸ Throughout the reporting period, local security forces repeatedly disrupted implementing partner operations by forcibly entering compounds, seizing vehicles, equipment, cash, and documents, and temporarily detaining or interrogating staff.²⁷⁹

USAID reported that the abrupt termination of all USAID awards in Afghanistan heightened the risk of fraud and asset loss, including potential theft of USAID BHA-funded goods or property damage by staff or local communities frustrated by the sudden decisions.

Twice in May 2025, the Taliban raided the premises of a USAID BHA implementer in Kabul and forcibly confiscated all remaining program assets, including two mission-owned armored vehicles and 147 pieces of sensitive security equipment.²⁸⁰ The confiscated USAID BHA-funded items, worth an estimated value \$42,000, were intended to be transferred to other NGOs operating in Afghanistan, and the implementer had submitted the required documentation for the transfers according to Taliban procedures. The GDI's 02 Division seized five armored vehicles elsewhere in June.²⁸¹

These actions significantly hindered the close-out process, resulted in major asset losses, and left implementing partners with limited options, leading to the closure of multiple compounds and suspension of further asset transfers.²⁸² Remaining goods and program support items are expected to be disposed of by September 2025.²⁸³

USAID Afghanistan Staff Reduced to Core Closeout Team

Through September 2, 2025, USAID staffing is undergoing a phased drawdown.²⁸⁴ USAID Afghanistan's Institutional Support Contractors were terminated January 20, although a mechanism was reactivated to allow for all but one of USAID Afghanistan's contracting specialists to return to work in order to support critical agreement terminations and closeout efforts.²⁸⁵ Nearly all (14 of 15) USAID Afghanistan U.S. direct hire staff were placed on indefinite administrative leave on February 24.²⁸⁶ Four caretaker local staff in Kabul were separated on May 22, and most remaining USAID Afghanistan staff in Kazakhstan and Doha were scheduled to separate on July 1.²⁸⁷ Four U.S. personal services contractors will continue essential closeout duties until September 2, along with four foreign service officers in Almaty and one in Doha who accepted retention incentives to stay on duty for the USAID Afghanistan Mission through August 15.²⁸⁸

Table 3.

State of USAID Afghanistan Staffing

Type of Hire	Staff as of March 31, 2025	Staff as of June 30, 2025
U.S. Direct Hires	2	5
U.S. Personal Services Contractors	22	4
Foreign Service Nationals (locally employed staff)	5	1
Institutional Support Contractors	5	5

Source: USAID Afghanistan, response to USAID OIG request for information, 3/28/2025; USAID Afghanistan OFM, response to USAID OIG request for information, 5/13/2025.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Classified Appendix to this Report

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Enduring Sentinel, as noted in several sections of this report. The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

APPENDIX B

About the Lead Inspector General

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sections 401-424), established in section 419 the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Section 419 requires the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to appoint a Lead IG from among the Inspectors General of the Lead IG agencies upon the commencement or designation of a military operation that exceeds 60 days as an overseas contingency operation or receipt of notification thereof.

Lead IG oversight of the operation “sunset” at the end of the first fiscal year after commencement or designation in which the total amount appropriated for the operation is less than \$100,000,000.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out the Lead IG statutory responsibilities to:

- Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis a report on the contingency operation and to make that report available to the public.
- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S. Government-funded activities supporting overseas contingency operations, including those relating to the Middle East.

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations.

APPENDIX C

Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Report

This report complies with section 419 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. sections 401-424), which requires that the designated Lead IG provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on each overseas contingency operation, and is consistent with the requirement that a biannual report be published by the Lead IG on the activities of the Inspectors General with respect to that overseas contingency operation.. The Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the DoD IG as the Lead IG for Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES). The Lead IG appointed the State IG to be the Associate IG for OES.

This report covers the period from April 1 to June 30, 2025. The three Lead IG agencies—DoD OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG—and partner oversight agencies contributed the content of this report.

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OES, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or from Federal agencies, and the information provided represents the view of the source cited in each instance.

INFORMATION COLLECTION FROM AGENCIES AND OPEN SOURCES

Each quarter, the Lead IG agencies gather information from the DoD, State, USAID, and other Federal agencies about their programs and operations related to OES. The Lead IG agencies use the information provided by their respective agencies for quarterly reporting and oversight planning.

This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report may include the following:

- U.S. Government statements, press conferences, and reports
- Reports issued by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks
- Media reports

The Lead IG agencies use open-source information to assess information obtained through their agency information collection process and provide additional detail about the operation.

REPORT PRODUCTION

The DoD IG, as the Lead IG for this operation, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoD OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG draft the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review process of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the DoD OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG as independent oversight agencies.

APPENDIX D

Status of State and USAID Programs in Afghanistan

Table 4.

State Humanitarian Programs Terminated, as of June 30, 2025

Implementer Scheduled Duration Award Value	Activity Description
Unnamed implementer 9/1/2024–2/26/2025 \$34,560,000	Supported critical emergency health interventions, prioritizing maternal health, safe deliveries, midwifery training and emergency supplies in 32 out of 34 provinces in Afghanistan.
Unnamed implementer 1/1/2025–4/6/2025 \$15,500,000	Provided emergency health care and medical vocational training.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1/1/2025–4/5/2025 \$13,000,495	Provided emergency shelter for displaced Afghans, distribution of non-food items.
International Organization for Migration (IOM) 9/30/2024–4/5/2025 \$13,500,000	Provided emergency medical services, transportation support to move returnees away from unsafe borders between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.
IOM-Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 1/1/2024–4/5/2025 \$7,300,000	Supported reintegration activities including health assistance and sanitation support for Afghan returnees.
Norwegian Rescue Committee 9/30/2024–3/5/2025 \$3,000,000	Provided shelter, livelihoods, legal rights, access to essential services, and protection.
International Medical Corps 9/30/2025–4/5/2025 \$2,931,552	Supported water, sanitation, and hygiene programs, and protection of women and children from violence in Afghanistan.
International Rescue Committee 11/1/2024–4/5/2025 \$2,831,348	Provided health care and sanitation to prevent disease. Protection from violence for women and girls.

Implementer Scheduled Duration Award Value	Activity Description
Monitoring Implementer 7/23/2024-4/7/2025 \$2,352,314	Third-Party monitoring services for cooperative agreements and voluntary contributions in Afghanistan.

Source: State PRM, response to State OIG request for information, 4/11/2025; State PRM vetting comments 6/12/2025, State SCA/A vetting comment, 8/7/2025.

Table 5.

Other State Terminated, as of June 30, 2025

Program Award Value	Program Description
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA)	
Mine Clearing and Victim assistance programs (8 programs) \$27,855,369	Supported mine clearing, victim assistance, and monitoring and evaluation of the other programs.
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Office of Press and Public Diplomacy (SCA/PPD)	
Higher education (3 programs) \$3,500,000	Supported access to higher education for Afghans.
Media capacity building (1 program) \$1,000,000	Strengthened the capacity of Afghan journalists and media in Afghanistan.
Afghan Alumni Engagement (1 program) \$1,000,000	Supported virtual programming among U.S.-Government alumni funded exchange programs.
Employment Support for Women (5 programs) \$3,250,000	Supported employment solutions for Afghan women and business expansion for women's small businesses in Afghanistan.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL)	
4 programs \$14,819,751	Supported building accountability and justice documentation in investigating atrocity crimes against women, ethnic and tribal communities, and anti-Taliban resistance groups. Promoted children's rights in Afghanistan. Supported media reporting safely in Afghanistan.

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Program Award Value	Program Description
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)	
Counternarcotics and Support for Alternative Livelihoods, Drug Treatment, Access to Justice (10 programs) \$77,286,770	The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Drug Use Disorder Treatment and Care for the Afghan People (As of 2/28/2025) UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform (As of 2/28/2025) Counternarcotics Public Information Project (Interagency agreement with USAGM) (As of 3/28/2025) The Colombo Plan Afghan Women's Leadership Fellowship (As of 4/7/2025) United Nations Development Program Consolidated Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development - Access to Licit Livelihoods 2.0 (As of 4/7/2025) UNODC Afghan Opiate Trade Project Phase II (As of 4/7/2025) UNODC Monitoring & Evaluation and Impact Assessment of Community-based Agriculture and Rural Development (CBARD) and UN Women Service Points projects (As of 4/7/2025) The Colombo Plan Continued NGO Assistance to Training and Specialized Substance Use Disorders Treatment Facilities (As of 4/8/2025) International Development Law Organization Supporting Access to Justice through Non-State Actors (As of 4/8/2025) UN Women Delivering Family Support Services in Afghanistan projects (As of 4/8/2025)

Sources: State DRL, response to State OIG request for information, 4/25/2025; State PRM, response to State OIG request for information, 4/11/2025; State PM/WRA, response to State OIG request for information, 3/31/2025; State SCA/PPD, response to State OIG request for information, 4/14/2025; State INL, response to State OIG request for information, 7/10/2025, and State INL, vetting comment, 8/7/2025.

Table 6.

USAID Afghanistan Activities Still Active, as of June 30, 2025

Award Name Scheduled Duration Amount Obligated to Date	Activity Description
Woman's Scholarship Endowment 9/27/2023–9/26/2028 \$50,000,000	Assists Afghan women in obtaining a university or graduate education in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) fields of study, better enabling them to overcome barriers to gaining employment, raise their incomes, and help them achieve leadership roles within their families and communities.
Supporting Student Success in Afghanistan (SSSA) 1/1/2023–12/31/2026 \$27,284,620	Sustains access and improves retention in local, quality higher education opportunities for male and female students living in Afghanistan.
Global Health Supply Chain Management (GHSCM-PSM) 4/20/2015–11/28/2026 \$9,099,998	Serves as the central procurement mechanism for USAID Missions worldwide to purchase high quality contraceptives and other essential public health supplies. This activity implements USAID's policy of centralized contraceptive procurement by providing a simplified mechanism for the transfer, obligation, and disbursement of all USAID funds designed for procurement.

Sources: USAID Afghanistan OFM, follow-up to USAID OIG request for information, 6/10/2025; USAID Afghanistan OFM, Q3 Active Awards, USAID OIG request for information, 6/10/2025.

Table 7.

USAID Afghanistan Activities Terminated, as of June 30, 2025

Award Name Scheduled Duration Amount Obligated to Date	Activity Description
Supporting Transformation for Afghanistan's Recovery (STAR) 2/18/2021–9/30/2025 \$26,585,607	Supported household efforts to enjoy a sustained increase in agricultural productivity and income. STAR's WASH supported individuals to live in more sanitary environments with durable access to safe water for domestic use and support conflict-affected children to cope with shocks and stressors.
Interagency Agreement (IAA) with USIP "Information, Dialogue and Rights (IDR)" Activity 9/23/2022–9/1/2025 \$14,079,528	Protected Afghans' access to independent sources of information, facilitate inclusive dialogue, and promote fundamental rights for all Afghan citizens, especially for women, girls, and religious and ethnic minorities.
Afghanistan Support Program (ASP) 9/16/2022–9/15/2025 \$25,884,633	Provided technical assistance and \$5 million in grants to support Afghans' basic rights to access independent sources of information and engage in civic activities. Empowered journalists, civic activists and human rights defenders to defend the basic civil rights and freedoms that underpin civic engagement and free media.
Countering Trafficking in Persons (CTP III) 10/1/2024–9/30/2027 \$8,250,000	Reduced vulnerabilities to trafficking in persons by empowering Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and providing support services to vulnerable communities. Supported local CSOs' use of innovative and contextually appropriate approaches to provide support services to counter TIP in the country. Conducted multi-dimensional public awareness campaign on trafficking in persons and provision of comprehensive trauma-informed protection.
Exports, Jobs, and Market Linkages in the Carpet and Jewelry Value Chains 1/31/2019–4/30/2025 \$14,935,752	Supported the Afghan carpet and jewelry sectors as drivers of broad-based economic growth and sustainable employment in Afghanistan. Created jobs and exports within the sectors, driving \$20 million in direct-to-market sales of finished Afghan carpet and jewelry products and supported 5,000 new jobs, particularly for women.
Afghanistan Competitiveness of Export-Oriented Businesses Activity (ACEBA) 1/28/2020–4/26/2025 \$105,722,822	Promoted Afghanistan's sustainable, market-driven economic growth by enhancing the export competitiveness and market linkages of Afghan businesses.
Afghan Value Chains Program (AVCP) 6/9/2018–6/8/2025 \$75,672,170	Addressed food security crises and supported women in the agriculture sector.
Engineering Support Program 7/23/2016–8/1/2025 \$125,000,000	Provided quality assurance, monitoring, and other engineering analyses for the implementation of the Mission's construction projects since 2016. Provided engineering support as USAID terminates and winds down its entire infrastructure portfolio in Afghanistan including technical review and verification of past work such as construction documents, unpaid invoices, and termination costs.

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Award Name Scheduled Duration Amount Obligated to Date	Activity Description
Women and Men in Agriculture (WAMA) 10/1/2024–9/30/2029 \$59,910,649	Improved food security for all Afghans and expanded women’s empowerment and benefit by supporting sustainable agricultural livelihoods. Focused on private sector-led broad-based market systems development to reactivate the rural economy and preserve the gains of USAID’s investments in agriculture over the last two decades.
Engineering Services for SEPS Completion and NEPS-SEPS Substations (USACE) 3/7/2018–9/30/2025 \$20,151,240	Provided quality assistance, monitoring, and engineering analyses for the implementation of the Southeast Power Systems (SEPS) completion and Northeast Power System (NEPS)–SEPS Connector Substation construction project since 2018. Provided engineering support as USAID terminates and winds down its entire infrastructure portfolio in Afghanistan.
Accessible and Quality Basic Education (AQBE) 10/1/2023–9/30/2028 \$79,249,987	Provided safe, equitable access to quality learning for primary school-aged girls and boys, secondary school-aged girls. Improved the delivery of quality instruction in foundational skills and delivery of the support for student well-being by educators. Reinforced community school management and family engagement to sustain access to safe public and community-based education. Increased transition rate of community-based education students into public primary schools and sustained secondary education engagement and learning opportunities for adolescent girls.
Young Women Lead (YWL) 9/28/2023–9/27/2025 \$4,935,797	Expanded post-secondary education opportunities and increased access in fields of study where females are allowed at the post-secondary education level such as allied health, education, agriculture, and information technology. Allied health fields included anesthesia, dental prosthesis, medical technology, midwifery, nursing, and pharmacy. YWL increased the number of young Afghan women enrolled in short post-secondary education opportunities, enhanced job readiness skills and professional networks for young Afghan women.
Mission Buy-in DECODE (Field Support) 2/1/2024–9/30/2028 \$800,000	Implemented an external evaluation of USAID/Afghanistan’s Accessible and Quality Basic Education (AQBE) activity.
Afghanistan Integrated Youth Activity 10/1/2024–9/30/2029 \$62,000,000	Improved learning outcomes and livelihood opportunities for young women and men. Improved post-secondary technical and vocational education or learning opportunities for youth, with a focus on market-relevant, skills-based learning within agricultural sector and its related value chains. Additionally, supported youth, particularly, girls and young women, to acquire market-relevant skills to improve livelihood opportunities and engage in climate resilient agricultural value chains in their home, community, or other settings.
Assistance to Families and Indigent Afghans to Thrive (AFIAT) 7/10/2020–7/9/2025 \$117,000,000	Improved the quality of primary and secondary health and nutrition services in targeted rural areas; increased access to high-impact and evidence-based health and nutrition services; enhanced adoption of optimal health and nutrition behaviors by communities and households; and collaborated with partners to plan, finance, and manage the public health system.
Urban Health Initiative (UHI) 10/14/2020–10/13/2025 \$104,000,000	Supported filling gaps in access to and quality of essential health services in five urban cities. Focused on health of women, children, and other vulnerable populations such as internally displaced persons and communities living in slums.

Award Name Scheduled Duration Amount Obligated to Date	Activity Description
WHO Polio and Immunization Grant II: Polio Eradication Surveillance and Response (Field Support) 2/2/2022–9/30/2031 \$28,500,000	Monitored 16 priority epidemic-prone diseases and pregnancy-related deaths under an indicator-based surveillance component.
Local Health System Sustainability (LHSS) 10/1/2022–7/31/2025 \$13,999,997	Provided financial and technical support to the Afghanistan Social Marketing Organization (ASMO) to strengthen the organization's impact and sustainability. ASMO is a local, social marketing organization which promoted family planning, diarrhea prevention and management, and nutrition by nationally distributing health products at an affordable price and motivating Afghans to use these products through social and behavior change.
Afghanistan Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Activity (AMELA) 3/13/2019–3/12/2025 \$44,848,003	Contributed to ensuring USAID's development programs in Afghanistan achieved their intended results through strong performance management service provision in an efficient and cost-effective manner, focusing on evaluation technical support services, monitoring and technical support services, learning and adaptive management services, and program support services. AMELA was a nationwide activity available to offer monitoring, evaluation, learning and program support services across USAID/Afghanistan's offices.
Strengthening Rural Livelihoods and Food Security (SRL-FS) 7/15/2022–7/14/2026 \$80,000,000	Improved food security crisis and emergency level affected population groups in rural areas of Afghanistan; to help minimize the impacts of economic disruption and instability, drought and other recent shocks on vulnerable, and at-risk agriculture-based communities and livelihoods; and help minimize negative effects on productive agricultural assets in targeted provinces and districts of Afghanistan.
Support for Essential Services for Afghan Women and Girls 7/18/2022–7/17/2025 \$30,000,000	Responded to the immediate needs of women, girls, and vulnerable populations by providing comprehensive support services in the areas of protection, women's rights, and livelihoods. As per the UN Women's model, support would be implemented through local NGOs to provide immediate assistance for women's shelters/protection, grants to women-led CSOs, and livelihoods.
Rural Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (RU-WASH) 6/24/2020–6/23/2025 \$35,841,332	Addressed WASH needs in Afghanistan such as acute water and needs in underserved, rural, and peri-urban areas; equal sanitation facilities for girls and boys in schools; lack of adequate WASH facilities in healthcare facilities; service delivery and operations support to sustain critical WASH structures, including community-level structures; and issues related to the transmission of COVID-19 in schools and their surrounding communities in high-risk COVID-19 areas.
Afghanistan Resilience Trust Fund (ARTF) 9/29/2020–12/31/2025 \$174,404,114	Administered by the World Bank, a multi-donor pooled trust fund mechanism and Category 2 Public International Organization. ARTF provided a vehicle for donors to pool resources and coordinate their basic human needs support in Afghanistan. USAID directly supported five activities under the ARTF in the health, education, WASH, community resilience, and private sectors.

Source: USAID Afghanistan OFM, Q3 Active Awards, USAID OIG request for information, 6/10/2025.

APPENDIX E

Completed Oversight Projects

From April 1 to June 30, 2025, the Lead IG and partner agencies issued five oversight reports related to OES, as detailed below. Completed reports by the Lead IG and partner agencies are available on their respective web pages.

FINAL REPORTS BY LEAD IG AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Summary Report: Housing Foreign Non-DoD Civilians on DoD Installations—Lessons Learned from Prior DoD OIG Reports

DODIG-2025-098; May 22, 2025

The DoD OIG completed this lessons learned report based on common themes reported in previous DoD OIG reports to highlight issues related to DoD contracts that supported Afghan relocation. The lessons learned serve as considerations for DoD officials in future planning and implementation of operations where the DoD is responsible for housing foreign non-DoD civilians on DoD installations.

Lessons learned identified in the report included that the DoD should:

- Establish agreements among Federal agencies to define roles, responsibilities, and authorities. The lack of agreements across federal agencies can cause confusion, for example, unclear expectation of roles, and complications in establishing terms for reimbursement.
- Review contractor invoices before payment, ensure contracted medical personnel have proper license in the state they are operating in, and include specialty medical care in future missions.
- Utilize military civil affairs advisors to meet the needs of the civilian population and provide expertise in functions that are normally the responsibility of civilian authorities.
- Establish standard accountability procedures, for example on establishing methods to ensure the accountability of Afghan evacuee under DoD supervision.
- Consider selecting installations with existing perimeter and access controls to house foreign non-DoD civilians.
- Establish agreements with local, state, or Federal law enforcement organizations to ensure alleged criminal activity is addressed appropriately.
- Identify mission-essential requirements that cannot be funded due to restrictions, and if possible reprogram under other funds to resource those requirements.
- Develop risk assessment procedures to identify and plan for the return of the facilities to normal operations in a timely manner.

The DoD OIG concluded that the lessons learned in previous reports may be relevant to future operations like those in support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to secure the Southern Border of the United States as directed in a January 20, 2025, executive order that authorized the DoD to construct, operate, control, or establish contracts to detain migrants at or near the U.S. border with Mexico.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspection of Embassy Doha, Qatar

ISP-I-25-12; May 6, 2025

State OIG inspected the executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of Embassy Doha. Embassy Doha hosts the Afghanistan Affairs Unit and the Coordinator for Afghanistan Relocations Efforts at Camp As Sayliyah.

State OIG found that 1) the Ambassador modeled some but not all of State's leadership and management principles; 2) the embassy's political, economic, and public diplomacy sections advanced Integrated Country Strategy and State priorities; 3) the embassy had consular issues related to visa advocacy, access to the consular section workspace, and controlled item inventories; 4) the embassy had internal control issues in general services, facility management, human resources, and financial management programs; and 5) the embassy had information management internal control deficiencies related to training, records management, and the development of a mobile application.

State OIG made 18 recommendations to Embassy Doha. The embassy concurred with 15 recommendations and neither agreed nor disagreed with 3 recommendations. At the time the report was issued, State OIG considered all 18 recommendations resolved, pending further action. The recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Afghanistan: USAID Can Strengthen Coordination, Award Requirements, and Guidance to Safeguard Implementers and Manage Taliban Engagement

5-000-25-002-P; May 28, 2025

USAID OIG conducted this audit to assess USAID's efforts in Afghanistan to safeguard its implementers and activities by 1) mitigating security and safety risks and 2) managing the impact of Taliban interference.

After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, USAID continued to fund programs that supported livelihoods, agriculture, education, and access to lifesaving food and healthcare in the country. USAID depended on NGOs to implement these programs. Given the political and security situation, USAID and its implementers faced a complex and dangerous operating environment with numerous risks, including safety threats as well as Taliban interference in the delivery of aid to Afghans.

USAID OIG determined that USAID took effective steps to mitigate security and safety risks for implementers in Afghanistan, but coordination and award requirements were inconsistent between operating units. Specifically, USAID/Afghanistan, the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, and the Office of Security lacked internal coordination and did not consistently direct implementers to develop plans or report incidents to mitigate security and safety risks.

USAID OIG also determined that USAID and implementers took effective steps to manage the impact of Taliban interference, but USAID did not provide clear guidance for implementer engagements with Taliban representatives. Consequently, Taliban representatives used these

engagements to gain information and access to USAID’s activities. In addition, without specific USAID guidance, Taliban officials could leverage agreements with implementers to exert control in ways that inappropriately benefit the goals of Afghanistan’s de facto government.

USAID OIG made four recommendations to better safeguard USAID’s implementers and USAID-funded activities in Afghanistan. USAID agreed with three recommendations and disagreed with one recommendation.

In May 2025, USAID officials reported that all awards in Afghanistan were terminated, and that all USAID staff whose work related to these awards were expected to be separated by September 2, 2025. All USAID programs and awards that remained active were transferred to State effective July 1, 2025. Based on the change in USAID’s operations, USAID OIG considered all four recommendations as overcome by events and therefore closed.

FINAL REPORTS BY PARTNER IG AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Participation in the Handling of Afghan Evacuees During Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome

25-056; June 10, 2025

DoJ OIG conducted this audit to assess the effectiveness of the FBI’s coordination with its Federal partners to support Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome.

In July 2021, the U.S. Government initiated Operation Allies Refuge (OAR), led by State, to relocate Afghan nationals who were eligible for U.S. Special Immigrant Visas. After the fall of the Afghan government to the Taliban in August 2021, the U.S. Government initiated Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), led by DHS, to facilitate the entry of around 90,000 vulnerable Afghans into the United States through a broad range of services, such as immigration processing and resettlement support.

The FBI supported OAR and OAW by, among other duties, screening and vetting Afghan refugees being resettled in the United States to ensure they did not pose a national security risk.

More specifically, DoJ OIG determined that FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) Operations Branch was able to utilize its existing process for screening individuals seeking to enter the United States. A review of TSC data identified 55 Afghan evacuees, as of May 2023, who were on the terrorist watchlist but still made it to a U.S. port of entry as part of the evacuation or who were added to the watchlist during the process of evacuation and resettlement in the United States.

DoJ determined that the FBI notified the appropriate external agencies at the time of watchlist identification and followed all required internal processes to mitigate any potential threat. As of July 2024, DoJ OIG found that nine of these evacuees remained on the watchlist, and were being tracked, as appropriate. The remaining 46 were removed from the watchlist for a variety of reasons, which included a determination by the FBI that the individual was no longer considered a threat to the United States.

DoJ OIG did not make any formal recommendations to the FBI. Accordingly, the FBI opted not to provide an official response to the report. However, the report included input from FBI officials and other federal partners gathered throughout the audit.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with Taliban-Led Ministries: State Department's Implementing Partners' MOUs Have Had Mixed Effect on Assistance Delivery

SIGAR 25-22-AR; April 28, 2025

SIGAR conducted this audit to determine the extent to which: 1) State's implementing partners have entered into agreements with the Taliban to facilitate program implementation; 2) those agreements were completed and reviewed in accordance with applicable requirements; and 3) agreements with the Taliban have affected program implementation.

According to SIGAR, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan since the Taliban took over the country has totaled about \$3.71 billion. These funds have supported humanitarian and development efforts, such as food security, agriculture, health, and education, as well as human rights, particularly the rights of women, girls, and minority communities. State partners with public international organizations, NGOs, and other government entities to deliver this aid.

SIGAR examined practices of State implementing partners from August 15, 2021, through December 31, 2023. SIGAR found that 16 out of 37 State implementing partners signed memoranda of understanding (MoU) with Taliban-led governing institutions for activities conducted during that time.

While State and its implementing partners reported that MOUs with the Taliban have not had significant negative impacts on assistance activities, the Taliban's requirement to complete MOUs gives the Taliban a powerful means of influencing U.S.-funded activities. SIGAR recommended that State consider directing State bureaus with projects in Afghanistan to review implementing partners' signed MOUs for consistency with departmental assistance objectives, legal obligations, and other potential concerns.

SIGAR made one recommendation in this report. State concurred with the recommendation and added that a foreign assistance review initiated on January 20, 2025, was ongoing at the time the audit was being conducted. At the time the report was issued, the recommendation was considered open pending the results of the foreign assistance review and of State's assistance posture in and outside of Afghanistan.



APPENDIX F

Ongoing Oversight Projects

Tables 8 and 9 list the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OES.

Table 8.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OES by Lead IG Agencies, as of June 30, 2025

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the DoD's Management of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Contract for the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts at Camp As Sayliyah (Project no. D2025-D000RJ-0029.000)

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's management of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) V contract in support of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE) Doha at Camp As Sayliyah (CAS).

Table 9.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OES by Lead IG Partner Agencies, as of June 30, 2025

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

National Snapshot of Recent Trends in the Refugee Resettlement Program (Project no. A-09-23-01009)

To 1) summarize nationwide data on the Office of Refugee Resettlement Program; 2) identify recent trends in participation and outcomes; and 3) identify any challenges encountered by states, replacement designees, and domestic resettlement agencies and other non-profit organizations in administering ORR-funded benefits and services.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Review of Asylum Application Adjudication Processing in Response to Ahmed vs. DHS (Project no. 24-015-ISP-USCIS)

To determine whether missed aliases or incomplete resolution of potential matches to derogatory records have increased following the Ahmed vs. DHS settlement agreement.

Evaluation of DHS' Monitoring of the End of Immigration Parole (Project no. 24-013-ISP-DHS)

To assess whether DHS has processes, procedures, and resources to monitor the end of immigration parole to ensure parolees are lawfully present in the U.S. and determine what enforcement consequences exist for parolees who stay in the U.S. after parole expiration or revocation.

CBP's Screening of Visa Holders That Received Waivers from Department of State (Project no. 24-011-AUD-CBP)

To determine the extent to which CBP was aware of Department of State policy changes to grant certain categories of visas without in-person interviews and biometrics; and the extent to which CBP can identify and fully screen visa holders with waivers upon arrival at United States ports of entry.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

U.S.-Funded Capital Assets in Afghanistan (Project no. SIGAR-E-025)

To re-evaluate and update SIGAR's prior capital assets report to determine the current status of these assets, including the extent to which the Taliban, or other actors in Afghanistan, have maintained and use these assets.

Follow on Performance Audit of State's Demining Activities in Afghanistan (Project no. SIGAR-161A)

To determine the extent to which State performed all required oversight activities including annual reviews of award risk assessment and monitoring plans, quarterly reviews of performance progress and financial reports, and final review memoranda; State developed measurable award agreement targets and objectives and connected them to higher level goals; and funds provided for demining activities have directly benefited the Taliban regime, or prohibited entities and individuals.

APPENDIX G

Hotline and Investigations

HOTLINE ACTIVITY

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority.

During the quarter, the DoD OIG Hotline received one allegation and referred one case related to OES or Afghanistan. State OIG referred 11. USAID OIG received 25 allegations. In some instances, a case may contain multiple allegations.

INVESTIGATIONS

The DoD OIG's criminal investigative component, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), maintained investigative personnel in Bahrain and Kuwait, where they worked on cases related to OES and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). DCIS agents also worked on OES/OFS-related cases from offices in the United States. State OIG and USAID OIG investigators worked on cases related to OES/OFS from Washington, D.C., El Salvador, Germany, Israel, South Africa, and Thailand.

During the quarter, investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 28 open investigations, and closed 2 investigations. They made one referral to the Department of Justice during this quarter.

The Lead IG agencies and their partners coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support. The investigative partner agencies consist of representatives from DCIS, State OIG, USAID OIG, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.



ACRONYMS

Acronym	
AAU	Afghanistan Affairs Unit
AI	artificial intelligence
AQIS	al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
BHA	USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
BLA	Baloch Liberation Army
CARE	State Office of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
D-ISIS	Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
EW	Enduring Welcome
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization
FY	fiscal year
GDI	(Taliban's) General Directorate of Intelligence
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISIS-K	ISIS-Khorasan
Lead IG	Lead Inspector General
Lead IG agencies	DoD, State, and USAID OIGs
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Acronym	
OES	Operation Enduring Sentinel
OFS	Operation Freedom's Sentinel
OIG	Office of Inspector General
PRM	State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
SDGT	Specially Designated Global Terrorist
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIV	Special Immigrant Visa
State	Department of State
Treasury	Department of the Treasury
TPS	Temporary Protected Status
TTP	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
UAS	unmanned aircraft systems
UN	United Nations
UNODC	UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Afghanistan Opium Survey
UNHCR	UN Refugee Agency
U.S.	United States
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
VOA	Voice of America
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	UN World Health Organization





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