LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



OPERATION ENDURING SENTINEL

AND OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO AFGHANISTAN

JULY 1, 2026–SEPTEMBER 30, 2026

ABOUT THIS LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sections 401-424), established in section 419 the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of War (DoW), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Section 419 requires the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to appoint a Lead IG from among the Inspectors General of the Lead IG agencies upon the commencement or designation of a military operation that exceeds 60 days as an overseas contingency operation or receipt of notification thereof.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out the Lead IG statutory responsibilities to:

- Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis a report on the contingency operation and to make that report available to the public.
- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

To fulfill the congressional quarterly report mandate, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from their respective agencies and other Federal entities about activities related to the operation. The Lead IG has generally prioritized three core areas for reporting: funding, personnel, and equipment.

The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the information collected from Federal agencies.

The DoW IG, as the Lead IG for this operation, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoW OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG drafted the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review process of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask the relevant Federal offices to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation if requested. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the DoW OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG as independent oversight agencies.

Pursuant to Executive Order 14347, "Restoring the United States Department of War," September 5, 2025, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) and Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) use the secondary titles of the Department of War Inspector General (DoW IG) and Office of Inspector General (DoW OIG), respectively. The use of these secondary titles does not in any way affect the primary statutory title or authorities of the DoD IG under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Chapter 4, Inspectors General), or the authorities or responsibilities of the DoD IG or DoD OIG pursuant to any laws, regulations, or policies.

CLASSIFIED APPENDIX TO THIS REPORT

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on this operation. The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

On the cover: The Blue Mosque in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan on July 6, 2026. (UNHCR photo)

We are pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report to Congress on Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES). This report discharges our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to Section 419 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

In October 2021, the Department of War (DoW) initiated OES as the U.S. mission to conduct over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations against threats emanating from Afghanistan. The U.S. Government also engages in security cooperation activities with Central and South Asian regional partners to build their border security and counterterrorism capacity.

This report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OES and discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies—the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs—and our partner oversight agencies. This report covers the reporting period of July 1 through September 30, 2026.

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U.S. AGENCY for INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

IN THIS REPORT

The DoW remained capable of monitoring ISIS-K, al-Qaeda, and other violent extremist organizations using intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

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- State reported that ISIS-K remains one of the foremost terrorist threats to U.S. interests. ISIS-K maintains its aspirations to attack Western targets, secures funding for its operations through illicit donor networks, and conducts high-profile assassinations targeting officials in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- The DoW has no relationship with the Taliban, adhering to U.S. Government policy of non-recognition. However, State continued to engage with the Taliban to negotiate the release and secure the welfare of U.S. detainees held in Afghanistan.
- For FY 2027, the DoW requested approximately $163.1 million in funding from Congress for OES.

State continued to wind down Enduring Welcome, the effort to relocate and resettle eligible Afghan allies and their families to the United States.

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- In September, the United States and Qatar agreed to a 9-month extension of an earlier agreement that permits the United States to operate at Camp as Sayliyah, the processing facility in Qatar where Afghan nationals seeking relocation reside.
- As of the end of the quarter, State reported an unobligated balance of $408 million in no-year funding allocated to accounts supporting Enduring Welcome.

The United States did not provide development or humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan but continued to support education programs for Afghans, including women and girls.

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- U.S. funding supported programming for more than 1,300 students and two scholarship funds for an additional 70 students.
- State reported that it was considering ways to continue education programs for students in Afghanistan while ensuring that funds were not diverted to the Taliban.

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MISSION UPDATE

Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES) is the Department of War (DoW) operation in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility to contain terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan and protect the U.S. homeland. The United States seeks to protect U.S. citizens, secure the release of all Americans detained in Afghanistan, and mitigate terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan.[1]

The Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy did not report any change to the OES lines of effort and desired end states during the quarter.[2]

FUNDING

In 2025, the Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (OUSW[C]) initated a review of how it calculated costs associated with OES. In previous fiscal years, the office had reported much higher obligations for OES—more than $4.2 billion in FY 2025—but those figures included many costs that were unrelated to Afghanistan.[3] For FY 2027, the DoW requested $163.1 million in funding from Congress for OES. (See Table 1.) The OUSW(C) noted that, due to the revision of how it calculates costs associated with OES, the FY 2027 request is $67.8 million less than the FY 2026 enacted funding amount.[4]

Table 1.

FY 2027 DoW Budget Request for OES

Component	Request
Navy	$134,065,000
Marine Corps	574,000
Air Force	20,449,000
U.S. Special Operations Command	5,871,000
Defense-wide	2,166,000
TOTAL	**$163,125,000**

Source: OUSW(C), vetting comment, 10/20/2026.

SECURITY

In 2020, the United States and the Taliban entered into the Doha Agreement. The United States committed to a phased, conditions-based withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan, and the Taliban pledged to prevent al-Qaeda and other extremist groups from using Afghan territory as a base to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.[5]

State reported that the Taliban has not met its obligations regarding counterterrorism and has continued to provide safe haven in Afghanistan to terrorist groups that threaten the security of the United States and its allies. State reported that it has repeatedly and publicly urged the Taliban to uphold its counterterrorism commitments. State said that the Taliban remains unable to prevent terrorist groups from planning and conducting attacks in Afghanistan.[6]

The Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy reported that the DoW continued to have no relationship with the Taliban, in line with the U.S. Government policy of not recognizing the Taliban as the Government of Afghanistan.[7]

Table 2.

Estimated Number of VEO Members in Afghanistan

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	4,000–6,000
ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K)	2,000
Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)	200–300
Al-Qaeda	Fewer than a dozen core members

Source: DIA, vetting comment, 10/13/2026.

THE VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION (VEO) THREAT

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria–Khorasan (ISIS-K), al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) maintain a limited presence of fewer than 3,000 members in Afghanistan.[8] The largest armed group operating in Afghanistan is Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization also known as the Pakistani Taliban. The TTP opposes the Pakistani government and operates along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.[9] (See Table 2.)

ISIS-K: ISIS-K remains one of the foremost terrorist threats to U.S. interests, although other threats persist, State said. ISIS-K aspires to attack the West, including the United States. ISIS-K continues to elicit funding for its activities from radicalized individuals and other ISIS branches, as well as through illicit activities such as extortion, human trafficking, smuggling, and illicit trade.[10]

The DIA, citing open-source reporting, reported that ISIS-K continued to conduct high profile assassinations against leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[11] The DIA reported that although the Taliban conducted counterterrorism operations against ISIS-K during the quarter, it did not prevent multiple ISIS-K attacks in Afghanistan. The DIA said that the Taliban's failure to eliminate the ISIS-K presence in Afghanistan and stop ISIS-K attacks "almost certainly" left a persistent threat to U.S. regional interests and countries in the region.[12]

Al-Qaeda: Al-Qaeda and its regional affiliate, AQIS, remain active and pose a threat to U.S. interests, State said. Recent intelligence from U.S. and Western officials, as well as United Nations monitoring teams, indicated that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have established at least 8 training camps in Afghanistan during the last 3 years. Al-Qaeda uses these camps to train militants in weapons, explosives, and guerrilla tactics as well as modern technologies such as encryption, artificial intelligence, and drones. Rather than leading operations, Al-Qaeda now acts as a consultant to other groups, offering guidance and training in covert operations and information security.[13]

Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP): The TTP continued to conduct attacks in Pakistan.[14] The DIA reported that the Taliban continues to provide safe harbor to the TTP and that the TTP continues to maintain ties to al-Qaeda.[15]

U.S. SECURITY ACTIVITY

Over-the-horizon operations: State reported that the United States maintains some capability to conduct over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.[16] The DIA reported that the DoW continued to rely on overhead intelligence collection to gather data on extremist organizations operating in Afghanistan. The intelligence gathered enables rapid surveillance and analysis for military use.[17]

Assistance to neighboring countries: In its May 2026 Counterterrorism Strategy, the White House noted that the United States had rebuilt relationships with partners in South and Central Asia to reduce the threat to the United States, part of a U.S. approach to "burden-share and burden-shift" counterterrorism efforts to partners.[18]

State security assistance programming in Central Asian countries focused on strengthening government abilities to detect and interdict weapons of mass destruction and component materials, improve security along the borders with Afghanistan, and counter the illicit drug trade that could fund groups in Afghanistan that intend to harm the United States and its interests.[19] (See Table 3.)

In addition, State provides ongoing border security programming in Pakistan that focuses on securing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to monitor surrounding areas, interdict terrorist travel, and limit the mobility of foreign terrorist organizations.[20] State also provides equipment and training to Pakistan's civilian law enforcement to combat the spread of terrorist organizations.[21]

Table 3.

State Afghanistan-related Programs in Central Asia

Objective	Programming Description
Detect and interdict weapons of mass destruction and their component materials	Strengthened governments' ability to detect chemical, biological, and explosives threats; counter unmanned aerial systems; and develop national forensic libraries to trace the origin of interdicted and radioactive materials. Provided training and equipment to countries neighboring Afghanistan to strengthen intragovernmental cooperation and capabilities to prevent diversion of dual-use chemicals and other similar materials to Afghanistan.
Improve security on the borders with Afghanistan	Supported construction of new Tajikistan border guard headquarters on the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border for up to 900 Tajikistan border guards responsible for responding to terrorist incursions, smuggling, and other illicit activities. Provided training, equipment, and mentorship for law enforcement counterparts in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This program ended in September.
Counter the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan	Provided training to improve information sharing, border security, drug identification, and transnational criminal network disruption to Central Asian countries to identify, dismantle, and prosecute Afghan-sourced drug networks. Provided funding and activities in support of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime satellite imaging and analysis, survey, and annual report of Afghanistan's illicit opium cultivation and heroin production. The report seeks to inform policymakers about illicit narcotics cultivation and production trends.

Source: State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 9/11/2026.

Afghan National Deported in First Use of Alien Terrorist Removal Court

In September, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the August deportation of an Afghan woman who admitted to being an "alien terrorist" in the first-ever case before the U.S. Alien Terrorist Removal Court, which was established in 1996.[22]

Nazira Haji Zada, 47, who had been residing in Fort Worth, Texas, supported a plot to commit an ISIS-inspired mass shooting on U.S. Election Day in 2024. Her son and son-in-law were previously arrested and convicted for involvement in the same plot, the DHS said.[23]

U.S. DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

Protecting U.S. citizens—including mitigating terrorist threats and securing the release of all unjustly detained Americans—remains State's top priority in Afghanistan. State said that it will engage with the Taliban only when it is in U.S. interests to do so, and that it currently engages with the Taliban solely on U.S. detainee issues. The United States coordinates with Qatar to provide consular emergency services to U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, including welfare and whereabouts visits to U.S. citizens detained in Afghanistan and delivery of emergency passports.[24] The number of U.S. citizens detained in Afghanistan is not publicly releasable.

Afghanistan Affairs Unit (AAU): Based in Doha, the AAU engages with international counterparts, including the United Nations and a broad group of Afghan actors outside of Afghanistan, and maintains contact with non-Taliban Afghans inside of Afghanistan. The AAU also provides timely reporting to State leadership to advance U.S. policy priorities.[25]

At the end of the quarter, the AAU had 13 staff members, of whom 12 were on ordered departure for much of the quarter due to Operation Epic Fury.[26] Two of the AAU staff members returned prior to when the ordered departure for Qatar ended on August 27 and transitioned to restricted operations on August 28. By the end of the quarter, all AAU staff had returned to post, State reported.[27]

U.S. Consulate General in Peshawar: On July 17, State announced that the closure of the U.S. Consulate General in Peshawar had been completed.[28] As the closest diplomatic post to the Afghanistan border, the consulate served as a primary operations and logistics hub during the Afghanistan conflict.[29] Responsibility for the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, including all diplomatic engagements and services, transferred to a dedicated Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Unit at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, located about 110 miles away from Peshawar.[30]

U.S. Sanctions: The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) reported that the overall sanctions regime against the Taliban did not change during the quarter.[31] State reported that the Taliban as an entity, and multiple Taliban members, remain designated under U.S. counterterrorism sanctions. In addition, multiple Taliban members remain designated under UN sanctions.[32] In July, Treasury sanctioned 134 cryptocurrency wallets associated with ISIS-K.[33]

Fund for the People of Afghanistan: Assets for the fund totaled $4.185 billion as of June 30.[34] The United States established the fund in 2022 in coordination with the Swiss government and Afghan economic experts to safeguard what was then $3.5 billion in Afghan central bank reserves. The fund's purpose is to use these assets for the benefit of the Afghan people while preventing the Taliban from accessing them.[35] However, absent its own administrative expenses, the fund has made no disbursements to date, State reported.[36]

Voice of America: During the quarter, the Voice of America Afghan Branch broadcast in Dari and Pashto across radio, TV, and digital platforms. Although programming hours were reduced, the branch maintained uninterrupted operations, focusing on U.S. foreign policy, regional news, and the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, with special attention to the rights of women, girls, and minorities. During the quarter, the branch published 1,706 web articles, 876 video packages, and 12,915 posts on social media platforms, reaching 113.5 million individual social media accounts across all Voice of America social media platforms, with 163.3 million views, and 6.5 million engagements in both languages.[37]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Afghan Service (Radio Azadi) continued to produce original journalism in Dari and Pashto for Afghan audiences. The outlets faced significant operational challenges, including staff reductions, funding cuts, and limited work hours. The U.S. Agency for Global Media noted that the audio stream is available only online, though efforts are underway to restore cross-border radio broadcasts. Audience research inside Afghanistan has become difficult due to Taliban raids on research providers, and updated audience estimates are unavailable. Despite these challenges, during the first 11 months of FY 2026, the Afghan Service averaged 606,000 website page views and several million video views across major social media platforms each month.[38]

The United States has not provided development or humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan since April 2025 due to a White House directive to U.S. Government agencies to suspend any assistance that could potentially reach the Taliban.

U.S. ASSISTANCE

Humanitarian agencies reported that Afghans continued to face food insecurity, high levels of malnutrition, internal displacement, and limited access to health care, according to State. These humanitarian crises have been further exacerbated by Afghanistan-Pakistan hostilities and instability linked to the conflict in Iran, constraining humanitarian operations and increasing pressure on vulnerable populations.[39] In July, the World Food Programme reported that Afghanistan's nutrition situation was deteriorating more rapidly than previously anticipated.[40]

The United States has not provided development or humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan since April 2025 due to a White House directive to U.S. Government agencies to suspend any assistance that could potentially reach the Taliban.[41]

During the quarter, State continued to fund two educational programs for Afghans.[42] (See Table 4.) State reported it was considering ways to continue education programs for students in Afghanistan while ensuring that funds were not diverted to the Taliban.[43]

The United States also provided funding to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan indirectly through the UN general budget, to which the United States contributes

Table 4.

U.S. Assistance Programs Related to Afghanistan, as of September 22, 2026

Program Name Award Value Period of Performance	Purpose	Program Outcomes
Women's Scholarship Endowment $50 million 9/2018 to 9/2028	To increase women's leadership in Afghanistan by providing undergraduate or graduate education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) or other relevant professional fields of study. Managed by a U.S. university, the program supports Afghan women enrolled in eight universities in seven countries in the region.	Since its inception, the program has supported 367 students, of whom 48 have graduated. State reported, as of the end of the most recent semester, 121 students were fully enrolled and participating in academic coursework, 23 students were in transit to continue their academic programs at other colleges, and 4 students' plans were on hold.
Supporting Student Success in Afghanistan $23 million 1/2023 to 12/2026	To promote higher education opportunities for Afghan students at an American-style university. Since 2025, the students have studied exclusively online.	Supporting 977 students during the Fall 2026 semester, three-fourths of whom are women. Received between 10,000-20,000 applications for undergraduate admission annually, and another 700-1,000 each year for the MBA program.

Source: State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 9/11/2026; State SCA/A, vetting comment, 10/13/2026; AUAF, interview with USAID OIG, 10/1/2026.

22 percent.[44] The United Nations estimated that the assistance mission's costs totaled $105.8 million in FY 2026.[45]

Separately, State reported that it funded two scholarship awards exclusively for Afghan students evacuated from Afghanistan, enabling 70 Afghan students to complete their undergraduate and graduate degree programs outside Afghanistan at in-person classrooms, rather than through online education.[46]

U.S. SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN ALLIES

State continued to wind down Enduring Welcome.[47] State reported that the contract with the DoW to support Camp as-Sayliyah (CAS) was scheduled to be in place until January 29, 2027, but had an option for a 6-month extension. State exercised this option, extending the contract to July 29, 2027. State updated all vendor contracts to require demobilization schedules; decommissioning plans for all buildings, structures and utilities; and personal property reconciliation plans, including disposal and/or reutilization plans. In addition, the United States and Qatar reached a separate agreement authorizing the United States to continue CAS operations.[48]

As of the end of the quarter, State reported an unobligated balance of $408 million in no-year funding in accounts supporting Enduring Welcome, including activities related to winding down Enduring Welcome. State said that it did not anticipate needing additional funding.[49]

Table 5.

Afghan Population Remaining at Camp as-Sayliyah, as of September 30, 2026

	FY 2026			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
U.S. Citizens	0	0	0	0
U.S. Citizen Family Members	4	4	3	3
Legal Permanent Residents (LPR)	0	0	0	0
LPR Family Members	1	1	1	1
SIV Applicants Awaiting Adjudication	217	1	0	0
SIV Applicants Already Adjudicated	N/A	214	205	197
Family of Unaccompanied Children	144	124	108	108
Other Family Unification	232	228	209	207
Other Refugee Applicants	569	548	525	516
TOTAL	**1,167**	**1,120**	**1,051**	**1,032**

Source: State SCA/A, vetting comment, 10/8/2026.

During the quarter, 1,032 Afghans remained at CAS.[50] (See Table 5.) State said that it remained focused on identifying third-country resettlement options for Afghans remaining at CAS.[51] According to State, 27 Afghan nationals residing at CAS voluntarily returned to Afghanistan during the quarter.[52]

State reported that it no longer maintains contact with individuals who previously sought U.S. Government assistance to leave Afghanistan, and that no Afghans were relocated from Afghanistan with U.S. Government support during the quarter. (See Table 6.). Due to the elimination of the Office of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, State will stop generating data to report on this topic beginning in FY 2027.[53]

Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs): Processing of SIV applications for applicants located at CAS ended in June.[54] State reported that during the quarter, it eliminated the last three Consular Affairs positions at the AAU.[55]

Table 6.

Relocation of Afghans, as of September 30, 2026

0 Afghans relocated from Afghanistan with U.S. Government support during the reporting period
55,180 identified eligible individuals in Afghanistan
40,367 have been in contact with State

Source: State SCA/A, vetting comment, 10/13/2026.

Table 7.

Afghans Who Have Voluntarily Repatriated to Afghanistan, as of September 30, 2026

		Number of Cases	Number of Individuals
FY 2025	Q1	2	6
	Q2	7	12
	Q3	25	65
	Q4	11	41
FY 2026	Q1	18	46
	Q2	14	47
	Q3	16	48
	Q4	4	27
TOTAL		**97**	**292**

Source: State SCA/A, vetting comment, 10/8/2026.

Afghan SIV applicants were initially exempt from a June 2025 Presidential Proclamation restricting the entry of nationals from 12 countries.[56] However, a subsequent December 2025 Presidential Proclamation expanded the restriction to include Afghan SIV applicants, effective January 1, 2026.[57] State reported that five Afghan SIV applications this calendar year were approved as national interest exceptions and two visas were issued.[58] Of the original Afghan SIV allotment, 6,005 were unused as of the end of the quarter.[59]

State reported that it issued 310 Chief of Mission approvals and 2,115 denials for all Afghan SIV applicants worldwide during the quarter as of September 9.[60] Chief of Mission approval is the first step in the Afghan SIV process, which requires four documents: the DS-157 SIV form, a human resources employment letter, a letter of recommendation, and evidence of Afghan nationality.[61] State reported that it expected to issue decisions in all pending Chief of Mission cases by the end of summer 2032. Projected completion dates will continue to fluctuate based on staff sizes and case completion rates.[62] A Chief of Mission approval remains valid unless State issues a notice to the applicant that it has been revoked.[63]

OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

COMPLETED OVERSIGHT REPORTS

During the reporting period of July 1 to September 30, 2026, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies completed one report related to OES.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Review of Asylum Application Adjudication Processing in Response to Ahmed v. DHS

OIG-26-26; September 23, 2026

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) conducted this evaluation after receiving complaints that the Ahmed v. DHS settlement agreement would result in asylum adjudication issues. Based on these complaints, the DHS OIG assessed whether missed aliases or incomplete resolution of potential matches to derogatory records increased in asylum applications from Afghans arriving in the United States under Operation Allies Welcome following the Ahmed v. DHS settlement agreement.

ONGOING OVERSIGHT PROJECTS

During the reporting period, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had eight ongoing projects related to OES. (See Table 8.)

Table 8.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OES by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs, as of September 30, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF WAR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Audit of the U.S. Navy's Ability to Sustain Maritime Security Capabilities for Naval Forces Operating in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility To determine whether the U.S. Navy has established adequate theater sustainment capability to execute emergent ship maintenance and battle-damage repairs for naval forces supporting maritime security operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
Evaluation of the Defense Health Agency's Deployment of the Joint Operational Medicine Information System To determine how effectively the Defense Health Agency is fielding Joint Operational Medicine Information System (JOMIS) as an effective and timely joint medical information system that meets the longstanding needs for interoperability across Military Services and Combatant Commands.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Audit of the Department of State's Vetting Processes to Mitigate Terrorist Financing Risks in the Near East To determine whether State designed and implemented its risk management and vetting processes to mitigate the risk of terrorist organizations benefiting from U.S. foreign assistance funds in the Near East.

Inspection of Embassy Tashkent, Uzbekistan
To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Tashkent, Uzbekistan
To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Audit of the Bureau of Consular Affairs' Coding of Derogatory Information for Interagency Use
To determine whether the Bureau of Consular Affairs is coding derogatory information about potential visa applicants accurately and that applicable data are available to DHS components responsible for immigration screening and vetting, intelligence, counterterrorism, border security, and law enforcement.

USAID OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Evaluation of USAID's Capacity to Manage Risks Associated with Award Terminations
To 1) describe changes to USAID's organizational capacity to process award terminations since January 2025 and 2) determine the extent to which USAID has staffing, policies, and procedures in place to mitigate risks associated with award terminations.

Review of Key Lessons from USAID Third-Party Monitoring Practices
To identify key lessons from the USAID OIG's prior oversight of USAID's third-party monitoring practices, including in nonpermissive environments.

PLANNED OVERSIGHT PROJECTS

During the reporting period, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had four planned reports related to OES. (See Table 9.)

Table 9.

Planned Oversight Project Related to OES by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs, as of September 30, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspection of the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
To evaluate the programs and operations of the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

Classified Inspection of the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
To evaluate the programs and operations of the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

Inspection of Embassy Astana and Constituent Post, Kazakhstan
To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Astana and constituent post, Kazakhstan.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Astana and Constituent Post, Kazakhstan
To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Astana and constituent post, Kazakhstan.

HOTLINE AND INVESTIGATIONS

Hotline: Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority.

During the reporting period, Lead IG hotlines received 12 allegations and 5 referrals related to OES.

Investigations: The Lead IG agencies and their partners coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support. The investigative partner agencies consist of representatives from the DoW OIG's criminal investigative component, State OIG, USAID OIG, Department of Homeland Security OIG, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

As of the end of the quarter, investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 19 open investigations and closed 2 investigations. They made 3 referrals to the Department of Justice, and there were five indictments during the period.

ACRONYMS

Acronym	
AAU	Afghanistan Affairs Unit
AQIS	Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
CAS	Camp as-Sayliyah
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoW	Department of War
FY	fiscal year
ISIS-K	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan
Lead IG	Lead Inspector General
Lead IG agencies	DoW, State, and USAID OIGs

Acronym	
OES	Operation Enduring Sentinel
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OUSW(C)	Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
SIV	Special Immigrant Visa
State	Department of State
TTP	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
VEO	violent extremist organization

Map of Afghanistan



ENDNOTES

1. State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 7/17/2025; ODASW/IWCT, vetting comment, 2/10/2026.
2. OUSW(P), response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.1 OES 001, 6/10/2026.
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