

**LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS**



# **OPERATION ENDURING SENTINEL**

**AND OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO**

# **AFGHANISTAN**



**JULY 1, 2025–DECEMBER 31, 2025**



**On the cover:** Afghans return to their homeland through the Islam Qala border crossing in Herat province on July 20, 2025, following a sharp rise in mass returns from Iran. (UNHCR photo)



We are pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report to Congress on Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES). This report discharges our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to Section 419 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

In October 2021, the Department of Defense (DoD) initiated OES as the U.S. mission to conduct over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations against threats emanating from Afghanistan. The DoD also engages in security cooperation activities with Central Asian and South Asian regional partners to build their border security and counterterrorism capacity.

This report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OES, as well as the work of the DoD, the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to further the U.S. Government's policy goals in Afghanistan. This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies—the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs—and our partner oversight agencies. Due to the U.S. Government shutdown, this report covers two quarters: July 1 through December 31, 2025.

Handwritten signature of Platte B. Moring, III in black ink.

**Platte B. Moring, III**  
Lead Inspector General for OES  
Inspector General  
U.S. Department of Defense

Handwritten signature of Arne B. Baker in black ink.

**Arne B. Baker**  
Acting Associate Inspector General  
for OES  
Senior Official Performing the Duties  
of the Inspector General  
U.S. Department of State

Handwritten signature of Van Nguyen in black ink.

**Van Nguyen**  
Acting Deputy Inspector General  
Performing the Duties of  
the Inspector General  
U.S. Agency for International  
Development





Afghans return to their homeland through the Islam Qala border crossing in Herat province on July 20, 2025, following a sharp rise in mass returns from Iran. (UNHCR photo)

# CONTENTS

JULY 1, 2025–DECEMBER 31, 2025

## 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## 4 MISSION UPDATE

- 5 Funding
- 5 Security
- 8 Diplomacy and Governance
- 10 Enduring Welcome
- 12 Humanitarian Assistance

## 14 APPENDIXES

- 14 Appendix A:  
Classified Appendix to this Report
- 14 Appendix B:  
About the Lead Inspector General
- 15 Appendix C:  
Methodology for Preparing this  
Lead IG Report
- 16 Appendix D:  
Completed Oversight Projects
- 19 Appendix E:  
Ongoing Oversight Projects
- 19 Appendix F:  
Planned Oversight Projects
- 20 Appendix G:  
Hotline and Investigations
- 21 Acronyms
- 22 Map of Afghanistan
- 23 Endnotes





At the border crossing point in Torkham, UNHCR receives and assists Afghans being returned from Pakistan on September 3, 2025. (UNHCR photo)

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) and al-Qaeda maintained a limited presence in Afghanistan but continued to threaten U.S. interests in the region.**<sup>1</sup> ISIS-K aspired to attack the West, claimed multiple low-casualty attacks against the Taliban, and continued efforts to recruit new members and raise funds.<sup>2</sup> Al-Qaeda and its affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) likely maintained several training camps in Afghanistan but were not rebuilding an attack capability.<sup>3</sup>

**Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) continued to conduct attacks in Pakistan.** Pakistan, which believes the TTP is based in Afghanistan, conducted retaliatory airstrikes in Afghanistan, including in Kabul.<sup>4</sup> The two sides agreed to a ceasefire, which has tentatively held, but efforts to mediate a lasting agreement were unsuccessful.<sup>5</sup> The Taliban worked to counter the TTP recruiting and training and sought to preempt attacks on Pakistan.<sup>6</sup> However, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed that the Taliban's efforts to enforce restrictions against the TTP would probably have a limited effect.<sup>7</sup>

**In November, President Trump convened a meeting of the presidents of five Central Asian countries at the White House.** The summit's participants discussed enhancing counterterrorism cooperation.<sup>8</sup> The United States continued to engage with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan on border security.<sup>9</sup>

**State was reviewing the possibility of designating the Taliban as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.**<sup>10</sup> The Taliban is already designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and is not recognized by the United States as the government in Afghanistan.<sup>11</sup>

**Enduring Welcome, the U.S. Government effort to relocate and resettle eligible Afghan allies and their families from Afghanistan to the United States, continued to wind down.**<sup>12</sup> The processing platform in Qatar is expected to close by the end of FY 2026.<sup>13</sup>

## MISSION UPDATE

Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES) is the Department of Defense (DoD) operation in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility to contain terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan and protect the U.S. homeland by conducting over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations against those threats. The United States seeks to protect U.S. citizens, secure the release of all Americans detained in Afghanistan, and mitigate terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan.<sup>14</sup>

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) reported no change to the OES lines of effort and desired end states during the July 1 to December 31, 2025, reporting period.<sup>15</sup>

OES replaced Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), which the DoD launched in 2015 following the end of U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan. During the OFS mission, U.S. forces trained, advised, and assisted Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and conducted counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda. OES began on October 1, 2021, following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan.<sup>16</sup>

**A man looks through rubble of his destroyed house after the 6.0 magnitude earthquake in Kunar province, Afghanistan on September 3, 2025. (WFP photo)**



**Overall U.S. Central Command costs for ISR activities in the region encompassing OES was \$72.2 million for the period October 1 to December 31.**

## FUNDING

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer OUSD(C) was unable to report obligations for OES during the reporting period. In July, the OUSD(C) reported that DoD obligations for OES exceeded \$4.2 billion during FY 2025.<sup>17</sup> However, due to the way that the Military Services report obligations to the OUSD(C), this figure includes many costs for activities not related to Afghanistan.

In 2025, the OUSD(C) reported that it revised how it calculated costs associated with OES. For FY 2026, the Military Services requested an estimated \$218 million in funding for OES, a figure that reflects this revision.<sup>18</sup> As of the end of the reporting period, the OUSD(C) continued to work with the Services to calculate FY 2026 obligations.

Similarly, it is difficult to pinpoint the costs associated with any intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) flights related to Afghanistan, as such costs are captured by region and not by overflight of a specific country. Overall USCENTCOM costs for ISR activities in the region encompassing OES was \$72.2 million for the period October 1 to December 31.<sup>19</sup>

## SECURITY

In 2020, the United States and the Taliban entered into the Doha Agreement, under which the Taliban made various counterterrorism commitments. State said that while it continued to urge the Taliban to fulfill these commitments, the Taliban has not lived up to its commitments under the Doha Agreement. It continued to give safe haven to terrorist groups in Afghanistan, State said.<sup>20</sup>

## THE VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION (VEO) THREAT

According to State, ISIS–Khorasan (ISIS-K) remained a terrorist threat to U.S. interests in the region. ISIS-K aspires to attack the West, including the United States. Al-Qaeda core members and its regional affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), may also pose a threat.<sup>21</sup> The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that ISIS-K and al-Qaeda maintain a limited presence in Afghanistan.<sup>22</sup> (See Table 1.)

Table 1.  
**Estimated Number of VEO Fighters in Afghanistan and Region**

<b>Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</b>	4,000-6,000
<b>ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K)</b>	2,000
<b>Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)</b>	200
<b>Al-Qaeda</b>	Fewer than a dozen core members

Source: DIA, vetting comment, 2/10/2025.

**ISIS-K:** The group claimed multiple low-casualty attacks against the Taliban, according to the DIA, citing open-source reporting. ISIS-K continued efforts to recruit new members and raise funds using its propaganda arm, al-Azaim Media.<sup>23</sup> The Taliban, which views ISIS-K as its primary security threat, routinely conducted operations that occasionally resulted in the elimination or arrest of ISIS-K members.<sup>24</sup> In December, the United Nations Assistance

Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that ISIS-K attacks in Afghanistan had decreased in frequency and scale.<sup>25</sup>

Despite its waning capabilities in Afghanistan, ISIS-K continued activity in Pakistan, often targeting Pakistani military and government personnel, the DIA said.<sup>26</sup> ISIS-K probably focused its recruitment efforts on Central Asian countries, particularly Tajikistan, and on members of the Central Asian diaspora worldwide.<sup>27</sup> The DIA reported that an Afghan national who allegedly provided support to ISIS-K in Afghanistan was arrested in Virginia in December.<sup>28</sup>

**Al-Qaeda:** The DIA reported “no indication” that al-Qaeda was rebuilding an attack capability in Afghanistan.<sup>29</sup> Al-Qaeda and AQIS “very likely” maintained an amicable relationship with the Taliban and likely covertly circumvented Taliban restrictions to work with external militant groups to conduct operations, despite ostensibly adhering to Taliban restrictions on militant activities.<sup>30</sup> However, al-Qaeda and AQIS likely maintained several training camps in Afghanistan, the DIA said.<sup>31</sup>

On November 24, State’s Rewards for Justice program offered a \$10 million reward for information related to Osama Mehmood, the leader of Afghanistan-based AQIS, and a \$5 million reward for information related to his deputy, Atif Yahya Ghouri.<sup>32</sup>

**Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP):** Though not a designated terrorist target under OES, the TTP maintained the largest and most active presence in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. The TTP continued to conduct attacks in Pakistan, and these attacks were an ongoing source of tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan.<sup>33</sup> Pakistan responded to the attacks with airstrikes inside Afghanistan. Several rounds of coordinated cross-border retaliatory ground attacks by Taliban forces followed, targeting Pakistani border posts.<sup>34</sup> Efforts to mediate between the two sides were unsuccessful.<sup>35</sup>

The DIA reported that the Taliban “proactively countered” the TTP recruiting and training and sought to preempt attacks on Pakistan emanating from Afghan soil.<sup>36</sup> In mid-December, the Taliban enlisted more than a thousand Afghan clerics, tribal elders, and religious leaders to issue a joint declaration stating that any Afghans conducting military operations outside Afghanistan would be considered “rebels against the state.”<sup>37</sup> However, the DIA assessed that enforcement of these restrictions is “uneven” and “probably will have a limited effect” on the group’s attack tempo in Pakistan during the next 3 months.<sup>38</sup> Additionally, al-Qaeda likely collaborated with the TTP to expand its operational presence in Pakistan and across the Indian subcontinent.<sup>39</sup>

## U.S. SECURITY ACTIVITY

The DoD conducts counterterrorism operations and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities to contain terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan and protect the U.S. homeland.<sup>40</sup> U.S. forces conduct counterterrorism operations from outside Afghanistan’s borders, mainly from bases in Qatar.<sup>41</sup> The OUSD(P) reported that there were no airstrikes in Afghanistan during the period July 1 to December 31.<sup>42</sup>

Despite its waning capabilities in Afghanistan, ISIS-K continued activity in Pakistan, often targeting Pakistani military and government personnel, the DIA said.

**The OUSD(P) reported that the DoD has not received orders to reoccupy Bagram Air Base and that no U.S. military personnel have visited the base since 2021.**

**U.S. support for regional border security:** The DoD and State cooperate with various Central Asian and South Asian partners to build counterterrorism and border security capabilities to prevent militants based in Afghanistan from conducting attacks in neighboring countries and to counteract terrorist recruitment efforts.<sup>43</sup> On November 6, President Trump convened a meeting of the presidents of five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) for the first-ever “C5+1” Presidential Summit at the White House. Leaders discussed enhancing counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and C5 countries, State reported.<sup>44</sup> State continued to engage with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan on border security.<sup>45</sup>

Although State’s Foreign Assistance Review terminated some counterterrorism-funded programs in Central Asia, State’s border security programs and many other counterterrorism programs remained active in the region.<sup>46</sup> State resumed all border security, detentions, and investigations programming in Central Asia. State said that it has no programming inside Afghanistan.<sup>47</sup>

**U.S.-origin equipment:** The DIA reported that it no longer tracked Taliban and VEO use of military materiel that the United States previously provided to the ANSDF. This sunseting process began in June 2025, as the DIA shifted its focus to other emerging intelligence production priorities.<sup>48</sup>

**Conventional weapons destruction:** As part of State’s Foreign Assistance Review, State terminated all conventional weapons destruction awards in Afghanistan as of April 4.<sup>49</sup> The awards were in the final stages of closeout as of the end of December.<sup>50</sup> Prior to the terminations, State supported U.S. conventional weapons destruction and related activities, including humanitarian demining, surveys, munitions destruction, mine-risk education, and victim assistance in Afghanistan.<sup>51</sup> From January 2024 to November 2025, there were approximately 233 deaths and 837 injuries from explosive ordnance in Afghanistan; 77 percent of the casualties were children.<sup>52</sup>

**Reprisals against former officials:** State said that there were no reprisals against former Afghan government officials or security personnel known to have been sanctioned by the Taliban during the reporting period.<sup>53</sup> However, between July 1 and September 30, UNAMA reported 21 instances of documented arbitrary arrest and detention and three instances of ill treatment and torture of former government officials and ANSDF members. In addition, UNAMA reported an estimated 14 killings of former ANSDF members.<sup>54</sup>

**THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NOT RECOGNIZED ANY ENTITY AS THE GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**

Any references in this report to so-called “Taliban governance,” the “Taliban’s ministries” and “officials,” a “former” Afghan government, and similar phrases are not meant to convey any U.S. Government view or decision on recognition of the Taliban or any other entity as the government of Afghanistan. The U.S. Government has not recognized any entity, including the Taliban, as the government of Afghanistan.<sup>55</sup>

## DIPLOMACY AND GOVERNANCE

The U.S. Government’s overall policy objectives in Afghanistan are ensuring the safety of U.S. citizens, including mitigating terrorist threats, and securing the release of all unjustly detained Americans.<sup>56</sup> During the reporting period, the U.S. Government continued a comprehensive interagency review of its Afghanistan policy, State reported.<sup>57</sup>

### TALIBAN ACTIVITY

**Women and Girls:** State reported that an August 2024 Taliban edict to limit the participation of women and girls in public life undermine peace and stability in Afghanistan and make it more difficult to stabilize the Afghan economy and limit the spread of extremism.<sup>58</sup> The Taliban continued to prevent female United Nations (UN) staff from accessing UN premises, and as a result, 38 percent of aid recipients struggled to receive aid, State said.<sup>59</sup> The Taliban also restricted women from receiving treatment from male doctors and banned educating female medical students.<sup>60</sup>

**Human Rights:** The Taliban continued to restrict cultural and religious practices and maintained limits on free speech, according to State.<sup>61</sup> In November, 55 countries and the European Union delegation to the United Nations released a joint statement condemning the Taliban’s discriminatory policies and alarming human rights record, including the treatment of women and girls, the suppression of journalists and civil society, public executions, corporal punishment, and arbitrary detentions. The United States did not sign the statement.<sup>62</sup>

**Counter Narcotics:** The Taliban continued efforts to eliminate opium poppy production, including by providing farmers with alternative crops. According to the United Nations, the Taliban’s opium ban has caused economic hardship for Afghanistan’s rural economy due to the overall reduction in revenue from poppy cultivation at a time when the rural economy is already experiencing drought, flooding, and challenges related to selling produce on the international market.<sup>63</sup>

### U.S. DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

The U.S. Government engaged with the Taliban to advance policy priorities, including counterterrorism, securing the release of American detainees, counternarcotics, and curbing illegal migration, State reported.<sup>64</sup>

Since the suspension of the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan in 2021, the Afghanistan Affairs Unit (AAU) at the U.S. Embassy in Doha, Qatar, has managed Afghan affairs for the U.S. Government.<sup>65</sup> The AAU engaged with the Qatari government, which serves as the protecting power for U.S. interests in Afghanistan.<sup>66</sup>


**U.S. citizens:** U.S. citizen Amir Amiry was released by the Taliban in September. According to State, several American detainees remained in Afghanistan, including American businessman Mahmoud Habibi, who disappeared in Afghanistan in 2022.<sup>67</sup>

**Sanctions:** State reported that it was reviewing the possibility of designating the Taliban as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, which would prohibit individuals and entities from knowingly providing material support to the group.<sup>68</sup> The Taliban is already designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, which means that any Taliban assets within U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with the Taliban.<sup>69</sup> During the reporting period, the UN Security Council approved several travel ban exemptions for UN-sanctioned Taliban members.<sup>70</sup>

**Fund for the Afghan People (Afghan Fund):** Assets for the Afghan Fund, a Geneva-based foundation established in 2022 to manage Afghan central bank reserves, grew to more than \$4.1 billion as of September 30, State reported.<sup>71</sup> (See Figure 1.) The Afghan Fund—whose Board of Trustees includes representatives from the U.S. Government, the Swiss government, and two Afghan economic experts—was established with \$3.5 billion and is mandated to support Afghanistan’s macroeconomic and financial stability. Absent its own administrative expenses, the Afghan Fund has made no disbursements to date, State reported.<sup>72</sup>

Figure 1.

**Assets of the Fund for the Afghan People, as of December 31, 2025, in \$ Millions**



## ENDURING WELCOME

Enduring Welcome, the whole-of-government effort to relocate and resettle eligible Afghan allies and their families from Afghanistan to the United States, was winding down from July to December.<sup>73</sup> State said that \$514 million remained in the Enduring Welcome administrative account.<sup>74</sup>

**Afghans in Qatar:** Camp as-Saliyah, the facility where thousands of Afghans were processed en route to the United States, is expected to close by the end of September 2026.<sup>75</sup> State said that some Afghans chose to voluntarily repatriate to Afghanistan, and others were waiting for third-country resettlement.<sup>76</sup> (See Table 2.) One quarter of the remaining residents at the camp (approximately 290 individuals) were adjudicated as ineligible for U.S. admission.<sup>77</sup>

Table 2.

### Population of Afghans Remaining at Camp as-Saliyah, as of December 2025

	FY 2025				FY 2026
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1
<b>U.S. Citizens</b>	6	—	—	—	—
<b>U.S. Citizen Family Members</b>	118	9	7	5	4
<b>Legal Permanent Residents (LPR)</b>	3	1	1	—	—
<b>LPR Family Members</b>	14	4	4	1	1
<b>SIV Applicants</b>	2,173	392	319	255	217
<b>Family of Unaccompanied Children</b>	215	181	164	164	144
<b>Other Family Unification</b>	201	229	220	220	214
<b>Other Refugee Applicants</b>	426	744	716	651	580
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,156</b>	<b>1,560</b>	<b>1,431</b>	<b>1,296</b>	<b>1,160</b>

Source: State SCA/A, responses to State OIG request for information, 12/1/2025 and 1/13/2026.

Table 3.

### Afghans Who Voluntarily Repatriated to Afghanistan

		Cases	Individuals
<b>2024</b>	October–December	2	6
<b>2025</b>	January–March	7	12
	April–June	25	65
	July–September	11	41
	October–December	18	46


Source: State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.

Table 4.

**Relocation of Afghans, as of December 31, 2025****0 Afghans relocated during the reporting period from Afghanistan with U.S. Government support****55,163 identified eligible individuals in Afghanistan****40,372 have been in contact with State**

Source: State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2025.

Figure 2.

**Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Issuances, July 2025–December 2025**

**Special Immigrant Visas (SIV):** State issued 4,890 SIVs to Afghan citizens in between July 1 and December 31.<sup>78</sup> (See Figure 2.) A total of 5,945 SIVs remain in the allocation process for principal applicants as of December 31, 2025.<sup>79</sup> Afghan SIV applicants were exempted from a June 2025 Presidential Proclamation restricting entry of nationals from 12 countries, including Afghanistan.<sup>80</sup> However, a subsequent Presidential Proclamation restricting entry applies to new Afghan SIV applicants as of January 1, 2026.<sup>81</sup>

**Emirates Humanitarian City:** In early July, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) started returning Afghan evacuees in Emirates Humanitarian City (EHC) to Afghanistan, according to State. The EHC processed 17,000 Afghans in a nearly 4-year period. Ultimately, 39 individuals were determined to have no path to the United States or other countries.<sup>82</sup>

The UAE government estimated that it spent \$367 million in providing accommodations for the resident Afghans.<sup>83</sup> While the U.S. Government did not provide financial support for EHC, State supported processing of residents for relocation to the United States. On July 20, President Trump said that he would “try to save” Afghans in the UAE set to be repatriated,

media reported.<sup>84</sup> State reported that the White House arranged for the remaining Afghans at the EHC, who were denied for U.S. immigration, to be resettled in Rwanda.<sup>85</sup>

## HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Afghanistan's humanitarian situation worsened during 2025 due to several factors, including earthquakes and the large-scale return of refugees. According to the UN, 65 percent of the population lives in acute poverty and almost half, approximately 23 million, need humanitarian assistance to survive.<sup>86</sup>

**Refugees:** The United Nations estimates that approximately 2.6 million people returned to Afghanistan in 2025, including 1.8 million from Iran and 805,000 from Pakistan.<sup>87</sup> These returns place additional strain on already-stressed households and increasing pressure on housing, land, water, education, and health services.<sup>88</sup>

**Health:** According to the World Health Organization, 422 health facilities closed in 2025 due to lack of funding, affecting approximately 3 million people in 30 provinces. Facilities still operating lacked staffing and supplies to respond to the earthquakes.<sup>89</sup>

**Food Security:** In August, the U.S.-funded Famine Early Warning Systems Network warned that acute food security conditions were expected to worsen through early 2026 amid consecutive years of drought, the influx of at least 2.3 million Afghans from Iran and Pakistan, and economic challenges.<sup>90</sup> In August, media reported that the World Food Programme turned hundreds of thousands of people away from nutrition centers, as the result of 400 clinics closing due to funding cuts.<sup>91</sup>

## U.S. ASSISTANCE

The United States stopped providing assistance to Afghanistan following executive orders and subsequent guidance issued by President Trump in January and April, 2025.<sup>92</sup> In total, 27 USAID programs in or related to Afghanistan, including those providing life-saving humanitarian assistance, were shut down.<sup>93</sup> Three programs initially among those terminated on April 5, were subsequently allowed to resume and were transferred to State administration effective July 1, 2025.<sup>94</sup> (See Table 5.) State reported that it did not hire former USAID staff to manage Afghan related programs.<sup>95</sup>

Other donors also reduced assistance in 2025, although some provided earthquake assistance, State said.<sup>96</sup> Overall humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan declined from \$3.27 billion in 2022 to \$994.8 million in 2025.<sup>97</sup> As of the end of December, 41 percent of the United Nations' humanitarian funding goal for Afghanistan had been met.<sup>98</sup>

State reported that its Afghanistan Affairs Unit staff continued as observers on humanitarian working groups and as attendees at meetings with like-minded countries in Doha and in the region.<sup>99</sup> State's Office of International Disaster Response continued to track the evolving humanitarian situation in Afghanistan.<sup>100</sup> The absence of U.S. leadership and humanitarian response expertise has impacted the Afghan people, especially in the areas of rapid emergency response, health, and food security, according to the United Nations.<sup>101</sup>

The United Nations estimates that approximately 2.6 million people returned to Afghanistan in 2025, including 1.8 million from Iran and 805,000 from Pakistan.

Table 5.

**Active U.S. Assistance Programs Related to Afghanistan, as of December 2025**

Program	Description
<b>Women’s Scholarship Endowment</b>	Created with \$50 million from the U.S. Government and managed by a U.S.-based university, the program supported 136 students. During the past academic year, the endowment provided full scholarships to 169 Afghan women enrolled in eight universities across seven countries.
<b>Supporting Student Success in Afghanistan</b>	This program scholarships to Afghans pursuing undergraduate studies at the American University of Afghanistan in Doha. Following the closure of the university’s Doha campus in 2025, the program has operated exclusively online.
<b>Pharmaceutical distribution program</b>	This program has not conducted any operations in Afghanistan since July due to State’s posture regarding assistance inside of Afghanistan.

**Source:** State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026; State SCA/A, vetting comment, 2/9/2026.

**Payments to implementers:** Between July and December, the U.S. Government paid \$15,607 to implementers of assistance in Afghanistan under the Prompt Payment Act, which authorizes interest penalties when the U.S. Government does not pay bills on a timely basis. In 2025, the U.S. Government paid \$84,113 in interest penalties.<sup>102</sup>

**U.S.-funded assets:** State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) reported that its objective in Afghanistan has shifted to preventing diversion of U.S. Government funds and U.S. Government-funded assets to the Taliban following the termination of its remaining projects.<sup>103</sup> State PRM’s humanitarian partners in Afghanistan reported successfully pushing back against pressure from local Taliban personnel to donate State-funded supplies following the termination of humanitarian assistance. State PRM said that it is working with recipients to complete final reporting, provide disposition guidance, issue final payments, collect refunds, and reconcile final award balances. State PRM said that it did not receive reports of forced asset seizure by Taliban personnel during the reporting period.<sup>104</sup>

State said that there are no longer USAID-owned goods or equipment in Afghanistan; the remaining USAID equipment and goods were transferred to implementing partners or other entities, or destroyed.<sup>105</sup>

**VOA Pashto and Dari:** In August 2025, Voice of America (VOA) began to lay off 532 of an estimated 632 remaining staff, despite an April court order that the VOA maintain services. During the reporting period, VOA continued broadcasting in four languages: Persian, Mandarin, Dari, and Pashto, media reported.<sup>106</sup>

# APPENDIXES

## APPENDIX A

### Classified Appendix to this Report

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Enduring Sentinel, as noted in several sections of this report. The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees

## APPENDIX B

### About the Lead Inspector General

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sections 401-424), established in section 419 the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Section 419 requires the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to appoint a Lead IG from among the Inspectors General of the Lead IG agencies upon the commencement or designation of a military operation that exceeds 60 days as an overseas contingency operation or receipt of notification thereof.

Lead IG oversight of the operation “sunset” at the end of the first fiscal year after commencement or designation in which the total amount appropriated for the operation is less than \$100,000,000.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out the Lead IG statutory responsibilities to:

- Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis a report on the contingency operation and to make that report available to the public.
- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S. Government-funded activities supporting overseas contingency operations, including those relating to the Middle East.

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations.

## APPENDIX C

# Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Report

This report complies with section 419 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sections 401-424), which requires that the designated Lead IG provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on each overseas contingency operation, and is consistent with the requirement that a biannual report be published by the Lead IG on the activities of the Inspectors General with respect to that overseas contingency operation. The Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the DoD IG as the Lead IG for Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES). The Lead IG appointed the State IG to be the Associate IG for OES.

This report covers the period from July 1 to December 31, 2025. The three Lead IG agencies—DoD OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG—and partner oversight agencies contributed the content of this report.

### INFORMATION COLLECTION FROM AGENCIES AND OPEN SOURCES

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OES, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. In our previous report, USAID staff identified challenges and risks with U.S. assistance programs in Ukraine. During the reporting period, USAID OIG followed up on the previously reported risks and challenges; however, staffing cuts at USAID and the ongoing operational drawdown at the agency limited the amount of information that USAID OIG could collect on USAID activities. Except in the cases of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the OIGs have not independently verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or from Federal agencies.

This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report may include the following:

- U.S. Government statements, press conferences, and reports
- Reports issued by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks
- Media reports

The Lead IG agencies use open-source information to assess information obtained through their agency information collection process and provide additional detail about the operation.

### REPORT PRODUCTION

The DoD IG, as the Lead IG for this operation, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoD OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG draft the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review process of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the DoD OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG as independent oversight agencies.

## APPENDIX D

# Completed Oversight Projects

From July 1 to December 31, 2025, the Lead IG and partner agencies issued four oversight reports related to OES, as detailed below. Completed reports by the Lead IG and partner agencies are available on their respective web pages.

### FINAL REPORTS BY LEAD IG AGENCIES

#### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

##### ***Audit of the DoD's Management of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Contract for the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts at Camp As Sayliyah***

DODIG-2025-163; September 19, 2025

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to assess the effectiveness of the DoD's management of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) V contract in support of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE) Doha at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar. The Army awarded the LOGCAP contract and State provided contracting officer's representatives (COR). The DoD OIG found that Army officials did not effectively manage the LOGCAP contract to support CARE Doha. An administrative contracting officer (ACO) from the 408th Contracting Support Brigade (CSB) did not designate 24 of 57 individuals as CORs because State personnel lacked access to the system that generates compliant designation forms, which documents COR roles and responsibilities, resulting in the use of a noncompliant form. Officials could not explain why an additional 4 of 57 individuals performed oversight without a designation letter.

The DoD OIG found that quality assurance specialists from the 408th CSB did not ensure that CORs completed 19 percent of required monthly quality assurance checklists because State did not provide enough CORs to oversee all LOGCAP services. Also, the Army Contracting Command-Rock Island (ACC-RI) procuring contracting officer (PCO) did not review \$293.4 million in interim vouchers before payment. This occurred because the PCO relied on the Defense Contract Audit Agency's prepayment reviews and the ACC-RI had not fully implemented corrective actions to improve oversight of voucher reviews despite multiple DoD OIG reports identifying this problem. The DoD OIG also identified areas of concern related to State's responsibilities for the contract, which the DoD OIG referred to the State OIG for their consideration during future reviews of the CARE Doha program.

The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander of the 408th CSB review the ACO's failure to properly designate CORs and take administrative action, as appropriate. In addition, the DoD OIG recommended that the ACC-RI Executive Director direct the PCO to review all telemedicine services payments, including the \$442,294 identified in this report, and request a refund or arrange for payment, as appropriate.

As of the date the report was published, one recommendation was closed, five are resolved and open, and two are unresolved. The DoD OIG will close these recommendations once they confirm the agreed upon actions have been taken.

## FINAL REPORTS BY PARTNER IG AGENCIES

### DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

#### ***DHS Needs to Improve Oversight of Parole Expiration for Select Humanitarian Parole Processes***

OIG-25-30; July 2, 2025

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) conducted this review to assess whether the DHS has processes, procedures, and resources to monitor the end of immigration parole to ensure parolees are lawfully present in the United States and determine what enforcement consequences exist for parolees who stay in the United States after parole expiration or revocation.

The DHS OIG found that none of the three Department of Homeland Security components responsible for end of parole activities: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement were designated to monitor parole expiration and the DHS did not have a well-defined process to address parole expiration for aliens paroled into the United States through Operation Allies Refuge/Operation Allies Welcome, following the collapse of the Afghan government in 2021. The DHS also did not initiate enforcement actions for parolees whose parole expired. As a result, the DHS did not have assurance that former parolees were lawfully present in the United States after parole expiration.

The DHS OIG made three recommendations to improve the DHS' oversight of humanitarian parole expiration. The recommendations included designation of a specific DHS component or office to oversee parole expiration for parolees who can develop and implement a process to identify parolees who are no longer authorized to remain in the United States. Furthermore, a process to ensure Immigration and Customs Enforcement receives timely, accurate data on parolees who are no longer authorized should also be created. At the time that the report was issued, two of the recommendations were considered open and resolved, with one still unresolved until the necessary supporting documentation is provided. The DHS OIG will close these recommendations once they confirm the agreed upon actions have been taken.

### SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

#### ***Follow on Performance Audit of State's Demining Activities in Afghanistan***

SIGAR 25-161A; August 29, 2025

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) conducted this audit to determine the extent to which State performed all required oversight activities including annual reviews of award risk assessment and monitoring plans, quarterly reviews of performance progress and financial reports, and final review memoranda; State developed measurable award agreement targets and objectives and connected them to higher level goals; and funds provided for demining activities have directly benefited the Taliban regime, or prohibited entities and individuals. Findings showed that The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs adjusted its programming activities to align with State guidance after the change in the operating environment, which included modifying and terminating awards, updating its strategic plan, and increasing reporting requirements for implementing partners. The report indicated that the Bureau generally met its Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD) programming targets and the State Department's strategic CWD objectives. No material weaknesses or noncompliance issues were identified.

***SIGAR Final Report: Seventeen Years of Reconstruction Oversight***

SIGAR 25-31-IP; December 3, 2025

The objective of this forensic audit was to consolidate and document the results of the SIGAR's oversight of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan over a 17-year period, assessing how reconstruction funds were planned, obligated, managed, and overseen, and identifying systemic issues affecting effectiveness and accountability.

This project was SIGAR's final completed oversight effort prior to the agency's sunset on January 31, 2026, and serves as a cumulative record of findings relevant to future large-scale overseas operations.

SIGAR examined U.S. reconstruction funding and found that longstanding weaknesses in planning, program design, contractor oversight, interagency coordination, and metrics for success limited the effectiveness of many reconstruction initiatives and contributed to significant waste, fraud, and abuse. Recurring patterns including the rapid obligation of funds without sufficient absorptive capacity, inadequate oversight of contractors and sub-contractors, inconsistent data used to assess progress, and limited sustainability of projects following U.S. disengagement were identified.



## APPENDIX E

# Ongoing Oversight Projects

Table 6 lists the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OES.

Table 6.

### Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OES by Partner Agencies, as of December 31, 2025

#### DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

##### ***Review of Asylum Application Adjudication Processing in Response to Ahmed vs. DHS (Project no. 24-015-ISP-USCIS)***

To determine whether missed aliases or incomplete resolution of potential matches to derogatory records have increased following the Ahmed vs. DHS settlement agreement.

## APPENDIX F

# Planned Oversight Projects

Table 7 lists the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OES.

Table 7.

### Planned Oversight Projects Related to OES by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs, as of December 31, 2025

#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

##### ***Audit of the Department of State's Counterterrorism Vetting***

To determine whether State designed its risk-management and counterterrorism vetting procedures to prevent terrorist organizations from benefiting from U.S. foreign assistance funds.

#### US AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

##### ***Review of the Realignment and Re-organization of U.S. Foreign Assistance***

To examine the actions USAID took to transfer its foreign assistance programs and operations to State, consistent with Executive Order 14169 and subsequent directives from the Acting USAID Administrator, and identify lessons learned to strengthen and ensure the continuity of foreign assistance programs and operations.

##### ***Review of Prompt Payment and Anti-Deficiency Act Violations***

To assess the extent of prompt payment and potential Anti-Deficiency Act violations and actions USAID has taken to address them and prevent additional violations.

##### ***Review of Closeout Procedures for Terminated USAID Awards***

To assess USAID's efforts to close out terminated awards in accordance with Federal regulations and USAID policies and procedures.

##### ***Review of Stop Work Orders for USAID Awards***

To determine how many USAID awards were paused, the amount of funding for the awards, and how many resumed or were terminated.

## APPENDIX G

# Hotline and Investigations

### HOTLINE ACTIVITY

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority.

During these two quarters, the DoD OIG Hotline received 11 allegations and referred 8 cases related to OES or Afghanistan. State OIG received 13 allegations and referred 11. USAID OIG received 25 allegations. In some instances, a case may contain multiple allegations.

### INVESTIGATIONS

The DoD OIG's criminal investigative component, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), maintained investigative personnel in Bahrain and Kuwait, where they worked on cases related to OES and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). DCIS agents also worked on OES/OFS-related cases from offices in the United States. State OIG and USAID OIG investigators worked on cases related to OES/OFS from Washington, D.C., El Salvador, Germany, Israel, South Africa, and Thailand.

During this reporting period, investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 24 open investigations and closed 2 investigations. They made 3 referrals to the Department of Justice during the period. The investigative agencies reported 1 indictment/information and 1 conviction, in addition to a civil settlement.

The Lead IG agencies and their partners coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support. The investigative partner agencies consist of representatives from DCIS, State OIG, USAID OIG, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.



## ACRONYMS

Acronym	
ACC-RI	Army Contracting Command-Rock Island
ACO	administrative contracting officer
ANDSF	Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
AQIS	al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
CARE	Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (State)
COR	contracting officer's representative
CSB	Contracting Support Brigade
CWD	conventional weapons destruction
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
EHS	Emirates Humanitarian City
FY	fiscal year
ISIS-K	ISIS-Khorasan
Lead IG	Lead Inspector General
Lead IG agencies	DoD, State, and USAID OIGs
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
OES	Operation Enduring Sentinel
OFS	Operation Freedom's Sentinel

Acronym	
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OUSD(C)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
OUSD(P)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
PCO	procuring contracting officer
PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State)
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIV	Special Immigrant Visa
State	Department of State
TTP	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
U.S.	United States
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	The U.S. Central Command
VEO	violent extremist organization
VOA	Voice of America





## ENDNOTES

1. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 12/1/2025; DIA, vetting comment, 8/11/2025; DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 OES 019, 7/8/2025 and 25.4 OES 031, 10/9/2025.
2. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.4 OES 021 and 25.4 OES 033, 10/9/2025.
3. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.4 OES 028, 10/9/2025; DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 025 and 26.1 OES 027, 1/6/2026.
4. OSASD/IWCT, vetting comment, 2/10/2026.
5. DIA, vetting comment, 2/19/2026.
6. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.4 OES 032, 10/9/2025.
7. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.4 OES 032, 10/9/2025 and 26.1 OES 029, 1/6/2026.
8. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
9. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
10. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 7/17/2025 and 1/13/2026; Secretary of State Marco Rubio, testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “FY26 State Department Posture: Protecting American Interests.” 5/21/2025.
11. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
12. State, “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, FY 2025,” 3/11/2025; State, vetting comment, 2/11/2026.
13. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026; State, vetting comment, 2/11/2026.
14. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 7/17/2025; ODASD/IWCT, vetting comment, 2/10/2026.
15. OUSD(P), response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 001, 1/6/2026.
16. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Periods of War and Dates of Recent Conflicts,” 2/5/2024.
17. OUSD(C), response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 OES 014, 8/5/2025.
18. OUSD(C), response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 OES 014, 8/5/2025.
19. OSD(C), response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 009, 1/12/2026.
20. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
21. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 12/1/2025.
22. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.3 OES 019, 7/8/2025 and 25.4 OES 031, 10/9/2025; DIA, vetting comment, 8/11/2025.
23. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.4 OES 021 and 25.4 OES 033, 10/9/2025.
24. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.4 OES 032 and 25.4 OES 033, 10/9/2025.
25. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 030, 1/6/2026; International Crisis Group, “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: A Jihadist Threat in Retreat?” 7/16/2025.
26. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.4 OES 021, 10/9/2025.
27. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 021, 1/6/2026.
28. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 019, 1/6/2026.
29. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.4 OES 02 7, 10/9/2025.
30. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 026, 1/6/2026.
31. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.4 OES 028, 10/9/2025; DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 025, 1/6/2026.
32. State, “Rewards for Justice,” website, undated; State, vetting comment, 2/11/2026.
33. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026; OUSD(P)/SSEA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 023, 1/6/2026.
34. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 036, 1/6/2026.
35. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 036, 1/6/2026; Reuters, “Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace Talks Collapse, Ceasefire Continues, Taliban Says,” 11/8/2025.
36. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.4 OES 032, 10/9/2025.
37. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 029, 1/6/2026.
38. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.4 OES 032, 10/9/2025 and 26.1 OES 029, 1/6/2026.
39. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 027, 1/6/2026.
40. Lieutenant General Michael E. Kurilla, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Lieutenant General Michael E. Kurilla, USA, to be General and Commander, United States Central Command,” 2/8/2022; OSD(PA), “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) Operation Enduring Sentinel—Over-The-Horizon Operations,” 1/4/2022; OUSD(P), vetting comment, 11/5/2024.
41. USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.2 OES 9, 4/7/2022.
42. ODASD/IWCT, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 002, 1/7/2026; ODASD/IWCT, vetting comment, 2/10/2026.
43. State SCA/P, response to State OIG request for information, 4/11/2025; USCENTCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 22.2 OES 9, 4/7/2022.
44. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
45. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
46. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.

47. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
48. DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 033, 1/6/2026.
49. State PM/WRA, response to State OIG request for information, 1/7/2026.
50. State PM/WRA, response to State OIG request for information, 1/7/2026.
51. State, fact sheet, “U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction in South and Central Asia: Releasing Land, Preventing Accidents, Promoting Recovery in Conflict-Affected Countries,” 1/20/2025; State, “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, FY 2025,” 3/11/2024.
52. State PM/WRA, response to State OIG request for information, 1/7/2026.
53. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 12/1/2025 and 1/13/2026; State, vetting comment, 2/11/2026.
54. UNAMA, report, “Updated on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: July -September 2025 Update,” October 2025.
55. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 7/17/2025.
56. State, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
57. State, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
58. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
59. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
60. Una Cilic, “Afghan Women, Girls ‘Bear Brunt’ of Earthquake amid Taliban Restrictions,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 9/3/2025; UN Women Afghanistan, press release, “Statement on the Earthquake in Eastern Afghanistan,” 9/2/2025.
61. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
62. Nazanin Mohseni, “On Human Rights Day, 56 Nations Condemn Widespread Abuses in Afghanistan,” Kabul Now, 12/10/2025; “Joint Press Statement on Behalf of Afghanistan, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, EU Delegation, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Slovenia,” 12/10/2025.
63. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026; State INL, response to State OIG request for information, 12/2/2025 and 1/8/2026; State INL, vetting comment, 1/22/2026; State, vetting comment, 2/11/2026.
64. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
65. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
66. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 7/17/2025.
67. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026; FBI, press release, “FBI Washington Field Office Releases Missing Persons Poster of Mahmood Shah Habibi,” 8/10/2025.
68. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 7/17/2025 and 1/13/2026; Secretary of State Marco Rubio, testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “FY26 State Department Posture: Protecting American Interests,” 5/21/2025.
69. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
70. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
71. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026; State, vetting comment, 2/11/2026.
72. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
73. State, “Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, FY 2025,” 3/11/2025; State, vetting comment, 2/11/2026.
74. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
75. Lara Korte, “Closure in Works at Qatar Camp Whose Afghan Evacuees Include Dozens of U.S. Forces’ Kin,” Stars and Stripes, 1/20/2026; State, vetting comment, 2/11/2026.
76. Lara Korte, “Closure in Works at Qatar Camp Whose Afghan Evacuees Include Dozens of U.S. Forces’ Kin,” Stars and Stripes, 1/20/2026.
77. Afghanistan Affairs Unit, cable, “Scenesetter for DHS Secretary Noem’s Visit to Doha,” 25 AFGHANISTAN AFFAIRS UNIT 842, 12/11/2025.
78. State CA, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
79. State CA, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026; State, vetting comment, 2/11/2026.
80. White House Presidential Actions, “Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats,” 6/4/2025; State, vetting comment, 2/11/2026.
81. State, website, “Special Immigrant Visas for Afghans—Who Were Employed by/on Behalf of the U.S. Government,” undated; State, vetting comment, 2/11/2026.
82. Embassy Abu Dhabi, cable, 25 ABU DHABI 636, 7/10/2025.
83. UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, press release, “17,600 Afghans Hosted by the UAE Prior to Departure to Final Destinations” 7/24/2025.
84. Humerya Pamuk, “Exclusive: Trump Pledged to Save Afghans, But UAE Had Already Sent Some Evacuees Back, Cable Shows,” Reuters, 7/20/2025.
85. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 12/1/2025.
86. OCHA, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, December 2024; UN OCHA, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, December 2025.
87. OCHA, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, December 2025.
88. OCHA, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, December 2025.

89. WorldHealthOrganization, “Afghanistan: Suspended-Closed/Health Facilities due to U.S. Government Work-Stop Ban,” website, 8/31/2025.
90. State PRM, response to State OIG request for information, 1/9/2026; State, vetting comment, 2/11/2026.
91. Ray Furlong and Omid Marzban, “World Food Program Warns of ‘Unprecedented’ Hunger Crisis in Afghanistan” Radion Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 8/18/2025.
92. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
93. USAID OFM, 6/13/2025.
94. USAID BHA Afghanistan, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/13/2025; USAID OFM, 6/13/2025.
95. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
96. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026.
97. OCHA, website, “Afghanistan, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025,” 12/2025; Lex Harvey, Masoud Popalzai, Billy Stockwell, Helen Regan, Char Reck, and Sana Noor Haq, “Taliban Calls for Foreign Help After Deadly Afghanistan Earthquake,” CNN, 9/2/2025.
98. OCHA, website, “Afghanistan, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025,” 12/2025; Associated Press, “Aid Agencies Tell Countries to Send Funds to Help Afghanistan After Earthquake,” 9/3/2025.
99. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 7/17/2025.
100. State PRM, response to State OIG request for information, 1/9/2026.
101. OCHA, “Afghanistan: Impact of U.S. Funding on the Humanitarian Response,” website, 5/19/2025.
102. USAID, website, Phoenix Financial Report, 1/23/2026.
103. State PRM, response to State OIG request for information, 1/9/2026.
104. State PRM, response to State OIG request for information, 1/9/2026.
105. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 1/13/2026; State SCA/A, vetting comment, 2/9/2026.
106. Minho Kim, “Trump Officials Move to Fire Most Voice of America Journalists,” New York Times, 8/29/2025.





TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE RELATED TO  
OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS  
AND PROGRAMS, CONTACT:



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOTLINE**

[www.dodig.mil/hotline](http://www.dodig.mil/hotline)

**1-800-424-9098**



**DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOTLINE**

[www.stateoig.gov/hotline](http://www.stateoig.gov/hotline)

**1-800-409-9926 or 202-647-3320**



**U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT HOTLINE**

[oig.usaid.gov/report-fraud](http://oig.usaid.gov/report-fraud)

**1-202-985-1764**

