



OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE

INCLUDING U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO

UKRAINE



APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026



Pursuant to Executive Order 14347, “Restoring the United States Department of War,” September 5, 2025, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) and Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) use the secondary titles of the Department of War Inspector General (DoW IG) and Office of Inspector General (DoW OIG), respectively. The use of these secondary titles does not in any way affect the primary statutory title or authorities of the DoD IG under The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Chapter 4, Inspectors General), or the authorities or responsibilities of the DoD IG or DoD OIG pursuant to any laws, regulations, or policies.

On the cover: A U.S. Army squadron master trainer hand-launches a Peregrine one-way attack unmanned aircraft during Project Flytrap at Pabrade Training Area, Lithuania, on May 15, 2026. (U.S. Army photo)



We are pleased to present this Special Inspector General report to Congress on Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR). This report discharges our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2024 and Lead IG reporting responsibilities under 5 U.S.C. 419.

Section 1250B states that no later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal quarter, the Special Inspector General for OAR shall submit to Congress a report summarizing U.S. funding, programs, and operations for Ukraine with respect to that quarter. This report covers the period April 1 to June 30, 2026.

This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the DoW, State, and USAID Offices of Inspector General and other U.S. oversight agencies that coordinate their activities through the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group.

This report addresses the following topics specified in Section 1250B:

- USEUCOM operations and related support for the U.S. military: pages 14–24
- Military assistance to Ukraine: pages 14–17, 25–33
- Non-military assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 8–14, 34–43
- Operations of other relevant U.S. Government agencies involved in the Ukraine response: pages 9–11
- Description of any waste, fraud, or abuse identified by the OIGs: pages 46–48
- Status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits: pages 46–51
- Status and results of referrals to the Department of Justice: page 51
- Description of planned oversight projects related to OAR: page 50

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Platte B. Moring, III".

Platte B. Moring, III
Special Inspector General for OAR
Inspector General
U.S. Department of War

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Arne B. Baker".

Arne B. Baker
Associate Inspector General for OAR
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of State

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Van Nguyen".

Van Nguyen
Acting Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of the
Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International
Development



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Mission Update

pp. 4–17

- U.S.-facilitated Russia-Ukraine peace talks remained suspended since the start of U.S. combat operations against Iran.
- Temporary U.S. waivers for sanctions on Russian crude oil and petroleum products did not detract from ongoing international pressure that involved expanded sanctions and interdictions of Russian shadow fleet tankers.
- Ukrainian mid-range and long-range strikes caused fuel shortages in Crimea and Russia, slowing but not halting Russian military operations.
- Despite suppressing most Russian unmanned aircraft and cruise missile threats, Ukraine lacked interceptor missiles to counter ballistic missiles and remained reliant on foreign air and missile defense support.
- European allies and partners are increasing their spending commitments: NATO increased its annual core defense expenditures by more than 19 percent in 2025; the European Union approved a €90 billion (\$105 billion) support loan for Ukraine.
- Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available for obligation \$196.43 billion since February 2022 for OAR and the Ukraine Response; approximately \$180.91 billion has been obligated and \$121.16 billion disbursed through June 30, 2026. \$10.02 billion remained available for obligation, and \$59.75 billion in obligations remained undisbursed.

U.S. Support to NATO

pp. 18–24

- Secretary of War Pete Hegseth called on other NATO members to lead a “NATO 3.0,” announcing that U.S. contributions to NATO might decrease if other countries do not meet defense spending targets.
- The DoW will conduct a 6-month review of USEUCOM’s force posture. Reductions to USAREUR-AF’s troop numbers and munitions have already impacted OAR mission operations and readiness.
- USEUCOM and USAREUR-AF conducted Sword 26 and other multinational exercises, focusing on improving U.S. integration into NATO-led operations to deter and defend against any Russian aggression in Europe.

U.S. Support to Ukraine

pp. 25–43

- As of June, NATO allies and partners have announced \$6.3 billion for the PURL initiative and \$2.8 billion for JUMPSTART to provide U.S. defense articles and services for Ukraine.
- The United States transported approximately 11,000 short tons of cargo in support of Ukraine, trained 575 UAF students, and helped restore 108 UAF articles to fully mission capable status during the quarter.
- As of June, there were more than 115 active U.S. assistance programs providing non-military assistance to Ukraine. More than 65 percent of State’s \$3.5 billion worth of implemented programming went to humanitarian and energy assistance.

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Then-Chief of Defence of Ukraine, General Oleksandr Syrskyi and the Military Representative of Ukraine, Major General Serhii Salkutsan at the NATO-Ukraine Council, on May 19, 2026. (NATO photo)



MISSION UPDATE

INTRODUCTION

Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) is the DoW operation in the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility to demonstrate the United States' commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) collective defense and to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression against NATO. Under OAR, the United States provides security assistance to Ukraine in its continued defense against Russia's full-scale invasion since February 2022.¹ Originally launched after Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea, OAR expanded substantially following Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and includes USEUCOM activities across the Baltics, Central Europe, and the Black Sea region.²

In addition to security assistance, the U.S. Government provides financial, material, and technical assistance to Ukrainian institutions and civil society. Since July 2025, new funding has largely come from NATO ally and partner contributions.³ State reported that the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv continued developing an updated Integrated Country Strategy—outlining U.S. policy goals and objectives in Ukraine—to replace the August 2023 strategy.⁴

DIPLOMACY AND SANCTIONS

No U.S.-facilitated trilateral talks with Ukraine and Russia occurred during the quarter. The last talks occurred on February 17, 2026, before the start of U.S. combat operations against Iran. State reported that Special Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met on an ad hoc basis with Ukrainian and Russian negotiating teams multiple times in April and May, but that no announcements of specific agreed-upon peace terms resulted from these engagements.⁵ According to State, Russia's long standing strategic objectives—claiming that the Ukrainian

SAG-U reported that although Ukraine maintained high interception rates against Russian unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles during the quarter, it continued facing significant shortages of munitions to counter ballistic threats.

regions of Crimea, Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia belong to Russia, as well as blocking Ukraine's military and economic integration with the West—remained unchanged.⁶

To offset global production declines in the Middle East during the quarter, the United States twice extended its waiver on sanctions for Russian crude oil and petroleum products at sea, but allowed the waiver to expire on June 17.⁷ Although the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed that the waiver extensions and higher global oil prices enabled Russia to accumulate additional revenue to invest in its wartime economy, both the DIA and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) said that the waivers did not materially ease the overall economic sanctions pressure on Russia.⁸

During the quarter, both the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom expanded their sanctions targeting individuals, energy revenues, and maritime activity linked to Russia.⁹ Meanwhile, the French navy seized two oil tankers and the United Kingdom's forces seized one; both vessels are suspected to belong to Russia's shadow fleet of vessels circumventing international sanctions.¹⁰

BATTLEFIELD UPDATE

The DIA assessed that Ukrainian and Russian strategic calculations and operational outlooks remained the same during the quarter. Notably, Ukraine continued focusing on inflicting high casualties among Russian frontline forces and conducting strikes against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure.¹¹

However, the DIA said that limited military manpower and equipment continued to constrain Kyiv's ability to sustain military operations, and that Ukraine remained reliant on an uncertain supply of Western materiel due to donor countries' other priorities beyond Ukraine.¹² The Security Assistance Group–Ukraine (SAG-U) said that this necessary materiel included air defenses and munitions to combat Russian ballistic missiles targeting Ukrainian civilian populations and critical national infrastructure.¹³ During the quarter, Russian forces continued making slow advances across the front line in Ukraine, which the DIA assessed reinforced Russia's non-conciliatory negotiations stance.¹⁴

Air war: The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) initiated a midrange unmanned aircraft strike campaign against Russian rearward military assets and logistics nodes, effectively slowing but not halting Russian forces' ground offensive by disrupting those logistics and causing fuel shortages in Russian-occupied Crimea. At the same time, Ukrainian long-range unmanned aircraft strikes into Russia disrupted Russian oil refining capacity by approximately 40 percent, causing fuel shortages for Russia's civilian population as well.¹⁵ SAG-U reported that although Ukraine maintained high interception rates against Russian unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles during the quarter, it continued facing significant shortages of munitions to counter ballistic threats.¹⁶ Shortly after the end of the quarter, on July 2, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy acknowledged that Ukraine lacks Patriot interceptor missiles, among other anti-ballistic capability deficiencies.¹⁷

Ground war: Disrupted Russian logistics and command and control—which was impacted after Russian forces lost access to Starlink in February—enabled the UAF to mount small-scale counter-offensives to reclaim portions of territory across Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and

Zaporizhzhia. However, the DIA assessed that as of the end of the quarter, Russian forces had largely restored their command and control capabilities, and that Russia continued making territorial advances elsewhere along the front line.¹⁸

Manpower: Ukraine implemented recruitment reforms on June 12, introducing fixed-term contracts with differentiated pay scales for combat and support roles that new recruits and existing UAF personnel can sign.¹⁹ Regarding Russian military manpower, the DIA assessed that despite sustaining high casualties in 2026 due to increasingly lethal Ukrainian tactics, the Russian government—through its use of increasingly coercive recruitment methods and lucrative signing bonuses—has thus far sustained its current force size without resorting to a general mobilization. During the quarter, Russia’s monthly recruitment numbers roughly equaled its monthly permanent losses.²⁰

Burden-sharing and Burden-shifting

The U.S. Government has emphasized “burden-sharing and burden-shifting” as a key priority of U.S. foreign policy, with the White House calling on European partners to take greater responsibility for continental security, including assistance for Ukraine.²¹ On June 18, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth articulated his vision for a “NATO 3.0” led primarily by European states rather than the United States, while cautioning that U.S. contributions to the alliance could decline if other member states fail to meet their defense spending targets.²²

Collective defense: According to NATO reporting, the alliance increased its core defense expenditures in 2025 by 19 percent compared to 2024 levels, and member states are largely on track to meet their agreed-upon Wales, Vilnius, and Hague Summit commitments.²³ In addition to NATO frameworks, EU defense funding mechanisms are also expanding. In May, the European Commission finalized its first “Security Action Plan for Europe” loan agreement for Poland to invest in border security, air defense, and artillery systems.²⁴

Support to Ukraine: On April 23, the Council of the European Union approved a 2-year €90 billion (approximately \$105 billion) support loan for Ukraine, €60 billion (\$70 billion) of which is intended for Ukraine’s defense needs, with the remaining amount intended for macroeconomic support for Ukraine’s most urgent budgetary needs.²⁵ The European Commission disbursed €7.1 billion (\$8.3 billion) of the loan to Ukraine as of the end of the quarter.²⁶ Also in April, the European Union announced that it would fund 57 projects worth \$1.26 billion in total that focus on mass unmanned aircraft production, unmanned aircraft defense, enhanced European autonomy, and increased partnership with Ukraine.²⁷ In May, the Council of the European Union approved a \$3.3 billion payment to Ukraine as part of the EU’s Ukraine Plan to assist with Ukrainian recovery, reconstruction, and modernization.²⁸

State reported that approximately \$300 billion in Russian sovereign assets remained immobilized globally, most of which are held within EU financial institutions. Although the United States and the European Union have not directly seized or otherwise used the assets’ principal to support Ukraine, the European Union and Group of Seven countries are advancing efforts to convert windfall interest generated by these immobilized assets into assistance for Ukraine.²⁹



STATUS OF FUNDS

In accordance with the Special Inspector General for Operation Atlantic Resolve’s (OAR) legislative mandate, this section provides a comprehensive accounting of the amounts appropriated by the United States for the Ukraine response.

The Special IG for OAR requested funding data from 14 Federal agencies authorized to receive funds through the Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts, or which otherwise received funds from these appropriations, principally the DoW, State, and USAID.

U.S. GOVERNMENT OVERVIEW

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available for obligation \$196.43 billion for OAR and the broader Ukraine response. (See Table 2.) These funds were derived from four categories of appropriations:

- \$174.19 billion that Congress appropriated through the five Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts enacted from Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 through FY 2024, of which Federal agencies allocated \$163.60 billion for OAR and the Ukraine response, and \$10.59 billion was allocated for purposes, primarily humanitarian, other than the Ukraine response;
- \$26.89 billion that agencies allocated from their regular annual appropriations;
- \$1.14 billion allocated from other supplemental appropriation acts; and
- \$4.80 billion provided by NATO allies and partners since August 2025 to the DoW through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative to procure new defense articles and services for Ukraine, or to replace defense articles from DoW inventory provided to Ukraine. These NATO contributions are credited pursuant to a permanent, indefinite appropriation under Section 8106 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026.³⁰ (See Table 1.)

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available for obligation \$196.43 billion for OAR and the broader Ukraine response.

Table 1.
Sources of Cumulative Appropriations, as of FY 2026 Q3, \$ in Billions

	Cumulative Appropriations
Five Ukraine Supplemental Appropriation Acts	\$174.19
Less: Allocations for Purposes Other Than the Ukraine Response	(10.59)
Net Amounts Allocated for OAR and the Ukraine Response	163.60
Regular Annual Appropriations	26.89
Other Supplemental Appropriation Acts	1.14
NATO Contributions Received	4.80
TOTAL	\$196.43

Sources: See endnote on page 59.

Table 2.

Status of U.S. Appropriations for Operation Atlantic Resolve, Including U.S. Government Activities Relating to Ukraine, Grouped by Funding Category, FY 2022 to FY 2026 Q3, \$ in Millions

Funds Appropriated by Agency and Account	Agency	Appropriated	Obligated	Disbursed
SECURITY				
U.S. Military Support, Primarily for U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)	DoW	\$51,083.25	\$45,753.83	\$34,776.46
Replenishment of DoW Stocks	DoW	45,780.00	42,131.01	18,886.55
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	DoW	33,512.46	32,402.93	19,832.24
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	State	7,110.77	7,110.77	4,838.54
NATO Contributions Received	DoW	4,798.62	1,413.94	1.58
European Capacity Building (ECB)	DoW	400.00	50.00	—
International Military Education & Training (IMET)	State	132.17	132.17	124.94
Security, Total		142,817.27	128,994.66	78,460.30
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT				
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	State/USAID	34,629.11	33,880.37	31,488.96
U.S. International Development Finance Corp.	DFC	4,217.54	4,217.54	929.01
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)	State/USAID	3,227.57	2,590.81	1,172.07
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	State	1,438.73	1,434.19	1,059.67
Multilateral Assistance, International Financial Institutions (IFI)	Treasury	990.00	990.00	988.20
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)	State	477.48	469.03	331.18
Global Health Programs (GHP-State)	State	202.37	173.35	150.35
U.S. Agency for Global Media	USAGM	179.73	179.73	174.96
Export-Import Bank of the United States	EXIM	156.56	156.56	—
Global Health Programs (GHP-USAID)	USAID	90.34	90.16	38.20
Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)	State	63.16	61.11	54.89
National Security Investment Programs (NSIP)	State	15.00	—	—
Governance & Development, Total		45,687.60	44,242.86	36,387.50
HUMANITARIAN				
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	USAID	2,575.12	2,575.04	2,013.34
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	State	1,204.97	1,204.97	1,181.00
Transition Initiatives (TI)	USAID	195.00	192.48	152.80
Department of Agriculture	USDA	150.00	134.97	134.97
Humanitarian, Total		4,125.09	4,107.46	3,482.12
AGENCY OPERATIONS				
Department of Health and Human Services	HHS	1,844.65	1,748.40	1,273.54
Department of Energy	DoE	842.52	837.83	665.27
Diplomatic Programs (DP)	State	496.15	489.24	442.34
Department of the Treasury	Treasury	145.87	138.57	132.99
Department of Justice	DoJ	126.40	102.91	100.32
Embassy Security, Construction & Maintenance (ESCM)	State	110.00	58.71	56.42
Operating Expenses (OE)	USAID	86.00	58.47	41.49
Capital Investment Fund (CIF)	State	44.17	44.03	37.86
USAID Office of Inspector General	USAID OIG	23.00	13.26	12.34
Department of Commerce	DoC	22.10	22.02	21.55
State Office of Inspector General	State OIG	21.50	20.57	19.06
DoW Office of Inspector General	DoW OIG	16.00	15.48	15.17
Emergencies in the Diplomatic & Consular Service (EDCS)	State	5.00	4.50	4.50
Six Agencies with Appropriations Under \$8 Million	Various	18.54	10.00	10.00
Agency Operations, Total		3,801.90	3,564.00	2,832.86
TOTAL FUNDING, SELECTED ACCOUNTS		\$196,431.86	\$180,908.98	\$121,162.78

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Agency cumulative appropriation data is provided for funds appropriated or otherwise made available for obligation for OAR and the Ukraine response after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, through June 30, 2026, except for State GHP data, which is presented as of March 31, 2026; USAID IDA, TI, GHP, OE and OIG data, which is presented as of June 30, 2025; and USAID ESF and AEECA data, which is presented as of December 31, 2024. Appropriations for DFC and EXIM reflect obligations on financial product commitments and do not reflect positive subsidy amounts. DoW OIG has not requested information on obligations and disbursements from four of the six agencies that manage appropriated balances under \$8 million.

Sources: See endnote on page 59.

Two U.S. funding activities related to OAR and the Ukraine response are only partially reflected in reported appropriations: 1) the \$20.00 billion Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan that the U.S. provided to Ukraine, secured by earnings on immobilized Russian sovereign assets, was supported with only \$535.25 million in appropriations obligated by USAID to guarantee the loan; and 2) the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) capitalized the U.S. share of the U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund with \$75.00 million in seed capital. Investments by the U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund may not be reflected in reported appropriations because they are conducted by a separate entity. The DFC announced the first investment by this fund—in a Ukrainian radio and navigation technology company—in March 2026.³¹

Congress has not made significant new funding available for OAR and the Ukraine response since April 2024. The most recent appropriation specifically for OAR and the Ukraine response was the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriation Act, 2024, enacted on April 24, 2024, that provided \$60.78 billion in funding. Since that time, additional funds from the FY 2024, FY 2025 and FY 2026 annual appropriation acts have been made available for OAR and the Ukraine response, but in relatively modest amounts. Only \$5.13 billion in FY 2025 appropriations and \$7.62 billion in FY 2026 appropriations have been made available for obligation for OAR and the Ukraine response as of June 30, 2026. (See Figure 1 and Table 3.)

FY 2026 appropriations consist largely of European Deterrence Initiative (\$3.40 billion) and NATO Contributions Received (\$3.73 billion) funding made available for obligation through June 30, 2026. Two new accounts were created in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026,

Figure 1.

Annual Appropriations by Funding Category, FY 2022 to FY 2026 Q3, \$ in Billions




Table 3.

Annual Appropriations, FY 2025 to FY 2026 Q3, \$ in Millions

Funds Appropriated by Agency and Account	Agency	FY 2025	FY 2026
SECURITY			
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)	DoW	\$3,087.19	\$3,402.75
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	DoW	300.00	—
NATO Contributions Received	DoW	1,065.80	3,732.82
European Capacity Building (ECB)	DoW	—	400.00
International Military Education & Training (IMET)	State	27.10	21.22
Security, Total		4,480.09	7,556.79
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT			
U.S. International Development Finance Corp.	DFC	555.21	41.60
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)	State	29.00	—
Global Health Programs (GHP-State)	State	18.89	—
U.S. Agency for Global Media	USAGM	12.62	—
Global Health Programs (GHP-USAID)	USAID	7.12	—
Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)	State	19.69	0.14
National Security Investment Programs (NSIP)	State	—	15.00
Governance & Development, Total		642.52	56.74
AGENCY OPERATIONS			
Department of the Treasury	Treasury	8.25	5.69
Agency Operations, Total		8.25	5.69
TOTAL FUNDING		\$5,130.86	\$7,619.22

Notes: Numbers have been rounded.

Sources: See endnote on page 59.

and were allocated for the Ukraine response during the quarter. The European Capacity Building (ECB) appropriation (\$400.00 million) was fully allocated for Ukraine in the quarter. A new account, National Security Investment Programs, replaced the long-standing Economic Support Fund and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia accounts, among others, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, and State allocated \$15.00 million of the new FY 2026 appropriation for Ukraine in the quarter.³²

Appropriations for OAR and the Ukraine response can be grouped into four funding categories, consisting of security assistance, governance and development, humanitarian assistance, and agency operations. Of the \$196.43 billion appropriated for OAR and the Ukraine response, \$142.82 billion was provided to the DoW and State for security assistance. The second largest portion, \$45.69 billion, was provided to State, USAID, and four other government agencies for governance and development assistance. A relatively small portion, \$4.13 billion, was provided to State, USAID, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture for humanitarian assistance. Finally, \$3.80 billion was provided for agency operations, including \$68.00 million provided to the DoW OIG, State OIG, USAID OIG, and the U.S. Government Accountability Office for oversight of OAR and the Ukraine response.

State, USAID, and other agencies that were authorized to receive funding through the Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts developed programming that extended beyond Ukraine to other countries in Europe and in some cases globally. Of the \$89.58 billion in funding allocated for the Ukraine response from a selection of the largest accounts, approximately nine percent, or \$7.68 billion, was allocated for countries other than Ukraine. (See Table 4.)

Table 4.

Allocations of Selected U.S. Appropriations to Specific Countries for Ukraine Response, Grouped by Funding Category, FY 2022 to FY 2026 Q3, \$ in Millions

Funds Allocated to Specific Countries by Agency and Account	Agency	For Ukraine	For Rest of Europe	For Rest of World	Total
SECURITY					
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	DoW	\$33,512.46	\$ —	\$ —	\$33,512.46
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program	State	3,684.59	3,236.18	190.00	7,110.77
European Capacity Building (ECB)	DoW	400.00	—	—	400.00
International Military Education & Training (IMET)	State	17.11	115.06	—	132.17
Security, Total		37,614.16	3,351.24	190.00	41,155.40
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT					
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	Joint	33,059.63	525.99	295.30	33,880.92
U.S. International Development Finance Corp.	DFC	2,291.35	1,922.72	3.47	4,217.54
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)	Joint	2,025.40	537.59	29.80	2,592.80
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	State	1,389.52	44.79	—	1,434.31
Multilateral Assistance, International Financial Institutions (IFI)	Treasury	540.00	50.00	400.00	990.00
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)	State	465.58	—	11.90	477.48
Global Health Programs (GHP-State)	State	202.37	—	—	202.37
U.S. Agency for Global Media	USAGM	112.25	65.80	1.69	179.73
Export-Import Bank of the United States	EXIM	156.56	—	—	156.56
Global Health Programs (GHP-USAID)	USAID	90.16	—	—	90.16
Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)	State	22.35	23.70	15.08	61.14
National Security Investment Programs (NSIP)	State	15.00	—	—	15.00
Governance & Development, Total		40,370.17	3,170.60	757.24	44,298.02
HUMANITARIAN					
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	USAID	2,570.38	4.74	—	2,575.12
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	State	1,204.97	—	—	1,204.97
Transition Initiatives (TI)	USAID	137.78	44.62	9.54	191.95
Department of Agriculture	USDA	—	—	150.00	150.00
Humanitarian, Total		3,913.13	49.37	159.54	4,122.03
TOTAL FUNDING, SELECTED ACCOUNTS		\$81,897.46	\$6,571.21	\$1,106.79	\$89,575.46

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Agencies have reported funds appropriated or otherwise made available for obligation following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, through June 30, 2026, and made country-specific allocations for these appropriations through that date, except for State GHP data, which is presented as of March 31, 2026; USAID IDA, TI and GHP data, which is presented as of June 30, 2025; and USAID ESF and AEECA data, which is presented as of December 31, 2024. Appropriations for DFC and EXIM reflect obligations on financial product commitments and do not reflect positive subsidy amounts. State and USAID jointly administer ESF and AEECA appropriations. Europe is defined to include countries to the west of the Ural Mountains and north of the Caucasus including Georgia but not Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Kazakhstan.

Sources: See endnote on page 59.

FUNDING PIPELINE

The status of the \$196.43 billion in funds appropriated or otherwise made available for obligation can be viewed as being in one of four states of funding execution: \$10.02 billion that has been appropriated and remains available for obligation, \$59.75 billion that has been obligated but not yet disbursed, \$121.16 billion that has been disbursed, and \$4.08 billion that has expired, meaning the funds are no longer available for obligation. An additional \$1.42 billion in funding—particularly USAID Economic Support Fund and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia funding—was not assigned to one of these categories due to missing data and resulting uncertainty about its status. (See Figure 2.)

The appropriation laws specify the number of years that each appropriation is available for obligation; typically, 1, 2, or 3 years, or until expended, and after this period of availability has ended, unobligated funds are said to “expire.” Almost all the expired funds are concentrated in three sets of DoW accounts. (See Table 5.)

The rate at which appropriated funds are obligated and disbursed varies significantly across accounts. While nearly all the amounts appropriated for DoW Stocks Replenishment and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative have been obligated, approximately one-half of these obligations remain undisbursed. Similarly, a large portion of the DFC obligations remain undisbursed, as many of the agency’s financial commitments are for loan guarantees and similar products that may not require funding. (See Table 5.)

Figure 2.

Status of Appropriated Funds as of FY 2026 Q3, \$ in Billions




Table 5.

Appropriated Funds Remaining Available for Possible Disbursement, Seven Largest Accounts and All Others, as of FY 2026 Q3, \$ in Billions

	Cumulative Appropriations	Expired Funds	Funds Remaining for Possible Disbursement		
			Appropriated, Not Yet Obligated	Obligated, Not Yet Disbursed	Total Remaining
U.S. Military Support, Primarily for USEUCOM and EDI	\$51.08	\$1.99	\$3.34	\$10.98	\$14.32
DoW Stocks Replenishment	45.78	0.94	2.71	23.24	25.80
Economic Support Fund	34.63	—	—	2.39	2.39
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative	33.51	1.02	0.09	12.57	12.66
Foreign Military Financing	7.11	—	—	2.27	2.27
NATO Contributions Received	4.80	—	3.38	1.41	4.80
U.S. International Development Finance Corp.	4.22	—	—	3.29	3.29
Subtotal—Seven Largest Accounts	181.13	3.95	9.52	56.16	65.53
All Other Accounts	15.30	0.13	0.49	3.59	4.08
TOTAL	\$196.43	\$4.08	\$10.02	\$59.75	\$69.61

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Agency funds appropriated or otherwise made available for obligation, funds obligated, funds disbursed, and the periods of availability for obligation have been analyzed to determine funds remaining available for possible disbursement and expired funds as of June 30, 2026 for most accounts. Funds that expired at September 30, 2025, could not be calculated for USAID-ESF, USAID-AEECA, OE, and USAID OIG because of lapsed reporting for these accounts, as more fully explained in the Notes to Table 2. Funds Under Review in Figure 2, Status of Appropriated Funds, includes appropriated balances from these accounts whose period of availability for obligation ended September 30, 2025, additional ESF and AEECA appropriations whose allocation to USAID is being examined, and appropriations to four agencies with account balances under \$4 million.

Sources: See endnote on page 59.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Nearly three-quarters of the funds appropriated for OAR and the Ukraine response are for security programs administered by the DoW and State, and currently total \$142.82 billion. (See Table 4.)

Since February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$135.59 billion to the DoW, consisting of four funding categories: U.S. Military Support, DoW Stocks Replenishment, Ukraine Security Assistance, and NATO Contributions Received. (See Table 6.) DoW Stocks Replenishment funding and a portion of NATO Contributions Received funding serve to replace defense articles drawn down from DoW stocks through the exercise of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). The subjects of remaining PDA and unfunded DoW Stocks Replenishment requirements are discussed below.

U.S. Military Support: The DoW defines OAR funding for U.S. Military Support as appropriations to the DoW in the five Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts other than Ukraine Security Assistive Initiative (USAI) and DoW Stocks Replenishment appropriations, totaling \$32.65 billion, as well as European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funds made available for obligation of \$18.45 billion, together totaling \$51.10 billion.

NATO Contributions Received: The DoW reported that 24 NATO allies and one NATO partner have contributed \$4.80 billion cumulatively through the PURL initiative to the U.S. Treasury as of June 30, 2026. These funds have been transferred to the DoW and fully

allocated to Ukraine Security Assistance (\$2.27 billion) for procurement of defense articles and services for Ukraine, and to DoW Stocks Replenishment (\$2.53 billion) to replace defense articles from DoW inventory provided to Ukraine. (See Table 6.)

DoW Stocks Replenishment: Congress appropriated \$45.78 billion for DoW Stocks Replenishment in the five Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts, and these appropriations are reported separately from NATO Contributions Received for DoW Stocks Replenishment in Table 6. A DoW OIG audit report, published in August 2025, identified a \$38.6 billion backlog

Table 6.

DoW Funds Apportioned from Ukraine Supplemental Appropriation Acts, Annual Agency Appropriation Acts, and NATO Contributions Received for Operation Atlantic Resolve, FY 2022 to FY 2026 Q3, \$ in Millions

U.S. Appropriations, Apportioned by Account	Army	Navy	Air Force	Defense-wide	Total
U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT, PRIMARILY USED FOR USEUCOM AND EDI					
Military Personnel	\$1,893.45	\$78.87	\$343.04	\$—	\$2,315.36
Operation & Maintenance	18,861.55	3,857.84	3,744.63	2,914.44	29,378.46
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation	159.68	128.50	860.74	488.72	1,637.64
Procurement	8,714.24	435.75	5,478.23	111.74	14,739.95
Military Construction	361.73	320.63	1,284.44	—	1,966.80
Defense Production Act Purchases	—	—	—	600.00	600.00
Defense Health Program	—	—	—	28.00	28.00
Office of the Inspector General	—	—	—	16.00	16.00
Army & Defense Working Capital Funds	7.07	—	—	409.97	417.04
U.S. Military Support, Total	29,997.72	4,821.59	11,711.08	4,568.86	51,099.25
DOW STOCKS REPLENISHMENT					
Operation & Maintenance	1,010.22	637.63	744.18	93.45	2,485.48
Defense Production Act Purchases	—	—	—	313.80	313.80
Procurement	30,010.20	4,528.28	1,908.40	98.26	36,545.15
Procurement Replacement of DoW Stocks	5,207.13	313.14	915.30	—	6,435.57
DoW Stocks Replenishment, Total	36,227.55	5,479.05	3,567.88	505.52	45,780.00
UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE					
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative	—	—	—	33,512.46	33,512.46
European Capacity Building	—	—	—	400.00	400.00
Ukraine Security Assistance, Total	—	—	—	33,912.46	33,912.46
NATO CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED					
Ukraine Security Assistance	—	—	—	2,273.22	2,273.22
DoW Stocks Replenishment	—	—	—	2,525.30	2,525.30
NATO Contributions Received, Total	—	—	—	4,798.62	4,798.62
TOTAL FUNDING	\$66,225.27	\$10,300.64	\$15,278.96	\$43,785.46	\$135,590.33

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Reflects apportionment of appropriated balances to the military services for Direct Military Support and DoW Stocks Replenishment in the Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts and for European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funding, and apportionment of appropriated balances to Defense-wide accounts for Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, European Capacity Building, and NATO Contributions Received appropriations as of June 30, 2026. EDI balances may be higher than enacted amounts due to revised planned execution. Procurement Replacement of DoW Stocks consists of the apportionment of Procurement appropriations to the military services in P.L. 118-50 Div. B for DoW Stocks Replenishment.

Sources: See endnote on page 59.

of unfunded DoW Stocks Replenishment requirements extending beyond the \$45.78 billion appropriated for DoW Stocks Replenishment in the five Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts.³³ The DoW reported that the backlog of unfunded requirements has been reduced to \$38.4 billion as of June 22, 2026, after reflecting drawdowns related to PURL packages and NATO Contributions Received for DoW Stocks Replenishment.

Ukraine Security Assistance: The funding category Ukraine Security Assistance consists of USAI and ECB appropriations totaling \$33.91 billion, and these appropriations are reported separately from NATO Contributions Received for Ukraine Security Assistance (\$2.27 billion) in Table 6. Congress appropriated \$32.31 billion for USAI in the five Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts, \$1.20 billion for USAI in the FY 2022 through FY 2025 regular annual appropriation acts, and \$400.00 million for ECB, which was fully allocated to Ukraine, in the FY 2026 DoW appropriations act. The DoW estimates that the cost of defense articles and services funded with USAI appropriations and delivered to Ukraine equaled 57.3 percent of the total USAI appropriations of \$33.51 billion as of August 2026.³⁴

Key Budget Terms

Appropriation: A provision of law authorizing Federal agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of the Department of the Treasury for specified purposes. Appropriations represent amounts that agencies may obligate during the period of time specified in the respective appropriation acts but do not represent the cash amounts set aside in Treasury for purposes specified in those acts.

Apportionment: The action by which the Office of Management and Budget distributes amounts available for obligation, including budgetary reserves established pursuant to law, in an appropriation or fund account. An apportionment divides amounts available for obligation by specific time periods (usually quarters), activities, projects, objects, or a combination thereof.

Obligation: Amounts representing orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, or similar transactions during an accounting period that will require payment during the same or a future period.

Disbursement: Amounts paid by U.S. federal agencies during the fiscal year to liquidate U.S. Government obligations.

Reprogramming: Realignment of budget authority within an appropriation or fund account for purposes other than those contemplated at the time of appropriation, usually to finance an emergent, unfunded requirement.

Transfer: The shifting of funds from one appropriation or fund account to another.

Expired Account or Appropriation: An appropriation or fund account in which the balance is no longer available for incurring new obligations but is still available to cover upward adjustments to prior year obligations and liquidating valid obligations. The account remains available for such purposes during the 5-year expiration period.

Source: DoW, Financial Management Regulation DoD 7000.14-R, "Glossary," 9/2021.

The DoW reported that the total PDA remaining available as of June 30, 2026, stood at \$4.96 billion, unchanged from the amount reported as of March 31, 2026.

Presidential Drawdown Authority: PDA is not a funding source but rather an authority that allows the President to provide military assistance from existing defense articles in the DoW’s stocks, subject to a statutory cap.³⁵ The long-standing statutory limit for PDA is \$100 million of weapons and equipment transferred worldwide per year.³⁶ However, in response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Congress increased the cap on PDA to \$11.00 billion for FY 2022, \$14.50 billion for FY 2023, and \$7.80 billion for FY 2024, providing \$33.30 billion in cumulative PDA.³⁷

Under Presidential authorization, the FY 2024 PDA balance was extended indefinitely on September 26, 2024. This served as the last required PDA notification to Congress.³⁸ The DoW reported that the total PDA remaining available as of June 30, 2026, stood at \$4.96 billion, unchanged from the amount reported as of March 31, 2026.³⁹

Foreign Military Financing (FMF): FMF is the U.S. Government’s standing program through which State procures, and the DoW delivers, weapons, materiel, services, and training requested by allies and partners. A portion of the total \$7.11 billion in FMF enables the U.S. Government to backfill partner nations that have depleted their military stocks through donations to Ukraine. One of the FMF program objectives is to encourage partners to divest from Russian equipment to disrupt support for the Russian military industrial complex and strengthen ties with the United States.⁴⁰ (See Table 7.)

As of June, State had disbursed approximately \$4.3 billion in Ukraine supplemental funds for the FMF program.⁴¹ (See Table 7.) State reported that in the quarter ending June 30, it had neither obligated nor disbursed additional funds for Ukraine. The President’s FY 2027 budget did not request any FMF for Ukraine.⁴²

State also reported that it had not designated any additional funds to Ukraine for the Ukraine Defense Enterprise Program (UDEP) during the quarter. UDEP is a country-neutral account within the FMF program specifically allocated to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war in Ukraine. State explained that UDEP seeks to support and expand the U.S. defense industrial base through enabling the procurement of U.S. defense articles for partners and allies.⁴³

Table 7.
Foreign Military Financing Programs Using Supplemental Funds as of June 2026, \$ in Thousands

Country	Total Disbursed	Funding Purpose and Countries
Ukraine	\$2,369,063	Multiple launch rocket systems; artillery; armed unmanned aircraft and counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); armored vehicles; air defense systems.
Other European Countries	1,956,873	UH-60 helicopter; chemical; biological; radiological; nuclear (CBRN) protection equipment; cybersecurity services; patriot air defense; and advanced targeting capability. Countries include Albania, Romania and Czechia.
GRAND TOTAL	\$4,325,936	

Notes: Ukraine total includes supplemental FMF funds obligated directly to Ukraine. FMF grant totals include \$120 million in FMF grant assistance provided as loan subsidies for Poland (for more than \$15 billion in FMF loans and loan guarantees) and a \$60 million FMF grant loan subsidy for Romania for a \$920 million FMF loan but excludes \$80 million FMF for Taiwan as unrelated to Ukraine. Loan subsidies for Poland and Romania will not show up as disbursed on this chart as they pay for loan costs and not FMS procurements.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 6/18/2026.



A U.S. Marine Corps assault amphibious vehicle at Exercise Sea Breeze 26 at Babadag Training Area, Romania, on June 15, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Through Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR), the United States seeks to demonstrate its commitment to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) collective defense, strengthen NATO’s deterrence capabilities against Russian aggression, and provide security assistance to Ukraine.⁴⁴ This security assistance consists of the provision of equipment, training, maintenance, and sustainment support, including those contributions of U.S. defense articles and services that since July 2025 have been funded by NATO allies and partners.⁴⁵

NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE

According to the Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy, the United States—as outlined in the 2026 National Defense Strategy—will provide critical, though more limited support to European allies “who will take primary responsibility for their own conventional defense.”⁴⁶

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

As of the end of the quarter, the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) reported that approximately 81,000 military personnel were assigned to its area of responsibility.⁴⁷ (See Table 8.) At the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defense on June 18, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced that the DoW would conduct a comprehensive 6-month review of this force posture.⁴⁸

Table 8.

DoW Personnel in Europe and U.S. Military Personnel Supporting OAR (approximate)

	July–September 2025	October–December 2025	January–March 2026	April–June 2026
DoW Civilian	6,000	6,000	4,000	5,000
Contractor	2,000	2,000	1,000	2,000
Military	83,000 (including 9,000 for OAR)	79,000 (including 10,000 for OAR)	85,000 (including 10,000 for OAR)	81,000 (including 7,000 for OAR)
TOTAL	90,000	86,000	91,000	87,000

Note: Numbers have been rounded to the nearest 1000 and may not add due to rounding.

Source: USEUCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OAR FOL011, 7/14/2026; USEUCOM, vetting comment, 8/10/2026.

However, further reductions may be constrained by legislative mandates. Under Section 1249 of the FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, the DoW cannot reduce USEUCOM’s long-term force posture below a statutory floor of 76,000 personnel without certifying to Congress that the reduction is in the United States’ national security interest and that it follows consultation with NATO allies and partners.⁴⁹

The U.S. military rotational posture in Europe has evolved over the course of the OAR mission. At the start of OAR in 2014, the United States deployed three brigade combat teams (armored, combat aviation, and sustainment) and one division headquarters to Europe. Following the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States strengthened its posture in Europe by adding two brigade combat teams and one division headquarters, bringing the total rotational posture at that time to five brigade combat teams and two division headquarters.⁵⁰ These rotations were assigned to the U.S. Army’s V Corps as part of its mission to maintain a combat-credible, deterrent force along NATO’s Eastern Flank.⁵¹

During the quarter, the U.S. Army Europe–Africa (USAREUR-AF) reported that ongoing reductions to its force posture—both rotational and permanently-stationed troops—impacted its mission operations and readiness.⁵²

Reductions to rotational forces: In December 2025, the DoW reduced USAREUR-AF’s rotational force posture by one brigade combat team and one division headquarters.⁵³

In May, the DoW canceled the scheduled deployment of the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division for its rotation through Poland in support of OAR.⁵⁴ Some personnel and equipment from this brigade combat team had already arrived in Europe and had to redeploy back to the United States.⁵⁵

USAREUR-AF said that this cancellation represented the “most significant change” to its OAR mission during the quarter. With only three combat teams in-theater, USAREUR-AF has reduced combat capability along the Eastern Flank and less ability to sustain its forward locations, including the NATO Forward Land Force battlegroup in Poland that the United States leads as the framework nation.⁵⁶ As of the end of the quarter, USAREUR-AF was working with USEUCOM to explore further potential posture changes to mitigate its reduced presence in Poland.⁵⁷

U.S. RESOURCE REALLOCATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

USEUCOM and USAREUR-AF reported ongoing resource reallocations and constraints due to Operation Epic Fury and the shift in U.S. global priorities away from Europe. During major combat operations against Iran, USEUCOM supported the U.S. Central Command by executing kinetic and non-kinetic strike activities, while also conducting ballistic missile defense and counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) operations to protect U.S. allies and partners. USEUCOM also provided access, basing, and overflight support; medical assistance; and other logistics deliveries to the U.S. Central Command.⁵⁸ According to USAREUR-AF, the United States' shift in global priorities—particularly the expenditure of munitions in support of Operation Epic Fury—has degraded its ammunition sustainment capabilities for the European theater.⁵⁹

USEUCOM said that most of its resource reductions, including the reallocation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to other combatant commands, occurred during the January through March period but continued into the quarter.⁶⁰ During the quarter, the DoW reallocated an additional 210 personnel from USEUCOM to other combatant commands.⁶¹

Reductions to permanent forces: The conversion of USAREUR-AF's 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team to a mobile brigade combat team in 2025 resulted in the downsizing of its engineer battalion to a company at Vicenza, Italy.⁶² Also in 2025, the DoW canceled plans to increase the size of the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade in Ansbach, Germany, by 1,450 personnel.⁶³ During the quarter, USAREUR-AF confirmed that the DoW had also canceled the deployment of the 3rd Battalion, 12th Field Artillery Regiment to Europe.⁶⁴

NATO INTEROPERABILITY

During the quarter, USEUCOM and USAREUR-AF supported the OAR mission and NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence along the Eastern Flank through activities and exercises designed to improve NATO's interoperability and readiness to collectively deter and defend against any Russian aggression.⁶⁵

OAR logistics: The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) reported that it moved 6,779 personnel and 709 short tons of equipment by air through 21 airfields across Europe. USTRANSCOM also shipped 767,382 square feet of cargo by sea through 10 seaports.⁶⁶ Compared to the previous quarter, these movements represent an approximate 10.6 percent increase in short tons moved via air and an 18.1 percent increase in square feet of cargo moved by ship.⁶⁷

USAREUR-AF reported that the ongoing transition to a new logistics system for issuing medical supplies created challenges at U.S. Army supply sites in the European theater. For example, U.S. Army personnel faced difficulties obtaining important medical material because forward locations often lacked the specialized storage and handling capabilities required for controlled substances and temperature-sensitive items. To mitigate these logistics gaps, USAREUR-AF continued to use legacy software systems and sent direct shipments to host-nation locations to ensure that critical medical supplies were not interrupted.⁶⁸

NATO Forward Land Forces: These forces consist of nine multinational battlegroups based in Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Each battlegroup is led by a NATO member state, the “framework nation” for that battlegroup, that deploys rotational forces alongside the partner host nation.⁶⁹ The United States is the framework nation in Poland and contributes additional forces to the battlegroup in Bulgaria.⁷⁰

As part of the Saber Strike multinational exercises, V Corps temporarily expanded the battlegroup in Poland from battalion to brigade size, adding a brigade headquarters and two maneuver battalions into the force posture to validate large-scale reinforcement capabilities.⁷¹ USAREUR-AF said that standing battlegroups and these rapid, exercise-driven expansions demonstrate NATO’s capability to quickly provide combat power on the Eastern Flank, helping to prepare and deter against any possible ground incursion by Russia.⁷²

Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative: NATO’s regional defense framework includes the development of an artificial-intelligence-enabled command and control network. This system plans to integrate remote sensors and uncrewed systems along the Eastern Flank to rapidly detect and counter potential large-scale Russian aggression.⁷³ U.S. and NATO forces supported this initiative during the quarter by testing near-space surveillance assets, low-altitude unmanned aircraft swarms, and C-UAS defense perimeters as part of the Sword 26 exercises.⁷⁴

USAREUR-AF’s Multi-Domain Command–Europe conducted experimental training with NATO allies to launch micro high-altitude balloons into the stratosphere spanning from Sweden to Latvia. Operating at 60,000 to 70,000 feet above sea level, these low-



Military aircraft from Czechia, Sweden, and France fly in a square formation over Finland during exercise Ramstein Flag on June 16, 2026. (U.S. Air National Guard photo)

cost balloons evade electromagnetic warfare that proliferates in the Baltic region and provide potential sensing and communications capabilities to enhance NATO's operational awareness.⁷⁵

The 2nd Cavalry Regiment stood up a battery unit to institutionalize the use of unmanned aircraft for reconnaissance and precision strike purposes at the brigade level.⁷⁶ During its fifth iteration of the Project Flytrap exercise, conducted in Lithuania alongside troops from the United Kingdom, USAREUR-AF tested the use of lower cost interceptor unmanned aircraft at the squadron scale to counter unmanned aircraft threats without depleting expensive, conventional air defenses.⁷⁷

USAREUR-AF said that these exercises successfully validated next-generation technologies that significantly reduce the alliance's sensor-to-shooter timelines, demonstrating that the NATO alliance remains lethal against modern, peer-level threats.⁷⁸ According to USAREUR-AF, the artificial-intelligence-enabled command and control system that integrates these technologies also automatically structures battle briefs, accelerates staff processes, and provides a unified operational picture for U.S. and NATO commanders.⁷⁹

Multinational exercises: USEUCOM participated in several other annual or semiannual multinational NATO exercises during the quarter, noting that all U.S. activities remained closely coordinated with allies to focus on NATO interoperability, readiness, and deterrence capabilities.⁸⁰ (See Table 9.)

USAREUR-AF led its inaugural Sword 26 exercise series, which replaced the annual DEFENDER series.⁸¹ According to USAREUR-AF, this replacement reflects the United States' shifting strategic focus to integrate into NATO's regional plans, advance the Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative, and rely on improved allied leadership and interoperability.⁸² During the quarter, the Sword 26 series and associated exercises mobilized more than 15,500 troops from the United States and other NATO member countries to validate Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative technologies and rehearse and improve NATO interoperability and combat readiness along NATO's flank.⁸³ These series of exercises included rapid troop deployments, large-scale combined arms live-fire exercises, and command post exercises.⁸⁴

As part of Sword 26, V Corps and other USAREUR-AF units also worked alongside host nation partners to rehearse casualty evacuations across the European theater by rail, air, and sea.⁸⁵ In support of OAR, USAREUR-AF tested and executed additional improvements to medical logistics during Sword 26 to strengthen forward medical readiness, survivability, and interoperability along the Eastern Flank. These improvements included the forward supply of freeze-dried plasma for servicemembers and military working dogs, the use of unmanned aircraft to resupply medical materials in high-risk or inaccessible environments, and medical triage based on data from wearable medical devices that monitor casualties' physiological conditions. However, USAREUR-AF noted that this emerging technology could be difficult to scale, might not work in austere environments, and may prove inoperable with other NATO members' medical capabilities.⁸⁶

This year, the United States ceased its participation in NATO's annual STEADFAST COBALT exercise that trains NATO communications and information system interoperability.⁸⁷

USAREUR-AF tested the use of lower cost interceptor unmanned aircraft at the squadron scale to counter unmanned aircraft threats without depleting expensive, conventional air defenses.

Table 9.

USEUCOM and NATO Multinational Exercises in Which USEUCOM Participated, April–June 2026

Exercise, Date, and Location	Leader and Participant Countries (Approximate Troop Numbers)	Purpose
ARCANE THUNDER 26 April 8–29 Germany, Netherlands, Poland, and the United States	Led by U.S. Army Europe and Africa 475 participants from the United States 90 participants from the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom; 14 observers from Germany and Italy	Live-fire exercise strengthened NATO multi-domain interoperability and demonstrated integrated, synchronized effects across cyber, space, electromagnetic warfare, and conventional forces.
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE 26 (Part of Sword 26) May 4–29 Sweden	Led by U.S. Army Europe and Africa 530 participants from the United States 2,900 participants from Sweden	Showcased NATO sustainment and integrated rotational forces' combat power in the High North.
SABER STRIKE 26 (Part of Sword 26) May 4–29 Finland, Lithuania, and Poland	Led by U.S. Army Europe and Africa 4,500 participants from the United States 2,400 participants from Germany, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom	Simulated a potential adversary scenario, focusing on rapid NATO overland deployment in the Baltic region.
SWIFT RESPONSE 26 (Part of Sword 26) May 4–29 Finland, Lithuania, and Poland	Led by U.S. Army Europe and Africa 140 participants from the United States 40 participants from Finland, Lithuania, and Poland	Deployed specialized equipment across the European theater, including equipment from the United States, to exercise rapid reinforcement of European forces during combat operations.
STEADFAST DETERRENCE 26 May 5–13 Norway and other NATO locations	Led by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 60 participants from the United States 8,000 participants from all other 31 NATO member states	Computer-assisted command post exercise simulated a collective NATO defense scenario in a joint, multi-domain operational environment, focusing on NATO-command level staff processes, procedures, and readiness
TROJAN FOOTPRINT 26 May 11–21 Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, North Macedonia, Poland, and Romania	Led by U.S. Special Operations Command Europe 960 participants from the United States 2,000 participants from Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom	Demonstrated NATO allies' Special Operations Forces' capabilities, interoperability, and cohesion in ground, maritime, and aviation operations.
ASTRAL KNIGHT 26 June 1–19 Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, United Kingdom, and other NATO locations	Led by U.S. Air Forces Europe and Air Forces Africa 60 participants from the United States	Validated NATO air forces' command and control alongside employment of advanced fighter and bomber operations for integrated air and missile defense, simulating interceptions of adversary combat aircraft and cruise missiles.

(continued on next page)

Exercise, Date, and Location	Leader and Participant Countries (Approximate Troop Numbers)	Purpose
SEA BREEZE 26-1 June 3–19 Romania	Led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa 290 participants from the United States 140 participants from Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Türkiye, and Ukraine	Focused on NATO ally and partner maritime and amphibious capabilities and interoperability, including training Ukrainian partners to NATO standards.
BALTOPS 26 June 4–19 Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, and the Baltic Sea	Led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa 1,720 participants from the United States 3,550 participants from Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom	Demonstrated NATO maritime interoperability across all domains—including amphibious operations, air defense, anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, crisis response, and unmanned systems—to deter and defend against Russian threats in the Baltic Sea region.
COALITION WARRIOR INTEROPERABILITY EXPLORATION, EXPERIMENTATION, EXAMINATION EXERCISE 26 June 8–26 Poland	Led by NATO Joint Force Training Centre 350+ participants from the United States 2,500+ participants from Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Türkiye, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the EU; additional observers from Australia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Pakistan, and South Korea	Tested NATO ally and partner digital interoperability, information technology services, and command and control capabilities.

Sources: USEUCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OAR 049, 6/23/2026, and 26.3 OAR FOL049, 7/14/2026; USEUCOM, vetting comment, 7/27/2026; U.S. Army, press release, “Arcane Thunder 26 Press Release,” 4/24/2026; USAREUR-AF, press release, “Sword: The Army’s Signature Exercise in Europe for Warfighting with Allies,” 4/27/2026; U.S. Army, press release, “Saber Strike Highlights the Readiness, Resilience, and Support Capabilities of U.S. and Polish Forces,” 5/6/2026; NATO Joint Warfare Centre, press release, “NATO Begins Exercise STEADFAST DETERRENCE 2026: Securing the High North, Reinforcing Transatlantic Collaboration on Collective Defence,” 5/5/2026; NATO SHAPE, press release, “NATO Special Operations Forces Strengthen Alliance Readiness Through Trojan Footprint 2026,” 5/22/2026; USAFE-AFAFRICA, press release, “Astral Knight 26: Fighters, Bombers, Tactical C2 Reinforce USAF Readiness,” 6/16/2026; Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, website, “Exercise Sea Breeze 2026,” undated; USNAVEUR-NAVAF, press release, “BALTOPS 2026 Takes Sail from Gdynia, Poland,” 6/4/2026; NATO Allied Command Transformation, press release, “CWIX 26 Strengthens NATO’s Digital Interoperability and Operational Readiness,” 6/30/2026; NATO Allied Command Transformation, website, “What Is Interoperability?,” undated; NATO SHAPE, press release, “National Exercises and Activities,” 6/18/2026.

Other support to NATO: USAREUR-AF continued to prioritize NATO interoperability, actively working to resolve operational gaps caused by disparate member state capabilities; intelligence sharing protocols; and tactics, techniques, and procedures. To bridge these gaps, USAREUR-AF maintained focus on integrating critical U.S. combat capabilities into broader NATO operational frameworks. Ongoing priorities include the integration of surveillance platforms, C-UAS, joint fires, aviation, and armored brigade combat team maneuvers. USAREUR-AF training has also focused on strengthening NATO’s electromagnetic warfare capabilities to ensure allied survivability in highly contested environments.⁸⁸

SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES OF UKRAINE

COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR UKRAINE

The United States, NATO allies, and partners coordinate security assistance to Ukraine through several international mechanisms. (See Table 10.) NATO Security and Assistance Training for Ukraine (NSATU) is increasingly responsible for coordinating allied logistics, training, and planning efforts.⁸⁹

The Security Assistance Group–Ukraine (SAG-U), in Wiesbaden, Germany, is responsible for coordinating U.S. assistance for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and other Ukrainian defense and security forces.⁹⁰ SAG-U assistance also enhances Ukraine’s situational awareness and operational picture on the battlefield.⁹¹ SAG-U said that this mission to support OAR, which did not change during the quarter, also allows U.S. and NATO allies and partners to observe and derive insights from rapid Ukrainian warfighting innovation.⁹² SAG-U also maintains a contingent of advisors at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine. Previously called SAG-U Operations-Kyiv, this group is now called SAG-U Forward.⁹³

Table 10.
Coordination of International Assistance to Ukraine

Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U)	• U.S. mechanism to coordinate and oversee the full spectrum of U.S. security assistance to the UAF. • Combined, joint service headquarters, established in November 2022. • Located in Wiesbaden, Germany, under the operational control of U.S. Army Europe and Africa. • As a Title 10 military command, can and does train and advise the UAF. • Includes SAG-U Forward, a contingent of advisors located in Ukraine.
NATO Security and Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU)	• The primary coordinating body for international training, sustainment, maintenance, and force development for Ukraine. • Successor to the International Donor Coordination Center. • Co-located with SAG-U in Wiesbaden. • The SAG-U commander is also the NSATU commander, but no command and control relationship exists between the two entities.
Ukraine Defense Contact Group	• Coalition of representatives, primarily Ministers and Chiefs of Defense, from more than 50 nations that meets approximately once a month to discuss Ukraine’s security needs and ways to meet these needs. • First meeting in April 2022.
U.S. Military Group-Ukraine (USMILGRP-Ukraine)	• Personnel based at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv who assess, inform, prioritize, and execute bilateral security assistance in support of Ukrainian defense and security forces.

Sources: SAG-U, response to DoW request for information, 24.1 OAR 026 and 24.1 OAR 027, 12/27/2023, 24.3 OAR 025, 7/2/2024, and 24.3 OAR 025, 7/2/2024; NATO, “NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine,” 7/11/2024; NATO, press release, “New NATO Secretary General Shape and NSATU,” 10/14/2024; SAG-U vetting comment, 10/29/2024; USMILGRP-Ukraine, vetting comment, 7/29/2024; OUSW(P), vetting comment, 1/26/2025.

SAG-U noted that it experienced decreased mission funding and personnel support during the quarter to sustain its mission requirements. SAG-U said that it is critically short on Operations and Maintenance funding for the rest of the fiscal year.⁹⁴ USEUCOM said that there are no efforts underway to increase SAG-U's personnel size.⁹⁵

U.S.-ENABLED EQUIPMENT INITIATIVES

The Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy said that as of June 24, the United States had committed more than \$68.2 billion in defense articles and services to Ukraine since February 2022. This includes assistance derived from Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and the European Capacity Building (ECB) program.⁹⁶ Since July 2025, NATO allies and partners have provided contributions to fund packages of U.S. defense articles and services going to Ukraine via the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative.⁹⁷

PURL: The United States uses these contributions to replace materiel that has been transferred from U.S. military stocks via Presidential Drawdown Authority or to procure via USAI new defense articles and services for Ukraine.⁹⁸ The United States continued to deliver defense articles and services to Ukraine during the quarter via the PURL initiative.⁹⁹

Table 11.

NATO Contributions Announced through the PURL Initiative, as of June 2026, \$ in Millions

Ally/Partner	Sum of Announced Amounts	Ally/Partner	Sum of Announced Amounts
Norway	\$1,260	Luxembourg	51
Netherlands	1,161	Slovenia	50
Germany	900	Croatia	38
Canada	834	Latvia	28
Sweden	543	Estonia	25
Belgium	235	Greece	24
United Kingdom	205	Bulgaria	20
Spain	175	Japan	15
Finland	163	Iceland	15
Denmark	153	New Zealand	9
Australia	133	North Macedonia	1
Poland	100	TOTAL	\$6,308
Portugal	59	Note: The table excludes a contribution not yet announced, as well as a contribution that is not public at the request of the donor.	
Romania	59	Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 6/18/2026 and 6/25/2026.	
Lithuania	54		

USTRANSCOM enabled the strategic lift of approximately 11,000 short tons of cargo (289 percent compared to the previous quarter) via 43 air missions and 4 sea missions in support of Ukraine during the quarter.

NATO allies and partners provide contributions to PURL to fund a mix of capabilities, including defense articles that 1) the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe has identified as critical for Ukraine, and 2) can only be sourced from the United States or which only the United States can fulfill rapidly and at scale.¹⁰⁰ Through PURL, the United States has continued to provide air defense, ammunition, and other equipment for Ukraine.¹⁰¹ President Zelenskyy and other senior Ukrainian officials have repeatedly emphasized the importance of PURL in meeting Ukraine's operational requirements.¹⁰²

State reported that since the PURL's inception, 27 NATO allies and partners have contributed or pledged a total of \$6.3 billion.¹⁰³ (See Table 11.) As of June 30, NATO had transferred \$4.8 billion to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) through the PURL initiative, according to the Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer.¹⁰⁴ Specific amounts and types of equipment put forward for contributions by NATO allies and partners through the PURL initiative are not publicly releasable.¹⁰⁵ The DoW confirmed that as of June 30, no deliveries had been canceled due to Operation Epic Fury.¹⁰⁶

Joint Ukraine Multinational Program—Services, Training, and Articles Rapid Timeline (JUMPSTART): Through JUMPSTART, international donor countries can fund Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases to procure U.S. defense articles, support services, and training for Ukraine.¹⁰⁷ State reported that six countries—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway—have collectively contributed \$2.8 billion in security assistance through this initiative. Notably, four of these countries directed their funding specifically toward F-16 sustainment and support. The remaining contributions procured other critical capabilities, including ground-based air defense systems and associated interceptors, precision munitions, electromagnetic warfare systems, and essential ground support equipment.¹⁰⁸


U.S. TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT

USTRANSCOM is responsible for the transportation of equipment and munitions for OAR from the United States to Europe except in cases where materiel is shipped directly from the manufacturer to its destination.¹⁰⁹ USTRANSCOM enabled the strategic lift of approximately 11,000 short tons of cargo (289 percent compared to the previous quarter) via 43 air missions and 4 sea missions in support of Ukraine during the quarter.¹¹⁰

Once materiel arrives in Europe, USEUCOM is responsible for coordinating transportation within the theater.¹¹¹ USAREUR-AF continued to provide logistics support for OAR's efforts to provide security assistance to Ukraine, managing \$29.1 million worth of materiel stock across 954 line-items for the UAF as of the end of the quarter.¹¹² Additional details on equipment deliveries for the UAF are not publicly releasable.

During the quarter, USAREUR-AF sent to the UAF a onetime shipment of excess U.S. lifesaving medical supplies that were close to expiration. USAREUR-AF said that this operation highlighted the planning, sourcing, quality assurance, transportation, and compliance processes that the United States could use for any future support when excess U.S. stocks align with urgent partner needs.¹¹³

Figure 3.

Disposition of EEUM Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine, as of June 2026**U.S. EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTABILITY**

USEUCOM reported that the DoW has not identified any credible evidence indicating the illicit diversion or misuse of the defense articles that the United States has provided to Ukraine.¹¹⁴

Federal law requires End-Use Monitoring (EUM) of certain transfers of defense equipment and services to foreign entities. This oversight ensures that foreign partners use the equipment in accordance with transfer agreements and applicable Federal law.¹¹⁵ Under the Golden Sentry program, the DoW oversees EUM for items transferred via FMS or other U.S. Government bilateral security cooperation programs. Under the Blue Lantern program, State conducts pre- and post-license checks of various U.S. articles and services exported through Direct Commercial Sales, including those funded by FMF.¹¹⁶

Certain defense items are subject to Enhanced EUM (EEUM) if they incorporate sensitive technology, are particularly vulnerable to diversion or other misuse, or if the diversion or misuse of those items could have significant consequences for U.S. national security.¹¹⁷ Of the 21 types of designated U.S. defense articles that require EEUM, the United States has provided 8 to Ukraine.¹¹⁸ (See Figure 3.)

All Ukrainian-reported losses and expenditures occurred during combat operations, and battlefield capture or loss are not considered illicit diversion.¹¹⁹ USEUCOM said that Ukrainian leaders have committed to full transparency regarding EUM accountability, including investigating and prosecuting any suspected illicit diversions. Ukraine reports incidents of possible, suspected, or known battlefield capture in accordance with end-use and transfer agreements.¹²⁰

State reported that personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv conducted EUM- and EEUM-related site visits to project locations, engaged with implementing partners, verified award compliance, and assessed program performance in the field. During the reporting period, embassy staff conducted 82 in-person and virtual visits and implementation meetings.¹²¹

State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) staff regularly perform site visits to monitor program implementation and training; however, security restrictions prevent staff from traveling close to frontlines. Consistent with State INL's EUM standard operating procedures, the bureau works closely with partners to conduct secondary inspections of assets on or near the frontlines, ensuring that State INL staff maintain accountability for taxpayer-funded assistance.¹²² State said that State INL does not have a third-party monitor following the termination of an earlier contract in March 2023. State INL said that it is soliciting a new EUM contract to augment ongoing oversight efforts.¹²³

State said that the rapid increase in the number of items requiring monitoring presents a challenge due to personnel constraints, which the new EUM contract will address. During the quarter State INL completed 30 monitoring visits, including travel to U.S.-funded construction projects, enabling it to monitor construction progress, verify implementation quality, and hold counterparts accountable for project timelines and deliverables.¹²⁴



A U.S. Air Force loadmaster in the cargo bay of a C-130J Super Hercules aircraft at Esbjerg Airport, Denmark, during exercise Ramstein Flag on June 18, 2026. (U.S. Air National Guard photo)

Table 12.

Tele- and Depot-Level Maintenance for the UAF, April–June 2026

Platform	Platform Type	Number Restored to Fully Mission Capable
M777 Howitzer	Artillery System	30
M119 Howitzer	Artillery System	12
HIMARS	Artillery System	11
M109A6 Howitzer	Artillery System	4
M109A5 Howitzer	Artillery System	1
Patriot	Air Defense Artillery System	7
HAWK	Air Defense Artillery System	7
NASAMS	Air Defense Artillery System	2
AN/TWQ-1 Avenger	Air Defense Artillery System	1
AN/TPQ-50	Radar System	8
AN/TPQ-36	Radar System	3
AN/TPQ-37	Radar System	2
GREY HAWK	Unmanned Aircraft System	1
Stryker	Fighting Vehicle	18
M1A1 Abrams	Battle Tank	1
TOTAL		108

Source: USAREUR-AF, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OAR FOL062, 7/20/2026.

U.S. MAINTENANCE SUPPORT

The United States continued to provide the UAF with tele-maintenance and depot-level maintenance support for U.S. defense articles during the quarter. USAREUR-AF said that U.S. tele-maintenance support along with UAF in-country maintenance and advanced manufacturing capability have extended the operationality of this equipment well past conventional limits.¹²⁵ For instance, the UAF is capable of conducting field- and intermediate-level maintenance on Stryker fighting vehicles and M777 artillery systems.¹²⁶ However, the UAF continued to lack the spare parts, specialized repair tools, and training to fulfill all maintenance needs, and relied on international maintenance support for depot-level repairs, especially on complex Patriot and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) platforms.¹²⁷

The United States, through contractor operations in Jasionka, Poland, provides tele-maintenance support for 34 combat systems operated by the UAF.¹²⁸ For depot-level repairs that the UAF cannot conduct in Ukraine, equipment is retrograded to U.S. maintenance facilities in Kaiserslautern or Vilseck, Germany.¹²⁹

According to SAG-U, approximately 575 UAF students—a roughly 28.6 percent decrease compared to the previous quarter—completed U.S.-provided training at various sites in Germany, Kosovo, Poland, Romania, Spain, Ukraine, and the United States.

USAREUR-AF said that partner efforts alongside U.S. tele-maintenance and depot-level servicing restored 108 platforms from non-mission capable to fully mission capable status during the quarter.¹³⁰ (See Table 12.)

U.S. TRAINING SUPPORT

The United States provided training to UAF students on multiple weapons platforms—including maintenance of those platforms—and across various leadership and functional competencies during the quarter.¹³¹ According to SAG-U, approximately 575 UAF students—a roughly 28.6 percent decrease compared to the previous quarter—completed U.S.-provided training at various sites in Germany, Kosovo, Poland, Romania, Spain, Ukraine, and the United States.¹³²

SAG-U said that it coordinated UAF training requests with NSATU so that the United States only provided training for specific capabilities or at capacity that other training partners cannot provide. This training is continuously adapted based on UAF feedback to ensure that U.S.-provided training remains relevant to Ukrainian warfighting needs.¹³³

The Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine (JMTG-U), the U.S. military entity tasked with training UAF soldiers at Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany, trained at least 342 of these students.¹³⁴ JMTG-U course offerings expanded during the quarter to include additional leadership, engineering, intelligence, and logistics training.¹³⁵

F-16 fighter jets: The United States continued training Ukrainian F-16 pilots according to training commitments coordinated by the Air Force Capability Coalition that the United States co-leads with Denmark and the Netherlands.¹³⁶

Bradley and Stryker fighting vehicles: The JMTG-U conducted its second-ever iteration of the Iron Phoenix Fires platform training for the UAF on Bradley and Stryker Fighting Vehicles, having created the course during the previous quarter. This course incorporated hands-on maintenance training, live-fire gunnery, and tactical field training exercises in both classroom and field settings over the span of 6 months.¹³⁷

HIMARS launchers: The JMTG-U conducted one HIMARS-related course for the UAF. The 2-week Advanced Targeting Development classroom-based course covered effective HIMARS employment; however, unlike in the previous quarter, the JMTG-U did not provide live-fire exercises and specialized training for maintenance personnel and platform operators.¹³⁸

Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK) systems: The JMTG-U conducted two courses on the HAWK surface-to-air missile system during the quarter, covering maintenance, operation, missile handling, and engagement. These courses for the UAF consisted of 10 days of classroom training in Spain followed by hands-on field training at Grafenwoehr Training Area.¹³⁹ Two of these courses had been delivered during the previous quarter.¹⁴⁰

Chaplain development: As in the previous quarter, one iteration of the JMTG-U's Combat Resilience Course provided 2 weeks of classroom-based instruction to UAF Chaplains on ethics, spiritual care, and advising command teams.¹⁴¹

Leadership: The JMTG-U continued providing UAF platoon- and staff-level training and added company-level training during the quarter. The field-based Platoon Leader Course taught offensive and defensive operations, the NATO/U.S. orders process, and tactical troop-leading procedures.¹⁴²

The Staff Planning Course trained non-commissioned and commissioned officers at the battalion level and higher in military decision-making processes.¹⁴³

A newly added Company Commander Course trained officers in tactical troop-leading procedures and combined arms synchronization.¹⁴⁴

Engineering: Additional JMTG-U training during the quarter provided Ukraine's State Special Transport Service personnel with the technical knowledge and engineering capabilities—including interoperability with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—to oversee large-scale reconstruction and even U.S.-Ukraine reconstruction efforts.¹⁴⁵

Logistics: During the quarter, the JMTG-U added a Logistics Planning Course to provide UAF students with instruction in sustainment planning from frontline up through brigade echelons. The course culminated in a battalion-level sustainment rehearsal.¹⁴⁶

Analytics and Intelligence: The JMTG-U also conducted analytics and intelligence training courses during the quarter. A Geographic Information System Operator Course taught UAF students to use commercially available imagery software to conduct battle damage assessments and to aid Ukrainian reconstruction efforts.¹⁴⁷

The Staff Intelligence Course focused on training battalion- and brigade-level staff capabilities in analytic tradecraft, military decision-making processes, intelligence preparation of the operational environment, collection management, and targeting. This 14-day course included over 50 hours of hands-on skills application and group exercises for UAF students.¹⁴⁸

SAG-U reported that U.S. classification requirements occasionally hinder U.S. training and limit instruction for the UAF. In such circumstances, U.S. trainers cannot fully explain to students certain fundamentals regarding why U.S. training dictates specific tactics, operations, and doctrine.¹⁴⁹

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE UKRAINIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

During the quarter, Ukraine continued to pursue international joint defense production agreements to secure materiel for its war effort, particularly for unmanned aircraft and air defense.¹⁵⁰ According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Ukraine has signed or discussed production agreements with 26 countries.¹⁵¹ (See Table 13.)

The DIA reported that since early April, Ukraine had signed 10-year defense agreements with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. These agreements focus on expanding Ukraine's cooperation with Middle Eastern states on unmanned aircraft warfare and integrated air defense as part of a broader framework that includes Ukrainian weapon exports and joint production and manufacturing. As part of these agreements, Kyiv has

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, Ukraine has signed or discussed production agreements with 26 countries.

Table 13.

International Defense Co-Production Agreements Signed or Discussed with Ukraine

Capability	Signed Agreements	Discussed Agreements
Unmanned/Counter-Unmanned Systems	Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States	Bahrain, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Türkiye
Air Defense	Germany, Latvia	Italy
Missiles	Denmark, Germany, Netherlands	
Ammunition	Czechia, Norway	
Electromagnetic Warfare	Germany	
Fighting Vehicles	Sweden	
Testing Infrastructure	Latvia	
Not Identified	Estonia, Poland	


Source: DIA, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OAR SUPP002, 7/14/2026.

provided Ukrainian C-UAS experts to the Gulf states in exchange for financial and material aid, including crude oil and diesel fuel supplies.¹⁵²

According to the DIA, Ukraine’s “Build With Ukraine” initiative seeks joint defense production ventures across Europe. These proposed production agreements would allow Ukraine to utilize Europe’s defense industrial base and related supply chains, while also providing Ukraine and European countries opportunities to attract investment and transfer knowledge across defense production sectors.¹⁵³

The war in Ukraine has highlighted the U.S. defense industrial base’s need to improve its own capabilities to manufacture defense articles at greater scale, as well as to increase its production of munitions to replenish U.S. stockpiles in advance of any future conflict.¹⁵⁴ During the quarter, the Office of the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment hosted a workshop with government and defense industry participants to identify how to shorten production timelines for solid rocket motors used in military systems.¹⁵⁵





UNHCR with its NGO partner, Rokada, providing assistance to families impacted by the aerial attack over Kyiv, on May 14, 2026. (UNHCR photo)

NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The U.S. Government continued to provide non-military assistance to Ukraine to address the effects of the conflict and strengthen Ukraine's civil society and democratic and economic institutions.¹⁵⁶ State reported that it had 115 active assistance programs supporting Ukraine with a combined value of \$3.5 billion. Of these programs, 10 expired during the quarter.¹⁵⁷ (See Table 14.) Other U.S. Government agencies, including the Department of Justice (DoJ) and Department of Energy (DoE), also operated assistance programs in Ukraine during the quarter.¹⁵⁸

Oversight: State reported that it used a combination of personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv alongside contracted staff to provide oversight of its assistance programs to Ukraine, including in-person monitoring. State reported that logistical constraints due to security conditions, travel restrictions in certain regions, and occasional delays in coordinating with local partners challenged these efforts.¹⁵⁹ During the quarter, one of State's third-party monitors conducted 91 site visits to monitor humanitarian assistance programs.¹⁶⁰ Another third-party monitor conducted more than 64 field site visits to monitor demining programs.¹⁶¹

In fiscal years 2022 to 2024, the United States provided approximately \$30.7 billion in direct budget support to the Ukrainian government, 84 percent of which went to the World Bank's Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) fund.¹⁶² The United States relies on the World Bank to manage the PEACE fund but contracted independent public accounting firms to provide reports about the Ukrainian government's capacity to

Table 14.

State Assistance Programs in Ukraine as of June 2026, \$ in Millions

Category	Number of Programs	Program Value
Humanitarian Assistance	23	\$1,366
Energy Sector	12	\$1,011
Demining	8	\$321
Law Enforcement- Border Security	20	\$227
Health Assistance	6	\$217
Agriculture Assistance	1	\$205
War Crimes-Atrocities-Human Rights	18	\$93
All Other Programs-Projects	2	\$59
Nonproliferation and Prevent Arms	10	\$22
Public Affairs	13	\$22
Anti-Corruption Assistance	2	\$3
TOTAL	115	\$3,546

Note: Data includes programs that expired during the quarter.

Sources: State, response to State OIG request for information, 6/18/2026; State, vetting comment, 7/27/2026.

receive funds and whether those funds are being used as intended.¹⁶³ State reported that six oversight reports in connection to this direct budget support had not been submitted due to the 2025 Foreign Assistance Review and the U.S. Government shutdown.¹⁶⁴

Ukraine's Ministry of Finance reported that additional delays stemmed from the fact that some beneficiary institutions reside in occupied territories, where they have been damaged or destroyed, or reorganized, according to State.¹⁶⁵ State reported that, after finalizing new timelines with the implementer, five of the six overdue reports were due to be completed in the second half of 2026.¹⁶⁶ A new tranche of audits, covering approximately \$3 billion, were being negotiated at Ukraine's Ministry of Education and Science, the National Pension Fund, and the National Health Service.¹⁶⁷ These newly commissioned audits are scheduled to be completed by March 2027, according to State.¹⁶⁸

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The United Nations estimated that 10.8 million people inside Ukraine—including 2.2 million children, 3.8 million internally displaced persons, and roughly 1 million people in the Russia-occupied territories—as well as approximately 546,000 Ukrainian refugees in neighboring countries require lifesaving humanitarian assistance.¹⁶⁹

During the quarter, State managed 23 humanitarian assistance programs, largely focused on frontline needs, with a combined value of \$1.4 billion.¹⁷⁰ (See Table 15.)

Table 15.

Humanitarian Assistance Highlights During the Quarter

Support to conflict-affected populations \$225.2 million	• Provided rapid response services following military strikes and frontline developments, and emergency shelter, water supply, sanitation, and hygiene service access. • Directly supported 52,800 people following frontline attacks. • Indirectly supported another 52,000 people through the rehabilitation of community water supply systems, sanitation infrastructure, and water trucking.
Support to frontline communities \$155 million	• Provided emergency support to vulnerable internally displaced people and frontline communities within 50 kilometers of the contact line, including after strikes and in response to evacuations. • Supported 81,900 people as of June 12. • 64,000 people received in-kind food assistance, 53,800 received multipurpose cash assistance, and 33,500 received access to safe drinking water.
Support to vulnerable populations \$154 million	• Supported vulnerable internally displaced persons and conflict-affected populations can meet their immediate needs with dignity during the humanitarian emergency. • Supported 44,500 people with emergency water trucking, mobile water tanks, hygiene kits, and rehabilitation of water supply and district heating infrastructure. • Supported 37,000 people with emergency drinking water, hygiene kits for families affected by airstrikes, and community water access through the rehabilitation of six boreholes.
Multi-sectoral support \$143 million	• Supported conflict-affected children, families, and communities through the rehabilitation of community water and sanitation systems, as well as winterization assistance.

Sources: State, response to State OIG request for information, 6/18/2026; State, vetting comment, 7/27/2026.

State reported that through other programs, it provided drinking water to 16,000 beneficiaries in Sloviansk and Donetsk; rapid basic needs assistance to 24,000 people in Odesa and Kyiv; medical consultations, hygiene items, and trauma counseling assistance to more than 3,500 people in Dnipro, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Mykolaiv; and rapid response assistance to more than 4,600 people across Ukraine following frontline attacks, displacement, strikes, and post-evacuation.¹⁷¹

State also reported that its support to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) strengthened national child protection systems and restored essential documentation for vulnerable children, reducing risks of long-term harm and exploitation.¹⁷² At the Ukrainian border with Belarus, UNICEF supported the development of child-friendly procedures at the Domanove-Mokran crossing and helped establish a referral system for children repatriated from Russian-occupied territories or Russia.¹⁷³

Humanitarian access: The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv reported in June that Russia’s altered warfare tactics have sharply restricted humanitarian access across Ukraine. Daytime unmanned aircraft strikes, extended multi-wave attacks, and systematic railway impacts have prevented the use of predictable movement patterns, compressed operational windows, and fragmented supply chains, forcing humanitarian organizations to reduce their field presence or suspend operations entirely in certain areas.¹⁷⁴ Russian unmanned aircraft have increasingly targeted humanitarian personnel, marked humanitarian vehicles, and moving trains.¹⁷⁵

On May 25, a Russian ballistic missile struck a World Food Programme warehouse which was storing approximately \$1.4 million worth of food assistance, sufficient to support 130,000 people.

For example, the embassy said that within the last 6 months, the World Food Programme lost access to 186 settlements, cutting off an estimated 30,000 people from emergency food assistance.¹⁷⁶ On May 25, a Russian ballistic missile struck a World Food Programme warehouse which was storing approximately \$1.4 million worth of food assistance, sufficient to support 130,000 people.¹⁷⁷

The embassy said that even where humanitarian organizations still operate, mine contamination and strikes on marked humanitarian vehicles have made frontline access increasingly dangerous, threatening the continued delivery of lifesaving assistance to those who need it most.¹⁷⁸ Escalating warfare tactics have also continued to limit access to Russian-occupied territories. In occupied Kherson, approximately 6,000 civilians, including at least 180 children by Ukrainian government estimates, lack access to food, medicine, and health care as Russian occupation forces block humanitarian assistance and ambulances.¹⁷⁹ Landmines and frequent unmanned aircraft attacks in these areas also continue to prevent organized civilian evacuations, according to UN reporting.¹⁸⁰

ENERGY

Russian strikes against Ukrainian national-level energy infrastructure during the quarter decreased compared to the previous quarter.¹⁸¹ Russia continued to attack power generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure that had already been significantly degraded by previous strikes.¹⁸² These attacks triggered widespread electricity outages that affected millions of civilians.¹⁸³

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Ukraine can repair most damaged substations within 6 months and damaged high-capacity power plants in at least 1 year. Ukrainian repair timelines are contingent on the level of further damage that Russian strikes inflict on them as well as partner contributions for repair equipment.¹⁸⁴

During the quarter, State operated 12 energy programs with a combined value of \$1 billion.¹⁸⁵ The largest program (\$897.3 million) provides technical and procurement assistance to strengthen Ukraine's energy sector resilience and security and to establish the foundation for post-war reconstruction.¹⁸⁶

State reported that during the quarter, U.S.-supported repairs focused on serving the most critical needs for electricity, gas, and heating utilities to maintain these services for homes and businesses. The Securing Power, Advancing Resilience & Connectivity program is the cornerstone of State's energy support to Ukraine, working with Ukrainian counterparts to build energy resilience and attract greater U.S. investment into the sector.¹⁸⁷

State said that U.S. contributions complemented a broader, coordinated donor effort, including through the EU's Ukraine Energy Support Fund that coordinates financial support for Ukraine's energy sector.¹⁸⁸ Additionally, the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology program continued technical and financial advisory services to develop a pathway for U.S. nuclear technology companies to take advantage of opportunities arising from Ukraine's post-war need to reconstruct its energy grid and steelmaking sector.¹⁸⁹

During the quarter, the DoE continued providing backup generators to Ukrainian towns and cities that were affected by any blackouts, ensuring that communities maintained access to clean water, sewage and heating systems, medical care, and shelters. The DoE said that it had operationalized 126 generators in Ukraine as of the end of the quarter.¹⁹⁰

DEMINING

During the quarter, State operated eight demining programs with a combined value of \$321 million. The largest program, for \$247.6 million, aims to strengthen the operational independence of Ukraine's deminers to operate safely and effectively.¹⁹¹

State said that during the quarter, U.S.-funded nongovernmental organizations started the spring demining season with the deploying manual, mechanical, and mine detection dog teams across six regions. Non-technical survey teams identified new hazardous areas, re-surveyed previously recorded areas, and collected information to guide allocation of Ukrainian demining resources. To mitigate civilian accidents, the implementers continued to provide explosive ordnance risk education, including sessions for staff of American companies in Ukraine.¹⁹²

Russia's aerial attacks continued to pause operations or otherwise impact operations. On June 24, a Russian attack in Kherson killed two civilian deminers and left four injured. The personnel were working under a project funded by a different donor, but the attack suspended U.S.-funded operations of the nongovernmental organization through the end of the quarter.¹⁹³

During the quarter, State operated eight demining programs with a combined value of \$321 million.

Mine clearance in the village of Velky Komyshevakh, on April 17, 2026. (World Food Programme photo)



Training: Throughout the conflict, State has funded and coordinated programs to train and equip humanitarian demining personnel in Ukraine.¹⁹⁴ State reported that during the quarter, deminers cleared 1,866 acres of land and 97 acres of aquatic areas of explosive remnants of war. Since January 2024, deminers have cleared 432,832 acres of land and 320 acres of aquatic areas, successfully destroying 261,232 explosive hazards.¹⁹⁵

During the quarter, State train-and-equip projects trained more than 316 deminers in several areas, including explosive ordnance disposal, mechanical demining machine operations, and non-technical survey. Additionally, a contractor provided underwater explosive ordnance disposal training, building on the underwater search techniques and procedures course provided the previous quarter.¹⁹⁶

Equipment: State reported that a contractor initiated a large-scale procurement of critical equipment for the State Special Transport Service demining teams, including specialized dive equipment and boats, armored excavators, armored backhoe loaders, trucks and trailers, and pickup trucks for transporting deminers. These activities continue to expand and refine Ukraine's demining cadre, positioning Ukraine to demine its own territory without relying on foreign assistance. During the quarter, the State Special Transport Service continued to demonstrate its commitment to independently run the training center in western Ukraine by providing instructors and by paying for utility costs.¹⁹⁷

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND BORDER SECURITY

State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and the DoJ continued training, equipping, and advisory programs to strengthen Ukraine's law enforcement capacity and border security.¹⁹⁸ (See Table 16.) State reported that during the quarter, it continued to execute 20 programs and contracts in the law-enforcement-border security sector.¹⁹⁹ The largest program, which is valued at \$40 million, provides the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service and National Guard of Ukraine with trailers, vehicles, and mobile accessories needed to operate U.S.-made radars and to transition stationary units countering unmanned aircraft to mobile ones.²⁰⁰

The DoJ resident legal advisor at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv continued to provide prosecutorial advice to Ukrainian justice sector counterparts.²⁰¹ During the quarter, the advisor conducted roundtable discussions for the National Police of Ukraine and investigators from the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office on how to draft mutual legal assistance requests to the United States.²⁰²

The DoJ said that Ukrainian partners play a substantive role in the DoJ's ability to bring cybercriminals to justice, with Ukraine consistently and promptly fulfilling requests for legal assistance and working collaboratively on international investigations. In June, representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Cyber Division and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv's legal attaché met with Ukrainian investigators and prosecutors to discuss efforts to combat international cybercrime.²⁰³ During the quarter, the DoJ and the FBI collaborated with Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office on an investigation of a high-level cybercriminal group in Ukraine, resulting in the arrest of the suspects.²⁰⁴ According to the DoJ, this group has caused millions of dollars' worth of damages to U.S. businesses.²⁰⁵

Table 16.
Assistance to Support Ukrainian Law Enforcement and Border Security During the Quarter

Equipment Deliveries	Training
Emergency equipment, including unmanned aircraft and counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), to the State Border Guard Service, the National Guard of Ukraine, and the National Police of Ukraine. (State)	- Advanced negotiations training for National Police of Ukraine negotiators. (State) - Basic Clandestine Laboratory Investigation and Safety Course to equip Ukrainian law enforcement officers. (Drug Enforcement Administration/State) - Training and case-based mentoring related to combating the manufacture and sale of counterfeit items to personnel from the Economic and Security Bureau of Ukraine, border guards, Prosecutor General's Office, and National Police of Ukraine. (DoJ/State) - Webinar on procurement fraud, with specific technical guidance on tackling economic crimes and combating organized crime groups that rig Ukrainian procurements. (DoJ)

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 6/18/2026; State, vetting comment, 7/27/2026; Embassy Kyiv, cable, "Ukraine: April Report: INL First American Government Entity to Procure Interceptor Drones as Russian Strikes into Ukraine Hit Record High," 26 KYIV 766, 5/14/2026; DoJ, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 LIG OCO WOG 002, 7/8/2026.

State noted that many of its training and equipping programs have resulted in benefits to the United States. Provision of unmanned aircraft and C-UAS equipment to Ukrainian law enforcement benefit U.S. Government agencies as well as manufacturers of such equipment by helping them learn from Ukraine's battlefield insights via information sharing and knowledge exchange programs, State said.²⁰⁶ In June, State also facilitated a knowledge exchange between Ukrainian experts and U.S. Customs and Border Protection to strengthen U.S. efforts to counter unmanned aircraft along the border and ahead of the World Cup.²⁰⁷

HEALTH ASSISTANCE

State reported that during the quarter, it had six health assistance programs in Ukraine, with a combined value of \$217 million. The largest program, valued at \$61 million, is designed to support tuberculosis testing and treatment efforts in Ukraine.²⁰⁸ With warmer weather conditions and easing energy demands, there were fewer interruptions at health facilities during the quarter.²⁰⁹

AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE

Agricultural production in Ukraine has fallen sharply because of the conflict.²¹⁰ Damage to agricultural infrastructure and limited access to certain territories due to explosive remnants of war have been compounded by labor shortages and higher production costs.²¹¹ The World Bank estimated in its December 2025 assessment that Ukraine's agriculture sector sustained approximately \$90 billion in combined damage and losses since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, including \$12.1 billion in direct damage and \$78 billion in economic losses.²¹²

State reported that it implemented one agriculture program, the Agriculture Growing Rural Opportunities activity, valued at \$205 million. The program's purpose is to accelerate economic development of rural Ukrainian communities through a better governed

State reported that during the quarter, it administered 18 programs dedicated to documenting, investigating, and prosecuting war crimes, systemic atrocities, and human rights abuses in Ukraine.

agricultural sector that encourages more productive, modern, and profitable agricultural enterprises. Working with Ukrainian businesses, the program continued to implement approximately 70 projects that developed food processing, storage, and irrigation. Because Ukrainian businesses are required to share in the cost of each project, they have a direct stake in making the projects succeed, State said.²¹³ Assistance also continued to advance pro-market reforms in land management and irrigation policy.²¹⁴

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES

State reported that during the quarter, it administered 18 programs dedicated to documenting, investigating, and prosecuting war crimes, systemic atrocities, and human rights abuses in Ukraine. These programs had a combined value of \$93 million. The largest program, valued at \$22 million, funds the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group initiative established jointly alongside the European Union and the United Kingdom. The Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group supports Ukraine's Office of the Prosecutor General to investigate, preserve evidence of, and prosecute atrocity crimes committed in Ukraine throughout the conflict.²¹⁵

Documentation: State reported continued funding for implementing organizations tasked with collecting and verifying testimonies of war crimes committed in Ukraine during the conflict. During the quarter, one of State's implementers completed a report documenting sexual violence as a systemic form of torture by Russian occupation authorities. The report verified the systemic sexual abuse of more than 200 male victims while they were held in Russian detention sites across four Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine.²¹⁶

Investigation: State reported sustained progress in investigating the financial and supply-chain networks that facilitate human rights abuses in Ukraine, using these investigations to strengthen international sanctions and export control enforcement to disrupt these abuses. As a direct result, a State-funded implementer advanced its work on tracking the plunder and export of stolen Ukrainian grain from occupied territories. The implementer submitted formal sanctions designation requests to the European Union, specifically targeting Russian actors allegedly orchestrating these grain theft operations. Additionally, the same implementer published a report examining how Iranian unmanned aircraft transfers and technological assistance to Russia may constitute complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity.²¹⁷

Prosecution: During the quarter, State reported that one of its implementers hosted a workshop in coordination with Ukraine's Office of the Prosecutor General, the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor's Office, and the State Security Service. Focusing on a high-priority, complex war crimes case, the workshop delivered hands-on legal and case-file analysis to refine the prosecutions teams' strategy, specifically mapping out subsequent investigative steps and identifying additional evidentiary requirements.²¹⁸

State also reported that during the quarter, its implementers conducted training and mentoring activities for prosecutors and investigators stationed within central and western regional offices. These capacity-building initiatives aimed to strengthen the investigators' specialized skills in documenting and prosecuting atrocity crimes—specifically torture and unlawful executions—committed against Ukrainian prisoners within Russian-run detention facilities.²¹⁹

NONPROLIFERATION, EXPORT CONTROLS, AND BORDER SECURITY

State reported that during the quarter, it operated 10 Nonproliferation and Prevent Arms programs with a combined value of \$22 million. The three largest programs (\$5 million each) provide U.S. nuclear technical advisory services to shape Ukraine's nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation standards for Small Modular Reactors. This initiative simultaneously advances U.S. national security interests while creating strategic opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in Ukraine's energy infrastructure reconstruction.²²⁰

Energy security: Assistance provided by other U.S. Government agencies during the quarter focused on helping Ukraine secure and monitor radiological, nuclear, and chemical material.²²¹ Alongside international partners, the DoE conducted workshops, technical and information exchanges, and other seminars to improve Ukrainian radiological experts' capacity to defend against physical and cyber threats to their nuclear infrastructure. This included how to use C-UAS and artificial intelligence when responding to facility security incidents.²²²

The DoE and the FBI provided operational support to enable Ukrainian law enforcement agencies to better counter the potential smuggling of nuclear material.²²³ During the quarter, the DoE provided equipment and capacity-building assistance to the National Police of Ukraine and the Security Service of Ukraine. The DoE delivered surveillance towers for Ukraine's State Border Guard Service use along the border with Moldova's Transnistria region and installed radiation monitors and detection devices at a critical border crossing with Poland. The DoE continued scoping similar installations at other border crossings and seaports. Finally, the DoE continued to operate a nationwide dose rate radiation sensor network in Ukraine, while initiating discussions to transition operational control of a portion of the DoE's air sampling network to allied foreign partners.²²⁴ According to the DoE, work stoppages arising from the persistent threat of incoming Russian aerial strikes continued to delay and challenge these infrastructure efforts.²²⁵

Border security and export controls: State's Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation's Office of Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) provided sustained, multi-faceted support to Ukraine's State Service for Export Control (SSEC), strengthening its regulatory, technical, and industry-engagement capacity across three complementary lines of effort. During the quarter, this included an industry event in Lviv in which more than 380 companies participated. On infrastructure, EXBS originally sponsored SSEC's StratLink e-licensing platform, which SSEC has since expanded to cover full licensing workflows and automated sanctions screening. These efforts measurably strengthened SSEC's institutional capacity to regulate, license, and engage Ukraine's rapidly expanding defense industrial base.²²⁶

EXBS strengthened Ukraine's ability to detect and prevent the diversion of strategic goods through targeted risk analysis and customs training initiatives. During the quarter, EXBS provided training Ukrainian officials on how to use the Wisconsin Project Risk Report database, a tool consolidating over 6,200 entity profiles and data on more than 600 controlled items to support screening in licensing, enforcement, and prosecution.²²⁷ EXBS has also funded the database's integration into Ukraine's Customs automated risk analysis system and is working toward its integration into the e-licensing platform.²²⁸

State reported that during the quarter, it operated 10 Nonproliferation and Prevent Arms programs with a combined value of \$22 million.

State reported that it administered two ongoing anti-corruption programs during the quarter, with a combined value of \$2.7 million.

Between April 1 and June 30, EXBS conducted end-use monitoring at 16 locations across 5 regions, verifying approximately 450 U.S.-donated assets (night-vision devices, thermal imagers, crypto modules, X-ray units, and more), reinforcing accountability and responsible stewardship of U.S. security assistance.²²⁹

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

State reported that during the quarter, it operated 13 public affairs programs with a combined value of \$22.3 million.²³⁰ The largest program was the Learn to Discern in Education program, valued at \$7 million. This program is designed to provide education stakeholders with critical information engagement skills and strengthen their resilience to adversarial, anti-American and anti-Ukrainian propaganda.²³¹ State reported that during the quarter, the implementer launched a new educator cohort, enrolling more than 2,000 Ukrainian teachers in professional development courses. The participating teachers conducted more than 180 learning events, reaching over 4,300 students and adult learners.²³² Classroom research involving 2,000 students of these students demonstrated improved critical thinking and information verification skills.²³³

ANTI-CORRUPTION

State said that corruption in Ukraine remains a serious systemic challenge in areas such as defense procurement and energy, and even at the highest levels of government. Emergency contracting mechanisms introduced after Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine created conditions ripe for abuse by allowing authorities to bypass traditional, multi-layered oversight structures.²³⁴

State reported that it administered two ongoing anti-corruption programs during the quarter, with a combined value of \$2.7 million.²³⁵ The largest program, which funds a DoJ Resident Legal Advisor in Kyiv, is valued at \$2.5 million.²³⁶ State reported that in April, American law enforcement personnel trained Ukrainian anti-corruption agency personnel on how to counter transnational organized crime. U.S. trainers, in consultation with the U.S. Secret Service and Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau, worked with forensic officers to extract and analyze data from encrypted mobile devices using State-procured software to collect evidence in corruption and organized crime cases.²³⁷

State reported that between April and June, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office announced 18 corruption investigations involving Ukrainian officials, executives, and business entities tied to procurement, infrastructure, energy, defense, and unmanned aircraft supply contracts.²³⁸

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Classified Appendix to this Report

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) and the U.S. Government's response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

APPENDIX B

About the Special Inspector General for OAR

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Section 419) established the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the DoW, State, and USAID.

On August 18, 2023, the DoW designated OAR as an overseas contingency operation, triggering Section 419, and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency selected the DoW IG to be the Lead IG for OAR, effective October 18, 2023. The DoW IG appointed the State IG as the Associate IG for OAR.

Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2024 re-designated the Lead IG for OAR as the Special Inspector General (Special IG) for OAR. The Lead IG agencies conduct oversight of the U.S. response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine individually under their own authorities and collaboratively, to carry out the following whole-of-government responsibilities:

- Submitting to Congress, on a quarterly basis, a report on the contingency operation and making that report available to the public no later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter.
- Developing a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensuring independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

The Special IG for OAR maintains a Ukraine Oversight website to promote transparency and accountability in the comprehensive, whole-of-government effort to oversee U.S. security, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. UkraineOversight.gov is a centralized website that consolidates oversight work, funding data, open and closed recommendations, and reporting from the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs, as well as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other participating members of the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group.



UkraineOversight.gov

APPENDIX C

Methodology for Preparing this Special IG Report

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OAR, the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources, such as Government statements.

The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes and notes on tables and figures. Except in the cases of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the OIGs have not independently verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or from Federal agencies. The information provided represents the view of the source cited in each instance.

The DoW IG, as the Special IG (and previously designated Lead IG) for OAR, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The OIGs for the DoW, State, and USAID draft input for the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the OIGs ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The three OIGs incorporate agency comments where appropriate and send the report back to the agencies for a second review before publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the OIGs for the DoW, State, and USAID as independent oversight agencies.

APPENDIX D

Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies

From April 1 to June 30, 2026, the Lead IG agencies and Department of Commerce OIG issued six oversight reports related to OAR and the Ukraine response, as detailed in the following summaries. Reports issued by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs and other oversight agencies are available on their respective websites and ukraineoversight.gov.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Classified Inspection of Embassy Bratislava, Slovakia

ISP-S-26-13, June 25, 2026

State OIG conducted this inspection to evaluate the programs and operations of Embassy Bratislava. This report is classified. Details can be found in this quarterly report's classified appendix.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Zagreb, Croatia

ISP-S-26-14, June 11, 2026

State OIG conducted this inspection to evaluate the programs and operations of Embassy Zagreb. This report is classified. Details can be found in this quarterly report's classified appendix.

Inspection of Embassy Zagreb, Croatia

ISP-I-26-14, June 4, 2026

State OIG inspected the achievement of foreign policy goals and objectives, policy and program implementation, consular operations, resource management, and information management of Embassy Zagreb, Croatia.

State OIG reported that Embassy Zagreb generally advanced U.S. foreign policy goals and managed its operations in accordance with State standards, but that it 1) did not regularly visit its network of American Corners and 2) had deficiencies in its life safety, fire safety, motor vehicle safety, and facilities programs.

State OIG made six recommendations, five to Embassy Zagreb and one to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations. The State entities concurred with all six recommendations, and at the time the report was issued, State OIG considered all six recommendations resolved, pending further action. The recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed-upon actions have been completed.

Audit of U.S. Missions' Emergency Preparedness in Selected Eastern European Countries

AUD-SIP-26-07, April 22, 2026

State OIG conducted this audit to determine whether overseas missions in selected Eastern European countries were prepared to respond to a variety of emergency scenarios, including risks posed by Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This report is classified. Details can be found in this quarterly report's classified appendix.

Audit of the Department of State's Energy Security and Diversification Initiative in the Black Sea Region

AUD-SIP-26-09, April 2, 2026

State OIG conducted this audit to determine whether State efforts to coordinate and advance energy security and diversification initiatives in the Black Sea region achieved desired results.

State OIG reported that the State bureaus implementing Black Sea energy security and diversification initiatives appropriately aligned their respective strategies and award-level goals and objectives with State, bureau, and mission-level strategic plans in place from 2022 to 2024. While State continued to implement these programs and initiatives, at the time of State OIG's review, State had not updated pertinent strategic guidance to help ensure that the implementation of these programs and initiatives continued to align with the current administration's strategy and priorities in these areas.

State OIG made six recommendations to improve the planning and monitoring of foreign assistance to advance energy security and diversification initiatives in the Black Sea region. The relevant State bureaus concurred with four recommendations and did not concur with two recommendations. State OIG considered one recommendation closed, three recommendations resolved pending further action, and two recommendations unresolved. The open recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed-upon actions have been completed.

FINAL REPORTS BY PARTNER IG AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the Bureau of Industry and Security's Enforcement of Russia and Belarus Export Controls

OIG-26-019-A; May 4, 2026

The Department of Commerce (DoC) OIG conducted this audit to assess the effectiveness of Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) actions to detect violations of export controls for Russia and Belarus in fiscal years 2022 and 2023.

DoC OIG found that BIS needs to strengthen its end-use check process to prevent restricted shipments to Russia and Belarus. Specifically, they found weaknesses in BIS methods to identify and select high-risk shipments for end-use checks; document results and assign final ratings of compliance with export control regulations; and complete enforcement actions to hold potential violators of export controls accountable. These weaknesses undermine the transparency and accountability of BIS's regulatory oversight and underscore the need for improvements to strengthen and modernize the end-use check process.

DoC OIG issued six recommendations to strengthen and modernize the end-use check process. Specifically, the DoC OIG recommended that the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement:

- Develop policy and guidance that, among other requirements, defines the methodology for target selection, including reviewing historical information when selecting a shipment for an end-use check and developing and conducting risk assessments to help inform the selection and requires documentation to support the analysis used to target high-risk shipments for end-use checks.
- Develop and conduct training for export compliance specialists and supervisors on the documented end-use check process and standard operating procedures.
- Conduct a cost study for replacing manual processes with advanced, automated analytical tools and systems to target and document end-use checks.
- Implement a systematic process for targeting end-use checks for shipment transactions, including the establishment of red flags and trend reports.
- Establish and implement oversight controls that ensure supervisors are verifying that follow-up actions to hold export violators accountable are completed when closing end-use checks in IMS-R.
- Conduct an assessment to determine the appropriate number of high-risk shipments to be selected for end-use checks, ensuring the selection is sufficient to effectively mitigate potential compliance risk.

The BIS agreed with four of the six recommendations and disagreed with the third and sixth recommendations above. DoC OIG considered recommendation 3 implemented and asked BIS to reconsider its position on recommendation 6. DoC OIG will close the remaining recommendations once all agreed-upon actions have been completed.

APPENDIX E

Ongoing Oversight Projects

Tables 17 and 18 list the titles and objectives for the Special IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OAR and Ukraine.

Table 17.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs, as of June 30, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF WAR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the Management of Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway Equipment (Project no. D2025-D000RL-0125.000)

To assess whether the Marine Corps effectively managed the maintenance of the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway inventory and conducted proper oversight of logistical support provided through a bilateral agreement with the Government of Norway.

Audit of the DoW's Purchase of Medical Materiel for Medical Treatment Facilities in the U.S. European Command (Project no. D2025-D000RH-0131.000)

To determine whether the DoW is effectively managing the ordering process of medical materiel for medical treatment facilities in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility.

Audit of the DoW's Capacity and Capability to Maintain Military Equipment in Powidz, Poland (Project no. D2026-D000RH-0005.000)

To determine the extent of the DoW's capacity and capability to adequately maintain military equipment at the Long-Term Equipment Storage and Maintenance Complex in Powidz, Poland.

Follow-up Evaluation of Open Ukraine-related DoW OIG Recommendations for the U.S. Army Europe and Africa and Subordinate Commands (Project no. D2025-DEV0PE-0158.000)

To assess the extent to which the U.S. Army Europe-Africa and its subordinate commands have taken action to implement 17 open Ukraine-related recommendations from 4 evaluations before and after recent operational and command and control changes.

Evaluation of DoW Management of Benefits for Contractor Personnel Supporting U.S. Forces in Germany (Project no. D2026-DEV0PA-0081.000)

To assess the extent to which the DoW managed the administration of DoW benefits granted under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for the contractor personnel supporting U.S. Forces in Germany.

Evaluation of the Interoperability of DoW Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) (Project no. D2026-DEV0SR-0085.000)

To determine the gaps in DoW C-UAS interoperability, and the corrective actions needed to standardize C-UAS interoperability.

Evaluation of DoW Management of Benefits for Contractor Personnel Supporting U.S. Forces in Germany (Project No. D2026-DEV0PA-0081.000)

To assess the extent to which the DoW managed the administration of DoW benefits granted under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for the contractor personnel supporting U.S. Forces in Germany.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspection of Embassy Bratislava, Slovakia (Project no. 26ISP002.00)

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Bratislava, Slovakia.

Evaluation of Department of State Administration of Foreign Assistance Programs Transferred from the U.S. Agency for International Development (Project no. 25AUD049)

To identify State resources for administering foreign assistance awards on behalf of USAID.

Inspection of Embassy The Hague and Constituent Post, Netherlands, and the U.S. Mission to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (Project no. 26ISP043.00)

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in The Hague and Constituent Post, Netherlands, and the U.S. Mission to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons.

Classified Inspection of Embassy The Hague and Constituent Post, Netherlands, and the U.S. Mission to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (Project no. 26ISP043.01)

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in The Hague and Constituent Post, Netherlands, and the U.S. Mission to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons.

Audit of the Department of State's Efforts to Combat Infectious Diseases in Selected Countries Through the Global Fund (Project no. 26AUD047)

To determine whether U.S. contributions to the Global Fund are achieving intended results relating to combating HIV, TB, and malaria in selected countries.

Evaluation of the Department of State's Data Reliability of Foreign Assistance Awards (Project no. 26ISP051)

To determine the extent to which integrated USAID and State financial and award data are reliable and sufficient for State bureaus to make informed decisions, and to identify potential opportunities for State to expand its oversight of assistance awards.

Evaluation of the Department of State's Regional Bureaus' Administration of Foreign Assistance Programs (Project no. 26ISP007)

To 1) determine the extent to which State's regional bureaus are administering foreign assistance and 2) assess State's regional bureaus' administration of foreign assistance.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of Selected Asset Disposition for Terminated USAID Awards in Ukraine (Project no. 8U1U0425)

To determine the status of USAID-funded physical assets procured under selected awards.

Audit of Chemonics International's Termination Settlement Proposals for Terminated USAID Awards (Project no. 3U100126)

To determine the allowability, allocability, and reasonableness of costs claimed in a sample of Chemonics' termination settlement proposals in accordance with Federal regulations.

Table 18.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by Partner Agencies, as of June 30, 2026

ARMY AUDIT AGENCY

Audit of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program V Contract, U.S. Army Europe and Africa (Project no. A-2025-FIZ-088)

To determine if the Army accurately paid for services performed under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program V contract in Europe.

Audit of Funds Management at Army Ammunition Facilities (Project no. A-2025-ALZ-049)

To determine whether Army ammunition facilities executed supplemental funding within established goals and timeframes.

Audit of Flying Hour Program in Europe (Project no. A-2025-FIZ-069)

To determine if Army units in Europe executed planned rotary-wing flying hour requirements and properly used flying hour program funds.

Storing Ammunition in Europe (Project no. A-2026-0036-FIZ)

To determine if Army units in Europe stored ammunition in accordance with policy.

APPENDIX F

Planned Oversight Projects

Table 19 lists the titles and objectives for the Special IG and partner agencies' planned oversight projects related to OAR and Ukraine.

Table 19.

Planned Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs, as of June 30, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF WAR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Evaluation of the Capabilities of U.S. Army Garrison Black Sea in Romania to Meet U.S. European Command Requirements

To determine the extent to which the planned and completed improvement projects at the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, Romania, have increased the capabilities and operational capacity of the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base to meet the requirements of the U.S. European Command's operational plans.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Evaluation of the Department of State's New Responsibilities for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) Program

To assess the transition of USAID's PEPFAR implementation responsibilities to State, and specifically State's structural capacity to implement, monitor, and evaluate programs in support of PEPFAR goals.

Evaluation of the Department of State's Administration of Its Continuing Foreign Assistance Programs

To describe State's administration of foreign assistance programs and associated awards approved to continue following the reviews required by Executive orders.

Audit of the Department of State's Administration of Selected Foreign Assistance Funded Contracts

To determine whether State is administering selected foreign assistance-funded contracts in accordance with Federal and State requirements and whether those contracts are achieving desired results.

Audit of the Department of State's Implementation of Foreign Assistance to Ukraine

To determine whether the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv has developed and implemented the structural capacity to administer foreign assistance awards in accordance with Federal and State requirements.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Evaluation of USAID's Capacity to Manage Risks Associated with Award Terminations

To describe changes to USAID's organizational capacity to process award terminations since January 2025 and determine the extent to which USAID has staffing, policies, and procedures in place to mitigate risks associated with award terminations.

Review of the Management and Oversight of the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loan to the Government of Ukraine

Assess the management and oversight of the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loan to the Government of Ukraine and the extent to which the funds are being used for eligible expenditures.

Audit of the Securing Power, Advancing Resilience and Connectivity (SPARC) Activity in Ukraine

To assess the SPARC contractor's compliance with procurement regulations, determine whether costs incurred for SPARC procurements were eligible and supported, and determine the extent to which the Department of State ensured that energy equipment and materials were successfully delivered to and used by recipients as intended.

APPENDIX G

Hotline and Investigations

HOTLINE

The DoW, State, and USAID OIGs each maintain their own hotline to receive complaints specific to their agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report suspected violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority. Each OIG Hotline office evaluates complaints received through the hotlines and forwards them to the respective investigative entity for review and investigation.

During the quarter, DoW OIG Hotline investigators referred 2 cases related to OAR for further criminal or administrative investigation. State OIG received 4 allegations and referred 3, and USAID OIG received 8 allegations of potential misconduct. In some instances, a case may contain multiple subjects and allegations.

INVESTIGATIONS

Law enforcement personnel from the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs investigate allegations of misconduct that might compromise U.S. Government programs and operations. Additionally, investigators identify, coordinate, and de-conflict fraud and corruption investigations; share best practices and investigative techniques; and coordinate proactive measures to detect and deter the criminals who would exploit U.S. Government assistance to Ukraine.

The Special IG and its oversight partners coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support regarding the response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The investigative partner agencies include the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS, the DoW OIG's criminal investigative component), State OIG, USAID OIG, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Homeland Security Investigations.

The Special IG agencies have positioned criminal investigators in Germany, Poland, and Ukraine to investigate allegations of fraud, corruption and potential diversion of weapons or technology. DCIS agents in Kyiv continue working jointly with U.S. Embassy partners and Ukrainian authorities to assess allegations of fraud and any reported discrepancies related to accounting for weapons and military equipment requiring enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM). Memorandums of Understanding with the Ministry of Defense for Ukraine, National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), State Bureau of Investigation, and the National Police, have continued to facilitate information sharing and collaboration. USAID OIG criminal investigators work regularly with NABU, SAPO, the National Police, and the Prosecutor General's office, in addition to other Ukrainian law enforcement.

As of June 30, Special IG and investigative partner agencies reported 49 open investigations, 10 investigations closed, and 1 case referred to the Department of Justice. Investigative efforts in this reporting period resulted in 10 administrative suspensions from contracts and one civil settlement for \$103,500.

ACRONYMS

Abbreviation	Full Title
BIS	Bureau of Industry and Security (Department of Commerce)
C-UAS	counter-unmanned aircraft system
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DFC	U.S. International Development Finance Corporation
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoC	Department of Commerce
DoE	Department of Energy
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoW	Department of War
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
ECB	European Capacity Building
EDI	European Deterrence Initiative
EEUM	enhanced end-use monitoring
EU	European Union
EUM	end-use monitoring
EXBS	Office of Export Controls and Border Security (State)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FY	fiscal year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
HAWK	Homing All the Way Killer
HIMARS	High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State)
JMTG-U	Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine
JUMPSTART	Joint Ukraine Multinational Program–Services, Training, and Articles Rapid Timeline
Lead IG	Lead Inspector General
NABU	National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine

Abbreviation	Full Title
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSATU	NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine
OAR	Operation Atlantic Resolve
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OUSW(A&S)	Office of the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment
OUSW(C)	Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
OUSW(P)	Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy
PDA	Presidential Drawdown Authority
PEACE	World Bank Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PURL	Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List
SAG-U	Security Assistance Group–Ukraine
SAPO	Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SPARC	Securing Power, Advancing Resilience and Connectivity
Special IG	Special Inspector General
SSEC	State Service of Export Control
Treasury	Department of the Treasury
UAF	Ukrainian Armed Forces
UDEP	Ukraine Defense Enterprise Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAFE-AFAFRICA	U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces in Africa
USAI	Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAREUR-AF	U.S. Army Europe–Africa
USEUCOM	The U.S. European Command
USTRANSCOM	The U.S. Transportation Command

Map of U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility



Map of Ukraine



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INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINE

The United States is committed to supporting the Ukrainian people during Russia's war of aggression. We are dedicated to providing oversight of the funds and resources American taxpayers have provided in support of Ukraine.

We encourage you to confidentially report any of the following suspected activities related to the programs or operations of the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of State (including the U.S. Agency for Global Media), and the U.S. Agency for International Development to the appropriate Hotline listed below.

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