Why We Did This Audit
Using eight strategically located warehouses around the world, USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) helped the Agency rapidly respond to global humanitarian crises when they occurred. USAID’s humanitarian assistance warehouse in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), provided humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations in the region, including Afghanistan, Gaza, and Syria, by enabling the quick delivery of prepositioned food commodities and nonfood items. The Dubai warehouse was the Agency’s largest warehouse with nonfood items.
Between October 2022 and July 2024, BHA used humanitarian supplies from the Dubai warehouse to respond to 17 crises. For example, between March and July 2024, BHA shipped 494 metric tons of high-energy biscuits and 719 hygiene kits valued at $1.5 million to Gaza as part of its response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the region. As of September 2024, BHA’s inventory in the Dubai warehouse included food and nonfood items valued at approximately $10.3 million.
Given the importance of the Dubai warehouse in supporting USAID’s humanitarian crisis responses, we conducted this audit to determine the extent to which USAID (1) followed Federal standards for managing its humanitarian assistance inventory and (2) conducted oversight of the warehouse and third-party inspections contracts for the BHA warehouse in Dubai.
What We Found
USAID did not use quality inventory information to make decisions on humanitarian assistance supplies at the Dubai warehouse. Instead, it relied on various inventory management tools, some of which required extensive manual entries and verification and where we identified a $4 million discrepancy in total inventory value. In addition, the Agency did not use inventory information to make forecasting decisions about commodity levels at the Dubai warehouse, including what items to store and dispose of. Instead, BHA followed an unwritten process to make decisions based on past procurement levels and response needs. As a result, USAID did not have the information needed to make informed decisions about humanitarian assistance commodities stored at the warehouse.
USAID did not enforce certain oversight requirements outlined in management and monitoring contracts for the Dubai warehouse. USAID also did not enforce certain oversight requirements for its third-party inspections contract related to monitoring warehouse and commodity conditions. As a result, the Agency could not ensure that commodities stored in the Dubai warehouse remained unspoiled and in operable condition.
What We Recommend
We are making two recommendations to USAID or other responsible U.S. government officials to improve the management and oversight of the Dubai warehouse and avoid unnecessary spoilage and waste. We also suggest that decision makers assess warehouse inventory information, enhance procurement planning, and improve the management of certain nonfood items in the future.