LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



OPERATION SOUTHERN SPEAR

JULY 1, 2026–SEPTEMBER 30, 2026

ABOUT THIS LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sections 401-424), established in section 419 the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of War (DoW), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Section 419 requires the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to appoint a Lead IG from among the Inspectors General of the Lead IG agencies upon the commencement or designation of a military operation that exceeds 60 days as an overseas contingency operation or receipt of notification thereof.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out the Lead IG statutory responsibilities to:

- Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis a report on the contingency operation and to make that report available to the public.
- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

To fulfill the congressional quarterly report mandate, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from their respective agencies and other Federal entities about activities related to the operation. The Lead IG has generally prioritized three core areas for reporting: funding, personnel, and equipment.

The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the information collected from Federal agencies.

The DoW IG, as the Lead IG for this operation, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoW OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG drafted the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review process of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask the relevant Federal offices to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation if requested. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the DoW OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG as independent oversight agencies.

Pursuant to Executive Order 14347, "Restoring the United States Department of War," September 5, 2025, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) and Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) use the secondary titles of the Department of War Inspector General (DoW IG) and Office of Inspector General (DoW OIG), respectively. The use of these secondary titles does not in any way affect the primary statutory title or authorities of the DoD IG under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Chapter 4, Inspectors General), or the authorities or responsibilities of the DoD IG or DoD OIG pursuant to any laws, regulations, or policies.

CLASSIFIED APPENDIX TO THIS REPORT

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on this operation. The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

On the cover: A U.S. Marine Corps UH-1Y Venom flies over a targeted vessel destroyed during a maritime interdiction operation in the Pacific Ocean on September 5, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

We are pleased to present this third Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report to Congress on Operation Southern Spear (OSS). This report discharges our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to Section 419 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

The Department of War (DoW) initiated OSS as the U.S. mission to disrupt the flow of narcotics from Designated Terrorist Organizations in the Western Hemisphere.

This report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OSS and presents OSS-related planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the DoW OIG, State OIG, USAID OIG, and our partner oversight agencies. This report covers the period July 1 through September 30, 2026.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
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IN THIS REPORT

The U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) suspended maritime strikes on suspected drug-smuggling vessels during the quarter to prioritize Venezuela earthquake assistance and to evaluate strike procedures. *p. 5–6*

- Following the evaluation, USSOUTHCOM implemented revised targeting guidance to enhance positive identification of DTO vessels prior to engagement.
- The U.S. military resumed strikes in late August, with lethal strikes against 4 boats identified as DTO vessels this quarter, resulting in an estimated 13 individuals killed or presumed dead.
- The U.S. military interdicted an additional 9 vessels, seized the cargo, disembarked the crew, and then sank the vessels.

In FY 2026, USSOUTHCOM obligated approximately $835.7 million in support of OSS. *p. 7*

- USSOUTHCOM reported $14.8 million in obligations related to OSS this quarter, a significant decrease from the $173.9 million reported last quarter and the $527.0 million in the second quarter of FY 2026.
- USSOUTHCOM attributed the sudden drop in expenditures to the departure of a significant number of personnel and ships from the joint operations area.

Six U.S. Navy warships and 14 U.S. Coast Guard vessels were deployed in the OSS joint operations area during the quarter. *pp. 8–9*

- Compared to last quarter, this was a slightly smaller U.S. Navy presence, with the departure of one destroyer.
- The reallocation of some USSOUTHCOM assets to support the U.S. Central Command's Operation Epic Fury had a limited impact of the effectiveness of OSS.

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MISSION UPDATE

INTRODUCTION

On November 13, 2025, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced Operation Southern Spear (OSS) as the Department of War (DoW) operation to disrupt the flow of narcotics in the Western Hemisphere from drug cartels that President Donald J. Trump has named as designated terrorist organizations (DTOs). OSS aims to defend the homeland, protect regional partners, and ensure stability and security across the Western Hemisphere, according to the DoW.[1] The OSS mission statement is classified.[2]

For several decades, the U.S. Government has implemented counternarcotics assistance programs and conducted counternarcotics operations—including non-lethal drug interdictions at sea—targeting narcotics flows from Central and South America. In August 2025, the U.S. military began to deploy significant numbers of additional military personnel, naval vessels, and air assets to the Caribbean Sea. On September 2, 2025, President Trump announced that the United States had executed its first strike on a vessel that the DoW said was operated by a Venezuelan cartel.[3]

U.S. Marines load onto a UH-1Y Venom helicopter during a rehearsal in the Caribbean Sea on July 18, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)



USSOUTHCOM said that it suspended maritime strikes in late June to prioritize Venezuela earthquake assistance and to evaluate strike procedures.

U.S. law allows the President to take military action without congressional approval in the event of "a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces."[4] In a September 4, 2025, notification to Congress of the military action taken against drug cartels in the Caribbean Sea, President Trump labeled the targeted cartels "terrorist organizations" and cited their "paramilitary capabilities" to threaten the United States.[5]

On August 4, USSOUTHCOM established the Joint Task Force-Western Hemisphere to centralize command and control for counter-DTO operations. Headquartered at USSOUTHCOM, the task force provides a dedicated capability to defend the Homeland —a core pillar of the National Defense Strategy—by synchronizing target identification, strike, interdiction, public affairs, non-kinetic effects, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).[6]

The Joint Task Force-Western Hemisphere (JTF-WHEM) replaced the Joint Task Force-Southern Spear, which had served as the lead military command for OSS since the inception of the operation.[7] The JTF-WHEM operates alongside but separately from Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South), a U.S.-led interagency and international organization that brings together military, intelligence, and law enforcement assets from across the U.S. Government and 19 partner nations to detect, monitor, and target illicit drug trafficking in the air and at sea.[8] JIATF-South is led by a U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) rear admiral, as the USCG is the lead agency for the interdiction and arrest of drug traffickers underfederal law.[9]

STRIKES AND INTERDICTIONS

Only groups designated as a DTO are subject to strikes or other military action under OSS, according to USSOUTHCOM.[9] The full list of DTOs and their activities is not publicly releasable.[10] DTOs are distinct from other commonly used designations—including Foreign Terrorist Organization, Drug Trafficking Organization, and Transnational Criminal Organization—all of which may also be subject to DoW action, though not necessarily under OSS.[11]


This quarter, the DoW OIG was in the process of conducting two evaluations related to strikes under OSS: one to assess the effectiveness of the process by which USSOUTHCOM and its subordinate elements process, exploit, and disseminate ISR; and another to determine whether DoW components complied with the established six-step process for targeting enemy combatants in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility.[12]

Air strikes against suspected DTO vessels: USSOUTHCOM said that it suspended maritime strikes in late June to prioritize Venezuela earthquake assistance and to evaluate strike procedures. Strikes resumed in August, after the conclusion of disaster relief efforts and the DoW's process review to improve targeting and efficiency.[13]

USSOUTHCOM said that it conducted lethal strikes against four boats that USSOUTHCOM identified as DTO vessels this quarter, resulting in 13 individuals killed or presumed dead. All but one of this quarter's strikes took place in the Caribbean Sea.[14] This was a significant decrease from the 19 strikes that killed 44 individuals during the previous quarter.[15] (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1.

Strikes Against Suspected DTO Vessels Under OSS, as of September 30, 2026



Source: DoW OIG analysis of public statements by the Secretary of War and USSOUTHCOM.

During the quarter, U.S. forces conducted eight maritime interdictions of suspected DTO vessels under the auspices of OSS.

The USCG said that it did not conduct search-and-rescue operations following any of this quarter's OSS strikes.[16] The USCG said that most of the OSS joint operations in the Caribbean Sea occur inside foreign nations' search-and-rescue regions. Search planning and the deployment of rescue assets fall under the authority of the respective country's Maritime Rescue Coordination Center.[17]

The USCG said that when it receives a request for assistance from a foreign nation, it evaluates the request for reasonableness and for potential impacts on U.S. search-and-rescue and law enforcement-response posture. In general, USCG cutters conducting interdiction operations under the JIATF-South are not positioned to provide timely responses to search-and-rescue responses in the OSS joint operations area and are typically unsuitable for this type of mission, according to the USCG.[18]

Maritime interdictions of suspected DTO vessels: During the quarter, U.S. forces conducted eight maritime interdictions of suspected DTO vessels under the auspices of OSS. USSOUTHCOM said that all the interdictions occurred in the Eastern Pacific and that intelligence linked the vessels to the Los Choneros organization. U.S. forces cleared the boats, disembarked the crew, and sank the vessels. Individuals removed were transferred to Ecuadorian authorities.[19]


USSOUTHCOM reported that it obligated $14.8 million for OSS during the quarter, bringing total obligations for FY 2026 to approximately $835.7 million.

FUNDING

USSOUTHCOM reported that it obligated $14.8 million for OSS during the quarter, bringing total obligations for FY 2026 to approximately $835.7 million.[20] (See Figure 2 and Table 1.) USSOUTHCOM attributed the sudden drop in expenditures, compared to the previous quarter, to the departure of a significant number of personnel and ships from the joint operations area.[21] In addition, USSOUTHCOM did not use any resources through the U.S. Transportation Command, which had accounted for a large proportion of costs in previous quarters.[22]

Figure 2.

OSS Obligations FY 2026, by Quarter, in $ Millions



Note: The Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer reported that the DoW had obligated $785.7 million for OSS since the start of FY 2026 through September 15. This total may differ slightly from USSOUTHCOM's total due to the timing of the reporting.

Source: USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.2 OSS 025, 4/10/2026; 26.3 OSS 016, 6/10/2026; and 26.4 OSS 011, 9/9/2026; OUSW(C), response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 020, 9/15/2026.

Table 1.

USSOUTHCOM OSS Obligations, July 1–September 9, 2026, in $ Millions

Services	Personnel	Operations	Transportation	TOTAL
Army	$1.07	$6.14	$0	$7.21
Marines	$1.15	$6.39	$0.05	$7.59
TOTAL	**$2.22**	**$12.53**	**$0.05**	**$14.80**

Source: USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 011, 9/9/2026.

FACILITIES

USSOUTHCOM said that it coordinates with other Combatant Commands and partner nations to resource the OSS mission, including current and future basing and infrastructure needs. There were no significant changes from last quarter in the U.S. military installations used to support OSS.[23]

USSOUTHCOM said that while it continues to use established facilities and infrastructure across the region, the Command remains focused on optimizing the use of existing facilities, improving logistical support, and maintaining operational flexibility. This includes regular assessments of installation capacity, readiness, and sustainment capabilities—including collaborative planning with partner nations—to ensure that U.S. forces can respond rapidly to emerging requirements.[24]

The overall U.S. maritime presence in the OSS joint operations area this quarter was similar to last quarter, with one less Navy destroyer.

ASSETS DEPLOYED

The overall U.S. maritime presence in the OSS joint operations area this quarter was similar to last quarter, with one less Navy destroyer.[25] (See Table 2.) The Coast Guard, which does not directly participate in lethal interdictions under OSS, reported that it maintained approximately two cutters per day at sea in the OSS joint operating area, across the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean. By comparison, the Coast Guard had an average of five cutters operating in the joint operations area each day in August and September 2025.[26]

Table 2.

U.S. Assets Deployed in the OSS Joint Operations Area this Quarter

USS Iwo Jima, amphibious assault ship
USS Lake Erie, guided missile destroyer with embarked MH-60 helicopter capability
USS Gridley, guided missile destroyer with embarked MH-60 helicopter capability
USS San Antonio, amphibious transport dock
USS Fort Lauderdale, amphibious transport dock
USS Billings, littoral combat ship
7x USCG Medium Class Endurance Cutters
3x USCG National Security Cutters
4x USCG Fast Response Cutters
3x support vessels
P-8 squadron, maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft
22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, Marines trained to conduct amphibious assaults and raids as well as extraction of forces from hostile locations

Source: USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 005, 9/9/2026.

According to USSOUTHCOM, OSS aerial platforms operate within the Command's area of operations, including the Eastern Pacific, Caribbean, and partner nations in South America, such as Venezuela and Colombia. USSOUTHCOM said that these platforms execute missions related to humanitarian support, maritime domain awareness, and counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations.[27]

OSS depends in part on host nations facilitating movement of DoW personnel, ships, and aircraft in the region.[28] State reported that diplomatic posts, via Defense Attaches, coordinated with host nations on facilitating movement of DoW personnel, ships, and aircraft in the region, as well as basing of DoW assets in support of OSS.[29] Operation Epic Fury, the mission to dismantle the Iranian regime's security apparatus, required the reallocation of certain military assets from USSOUTHCOM to support the U.S. Central Command priorities this quarter.[30]

The reallocations of USSOUTHCOM assets to support the U.S. Central Command included Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit availability, surface combatant ships, air refueling, strategic lift, and medical support. USSOUTHCOM said that it adapted to these challenges by refining operational methods, maintaining close coordination with interagency and partner nation forces, and leveraging ongoing force review processes to rebalance and mitigate risks. USSOUTHCOM reported that overall, Operation Epic Fury had a limited impact on the effectiveness of OSS this quarter.[31]

U.S. Marines transfer a detainee aboard a rigid-hull inflatable boat during a maritime interdiction operation in the Pacific Ocean on September 5, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)



OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

COMPLETED OVERSIGHT REPORTS

During the period July 1 to September 30, 2026, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies completed one report related to OSS.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the Implementation of the Viper Program for Cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations at Selected U.S. Mission Mexico Posts

AUD-STP-26-20, September 14, 2026

State OIG conducted this audit to determine whether selected U.S. Mission Mexico posts implemented the Viper program in accordance with requirements and in response to the designation of cartels and transnational criminal organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This report is not publicly available.

ONGOING OVERSIGHT PROJECTS

As of the end of the quarter, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had five ongoing projects related to OSS. (See Table 3.)

Table 3.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OSS by Lead IG and Partner Agencies, as of September 30, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF WAR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Audit of the Department of the Air Force's Sustainment of Airfield Runways, Taxiways, and Parking Aprons Used to Support the U.S. Southern Command To assess the effectiveness of the Department of the Air Force's sustainment of airfield runways, taxiways, and aprons used to support U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) operations in the Western Hemisphere.
Evaluation of the U.S. Southern Command Joint Targeting Cycle To determine whether DoW Components followed the established framework of the six-phase Joint Targeting Cycle when conducting targeting operations in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility.
Evaluation of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination in the U.S. Southern Command To assess the effectiveness of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination process for USSOUTHCOM and its Service and subordinate commands and contractors to support USSOUTHCOM ISR requirements.
Audit of Base Operations Support to U.S. Special Operations Forces To determine the adequacy of base operations support for U.S. special operations forces operating in support of geographic combatant commands.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the Department of State's Efforts to Counter the Flow of Fentanyl into the United States
To determine whether 1) State designed and implemented a coordinated program to counter the flow of fentanyl, fentanyl precursor chemicals, and other opioids from the People's Republic of China, India, and Mexico into the United States and 2) State's counter-fentanyl efforts are achieving intended results.

PLANNED OVERSIGHT PROJECTS

As of the end of the quarter, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had two planned projects related to OSS. (See Table 4.)

Table 4.

Planned Oversight Projects Related to OSS by Lead IG and Partner Agencies, as of September 30, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF WAR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the DoW's Use of Intelligence from Hunt Forward Operations
To determine whether U.S. Cyber Command and its operational components are effectively using intelligence gathered from Hunt Forward missions to improve the cybersecurity of DoW networks.

Audit of the DoW's Logistical Staging Capabilities in Support of Operation Southern Spear/Joint Task Force-Western Hemisphere
The objective of this proposed project is to be determined.

HOTLINE AND INVESTIGATIONS

Hotline: Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority.

During the reporting period, the Lead IG hotlines received no allegations related to OSS.

Investigations: The Lead IG agencies and their partners coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support. The investigative partner agencies consist of representatives from the DoW OIG's criminal investigative component, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, State OIG, USAID OIG, Department of Homeland Security OIG, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.


As of the end of the quarter, investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had two open investigations and closed two investigations. They made no referrals to the Department of Justice during the reporting period.

ACRONYMS

Acronym	
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoW	Department of War
DTO	designated terrorist organization
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JIATF-South	Joint Interagency Task Force-South
JTF-WHEM	Joint Task Force-Western Hemisphere
Lead IG	Lead Inspector General

Acronym	
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OSS	Operation Southern Spear
OSW(PA)	Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of War for Public Affairs
State	Department of State
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command

Map of Central America and the Caribbean Sea



ENDNOTES

1. OSW(PA), briefing card, "Operation Southern Spear," 3/6/2026.
2. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.2 OSS 001, 4/2/2026.
3. President Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social post, 9/2/2025, 5:22 PM ET.
4. 50 U.S.C. 1541(c)(3).
5. White House, "Letter Informing Congress of Action Taken Consistent with the War Powers Resolution Public Law 93-148," 9/2/2025.
6. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 024, 9/14/2026.
7. USSOUTHCOM, vetting comment, 10/13/2026.
8. USSOUTHCOM, website, "Joint Interagency Task Force South," 7/1/2025.
9. Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, "Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success," Institute for National Strategic Success, National Defense University, 6/2011.
10. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OSS 004, 6/10/2026.
11. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.2 OSS SUPP 001, 4/20/2026.
12. DoW OIG, project announcement, "Evaluation of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination in the U.S. Southern Command," Project No. D2026-DEV0SI-0104.000, 6/29/2026; DoW OIG, project announcement, "Evaluation of U.S. Southern Command Joint Targeting Cycle," Project No. D2026-DEV0PD-0091.000, 5/11/2026.
13. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS SUPP 001, 9/28/2026.
14. USSOUTHCOM, press release, "Lethal Kinetic Strike, September 19, 2026," 9/19/2026; USSOUTHCOM, press release "Lethal Kinetic Strike, September 9, 2026," 9/9/2026; USSOUTHCOM, press release, "Lethal Kinetic Strike, August 25, 2026," 8/25/2026; USSOUTHCOM, press release, "Lethal Kinetic Strike, August 23, 2026," 8/24/2026.
15. DoW OIG analysis of public statements by USSOUTHCOM.
16. DHS/USCG, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 014, 9/4/2026.
17. DHS/USCG, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 022, 9/4/2026.
18. DHS/USCG, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 022, 9/4/2026.
19. USSOUTHCOM, press release, "Interdiction of Narco-terrorist Refueling Vessel, August 28, 2026," 8/28/2026; USSOUTHCOM, press release, "Interdiction of Narco-terrorist Refueling Vessel, September 2, 2026," 9/2/2026; USSOUTHCOM, press release, "Interdiction of Narco-terrorist Refueling Vessel, September 3, 2026," 9/3/2026; USSOUTHCOM, press release, "Interdiction of Narco-terrorist Refueling Vessel, September 5, 2026," 9/5/2026; USSOUTHCOM, press release, "Interdiction of Narco-terrorist Refueling Vessel, September 7, 2026," 9/7/2026; USSOUTHCOM, press release, "Interdiction of Narco-terrorist Refueling Vessel, September 8, 2026," 9/8/2026; USSOUTHCOM, press release, "Interdiction of Narco-terrorist Refueling Vessel, September 9, 2026," 9/9/2026; USSOUTHCOM, press release, "Interdiction of Narco-terrorist Refueling Vessel, September 15, 2026," 9/15/2026; USSOUTHCOM, press release, "Interdiction of Narco-terrorist Refueling Vessel, September 16, 2026," 9/16/2026.
20. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.2 OSS 025, 4/10/2026; 26.3 OSS 016, 6/10/2026; and 26.4 OSS 011, 9/9/2026.
21. USSOUTHCOM, vetting comment, 7/13/2026; USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 011, 9/9/2026.
22. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OSS 016, 6/10/2026; USSOUTHCOM, vetting comment, 10/13/2026.
23. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 008, 9/9/2026.
24. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 008, 9/9/2026.
25. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OSS 008, 6/10/2026; DHS/USCG, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 012, 9/4/2026.
26. DHS/USCG, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 012, 9/4/2026.
27. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 007, 9/9/2026.
28. State, response to State OIG request for information, 9/17/2026.
29. State, response to State OIG request for information, 9/17/2026.
30. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 017, 9/9/2026.
31. USSOUTHCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.4 OSS 017, 9/9/2026.

TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE RELATED TO OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND PROGRAMS, CONTACT:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOTLINE

www.dodig.mil/hotline

1-800-424-9098

DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOTLINE

www.stateoig.gov/hotline

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT HOTLINE

oig.usaid.gov/report-fraud

1-202-985-1764