

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



**OPERATION
ENDURING SENTINEL
AND OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO
AFGHANISTAN**



APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026



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On the cover: Afghans returning from Iran through the Islam Qala border crossing in Herat Province, on March 10, 2026.
(UNHCR photo)



We are pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report to Congress on Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES). This report discharges our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to Section 419 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

In October 2021, the Department of War (DoW) initiated OES as the U.S. mission to conduct over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations against threats emanating from Afghanistan. The U.S. Government also engages in security cooperation activities with Central Asian and South Asian regional partners to build their border security and counterterrorism capacity.

This report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OES and discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies—the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs—and our partner oversight agencies. This report covers the quarterly reporting period April 1 through June 30, 2026

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Platte B. Moring, III".

Platte B. Moring, III
Lead Inspector General for OES
Inspector General
U.S. Department of War

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Arne B. Baker".

Arne B. Baker
Associate Inspector General for OES
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of State

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Van Nguyen".

Van Nguyen
Acting Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of the
Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International
Development



IN THIS REPORT

The DoW continued to monitor ISIS-K and other regional violent extremist organizations using intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

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- The DoW remained able to conduct over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.
- The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Khorasan (ISIS-K) claimed responsibility for small-arms attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and continued to operate training camps in Pakistan.
- The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said that the Taliban almost certainly continued to provide sanctuary for some legacy al-Qaeda members and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) militants in Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan Affairs Unit at the U.S. Embassy in Doha, Qatar, continued to manage Afghanistan affairs despite most staff being on ordered departure due to Operation Epic Fury.

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- The U.S. Government increased its reward for information leading to the recovery of Paul Overby, an American freelance writer who vanished in Khost province in 2014. Overby is among an undisclosed number of Americans who remain either missing or detained in Afghanistan.
- State continued to wind down Enduring Welcome, the effort to relocate and resettle eligible Afghan allies and their families from Afghanistan to the United States.
- State reported that it likely will not meet its goal of closing Camp as-Sayliyah, the primary transit and processing facility for Afghans in Qatar, by the end of September 2026.

The United States did not provide development or humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan during the quarter.

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- In April 2025, U.S. Government agencies were directed to suspend any assistance that could possibly reach the Taliban.
- The United States continued to support two ongoing education programs for Afghan nationals residing both outside and inside Afghanistan.

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Afghans returning from Iran through the Islam Qala border crossing in Herat Province, on March 10, 2026. (UNHCR photo)



MISSION UPDATE

Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES) is the Department of War (DoW) operation in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility to contain terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan and protect the U.S. homeland by conducting over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations against those threats. The United States seeks to protect U.S. citizens, secure the release of all Americans detained in Afghanistan, and mitigate terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan.¹

The Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy (OUSW[P]) reported no change to the OES lines of effort and desired end states during the quarter.²

FUNDING

In 2025, the Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (OUSW[C]) took steps to revise how it calculated costs associated with OES.³ The OUSW(C) said that previously reported obligations for OES—which exceeded \$4.2 billion in FY 2025—included many costs that were unrelated to OES or Afghanistan.⁴

Table 1.
Funding for OES,
FY 2024–2026,
in \$ Thousands

	FY 2024 Enacted	FY 2025 Enacted	FY 2026 Requested
Army	\$1,471,947	\$254,432	\$0
Navy	911,424	229,725	172,127
Marine Corps	284	346	262
Air Force	5,750,889	4,474,693	30,875
Special Operations Command	0	8,100	12,942
Defense-wide	7,259	2,215	2,217
TOTAL	\$8,141,803	\$4,969,511	\$218,423

Note: FY 2025 obligations as of June 30, 2025.

Source: OUSW(C), response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3. OES 011, 7/22/2026.

For FY 2026, the DoW requested \$218.4 million in funding for OES.⁵ (See Table 1.) The OUSW(C) reported that the DoW Components, which provide initial OES funding execution data to the OUSW(C), continued to include costs not related to OES or Afghanistan. As of July 2026, the DoW Components reported nearly \$5.4 billion in obligations attributed to OES—much more than the requested amount. The OUSW(C) said that it continued to work with the DoW Components to identify costs that were associated with OES and Afghanistan.⁶

SECURITY

In 2020, the United States and the Taliban entered into the Doha Agreement, under which the United States committed to a phased, conditions-based withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan and the Taliban pledged to prevent al-Qaeda and other extremist groups from using Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.⁷

State reported that the Taliban has not lived up to its obligations regarding counterterrorism and continued to provide safe haven to terrorist groups in Afghanistan that threaten the security of the United States and its allies.⁸ State reported that the Taliban remains unable to completely prevent terrorist groups from planning and conducting attacks in Afghanistan.⁹

In May, Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander of USCENTCOM, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Afghanistan “remains on the forefront of what we’re watching in terms of terrorist activity” and that the United States was “paying close attention to a variety of partnerships” and “suppressing any threat” that might emanate from Afghanistan.¹⁰

The OUSW(P) reported that the DoW has no relationship with the Taliban, in line with the U.S. Government policy of not recognizing the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan.¹¹

THE VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION (VEO) THREAT

The White House released its latest Counterterrorism Strategy in May, designating al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Khorasan (ISIS-K) among the top five legacy Islamic terror groups with the intent and capability to execute external operations against the United States.¹² State said that al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), an al-Qaeda affiliate, remained a threat.¹³

Table 2.

Estimated Force Size of Violent Extremist Organizations in Afghanistan

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	4,000–6,000
ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K)	2,000
Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)	200–300
Al-Qaeda	Fewer than a dozen core members

Source: DIA, vetting comment, 7/10/2026.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that ISIS-K, al-Qaeda, and AQIS maintain a limited presence in Afghanistan.¹⁴ The largest armed group operating in Afghanistan has been Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization also known as the Pakistani Taliban, which opposes the Pakistani government and operates along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.¹⁵ (See Table 2.)

ISIS-K: In April, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a small-arms attack on a Shia shrine in Herat province that killed an estimated 11 civilians.¹⁶ ISIS-K also claimed responsibility for the assassination of a prominent cleric and political leader in Pakistan, near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.¹⁷

The DIA reported that as of February, ISIS-K was operating training camps in Pakistan. Pakistan continued to deport thousands of Afghan nationals, including some who were ISIS-K fighters.¹⁸

The Department of the Treasury reported that ISIS-K continued to receive funding from ISIS global leadership to conduct external operations and relied heavily on virtual assets as a mechanism for receiving funding. A large portion of ISIS-K's donations have come from ISIS-K's monthly magazine, the Voice of Khorasan, which embedded quick response codes linked to cryptocurrency wallets.¹⁹

Al-Qaeda: The DIA said that AQIS continued to conduct operations in Pakistan as part of an umbrella group called the Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan to avoid Taliban scrutiny and maintain plausible deniability of any involvement in attacks in Pakistan.²⁰

The DIA said that as of June, the Taliban almost certainly continued to provide sanctuary for some legacy al-Qaeda members and AQIS militants. While both groups acknowledge and ostensibly adhere to Taliban restrictions prohibiting militant activities, they very likely remain capable of circumventing restrictions to work with anti-Pakistani militant groups to conduct operations, the DIA said.²¹

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP): TTP attacks targeting Pakistan persisted throughout the quarter, though at a decreased rate compared to the previous quarter, when Pakistan launched airstrikes in Afghanistan.²² The DIA reported that it tracked 365 TTP-attributed attacks last quarter, and 161 attacks in April and May. Data for June was not yet available.²³ On June 29, Pakistan launched a deadly attack targeting TTP militants in three Afghan provinces in response to a June 27 attack in Karachi, media reported.²⁴

In April, China-hosted diplomatic talks to reach a ceasefire failed.²⁵ The DIA said that the failure to reach a formal ceasefire agreement elevated the risk of further escalation or intensified conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the next 3 months.²⁶ Following the talks, Pakistan reiterated its commitment to counterterrorism operations.²⁷

As of June, the Taliban continued to provide sanctuary to TTP members, which the DIA said likely contributed to persistent TTP attacks in Pakistan and intermittent cross-border violence between the Taliban and the Pakistani government.²⁸

U.S. ACTIVITY

State reported that the United States is able to conduct over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.²⁹ The DIA reported that the DoW continued to monitor ISIS-K and other regional VEOs using intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, including overhead intelligence collection, which is used to enable rapid surveillance and analysis for military use.³⁰

The White House's May 2026 Counterterrorism Strategy noted that the United States had rebuilt relationships with partners in South and Central Asia to reduce the threat to the United States and emphasized that Europe should increase its counterterrorism efforts in Asia, as part of a U.S. approach to "burden-share and burden-shift" counterterrorism efforts to partners.³¹

The DIA reported that the DoW continued to monitor ISIS-K and other regional VEOs using intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, including overhead intelligence collection, which is used to enable rapid surveillance and analysis for military use.

In April, Taliban members arrested six members of their own security forces in Badakhshan province for alleged ties to ISIS-K, according to the DIA, citing press reporting.

Counternarcotics and regional border security: State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs continued to work with Central Asian governments to prevent Afghan-origin drugs from moving northward. State said that it plans to prioritize expanding the Drug Enforcement Administration's access to counternarcotics authorities in the region and will focus on border security training, synthetic drug identification, and disrupting Afghan-sourced drug networks.³²

TALIBAN ACTIVITY

The DIA reported that the Taliban maintained its counterterrorism campaign against ISIS-K during the quarter—including operations that resulted in the seizure of small-arms caches—but almost certainly fell short of eliminating the group's clandestine cells and ability to conduct attacks in Afghanistan in the next 3 months.³³

In April, Taliban members arrested six members of their own security forces in Badakhshan province for alleged ties to ISIS-K, according to the DIA, citing press reporting.³⁴ The DIA said that instances of Taliban members covertly supporting ISIS-K suggest that the Taliban will continue to struggle to eliminate clandestine ISIS-K cells operating in Afghanistan, which will almost certainly leave a persistent threat to U.S. regional interests and the U.S. homeland.³⁵

State said that there has been no indication that Taliban leaders have rescinded the August 2021 general amnesty prohibiting reprisal against former government employees and security personnel. However, the amnesty does not apply to former government officials who are actively involved in military opposition to the Taliban, State said.³⁶ The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported in May that killings of former Afghan security force members continued, including five deaths during the period January 1 to March 31, 2026.³⁷

DIPLOMACY AND GOVERNANCE

The United States did not hold any direct, bilateral engagements with the Taliban regarding its counterterrorism commitments during the reporting period.³⁸ However, U.S. officials engaged with Taliban representatives during the quarter to seek the release of detained Americans, State reported.³⁹

Afghanistan Affairs Unit (AAU): Since the 2021 suspension of operations at the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan, the AAU—operating out of the U.S. Embassy in Doha, Qatar—has managed Afghan affairs for the U.S. Government.⁴⁰ The AAU coordinates with Qatar, which serves as the protecting power for U.S. interests in Afghanistan.⁴¹ During the quarter, Qatari government officials conducted welfare and whereabouts visits to at least one U.S. citizen detained in Afghanistan and delivered emergency passports, State reported.⁴²

On May 18, AAU representatives met with UNAMA and G7 envoys to review the progress of the UN-led Doha Process.⁴³ State reported that, due to security concerns stemming from Operation Epic Fury, 14 of 15 AAU staff remained on ordered departure status as of June 12.⁴⁴

U.S. Consulate General in Peshawar: In May, State announced the phased closure of the U.S. Consulate General in Peshawar, Pakistan. As the closest diplomatic post to the Afghanistan border, the consulate served as a primary operations and logistics hub during the Afghanistan conflict. State said that the closure reflected its commitment to personnel safety and efficient resource management. State emphasized that the U.S. Government sustains engagement with regional officials to promote security through the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad.⁴⁵

In May, State announced the phased closure of the U.S. Consulate General in Peshawar, Pakistan.

U.S. Sanctions: The Department of Treasury reported that the overall sanctions regime against the Taliban did not change during the last quarter.⁴⁶ The Taliban as an entity, along with multiple individual members, remains designated under U.S. counterterrorism sanctions, according to State.⁴⁷ The Taliban remains a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group, which means that any Taliban assets within U.S. jurisdictions are blocked, preventing them from being accessed, transferred, withdrawn, or used in any transactions or financial dealings.⁴⁸

In March, Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated Afghanistan as a State Sponsor of Wrongful Detention. This designation authorizes the U.S. Government to impose additional economic sanctions, visa and foreign assistance restrictions, and travel restrictions for U.S. passport holders.⁴⁹ U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with the Taliban, though licenses remained in place that are designed to facilitate the continued delivery of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.⁵⁰

Reward increased for kidnapped U.S. citizen: Freelance writer Paul Overby was kidnapped in Khost province in May 2014 and has since been held hostage.⁵¹ During the quarter, the Department of Justice announced a \$1 million reward for information leading to his recovery, supplementing the existing \$5 million offered through State's Rewards for Justice program.⁵²

Naseer Ahmed Faig, Charge d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations, addresses the Security Council meeting on the situation in Afghanistan. (UN photo)



Assets of the Fund for the Afghan People grew to more than \$4.1 billion as of March 31, 2026.

Fund for the Afghan People: Assets of the fund grew to more than \$4.1 billion as of March 31, 2026.⁵³ The United States established the fund in 2022—in coordination with the Swiss government and Afghan economic experts—to safeguard \$3.5 billion of Afghan central bank reserves. The fund’s purpose is to use these assets for the benefit of the Afghan people while preventing the Taliban from accessing them.⁵⁴ However, absent its own administrative expenses, the Fund has made no disbursements to date, State reported.⁵⁵

The Department of the Treasury reported that there were no actions taken this quarter to unfreeze any Afghan Central Bank assets in the United States or held by any U.S. financial institution. The funds were frozen pursuant to Executive Order 14064.⁵⁶

UNAMA: On June 15, the United States joined the other UN Security Council members to extend the UNAMA mandate until June 17, 2027. During the proceedings, council members warned that the systematic exclusion of women and girls from public life continues to undermine Afghanistan’s prospects for peace, stability, and recovery.⁵⁷

U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM): USAGM reported that its Afghan Service continued to provide original Dari and Pashto language journalism during the quarter, including radio services, as well as TV satellite and digital media services. The services sought to hold the Taliban accountable and counter disinformation. However, reliable audience research within Afghanistan remained unavailable due to Taliban raids on research providers.⁵⁸

Due to Executive Order 14238 and subsequent financial pressures, the Afghan Service has sharply reduced its radio programming. Weekly original radio programming dropped from 91.5 hours in February 2025 and 79.2 hours in January 2026 to 28 hours beginning May 1, 2026. USAGM also canceled rebroadcasting contracts from Tajikistan, leaving the service’s audio stream accessible only online.⁵⁹

Under a new schedule beginning May 1, daily programming includes two 4-hour blocks per day—in the morning and in the evening—each starting with 30 minutes of news in both languages. While social media output remained steady, website publishing declined by about 40 percent. USAGM expended \$3.71 million this quarter of its \$25 million FY 2026 funds allocated for Afghan operations.⁶⁰

Defendant in Abbey Gate Bombing Found Guilty

In May, the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, VA, found Mohammad Sharifullah guilty of conspiring to provide material support to ISIS-K.⁶¹ Prosecutors demonstrated that Sharifullah surveilled the road leading to the Kabul airport and communicated with ISIS-K leaders before the August 26, 2021, Abbey Gate attack that killed 13 U.S. Service members. Prosecutors also alleged that Sharifullah provided support to a 2016 attack on the Canadian embassy in Kabul and the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow.⁶² As of the end of the quarter, Sharifullah is the only defendant to face trial related to the Abbey Gate attack.⁶³

U.S. ASSISTANCE

The United States has not provided development or humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan since April 4, 2025. This freeze followed a White House directive that instructed U.S. Government agencies to suspend any assistance that could potentially benefit or reach the Taliban.⁶⁴ State reported that it revised the Afghanistan-related programming budget to comply with the directive.⁶⁵ Under the revised framework, the United States continues to fund two ongoing education programs for Afghan nationals residing both inside and outside Afghanistan.⁶⁶ (See Table 3.)

During the quarter, the university that hosts students via the Supporting Students Success in Afghanistan program continued to operate despite significant funding uncertainty.⁶⁷ In April, the university notified Congress and State that it was planning an orderly shutdown starting May 1, 2026, due to lack of funds.⁶⁸ However, in May, State averted the immediate closure of the university by authorizing a onetime \$3 million obligation.⁶⁹ This funding is still \$4.72 million short of the cooperative agreement’s ceiling (“not to exceed”) amount, around which the university had planned its 2026 program.⁷⁰ Consequently, the university will proceed with a truncated fall semester using reduced staff.⁷¹

Separately, State reported that it funded 2 scholarship awards enabling 70 Afghan students, who were evacuated from Afghanistan after 2021, to complete their undergraduate and graduate degree programs outside Afghanistan.⁷²

Table 3.

Active U.S. Assistance Programs Related to Afghanistan, as of June 30, 2026

Program	Description	Program Outcomes
Women’s Scholarship Endowment \$50 million 9/2018 to 9/2028	Aims to increase women’s leadership in Afghanistan by providing undergraduate and graduate education in STEM or other relevant professional fields of study. Managed by a U.S. university, the program supports Afghan women enrolled in eight universities in seven countries in the region.	Since its inception, the program has supported 367 students, of whom 36 have graduated. As of the end of the most recent semester, the program had 107 students who were fully enrolled and participating in academic coursework, 23 in the process of traveling to continue their academic programs in other colleges, and 28 who were on hold.
Supporting Student Success in Afghanistan \$23 million 1/2023 to 12/2026	Promotes higher education opportunities for Afghan students at an American-style university. Since 2025, the students have studied exclusively online.	Supported 1,006 students enrolled in the Spring semester that ended in May. In June, 116 students in the program graduated, including 18 who received MBAs. Receives between 10,000-20,000 applications for undergraduate admission annually, and another 700-1,000 each year for the MBA program.

Sources: State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 6/12/2026; WSE, response to USAID OIG request for information, 3/25/2026; AUAF, response to USAID OIG follow-up request for information, 6/25/2026; State, “Report to Congress on Women’s Empowerment in Afghanistan,” 3/17/2026; State SCA/A, vetting comment, 7/13/2026.

Humanitarian Update

During the quarter, humanitarian agencies reported that Afghans continued to face food insecurity, high levels of malnutrition, internal displacement, and limited access to health care. Afghanistan-Pakistan hostilities and instability linked to the conflict in Iran have constrained humanitarian operations and increased pressure on vulnerable populations, State reported.⁷³

Displacement: Inside Afghanistan, 3.2 million people remained internally displaced, with an additional 69,000 newly displaced in 2026. In addition, more than 750,000 Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan through five key points of entry during the first 5 months of 2026.⁷⁴ The International Organization for Migration reported that returns from Pakistan and Iran continue to be largely involuntary. Pakistan has periodically reopened the Torkham border crossing to allow Afghan returnees to reenter Afghanistan.⁷⁵

Oppression of women and girls: The Taliban's systemic oppression of women and girls continued during the quarter. A UN analysis published in April projected that Afghanistan could lose 20,000 female teachers and 5,400 female health workers by 2030 due to ongoing restrictions on girls' education and women's employment. According to the analysis, these losses threaten children's learning and health, a crisis compounded by Taliban edicts prohibiting women from receiving medical care from male practitioners. Since girls were also barred from secondary school in 2021, an estimated one million have been denied education. The analysis warned that if these restrictions persist, more than two million girls will be affected by 2030.⁷⁶

Natural disasters: State reported that the devastating effects of severe flooding across Afghanistan since late March were worsened by a 5.9 magnitude earthquake in northeastern Afghanistan on April 3. An estimated 73,000 people across 31 provinces were directly affected by these natural disasters. The compounding disasters caused extensive destruction to homes, essential infrastructure, agricultural land, and cultural sites, according to State.⁷⁷ The humanitarian situation deteriorated further on May 1, when additional heavy rains triggered further flooding across three provinces.⁷⁸

Health: Media reported that in May, the Ministry of Health launched a second polio vaccination campaign in 20 provinces with the goal of immunizing 8.3 million children. In late 2024, the Taliban halted door-to-door campaigns, shifting vaccinations to mosque-based sites and restricting the participation of female health workers, according to media sources.⁷⁹

Food insecurity: State reported that humanitarian agencies need to budget 20 to 40 percent more for planned supply operations due to disruptions associated with the conflict with Iran and border closures with Pakistan and Iran. For example, due to the inaccessibility of ports in Iran, a World Food Program shipment must travel from the United Arab Emirates through multiple countries and the Caspian Sea, a journey of 3 months, according to State.⁸⁰ The World Food Program suspended assistance for returnees at five key border crossings during the quarter and canceled famine prevention interventions for 1.5 million people, according to State.⁸¹

Table 4.

Afghan Population Remaining at Camp as-Sayliyah, as of June 30, 2026

	FY 2025	FY 2026		
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
U.S. Citizens	0	0	0	0
U.S. Citizen Family Members	5	4	4	3
Legal Permanent Residents (LPR)	0	0	0	0
LPR Family Members	1	1	1	1
SIV Applicants Awaiting Adjudication	255	217	1	0
SIV Applicants Already Adjudicated	N/A	N/A	214	205
Family of Unaccompanied Children	164	144	124	108
Other Family Unification	220	232	228	209
Other Refugee Applicants	651	569	548	525
TOTAL	1,296	1,167	1,120	1,051

Source: State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 6/12/2026; State SCA/A, vetting comment, 7/13/2026.

ENDURING WELCOME

State continued to wind down Enduring Welcome, the whole-of-government effort to relocate and resettle eligible Afghan allies and their families from Afghanistan to the United States.⁸² State reported that it likely will not meet its goal of closing Camp as-Sayliyah, the primary transit and processing facility in Qatar, by the end of September 2026.⁸³ During the quarter, State prepared for closure by finalizing demobilization and decommissioning negotiations with onsite vendors.⁸⁴ As of the end of the quarter, State reported an unobligated balance of \$490 million for relocation-related activities, including costs to the wind down, and did not anticipate needing additional funding.⁸⁵

During the quarter, more than 1,050 Afghans remained at Camp as-Sayliyah.⁸⁶ (See Table 4.) State reported that 194 extended family members of American citizen DoW Service members remained at Camp as-Sayliyah.⁸⁷

Table 5.

Relocation of Afghans, as of June 30, 2026

0 Afghans relocated during the reporting period from Afghanistan with U.S. Government support

55,179 identified eligible individuals in Afghanistan

40,366 have been in contact with State

Source: State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 6/12/2026.

Table 6.

Afghans Who Have Voluntarily Repatriated to Afghanistan, as of June 30, 2026

		Cases	Individuals
FY 2025	Q1	2	6
	Q2	7	12
	Q3	25	65
	Q4	11	41
FY 2026	Q1	18	46
	Q2	14	47
	Q3	14	57
TOTAL		91	274

Sources: State SCA/A response to State OIG request for information, 6/12/2026; State SCA/A, vetting comments, 7/13/2026 and 7/22/2026.

In testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on June 2, Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that the administration was actively working to identify and secure viable resettlement alternatives that offer safe and suitable options for the remaining Afghan population at Camp as-Sayliyah.⁸⁸ State reported that during the quarter, negotiations with third-country partners were ongoing.⁸⁹

According to State, some Afghan nationals residing at Camp as-Sayliyah voluntarily returned to Afghanistan, including 265 who repatriated between October 1, 2024, and June 30, 2026.⁹⁰ State reported that it was still offering payments for voluntary repatriations: \$4,575 for the main applicant and \$1,145 per additional household member.⁹¹ Families with more than nine members receive an additional \$381 per member, State said.⁹²

Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs): Consular processing for Afghan SIV applications continued at U.S. embassies and consulates globally. However, active SIV processing for SIV applicants located at Camp as-Sayliyah ended in June 2026.⁹³ As a result, the U.S. Embassy in Doha approved the elimination of the five consular positions at the AAU, to be fully implemented by summer 2026.⁹⁴

Afghan SIV applicants were initially exempt from a June 2025 Presidential Proclamation restricting the entry of nationals from 12 countries, including Afghanistan.⁹⁵ However, a subsequent December 2025 Presidential Proclamation expanded the restriction to include Afghan SIV applicants, effective January 1, 2026.⁹⁶ State reported that during the quarter, it issued five national interest exceptions to the December 2025 proclamation.⁹⁷

State reported that no visas issued before the effective date of the December 2025 proclamation were revoked and that all remained valid for travel to the United States. It is the visa holder's responsibility to travel to a U.S. port of entry before the visa expires, according to State.⁹⁸ State reported that 5,994 visas of the original Afghan SIV allotment were unused as of the end of May.⁹⁹

In February, State informed all Afghan SIV applicants with incomplete applications pending Chief of Mission approval (excluding appeals) that they were required to provide all supporting documentation for Chief of Mission review by June 5. State closed SIV cases that were pending Chief of Mission approval if the required documents were not received by that date.¹⁰⁰ State reported that it had issued 429 Chief of Mission approvals and 2,362 denials during the quarter as of June 5. State reported that it expected to issue decisions in all pending Chief of Mission cases by the end of spring 2032.¹⁰¹ A Chief of Mission approval remains valid unless State issues a notice to the applicant that it has been revoked.¹⁰²

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Classified Appendix to this Report

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Enduring Sentinel, as noted in several sections of this report. The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

APPENDIX B

About the Lead Inspector General

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sections 401-424), established in section 419 the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of War (DoW), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Section 419 requires the Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to appoint a Lead IG from among the Inspectors General of the Lead IG agencies upon the commencement or designation of a military operation that exceeds 60 days as an overseas contingency operation or receipt of notification thereof.

The Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the DoW IG as the Lead IG for Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES) in November 2021. The Lead IG appointed the State IG as the Associate IG for OES.

Lead IG oversight of the operation “sunset” at the end of the first fiscal year after commencement or designation in which the total amount appropriated for the operation is less than \$100,000,000.

The Lead IG agencies collectively implement the Lead IG statutory responsibilities to:

- Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis a report on the contingency operation and to make that report available to the public.
- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S. Government-funded activities supporting overseas contingency operations, including those relating to the Middle East.

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations.

APPENDIX C

Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Quarterly Report

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OES, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from their respective agencies and other Federal agencies about activities related to the operation. This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources, such as U.S. Government statements, think tank reports, and media reports. The Lead IG agencies use open-source information to assess information obtained through their agency information collection process and provide additional detail about the operation.

The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or from Federal agencies, and the information provided represents the view of the source cited in each instance.

The DoW IG, as the Lead IG for this operation, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoW OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG draft the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review process of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the DoW OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG as independent oversight agencies.

APPENDIX D

Completed Oversight Reports

From April 1 to June 30, 2026, the Lead IG and partner agencies did not complete any oversight reports related to OES.



APPENDIX E

Ongoing Oversight Projects

Table 7 and 8 list the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies’ ongoing oversight projects related to OES.

Table 7.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OES by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs, as of June 30, 2026

<i>Audit of the Department of State’s Vetting Processes to Mitigate Terrorist Financing Risks in the Near East (Project no. 25AUD053)</i> To determine whether State designed and implemented its risk management and vetting processes to mitigate the risk of terrorist organizations benefiting from U.S. foreign assistance funds in the Near East.
<i>Inspection of Embassy Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Project no. 26ISP041.00)</i> To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
<i>Classified Inspection of Embassy Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Project no. 26ISP041.01)</i> To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Table 8.

Ongoing Oversight Project Related to OES by Partner Agency, as of June 30, 2026

<i>Review of Asylum Application Adjudication Processing in Response to Ahmed vs. DHS (Project no. 24-015-ISP-USCIS)</i> To determine whether missed aliases or incomplete resolution of potential matches to derogatory records have increased following the Ahmed vs. DHS settlement agreement.
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APPENDIX F

Planned Oversight Project

Table 9 lists the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies’ planned oversight project related to OES.

Table 9.

Planned Oversight Project Related to OES by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs, as of June 30, 2026

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
<i>Review of Closeout Procedures for Terminated USAID Awards</i> To assess USAID’s efforts to close out terminated awards in accordance with Federal regulations and USAID policies and procedures.

APPENDIX G

Hotline and Investigations

HOTLINE

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority.

During the quarter, the DoD Hotline did not receive any allegations or make any referrals related to OES or Afghanistan. State OIG received 5 allegations and referred 3. USAID OIG received 2 allegations. In some instances, a case may contain multiple allegations.

INVESTIGATIONS

The DoW OIG's criminal investigative component, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), worked on cases related to OES, and its predecessor Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), from offices in Europe and the United States. State OIG and USAID OIG investigators worked on cases related to OES/OFS from Washington, D.C., El Salvador, Germany, Israel, South Africa, and Thailand.

Regarding OES/OFS during this reporting period, investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 17 open investigations and closed 4 investigations. They made no referrals to the Department of Justice during the period. The investigative agencies reported no indictment/information or convictions.

The Lead IG agencies and their partners coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support. The investigative partner agencies consist of representatives from DCIS, State OIG, USAID OIG, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.



ACRONYMS

Acronym	
AAU	Afghanistan Affairs Unit
AQIS	al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoW	Department of War
FY	fiscal year
ISIS-K	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan
Lead IG	Lead Inspector General
Lead IG agencies	DoW, State, and USAID OIGs
OES	Operation Enduring Sentinel
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OUSW(C)	Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
OUSW(P)	Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy

Acronym	
SIV	Special Immigrant Visa
State	Department of State
TTP	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
U.S.	United States
USAGM	U.S. Agency for Global Media
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	The U.S. Central Command
VEO	violent extremist organization
WFP	World Food Program



Map of Afghanistan



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